Raymond Collishaw, the Royal Air Force and the Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941

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Mike Bechthold Hons BA, MA (Wilfrid Laurier University)

This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW@ADFA 2014

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Title: Raymond Collishaw, the Royal Air Force and the Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941

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This dissertation examines the origins of the British system of tactical air support which significantly contributed to the defeat of Germany during the Second World War. Poor relations between the Royal Air Force and Army early in the war hindered the success of operations. The RAF air campaign during Operation Compass demonstrated the fundamental tenets of the formal Allied tactical air doctrine that would emerge later in the war. The central figure was Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw who directed his small force to overwhelm the Italian air force and dislocate enemy logistics to make a substantial contribution to the first major British victory of the war. Collishaw’s career prepared him well for this campaign. Known primarily as a Great War ace, he was also one of the first specialists in close air support during the Hundred Days campaign. After the war he fought campaigns in South Russia and Mesopotamia, served aboard the aircraft carrier HMS Courageous, policed riots in Palestine and deployed to Sudan during the Abyssinian crisis. This experience primed him for senior command and taught him much about the application of air power, especially how to work effectively with the Army and the Royal Navy. The failure of Operation Battleaxe in June 1941, fought according to Army doctrine, led Prime Minister Winston Churchill to consider the higher level direction of future air campaigns. He identified and codified the elements of a successful tactical air campaign in a directive which confirmed the RAF view of mission and target selection. The pattern of operations outlined by Churchill rejected the army’s preference to use the RAF for the close defence of its troops. Rather, Churchill’s directive reflected the basic principles of Collishaw’s air plan employed during Operation Compass. This study is based on a close reading of Collishaw’s papers as well as the documentary records of the RAF, British Army and the British Cabinet. Operational Record Books, War Diaries and Cabinet minutes along with the personal letters and diaries of the main actors form the primary body of evidence for understanding the events in the Western Desert in 1940-1941.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... ii

Note on conventions ...... iii

List of Maps ...... iv

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1 – The First World War ...... 29

Chapter 2 – South Russia and Mesopotamia ...... 61

Chapter 3 – RAF Staff College, HMS Courageous and the Sudan ...... 90

Chapter 4 – The Western Desert 1939-1940 ...... 124

Chapter 5 – The Western Desert and the Start of the War ...... 151

Chapter 6 – Operation Compass I: The Battle of the Camps and Bardia ...... 180

Chapter 7 – Operation Compass II: Tobruk and Beda Fomm ...... 212

Chapter 8 – Reversal of Fortune: The Retreat to the Frontier ...... 252

Chapter 9 – The Siege of Tobruk, Operation Brevity and Crete ...... 291

Chapter 10 – Operation Battleaxe ...... 323

Chapter 11 – After Battleaxe ...... 358

Conclusion ...... 389

Bibliography ...... 406

Appendix 1 – A Note by the Minister of Defence, 7 October 1941 ...... 433

Appendix 2 – Talk by Air Vice-Marshal Sir A. Coningham, 16 February 1943 ...... 436

Acknowledgments

[to be inserted at a later date.]

Note on conventions

The question of individuals’ ranks is a confusing matter as many of the officers mentioned in this text were regularly promoted during the period under consideration. An officer’s ultimate rank will be used when referencing his overall career but officers will be identified by the rank they held during the events under consideration. Thus, it is Group Captain Arthur Longmore in Chapter 2 when discussing his role in Iraq in 1923 and Air Chief Marshal Longmore in Chapter 6 when he was the senior RAF officer in the Middle East at the time of Operation Compass.

The spelling of towns and places in Egypt and Libya varies widely depending on the source. For example, the British official history refers to Rabia, Maktila and Tummar, the German official history contains Rabiyah, Maqtalah and Tummayr while original documents contain an even wider variety of different spellings.1 For the purposes of this narrative as well as the original maps created for this dissertation, spelling has been standardized as it is found in the British official history. The only exception is the usage found in direct quotations.

1 I.S.O. Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1: The Early Successes against Italy (to May 1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), 261; Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War: Vol.3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 646.

iii

List of Maps

Map 1 – The Western Front, 1915-1918 ...... v

Map 2 – South Russia, 1919-1920 ...... vi

Map 3 – The British Mandate of Iraq, 1923 ...... vii

Map 4 – Kurdistan Operations, Koicol and Frontiercol: March-April 1923 ...... viii

Map 5 – The Western Desert ...... ix

Map 6 – Operation Compass, First Phase: 9-12 December 1940 ...... x

Map 7 – Operation Compass, Second Phase: 12 December 1940 – 8 February 1941 ...... xi

Map 8 – Axis Counteroffensive, March-April 1941 ...... xii

Map 9 – Operation Battleaxe, 15-17 June 1941 ...... xiii

vii

viii

xii

xiii

Introduction

Allied tactical air support was an issue of fundamental importance in the defeat of Nazi

Germany in the Second World War. In the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe British and

American aircraft worked closely with the army to destroy the Luftwaffe, obstruct the movement

of reserves and supplies to the front lines and on occasion destroyed tanks and other targets in

direct support of the ground forces. Without effective Allied air support the war in Europe would

have lasted much longer. Second Tactical Air Force of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Ninth Air

Force of the US Army Air Forces emerged from the war as sophisticated organisations which

worked closely, if not always harmoniously, with their army groups to defeat the Germans.1 This

was not, however, the situation at the start of the war when the British army and the RAF held

very different views on the issue of air support. The 1940 campaign in France ended with the

expulsion of the British Expeditionary Force from the continent which led to much recrimination

from the army over the poor support provided by the RAF.2

This dissertation is concerned with the first successful British campaign of the Second

World War and its impact on the development of Allied tactical air support doctrine. It was here that the basic principles behind that effective air support system were first successfully employed. Operation Compass, launched in December 1940 as a five-day raid, expelled the

Italians from Egypt and Cyrenaica in a well-orchestrated offensive where the army and the RAF

1 The two best academic works on the Allied tactical air forces in Northwest Europe are Ian Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe, 1943-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1998) and Thomas Alexander Hughes, Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II (New York: The Free Press, 1995). See also Benjamin Franklin Cooling, ed., Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990). 2 David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), chs.3-4. 2 worked closely together to capture and destroy a much larger enemy force. The RAF air campaign demonstrated all the fundamentals of the formal Allied tactical air doctrine that would emerge later in the war. The central figure in this success was Air Commodore Raymond

Collishaw who directed his small force to overwhelm the Italian air force, dislocate enemy logistics and make a substantial contribution to the success of Operation Compass. His accomplishments were aided by his First World War experience where he was one of the first specialists in close air support, and years of Empire postings, especially in the Middle East, where he learned to work closely with the other services and operate with minimal resources at the end of a long supply line.

Operation Battleaxe, an attempt to relieve the trapped garrison at Tobruk in June 1941, ignored many of the successful features of the Compass air campaign and adhered to army demands for the close fighter protection of its troops. A series of defeats suffered by the army in

Greece, Crete and Cyrenaica led them to place a large burden of the blame on the RAF for failing to provide the necessary air support. Political intrigue at the highest levels in London forced the RAF to adopt the army’s plan or again risk being held responsible for any setback.

The subsequent failure of Battleaxe forced a wide-ranging reappraisal of the methods of cooperation between the army and the RAF. At the tactical level significant progress was made on improving the command and control aspects of air support as well as improving the mobility and logistics of the RAF squadrons. More importantly, the higher level direction of future air campaigns (at the operational level) was considered by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and after consultation with his air advisors and based largely on the previous RAF experience in the Western Desert, he identified and codified the effective elements of a successful tactical air campaign. His directive, based on the earlier pattern of RAF operations in the Western Desert,

did not end inter-service bickering nor did it solve any technical problems, but it confirmed the

RAF view of mission and target selection. The pattern of operations outlined by Churchill

rejected the army’s preference to use the RAF for the close defence of its troops and the attack of

enemy targets on the battlefield where air power was treated in the same manner as the artillery.

Rather, Churchill’s directive reflected the only successful British joint campaign up to that point

in the war – Operation Compass and the defeat of the Italians in the Western Desert between

December 1940 and February 1941.3

This early period of the war has been largely overlooked in the scholarship of the development of Allied tactical air doctrine. The origins of the air support system are generally traced to the arrival of Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham in the desert in late 1941. He is said to have transformed the RAF into an effective organisation which worked well with the army and resulted in the defeat of the Germans and Italians in North Africa. The system developed by

Coningham in partnership with General Bernard Montgomery was later adopted by the Allied air forces in Northwest Europe and served as the template for both American and British tactical air operations in support of the D-Day landings and the subsequent campaign which ended the war.4

This conventional narrative does not consider the fact that Coningham inherited a maturing

organisation that had already proven itself in battle using exactly the same tenets for which he

would be credited. Coningham would refine and improve the effectiveness of the Desert Air

3 Vincent Orange relates that Churchill’s pronouncement was based on arguments made by Air Marshal Arthur Tedder, the Commander-in-Chief RAF Middle East Command, relayed to him by Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff. Vincent Orange, Churchill and his Airmen: Relationships, Intrigue and Policy Making 1914-1945 (London: Grub Street, 2013), 176. 4 For a full discussion of the North African Campaign and its role as the genesis of Allied tactical air support doctrine, see B. Michael Bechthold, ‘A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43,’ Journal of Military History 68, no.3 (July 2004), 821-851; Brad Gladman argues that the lessons learned by the British and their American partners in North Africa led to the creation of ‘the best system of air/land warfare ever seen’ which would become one of the Allies’ ‘great tools for victory.’ See Brad William Gladman, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940-43 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), Introduction (quotations found on pages 2 and 18). 4

Force using the vastly greater resources at his disposal, but the system of air support that would

be endorsed by Winston Churchill and adopted by the Allied air forces was that successfully

employed by Collishaw during Operation Compass.

Battleaxe had been the catalyst for an attempt by General Claude Auchinleck, the army’s

senior commander in the Middle East, to assume control of air resources in the Middle East. In

its aftermath, Churchill was forced to remind him that ‘the Air Force has its own dominant

strategic role to play, and must not be frittered away in providing small umbrellas for the

Army.’5 Churchill soon reinforced this statement with a comprehensive directive which

fundamentally changed the dynamic of British army-air cooperation and set out the parameters

which guided the provision of air support at the operational level for the remainder of the war.

By explicitly endorsing the Royal Air Force (RAF) view of air power Churchill effectively ended

the debate between the army and air force regarding the form air support would take and allowed

the two services to concentrate on refining the command and control elements of army-air

support missions.6 Coningham introduced important improvements to the air support system, especially in the area of communications, intelligence, mobility, logistics and repair, but these changes were effective because the higher level debate regarding the role of the RAF in the land battle had been settled by Churchill.7

The air component of the first British victory was directed by Collishaw, a Canadian

Great War ace who drew on his considerable personal experience to orchestrate a successful air

campaign despite commanding an air force that was obsolescent and outnumbered. His

5 Telegram, Prime Minister to C-in-C, ME, 6 July 1941, quoted in ‘Army-Air Co-operation,’ The National Archives (UK) [TNA] CAB 101/136, 25. 6 Winston S. Churchill, ‘A Note by the Minister of Defence,’ 7 October 1941, TNA AIR 8/983. 7 For details on Coningham’s refinements of the air support organisation see, Vincent Orange, ‘Getting Together: Tedder, Coningham, and Americans in the Desert and Tunisia, 1940-43,’ in Daniel R. Mortensen, ed., Airpower and Ground Armies: Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine 1940-43 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1998), 1-44. 5

knowledge of army support missions from the First World War, combined with his interwar

postings to various colonial conflicts gave him first-hand knowledge of how the air force could

best support a land campaign and he understood army culture due to his past postings. He

rejected army demands to provide defensive air cover and attack armoured fighting vehicles on

the battlefield as he knew these types of operations were dangerous, wasteful and ineffective. To

protect the army it was far more advantageous to take the initiative and destroy the enemy air

force through offensive sweeps and airfield interdiction rather than react to their attacks. Having

spent nearly five years in the desert he understood that the logistical support of the army was

vital and attacks on ports and road convoys would affect the ability of an army to fight as surely

as destroying it in battle. Most importantly, Collishaw took these principles of tactical aviation

and proved that they worked in battle.8

At the outset of the Second World War the Army and the RAF held very different conceptions regarding the form of air operations required to support the army on the battlefield.

Ground commanders considered aircraft an ancillary tactical weapon like artillery or tanks,

which should be used in small numbers or ‘penny packets’ to attack enemy positions on the front

lines to aid the infantry.9 The army believed they should control these decentralised air

operations. Conversely, the RAF viewed air power as a weapon which should be centrally

controlled and concentrated to achieve an operational level effect through the attainment of air

superiority and interdiction of the battlefield. Unlike artillery which acted in a small, defined

8 Orange, Churchill and his Airmen, 176. 9 ‘Penny packets’ was a British term that referred to a small number of things or people. In the air force context it meant the tendency to despatch small numbers of aircraft on a wide variety of missions, usually in support of the army, rather than concentrate on larger objectives. Vincent Orange defined the term as ‘numerous small formations of aircraft circling over front-line troops as [a] defensive umbrella against, in particular, dive-bomber attacks.’ Vincent Orange, Tedder: Quietly in Command (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 210. For other usage see John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 149; and John Slessor, The Central Blue: The Autobiography of Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the RAF, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), 284, 421. 6

area, aircraft could operate over a much wider area, perform a variety of tasks and had the

flexibility to be quickly re-tasked against widely separated targets. Only in rare and/or dire

circumstances should air power be applied directly on the battlefield where targets were fleeting,

difficult to find and hit, and where severe losses in pilots and aircraft could be expected. The

experience in Norway, France, Greece and Crete in 1940 and 1941 reinforced the view of the

British Army that it required its own specialised air force. The RAF countered that air superiority

was a necessary precondition for effective air support and without central control, which allowed

a concentration of air resources, failure was sure to follow. This acrimonious debate did not end

with Churchill’s intervention, but his pronouncement settled the form of army-air co-operation at

the operational level and allowed future discussions to focus on shaping army support operations

at the tactical level.10

Collishaw, a Canadian from Nanaimo, British Columbia, was one of the top aces of the

First World War. He served with the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) and the RAF over the

Western Front and was credited with destroying 61 enemy aircraft and eight observation

balloons.11 Although he is best known for his skills as a fighter pilot, Collishaw was one of the

first Allied specialists in low-level attack missions. In 1918 he commanded No.3 Squadron

RNAS/No.203 Squadron RAF which was dedicated to trench strafing operations to help stop the

German offensive in March and flew in close support of the army during the Hundred Days

Campaign in the fall of 1918. Collishaw learned a great deal about flying missions against

10 The body of scholarship by David Ian Hall, especially Strategy for Victory, examines the differences between the army and the RAF concepts on air support/air operations and who should control the air resource. See Hall, Strategy for Victory, 4-7, 23-25, 28-29, 32-34, 46-47, 61-67. 11 For the basic details of Collishaw’s First World War career, especially his exploits in air-to-air combat, see David L. Bashow, ‘Four Gallant Airmen: Clifford Mackay McEwen, Raymond Collishaw, Leonard Joseph Birchall, and Robert Wendell McNair,’ in Bernd Horn, ed., Intrepid Warriors: Perspectives on Canadian Military Leaders, (Toronto and Kingston: The Dundurn Group and Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007); and David L. Bashow, Knights of the Air: Canadian Fighter Pilots in the First Wold War (Toronto: McArthur & Company, 2000). 7

ground targets including what air power could be expected to achieve as well as the cost and limitations of such missions.12

After the war the RAF drastically cut its size but Collishaw was one of the few officers

offered a permanent position. He was immediately sent to South Russia to command a British

squadron in the fight against the Bolsheviks where he spent significant time spent engaging

ground targets. In 1920 he was posted to the Middle East for three years where he helped to defend the Empire through the newly-developed concept of ‘air policing.’ One of his most important experiences came in 1923 when he joined an army expedition against Turkish and

Kurdish insurgents as the RAF Liaison Officer. His first posting away from an active theatre came in late 1923, five years after the end of the First World, when he was given command of

No.41 Squadron based in England; soon after he attended RAF Staff College. The mid-1920s he

commanded various squadrons, stations and wings, and served as the senior air officer aboard a

Royal Navy (RN) aircraft carrier where his squadrons saw action on numerous occasions,

primarily in the Middle East. At the start of the Second World War Collishaw was in command

of the Egypt Group in Alexandria which he led in battle as 202/204 Group against the Axis

powers in the Western Desert in 1940-1941.13

In his memoirs, Collishaw wrote that despite his great success during the First World

War:

12 On 1 April 1918 the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and RNAS joined to form the Royal Air Force (RAF). RFC squadrons retained their old numbers while RNAS squadrons received a new 200-series designation. Thus, Collishaw’s No.3 Squadron RNAS became No.203 Squadron RAF. Raymond Collishaw with R.V. Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story (London: William Kimber and Co., 1973), 166-167; Sydney F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, vol.1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 549-50; J.C. Nerney, ‘The Western Front – Air Operations, May-November 1918,’ 230-67, Air Historical Branch, n.d., TNA AIR 1/677/21/3/1887. 13 Details of Collishaw’s career may be found in his official record of service, a copy of which may be found in his personal papers at Library and Archives Canada. ‘Air Vice-Marshal Raymond Collishaw – Record of Service,’ sent to R.V. Dodds in response to an enquiry on 1 August 1963, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9. 8

I feel that my days of command in North Africa, when we had to depend upon superior strategy, deception and fighting spirit, faced with a numerically superior enemy, represent by far my best effort. Yet if I am known at all to any of my fellow Canadians it is through more carefree days, when as a fighter pilot, with the limited responsibilities of a flight commander in a squadron over France, I had the good fortune to shoot down the enemy without in turn being killed.14

This is a curious statement from one of the great air aces of the First World War. His role during

the Western Desert campaign has been virtually forgotten by historians and when he is

mentioned there is no indication that he accomplished anything particularly noteworthy which

stands in stark contrast to perceptions of his First World career. There is a tendency in the

literature to accept the appraisal of Arthur Tedder, Collishaw’s last commander in the desert, that

he would not have succeeded at a higher level of command. This conjecture is repeated in most

accounts of the first desert air campaign and confuses an assessment of Collishaw’s command

potential with an honest appraisal of what he actually accomplished.15

The details of the relationship between Collishaw and Tedder cannot be reconstructed

from the surviving historical record. Tedder’s appropriately titled memoirs, With Prejudice,

serve as the most complete and accessible commentary on Collishaw’s time in the Western

Desert. His first mention of Collishaw offers mild praise for his accomplishments early in the

war, but he quickly makes it clear that he considered him to be a ‘bull in a china shop’ who had

14 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Memories of a Canadian Airman,’ 42, undated manuscript found in Collishaw’s biography file, Directorate of History and Heritage, Canadian National Defence Headquarters. This account was later serialised in the Royal Canadian Air Force’s monthly magazine, The Roundel. See Raymond Collishaw, ‘Memories of a Canadian Airman,’ The Roundel 16, no.4 (May 1964), 4-10; 16, no.5 (June 1964), 18-24; 16, no.6, (July/August 1964), 20-24. 15 For Tedder’s assessment of Collishaw see Lord Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, GCB (London: Cassell & Company, 1966), 55; For examples of Tedder’s influence in subsequent appraisals of Collishaw, see Roderic Owen, The Desert Air Force (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1948), 60; Christopher Shores, Giovanni Massimello, and Russell Guest, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, vol.1: North Africa - June 1940-January 1942 (London: Grub Street, 2012), 128-129; John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 311. 9

the tendency to ‘go off half-cock.’16 Collishaw, according to Tedder, may have had success against the Italians but he was not up to the challenge of fighting the Germans.17 This memoir, as

well as various letters written by Tedder during the period, indicate that he likely held a bias

against Collishaw before being posted to Cairo in December 1940, or formed it shortly after his

arrival.18

Collishaw barely mentions Tedder in his memoirs even though he served under him for

more than six months during what he considered the highlight of his career.19 An attempt has

been made to determine if their relationship predated the Second World War but nothing in their

service career suggest an obvious conflict. Both men had similar First World War and inter-war

careers and though the RAF was a relatively small organisation there appears to be no occasions

when they served together prior to December 1940.20 It would be surprising, however, if the two

men had not crossed paths at some point prior to 1940 and it is not hard to imagine that some

small, otherwise insignificant, event had prejudiced Tedder’s view of Collishaw.

Tedder’s opinion of Collishaw is significant but it needs to be examined in the context of

his demonstrated distaste for the First World War ace. It is important to reconstruct and evaluate

the role Collishaw played in the early desert battles without any bias, positive or negative,

imposed by outside interpretations. The primary records created during the war will be essential

for this task.

