348 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 15 JANUARY, 1948 attack convinced General Schmitt command- es Suera, Bir el Cleibat and Marada, and with- ing the garrison, however, of the futility of drew his armoured force to re-equip. further resistance and early on the 2nd January I was as anxious to; secure this area as the garrison surrendered unconditionally. Rommel was to hold it. Apart from the need Our casualties in this successful operation were to traverse it to invade Tripolitania, which was slight and did not exceed 450 all told, of which my ultimate intention, I considered it essential the majority belonged to the 2nd South African to control this region in order to hold Cyrenaica. Division. In addition to prisoners and material Otherwise, I feared, we should have to retire to captured from the enemy, the fall of Bardia the frontier, if the enemy were, at some later released over 1,100 of our own men, who had date, again to become strong enough to launch been kept in .the fortress as prisoners of war, an offensive in force.* in conditions of great privation. Much enemy Before we could approach the task of throw- ammunition fell into our hands. ing the enemy out of El Agheila, however, we Preparations were at once put in hand for were obliged to wait for reserves to be accumu- the reduction of Halfaya, and it was hoped lated and the administrative situation to im- that the fall of Bardia would intensify the lack prove, so that we might concentrate sufficient of food and water from which the place was troops for this difficult undertaking. Until already suffering, if prisoners' stories were to that time came, which I judged would be about be believed. On the nth January ihe Trans- the middle of February, we must content our- vaal Scottish attacked Sollum and completed selves with leaving only light forces to watch its capture early the next day, with nearly 350 the enemy. It seemed highly -unlikely that he prisoners. On the I3th the South Africans would be in a position to attack us before then, finally denied to the enemy access to his last •but the Eighth Army and the I3th Corps source of water supply, and ihis surrender be- issued instructions against this contingency. came inevitable. Plans were made for the final On the 2ist January the improbable occurred, attack, in which the ist Free French Brigade and without warning the Axis forces 'began to Group were to take the main part; but early advance. on the I7th January General de Giorgis, the • commander of the garrison, surrendered un- CONSOLIDATION AT GAZALA. conditionally. Some 5,500 prisoners were taken, of whom 2,000 were Germans. Few Dispositions and Plans of the Opposing Forces. serviceable weapons fell into our hands and Prior to the 2 ist January, the enemy no stores of any value. The prisoners were appeared to have three weak Italian divisions exhausted from lack of nourishment. of the 2ist Corps, Pavia, Sabrata and Brescia, in Agheila itself and to the east of it. The The Enemy retires to El Agheila. Trieste, Ariete and Trento Divisions seemed to In Western Cyrenaica early January was 'a be round Maaten Giofer about twenty miles to period of acute administrative difficulty. The the south, watching the gap between the Wadi expenditure of artillery ammunition, except by el Faregh and the marshes to the west, through troops actually attacked by the enemy, was which runs the track from Agheila to Marada. limited to twenty-five rounds a gun a day, in At Marada itself were thought to be some of order to allow reserves to be accumulated for the German goth Light Division, the Burck- the projected assault on the enemy holding hardt battle group and some Italian troops. Agedabia, which was to be' launched when the The bulk of the goth Light Division was ist Armoured Division arrived. The move of probably in the dangerous sector immediately this division had been delayed owing to the south of Marsa el Brega on the coast, while lack of transport to bring forward petrol, but the two Panzer Divisions were believed to be it evemlnially reached Antelat on the 6th between the minefields which covered the goth January. On the morning of the 7th our Light Division's positions and the north bank patrols reported that Agedabia had been of the Wadi el Faregh. Elements of the goth evacuated. Light Division were also thought to be watch- Columns of the 22nd Guards Brigade ing the coast west of El Agheila towards Ras el followed up, but were delayed by the mine- Aali. fields round Agedabia and by bad going; and About the middle of January the enemy's it was not until the evening of the 8th January strength was estimated at some 17,000 German that they came up against the enemy in strong and 18,000 Italian troops with about seventy positions sixteen miles further south. The medium tanks altogether, of which twenty-five enemy withdrew from these positions two days were 'German. Another twenty German later, and on the nth January the Guards medium tanks might be available at short Brigade were in contact with the forward posi- notice. tions of the enemy's final line running south- wards from Marsa Brega. It was not thought possible for Rommel to The country round El Agheila offers one of receive any new German formations for some the most easily defensible positions in Libya. time, though the arrival of a fresh Italian A broad belt of salt pans, sand dunes and armoured division with some hundred and innumerable small cliffs stretches southwards forty tanks might be expected within a month for fifty miles, its southern flank resting on the or so. Even the arrival of these reinforcements, Libyan Sand Sea, a vast expanse of shifting would probably not enable the enemy to take sand. Apart from the main road from Bengasi the offensive, as his supply problem appeared to> Tripoli only a few tracks cross this in- to be acute. He was expected to stand on the hospitable country, so that the thirty-five Agheila—Marada line until forced to withdraw thousand enemy now left out of the original from it by our pressure, or because of difficulties hundred thousand sufficed to hold it. Accord- of supply. ingly Rommel set his infantry to guard the * G.H.Q., M.E.F. Operation Instruction No. no," approaches at Marsa Brega, Bir el Ginn, Bir igth January 1942—Appendix 6.