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2 4~TI. T4~K REGI~E~Tfs44 - T4~K 4~[) 4~TI.T4~K I~ the WESTER~ [)ESERT 1941.1942 (()4RT 4)

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2 4~TI. T4~K REGI~E~Tfs44 - T4~K 4~[) 4~TI.T4~K I~ the WESTER~ [)ESERT 1941.1942 (()4RT 4) Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 4, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za 2 4~TI. T4~K REGI~E~TfS44 - T4~K 4~[) 4~TI.T4~K I~ THE WESTER~ [)ESERT 1941.1942 (()4RT 4) Mov:ng into the Gazala Line South African units were making a reappear- ance at the front. Since its mauling in the By the end of January Rommel's counter-at- early stages of 'Crusader' 1 SA Division had tack had put him in possession of Benghazi, been resting and retraining in the area of while XIII Corps attempted to make the best Mersa Matruh. On 25 January 1 SA Brigade of a fighting retreat eastwards across the Je- and supporting units had moved to provide bel. The Axis forces' petrol difficulties had cover should it be necessary for 8 Army to convinced Rommel that he would have to halt retreat to the frontier, and when the decision the main body of his advancing troops in the was taken to establish the major defence line Benghazi area, although Afrika Korps might be at Gazala this brigade was moved up to be. pushed forward to the vicinity of Gazala. gin the task. On 31 January, 1 SA Division Meanwhile Ritchie, commanding 8 Army, at entered XIII Corps area, with 1 SA Brigade, last believed his subordinates' protestations the Polish Carpathian Brigade and Free French that they were at present unable to success- Brigade under command. The South African fully oppose any enemy armoured force and Divisional front constituted the northernmost agreed to a withdrawal to a line running from 9t miles, and on 10 February 4 Indian Divi- Gazala to Bir Hacheim. sion took over the southern end of the line. By 1 February the 2 Armoured Brigade with 2 SA Brigade now began to arrive and the 2 Anti-Tank Regiment SAA was at Wadi el Free French Brigade moved under Indian Hamman, and on the next day 6 A/Tk Bat- command, while 2 SA Brigade immediately tery moved to Mechili in support of the Po- moved to cover the coastal strip to the north lish Carpathian Brigade, while the other guns of the escarpment between Gazala and Acro- of the Regiment moved to Mangar el Teserim mao There were three important landing in support of 150 Infantry Brigade. By the grounds here. and there was always the 4th all the Regiment's 2-pdrs were concen- chance that paratroops or a small landing trated at Bir Hacheim in support of 150 Bri- force could push into this position. gade, at the southern end of the Gazala Line, On 16 February 7 and 8 A/Tk Batteries and during the next few days there was the moved north to come under 2 SA Brigade chance of undertaking the reorganisation ne- command, the former moving one mile south cessitated by the Regiment's losses. All the of Acroma Fort with 1 Natal Mounted Rifles, 18-pdrs were formed into a temporary 6 Bat- and 8 Battery digging in in support of the tery under Major Chaplin, while the remain- Cape Town Highlanders in the coastal area. der of 6 Battery's guns and personnel were Two days later 5 Battery moved into the divided among the rest of the Regiment to coastal area in support of 1/2 Field Force make up complete 2-pdr batteries. The latter Battalion in the area of the Ruined Village. were placed in support of 150 Brigade's in- fantry battalions, 5 Battery with 5 Green The remainder of the month passed fairly Howards, 7 Battery with 4 East Yorks and 8 uneventfully for 2 A/Tk Regiment. apart from Battery with 4 Green Howards, while the 18- brief defensive exercises and occasional figh- pdrs were sited for defence in depth in the ter-bomber raids. middle of the Bir Hacheim box. On 13 Feb- ruary Major Chaplin took the 18-pdrs to a Another change in deployment was made point five miles west of Knightsbridge, where between 15 and 18 March, when the Polish they were placed under the command of 200 Brigade was moved southwards and 6 SA Brigade moved up under 1 SA Division's Guards Brigade. command, taking over Acroma and the coast- At the northern end of the Gazala Line other al sector, while 2 SA Brigade replaced the 33 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 4, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za w ~ THEATRE OF WAR MAY - JULY 1942 "l 674 q D M E I r e /t /t .<4 E A # s E A N ; ,"; ,." \I' ,~.: -: ~_BifHaheim .~',::'':\0' xX + y R~"E + ., c N A c A •Jr ":'-'1 .. ~~.>Ajedabia ... '~::. ";':':~:':;;' .....• .......•..... .• _.•••• _-:: Mersa Bregs ... ,,<! '~ t ...... \~J.heila'.' ,,;11;' .." ~'.•.' , ..." "...... ," ...•.. ". ", Jarabub + y p Jato. 71?lt~~'ll;¥~Zt~i*~i,~#:~~~". Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 4, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za Polish Brigade. Most of 2 A/Tk Regiment airfields while other forces from 1 SA Division remained in its old positions although the 18- 'Jnd the Free French Brigade forced the enemy pdr composite Battery was broken up and out of his strong points. The South African the guns redistributed: 5 Battery with 12 2- contribution would be handled by a force pdrs and 3 18-pdrs occupied Ruined Village from 2 SA Brigade under Brigadier W. H. E. with 2 Transvaal Scottish; 7 Battery with Poole, and comprising three columns, 'Jock- 12 2-pdrs and 2 18-pdrs was at Gazala and col', 'Quinncol' and 'Harecol'. 8 A/Tk Battery, 2 South African Police; and 6 Battery with which had been attached to 2 SA Brigade 8 2-pdrs and 14 18-pdrs was back near for some weeks now, would provide its 'M' Acroma with 1 South African Police. The re- and '0' Troops as anti-tank protection for maining 8 2-pdrs and 4 18-pdrs were under 'Harecol', under Lt Col L. M. Harris of the 8 A/Tk Battery at Carmusset-er-Regem, still Natal Mounted Rifles. 'Harecol's' task was to in support of 2 SA Brigade in the latter's new occupy and hold Bir Temrad until the offen- area. sive columns had done their work. and retirea Operation 'Fullsize' to the Allied lines, and this they did, without coming into action. As a whole .the operation, By the end of the first week in March Rom- called 'Fullsize', was a success and, at the mel appeared to be stabilising his main de- cost of about 80 casualties, 3 enemy officers fence line between Derna and Mechili, and and 118 men were captured and several guns there were no signs as yet of any Axis inten- destroyed. Enemy aircraft were temporarily tion to launch an offensive. Later that month drawn off from the convoy, although the latter the British intended to run a convoy from was unfortunately spotted by U-boats and Alexandria to Malta and Ritchie proposed to transport aircraft and came under heavy at- draw off enemy aircraft by attacking Martuba tack before reaching Malta. Less than a quar- landing-ground and the Tmimi area. These ter of the convoy's cargo reached its destina- areas were screened by a series of enemy tion, and it was obvious that only after the positions and it was intended that colurrns permanent recapture of Cyrenaica's airfields from the 'British 50 Division should attack the would it be possible to resupply the island. ~ ,:~:\(.. "'''.!IA l\ .~(. ... ,/ t- ~~ .'" )w"~:.!!.~",~'---:""".i ..••S'!!~m~.~... 'PO'ol:18~ ~~.n, ...t . ~:. "--"'~~~" \ .• .~------ '- I'o",Z09 (i':"'(.,t~",n ..._~~\ -~onwult"~ ~....-..,., \ "~;:i.._..):\ .•.'21t. •.•..•.• ,. E1"". T._ ~:'" ,ll:";) .' .. i..._•..,..J..~\ '"11:-. ;;/ ", . __ - .. ...r..,..••~:..' y ''''. l' _--~-:_II~-'IlIJ~- •._.•.-... / : 3,.., ~~/ •.• Al.. 'A ", ~ ,~ ,.,'" •.., •.... .. " I" , •••• Till. l c ••.•~ ••.'t'........ tru".~ /-....• ' ''''''aSjf".'-- " """,-'r.\, ~ • ~''','''_ .... ,,. , , " ",.,0.,. ""¥~;;.~7_::.,-"':~-~.!--__~,... Iopo'~ ( ,'G.-w: ",f} / --'-~.. I' '''nS"," ~ ••••••••••••••• ~~-- !"!!_'!.:.,,' , .' •••• '.!!'" '" fi"t~ ••.••~ 'h ..', •...,'i,,=1.j I, ~"""'''--''''-!J-- ---- __\, !\'i}. >"'r-); ...•...•__ '~~X ,/--.,', " -~"-' f //0"._ •• .. \--'~~':::>-"--"-~~:~~;,~v(------,'----_ \ C.nnu~en 1Ibe: ..•..-.t..---- . /~ ---, '\1 ~:.... -', I ",,'- /----- '\l /; ! ""'« \, THE GAZALA POSITIONS // !oJ ,'.!. ,..•.., , ~~, \ ~~~-===-=-=- _ - i I "OA" •• MIL" ,/ \ r'i".' "-".,..] ....\ -,'---:. , , . '. .:~ ; Y J "', : .. •••_~,,.,.,. • '-~ NOTf.- J/iJ..., 01- ••••_•••••• ~"-.......' :J \ , --r.lln.l~twl~"'" Po'", 17'- - • __ " __ ••• .. _"" •.•• ,/,>,.••~.~jo,!, •••• __ , __ ', .Ret... ••••••.••. ...•t~.I-E- ""- ..•. -.•..-•... I'. M, R, U/!JQ. 35 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 4, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za After 'Fullsize' Allied paLrols were sent out the Netherlands East Indies, followed by a daily to harass the enemy's front line and Japanese invasion of Burma. In the provi- gain intelligence while denying Rommel de- sion of reinforcements and equipment the tailed knowledge of the British defences. 8 urgent claims of the Far Eastern front were A/Tk Battery was called upon to send out to receive prior satisfaction. Churchill and sections of 2-pdrs to protect 2 SA Brigade's his colleagues still maintained strong pressure patrols. on Auchinleck for an offensive to take place in May, if for no other purpose than to On 6 April 2 A/Tk Regiment received 107 relieve Malta of the terrible weight of Axis reinforcements from 7 SA Reconnaissance air attacks and to allow an island fortress Battalion, and these were drafted into the to be re-supplied. Unless Malta could be four batteries to bring them up to equal held and could continue to function as a strength, and two days later the. Regiment base for attacks on the Axis shipping lanes, received 3 18-pdrs and 8 2-pdrs, as replace- Rommel's force could be supplied and ex- ments for equipment lost in January.
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