16 Tedder, With Prejudice, 55. ‘Bull in a china shop’ is defined as ‘a very clumsy creature in a delicate situation’ and to ‘go off half-cock’ as ‘inadequately or poorly prepared.’ See , accessed 24 September 2013. 17 Tedder, With Prejudice, 55. 18 Regarding Tedder’s correspondence, see especially his letters to Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman contained in TNA AIR 20/2792, to Portal in TNA AIR 23/1395 and to his wife as cited in Vincent Orange, Tedder: Quietly in Command (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 126-127. Whatever the source of friction, an anti-colonial bias was not likely as Tedder enjoyed close working relationships with Arthur Longmore, an Australian, and Arthur Coningham, a New Zealander, among others. 19 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command, 247, 251. 20 The details of each man’s service career may be found at ‘Air of Authority – A History of RAF Organisation,’ , accessed 24 September 2013. 10

Collishaw has left extensive personal papers that form a major source for this study. His

main papers reside at Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa, Canada and are augmented by

other significant holdings at the Canadian War Museum and at the Directorate of History and

Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, the historical section and archives of the Canadian

military. The documentary records of the RAF and British Army are largely held by the UK

National Archives in Kew. Squadron and formation Operational Record Books, War Diaries

along with operations orders and after-action reports found in the AIR and WO collections will

form the primary body of evidence for examining the events in the Western Desert in 1940-1941.

These archival sources provide the majority of the primary material referenced here.21

Raymond Collishaw wrote an autobiography, aided by Ronald Dodds, an historian who worked for the Royal Canadian Air Force Air Historian, during the 1960s. It offers the most comprehensive record of Collishaw’s overall career, from his start in the Canadian Fisheries

Protection Service prior to the First World War, through to the end of the Second World War.22

It accurately reflects the documentary record and is largely free of the hyperbole found in the

memoirs of some First World War aces.23 Its main drawback is that it was published late in his

life. This makes it excellent regarding impressions and recollections, but it lacks the detail and

21 See Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492- 0-5-E; Air Vice-Marshal Raymond Collishaw Fonds; Raymond Collishaw Biography File, Ottawa; Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. 22 Dodds did not leave any personal papers but his extensive personal correspondence with Collishaw may be found in his Collishaw’s papers at Library and Archives Canada as well as the Directorate of History and Heritage, both in Ottawa. These two sources are the prime repositories of the Collishaw-Dodd correspondence though some additional material can be found in the Canadian War Museum archives as well as in The Beatrice Hitchens Memorial Collection of Aviation History, Western Archives, Western University, London, Ontario. Details of Dodds’ career in the office of the Air Historian may be found in Hugh Halliday, ‘The Air Historian – Part II,’ The Canadian Air Force Journal 4, no.4 (Fall 2011), 22-30. 23 William Bishop’s memoirs were particularly embellished but were not unique. William A. Bishop, Winged Warfare (New York, Doran, 1918). For more details see David Bashow, ‘A Note on Sources,’ in Knights of the Air: Canadian Fighter Pilots in the First World War (Toronto: McArthur and Company, 2000), 188-189. 11

immediacy that would accrue from a narrative written closer to the events.24 Large sections of the book, however, are closely related to a biographical narrative that Collishaw wrote prior to the Second World War. This narrative also provides important details that are lacking in the published autobiography.25 Collishaw refers to his time in command of RAF Station Heliopolis

in Egypt before the outbreak of the Second World War as ‘the most pleasant of all those that I

spent in uniform.’26 His family was able to join him during this period and it is likely that the relative calm of this posting allowed Collishaw the time to draft this autobiographical account.

The Times Literary Supplement considered that Collishaw’s memoirs ably showed both sides of air operations, from the point of view of the pilot and the senior commander, and it found the section of the book dealing with the Western Desert to be ‘the more informative part of the book.’27 Vincent Orange states that Collishaw was ‘contemptuously dismissed’ in Tedder’s

memoirs and that it was not surprising that Tedder was ‘completely ignored’ in Collishaw’s

account.28 Collishaw did not hesitate to criticise problems he identified in the conduct of

operations but he refrained from criticising individuals in his memoir. His silence on Tedder

leaves us with no insights on his relationship with his commander.

Collishaw was one of the leading air aces of the First World War, with 61 confirmed kills

making him the leading British Empire ace behind Billy Bishop,29 but he has not been the

24 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story. A second edition of the book was published in 2008 by CEF Books under a different title: Raymond Collishaw, CB, DSO, DSC, DFC (with Ronald Dodds), The Black Flight: The Memoir of Air Vice-Marshal Raymond Collishaw (Ottawa: CEF Books, 2008). 25 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025. 26 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 234. 27 Times Literary Supplement, issue 3745, 14 December 1973, 1549. 28 Vincent Orange, Tedder: Quietly in Command (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 126. 29 The verification and authentication of aerial ‘kills’ remains contentious as the British system for verifying claims in the First World War was haphazard at best. However, it is generally agreed that Major William ‘Billy’ Bishop led Allied aces with 72 kills and that Collishaw was second with 61 kills, tied with Major Edward ‘Mick’ Mannock. For a more complete discussion, see Christopher Shores, Norman Franks, and Russell Guest, Above the Trenches: A Complete Record of the Fighter Aces and Units of the British Empire Air Forces 1915-1920 (Stoney Creek, ON: Fortress Publications, 1990), 115-6 and Christopher Shores, Norman Franks, and Russell Guest, Above the Trenches: Supplement (London: Grub Street, 1996), 16. 12

subject of the same historical consideration as his contemporaries. He is frequently mentioned in

books and articles about the air war over the Western Front and is featured in many books about

Canadian air aces, but he is the subject of only one recent non-academic monograph.30 In

contrast, countless books can be found dealing with the life and death of Manfred von

Richthofen, the leading German ace,31 while Bishop and Edward ‘Mick’ Mannock feature in

numerous books and articles and many of the other top aces are subjects of serious academic

studies.32 Collishaw, an ace of similar stature who subsequently had an eventful and largely

success interwar and Second World War career has not attracted this same attention. The best

analyses of his career were book chapters written by David Bashow in which Collishaw appears

as only one of the brightest lights amongst the pantheon of Canadian aces.33

There is a vast literature, academic and popular, devoted to the Desert War in 1940-1943

with Rommel and Montgomery, Tobruk and El Alamein receiving the most attention. Rather

surprisingly, there are no academic monographs devoted solely to the overall campaign in the

30 Roger Gunn recently published a non-academic monograph dealing with Collishaw’s First World War career but it is largely a rehash of the material contained in Collishaw’s autobiography and offers little new information. Roger Gunn, Raymond Collishaw and the Black Flight (Toronto: Dundurn, 2012). Although there are numerous books on Canadian aces which include an examination of Collishaw’s First World War career, their quality is uneven and they tend to celebrate his exploits as a great fighter pilot while minimising or excluding the rest of his career. A selection of the most prominent of these books includes Ronald Dodds, The Brave Young Wings (Stittsville, ON: Canada's Wings, Inc., 1980); George A. Drew, Canada's Fighting Airmen (Toronto: Maclean Publishing Company, Limited, 1930); Dan McCaffery, Air Aces: The Lives and Times of Twelve Canadian Fighter Pilots (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1990); Edmund Cosgrove, Canada's Fighting Pilots (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2003). 31 Richard Townshend Bickers, Von Richthofen: The Legend Evaluated (London: Airlife Publishing Ltd, 1996); Peter Kilduff, Red Baron (Newton Abbot, UK: David & Charles, 2007); Claud W. Sykes, Richthofen: The Red Knight of the Air (Bristol: Cerberus Publishing Ltd, 2005) are only a few of the most recent books on Richthofen. 32 Studies of Bishop include Brereton Greenhous, The Making of Billy Bishop: The First World War Exploits of Billy Bishop, VC (Toronto: Dundurn Press Ltd, 2002); Dan McCaffery, Billy Bishop: Canadian Hero (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 2002); and William Arthur Bishop, The Courage of the Early Morning: A Frank Biography of Billy Bishop, the Great Ace of World War I (Toronto: D. McKay Co., 1966). Books on Mannock include Adrian Smith, Mick Mannock, Fighter Pilot: Myth, Life and Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2001); and Norman Franks and Andy Saunders, Mannock: The Life and Death of Major Edward Mannonk VC, DSO, MC RAF (London: Grub Street, 2008). Other top aces who have been the subject of dedicated biographies include William Barker, Albert Ball and Eddie Rickenbacker. Wayne Ralph, William Barker VC: The Life, Death and Legend of Canada's Most Decorated War Hero (Mississauga, ON: John Wiley & Sons Canada Ltd, 2007); Colin Pengelly, Albert Ball V.C.: The Fighter Pilot Hero of World War I (London: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2010); Walter David Lewis, Eddie Rickenbacker: An American Hero in the Twentieth Century (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). To list the literature dealing with air aces in the First World War would require a separate volume. 33 Bashow, ‘Four Gallant Airmen’; Bashow, Knights of the Air. 13

first year of the war in the desert. There are biographies of the major figures, accounts of specific

battles, and technical histories of weapons and tactics. The majority of these works are somewhat

dated and only recently have studies been published that contribute new insights to our

understanding of the period. Existing works on the early years of the Western Desert Campaign

provide a rich background for a study of this campaign but there is a significant gap relating to

air matters. With the possible exception of the official British histories, the role of air power in

the Western Desert in 1940-1941 has been minimised. When referenced, it is generally

considered a transitional period that does not contribute significantly to our understanding of the

fighting in North Africa or the more general development of air power during the Second World

War. However, as these early battles against the Italians and Germans in Egypt and Cyrenaica

were a crucial phase in the creation of the British system of tactical air support, they merit further

study.

A survey of the literature on the North African campaign shows a number of characteristics which link these studies. The early battles are seen as precursors or background to the later, more important, battles such as El Alamein and less extraordinary as victories over the

Italians, considered a much weaker foe than the German Afrika Korps. These viewpoints do not do justice to those early battles which are important and significant victories in their own right.

There is also a tendency to ‘stovepipe’ the focus of their particular history. General campaign studies concentrate on the ground war and contain minimal discussions of air and sea operations so there is much to be learned from an integrated, joint study of operations in the Western

Desert.

In the preface to the second edition of his book, The Desert Generals, Corelli Barnett

examines the ‘Montgomery Myth’ which dominated writing on the North African campaign

prior to the publication of his book in 1960. He describes how Field Marshal Bernard

Montgomery, the successful commander of Eighth Army, crafted the perception of the

campaign:

According to this myth, all in the Western Desert was defeat, retreat and confusion until the War Premier, Winston Churchill, by a masterful stroke of policy replaced General Sir Claude Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, by General Sir Harold Alexander, and Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Montgomery became General Officer Command Eighth Army…Churchill himself summed it up in a phrase much quoted since, ‘It may almost be said [the “almost” tends to get lost in quotation]: “Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat.”’34

This viewpoint helps to explain the lack of scholarship focusing on the early battles in the

desert. Barnett wrote his book to highlight the three major British victories in the Desert before

Montgomery’s successes at Alam Halfa and El Alamein. In particular, he argued that Lieutenant-

General Richard O’Connor’s victory over the Italians in 1940-41 was ‘the most daring and

brilliant of all the British operations in North Africa.’35

As much as the early battles in the Western Desert have been overlooked by historians,

the role played by the RAF in the achievement of these victories has received even less

consideration. One otherwise excellent Master’s thesis which focuses on the development of

tactical air doctrine in the Western Desert from 1941-43 manages to dismiss this entire early

period in one sentence: ‘The poor quality of the Italian opposition [during Operation Compass],

however, made a true estimation of the Royal Air Force’s doctrines and methods impossible.’36

The starting point for any study of this period remains the two volumes of the British

official history on the Mediterranean and Middle East. I.S.O. Playfair and his co-authors crafted

34 Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals (London: Pan Books, 1983 (1960)), 8. 35 Barnett, The Desert Generals, 9 36 Bradley P. Tolppanen, ‘Getting the Air Force on Side: The Development of Tactical Air Support Doctrine by the Royal Air Force in the Western Desert, 1941-1943’ (Master of Arts Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1994), 13. 15

a detailed account of Britain’s preparations for war, Italy’s first moves and the successful British

counter-offensive.37 It is an essential, top-down history that does a better job than most of

integrating air and land elements into the narrative. Not surprisingly, due to its breadth and

scope, it is unable to deal with many details of the development of the air support system in the

desert and, like most official histories, is not definitive but an excellent first analysis of the

campaign.

S.W. Roskill’s The War at Sea, volume 1, provides a useful discussion of the important

role played by the navy in the Western Desert campaign. This official British history of the RN

explores its direct support of combat operations, including the bombardments of Maktila, Sidi

Barrani and Sollum during the opening stages of Operation Compass, and the crucial role it

played in providing logistical support for the ground campaign. As would be expected, the story

is told almost exclusively from the navy’s point of view and does little to contextualise the

support it provided into the overall progress of the land campaign.38 F.H. Hinsley’s official

volume on British intelligence in the Second World War fundamentally changed our understanding of the campaign through his examination of the use made by Allied commanders of Ultra intelligence, an element missing from all books written before the mid-1970s. Ralph

Bennett’s more recent book on Ultra and the Mediterranean is an important supplement to the official history.39

The various Commonwealth countries involved in the Western Desert campaign have

contributed a large selection of official army histories. Australia and India are the most important

37 I.S.O. Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1: The Early Successes against Italy (to May 1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1954); I.S.O. Playfair, C.J.C. Molony, and S.E. Toomer, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2: The Germans come to the help of their Ally (1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956). 38 S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, vol.1: The Defensive (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954) 39 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.1: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979); Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989). 16

for the period under consideration, but the New Zealand and South African histories are also

worth consulting. These books tend to be written, detailed accounts of their national forces but

generally provide only a fleeting discussion of air power as it related to the experience of the

national army under consideration.40

Significant autobiographies on the air war have been published by the two principal

senior commanders, Air Marshals Arthur Longmore and Arthur Tedder. Longmore was the

Commander-in-Chief RAF Middle East Command from April 1940 until May 1941 and worked

with General Archibald Wavell and Admiral Andrew Cunningham during this extremely busy

year when campaigns were being fought in East Africa, Malta, Greece, Crete and the Western

Desert. His memoirs prominently feature Collishaw as his senior operational commander and he

comments favourably upon Collishaw’s performance. Longmore knew Collishaw from previous

service together in the Kurdistan and he trusted Collishaw with the operational control of all

squadrons engaged in the Western Desert.41 He reproduced verbatim Lieutenant-General

O’Connor’s glowing tribute to Collishaw’s support during Operation Compass. His memoirs

40 For Australia, see: Gavin Long, To Benghazi (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1961 (1952)); Barton Maughan, Tobruk and El Alamein (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1965); for India, see: P.C. Bharucha, The North African Campaign, 1940-1943 (Calcutta, India: Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan, 1956); for New Zealand, see: W. E. Murphy, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-45: The Relief of Tobruk (Wellington, NZ: War History Branch, 1961); J.L. Scoullar, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-45 (Wellington, NZ: War History Branch, 1955); Ronald Walker, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War: Alam Halfa and El Alamein (Wellington, NZ: War History Branch, 1967); W.G. Stephens, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War: Bardia to Enfidaville (Wellington, NZ: War History Branch, 1962); for South Africa, see: J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton and L.C.F. Turner, The Sidi Rezegh Battles, 1941 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1957); J.A.I. Agar-Hamiliton and L.C.F. Turner, Crisis in the Desert, May-June 1942 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1952); Neil Orpen, South African Forces World War 2: War in the Desert (Cape Town: Purnell, 1971). (The first two volumes listed were published by the Union War Histories Section of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa. After the Histories Section was shut down in 1961 the South African War Histories Advisory Committee was formed to fund a new series of books, including the Orpen volume.) 41 Arthur Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946), 245. 17

highlight the challenges faced when fighting a numerically superior enemy on numerous fronts

while dealing with the difficulties of inter-service cooperation.42

Tedder arrived in the Middle East in December 1940 and initially served as Longmore’s

deputy before taking over command after Longmore was dismissed in late May 1941. Although

Tedder presided over a period when resources were more plentiful and the breadth of

commitments was waning, he was challenged by the growing strength of the German and Italian

forces in the North African theatre and blamed early failures on the inability of the army to

understand fully the air dimension of the battlefield.43

A number of reminiscences published during or shortly after the war by senior air

commanders which shed important light on the Western Desert campaign, may found in the

Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Those of air commanders such as Tedder,

Coningham, Peter Drummond, Thomas Elmhirst and Hugh Lloyd provide useful contemporary

analyses of the conduct of air-ground operations in North Africa.44

The next wave of histories, revising the commanders’ views, published in the 1950s and

1960s, offers new information on the campaign and also probes the tension among the generals.

Correlli Barnett’s excellent The Desert Generals is best known for resurrecting the reputation of

General Sir Claude Auchinleck at the expense of the ‘Montgomery Myth.’45 Although that

debate post-dates the period examined by this study, Barnett’s discussion of Lieutenant-General

42 Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 260. 43 Tedder, With Prejudice, 74, 90-91, 101. 44 Arthur Tedder, ‘Air, Land and Sea Warfare,’ The RUSI Journal 91, no.561 (1946), 59-68; Arthur Coningham, ‘The Development of Tactical Air Forces,’ The RUSI Journal 91, no.562 (1946), 211-226; P.R.M. Drummond, ‘The Air Campaign in Libya and Tripolitania,’ The RUSI Journal 88, no.552 (1943), 249-266; Thomas Elmhirst, ‘Mobile Air Forces,’ The RUSI Journal 96, no.583 (1951), 457-61; Hugh Lloyd, ‘Allied Air Power in the Mediterranean, 1940-45,’ The RUSI Journal 92, no.568 (1947), 554-566. 45 Barnett, The Desert Generals, passim. 18

Richard O’Connor, whom he christens ‘the forgotten victor,’46 is very well presented and sheds

considerable light on the period. Like many histories with an army focus, it lacks a serious

consideration of air matters. In a similar manner Roger Parkinson wrote a good campaign history

of the fighting in North Africa but it too presents an almost exclusive focus on the ground campaign. In its chapters dealing with Operation Compass, the RAF makes two brief appearances, once being credited with concealing the deployment of the army prior to the commencement of fighting and later with maintaining complete air supremacy.47 Also, despite

the controversy over RAF participation in Operation Battleaxe, no mention of air matters is made

by Parkinson in his chapter on that operation.48 Other useful books from this period include

various works by Michael Carver,49 and W.G.F. Jackson.50

In the last 30 years, many books which rely on interviews and recollections but are not

based on available primary sources, have been published on the desert campaign. Nigel

Hamilton’s biographical works on Montgomery are the most prominent in this group, but there

are scores of others, including Barrie Pitt’s The Crucible of War and two books by Robin

Neillands on 7th Armoured Division and Eighth Army.51 A number of solid studies have been

published more recently which continue this trend, with the outstanding one being Robert

46 John Baynes thought this description of O’Connor was particularly appropriate and used it as the title for his biography of O’Connor. John Baynes, The Forgotten Victor: General Sir Richard O'Connor, KT, GCB, DSO, MC (London: Brassey's (UK), 1989). 47 Roger Parkinson, The War in the Desert (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon Ltd, 1976), 23, 34. 48 Parkinson, The War in the Desert, Ch.2. 49 Michael Carver, Tobruk (London: Batsford, 1964); Michael Carver, El Alamein (London: Batsford, 1962); Michael Carver, Dilemmas of the Desert War: A New Look at the Libyan Campaign 1940-1942 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986). 50 W.G.F. Jackson, The Battle for North Africa (New York: Mason, Charters, 1975). 51 Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Making of a General, 1887-1942 (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1981). This volume covers the period of the Desert War but, in total, Hamilton has written three volumes about Montgomery’s life. Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War, vol.1: Western Desert 1941 (London: Book Club Associates, 1980) and volume 2 of his study is subtitled: Year of Alamein, 1942; Robin Neillands, The Desert Rats: 7th Armoured Division 1940-1945 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991); Robin Neillands, Eighth Army: The Triumphant Desert Army that Held the Axis at Bay from North Africa to the Alps, 1939-45 (New York: The Overlook Press, 2004). Neillands’ books are useful, well written narratives but do not add much that is new to the existing historiography. 19

Citino’s Death of the Wehrmacht which analysed German campaigns in 1942 with the aim of

providing a better understanding of the root causes of the eventual defeat(s) of the German army.

