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THE DESERT WAR: the NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN Belligerents

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THE DESERT WAR: the NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN Belligerents THE DESERT WAR: THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN DATE: JUNE 10 1940 – MAY 13 1943 Belligerents Allies Axis British Empire Italy United Kingdom Libya India Germany Australia New Zealand Vichy France South Africa Southern Rhodesia Algeria Canada Tunisia United States Morocco Free France OVERVIEW OF THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN The North African Campaign of the Second World War took place in North Africa from June 10 1940 to May 13 1943. It included campaigns fought in the Libyan and Egyptian deserts (Western Desert Campaign, also known as the Desert War) and in Morocco and Algeria (Operation Torch), as well as Tunisia (Tunisia Campaign). The campaign was fought between the Allies, many of whom had colonial interests in Africa dating from the late 19th century, and the Axis Powers. The Allied war effort was dominated by the British Commonwealth and exiles from German-occupied Europe. The United States officially entered the war in December 1941 and began direct military assistance in North Africa on May 11 1942. Fighting in North Africa started with the Italian declaration of war on June 10 1940. On June 14, the British Army's 11th Hussars, assisted by elements of the 1st Royal Tank Regiment, crossed the border from Egypt into Libya and captured the Italian Fort Capuzzo. This was followed by an Italian counter-offensive into Egypt and the capture of Sidi Barrani in September 1940 and again in December 1940 following a British Commonwealth counteroffensive, Operation Compass. During Operation Compass, the Italian 10th Army was destroyed and the German Afrika Korps - commanded by Erwin Rommel, who later became known as "The Desert Fox" - was dispatched to North Africa in February 1941 during Operation Sonnenblume to reinforce Italian forces in order to prevent a complete Axis defeat. A fluctuating series of battles for control of Libya and regions of Egypt followed, reaching a climax in the Second Battle of El Alamein in October 1942 when British Commonwealth forces under the command of Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery inflicted a decisive defeat on Rommel's Afrika Korps and forced its remnants into Tunisia. After the Anglo-American landings (Operation Torch) in North- West Africa in November 1942, and subsequent battles against Vichy France forces (who then changed sides), the Allies encircled several hundred thousand German and Italian personnel in northern Tunisia and finally forced their surrender in May 1943. Operation Torch in November 1942 was a compromise operation that met the British objective of securing victory in North Africa while allowing American forces the opportunity to engage in the fight against Nazi Germany on a limited scale. In addition, as Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, had long been pleading for a second front to be opened to engage the Wehrmacht and relieve pressure on the Red Army, it provided some degree of relief for the Red Army on the Eastern Front by diverting Axis forces to the North African theatre. Over half the German transport planes that were needed to supply the encircled German and Romanian forces at Stalingrad were tied up supplying Axis forces in North Africa. Information gleaned via British Ultra code-breaking intelligence proved critical to Allied success in North Africa. Victory for the Allies in this campaign immediately led to the Italian Campaign, which culminated in the downfall of the fascist government in Italy and the elimination of Germany's main European ally. PART ONE: OPERATION COMPASS DECEMBER 09 1940 – FEBRUARY 09 1941 Following Italy's June 10, 1940, declaration of war on Great Britain and France, Italian forces in Libya began raiding across the border into British-held Egypt. These raids were encouraged by Benito Mussolini who wished the Governor-General of Libya, Marshal Italo Balbo, to launch a full-scale offensive with the goal of capturing the Suez Canal. After Balbo's accidental death on June 28, Mussolini replaced him with General Rodolfo Graziani and gave him similar instructions. At Graziani's disposal were the 5th and 10th Armies which consisted of around 150,000 men. Opposing the Italians were the 31,000 men of Major General Richard O'Connor's Western Desert Force. Though badly outnumbered the British troops were highly mechanized and mobile, as well as having more advanced tanks than the Italians. Only one Italian unit was largely mechanized, the Maletti Group, which possessed trucks and a variety of light armor. On September 13 1940, Graziani gave into Mussolini's demand and attacked into Egypt with seven divisions along with the Maletti Group. After recapturing Fort Capuzzo, the Italians pressed into Egypt, advancing 60 miles