ISSUE #7 Spring 2003 WARGAMING & FILM
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La Ricostruzione Dell'immaginario Violato in Tre Scrittrici Italofone Del Corno D'africa
Igiaba Scego La ricostruzione dell’immaginario violato in tre scrittrici italofone del Corno D’Africa Aspetti teorici, pedagogici e percorsi di lettura Università degli Studi Roma Tre Facoltà di Scienze della Formazione Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Educazione Dottorato di ricerca in Pedagogia (Ciclo XX) Docente Tutor Coordinatore della Sezione di Pedagogia Prof. Francesco Susi Prof. Massimiliano Fiorucci Direttrice della Scuola Dottorale in Pedagogia e Servizio Sociale Prof.ssa Carmela Covato Anno Accademico 2007/2008 Per la stella della bandiera Somala e per la mia famiglia Estoy leyendo una novela de Luise Erdrich. A cierta altura, un bisabuelo encuentra a su bisnieto. El bisabuelo está completamente chocho (sus pensamiemto tiene nel color del agua) y sonríe con la misma beatífica sonrisa de su bisnieto recién nacido. El bisabuelo es feliz porque ha perdido la memoria que tenía. El bisnieto es feliz porque no tiene, todavía, ninguna memoria. He aquí, pienso, la felicidad perfecta. Yo no la quiero Eduardo Galeano Parte Prima Subire l’immaginario. Ricostruire l’immaginario. Il fenomeno e le problematiche Introduzione Molte persone in Italia sono persuase, in assoluta buona fede, della positività dell’operato italiano in Africa. Italiani brava gente dunque. Italiani costruttori di ponti, strade, infrastrutture, palazzi. Italiani civilizzatori. Italiani edificatori di pace, benessere, modernità. Ma questa visione delineata corrisponde alla realtà dei fatti? Gli italiani sono stati davvero brava gente in Africa? Nella dichiarazioni spesso vengono anche azzardati parallelismi paradossali tra la situazione attuale e quella passata delle ex colonie italiane. Si ribadisce con una certa veemenza che Libia, Etiopia, Somalia ed Eritrea tutto sommato stavano meglio quando stavano peggio, cioè dominati e colonizzati dagli italiani. -
VICTORY at SIDI BARRANI 28 Nov-6 Dec Preparations That Were Being Made Around Them
CHAPTER 6 VICTORY AT SIDI BARRAN I HE stage was now set for the opening of the desert battle which Genera l T Wavell and his subordinates had discussed before the Italian invasion of Greece. Thus far the new theatre of war had made relatively smal l demands on Wavell's and Longmore's forces, and the Italian Army's failure to overcome the Greeks lowered an already low estimate of it s efficiency . Although Western Desert Force was still greatly outnumbered by General Bergonzoli's army, it had received useful reinforcements . It will be recalled that in October two tank regiments from England ha d joined the 7th Armoured Division, bringing its two armoured brigade s each to their proper strength of three regiments ; and the 7th Royal Tank Regiment had arrived, equipped with heavy "Matilda" tanks to be use d with infantry to break into strong defensive positions . In September the 4th Indian Division had been completed by adding to it the 16th Britis h Brigade ; in November its own third brigade arrived . In the Matruh Fortress was assembled a force equal to two infantry brigades . The 4th Ne w Zealand Brigade, had, since September, been in reserve either at Dab a or Bagush ; and on the edge of the Delta were the 6th Australian Division , now more or less complete, and the Polish brigade . Thus in three month s the forces west of Alexandria had increased from two weak divisions t o three at full strength or close to it, plus four infantry brigades ; and within a few weeks the New Zealand and the 7th Australian Divisions woul d be complete, in units if not equipment, and the 2nd Armoured Divisio n would have arrived. -
PLAYBOOKPLAYBOOK Table of Contents