The battles of 1941 are the not the focus of this book but they are discussed in some detail as a

foundation for the later discussion. Although not founded on archival research, Citino’s book is

soundly based on a comprehensive reading of the published primary and secondary literature and

provides a compelling account of the downfall of the Wehrmacht.52 Other recent books include

those on El Alamein by Jon Latimer, John Bierman and Colin Smith, and Stephen Bungay which

are similar in nature in that they ostensibly focus on a single battle but are, in fact, campaign

histories. The best of these popular histories is Latimer’s book, though the others are also

worthwhile.53

There are several recent erudite academic studies worthy of serious consideration. The

best of these is Niall Barr’s, The Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein which

focuses, as the sub-title suggests, on the fighting around El Alamein in 1942. Although it

provides limited coverage of the early period of desert fighting, its methodology and research set

the standard for studies of this campaign despite the absence of a serious consideration of the

corresponding air campaign.54 Another excellent study is William F. Buckingham, Tobruk: The

Great Siege 1941-42. Like many books on Alamein, it is really a campaign history with an

emphasis on Tobruk rather than a strict examination of the fighting at Tobruk. However, as the

port of Tobruk was the focus of the back and forth battles of 1940-41, this book provides a useful

52 Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2007). 53 Jon Latimer, Alamein (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); John Bierman and Colin Smith, The Battle of Alamein: Turning Point, World War II (New York: Viking Adult, 2002). (This book was published in the UK as Alamein: War Without Hate); Stephen Bungay, Alamein (London: Aurum, 2002). 54 Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004). An examination of the bibliography and notes of this book reveal that virtually no Royal Air Force documents were consulted. 20

window into this period and it is better than most in integrating the RAF and RN into the

narrative.55

Another noteworthy battle study is Craig Stockings’ Bardia which is based on extensive

archival research and examines the role of the 6th Australian Division in the capture of the port

of Bardia in January 1941. In many ways it is a model example of how a detailed operational

history can open windows into our understanding of the wider issues of the war. Among its most

useful features is a nuanced discussion of the standard British Commonwealth view of the

lacklustre battlefield performance of Italian forces in the Western Desert.56 The best recent campaign study is Martin Kitchen’s, Rommel’s Desert War which, despite its title, is not another hagiography of Rommel, but a carefully argued appraisal of the campaign told from the German perspective which does not hesitate to criticise Axis moves. It is also a rare English-language monograph based on German archival research.57

Jonathan Fennell has written an innovative study on morale, Combat and Morale in the

North African Campaign, which convincingly demonstrates that the morale of the

Commonwealth soldier mirrored success and failure on the battlefield. This study made use of

previously untapped sources such as censorship summaries of soldiers’ mail to the battles of El

Alamein in 1942. Although not focusing on air power, Fennell provides some interesting insights

into the effect of air attacks on soldiers’ morale.58

The air campaigns in North Africa have received less attention than the ground war

which reflects the wider historiography of the air war which highlights strategic air campaigns

55 William F. Buckingham, Tobruk: The Great Siege, 1941-42 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2008), 350. 56 Craig Stockings, Bardia: Myth, Reality and the Heirs of Anzac (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2009). 57 Martin Kitchen, Rommel's Desert War: Waging World War II in North Africa, 1941-1943 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 58 Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 21

and, to a lesser extent, air battles over England and continental Europe to the detriment of

operations in support of the army. One of the best sources from which to gain a better

understanding of tactical air support is the British official history of the Mediterranean and

Middle East.59 Playfair and his co-authors discuss the challenges and mechanics of the system of

air-ground support as it developed in the Western Desert but, not surprisingly, do not analyse it

in any great detail as it is not the focus of their study. Also, the air campaign in the Western

Desert is not well served by the RAF’s official history which devotes three chapters to disparate

operations in the Middle East with its narrative following the same lines as the Playfair volume,

although it does contain somewhat greater detail of RAF operations.60 While the Western Desert

campaign is comprehensively covered by the unpublished RAF Air Historical Branch’s

operational narratives, The Middle East Campaigns,61 the first volume of which provides the

most detailed narrative of the early battles in the desert, it tends to be very strong at conveying

battle details but lacks a sophisticated analysis of the events under consideration.62

Two recent books provide the best current scholarship on air aspects of the desert war.

David Ian Hall’s Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-

1943 presents a strong narrative which examines the development of British tactical air power

from its genesis in the First World War to its maturation through the early campaigns of the

Second World War.63 It begins with the state of British tactical air doctrine at the end of the

Great War before examining developments in the interwar period. Hall’s ability to relate

59 See discussion above; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2. 60 The first volume of Richards, Royal Air Force references the Western Desert campaign in 1940-41. In total the collection comprises three volumes authored by Denis Richards and Hilary St. G. Saunders. 61 This collection totals 52 mostly unpublished narratives providing excellent coverage of all RAF campaigns in the Second World War. For a complete listing, see , (accessed 18 July 2011). 62 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44. 63 Hall, Strategy for Victory. 22

doctrinal developments with real world experience of tactical air operations is one of the

strengths of this book and its comparison of developments in England and France with the often

independent but concurrent evolution of tactical air operations in the Western Desert and North

Africa is also useful. Hall briefly covers the early period of fighting in the Western Desert and

has more to say on the battles from Operation Crusader onwards. A second recent book to focus

on the air war in the desert is Brad William Gladman’s, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air

Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940-43.64 He argues that

intelligence (specifically its acquisition and application) was critical to the success of close air

support in the Second World War and he uses the battles in North Africa to prove his point.

However, he goes even further by suggesting that lessons learned by the British and their

American partners led to the creation of ‘the best system of air/land warfare ever seen’ which

would become one of the Allies’ ‘great tools for victory.’65 Like Hall, Gladman concentrates on

events starting with Operation Crusader.

John Terraine has written a masterful study of the RAF campaigns against Germany and

Italy which covers the entire war and has a functional section on the Western Desert. He argues

that the stress of war in North Africa forced the RAF and the army to form a closer partnership

than might otherwise have happened.66 Philip Guedalla, a prolific British writer, barrister and

failed parliamentarian, enlisted in the RAF at the start of the Second World War and wrote the

first contemporary history of the air war in the desert which was published in 1944 shortly before

64 Brad William Gladman, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940-43 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 65 Gladman, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two, 2, 18. 66 Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945. This book was published as A Time For Courage in the US. Hall noted in his book that Terraine drew much of his material from the unpublished RAF AHB narratives. See Hall, Strategy for Victory, 177, note 24. 23

his premature death from a disease contracted in the Middle East while researching his book.67

Although it is a straight-forward narrative of events it combines the views of one who was there

with a first generation historical account, and it has merit on both counts. Two additional early histories were written by Roderic Owen. His first, The Desert Air Force, chronicles that organisation from its origins to the end of the war in Italy while his second is a biography of Air

Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder.68 More recently, Richard Townshend Bickers has written an

account of the air war in the desert which follows the same pattern as earlier studies.69 Like

Guedalla, these books are largely uncritical histories that value narrative over analysis and tend to be quite enamoured with their subjects. Christopher Shores has written a number of important books on the air campaigns in the Middle East. Through meticulous research he has compiled a substantial amount of important data on day-to-day air operations. Although weak on analysis, his books provide a wealth of information crucial to any in-depth study.70

There are few English-language accounts of the fighting in the desert or substantial accounts of the entire campaign from the Italian perspective comparable to those produced from the Commonwealth and German perspectives. There are several important works by James J.

Sadkovich and although he produced only one monograph, on the Italian Navy in the Second

World War,71 he wrote several articles which examine the role of the Italian Army. As he is at

67 Philip Guedalla, Middle East 1940-1942: A Study in Air Power (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1944); Elton, ‘Guedalla, Philip (1889–1944)’, rev. Mark Pottle, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., January 2008 . 68 Roderic Owen, The Desert Air Force; Roderic Owen, Tedder (London: Collins, 1952). 69 Richard Townshend Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939-1945 (London: Leo Cooper, 1991). 70 Christopher Shores’ most important book for the purposes of this study is Christopher Shores, Giovanni Massimello, and Russell Guest, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, vol.1: North Africa - June 1940-January 1942 (London: Grub Street, 2012), but his other books, Christopher Shores and Hans Ring, Fighters Over the Desert: The Air Battles in the Western Desert, June 1940 to December 1942 (New York, NY: Arco Publishing Company, Inc., 1969); Christopher Shores, Brian Cull, and with Nicola Malizia, Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete, 1940-41 (London: Grub Street, 1987); Christopher Shores, Dust Clouds in the Middle East: The Air War for East Africa, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Madagascar, 1940-42 (London: Grub Street, 1996), are also useful. 71 James J. Sadkovich, The Italian Navy in World War II (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990). 24

the forefront of researchers trying to understand the battlefield performance of the Italians in

North Africa without the biases imposed by the standard British and German perspectives, his

works are essential reading for anyone attempting to understand the war in the desert.72 Of particular interest is his article on Rommel and the Italians in which he claims that the Rommel myth ‘reaffirms the prevalent Anglo-American stereotypes of German prowess, British doughtiness, and Italian ineptitude.’73 He suggests that further study of the campaign is necessary to de-mystify Rommel and re-examine the campaign taking into account the many stereotypes that have clouded our understanding of events.

Another well-researched article is Brian Sullivan’s ‘The Italian Soldier in Combat, June

1940-September 1943: Myths, Realities and Explanations’ in which he attempts to cut through the rhetoric surrounding Italian battlefield performances. He posits that early Italian failures were based largely on poor training and equipment but that as the war progressed the Italians’ battlefield competence improved, and the early failures did not indicate a lack of motivation on the part of the Italian military.74 Another article in this vein is Domenico Petracarro’s ‘The

Italian Army in Africa 1940-1943’ in which he argues that the campaign in North Africa

demonstrated that the army was ‘strategically and tactically passé, poorly trained, hopelessly led,

very badly equipped, extremely unorganised, low in morale, and whose mission may have been

72 His most important works regarding the desert war are James J. Sadkovich, ‘Of Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in North Africa, 1940-1942,’ The International History Review 13, no.2 (May 1991), 284-313; James J. Sadkovich, ‘German Military Incompetence through Italian Eyes,’ War in History 1, no.1 (1994), 39-62 and his other articles are also worthwhile: James J. Sadkovich, ‘Understanding Defeat: Reappraising Italy's Role in World War II,’ Journal of Contemporary History 24, no. 1 (January 1989), 27-61; James J. Sadkovich, ‘Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941,’ The Journal of Military History 58, no. 4 (October 1994), 617-42; James J. Sadkovich, ‘Re-Evaluating Who Won the Italo-British Naval Conflict, 1940-2,’ European History Quarterly 18 (1988), 455-471. 73 Sadkovich, Of Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in North Africa, 1940-1942, 285. 74 Brian Sullivan, ‘The Italian Soldier in Combat, June 1940-September 1943: Myths, Realities and Explanations,’ contained in Paul Addison and Angus Calder, eds., Time to Kill: The Soldier's Experience of War in the West, 1939- 1945 (London: Pimlico, 1997). 25

undermined severely by the political situation and manoeuvrings at home’75 but that despite all its failings, at times, the Italian army performed much better than might have been expected.

Other indispensable studies include MacGregor Knox’s Mussolini Unleashed 1939-41 and John

Gooch’s Mussolini and His Generals.76 Not surprisingly based on their titles, these books are

top-down studies of the Italian political and military situation at the start of the Second World

War. Both characterise Mussolini as a rational actor on the world stage who, though he may have

had irrational aspirations, deserves serious attention.

There are numerous accounts of the desert campaign from the German perspective. The

starting point is volume 3 (The Mediterranean, South-east Europe, and North Africa, 1939-1941)

of a recent German series on the Second World War edited by the Militärgeschichtliches

Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History) in Freiburg, Germany.77 This study is a

detailed campaign study of the war in the Mediterranean from the German perspective. It makes

extensive use of German primary documents although the material from other nations, especially

Great Britain and Italy, is based largely on the relevant official histories and other published

books. The sections which detailed combat in the Western Desert do not contribute much that is

new, but the integration of the German, British and Italian source material is better than that of

many other English-language books. Part I of this book contains a detailed breakdown and

analysis of the Italian political scene and the state of its military at the outbreak of the war but

there is a clear anti-Italian bias. Mussolini is ‘emphatically’ declared to be incompetent,78 and

75 Domenico Petracarro, ‘The Italian Army in Africa 1940-1943: An Attempt at Historical Perspective,’ War & Society 9, no.2 (October 1991), 103-127; the quotation is found on 113-114. 76 MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); John Gooch, Mussolini and His Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922, 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 77 Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 78 Gerhard Schreiber, ‘Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939-1940,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 52 26

although the Italian soldier is considered as good as any, he is seen to have been betrayed by

obsolete weapons and equipment, archaic operational principles and divisions which lacked

offensive and defensive punch when compared to its contemporaries.79 The conclusion to the

section on Italy leaves no doubt as to how Italy was viewed by the authors:

Mussolini was about to enter a conflict…in which Italy’s armed forces and economy were inadequate from military, material, organizational, and domestic points of view. He was doing so, moreover, as a member of a coalition which, on economic and geo-strategic grounds, was bound to become overstressed by any joint conduct of the war, as in the long run the strategic gap between and increased demand – to offset consumption and losses – and inadequate armament facilities must, with a probability bordering on certainty, grow ever wider.80

Bernd Stegemann makes it clear that Germany and Italy were not equal partners as

although officially co-belligerents in an equal partnership, this was really a mésalliance.

Mussolini’s intent was to fight a ‘parallel war’ in which Italy pursued independent war aims but

events led his country down a very different path.81 One shortcoming of this German history is

the secondary importance accorded to air power. Understandably, its focus is at the level of

grand strategy but there is comprehensive treatment of the ground campaigns at the operational

and even grand tactical levels. Although sea power has a prominent role in terms of its

importance in securing the sea lines of communications in the Mediterranean there is no

comparable treatment of air power as it is only mentioned in passing or as auxiliary to events on

land or at sea. Also, there is no discussion of the influence of air power on the land campaign from either the Axis or Allied perspective.

79 Gerhard Schreiber, ‘Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939-1940,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 72 80 Gerhard Schreiber, ‘Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939-1940,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 98 81 Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 755-67 27

To provide a non-British Commonwealth interpretation of events, some foreign language

studies have been consulted. The Italian official histories provide useful material which counters

the strong German bias in existing literature.82 Karl Gundelach wrote a very strong two-volume

history of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean which is essential for understanding the role of

German air power as well as the logistical challenges faced by the Afrika Korps.83

A relatively balanced account of the campaign written with a focus on the German side of operations can be found in Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, Rommel’s North African

Campaign.84 Rommel’s own writings, published in English by Basil Liddell Hart as The Rommel

Papers, are another important source of information.85 Bruce Gudmundsson published an edited

collection of historical accounts written by German officers for the US Army Foreign Military

Studies Programme after the war. Although the book is subtitled ‘The Crusader Battles,’ it also

deals with the preceding period, including Operation ‘Battleaxe.’86

There is much to be learned from a detailed campaign study of the first year of the war in

Egypt and Libya. The roots of the British air support system saw its first operational test during

Operation Compass and demonstrated the legitimacy of those methods. Raymond Collishaw had

effectively directed the employment of his squadrons to support the British offensive which

succeeded beyond the expectations of all and destroyed a much large enemy force. This could

not have occurred without the air superiority and interdiction campaign conducted by Collishaw,

a pattern of operations that would eventually become standard in the Allied air forces for the

82 Ministero della Difesa, In Africa Settentrionale: La Preparazione Al Conflitto l'Avanzata Su Sidi El Barrani, Ottobre 1935 - Settembre 1940 (Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1955); Ministero della Difesa, La Prima Offensiva Britannica in Africa Settentrionale (Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1979); Ministero della Difesa, La Prima Controffensiva Italo-Tedesca in Africa Settentrionale (15 Febbraio-18 Novembre 1941) (Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1974). 83 Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche Luftwaffe Im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981). 84 Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, Rommel’s North African Campaign (Conshokocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1994). 85 B.H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers (London: Arrow Books Ltd, 1987 (1957)). 86 Bruce I. Gudmundsson, ed., Inside the Afrika Korps: The Crusader Battles, 1941-1942 (London: Greenhill Books, 1999). 28 remainder of the war. There was much work yet to be done on the technical matters of providing effective support, but when relations between the army and the RAF deteriorated over the direction of air support Churchill decisively intervened in the debate by advocating the exact methods successfully employed by Collishaw during Operation Compass.

Raymond Collishaw is variously described as a great fighter pilot, inspirational leader and iconic hero but is also characterised as a commander who was promoted perhaps one rank too high and did not possess the skills to manage a large staff. However, the ultimate test of a commander’s abilities lies in his conduct during battle and it is by that standard he should be judged.

Chapter 1 – The First World War

Raymond Collishaw emerged from the First World War as one of the conflict’s top aces and this

has remained his legacy in the historical record. His success in air-to-air combat, while impressive, was less important than his development in other areas. In 1914 Collishaw was set on a career in the Canadian Fisheries Protection Service but in 1915 he joined the Royal Naval

Air Service and over the next three years he rose steadily through the ranks ending the war as a squadron commander. This chapter will explore the Collishaw’s First World War experiences to show how this was a formative period in his career development. His success and experience as a commander prepared him for a successful post-war career in the Royal Air Force (RAF) and it was his specialisation and operational experience in the ground attack role that would inform his actions as a commander during the Second World War.

Raymond Collishaw is best remembered as one of the top aces of the First World War.

Over the course of two years of operational flying with six squadrons he was credited with 61 confirmed kills, making him the second leading British Empire ace behind fellow Canadian,

William Avery ‘Billy’ Bishop.1 But his Great War exploits are but one aspect of his development as an officer in the Royal Naval Air Service and subsequently the Royal Air Force. Collishaw had a range of experiences during the First World War and in the interwar period which educated and prepared him for his ultimate command in the Western Desert in 1940-1941.

1 The question of aerial kills has always been a contentious issue. The British system of verifying claims in the First World War was haphazard at best. It is generally agreed that Major William ‘Billy’ Bishop led Allied aces with 72 kills and that Collishaw was second with 61 kills, tied with Major Edward ‘Mick’ Mannock. For a more complete discussion on this issue, see Christopher Shores, Norman Franks, and Russell Guest, Above the Trenches: A Complete Record of the Fighter Aces and Units of the British Empire Air Forces 1915-1920 (Stoney Creek, ON: Fortress Publications, 1990), 115-6 and Christopher Shores, Norman Franks, and Russell Guest, Above the Trenches: Supplement (London: Grub Street, 1996), 16. 30

Raymond Collishaw was born in Nanaimo, British Columbia, Canada on 22 November

1893. His parents, Jack and Sadie (nee Jones), were from Wales and immigrated to the United

States where they met in Oakland, California. They moved to a farm near Vancouver, BC but

found the low-lying ground prone to flooding so they moved again to Nanaimo. It was here they

started their family and Raymond was the first of four brothers and two sisters born to the

couple. Jack was described as a ‘dreamer with a restless nature’2 who did the ‘gold miner’s

grand tour.’3 His attempts to strike it rich took him from Western Australia to California and then up to the Klondike, but he spent more time looking for gold than actually finding it.

Through most of this period Sadie was left behind in Nanaimo to mind the family. One

biographer, Allan Snowie, observed that Raymond ‘inherits both his mother’s sense of

responsibility and his father’s spirit of adventure.’4 This astutely captures the essence of

Collishaw’s character.

In 1908 Collishaw left home and joined the Canadian Fisheries Protection Service

(CFPS). Starting as a cabin boy, Collishaw served on the CGS Alcedo, a 69-foot-long wooden steamer. He recalled that his position was more akin to a junior seaman and was specially arranged for him by his father, who was a good friend of the Superintendent of Fisheries for

British Columbia.5 Over the next seven years Collishaw served on several ships engaged in patrol work along the BC coast. He found his time in the CFPS to be interesting and engaging and he was given ample time to continue his studies. He spent time ashore at the Vancouver

Navigation School and took his books with him when he was at sea. He achieved his Mates

2 J. Allan Snowie, Collishaw & Company: Canadians in the Royal Naval Air Service, 1914-1918 (Bellingham, WA: Nieuport Publishing Inc, 2010), xviii. 3 Raymond Collishaw, ‘The Collishaw Story,’ n.d., Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9. 4 J. Allan Snowie, Collishaw & Company, xix. 5 Raymond Collishaw, ‘The Collishaw Story.’ 31

Certificate in 1911 and his Masters Certificate three years later. He was able to rise through the

ranks becoming first a seaman and eventually a first officer and mate.6

In 1914 Collishaw was First Mate aboard the CGS Fispa, a ‘plum’ appointment as the

ship was lavishly appointed and served as the personal yacht of the Superintendent of Fisheries

in British Columbia.7 At the outbreak of the war, the Fispa was tasked along with other CFPS

vessels to patrol the west coast of Canada to keep watch for German naval ships. It was fortunate

for Collishaw that the German warship Leipzig chose not to approach the Canadian coast as the

small Canadian vessels were no match for the powerful cruiser.8 Late in the year Collishaw was

told that he would receive command of the next available ship but he wanted to play a more

active role in the war and feared it would end before he saw any action.9 He applied for active

sea duty in the Royal Canadian Navy but heard nothing back so in early 1915 he applied for

service in the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS). Collishaw had been entranced by a flying show

on Lulu Island near Vancouver before the war and the mystique of aeroplanes appealed to his

sense of adventure. Aviation was still in its infancy at the start of the war; it was barely a decade

since the Wright brothers had first proved heavier than air flight possible. Collishaw passed an

initial interview in Esquimalt, BC and was then sent to Ottawa where he was personally

interviewed by Vice-Admiral Charles Kingsmill, the head of the Royal Canadian Navy.

6 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 1-4; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Remarks on my Royal Canadian Navy, Fishery [sic] Protection Service – 1908 to 1915,’ n.d. but attached to letter sent to R.V. Dodds, 17 May 1972, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9. 7 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Remarks on my Royal Canadian Navy, Fishery [sic] Protection Service – 1908 to 1915.’ 8 The story of the chase of the Leipzig can be found in Gilbert Norman Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Its Official History, vol.1: Origins and Early Years (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1962), 268-290. 9 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Remarks on my Royal Canadian Navy, Fishery [sic] Protection Service – 1908 to 1915.’ 32

Collishaw was told by Kingsmill that his service reports were good and he passed his interview

and was accepted as a probationary flight sub-lieutenant.10

But, as Collishaw recalled, there was ‘one hurdle to clear before I could actually be

sworn in and appointed to a commission. Entirely at my own expense I had to seek out a suitable

private flying school, make arrangements for admission, pay the tuition fee and qualify for a

private pilot certificate as issued under the regulations of the Fédération Aéronautique

Internationale.’11 The only suitable flying school in Canada at this time was the Curtiss aviation

school in Toronto. It was a significant undertaking for students to attend the school. Flight

training has always been expensive and tuition for the school started at $400. The candidate was

also responsible for his own room and board which could amount to over $1,000 in Toronto in

just a few months. To put the burden of this expense in perspective, a Canadian private on active

service in 1915 made $1.10 per day.12 Jobs on the side were not possible as the Curtiss School

expected candidates to spend their unstructured time at the hangars and flight line.13 Collishaw

arrived in Toronto in the fall of 1915 and paid a $50 deposit to hold a place in a future course.

