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The Battle for Libya

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The Battle for Libya THE BATTLE FOR LIBYA KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES AND TORTURE Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters, members and activists in more than 150 countries and territories who campaign to end grave abuses of human rights. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations. First published in 2011 by Amnesty International Ltd Peter Benenson House 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW United Kingdom © Amnesty International 2011 Index: MDE 19/025/2011 English Original language: English Printed by Amnesty International, International Secretariat, United Kingdom All rights reserved. This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for advocacy, campaigning and teaching purposes, but not for resale. The copyright holders request that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for reuse in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from the publishers, and a fee may be payable. To request permission, or for any other inquiries, please contact [email protected] Cover photo : Misratah, Libya, May 2011 © Amnesty International amnesty.org CONTENTS Abbreviations and glossary .............................................................................................5 Introduction .................................................................................................................7 1. From the “El-Fateh Revolution” to the “17 February Revolution”.................................13 2. International law and the situation in Libya ...............................................................23 3. Unlawful killings: From protests to armed conflict ......................................................34 4. Enforced disappearances, detentions and torture........................................................57 5. Abuses by opposition forces .....................................................................................70 6. Foreign nationals: Abused and abandoned .................................................................79 7. Conclusion and recommendations.............................................................................91 Endnotes ...................................................................................................................96 4 The battle for Libya Killings, disappearances and torture Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, No. 3787 Rev. 4 June 2004 © UN Cartographic Section Amnesty International September 2011 Index: MDE 19/025/2011 The battle for Libya 5 Killings, disappearances and torture ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY Al-Gaddafi forces Military and security forces loyal to Colonel Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation Libya’s equivalent to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs General People’s Committee for Justice Libya’s equivalent to a Ministry of Justice General People’s Committee for Public Security Libya’s equivalent to a Ministry of the Interior EU European Union Kata’ib Popular name for Colonel al-Gaddafi’s armed brigades Kateeba Popular name for the Kateeba al-Fodhil Bou ‘Omar military barracks in Benghazi ICC International Criminal Court ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights IOM International Organization for Migration ISA Internal Security Agency, an intelligence agency associated with some of the worst human rights violations under Colonel al-Gaddafi’s rule NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NTC National Transitional Council, the Benghazi-based leadership of the opposition Revolutionary Committees Bodies created by Colonel al-Gaddafi to “protect” the 1969 “El-Fateh Revolution” Revolutionary Guards Security militia under Colonel al-Gaddafi’s rule RPG Rocket-propelled grenade Thuwwar Popular name for opposition fighters, literally meaning “revolutionaries” Index: MDE 19/025/2011 Amnesty International September 2011 6 The battle for Libya Killings, disappearances and torture Amnesty International September 2011 Index: MDE 19/025/2011 The battle for Libya 7 Killings, disappearances and torture INTRODUCTION Inspired and emboldened by anti-government protests sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa region, Libyans called for 17 February 2011 – the fifth anniversary of a brutal crackdown on a public protest in Benghazi – to be their “Day of Rage” against Colonel Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi’s four-decade long repressive rule. Until opposition forces finally stormed the capital, Tripoli, in late August, Colonel al-Gaddafi had controlled Libya for over four decades. Desperate to maintain their grip on power in the wake of the uprisings in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt which led to the toppling of long-standing presidents, the Libyan authorities arrested a dozen activists and writers in the lead-up to the “Day of Rage.” However, the arrest of prominent activists in Benghazi and al-Bayda had the opposite of the intended effect – it triggered a public outcry of anger and prompted demonstrations in eastern Libya ahead of the scheduled date. Security forces greeted the peaceful protests in the eastern cities of Benghazi, Libya’s second city, and al-Bayda with excessive and at times lethal force, leading to the deaths of scores of protesters and bystanders. When some protesters responded with violence, security officials and soldiers flown in from other parts of the country failed to take any measures to minimize the harm they caused, including to bystanders. They fired live ammunition into crowds without warning, contravening not only international standards on the use of force and firearms, but also Libya’s own legislation on the policing of public gatherings. The crackdown in eastern Libya did not discourage people in other regions from joining the uprising. Protests flared up across the country from Nalut and Zintan in the Nafusa (western) Mountain region, and al-Zawiya and Zuwara in the west; to Tripoli; to Kufra in the south-east. Such protests were met with tear gas, batons and live ammunition. In the face of government brutality, the protesters’ determination to topple Colonel al-Gaddafi grew. Anti-government protests quickly escalated into armed clashes with Colonel al-Gaddafi’s security forces (al- Gaddafi forces). In some areas, opponents of Colonel al-Gaddafi’s rule quickly overpowered the security forces and seized abandoned weapons. They burned many public buildings associated with state repression, including premises of the Revolutionary Committees, a body entrusted with “protecting” the principles of the “El-Fateh Revolution” that brought Colonel al-Gaddafi to power in 1969; and the Internal Security Agency (ISA), an intelligence body implicated in gross human rights violations in past decades. By late February, most of eastern Libya, parts of the Nafusa Mountain and Misratah (Libya’s third city, located between Benghazi and Tripoli) had fallen to the opposition. The unrest rapidly evolved into an armed conflict, and the civilian population increasingly suffered as the battle for Libya raged on. In the unrest and ongoing armed conflict, al-Gaddafi forces committed serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes, and gross human rights violations, which point to the commission of crimes against humanity. They deliberately killed and injured scores of unarmed protesters; subjected perceived opponents and critics to enforced Index: MDE 19/025/2011 Amnesty International September 2011 8 The battle for Libya Killings, disappearances and torture disappearance and torture and other ill- treatment; and arbitrarily detained scores of civilians. They launched indiscriminate attacks and attacks targeting civilians in their efforts to regain control of Misratah and territory in the east. They launched artillery, mortar and rocket attacks against residential areas. They used inherently indiscriminate weapons such as anti- personnel mines and cluster bombs, including in residential areas. They killed and injured civilians not involved in the fighting. They extra-judicially executed people who had been captured and restrained. They concealed tanks and heavy military equipment in residential buildings, in a deliberate attempt to shield them from Tripoli Street, Misratah © Amnesty International possible air strikes by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.1 The siege by al-Gaddafi forces of opposition-held territory, notably Misratah but also areas such as Zintan in the Nafusa Mountain, aggravated humanitarian crises there as residents were living without or with only limited access to water, electricity, fuel, medicine and essential foodstuffs. As al-Gaddafi forces shelled opposition-held areas, civilians had nowhere safe to hide. Those who could flee from Ajdabiya, 160km west of Benghazi, and the Nafusa Mountain did so. Others, such as residents of Misratah, particularly from late March to early May, were trapped as the city was besieged from all sides but the sea and relentlessly shelled. Even Misratah’s port came under fire by al-Gaddafi forces in a clear attempt to cut the city’s only remaining escape route and lifeline for humanitarian supplies. Al-Gaddafi forces also engaged in an extensive campaign of enforced disappearances
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