PLAYBOOKPLAYBOOK Table of Contents 1.0 Scenarios ...........................................................................2 2.0 ZOC Effects Summary...................................................10 1.1 Compass ..........................................................................2 3.0 OOS Effects Summary ...................................................10 1.2 Sunflower .........................................................................4 Extended Example of Play ..................................................11 1.3 Crusader ...........................................................................6 1.4 Gazala ..............................................................................8 Designer’s Notes ...................................................................19 GMT Games, LLC • P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308 • www.GMTGames.com 2 The Dark Sands ~ Playbook 1.0 Scenarios The scenarios are both self-contained and potential starting points in the campaign. The setup instructions contain directions for setting up all units, counters and tracks. The setup instruc- tions also indicate which Units and Assets should be placed on the Reinforcements Track for the scenario being played. Each scenario setup section has the following sections: On Map: Place listed units on the map locations indicated. Available Assets: Place listed Assets in the appropriate “Available Assets” box. Out of Play Units: Place listed units in the game box. Returning Units: Place listed units in their returning location on the “Reinforce- -
THE DESERT WAR: the NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN Belligerents
THE DESERT WAR: THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN DATE: JUNE 10 1940 – MAY 13 1943 Belligerents Allies Axis British Empire Italy United Kingdom Libya India Germany Australia New Zealand Vichy France South Africa Southern Rhodesia Algeria Canada Tunisia United States Morocco Free France OVERVIEW OF THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN The North African Campaign of the Second World War took place in North Africa from June 10 1940 to May 13 1943. It included campaigns fought in the Libyan and Egyptian deserts (Western Desert Campaign, also known as the Desert War) and in Morocco and Algeria (Operation Torch), as well as Tunisia (Tunisia Campaign). The campaign was fought between the Allies, many of whom had colonial interests in Africa dating from the late 19th century, and the Axis Powers. The Allied war effort was dominated by the British Commonwealth and exiles from German-occupied Europe. The United States officially entered the war in December 1941 and began direct military assistance in North Africa on May 11 1942. Fighting in North Africa started with the Italian declaration of war on June 10 1940. On June 14, the British Army's 11th Hussars, assisted by elements of the 1st Royal Tank Regiment, crossed the border from Egypt into Libya and captured the Italian Fort Capuzzo. This was followed by an Italian counter-offensive into Egypt and the capture of Sidi Barrani in September 1940 and again in December 1940 following a British Commonwealth counteroffensive, Operation Compass. During Operation Compass, the Italian 10th Army was destroyed and the German Afrika Korps - commanded by Erwin Rommel, who later became known as "The Desert Fox" - was dispatched to North Africa in February 1941 during Operation Sonnenblume to reinforce Italian forces in order to prevent a complete Axis defeat. -
Aut. Antonio FORESTI (1915-1987) Mike Ball, Baydon, January 2016
Aut. Antonio FORESTI (1915-1987) Mike Ball, Baydon, January 2016 Antonio dressed in an English uniform on his way back to Italy in 1945. Photo: P. Foresti Antonio FORESTI was born 14 March 1915 in S. Maria Maggiore in the Piedmont region of Italy. By the time that he had become an adult, Italy had become a Fascist Dictatorship under Mussolini. Conscription (la naja) was normal and Antonio went into the Artillery of the Royal Italian Army, which was unusual for him as most young men from that area joined the Alpini. At the outbreak of war he was called up as a driver (Autiere) for the anti- aircraft artillery detachments stationed in Rome. He was transferred to the transport section of the mechanized artillery in North Africa with the 10th Army. He drove high quality Fiat-SPA AS.37 Sahariani lorries, and the drivers alternated duties between transporting ammunition, food and water so that their risk of being blown-up by their load was reduced to 1-in-3. Fig. Lorries of the "Maletti" Group, December 1940 https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:AS37.JPG The Italian army, though much larger than the Allies in the area, was under mechanized and spread too sparsely to be effective. During Operation Compass, Antonio was taken as a Prisoner of War (PoW), probably in February 1941 at Beda Fomm, Cyrenaica, Libya. Initially he was held in a camp in North Africa and he was then taken to the Lodge Moor, Sheffield transit camp where his state of health was checked and any illness treated. -