The school at the time was operating well above capacity and had a large backlog of students

waiting to start their flight training. After some months the navy recognized the delays and

Collishaw was among a group sent to Halifax in late November 1915 for naval training aboard

the old Canadian cruiser HMCS Niobe. He found this short course to be an excellent introduction

10 Raymond Collishaw, ‘The Collishaw Story’; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 3-4. 11 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 5. In 1915 $400 equated to $8,059 in May 2013, see the Bank of Canada’s inflation calculator found at , assessed 16 March 2012; Information of Canadian army pay rates taken from Canadian Army Active Service Pay Book, 1915, found at , accessed 11 May 2013. 12 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 5. 13 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to Fred H. Hitchins, 22 January 1957, The Beatrice Hitchens Memorial Collection of Aviation History, Western Archives, Western University, London, Ontario, Collishaw correspondence file, III-14. 33

to naval knowledge and customs which was very useful when RNAS flight training commenced

in England.14

Collishaw left New York City for England on the SS Adriatic on 12 January 1916. He

arrived at Royal Naval Air Station at Redcar, near Middlesbrough in northeast England on 3

February on 3 February 1915 and discovered that the RNAS policy of pilot training had changed.

He made his first flight in a dual control French Breguet a week after his arrival and he made his

first solo on 16 June. Like many early aviators, Collishaw was lucky to survive this period of

training. Aircraft were primitive and unreliable and mechanical failures were frequent.

Reflecting on this training, Collishaw observed, ‘I now realize that the RNAS System of Air

Training in use in 1916 was conducted in a very lackadaisical manner. The only driving force

apparent was vested in the students, who were eager to get on with active service.’15 His flying

logbook revealed numerous forced landings resulting from engine stoppages during this early

period.16 Collishaw was next sent to the Gunnery School at Eastchurch on the Ile of Sheppey

near London in the middle of July. By his own admission he had become a competent pilot after

some 33 hours of solo flight and he was awarded his pilot’s certificate. Under the RNAS system,

this meant that he was now able to fly any type of aircraft without further instruction.17

Upon completion of the course in aerial gunnery and bomb-dropping, Collishaw was

confirmed in his rank of flight sub-lieutenant and posted to his first operational unit, No.3

(Naval) Wing on 2 August 1916. This unit was the forerunner to RAF Bomber Command and

14 Raymond Collishaw, ‘The Officers Training Class in HMCS “Niobe” 1915,’ n.d., Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9; Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 5-8. 15 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Royal Naval Air Service Station, Redcar, Yorks, 1916,’ n.d. but attached to letter sent to R.V. Dodds, 17 May 1972, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9. 16 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Pilot’s Flying Log Book No.1, 1915-1918,’ Canadian War Museum 19770669-019. 17 ‘Details of Collishaw’s draft to the UK,’ n.d., Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 3-5. 34

was the first strategic bombing force. He was assigned to fly the fighter version of the Sopwith

1½ Strutter and flew escort for the RNAS bombers until he was posted to No.3 (Naval) Squadron in late January 1917.18

At this early point in his flying career Collishaw was identified as a pilot with leadership,

command and organizational skills and his confidential efficiency reports consistently remarked

upon these talents. In January 1917, Captain (N) W.L. Elder, his commanding officer in No.3

Wing RNAS, commented: ‘Ability to command Very Good Indeed being steady & reliable pilot.

Has shown great resource as a fighter pilot. Recommended for promotion.’19 This evaluation was

repeated six months later when his confidential report recorded: ‘Exceptionally capable Flight

Commander with exceptional ability to command and organize.’20 Collishaw was able to

combine the rare talent of being both a great fighter pilot and a capable leader of men.

Major Bertram Bell, a Flight Commander with No.3 Squadron RNAS, recognized

Collishaw as ‘one of the most promising boys in the squadron’ when he first encountered the

‘round, red-faced boy sitting in one corner’ of the mess.21 Bell, an abrasive, ‘no nonsense’

Australian, was not generally well liked by his pilots but he proved to be an able commander by turning No.10 Naval into one of the top Allied squadrons on the Western Front. He was

18 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Pilot’s Flying Log Book No.1, 1915-1918,’ Canadian War Museum 19770669-019; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 5-7; Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 7-16. The parallel between No.3 Wing RNAS in the First World War and RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War is drawn from an article written by R.V. Dodds, see R.V. Dodds, ‘Britain’s First Strategic Bombing Force: No.3 (Naval) Wing,’ The Roundel, 15, no.6 (July- August 1963). 19 Admiralty: Royal Naval Air Service: Registers of Officers' Services. Page 147: Raymond Collishaw DSO; DSC., ADM 273/8/147. 20 Admiralty: Royal Naval Air Service: Registers of Officers' Services. Page 147: Raymond Collishaw DSO; DSC., ADM 273/8/147. 21 Major B.C. Bell, ‘Raymond Collishaw, D.S.O., D.S.C., D.F.C.,’ Reveille 10, no.4 (1 December 1936), 22, newspaper clipping found in Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Raymond Collishaw Fonds, MG 30, E280, vol.1. 35

‘completely intolerant’ of pilots who did not display his same level of commitment, but he was

extremely generous to those, such as Collishaw, who did.22

When Bell was assigned command of No.10 Squadron RNAS he brought Collishaw along as one of his flight commanders who proved his leadership ability by quickly putting ‘B’

Flight in good order.23 This was the famous ‘Black Flight,’ made up entirely of Canadians flying

the Sopwith Triplane. Collishaw’s aircraft was dubbed ‘Black Maria,’ and the other aircraft of

the flight were known as ‘Black Death,’ ‘Black Prince,’ ‘Black Roger,’ and ‘Black Sheep.’ This unit became one of the most successful fighting groups of the war, destroying 87 enemy aircraft between May and July 1917. Collishaw alone accounted for 27 aircraft destroyed during this period and was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and Distinguished Service Order for his accomplishments.24

Though Collishaw achieved great personal success while serving with Naval 10, the

intensive operations were costly for the squadron. Attrition was a serious problem for the RNAS

and RFC over the Western Front in 1917. April and May had been deadly months and the

situation did not ease with the Battle of Messines in June. The loss of pilots and aircraft became

so severe that Major-General Hugh Trenchard, Officer Commanding the RFC in France, issued a

warning to his brigade commanders on 10 June which stated: ‘I would ask that as far as possible

you do your best to point out to your Armies that it is of the utmost importance that the Flying

Corps should avoid wastage in both pilots and machines…My reserve at present is dangerously

low, in fact, in some cases it barely exists at all and the supply from home is not coming forward

22 Mike Westrop, A History of No.10 Squadron Royal Naval Air Service in World War 1 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2004), 24. 23 Westrop, A History of No.10 Squadron Royal Naval Air Service in World War 1, 24-25; P.S. Sadler, ‘Bell, Bertram Charles (1893–1941),’ Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, , accessed 15 April 2013. 24 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 33-70; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 2-6. 36

sufficiently freely to enable us to continue fighting an offensive in the air continuously…[thus] it

is necessary to do everything to avoid losses.’25 Trenchard concluded his order on a

contradictory note when he urged that ‘It is of the utmost importance, however, that the offensive

spirit is maintained in the Flying Corps.’26 Collishaw observed after the war that it seemed that

his Brigade commander had missed reading this order, or decided that the last sentence was the

only part that was important.27 His squadron, Naval 10, was heavily engaged from late April

through July and suffered severe losses – 12 killed, four wounded and three prisoners of war; the

overwhelming majority of these casualties occurred after Trenchard gave his order to avoid

wastage.28 These losses noticeably impacted the squadron as the ‘heavy casualties caused an

inevitable weakening of what had been a well trained and experienced Squadron, and its eager

spirit declined.’29 Collishaw understood that sometimes heavy casualties were an unavoidable

part of combat, but he also understood the risk of trying to do too much. He believed that Naval

10 was pushed too hard during this period and its combat effectiveness suffered as a result.30

Another issue during Collishaw’s time with the squadron was the reliability of their

aircraft. The Sopwith Triplane, a fast, agile fighter, had a tendency to break up during violent

aerobatics; three or four pilots had been killed as a result of the aircraft’s structural problems

causing many pilots to lose confidence in it. Collishaw volunteered to put on a flying display for

the men to show that the aircraft was sound:

25 Quoted in H.A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, vol.4 (London: Naval & Military Press, 2002 (1934)), 133-134. 26 Jones, The War in the Air, vol.4, 134. 27 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command, 90. 28 Eight of the 12 fatal casualties, two of the seriously wounded and all three POWs occurred after Trenchard’s order of 10 June. For details see ‘Appendix E – Casualties, Crashes and Incidents,’ Westrop, A History of No.10 Squadron Royal Naval Air Service in World War 1, 176-177. 29 Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 8. 30 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command, 90; see also John H. Morrow, The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921 (Washington: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1993), 238. 37

I suddenly realized what kind of a display Collishaw would give, and a sickening feeling of horror and fear came over me as I stood watching the ‘Black Maria’ [Collishaw’s aircraft] climb to 3000 feet. Collishaw did every possible thing he could do to smash that machine in the air – rolls, loops and spins harshly made, and finally a vertical dive with his engine full on, pulling out with a violent jerk only at the last moment.

At last he landed, and as the ‘Black Maria’ taxied across the aerodrome I could see the slack flying wires and bracing wires shaking violently. Jumping out of the cockpit before the admiring group of young pilots, he said, ‘Now then boys, see if one of you can smash one, I’ll bet you can’t!’31

A fearless, lead-by-example character was evident in Collishaw’s command style throughout his career. Bell continued to hold a high opinion of Collishaw’s abilities while he was with Naval Three and he observed, ‘In my opinion this Officer is quite capable of running a

Squadron, and I strongly recommend him from early promotion to Acting Squadron Cdr

[Commander].’32

Following a two-month leave, Collishaw was posted to the Seaplane Defence Squadron,

flying Sopwith Camels near Dunkirk. He was promoted to command this unit, redesignated

No.13 (Naval) Squadron, when its commanding officer was injured in a crash. In late January

1918, Collishaw was further promoted to squadron leader and appointed to command his old

squadron, Naval Three.33 This unit, also equipped with Sopwith Camels, was very active during

Collishaw’s time as commander, especially during the 1918 German offensive of March-April,

and the resulting Allied counteroffensive, ‘the Last Hundred Days.’ No.203 Squadron was

31 Major B.C. Bell, ‘Raymond Collishaw, D.S.O., D.S.C., D.F.C.,’ Reveille 10, no.4 (1 December 1936, newspaper clipping found in Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Raymond Collishaw Fonds, MG 30, E280, vol.1), 22, 30. 32 Admiralty: Royal Naval Air Service: Registers of Officers' Services. Page 147: Raymond Collishaw DSO; DSC., ADM 273/8/147. 33 Naval Three was the colloquial name given to No.3 Squadron, Royal Naval Air Service. On 1 April 1918 it became No.203 Squadron when the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service were combined to create the Royal Air Force. 38

credited with downing 125 aircraft while losing only 30 of its own pilots, an indication of

Collishaw’s skill and leadership abilities.34

The preceding discussion, with a much greater emphasis on Collishaw’s skill in air-to-air

combat, is the traditional narrative of his career. For the purposes of this study the early part of

his career as well as the focus on his ability to shoot down enemy aircraft is less important in

understanding Collishaw than other facets which have received scant attention in the literature.

His experiences over the Western Front showed the development of an excellent leader and

commander. They also demonstrated that he was one of the first experts in low-level army support missions. This important role has received almost no attention in the writings about him, but by Collishaw’s own admission almost half the missions he flew in the last three months of the war were low level strafing and bombing attacks.35 Collishaw took command of Naval Three

near the end of January 1918 and after two quiet months his squadron was committed to help

stop the German spring offensive. The German attack commenced on 21 March and quickly

breached the lines of the British 3rd and 5th Armies. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the

Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, committed all available reserves

including 36 squadrons of the RFC by the end of the first day and added more later.36

Naval Three spent the first two days flying offensive patrols to harass and destroy enemy aircraft, but on 25 March it was ordered to undertake low-level attacks to help stem the enemy

34 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 170. 35 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 165. Collishaw’s flying logs for this period show that 51 of 168 missions were low level attack missions. It is likely that a significant number of additional sorties were also ground support missions which cannot be specifically identified from the logs. See Raymond Collishaw, ‘Pilot’s Flying Log Book No.1, 1915-1918,’ and ‘Pilot’s Flying Log Book No.2, 1918-1926,’ Canadian War Museum 19770669-019. 36 For a detailed discussion of the German spring offensive see J.P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ch.17; John Terraine, To Win a War: 1918, The Year of Victory (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1981); David Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). See also the British official histories: James Edmonds, Military Operations. France and Belgium, 1918, Vol. 1 (London: Macmillian, 1935) and H.A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, vol.4 (London: Naval & Military Press, 2002 (1934)). 39

advance. Collishaw recalled that his squadron was ordered to attack the ‘German front line and

forward positions, bombing and firing at troop concentrations, convoys and any other suitable

targets they could find.’37 Major-General John Salmond, General Officer Commanding the

Royal Flying Corps in the Field, issued an operational order on 25 March that stated in part,

‘These squadrons will bomb and shoot up everything they can see on the enemy side of this line.

Very low flying is essential. All risks to be taken. Urgent.’38 On 27 March the RFC effort reached its peak of close support missions. Aircraft of the III, V and IX Brigades reinforced by I and II Brigades flew an average of four flights per day. The pace of operations for Collishaw’s

Naval Three was even higher as it averaged six sorties per day.39

Collishaw discussed the merits of this low level air support in his autobiography. He noted that the vast majority of RFC and RNAS units, including artillery co-operation and day- bombing squadrons, had been devoted to direct attacks designed to blunt the German advance.

Though this use of aircraft was controversial at the time, and since, he believed that the effort was justified by the dire situation.40 Collishaw admitted that it was difficult to assess the impact

these attacks had on the German army, but he quoted a number of passages from German

regimental histories which discussed the negative impact the air attacks had on their troops. The

intensity of these ground attack missions was demonstrated by one German soldier who recalled

a British aircraft which pressed its attack so low that his company commander was ‘literally run

over’ by the wheels of the aircraft as it strafed the German column. Collishaw concluded that

37 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 149. 38 Quoted in Jones, The War in the Air, vol.4, 320. 39 Sydney F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, vol.1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 507. 40 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 152-3. John Slessor, considered the foremost theoretician on close air support in British between the wars, came to the same conclusion in the mid-1930s. He argued that the air force should not engage in close support operations except in an emergency. See John Slessor, Air Power and Armies (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2009 (1936)), 90. 40

based on the evidence provided by pilots and information obtained from the enemy, ‘there seems

little doubt that our low-level attack resulted in significant German losses.’41

The high tempo of ground attack missions continued for a week and the British contained

the German offensive by 5 April before it reached Amiens. The respite was short, however, as

the Germans launched a new offensive on 7 April astride the Lys River in Belgium. This

offensive was aimed at Ypres with the ultimate goal of capturing the French channel ports of

Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk in order to sever the logistical lifeline of the British Expeditionary

Force.42 Collishaw’s Naval Three (renamed No.203 Squadron on 1 April 1918) was again

committed to the battlefield and it was a period as hectic as any experienced during the war. The

majority of missions flown in April were in direct support of the army though more sorties were devoted to ‘Offensive Patrols’ (air superiority missions) than during the previous German attack.

On one particularly busy day, 12 April, the squadron dropped 196 25-pound bombs and fire

23,000 rounds of ammunition in low-level flying.43

Ground support operations in 1918 were ad hoc in nature. The pilots had received no

specialized training in air to ground operations and there were no procedures established for

coordinating the army and the air force. ‘Tich’ Rochford, one of the best pilots in Collishaw’s

squadron, was honest but not unique in his description of these undertakings:

These low level missions were thoroughly disliked by most of us as one becomes a mere target to be shot at all the time and it was a matter of sheer luck whether one got hit or not. Nor was it always easy to identify German from British troops, and while this was being done one became even more vulnerable. My method was to take the flight to a height from which likely targets could be seen clearly, then

41 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 153. 42 Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War, 467-470; Terraine, To Win a War, 49-50; Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall, 68-78. 43 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 154-7; ‘Tich’ Rochford noted that no fewer than 220 bombs were dropped on 12 April. Leonard H. Rochford, I Chose the Sky (London: William Kimber, 1977), 152- 153. 41

dive down on them firing off all ammunition as quickly as possible and, having made a mental note of the positions of all enemy troops, return home.44

This period of operations was hard on the pilots, both new and old, as the stress and

danger of these missions was high. Rochford noted with obvious relief that with the defeat of the

Lys offensive at the start of May the squadron moved away from low level missions and again

mainly flew patrols and offensive missions.45 June and July were relatively quiet months for the

RFC and No.203 Squadron. Collishaw returned to the air in June after being grounded by

administrative work during the German offensives. In spite of only flying three or four times a

week, Collishaw was able to add a further 11 confirmed kills to his total.46

The Battle of Amiens, the great Allied victory of August 1918, is remembered as the

beginning of the end for Germany in the First World War. It was operationally important as the

‘black day of the German army,’47 but it also featured the greatest air concentration of any battle

during the First World War. Aircraft were tasked to fly air superiority, interdiction and close

support missions. It was in many respects the first thoroughly modern and comprehensive

application of air power on the battlefield and would set the standard for future air operations in

44 Rochford, I Chose the Sky, 147. 45 Rochford, I Chose the Sky, 157. 46 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 160; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Pilot’s Flying Log Book No.1, 1915-1918,’ Canadian War Museum 19770669-019; Shores et al., Above the Trenches, 116. Collishaw did not fly many operational missions after taking command of Naval Three. During most of this period he was occupied with the administrative side of running his squadron. This does not diminish the important learning experience he would have gained from his squadron being largely committed to flying low level missions to stop the German offensives during the six week period. 47 General Erich Ludendorff, the German Chief of the General Staff, recorded in his memoirs, ‘August 8th was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war.’ Quoted in G.W.L. Nicholson, The Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), 407; Sydney F. Wise, ‘The Black Day of the German Army: Australians and Canadians at Amiens, August 1918,’ in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, eds., 1918: Defining Victory. Proceedings of the Chief of Army's History Conference Held at the National Convention Centre, Canberra 29 September 1998 (Canberra: Army History Unit, Department of Defence, 1999), 25. 42

both the First and Second World Wars.48 Royal Canadian Air Force official historian Syd Wise

provided one of the few academic examinations of the Amiens air battle and concluded that it

was ‘tactically innovative and set the pattern for the remainder of the war.’49 Collishaw was

closely involved this battle flying and directing army support missions as the commander of

No.203 Squadron.

