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Neame's Armoured Division THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL THE “LOST” BATTLE OF MERSA EL BREGA LIBYAN DESERT 31 MARCH 1941 Being a thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In the University of Hull BY NORMAN KENNETH MURPHY B.A., M.A. NOVEMBER 2011 1 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is true to say that this thesis would not have been written without the help and support of several individuals and institutions. I should therefore here like to thank those who assisted me in this endeavor. My first thanks must go to my supervisor Dr David Lonsdale. Without whose unstinting advice and encouragement this work could not have been written. His helpful, and often much needed guidance, kept me focused on the task in hand, when I could so easily have gone astray. I must also pay tribute to my friends who have listened tirelessly to my endless references to the events chronicled in the work. Prominent among these are my work colleague and friend Leigh Emerson who listen patiently to rereads of extracts from the work on an almost daily basis for three years. Also in this regard I must thank Phil Kershaw for his practical help and for at least pretending to be interested in the detailed workings of British, as opposed to Italian, tanks. My thanks must also go to the staff of several institutions. First among these are the staff of Scarborough Library who always went the extra mile to search out some obscure book for me. Likewise gratitude must go to the staff at the Liddell-Centre, Imperial War Museum, and Public Records Office who were all equally helpful. Lastly I must thank my wife Eileen for her patients, understanding, and the support she has given me, throughout the writing of this work. Indeed she has marched up and down so many sand dunes with me that she deserves a campaign medal. 2 Contents INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 7 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................ 9 METHODICAL INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 10 UNDERPINNING THE METHOD OF RESEARCH .......................................................................... 12 EXAMPLES OF RESEARCH .............................................................................................................. 15 SECONDARY SOURCES ................................................................................................................... 19 ASSEMBLING SOURCES .................................................................................................................. 20 ACCESSING SOURCES: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH ......................................................................... 23 COMMAND AND COMMANDERS IN CONTEXT .......................................................................... 26 REFERENCE TO THE LITERATURE ON COMMAND................................................................... 27 CONTRADICTIONS: TERRAIN AND UNIT AVAILABILITY ....................................................... 32 UNIT DEPLOYMENT AND CAPABILITY ....................................................................................... 37 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 39 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................ 39 MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY ROWAN-ROBINSON ......................................................................... 42 CORRELLI BARNETT ........................................................................................................................ 46 JOHN CONNELL ................................................................................................................................. 48 MORE GENERAL READING ............................................................................................................. 51 ELEMENTS OF COMMAND ....................................................................................... 63 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 63 SUBORDINATE COMMAND ............................................................................................................ 67 ARMY ORGANISATION .................................................................................................................... 68 U.S. 88th INFANTRY DIVISION ......................................................................................................... 70 SO WHAT MAKES A COMPETENT COMMANDER? .................................................................... 72 PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AND TRAITS ........................................................................................ 72 WORKING WITH THE SYSTEM ....................................................................................................... 77 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 80 CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................... 82 BRITAIN’S POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA...................................................... 82 A TENUOUS GRIP .............................................................................................................................. 84 GENERAL WAVELL: SCHOLAR AND SOLDIER? ......................................................................... 89 G.O.C. MIDDLE EAST 1939 ............................................................................................................... 89 A BASE IS BORN ................................................................................................................................ 91 3 FUEL ..................................................................................................................................................... 92 TRANSPORT ....................................................................................................................................... 92 HOBART ARRIVES ............................................................................................................................ 94 WILSON ARRIVES ............................................................................................................................. 95 PLANS FOR ATTACK ........................................................................................................................ 99 FRANCE FALLS ITALY ENTERS THE WAR ................................................................................ 102 WAVELL IS CALLED HOME .......................................................................................................... 105 CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................. 114 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 114 THE FIRST THREE DAYS ............................................................................................................... 118 THE EXCHANGE OF 4 INDIAN & 6 AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONS ................................................ 120 SHIPPING ........................................................................................................................................... 122 4 INDIAN: CHARACTER, TRAINING & ADMINISTRATION ..................................................... 123 SPEED ................................................................................................................................................ 125 LOGISTICS ........................................................................................................................................ 126 WAVELL’S LUCK HOLDS .............................................................................................................. 129 INEVITABLE PROBLEMS ............................................................................................................... 130 WATER .............................................................................................................................................. 132 BARDIA: THE FIRST AUSTRALIAN VICTORY ........................................................................... 133 TOBRUK ............................................................................................................................................ 135 THE GEOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................... 137 THE SPOILS OF WAR ...................................................................................................................... 141 THE LOST OPPORTUNITY: ............................................................................................................ 143 ATTACK TURNS TO DEFENCE ..................................................................................................... 146 THE OPPOSITION & TIMING ......................................................................................................... 149 MILITARY LOGISTICS .................................................................................................................... 150 THE NAVY AND RAF .....................................................................................................................
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