Raymond Collishaw, the Royal Air Force and the Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941
Raymond Collishaw, the Royal Air Force and the Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941 Mike Bechthold Hons BA, MA (Wilfrid Laurier University) This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW@ADFA 2014 PLEASE TYPE THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Surname or Family name: Bechthold First name: Blain Other name/s: Michael Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: PhD School: UNSW@ADFA Faculty: HASS Title: Raymond Collishaw, the Royal Air Force and the Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941 Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE) This dissertation examines the origins of the British system of tactical air support which significantly contributed to the defeat of Germany during the Second World War. Poor relations between the Royal Air Force and Army early in the war hindered the success of operations. The RAF air campaign during Operation Compass demonstrated the fundamental tenets of the formal Allied tactical air doctrine that would emerge later in the war. The central figure was Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw who directed his small force to overwhelm the Italian air force and dislocate enemy logistics to make a substantial contribution to the first major British victory of the war. Collishaw’s career prepared him well for this campaign. Known primarily as a Great War ace, he was also one of the first specialists in close air support during the Hundred Days campaign. After the war he fought campaigns in South Russia and Mesopotamia, served aboard the aircraft carrier HMS Courageous, policed riots in Palestine and deployed to Sudan during the Abyssinian crisis. -
Italian Forces in North Africa, Operation Compass, 1
Italian Forces in North Africa Operation Compass 1 November 1940 - February 1941 Commandante Superiore: Maresciallo d'Armata Rodolfo Graziani 10th Army: Commanding Officer: Generale d'Armata Gariboldi (until 11/17/40) Generale d'Armata Berti (until 12/23/40 Generale d'Armata Tellera (died 2/7/41) XXI Corps: Generale di Corpo d'Armata Bergonzoli 1st Lybian Division organization unknown 2nd Lybian Division organization unknown 4th Blackshirt Division organization unknown Maletti Group organization unknown 63rd Cirene Division 157th Liguria Infantry Regiment 158th Liguria Infantry Regiment 45th Cirene Artillery Regiment 62nd Marmarica Division 115th Treviso Infantry Regiment 116th Treviso Infantry Regiment 44th Marmarica Artillery Regiment 64th Catanzaro Divsion 141st Catanzaro Infantry Regiment 142nd Catanzaro Infantry Regiment 64th Artillery Regiment 1st Black Shirt Division organization unknown 2nd Black Shirt Division organization unknown Frontier Guard Units & Fortress Troops in Bardia organization unknown XXII Corps: Generale di Corpo d'Armata Petassi Mannella 61st Sirte Division 69th Ancona Infantry Regiment 70th Ancona Infantry Regiment 43rd Sirte Artillery Regiment Fortress Troops & Artillery in Tobruk organization unknown XX Corps: Generale di Corpo d'Armata Cona 60th Sabratha Division 85th Verona Infantry Regiment 86th Verona Infantry Regiment 42nd Sabrata Artillery Regiment 1 27th Brescia (mot) Division 19th Bresica Infantry Regiment 20th Bresica Infantry Regiment 55th Artillery Regiment 27th Mixed Engineer Battalion 34th Medical Section 35th Surgical Unit 95th Field Hospital 328th Motor Transport Section 34th Supply Section 127th CCRR Section 17th Pavia Division 27th Pavcia Infantry Regiment 28th Pavcia Infantry Regiment 26th Rubicone Artillery Regiment 17th Mixed Engineer Battalion 21st Medical Section 66th Field Hospital 94th Field Hospital 207th Motor Transport Section 71st Field Bakery 74th CCRR Section Babini Armored Brigade organization unknown Pitt, B., The Crucibal of War, Western Desert 1941, London, Jonathan Cape. -
DAK2 Rules Vol. 2