The attack at Amiens was designed to break through the main German defensive

positions east of the city. The main assault was bounded by the Amiens-Roye road in the south

and the Ancre River in the north. It was led by the Canadian and Australian Corps with

supporting British and French corps to the north and south. The objective for the first day’s

operations was designated as the Blue Line, the old outer Amiens defences. The main thrust was

strongly augmented by tanks, some 360 in total, which provided close support for the infantry

and precluded the need for artillery preparation and facilitated a surprise attack. The artillery

would only come into action once the attack had started and it would target known enemy positions, fire counter-battery tasks and shield the battlefield from arriving reserves. There was an entire corps of cavalry in reserve to exploit any breakthrough.50

The RAF was assigned a major role for this battle and more than 40 squadrons and 800

aircraft took part in the offensive. The French to the south contributed another 1,025 aircraft. The

principal objective for the RAF was to support the ground battle. For Collishaw, this battle

marked an important change from the defensive struggles of the spring and summer. The ground

and air forces planned to work together in an unprecedented manner and there would be close

48 Slessor, Air Power and Armies, 148-199. John Slessor, a RAF Staff College classmate of Collishaw, devoted a considerable portion of his influential 1936 book to air operations at Amiens with the goal of learning the lessons from that operation. 49 Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 518. 50 Nicholson, The Canadian Expeditionary Force, 386-98; Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918 (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008), 409-18; Wise, ‘The Black Day of the German Army: Australians and Canadians at Amiens, August 1918,’ 24-25. 43

pre-planned co-operation between the army and RAF.51 ‘Sholto’ Douglas, the experienced

commander of No.84 Squadron, noted this was one of the few times that the army commanders

had shared the details of a plan with the RAF beforehand.52 Prior to the start of the operation the

RAF directed a number of fighter squadrons to patrol the front line and prevent German aircraft

from discovering the large scale buildup. Unsettled weather which limited air operations during

the first week of August helped disguise the offensive but when it cleared up on 7 August the

strong RAF presence prevented German aircraft from discovering anything useful. On the night

of 7/8 August two Handley-Page bombers struggled into the air in less than ideal conditions and

flew over the front lines for three hours before the launch of the attack. This patrol masked the

sound of the assembling tanks and helped to preserve the surprise nature of the attack.53

On the morning of the attack air superiority was maintained by a screen of six single-seat

fighter squadrons from the RAF’s IX Brigade. These aircraft patrolled a line 15-20 miles to the

east of the start line to prevent German aircraft interfering with the operation. Six corps (or army

co-operation) squadrons were assigned to work closely with the army and largely provided

tactical reconnaissance for the army corps with which they worked. This included flying contact

patrols to keep track of the advancing troops and direct the fire of the artillery. The squadrons

carried out attacks against enemy targets when required. Two of the corps squadrons were

assigned the special task of laying a smoke screen at designated spots on the Australian and

51 Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 521-523; Wise, ‘The Black Day of the German Army: Australians and Canadians at Amiens, August 1918, 24-25. 52 Sholto Douglas, Years of Combat: The First Volume of the Autobiography of Sholto Douglas (London: Collins, 1963), 325. 53 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 164; Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 519-21. 44

Canadian fronts. This was done to impede the view of the German gunners and protect attacking

troops and tanks.54

A central part of the plan for the Amiens offensive saw a further nine single-seat fighter

squadrons employed exclusively against ground targets. These low-flying attacks in the battle zone targeted enemy troop concentrations, artillery batteries, machine gun positions, ammunition wagons and other transport. Orders stressed that special attention was given to German anti-tank

gun positions as they most threatened the advance of the tanks. Each squadron would dispatch

aircraft in pairs to their assigned sector at intervals of 30 minutes. Further away from the front

line, a concentrated attempt was made to interdict the battlefield to prevent the Germans from

reinforcing the battle area. To accomplish this, attacks were made on enemy aerodromes and key

choke points such as bridges and railway hubs. A small number of aircraft were dedicated to

providing strategic reconnaissance during the course of the battle. The RAF’s I Brigade,

including Collishaw’s No.203 Squadron, concentrated on low-level missions – trench strafing in the vocabulary of the time, or what today would be called close air support.55

Collishaw led No.203 Squadron into the air soon after the offensive commenced though

their departure was delayed by ground fog which also impeded the effectiveness of their early

low level attacks. The mist lifted by 0900 hours revealing ground targets to attacking pilots.

No.203 Squadron concentrated on attacking targets on the Canadian Corps front. The ground

support role was crucial in this battle as the infantry soon advanced beyond the range of their

supporting artillery. The intensity and tempo of air operations on 8 August matched those of the

ground forces. No.203 Squadron was the most active low-level squadron in I Brigade, dropping a

54 J.C. Nerney, ‘The Western Front – Air Operations, May-November 1918,’ Air Historical Branch, n.d. TNA AIR 1/677/21/3/1887, 116-120. 55 J.C. Nerney, ‘The Western Front – Air Operations, May-November 1918,’ Air Historical Branch, n.d. TNA AIR 1/677/21/3/1887, 120-127; Slessor, Air Power and Armies, Part III; Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, ch.17. 45

total of 112 25-pound bombs by 1600 hours on 8 August.56 Collishaw flew his first mission at

0500 hours and subsequently flew three additional missions. His final mission of the day ended

in near tragedy when his Sopwith Camel was hit by ground fire and forced down.57 He recalled,

‘My logbook shows that I put in 11 hours, 20 minutes in the air during the day, all at heights of

100 feet or less.’58

It is impossible to quantify the impact of close air support on 8 August but anecdotal

evidence suggests the attacks helped the progress of the infantry. General Sir Henry Rawlinson,

commander of Fourth Army, stated after the battle that ‘the action of low-flying machines on “Z”

day, though it entailed heavy casualties, had a serious effect in lowering the enemy’s morale and

inflicting serious losses, as is shown by captured enemy documents…In no battle had they

(R.A.F.) taken part with greater success in dealing with ground attacks.’59 A comment in the war

diary of the 5th Canadian Infantry Battalion highlighted the importance of aircraft on 8 August:

In a sunken road between one hundred and fifty and two hundred germans [sic] were caught by Tanks and aeroplanes, and not one got away. The enemy losses must have been terrible. Our planes seemed like things possessed; a plane would streak down from behind to within a few yards of our heads, and with a roar shoot up almost perpendicularly, the cheers of our men following it. Kilometres ahead they could be seen diving at the retreating enemy, and the merry rattle of their machine guns was heard continuously. The air was thick with them, and never an enemy plane to be seen.60

The Fourth Army history, written shortly after the war by Major-General Sir Archibald

Montgomery, the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of Fourth Army, was very

56 Royal Air Force Operations Summary for 1st Brigade, 4 pm – 7th August to 4 pm – 8th August 1918, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9. No.203 Squadron dropped more than twice the number of bombs of any other squadron in I Brigade and most other squadrons dropped far less. 57 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Pilot’s Flying Log Book No.1, 1915-1918,’ Canadian War Museum 19770669-019. 58 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 165 59 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Memorandum to V Brigade RAF, 16 August 1918, quoted in J.C. Nerney, ‘The Western Front – Air Operations, May-November 1918,’ Air Historical Branch, nd. TNA AIR 1/677/21/3/1887, 152. 60 War Diary, 5th Canadian Infantry Battalion, 8 August 1918, LAC RG 9, Series III-D-3, Volume 4916, Reel T- 10709. 46

complimentary towards the work of the RAF. He considered that the hazardous support rendered

by the RAF was an essential part of the victory, especially the low-level attacks which

‘completed the demoralization of the enemy by attacking his retiring troops and transport with

bombs and machine-gun fire, and by shooting gun teams in the act of withdrawing the guns.’61

A sortie flown by Lieutenant W.C. Sterling of No.24 Squadron in support of the

Canadian Corps was typical of the support rendered by the RAF. Flying an SE-5a Lieutenant

Sterling dropped four 25-pound bombs on a train in the village of Rosières. He then discovered a concentration of horse-drawn wagons which he machine gunned with great effect.62 These low level attacks continued all day and had a tremendous effect on the Germans. John Slessor, who had low level flying experience as a flight commander with No.5 Squadron over the Western

Front and would later be a classmate of Collishaw’s at the RAF Staff College, remarked after the war that there was ‘no question but that the action of the low-flying fighters was a factor of immense importance in the overwhelming success of the initial attack.’63 The first day of

operations saw an unprecedented advance of some eight miles in the Canadian sector and seven

miles in the Australian sector. Seven German divisions had been badly mauled and most of the

old Amiens defences were captured.64 The official history of the Royal Canadian Air Force

recounted that this attack was a ‘classic example of inter-arms co-operation and in it the air arm

had played a significant part.’65

But this type of low level support was costly to the RAF. On the first day of operations,

45 aircraft were lost and a further 52 which made it back to base were so heavily damaged that

61 Archibald Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days, August 8th to November 11th, 1918 (London: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., 2008 (1919)), 50. 62 Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 529. 63 Slessor, Air Power and Armies, 169; Max Hastings, ‘Slessor, Sir John Cotesworth (1897–1979),’, rev. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., January 2011, [http://www.oxforddnb.com.remote.libproxy.wlu.ca/view/article/31692, accessed 11 March 2012]. 64 Nicholson, The Canadian Expeditionary Force, 407-414; Cook, Shock Troops, 419-36. 65 Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 530. 47

they were scrapped. In terms of personnel, 61 aircrew were killed, missing or became prisoners

of war and 19 men were wounded. This meant that attrition rate for the approximately 700

aircraft involved in operations that day was 13 percent. The loss rate was even worse for the 300

aircraft involved in low level operations which suffered 70 of the 97 aircraft losses for an

attrition rate of 34 percent.66

The army was aware of the heavy price paid by the RAF, but Major-General

Montgomery considered that the results obtained ‘were well worth the losses incurred.’67 The

RAF had a different view, especially No.203 Squadron which suffered heavily in these attacks.

Of the 15 pilots available for action on 8 August, four were lost on the first day and another a

few days later meaning the squadron suffered losses of over 25 percent.68 Collishaw recalled

after the war that at Amiens, ‘Each time the fighter pilots were launched to assault the infantry,

they could see the aeroplane graveyard beneath them, and one was conscious, while passing

through a hail of fire, that at any moment the frail shell [of his aircraft], in which the pilot felt

poised precariously, might join its kind below.’69 He knew what he was talking about. In the last

three months of the war Collishaw flew 168 sorties of which 51, or nearly a third, were recorded

in his log book as low level missions with notations such as ‘strafing machine gun strongpoints,’

‘attacking anti-tank guns,’ or ‘attacked convoy on Mons Road.’ He was hit by enemy small arms

fire numerous times during these missions and at least twice forced down by the damage.70

66 H.A. Jones, The War in the Air, vol.6, 445-6. To put these numbers in perspective, during the Second World War RAF Bomber Command considered that loss rates above 5 percent were unsustainable, even in the short term. 67 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days, August 8th to November 11th, 1918, 50. 68 No.203 Squadron Record Book, August 1918, found in Raymond Collishaw Fonds, LAC MG 30-E280, R2492-0- 5-E, vol.9. 69 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 18. 70 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Pilot’s Flying Log Book No.1, 1915-1918,’ and ‘Pilot’s Flying Log Book No.2, 1918- 1926,’ Canadian War Museum 19770669-019. The description of each mission in the logbook was brief, often only a few words, which tended to highlight the most important aspect of a particular mission. It can be assumed that Collishaw flew additional low level missions that cannot be specifically identified from his log books. 48

Collishaw much preferred aerial combat which offered pilots the opportunity to test their skill in

a more or less even contest against fellow pilots. He did not like the exposed nature of ground

attack missions:

Air fighting is exclusively an individualist and specialist game, and pilots of outstanding merit require considerable experience before they can be relied upon to engage the enemy successfully. Experienced and talented leaders are required both to achieve results and so that the novices may generate enthusiasm to emulate the exploits of their leaders. Ground strafing eliminates without distinction both the fit and the unfit, and a Commander must beware of embarking upon any project potentially capable of destroying the fighting value of his Air Force. Army Commanders without Air Force experience are sometime inclined to insist upon the employment of an Air Force in close support in a way which might lead to this result, with the consequence that air superiority might be lost at a later stage in the campaign. This lesson was learned in the Roye Road Battle [Amiens], with the result that the ruthless employment of the major part of the Air Force upon ground strafing was not repeated during the Great War.71

One of Collishaw’s flight commanders in Naval Three was Captain Leonard ‘Tich’

Rochford, a skilled pilot who was the highest scoring ace while with the squadron.72 He was a diminutive pilot described by Collishaw as so tiny that ‘I think I could have worn him for a watch charm.’ Nevertheless, he had the ‘heart of a lion’ and was an ‘absolute hell on wings’ when he was in the cockpit of a fighter.73 In the short foreword to Rochford’s memoirs,

Collishaw wrote a tribute to the top aerial ace in his squadron but thought it important to recall

the ‘dangerous and exhausting strafing operations…which so significantly contributed to the

final Allied victory in 1918.’74 Rochford had made numerous trench strafing attacks and he

understood the importance of the difficult missions, but he shared Collishaw’s disdain for the

71 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 19. This account is particularly noteworthy because it was written before the Western Desert Campaign of 1940-1. 72 Rochford scored all of his 29 kills while serving with No.3 Squadron RNAS/No.203 Squadron. Shores et al., Above the Trenches, 323. 73 Raymond Collishaw in the foreward to Rochford, I Chose the Sky, n.p. 74 Raymond Collishaw in the foreward to Rochford, I Chose the Sky, n.p. 49

task and considered luck more important than skill or experience in surviving the hazardous

sorties.75

Following the Amiens offensive, Collishaw’s squadron remained active supporting the

Allied advance in the Last Hundred Days. The British attack was renewed on the Arras front on

22 August. No.203 Squadron was paired with No.80 Squadron to provide close support for

Fourth Army by sending out pairs of fighters every hour to attack German troops, vehicles and

anti-tank guns. The commander of the RAF’s V Brigade, Brigadier-General L.E.O. Charlton,

issued a memorandum on 14 August ordering his men to pay special attention to enemy anti-tank

guns. He argued that the experience at Amiens had shown that single anti-tank guns could

seriously stall the advance and it was the duty and responsibility of pilots and their observers to

take offensive action against these guns. There appeared to be no understanding at this point of

the difficulty in finding, engaging and destroying such small and difficult targets.76

In his memoirs Collishaw quoted a passage from the V Brigade summary for 29 August

which detailed the squadron’s activities that day:

Patrols of No.203 Squadron dropped 20 bombs on a convoy of lorries on Peronne- Rancourt Road and fired 2500 rounds into objectives in this vicinity. 20 bombs were also dropped on convoy on lorries on Grand Prix Road east of the Somme and 2500 rounds fired. Capt. Whealy’s Patrol dropped 20 bombs on parties of men in the vicinity of Bussu east of Peronne. The bombs were seen to explode amongst these troops. 2800 rounds were fired into about 200 lorries on different main roads eastward of Peronne. Eight bombs were dropped on enemy huts and transport at Aizecourt, causing a large fire. 600 rounds were fired from a low altitude. 25 bombs were dropped on a battalion of infantry. The bombs were seen to fall amongst the troops who disappeared in shrubbery and were dispersed. About 100 lorries were also attacked, 3200 rounds being fired at them. 32 bombs were dropped and 4400 rounds fired at various targets.77

75 Rochford, I Chose the Sky, 147. 76 J.C. Nerney, ‘The Western Front – Air Operations, May-November 1918,’ Air Historical Branch, nd. TNA AIR 1/677/21/3/1887, 179-80. 77 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 166-167. 50

Though this was a busy day for the squadron, Collishaw stated that it was not unusual

during this period. No.203 Squadron had become one of the specialist ground attack units on the

Western Front. Through August and early September Collishaw’s squadron did the majority of

the low-level machine gunning on the Fourth Army front and this pattern of operations continued

when No.203 Squadron was shifted to support First Army on 6 September. Coordination

between the Army and the RAF was limited, but some progress was made towards developing a

more flexible system. Collishaw recalled that procedures were instituted which allowed the army to request low-level attacks on specific targets such as road junctions, enemy troop concentrations and even specific anti-tank gun positions which were holding up an advance.

These efforts were embryonic at best and the results of these attacks are unknown, but they did foreshadow advances which became considerably more effective in the Second World War.78

These new tactics were first tried during the Cambrai offensive which started on 27

September 1918. Collishaw’s No.203 Squadron had been transferred to I Brigade and was one of

five squadrons under the control of Major B.E. Smythies which provided close support for the

First Army attack. Specific orders were issued to the squadrons setting out special tactical targets

which were of particular interest to the army. Over the next three days the RAF conducted

intensive operations in support of the ground assault and No.203 Squadron was heavily engaged

throughout.79 In preparation for the offensive aircraft of Nos.22, 40, and 203 Squadrons were

sent to bomb the German airfield at Lieu-Saint-Amand. Collishaw led his squadron on this mission which showed the varied nature of air operations undertaken by the RAF at this point in the war. On the way to the target Collishaw destroyed two enemy aircraft and continued to fly

78 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 166-167; Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 549-50; Nerney, ‘The Western Front – Air Operations,’ 230-67. 79 J.C. Nerney, ‘The Western Front – Air Operations, May-November 1918,’ Air Historical Branch, nd. TNA AIR 1/677/21/3/1887, 198, 252; Jones, The War in the Air, vol.6, 516-23; Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 562-3. 51 cover while the aerodrome was successfully bombed and numerous buildings were set on fire.

On the way back to base Collishaw led Lieutenant D.H. Woodhouse on a strafing attack against bodies of German infantry and cavalry.80 On 27 September, the first day of the attack at

Cambrai, the squadrons of 1 Brigade were ordered to carry out low level bombing and machine gun attacks on targets in front of the Canadian Corps. Special attention was given to crossings over the Sensée Canal and the Canal de l’Escaut where many direct hits and casualties were reported by the attacking pilots. The attacks on army targets continued at a heavy pace over the next three days and hundreds of 25-pound bombs and thousands of rounds of ammunition were expended in the effort.81

The fighting ended for Raymond Collishaw on 21 October 1918 when he was ordered to

London. During his time over the Western Front he had amassed over 1,000 hours of flying time and 61 confirmed kills. His next posting was to be in Canada with the Royal Air Force Canada, a major training program for Canadian, British, and American pilots, which started as Royal

Flying Corps Canada in early 1917. This program operated a number of aerodromes in Southern

Ontario and made a substantial contribution to the number of trained pilots and aircrew in the

RAF. Its first graduating class in June 1917 was 30 pilots and by March 1918 the program was contributing 245 pilots a month. Collishaw was assigned as the senior staff officer to the commanding officer, Brigadier-General C.G. Hoare, and he was appointed to join RAF Canada as it continued its expansion to fill the great need for pilots. Attrition over the Western Front and the planned expansion of the RAF for operations in 1919 gave even greater importance to the

80 V Brigade Royal Air Force War Diary, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9. 81 I Brigade Royal Air Force War Diary, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9. 52

Canadian training establishment. Collishaw joined the organization in the midst of this

expansion.82

In preparation for his duties, Collishaw was sent on a familiarization tour of RAF training

establishments in the UK to learn the current practices for pilot training. Pilot training in the UK

had advanced significantly from the early days of the war where pilots learned by example and

essentially taught themselves how to fly with no real understanding of the physics of flight. In

1917 Major R.R. Smith-Berry developed a revolutionary system of flight instruction that taught

students the physical laws of flight and instructed them in a dual-control machine before being

allowed to solo.83 By mid-1918 the RAF Canada scheme utilized a sophisticated multi-school

program for its trainee pilots which took them through basic training, wireless instruction, air

navigation, artillery cooperation and aeronautics before commencing flight training. This

method, introduced in Canada as the Armour Heights System in July 1918, cut training accidents

in half within four months. Collishaw’s own introduction to flying had been rather haphazard

and like many early apprentice flyers he was fortunate to survive the early days of his training.84

From 25 October to 11 November Collishaw visited RAF bases and training

establishments throughout the British Isles and he was in the midst of this tour when the war

ended. This brief time in this training environment was an important development in Collishaw’s

career. The importance he placed on proper pilot and aircrew training become apparent during

subsequent postings, particularly during his time about the aircraft carrier HMS Courageous.85

82 The best overview of the RFC/RAF Canada program can be found in Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, ch.4. Other useful works include a demi-official history published in 1919 and a popular history published 80 years later. Alan Sullivan, Aviation in Canada, 1917-1918 (Toronto: Rous & Mann Limited, 1919); C.W. Hunt, Dancing in the Sky: The Royal Flying Corps in Canada (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009). 83 This method of instruction, known as the Smith-Berry or Gosport Method, was the most advanced training system employed during the First World War. See Sullivan, Aviation in Canada, 1917-1918, 211-218. 84 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 6-9. 85 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 170, 177; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Pilot’s Flying Log Book No.2, 1918-1926,’ Canadian War Museum 19770669-019. 53

Collishaw’s short interlude with the RAF training establishment ended when he was

approached to take over command of the new Canadian Air Force (CAF) wing which formed

shortly before the end of the war. The genesis of this force can be traced to a Canadian desire to

have an identifiable national air force rather than see its pilots serve in British or Imperial

formations. Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Turner, Chief of the Canadian General Staff,

Overseas Military Forces of Canada, was responsible for all Canadian forces serving overseas.