in three days. Halting at Sidi Barrani, the Italians dug in to await supplies and reinforcements. These were slow arriving as the Royal Navy had increased its presence in the Mediterranean and was intercepting Italian supply ships. To counter the Italian advance, O'Connor planned Operation Compass which was designed to push the Italians out of Egypt and back into Libya as far as Benghazi. Attacking on December 8 1940, British and Indian Army units struck at Sidi Barrani. Exploiting a gap in the Italian defenses, British forces attacked south of Sidi Barrani and achieved complete surprise. Supported by artillery, aircraft, and armor the assault overran the Italian position within five hours and resulted in the destruction of the Maletti Group and the death of its commander, General Pietro Maletti. Over the next three days, O'Connor's men pushed west destroying 237 Italian artillery pieces, 73 tanks, and capturing 38,300 men. Moving through Halfaya Pass, they crossed the border and captured Fort Capuzzo. Wishing to exploit the situation, O'Connor wanted to keep attacking however he was forced to halt as his superior, General Archibald Wavell, withdrew the 4th Indian Division from the battle for operations in East Africa. This was replaced on December 18 by the raw Australian 6th Division, marking the first time Australian troops saw combat in World War II. Resuming the advance, the British were able to keep the Italians off balance with the speed of their attacks which led to entire units being cut off and forced to surrender. Pushing into Libya, the Australians captured Bardia on January 5 1941, Tobruk on January 22, and Derna on February 3. Due to their inability to stop O'Connor's offensive, Graziani made the decision to completely abandon the region of Cyrenaica and ordered the 10th Army to fall back through Beda Fomm. Learning of this, O'Connor devised a new plan with the goal of destroying the 10th Army. With the Australians pushing the Italians back along the coast, he detached Major General Sir Michael Creagh's 7th Armoured Division with orders to turn inland, cross the desert, and take Beda Fomm before the Italians arrived. Traveling via Mechili, Msus and Antelat, Creagh's tanks found the rough terrain of the desert difficult to cross. Falling behind schedule, Creagh made the decision to send a "flying column" forward to take Beda Fomm. Christened Combe Force, for its commander Lieutenant Colonel John Combe, it was comprised of around 2,000 men. As it was intended to move quickly, Creagh limited its armor support to light and Cruiser tanks. Rushing forward, Combe Force took Beda Fomm on February 4. After establishing defensive positions facing north up the coast, they came under heavy attack the next day. Desperately attacking Combe Force's position, the Italians repeatedly failed to break through. For two days, Combe's 2,000 men held off 20,000 Italians supported by over 100 tanks. On February 7, 20 Italian tanks managed to break into the British lines but were defeated by Combe's field guns. Later that day, with the rest of the 7th Armoured Division arriving and the Australians pressing from the north, the 10th Army began surrendering en masse. OPERATION COMPASS: AFTERMATH The ten weeks of Operation Compass succeeded in pushing the 10th Army out of Egypt and eliminating it as a fighting force. During the campaign the Italians lost around 3,000 killed and 130,000 captured, as well as approximately 400 tanks and 1,292 artillery pieces. Western Desert Force's losses were limited to 494 dead and 1,225 wounded. A crushing defeat for the Italians, the British failed to exploit the success of Operation Compass as Churchill ordered the advance stopped at El Agheila and began pulling out troops to aid in the defense of Greece. Later that month, the German Afrika Korps began deploying to the area, radically changing the course of the war in North Africa. M’44 SCENARIOS FOR DESERT WAR PART ONE: OPERATION COMPASS Operation Compass includes 22 scenarios, including 1 Overlord (OL) map and 1 Breakthrough (BT) map. These scenarios chronicle the major engagements of the campaign, and include only the best available in the Scenarios from the Front (SFTF) files section on the DoW website. No campaign rules are included; not all M’44 players have access to the Campaign books. Instead, simply tally up the number of medals won in each scenario after playing both sides. A medal tally table for all scenarios is included below. Scenarios include armies of various nations. Although optional, it is suggested that you use the unofficial Battle of Nations rules when playing the sides of these armies. BCF command rules and Italian Royal Army rules are in effect for all scenarios. DESERT WAR PART ONE: OPERATION COMPASS 1. JUN 14: Capture of Fort Capuzzo 12. JAN 02: Capture of Bardia 2. SEPT 13: The Italian Advance 13. JAN 02: Bardia 3. DEC 09: Unpleasant Surprise at Nibeiwa ** 14. JAN 03: Wadi Muatered 4. DEC 09: Operation Compass BT 15.
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