The Gamers, Inc. Operational Combat Series: DAK-II: Deutsches Afrika Korps, Vol. II ©2004. Multiman Publishing, LLC. All Rights Reserved. 7.18 El Alamein: Commonwealth Set Up: Information: Near East Box: The Third Battle— 7 Aus Div (18 Aus, 21 Aus, 25 Aus Inf 22 Oct 42, City Ownership: Two Months Bde, Organic Truck (Full)) (+): Alexandria (all), Cairo (all), 6-4-3 Inf Bde (14, 201 Gd) Campaign Start Helwan, Port Said, Suez 5 Ind Div (9 Ind, 10 Ind Inf Bde, Organic Reserve Markers Available: 8 Truck (Full)) Hedgehogs Remaining: 0 General Information: 10 Ind Inf Div (25 Ind Inf Bde, Organic Minefields Remaining: 3 Truck (Full)) Set Up Order: Axis, Senussi Hexes remaining: None 6-4-3 Ind Inf Bde (3 Ind) Commonwealth remain to be activated. First Player: Commonwealth Training Marker Positions: 6 Far East Box: First Turn: 22 Oct 42 Aus Div (Normal), 2 Arm Div 6-4-3 Inf Bde (16, 23) Last Turn: 29 Nov 42 (Normal), 9 Aus Div (Normal), 2 NZ 7 Arm Div (8-4-7 Arm Bde (7)) Game Length: 14 Div (Normal), 7 Aus Div (Normal), 1 Maps in Play: All SA Div (Normal), 2 SA Div (Normal), E10.26: Use Campaign Rules?: Yes 1 Arm Div (Normal) 2-3-5 Egyptian Camel Bn (Hauwasa) Port Damage: None Greek Campaign Status Track Airfield Ownership: The Axis Marker: Campaign Termination Box D25.17: controls all air strips occupied by or west of Greek Deployment Progress 7-5-3 FF Inf Bde (1 FF) their units. All other on-map airbases and Track Marker: No longer in use. -
This Work Has Been Submitted to Chesterrep – the University of Chester's Online Research Repository
‘From mechanisation may be born a David to slay a Goliath’ an assessment of the impact of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s indirect approach on Operation Compass 1940 – 1941 Item Type Thesis or dissertation Authors Hughes, Alexander J. Publisher University of Chester Download date 29/09/2021 04:52:34 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10034/316037 This work has been submitted to ChesterRep – the University of Chester’s online research repository http://chesterrep.openrepository.com Author(s): Alexander James Hughes Title: ‘From mechanisation may be born a David to slay a Goliath’ an assessment of the impact of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s indirect approach on Operation Compass 1940 – 1941 Date: 2013 Originally published as: University of Chester MA dissertation Example citation: Hughes, A.J. (2013). ‘From mechanisation may be born a David to slay a Goliath’ an assessment of the impact of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s indirect approach on Operation Compass 1940 – 1941. (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Chester, United Kingdom. Version of item: Submitted version Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10034/316037 ‘From mechanisation may be born a David to slay a Goliath’ An Assessment of the Impact of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach on Operation Compass 1940 – 1941. By Alexander James Hughes MA Military History University of Chester HI7306 1 Contents Introduction Chapter I: The Inter-War Years & British Tank Development Chapter II: The Italian Invasion of Egypt & Operation Compass Conclusion Appendix I: Early War Armoured Fighting Vehicles Appendix II: The Opposing Forces of Operation Compass Bibliography 2 Introduction 3 In the Second World War the Germans introduced a new form of warfare: Blitzkrieg, whereby rapid mechanised assaults supported by aircraft swept all before the advancing Wehrmacht. -
The London Gazette
Wumb, 37609 2997 THIRD SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY the nth of JUNE, 1946 * by Registered as a newspaper THURSDAY, 13 JUNE, 1946 The War Office, May, 1946 OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM AUGUST, 1939 TO NOVEMBER, 1940. The following Despatch was submitted to the B. Palestine. Secretary of State for War on 10th (i) 8th Division— December, 1940, by GENERAL SIR Two Brigades—each of three British ARCHIBALD P. WAVELL, K.C.B., Battalions. C.M.G., M.C., Commander-in-Chief, in the No artillery. Middle East. (ii) Two British Cavalry Regiments. .. • 1. This despatch covers the period from (iii) Four additional British Battalions the formation of the Middle East Command in (less one Company of one Battalion in August, 1939, to the middle of November, Cyprus). 1940, when the war with Italy had lasted C. Sudan. approximately 5 months. (i) Three British Battalions. 