Turner outlined his arguments in favour of the creation of a Canadian air force in a letter to Sir

Edward Kemp, the Minister of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada. In addition to the large number of Canadian pilots in British service, Turner believed that a number of other factors pointed to the creation of a CAF including the example of the Canadian Corps, which showed that Canadians could administer their own troops and the observation that the best interests of

Canadian pilots did not lie within a British service but, rather, a national formation which would better look after its own pilots.86 Major William A. Bishop strongly advocated the creation of a

Canadian air force. He made a strong case in an April 1918 letter:

Under the present circumstances, Canadians in the R.A.F., although doing remarkably well, are certainly not doing as well as if they were in a Canadian Corps for the reasons that (1) They are in a great many cases working under senior Officers who do not understand them. (2)They are also working with Officers who do not understand them nor often appreciate their different point of view. (3) They have not the personal touch with their country which branches of the Canadian Corps have and consequently are not inspired by direct connection with the country they are fighting for and the people at home.87

At a conference on 5 June 1918, Canadian authorities were finally able to overcome

British reluctance and it was agreed that two Canadian squadrons, one fighter and one bomber,

86 Letter, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Turner to Sir A. Edward Kemp, 30 April 1918, quoted in Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 595-6. 87 Bishop was by this time the leading Canadian ace, and one of the top Allied aces of the war, which added weight to his opinion. Letter, Major W.A. Bishop to Brigadier-General E.W.B. Morrison, General Officer Commanding the Royal Artillery, the Canadian Corps, 10 April 1918, quoted in Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 597. 54

would be formed. Major Bishop was assigned to assemble this new organization and he was

attached to HQ Overseas Military Forces of Canada as the head of the Canadian Air Force

section. His primary responsibility was to gather the personnel for the two new squadrons and he

would also liaise with the RAF and advise Kemp on all matters related to the formation of the

CAF. Bishop’s first task was to find commanding officers for the two new squadrons. His first

choice to command the fighter squadron was Collishaw but his current appointment as the

commanding officer of No.203 Squadron made him unavailable. The formation of the squadrons

was well advanced in early October when Bishop decided to resign his position and return to

Canada.88

It was at this point that Collishaw became involved with the nascent CAF. Shortly after

the war ended Collishaw was appointed to replace Bishop as the head of the CAF section in

England.89 Bishop, while a supporter of the Canadianisation of the flying service, was not

pleased with his new appointment, especially as it removed him from combat on the Western

Front. In a letter to his wife he stated his feelings with no reservations, ‘I’ve never been so

furious in my life.’90 According to Collishaw, ‘when Bishop accepted the command of the new

Canadian Wing, he thought that it was to be employed on normal Fighter duties in France. When he found that it was proposed to employ his wing almost exclusively on ground strafing he

88 Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 600-1, 608-10. 89 No confirmation of this appointment can be found in the official records, but Collishaw repeatedly makes this claim in his writings and correspondence. See Raymond Collishaw, ‘A Brief Resumé of the History of Military Aviation,’ n.d. but ca. December 1956, Hitchens Collection, Western University, Collishaw correspondence file, III- 14, 4; letter, Collishaw to Fred H. Hitchins, 28 December 1956, The Beatrice Hitchens Memorial Collection of Aviation History, Western Archives, Western University, London, Ontario, Collishaw correspondence file, III-14; letters, Collishaw to Clayton-Kennedy, 12 March, 30 May and 27 September 1965, Kenneth Edgar Clayton- Kennedy Fonds, Canadian War Museum 19900346-150. 90 Letter, William A. Bishop to wife, Margaret Bishop, née Burden, 16 June 1918, William Avery Bishop Collection, 2001/9, Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, ON; see also Dan McCaffery, Billy Bishop: Canadian Hero (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 2002), 191. 55

baulked, declaring himself horrified with the idea.’91 Collishaw was also not thrilled at the idea

of taking over the Canadian Wing with its emphasis on ground support work. In a note he wrote

entitled, ‘A Brief Resumé of the History of Military Aviation,’ Collishaw reflected on the

accomplishments of trench strafing in the last year of the Great War:

The impact of the famous signal by Sir Douglas Haig to the effect that we had our backs to the wall and that every military factor was to be thrown into the battle brought about a startling change in military aviation. All the ‘Fighter’ or Scout aircraft squadrons were thrown directly into the land battle. Armed with 4 – 20 lb bombs and the machine guns, the pilots were sent out individually to strafe trenches. The Army was delighted that they had at last got the Air Force into the trenches! Personally, I do not think the air intervention in trench warfare achieved anything beyond perhaps moral support…From the airman’s point of view ground strafing was a monstrous invention.92

In spite of these reservations, Collishaw accepted the position as he ‘knew General Currie

very well and he had specially asked for me to command the wing. I felt that he would be

reasonable on the ground strafing ordeal for the squadrons.’93 Generally, the Canadian squadrons

would provide air protection and reconnaissance for the Canadian Corps, but during operations

other RAF squadrons would take over this role and the Canadian squadrons employed on low-

flying operations. Soon after taking over the Canadian Wing, Collishaw flew to France to meet

with Currie where they agreed that ‘trench strafing would be introduced only in an emergency.’94

When the Wing moved to France, its HQ staff would join the Canadian Corps staff and the wing

commander would become Lieutenant-General Currie’s air advisor but none of this came to

fruition as at the time of the Armistice on 11 November 1918 the Canadian squadrons were still

91 Letter, Collishaw to Fred H. Hitchins, 28 December 1956, The Beatrice Hitchens Memorial Collection of Aviation History, Western Archives, Western University, London, Ontario, Collishaw correspondence file, III-14. 92 Raymond Collishaw, ‘A Brief Resumé of the History of Military Aviation,’ n.d. but ca. December 1956, Hitchens Collection, Western University, Collishaw correspondence file, III-14, 4. 93 Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie was the commander of the Canadian Corps from June 1917 until the end of the war. Letter, Collishaw to Fred H. Hitchins, 28 December 1956, The Beatrice Hitchens Memorial Collection of Aviation History, Western Archives, Western University, London, Ontario, Collishaw correspondence file, III-14. 94 Letter, Collishaw to Clayton-Kennedy, 27 September 1965, Kenneth Edgar Clayton-Kennedy Fonds, Canadian War Museum 19900346-150. 56

forming in England. Squadron commanders as well as most of the pilots, air crew and

maintenance personnel had been found but the units had not yet reached operational status. It had

been hoped that the squadrons would reach France in early December with the goal of

commencing operations by 10 December 1918.95

Collishaw’s only regret about his short interlude with the Canadian Air Force was ‘that

events had not permitted the Canadian Wing to operate in France and that army co-operation

tactics would, thus, have been advanced by a generation.’96 Little is known about the proposed

working relationship between the Canadian Corps and the CAF, but it appears that the two

formations became much more closely linked, in planning and operations, than had been the case

with British Army/Royal Air Force operations over the Western Front in 1918. In fact, the

relationship more closely approximated the successful partnership that Collishaw was to form

with Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O’Connor in the Western Desert in 1940-41.97

* * * * *

Collishaw emerged from the Great War as one of the foremost aces of the conflict. His

ability in aerial fighting was unquestioned and he had proven himself an effective leader at the

flight and squadron level. Soon after his introduction to combat he was marked as a competent

pilot and was rewarded as a flight commander when he joined No.10 Naval Squadron. After a

brief period with the Seaplane Defence Squadron where he served as a flight leader and then

commanding officer, he was given command of Naval Three in January 1918. He retained

command of this unit through most of 1918, a period of intense combat marked by the German

95 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Genesis of the Royal Canadian Air Force,’ n.d. but ca. December 1956, Hitchens Collection, Western University, Collishaw correspondence file, III-14, 4. 96 Letter, Collishaw to Fred H. Hitchins, 28 December 1956, The Beatrice Hitchens Memorial Collection of Aviation History, Western Archives, Western University, London, Ontario, Collishaw correspondence file, III-14. 97 Letter, Collishaw to Fred H. Hitchins, 28 December 1956, The Beatrice Hitchens Memorial Collection of Aviation History, Western Archives, Western University, London, Ontario, Collishaw correspondence file, III-14; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Genesis of the Royal Canadian Air Force,’ n.d. but ca. December 1956, Hitchens Collection, Western University, Collishaw correspondence file, III-14, 4. 57

spring offensive and the subsequent Allied advance in the Hundred Days. This was a busy and

trying period for any commanding officer, but Collishaw prospered in this environment.

The traditional narrative of Collishaw’s career emphasises his skill and aerial combat as

well as his leadership abilities. Less understood is Collishaw’s familiarity with ground support

operations. The extensive body of writings on the war in the air concentrate almost exclusively

on the ‘knights of the air,’ and there has been little attention paid to the role of aircraft supporting

army operations on the battlefield.98 However, low-level attacks in support of the army were a major part of the RAF contribution to victory and Collishaw was one of the earliest practitioners of this hazardous mission. He drew lessons from this experience that served him well later in his career. Collishaw was aware of the danger and uncertainty of these missions when compared to regular patrol missions. Flying low over enemy trenches exposed pilots to a range of dangers not present when flying at altitude, and the proximity to the ground meant that when something went wrong there was little time to recover. As it was shown from Amiens on, the RAF was able to contribute materially to supporting army operations, but it came at a high cost in lost aircraft and pilots.

98 There is a wealth of writing on the 1914-18 air war, but remarkably little which focuses on air-ground operations. There are no monographs devoted to the topic and only a small number of articles. Brereton Greenhous, for example, has written two articles dealing with specialized aspects: Brereton Greenhous, ‘Close Air Support Aircraft in World War I: The Counter Anti-Tank Role,’ Aerospace Historian 21 (Summer 1974); Brereton Greenhous, ‘Evolution of a Close Ground-Support Role for Aircraft in World War I,’ Military Affairs 39, no.1 (February 1975), 22-28. There are also two recent articles in the Royal Air Force Air Power Review that examine the air-land integration at the Battle of Amiens and in the Last Hundred Days. Alfred Price, ‘Air Power Taken to its Limits and Beyond: The Battle of Amiens,’ Royal Air Force Air Power Review 4, no. 4 (2001), 118-36; David Jordan, ‘The Royal Air Force and Air/Land Integration in the 100 Days, August-November 1918,’ 11, no.2 (Royal Air Force Air Power Review, Summer 2008), 12-29.The best overall treatment is to be found in Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, but it is only one small part of a large monograph. A number of books which look at tactical air operations in the Second World War start their narrative in the Great War but provide only a basic description of air- ground operations: David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008); Richard P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1911-1945 (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing Ltd, 1989); Lee Kennett, ‘Developments to 1939,’ in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990). Each of these books examines air support in the First World War from the perspective of its contribution to the future development of tactical air power doctrine, and do not examine the role of aircraft for their contribution to contemporary operations. 58

The effectiveness of these missions also needs to be questioned. Operational research

reports from the Second World War, and Normandy in particular, indicated that aircraft flying

close support missions had an exceedingly difficult time trying to find, hit and destroy those

targets which were of the greatest interest to the army: tanks, artillery and other discrete objects

on the battlefield.99 Of course conditions were different over the Western Front where aircraft such as the Sopwith Camel flown by Collishaw flew much lower and slower than specialized tank-busting aircraft like the Hawker Typhoon did over Normandy. But the challenges remained the same. Targets were relatively scarce, difficult to locate and identify, and anything worth

hitting was well defended by machine guns and anti-aircraft artillery. Collishaw recognized these

problems in a paper written about his war experiences while he attended the RAF Staff College

in 1924, observing that air power needed to be concentrated to be effective. Standing air patrols

over the front were too weak to discourage the enemy, who was then able to concentrate and

overwhelm a selected part of the line: ‘History teaches us the folly of the attempt to be strong

everywhere.’100 Collishaw argued that the air effort at Amiens was of great importance early in

the battle: ‘historians have not rightly appreciated the extent of the influence of air power on the

impulse given to the advance [of the Australian and Canadian Corps] on the 1st and 2nd day.’101

He tempered this assessment with the understanding that not all targets on the battlefield were

99 For a detailed discussion of issues related to close air support revealed by operational research, see Terry Copp, ed., Montgomery's Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe: The Work of no.2 Operational Research Section with 21 Army Group June 1944 to July 1945 (Waterloo, Ontario: Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 2000). This book contains a useful introduction to the question of operational research as well as detailed reports written during the war which examine the problems and challenges in the provision of close air support. 100 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Personal Impressions During the Decade Ending 1924,’ 3rd Course, RAF Staff College, 23 September 1924, TNA AIR 1/2387 Part 1, 4. 101 Collishaw, ‘Personal Impressions,’ 5. 59

practical, singling out attempts to destroy German anti-tank guns in the path of the advancing

tanks as a task that was both ‘impracticable and costly.’102

John Slessor, an RAF Staff College classmate of Collishaw, is considered the greatest

British interwar thinker on the tactical air power theory. His book, Air Power and Ground

Armies (1936) was a carefully argued treatise on the challenges of air support for the army which are solidly based on the RAF experience on the Western Front. Slessor, however, had limited personal experience of these types of operations, especially when compared to Collishaw whose interwar writings demonstrated that he had arrived at similar conclusions regarding the strengths,

limitations and weaknesses of army air support missions. Of particular note is the RAF Staff

College essay he wrote in 1924 as well as a short autobiography that detailed his career up to the

end of the Abyssinian crisis. His observations were remarkably prescient and there are close parallel between the lessons he learned in 1918 and the air campaign he fought in the Western

Desert in 1940-1941.

102 Collishaw, ‘Personal Impressions,’ 5. 60

Chapter 10 – Operation Battleaxe

Operation Battleaxe was a major British offensive aimed at relieving the port of Tobruk.

This chapter shows that army insistence led to a misapplication of air power which allowed

German and Italian reinforcements to advance to the front quickly and uncontested, a factor

which proved decisive in the outcome of the battle. Battleaxe is largely forgotten today but at the

time it was seen as a major defeat for the British and its failure led to a significant high-level re-

evaluation of the army-RAF partnership on the battlefield.

Operation Battleaxe was a crucial turning point in the development of British tactical air

power doctrine and its outcome would exert a powerful influence on the future course of army-

air relations. It was designed as a three-phase operation with the goal of relieving the besieged

garrison at Tobruk by destroying all enemy forces in the Frontier area. The plan was essentially a

replay of Operation Brevity where brigades would replace battalions and divisions would replace

brigades. The first phase anticipated that 7th Armoured and 4th Indian Divisions would recapture

Halfaya Pass, Sollum and Fort Capuzzo while destroying Axis forces in the sector. The second

phase would see British forces exploit to Tobruk and relieve the trapped garrison while the final

phase envisioned a further westward advance of some 60-70 miles to provide security for the

approaches to Tobruk.1 The British Chiefs of Staff considered that this operation would alter the

balance of power in the Middle East and Churchill placed great hopes in its success. German

forces in North Africa were being maintained by tenuous sea lines across the Mediterranean via

Sicily and the west coast of Greece to Tripoli. Due to the range limitations of British aircraft,

1 Telegram, General Wavell to War Office, 7 June 1941, TNA WO 106/2161; Western Desert Force Operation Instruction No.11 [op order for Battleaxe], 12 June 1941, TNA WO 201/2482, 3; W.G.F. Jackson, The Battle for North Africa (New York: Mason, Charters, 1975), 159. 323

secure air bases between Sollum and Derna were required to allow the RAF to interdict Axis

shipping in the Mediterranean.2

These strategic imperatives led the British to commit all their available strength, both

ground and air, to ensure the success of Battleaxe. Churchill strongly supported the concept of

Battleaxe and was prepared to accept great risks. As he told Wavell, ‘Now…is the time to fight a

decisive battle in Libya and go on day after day facing all necessary losses until you have beaten

the life out of General Rommel’s army.’3 He directed Wavell to concentrate on destroying enemy units; the securing territory was of secondary importance. This attritional battle, combined with the naval and air interdiction of the long and tenuous Axis supply line, would lead to British ascendancy in the Western Desert.4

The importance placed on the success of Battleaxe was echoed by Air Marshal Sir

Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, who told Tedder:

The outcome of this battle must be of supreme and possibly decisive strategic importance to the Middle East and the whole war. Its political effect will be profound and worldwide. The importance of seizing and maintaining the initiative cannot be overrated…Every nerve must be strained and no effort ought to be spared to bring the maximum possible force to bear on the enemy…I urge you to throw in everything you can at the outset, regardless of the future, and I will do my best to make good your losses.5

Tedder made the maximum number of aircraft available for Battleaxe, augmenting

Collishaw’s 204 Group with additional squadrons from East Africa and by reassigning pilots and

aircraft from squadrons re-forming in Egypt following the tough campaigns in Greece and Crete.

At the outset of the battle Collishaw would have five fighter, three medium bomber and two

2 I.S.O. Playfair, C.J.C. Molony, and S.E. Toomer, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2: The Germans come to the help of their Ally (1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), 163. 3 Telegram, Prime Minister to General Wavell, 28 May 1941, TNA PREM 3/287-1. 4 Telegram, Prime Minister to General Wavell, 9 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 5 Telegram, Tedder from C.A.S., 9 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 324

army support/reconnaissance squadrons available.6 This gave the RAF a rough parity with the

Axis air forces with an approximate strength of 203 serviceable aircraft7 compared to 101

German and 114 Italian aircraft.8 In actuality, for the first time the RAF enjoyed a substantial advantage in the air as the majority of the Italian aircraft were deployed to the rear (Derna-

Benghazi-Tripoli) and would not participate in the battle. The Luftwaffe possessed an additional

157 aircraft in Crete and Greece, many of which were sent to Libya by the second or third day of the battle.9

Churchill demonstrated his commitment to Battleaxe when he authorized the

reinforcement of British forces in the Middle East. The British were dangerously weak in tank

strength at home but Wavell was seriously inferior to the Germans in tank strength in North

Africa and this needed to be quickly rectified. Churchill was prepared to accept the risks of

sending a convoy on the direct route to Egypt, even if it meant losing half the tanks. The ‘Tiger’

convoy was soon dispatched through the Mediterranean Sea. A significant naval commitment

including Force H (an aircraft carrier, two battleships, four cruisers and 11 destroyers) plus the

entire Mediterranean Fleet (an aircraft carrier, three battleships, 3 cruisers and all available

6 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 166; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 161, 165-166. The composition of 204 Group at the start of Operation Battleaxe was as follows: Nos.1 SAAF, 2, SAAF, 73, and 274 Squadrons – Hurricanes; No.250 Squadron – Tomahawks; Nos. 14 and 113 – Blenheims; No.24 SAAF – Marylands; Army Co-operation: No.6 Squadron – Hurricanes and No.39 Squadron – Marylands; Nos.37, 38, 70 and 148 Squadrons – Wellingtons. 7 The approximate strength of serviceable aircraft for the RAF was 50 heavy bombers, 55 medium bombers, 84 single-engine fighters and 14 twin-engine fighters. See Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 166; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 161, 165-166. 8 Gundelach gives the Luftwaffe strength as 46 Ju 87s, 11 Ju 88s, 9 Me 110s, 26 Me 109s and 11 reconnaissance aircraft. This figure is used here as it is based on the most recent research. The British official history provides higher number – 59 bombers/dive bombers and 60 single/twin-engine fighters while the RAF AHB report provides a lower figure of 80 German aircraft – 10 bombers, 29 dive bombers, 24 single-engine fighters and 17 twin-engine fighters. Details of the Italian air strength (114 aircraft as of 1 May 1941) are not available. Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 143-144; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 166; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 161, 165-166. 9 Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 143-145. 325

destroyers) were provided to ensure safe passage. One of the five fast merchantmen was lost

during the voyage when it hit a mine and sank taking with it 57 tanks and 10 Hurricanes. The rest

of the convoy arrived in Egypt on 12 May with its precious cargo of 82 cruiser, 135 ‘I’ and 21

light tanks as well as 43 Hurricanes. This force would reinforce the RAF and allow 7th

Armoured Division, commanded by Major-General Michael O’Moore Creagh, to be rebuilt in time for Operation Battleaxe.10

Despite these preparations the commanders responsible for its success had significant

misgivings. Wavell wrote to General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff,

expressing his doubts regarding the prospects of success. He did not have confidence that his

forces could rout the Germans the same way they had the Italians. As well, he listed problems

with reconnaissance by armoured cars and the suitability of British infantry and cruiser tanks

against German armour and anti-tank guns.11 Wavell was under pressure from London to launch

Battleaxe at the earliest possible date, but he was forced to delay the start of the operation by two

weeks, principally because time was needed to integrate the new tanks into 7th Armoured

Division. This unit had to be virtually reconstituted following its losses earlier in the year, its

men needed to be trained on the newly-arrived tanks and a variety of maintenance tasks had to be performed to get the tanks ready for battle. Another complication was the need to devise tactics which allowed infantry and cruiser tanks, with their vastly different speeds, to be employed in the same formation.12

Wavell recognized the risks inherent in the Battleaxe plan. He assessed that the first stage

of the plan, consolidation of the area around Sollum – Capuzzo, could be successfully

accomplished with the available forces, but that this result would be in doubt if the Germans

10 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 107-119, 162. 11 Telegram, C.I.G.S. from General Wavell, 28 May 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 12 Telegram, C.I.G.S. from General Wavell, 31 May 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 326

were able to reinforce their forward troops with some of the forces opposite Tobruk.13 German reinforcement of the frontier area could be prevented in two ways: first, by the Tobruk garrison presenting a significant threat to German forces in the area that would prevent their redeployment. This possibility was discounted as Wavell did not want to compromise the defence of the Tobruk perimeter should the first phase of Battleaxe fail.14 The second option was

to use the RAF to strike at the enemy lines of communications. This tactic had worked

effectively the previous month during Brevity but Wavell undermined this possibility by

allowing his deputy, Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Beresford-Peirse, commander of the Western

Desert Force, to demand the RAF provide a continuous fighter umbrella over the army. This

commitment to a defensive role negated the offensive contribution the RAF could make to the

battle.

RAF operations during the first week of June were characterized by daylight fighter

patrols to protect British ships resupplying Tobruk and nightly Wellington attacks on Benghazi

harbour and the Cyrenaican airfields. The Blenheim squadrons, decimated and exhausted by the

Crete operation, were mostly out of combat during this period contributing only occasional

reconnaissance sorties. The task of convoy escort was a significant commitment for the

Hurricane squadrons but the survival of the Tobruk garrison depended on the regular delivery of

supplies. The Luftwaffe had some success at interdicting these convoys; the number of anti-

shipping strikes increased significantly as German aircraft were reassigned after the conclusion

of the Crete operation, but no ships were lost when fighter cover was provided. The RAF

commitment to support Battleaxe limited the availability of fighters for naval support and forced

Admiral Cunningham to adjust his operations. Fighter cover would still be provided when

13 Telegram, C.I.G.S. from General Wavell, 7 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 14 Telegram, C.I.G.S. from General Wavell, 7 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 327

available but after 7 June he ordered that only destroyers were to be used to transport supplies as

they were fast and could defend themselves.15

A week before the launch of Battleaxe the operational pattern of 204 Group changed as it

prepared for the offensive. Initially, RAF attacks were made on the distant German lines of

communication and then two days before the battle the focus switched to attacks on the lines of

communication in the forward areas.16 On 9 June Hurricanes from Nos.73 and 274 Squadrons

and Blenheims from No.14 Squadron made a series of low-level strafing attacks on airfields at

Tobruk, Bardia, Derna and Gazala. The following day fighter Blenheims from No.113 Squadron discovered a hundred-vehicle convoy travelling east on the road between Barce and Derna.

Repeated attacks on the column, believed to be transporting petrol from Benghazi to the forward area, destroyed 28 large trucks towing trailers, mostly tankers. On 11 June Blenheims from

No.113 Squadron machine-gunned 18 aircraft at Berka airfield while Marylands from No.24

SAAF Squadron destroyed 18 large vehicles on the road between Gazala and the frontier. No offensive operations were carried out on 12 June but the medium bomber squadrons attacked vehicle convoys and airfields throughout Cyrenaica over the following two days. The fighter

squadrons were withdrawn from offensive operations as they were required to provide convoy

cover on 11, 12 and 13 June. The day before the launch of Battleaxe a series of dawn raids were

made by Hurricanes led by No.24 Squadron Marylands. A successful attack was made be No.1

SAAF and 73 Squadrons on the Gazala airdromes where 11 enemy aircraft were reported destroyed. A similar attack against the Derna landing ground failed when the Hurricanes of

No.274 Squadron lost their Maryland pathfinder and returned to base without making an attack.

15 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 163-165; ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Daily Operational Summaries, June 1941,’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1075. 16 Telegram, C.A.S. from Tedder, 10 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 328

Later in the day additional sweeps were made by Hurricanes between Gazala and Capuzzo and

reported the destruction of 19 vehicles. Additionally, an attack by a cannon-armed Hurricane on

an enemy armoured column near the frontier destroyed four vehicles and disabled three light

tanks. On 14 June Collishaw’s fighter squadrons commenced their provision of air cover for the

Western Desert Force. This defensive umbrella would be the primary task of the fighters for the next three days.17

By this point in the war, the RAF was well aware that the use of an air umbrella was an

unprofitable use of air resources. Collishaw’s success during the early part of the war was

derived from an aggressive and offensive use of his limited air resources. His constant sorties

against enemy airfields, port facilities and lines of communications during Operation Compass

forced the Italians to mount standing air patrols in an effort to counter the attacks. The

ineffectiveness of these defensive patrols was recognized by Collishaw, and clearly stated in his

after-action report on the first British offensive:

The failure of the Italian air force to strike at our aircraft on their aerodromes while the R.A.F. continued their sustained attacks on the Italian aerodromes brought about the destruction of the Italian air force at Cyrenaica. Our attacks on the enemy=s bases, lines of communication and his aerodromes forces the Italian air force on the defensive and the policy of maintaining standing fighter patrols over many bases wore out the fighter units…The [army] generals also contributed to the failure of the Italian air force by insisting on having fighter patrols flying over roads to prevent our air force from attacking the M.T. columns.18

A British Army report written about the same time as Collishaw’s report observed that air cover provided by the RAF during Operation Compass was relatively ineffective and though some Italian air raids were intercepted, the cover provided by the umbrella was insufficient to

17 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Daily Operational Summaries, June 1941,’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1075; Operations Record Book, 204 Group, June 1941, TNA AIR 25/815. 18 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy – the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 11-12. 329

stop all, or even a majority, of attacks. The medium-level Italian bombing attacks caused some disruption in the movement of British units but casualties were light. In spite of this assessment,

the army report concluded that although the air umbrella was relatively ineffective, it was still

needed to protect ground forces.19

This army belief in the efficacy of standing fighter patrols was incorporated into the

Battleaxe plan. Beresford-Peirse insisted that RAF fighters provide an umbrella during the

approach march to the battlefield and during the operation itself. This request was not surprising

given the outcome of the campaigns in Greece and Crete where the army had been subjected to

constant and heavy Luftwaffe air attacks. Lieutenant-General Henry Wilson partially blamed the

defeat in Greece on the inability of the RAF to provide the support requested by the army while

General Wavell had been very critical of the air force’s role during the disastrous retreat through

Cyrenaica in April. Collishaw, however, was very much against this plan and preferred to use his

fighters in an offensive manner and the outcome of Operation Brevity supported his assessment

of the situation.20 During initial planning meetings for Battleaxe both Wavell and Beresford-

Peirse expressed concern over expected German air attacks. Tedder, with Collishaw’s agreement, was able to pacify them with the promise that the available fighters ‘should be able to secure and maintain reasonable air superiority.’21 This agreement allowed Collishaw to devote a small

portion of his fighter force to the air umbrella while sending the majority on offensive missions.

There were, however, larger issues involved which moved the issue of air support for

Battleaxe from the operational to the political level. The army perception of being abandoned by

the RAF in Greece and Crete was a major issue for Tedder in late May and early June based on

19 ‘Report on Air Co-Operation with the Army During Operations in the Western Desert and Libya, December 1940 – February 1941,’ May 1941, TNA AIR 2/7447. 20 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the Time of our Retreat through Cyrenaica – including the Operation Battleaxe,’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 7. 21 Telegram, C.A.S. from Tedder, 9 June 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. 330

his communications with Portal. At the height of the battle Tedder started a telegram to Portal

stating, ‘Small scale of effective air support we are able to give to defence of CRETE has been and is my main concern.’22 Subsequent communications with Portal make it clear that though it

was a difficult mission for Collishaw’s squadrons, all possible efforts were being made to

support the British army in Crete.23 It was on 27 May that Tedder signalled the first warning that

the RAF would be blamed for the loss of Crete.24 The next day Portal signalled back to Tedder to

confirm his suspicions and warn him that the issue had grown to the point where the British

Ambassador to Egypt, Sir Miles Lampson, and the New Zealand Prime Minister, Peter Fraser,

were ‘expressing serious concern at what is regarded as our neglect or failure to provide

adequate air forces for Mideast resulting in Army having to fight in Greece and Crete without

adequate air support.’25 Tedder confirmed this situation in a letter to Freeman on 3 June when he

stated that there was a ‘first class hate working up in the Army’ for the RAF who they felt had

not provided adequate air support in Greece and Crete.26

On 11 June Portal intervened in the planning for Battleaxe due to his concern about the

ramifications of the recent army criticism of the air force. He told Tedder:

Political circles here will be on the lookout for any failure on the part of the R.A.F. to afford close repeat close support to troops in forthcoming operations. Suggestion is being made that we shall pay too much attention to shooting up lines of communication and aerodromes in rear and not enough to dealing with anti-tank guns, tanks and artillery that may be firing on our troops…it is essential that you and Collishaw at your respective levels should obtain before hand complete agreement of Army to your tactical plans[.] If their requirements appear to you unsound and if persuasion fails to move them you should do your best to

22 Telegram, For C.A.S. Personal from TEDDER, 23 May 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. 23 Telegram, Personal for C.A.S from TEDDER, 25 May 1941; Telegram, Private and Personal for C.A.S. from TEDDER, 27 May 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. 24 Telegram, Private and Personal for C.A.S. from TEDDER, 27 May 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. 25 Telegram, Private and Personal for Tedder from C.A.S., 28 May 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. 26 Letter, Tedder to Freeman, 3 June 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 331

act as they require and register your disagreement to them and to me before the action starts.27

These instructions left Tedder with no flexibility but to accept the Army air support demands for

the upcoming battle.28 For better or worse, Battleaxe would be fought according to army principles for air support.

Tedder did not object to Portal’s cable but immediately thanked him for the warning.

Though Tedder did ‘not see any immediate danger [or] disagreement here’ over the plan for

Battleaxe he recognised that ‘if there is any failure [it is] quite clear that any opportunity of

making R.A.F. scapegoat will be seized.’ Beresford-Peirse had requested attacks on the enemy

lines of communications prior to Battleaxe but expected close fighter protection once the

operation commenced. Tedder observed that interdiction during the past two months ‘have

contributed very considerably to restricting enemy action.’ This did not prevent Beresford-Peirse

from complaining about the level of RAF support, but Tedder dismissed the complaint stating,

‘Having been given the jam and cream Army now complain they do not always have both.’ In

spite of these complaints, Tedder reported that Beresford-Peirse and Collishaw ‘appear to work

well together.’29

Based on Portal’s directive, and the continued insistence of Beresford-Peirse that the

fighter force be used to protect the army during its approach march and the battle, Tedder

ordered Collishaw to devote the majority of his fighters to maintaining a dawn-to-dusk air

umbrella. As a result, Collishaw was forced to use his fighters in a defensive role during the key

phase of Battleaxe. There is no record of Tedder overtly registering his disagreement with this

plan before the battle, and afterwards he stated that the policy was justified in the short term,

27 Telegram, C.A.S. to Tedder, 11 June 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. 28 This point was emphasised to the author in personal correspondence with Seb Cox, Head of the RAF Historical Branch, 25 October 2013. 29 The quotations in this paragraph are found in: Telegram, Tedder to C.A.S, 11 June 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. 332

though he recognized that the continuation of such a policy over a longer term would cause the

RAF fighter strength to be ‘gradually frittered away.’30

Collishaw faithfully carried out his orders but he did not agree with the plan as it went

completely against his concept of the proper use of air power in support of the army. In his after- action report on Battleaxe Collishaw stated his view that he:

desired to employ his fighters offensively, either to operate in force over the enemy’s advanced aerodromes, or to “shoot up” the thin-skinned vehicles comprising the second Echelon – petrol ammunition supply vehicles immediately behind the armoured fighting vehicles. The G.O.C. Western Desert Force, however, insisted on our fighter force being used to carry out “umbrella” tactics to cover our troops…31

Collishaw had discovered over the Western Front in the First World War that the air umbrella

was an ineffective use of air assets. While at RAF Staff College in 1924 he wrote of the problem

of maintaining standing air patrols which ‘permitted the enemy to assemble superior force (moral

and physical) to maintain a war of attrition. History teaches us the folly of the attempt to be

strong everywhere.’32 This point was reinforced to Collishaw during his time as the Head of

Operations and Intelligence at the headquarters of Air Defence of Great Britain where he served

for two years in the late 1920s. Though the increasing speed of bombers challenged the ability of

the existing network of coast watchers and anti-aircraft guns to react in time to stop an attack, the idea of using standing patrols of fighters was discarded as ‘this plan would soon wear out the defence.’33 His after-action report on Operation Compass, written before Battleaxe, contained

numerous mentions of how the Italian use of the air umbrella contributed significantly to its

defeat. The problem was caused by Italian generals who insisted on ‘having fighter patrols flying

30 Telegram, C.A.S. from Tedder, 21 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 31 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the Time of our Retreat through Cyrenaica – including the Operation Battleaxe,’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 7. 32 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Personal Impressions during the Decade Ending 1924,’ An account by course students of war experiences, 3rd Course, RAF Staff College, 23 September 1924, TNA AIR 1/2387/228/11/40. 33 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 41. 333

over roads to prevent our air force from attacking the M.T. [motor transport] columns.’34 This

caused the enemy to become so focused on ‘trying to thwart our air offensive…that he was

unable to provide any important fighter force to dispute air superiority over our advancing

army.’35

Tedder also understood that attacks on the enemy lines of communications were more

effective in supporting the army than maintaining a continuous defensive fighter umbrella but his

freedom to act was limited by a number of factors. The recent failures in the Western Desert,

Greece and Crete left the army deeply disappointed with the air support it had received. The

navy too was unhappy the level of RAF support. These complaints were frequently repeated in

Cairo and London in the weeks preceding Battleaxe and had poisoned the relationship between

the three services. Portal was acutely aware of these grievances and in an attempt to prevent a

further breakdown ordered Tedder to accede to army air support demands. As Tedder recalled in

his memoirs, ‘Portal saw to it that I understood the R.A.F. to be fighting a battle, not only in the

Desert, but in London.’36 Though Churchill placed great hopes in the success of the offensive,

Portal understood that any failure would be blamed on the RAF so he directed Tedder to do his

best to convince the army of the proper employment of air power, but failing that, to carry out

the support as requested by the army. The evidence suggests that Portal and Tedder understood

that the RAF must do everything possible to avoid being blamed for the failure of Battleaxe.

Such a circumstance would setback the development of future RAF operations. Conversely, a

battlefield defeat while following the army’s directions would be regrettable but might have

34 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 11-12. 35 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 13. 36 Tedder, With Prejudice, 123. 334

positive long-term ramifications for convincing the army – and London – of the validity of RAF

methods.37

As a result of these political dimensions RAF operations prior to and during the first two

days of Battleaxe were a significant departure from the successful template employed by

Collishaw up to this point in the campaign and, in fact, more closely followed the tactics which doomed the Italian air force in Compass. Beresford-Peirse and the army were pleased to be receiving the type of support they requested but the problems in this approach would become apparent as the battle progressed.

* * * * *

Wavell believed that the major failing in Operation Brevity had been his underestimation

of the enemy. Consequently, the ground plan for Operation Battleaxe was a larger version of the

previous plan and differed only slightly in its concept of operations. Two full divisions were to

be employed with 7th Armoured Division benefitting from the recent influx of new tanks for

England. The only major difference was the manner in which the RAF was to be employed.

Rommel, however, made significant changes to the disposition of his forces based on the Brevity

experience which had revealed Axis forces in the frontier to be dangerously weak. The Germans

fortified Halfaya Pass and Points 206 and 208. These three positions along with Sidi Azeiz were

equipped for all-round defence and formed the outer defensive perimeter. A second line based on

strongpoints at Fort Capuzzo, Musaid and Sollum were held by Italian troops. The armoured

regiment of 15th Panzer Division was held in reserve along the main road between Capuzzo and

Bardia. The plan of Major-General Walter Neumann-Silkow, commander of 15th Panzer

Division as well as of the Sollum front, was for the first line of strongpoints to slow the British

37 The author is very grateful to Seb Cox, Head of the RAF Historical Branch, for sharing his knowledge and guidance on the political dimensions of RAF relations with the army during this period. 335

advance while heavy casualties amongst the British armour were to be caused by anti-tank

weapons and artillery located in the second line. The armoured regiment would then be

committed to the battle in a major counterattack to decimate the weakened attackers. These

German preparations were completed just before the commencement of the British offensive.38

Battleaxe opened on the morning of 15 June with mixed results. The only British success

of the day was the capture of the Fort Capuzzo – Bir Wau area by the 4th Armoured Brigade.

The two-pronged attack by 4th Indian Division on the Halfaya Pass was stalled by the strong

resistance of its Italian and German defenders along with a timely armoured counterattack along

the top of the escarpment. The attempt of 7th Armoured Brigade to capture the main Hafid

Ridge/Point 208 position was defeated late in the afternoon by hidden enemy anti-tank guns.

Beresford-Peirse was not overly concerned about these developments and he made plans for a new set-piece attack on Halfaya to be made the next day while 4th Armoured Brigade attacked

Hafid Ridge while 7th Armoured Brigade would ‘attack and smash’ the German attempt to outflank the British positions from the west.39 He was confident that after a short operational

pause 7th Armoured Division supported by 22nd Guards Brigade would continue the advance to

Tobruk after masking Bardia. The Tobruk garrison was ordered to prepare its ‘main offensive

when and if 7th Armoured Division comes within striking distance.’40 There was good reason for

British optimism. Large numbers of German guns had been captured and destroyed, the 8th

Panzer Regiment had been severely mauled, the defended locality at Point 206 had been

38 Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 700. 39 Lieutenant-General N. Beresford-Peirse, ‘The Battle of Capuzzo, 15-17 June, 1941,’ n.d. but ca. August 1941, TNA WO 201/2482. 40 ‘Note on the Remainder of the Plan for Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 16 June 1941, TNA WO 106/2161. 336

eliminated, the mobile reserve of infantry and anti-tank guns at Capuzzo had been scattered, and

Halfaya Pass had been isolated.41

Early on the morning of 16 June the 2nd Support Group captured Musaid by a silent

bayonet charge and soon after occupied Sollum Barracks. A series of three major counterattacks

by the 8th Panzer Regiment on the British position at Capuzzo with as many as 80 tanks were

defeated with heavy losses but these actions prevented 4th Armoured Brigade from striking at

the Hafid Ridge position. The 7th Armoured Brigade fought a series of running battles with the

reinforced German 5th Light Division as it attempted to outflank the British in the direction of

Sidi Omar. The enemy garrison at Halfaya Pass was attacked twice on 16 June, at 0730 hours and 1930 hours, but it was not possible for the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade to secure the

position.42 Wavell’s assessment of the battle at the end of the second day was still positive:

‘General impression [is] heavy fighting and close run battle. Position appears not repeat not

unsatisfactory but obviously losses are considerable and there will have to be a pause and

reinforcements before second stage can be attempted.’43

Any optimism in a successful outcome to the battle disappeared on the morning of 17

June as the German advance could not be checked. Strong counterattacks at Capuzzo prevented the tactical withdrawal of 4th Armoured Brigade that had been ordered the previous night. By

0800 hours the situation became serious when it was reported that the lead enemy armoured column had pushed aside attempts by 7th Armoured Brigade to slow its progress and was at Sidi

Suleiman heading for Halfaya Pass. General Wavell realized that a critical point in the battle had

41 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 168; Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3, 702 42 Lieutenant-General N. Beresford-Peirse, ‘The Battle of Capuzzo, 15-17 June, 1941,’ n.d. but ca. August 1941, TNA WO 201/2482; ‘Notes on Action 7 Armd Div 14-17 Jun 41,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/357; ‘Report by Comd 4 Ind Div on Operations in the Western Desert 15-18 June 1941,’ n.d. TNA WO 201/357; Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo- German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3, 702-703 43 Telegram, General Wavell to War Office, 17 June 1941, TNA WO 106/2161. 337

been reached and flew to the front with Beresford-Peirse to meet with the divisional commanders. Before he could make a decision Wavell learned that Major-General Frank

Messervy, commander of the 4th Indian Division, had ordered the withdrawal of the 22nd

Guards Brigade as he feared it would be trapped and destroyed. After evaluating the situation

Wavell confirmed Messervy’s decision and called off Battleaxe by ordering the general disengagement of British forces. The 4th Indian Division and 22nd Guards Brigade began their

retreat along the escarpment around mid-morning and intervention by the 4th and 7th Armoured

Brigades allowed the formations to successfully withdraw. Before nightfall all British troops had escaped the encircling German forces and were established along the line Buq Buq – Sofafi –

Habata.44

Early on morning of 18 June Wavell cabled London and announced ‘Regret to report

failure of Battleaxe.’45 The battle ended in a draw as both sides maintained their earlier positions,

however, given their failure to break through to Tobruk and their severe losses in tanks, the battle

cannot be considered anything but a British defeat. The Western Desert Force suffered 969

casualties while Axis losses were even greater at 1,277 total casualties.46 More telling in the

British failure was the loss of 27 cruisers and 64 ‘I’ tanks, nearly half the armour which started

the battle. In excess of 60 German tanks were knocked out during Battleaxe but their possession

44 Lieutenant-General N. Beresford-Peirse, ‘The Battle of Capuzzo, 15-17 June, 1941,’ n.d. but ca. August 1941, TNA WO 201/2482; ‘Notes on Action 7 Armd Div 14-17 Jun 41,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/357; ‘Report by Comd 4 Ind Div on Operations in the Western Desert 15-18 June 1941,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/357. 45 Telegram, General Wavell for War Office, 18 June 1941, TNA WO 106/2161. 46 The breakdown of casualties was as follows: The Western Desert Force – 122 men killed, 588 wounded and 259 missing; Germans – 88 men killed, 336 wounded and 168 missing; Italians – 95 men killed, 355 wounded and 235 missing. British figures given in Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 171; Axis figures from Ministero della Difesa, La Prima Controffensiva Italo-Tedesca in Africa Settentrionale (15 Febbraio-18 Novembre 1941) (Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1974), 183. 338

of the battlefield at the end of the fighting allowed them to recover and repair most of those

losses.47

The RAF effectively performed its assigned role during the early stages of the battle.

Continuing with the air umbrella started on 14 June, Collishaw committed the majority of his

fighters on the first day of Battleaxe to protect the advancing troops from enemy air attacks.