2. The Middle East Command, with a staff (ii) Sudan Defence Force consisting of 20 of five officers, was formed at the beginning Companies in all, of which the greater part of August, 1939, as a planning staff for the were employed on internal security over the MiddRe East. Its original Charter is given vast area of the Sudan. as Appendix A. General Headquarters Middle East now comprises over 225 graded D. Cyprus. staff officers, exclusive of attached officers and One Company British Battalion. non-graded officers. E. British Somaliland. September, 1939, to April, 1940. H.Q. and three Companies of Camel 3. On the outbreak of war with Germany Corps. -
Download Date 30/09/2021 08:51:05
‘From mechanisation may be born a David to slay a Goliath’ an assessment of the impact of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s indirect approach on Operation Compass 1940 – 1941 Item Type Thesis or dissertation Authors Hughes, Alexander J. Publisher University of Chester Download date 30/09/2021 08:51:05 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10034/316037 This work has been submitted to ChesterRep – the University of Chester’s online research repository http://chesterrep.openrepository.com Author(s): Alexander James Hughes Title: ‘From mechanisation may be born a David to slay a Goliath’ an assessment of the impact of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s indirect approach on Operation Compass 1940 – 1941 Date: 2013 Originally published as: University of Chester MA dissertation Example citation: Hughes, A.J. (2013). ‘From mechanisation may be born a David to slay a Goliath’ an assessment of the impact of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s indirect approach on Operation Compass 1940 – 1941. (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Chester, United Kingdom. Version of item: Submitted version Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10034/316037 ‘From mechanisation may be born a David to slay a Goliath’ An Assessment of the Impact of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach on Operation Compass 1940 – 1941. By Alexander James Hughes MA Military History University of Chester HI7306 1 Contents Introduction Chapter I: The Inter-War Years & British Tank Development Chapter II: The Italian Invasion of Egypt & Operation Compass Conclusion Appendix I: Early War Armoured Fighting Vehicles Appendix II: The Opposing Forces of Operation Compass Bibliography 2 Introduction 3 In the Second World War the Germans introduced a new form of warfare: Blitzkrieg, whereby rapid mechanised assaults supported by aircraft swept all before the advancing Wehrmacht. -
Операция Compass – Ливия Декабрь 1940 – Январь 1941
ОПЕРАЦИЯ COMPASS – ЛИВИЯ ДЕКАБРЬ 1940 – ЯНВАРЬ 1941 Созданная летом 1939 года группировка британских вооруженных сил на Ближнем Востоке, которую в августе этого года возглавил фельдмаршал Арчибальд Уэйвелл (Archibald Wavell), - Middle East Command – располагала войсками, разбросанными по девяти странам и двум континентам на территории размером 1 700 миль х 2 000 миль. Занимаемая военной группировкой Уэйвелла территория в Северной Африке и на Ближнем Востоке имела важнейшее значение для британцев, так как представляла собой западный фланг британских позиций в этом регионе, и контроль над ней означал сохранение за Британской Империей Суэцкого канала и кратчайшего пути в Индию и удержание под контролем нефтяных месторождений Ирака и Ирана. В обязанности Уэйвелла входило военное планирование для всего будущего театра военных действий, организация переброски на него подкреплений в случае наступления кризисной ситуации, распределение войск и размещение гарнизонов. В дополнение к этому, Уэйвелл должен был согласовывать свои действия с военно-морскими и военно- воздушными силами, встречаться с послами Великобритании в Египте и Ираке, генерал- губернатором в Судане, верховным комиссаром в Палестине и Трансиордании, губернаторами на Кипре, в Адене и в Британском Сомали. Дипломатические и политические аспекты должностных обязанностей Уэйвелла были весьма существенными и добавляли ему проблем. При этом для выполнения такого большого объема административной работы он первоначально получил в свое подчинение штабной персонал численностью в пять офицеров.