Hurricanes and Tomahawks of six squadrons provided standing patrols over the battlefield from

dawn until sunset. The provision of such comprehensive coverage required the designated

squadrons to despatch three aircraft every 40 minutes. Separate patrols were to be maintained at

9,000, 13,000 and 18,000 feet and the number of aircraft would be doubled during the four-hour

periods after daybreak and before sunset.48 These patrols accomplished their mission of protecting the attacking troops but the cost was high; for the destruction of three enemy fighters a total of four Hurricanes were lost and two others heavily damaged.49

The number of offensive missions flown by 204 Group was limited by this defensive

commitment as well as the small number of Blenheims available. At dawn on 15 June eight

Hurricanes of No.274 Squadron made attacks on two enemy motor transport columns between

Capuzzo and Gazala and claimed the destruction of 15 vehicles. Two missions were made later

that morning by flights of six and ten Hurricanes which strafed 25 vehicles and four aircraft; unfortunately, four Hurricanes were lost in the low-level attacks. At the special request of the army, a cannon-armed Hurricane made a successful low-level attack on enemy gun positions at

Halfaya but was shot down. Only four Blenheims from No.113 Squadron were active on 15 June

47 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 171; Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3, 703. 48 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.371. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 16th June 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1075; ‘No.204 Group Operation Order No.4,’ 14 June 1941 contained as Appendix D to Operations Record Book, 204 Group, June 1941, TNA AIR 25/815. 49 Christopher Shores, Giovanni Massimello, and Russell Guest, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940- 1945, vol.1: North Africa - June 1940-January 1942 (London: Grub Street, 2012), 222. 339

attacking enemy motor transport columns near Benghazi. Reconnaissance flights by No.39

Squadron revealed three large enemy columns advancing westward towards Capuzzo along the

main road from Tobruk but no attacks were made. A Hurricane from No.6 Squadron was lost

during a tactical reconnaissance mission, bringing RAF losses to ten aircraft on the first day of

the battle.50

The next day Collishaw continued to provide the air umbrella but reorganized the tasking

so his fighters patrolled in greater strength to meet the large formations of enemy aircraft being

encountered. This concentration left more holes in the air cover which were exploited. Enemy

sources reveal that at least 10 Ju 88, 30 Stuka and 11 Me 110 attacks were made on British

positions in the Capuzzo-Halfaya and Gasr el Arid sectors without interception. Italian bombers

and fighters were also active striking at British troops at Sidi Suleiman, Sidi Omar and Gasr el

Arid. British army sources confirm these attacks but the absence of any specific mention of

casualties indicates that the attacks were generally harmless.51 Remarkably, the RAF carried out

no offensive operations on 16 June. Collishaw’s fighters were totally committed to the umbrella

and his medium bombers were not employed due to the unavailability of fighter escorts.52

50 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.371. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 16th June 1941’ and ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.372. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 17th June 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1075; Operations Record Book, 204 Group, June 1941, TNA AIR 25/815; Lieutenant-General N. Beresford-Peirse, ‘The Battle of Capuzzo, 15-17 June, 1941,’ n.d. but ca. August 1941, TNA WO 201/2482; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 168-169. 51 German and Italian sources cited in RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 169. These numbers are confirmed by Gundelach , see Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 144-145. The after- action reports of the Western Desert Force as well as 7th Armoured and 4th Indian Divisions do not miss any opportunity to criticize the RAF but they make no reference to any casualties from air attacks on 16 June. See Lieutenant-General N. Beresford-Peirse, ‘The Battle of Capuzzo, 15-17 June, 1941,’ n.d. but ca. August 1941, TNA WO 201/2482; ‘Notes on Action 7 Armd Div 14-17 Jun 41,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/357; ‘Report by Comd 4 Ind Div on Operations in the Western Desert 15-18 June 1941,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/357. 52 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.372. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 17th June 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1075; Operations Record Book, 204 Group, June 1941, TNA AIR 25/815; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 169; James Ambrose 340

Reports on the progress of Battleaxe were being closely followed by Churchill, Dill and

Portal. Wavell and Tedder were sending brief but regular updates to London and both received direction on the battle as event unfolded. The reports sent from Egypt on the first two days revealed a battle that was not an overwhelming success. The anticipated destruction of enemy forces had not occurred and heavy casualties had been sustained. The overall tone of the reports remained optimistic but there were indications that failure was a possibility. A three-page note on the progress of Battleaxe sent to General Dill on 16 June revealed that resistance in the frontier area remained fierce and air reconnaissance reported indications of enemy forces concentrating for a counterattack. No mention was made of RAF operations, especially offensive missions, other than to state that the RAF was ‘most active in support of the operations.’53

The absence of any reports on RAF offensive operations prompted Portal to send a

query/directive to Tedder early on the morning of 17 June:

It appears your fighters are mainly being used on defensive patrols throughout the day in small numbers over our forward troops. Protection afforded to Army by this method appears successful though our fighters are out-numbered and combats are inconclusive whenever the enemy puts up a sweep in force. Do not of course know from here that better results could be obtained and equal freedom given to our troops if Blenheims escorted by strong fighter formations make daylight attacks on known enemy concentrations. Moreover situation at Halfaya as reported yesterday appeared to us to give ideal opportunity for intensive bombing of enemy positions by Blenheims. If successful this would undoubtedly force enemy to employ fighters on defensive patrols and so enable our fighters to engage with superiority.54

Portal in London was able to grasp the misallocation of air resources that had prevented

the RAF from contributing to the destruction of the enemy. The major RAF contribution to the

earlier battles in the Western Desert was its ability to take the battle to the enemy through

Brown, Eagles Strike: The Campaigns of the South African Air Force in Egypt, Cyrenaica, Libya, Tunisia, Tripolitania and Madagascar 1941-1943 (Cape Town: Purnell, 1974), 44. 53 ‘Note for C.I.G.S. on progress of Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 16 June 1941, TNA WO 201/2161. This file also contains the series of telegrams despatched from Egypt to London during the course of the battle. 54 Telegram, CAS to Air Chief Marshal Tedder, 17 June 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. 341

offensive strikes against ports, airfields and other communications targets. Though not as

comforting to the army as seeing friendly air cover overhead, this policy provided a better level

of protection to the army by destroying the enemy’s air force while compelling it to react to RAF

attacks which consequently prevented similar attacks against the British. By the end of the

second day of operations Portal realised that the air support demanded by the army was not

materially contributing to the battle and a change in focus was necessary.

Dill, concurrent with Portal’s message to Tedder on 17 June, issued a similar directive to

General Wavell stating, ‘Urge most strongly that Tedder should use his superiority (a) to bomb

Germans surrounded at Halfaya as our troops were bombed in Crete and (b) smash up any

concentrations which enemy may make in the desert. All this you may be doing but I have no

information of part being played by our bombers.’55 It appears the army was slowly coming to

the realization that air power could accomplish more than provide protection from enemy air

attacks.

Tedder reacted quickly to the message from Portal by issuing a directive to 204 Group

that marked a complete reversal of his earlier orders: ‘MOST IMMEDIATE…Concentrate on

ground strafing regardless of possible presence of German fighters. Do not waste fighters

protecting Army against possible enemy air attacks.’56 Tedder cabled the Air Ministry late on 17

June to respond to Portal’s query regarding the employment of the RAF in the battle: ‘Discussed

this with Collishaw last night[;] Army had specifically request Umbrella. Agree that escorted

bombers would ultimately force enemy to defensive patrols…This morning in view of

55 Telegram, C.I.G.S. to General Wavell, 17 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 56 Message, Air Marshal Tedder to Air Commodore Collishaw, 17 June 1941, Appendix 23 to Operations Record Book, 204 Group, June 1941, TNA AIR 24/1075. 342

information re enemy fighter weakness I instructed Collishaw that Umbrella now appeared

relatively unnecessary and he should concentrate effort against land movements.’57

On the third day of the battle Collishaw was finally free to conduct the offensive

operations he desired. Comprehensive air umbrella coverage ended by noon as the morning

flights returned to base and were not replaced. For the remainder of the day RAF sorties

consisted overwhelmingly of offensive operations. An unprecedented total of 193 fighter and

bomber sorties were devoted to close air support missions in the Sidi Omar – Sollum area.

Blenheims of Nos.14 and 113 Squadrons and Marylands of No.24 SAAF Squadron conducted

numerous bombing and machine gun attacks and reported attacking large numbers of enemy

AFVs and motor transport. Many of these attacks were directed at columns of the German 5th

Light Division that were attempting a flanking maneuver to trap British forces at Sidi Suleiman

and Halfaya. The low-level bombing and strafing sorties claimed the destruction of dozens of

vehicles and Beresford-Peirse believed the RAF ‘played an important part in bringing this enemy

column to a halt.’58 In addition, all seven fighter squadrons along with the bomber squadrons

were directed to conduct offensive patrols which targeted enemy vehicles on the roads from

Gazala to Capuzzo and Sidi Omar. Collishaw reported that ‘it was subsequently confirmed that

the enemy motorized units suffered heavy casualties during the attacks, particularly from the four

forward guns of the Maryland aircraft.’59

57 Message, Air Marshal Tedder to Air Ministry, 17 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 58 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the Time of our Retreat through Cyrenaica – including the Operation Battleaxe,’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 9; ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.373. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 18th June 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1075; Operations Record Book, 204 Group, June 1941, TNA AIR 25/815; Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941,’ The London Gazette, 3 July 1946, 3442-3443; Brown, Eagles Strike, 42-45. 59 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the Time of our Retreat through Cyrenaica – including the Operation Battleaxe,’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 8; ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.373. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 18th June 1941’ 343

Enemy attacks continued on British army targets in the absence of the air umbrella

though for the most part these attacks were ineffective. Small patrols of Hurricanes from Nos.33

and 229 Squadrons caused enemy bombers to jettison their bombs on three occasions and they

also intercepted a raid by 35 Ju 87s on the retreating British forces near Abu Fayres claiming the

destruction of 10 Stukas. Enemy sources record the loss of only one Ju 87 but regardless of kills

the British patrol severely disrupted the German attack.60 The Luftwaffe achieved one notable success on 17 June when 17 Stukas bombed the 8th Field Regiment of 4th Indian Division causing 100 casualties. This successful attack was unfortunate but it was also atypical as the unit was surprised just as it was getting into action. As a result the unit’s vehicles were bunched up, the men were not vigilant to the possibility of air attack, no anti-aircraft guns were deployed and

the men were above ground in the open with no available cover.61 The circumstances of this

attack did not, however, stop army commanders from blaming the RAF for the absence of air

cover.62

The high tempo of army support missions continued after the Western Desert Force had

withdrawn from the battlefield and had assumed a defensive posture. On the night of 17/18 June

two Wellingtons of No.70 Squadron supported by Fleet Air Arm Swordfish attacked enemy

motor transport near Bardia and reported ensuing large fires. Six heavy bombers struck at the

contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1075; Operations Record Book, 204 Group, June 1941, TNA AIR 25/815. 60 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 169-170; Shores, Massimello, and Guest, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 224-227; ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.373. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 18th June 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1075. 61 ‘4 Ind. Div. Report on Operations 15-17 Jun 41. Report by C.R.A. [Commander, Royal Artillery]’ Appendix B to ‘Report by Comd 4 Ind Div on Operations in the Western Desert 15-18 June 1941,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/357. 62 Tedder mentioned Wavell’s complaint in a message to London, while Beresford-Peirse, Creagh and Messervy each discussed the attack without providing context. See message, Tedder to Air Ministry, 17 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582; Lieutenant-General N. Beresford-Peirse, ‘The Battle of Capuzzo, 15-17 June, 1941,’ n.d. but ca. August 1941, TNA WO 201/2482; ‘Notes on Action 7 Armd Div 14-17 Jun 41,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/357; ‘Report by Comd 4 Ind Div on Operations in the Western Desert 15-18 June 1941,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/357. 344

port of Benghazi while others targeted the airdromes at Derna and Gazala. The following

morning Blenheims and Marylands attacked enemy concentrations in the frontier area while

Hurricanes and Tomahawks conducted successful wide-ranging low-level raids in the afternoon.

These missions came with a cost; no medium bombers were lost, but nine Hurricanes

were shot down. Four aircraft from No.1 SAAF Squadron escorting a Blenheim mission were

shot down by German fighters; three Hurricanes were shot down either by ground fire or enemy

fighters while conducting low-level strafing missions, while two others were lost engaging

enemy dive-bombers. Four Tomahawks of the newly-arrived No.250 Squadron were lost on 18

June when they were bounced by German Me 109s while returning from a strafing mission.63

The full impact of these attacks on the enemy is not known but a recent German history

reported that ‘German movements during the entire operation were seriously hampered by the

Royal Air Force, which mounted very successful attacks against German rear communications

and supply-columns.’64 Considering that such attacks were minimal on 14 and 15 June, and non- existent on 16 June, this comment must largely refer to the attacks carried out on 17 and 18 June.

It is possible, maybe even likely, that an earlier commitment of air power to interdicting German

movements may not have affected the outcome of Battleaxe due to Rommel’s strengthening of the frontier defences in the aftermath of Brevity. It is worth noting, however, that significant

German reserves were rushed from Tobruk to the frontier on 15 and 16 June, a distance of 120 kilometres by road. The British official history noted that the small number of RAF attacks had

‘disorganized and delayed transport’ along the Trigh Capuzzo.65 During Brevity and again

63 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 169-171; Brown, Eagles Strike, 42-45; Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 224-228. 64 Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3, 703. This comment is based in part on a reading of Gundelach, Die Deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer, 145-146. 65 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 169. 345 during the closing phase of Battleaxe RAF attacks had slowed and blunted the pace of enemy operations. The impact of nearly 200 daily interdiction sorties at the outset of the battle on the ability of Rommel to reinforce and resupply his forces can only be surmised.

* * * * *

The failure of Battleaxe was a major setback for British ambitions in the Mediterranean and led to much recrimination as the commanders tried to understand what went wrong. In a telegram sent to London on 18 June, the day after Battleaxe was cancelled, General Wavell ascribed three factors to the failure of the operation. The Germans possessed greater tank strength than expected; they were prepared for the attack and immediately counterattacked; and

7th Armoured Division did not have sufficient time to train and integrate its new tanks into an effective and battle-ready formation.66 Noticeably absent from the main causes for the defeat was any blame attributed to the RAF.

Wavell had great confidence in his tank force and had crafted Battleaxe to bring about a

‘big tank battle’ in the frontier area. His plan expected the movement of German reinforcements from Tobruk once the battle began and even welcomed this development as it would give 7th

Armoured Division the opportunity for a decisive victory which would clear the way for the relief of Tobruk.67 This might explain Wavell’s failure to use the RAF to interdict this movement on 15 June. However, by the end of the first day Wavell’s telegrams to London indicated that he knew the armoured thrust had failed and his plan should have been reconsidered.68 Instead,

German reinforcements were allowed to move to the frontier on 16 June uncontested as the RAF continued with its defensive combat patrols as requested by the army and did not conduct any offensive air operations on that day.

66 Telegram C.I.G.S. from General Wavell, 18 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 67 Telegram, General Wavell to C.I.G.S., 10 June 1941, TNA WO 106/2161. 68 Telegram, General Wavell to War Office, 16 June 1941, TNA WO 106/2161. 346

The Germans took advantage of poor British signals discipline before and during

Battleaxe. Intercepted radio broadcasts had alerted Rommel to the imminent launch of the

operation and he responded by placing his units on alert. During the course of the battle, further

signals intelligence allowed Rommel to understand British intentions and as a result he was able

to rapidly redeploy his forces to halt the British advance.69 These countermoves proved to be the

decisive element of the battle.

At the end of his report Wavell addressed the role of air power in the battle. He stated,

Our air forces protected our troops effectively from enemy bombing except on certain occasions when their protection had been temporarily withdrawn....We never had sufficient superiority to afford entire protection to our troops or to stop enemy=s movements. We are not organized or trained for the type of close support the enemy employs and cannot expect it.70

Wavell’s main contention was that the air force was unable to concurrently provide an air

umbrella while also conducting interdiction strikes. This was a fair criticism but the accusation in

the last line brought storms of protest from the air force. Upon seeing Wavell=s signal, Tedder

cabled London to express his displeasure. He pointed out the ‘utter inaccuracy’ of Wavell=s statements and stated that ‘further argument in the face of such apparent inability to understand principles of air warfare appeared valueless.’ Tedder believed that Wavell=s discussion of air power in his signal was ‘naive and meaningless.’71

This disagreement illustrated the large gulf that existed between the army and the air

force in their attempts to create an effective system of close air support. At the heart of the

debate was the question of who should control the air resource. The army believed that they

knew best what their needs were and as such ultimate responsibility for air taskings should lie

69 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.1: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979), 399; Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 144-145. 70 Telegram C.I.G.S. from General Wavell, 18 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 71 Telegram, C.A.S. from Tedder, 21 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582. 347

with them. Conversely, the air force argued that air power was capable of much more than simply acting in intimate support of the army, and as such they should be able to act

independently. In Battleaxe Tedder provided the army with what they requested – large scale air

cover of the army by the fighters and small scale attacks on the lines of communications by

bombers. This allocation of air resources meant that the RAF was not available to interdict the

movement of German reinforcements to the front during the crucial first 48 hours of the battle

and this may have cost them victory.

Both the army and air force reported insignificant German air attacks on the battlefield.

The majority of German fighters were retained to provide defence to rear areas in the face of

RAF attacks. Those few air raids launched by the Germans were ineffective. The attacks may have caused consternation among the ground troops targeted, but little damage was caused. RAF

bombers proved effective at hitting enemy targets during the course of the battle, but they were

not able to stop the flow of German units to the front. British tanks had a range of only 40 miles

and after covering half that distance they would have to stop to refuel to ensure a sufficient

reserve in the event of combat. German tanks would have operated under a similar constraint.

The destruction of the supply vehicles and fuel trucks would quickly render German armour

unable to conduct operations. It was the timely arrival of German reinforcements on the

battlefield that turned the tide of the battle. Any delay or weakening of those reinforcements

would have had a significant effect on British fortunes.72 The ramifications of these attacks would have been even more serious for the Germans had the fighter force been released for offensive actions.

72 Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3, 703. 348

In his after-action report Tedder defended his use of the air umbrella during the first two

days of the battle. He argued that the air cover had been effective in protecting the army and

‘with 2 possible exceptions in the extreme forward area[,] enemy attempts [to] attack troops were

intercepted and bombs dropped unaimed.’ He explained that to maintain the umbrella required

the use of relatively weak patrols which meant higher casualties when the small number of

defenders met large groups of enemy aircraft. Tedder did not address the opportunity cost by

considering what the squadrons might have contributed to the battle if they had been released

earlier from their air umbrella tasking. RAF casualties were very high – 35 aircraft were lost

during the battle. All but three of these aircraft were Hurricanes and Tomahawks representing

nearly 40 percent of the initial serviceable strength of the fighter squadrons. A major factor in the

losses was a general lack of experience amongst the pilots committed to the battle. Four

squadrons had recently been transferred to the desert and though its pilots had considerable

experience in East Africa, this was the first time they fought an enemy with modern, first-class

aircraft. Experienced pilots were also lacking in the other squadrons due to recent losses in

Greece and Crete. Many pilots had not been through the operational training unit, squadron level

training was deficient and there had not been time to train with the land forces.73

Another problem exposed during Battleaxe was the lack of close cooperation between the

army and air force. The two services worked together to form the initial plan for Battleaxe, but limited provisions were made to sustain this teamwork in combat. Beresford-Peirse and

Collishaw worked well together, but they did not have the time to form the same close relationship enjoyed by Collishaw and O=Connor. The army after-action reports were universal in

73 Telegram, C.A.S. from Tedder (six parts), 21 June 1941, TNA WO 106/2161. The aircraft loss figures are 33 fighters and three bombers. An even larger number of aircraft were damaged but returned to duty. See Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 171; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 172; Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 218-228; Brown, Eagles Strike, 45-46. 349

their criticism of the problems experienced in army-air cooperation. Beresford-Peirse lamented the 180 kilometres of separation between his headquarters located at Sidi Barrani and

Collishaw’s 204 Group HQ at Maaten Bagush. In the covering letter to his report on Battleaxe,

Beresford-Peirse considered the issue of co-operation with the RAF to be the main point of interest for the Western Desert Force:

Lack of comn [communications] and the fact that all aircraft operated from LGs [landing grounds] east of MATRUH, fighters refuelling at SIDI BARRANI, made close support and quick response to calls for fighter protection impossible….I regard the provision of ways and means for closer co-operation with the RAF, and the development of a satisfactory system for the use of aircraft in close support of ground troops as the most important and urgent problems we have to face at the moment.74

This letter demonstrated the continued treatment of the RAF as an adjunct arm similar to the

artillery and does not appreciate the wider impact that air power could have on the conduct of a

battle.

Major-General Michael O’Moore Creagh, commander of 7th Armoured Division, was

also disappointed with the support provided by the RAF and stated, ‘There is no doubt that the

whole problem of air co-operation has yet to be solved.’ He thought that the RAF ‘never really

got into the ground picture [because] they operated too far back.’ His recommendation was that a

senior RAF officer needed to be co-located at the divisional headquarters in an armoured car

with a radio link who could advise the rear air force headquarters of the situation at the front.75

This point was reiterated by Major-General Frank Messervy, commander of the 4th Indian

Division. He pointed out that German armoured operations presented tempting targets due to the large number of petrol, ammunition, and repair and recovery vehicles that followed close behind the spearheads. ‘Bombers quickly “whistled up” to deal with such targets might have a decisive

74 Lieutenant-General N. Beresford-Peirse, Letter ‘Subject: Battle of Capuzzo 14-17 Jun 41,’ 6 August 1941, TNA WO 201/357. 75 Major-General Michael O’Moore Creagh, ‘Lessons from Recent Operations,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/357. 350

effect in any battle in which enemy tanks are engaged in considerable numbers. I would go so far

as to say, that, especially in the Western Desert, no formation can be tactically complete till close

air support with the necessary communications to ensure its rapid intervention is provided.’76

These were valid criticisms, but on the main point of the problem of distance there was

not much that could be done at that stage of the war. Without dependable communications links

and/or secure airfields close to the front line, the army and air commanders had no choice than to

be at their respective headquarters. These coordination problems would be largely solved as the

war progressed.77 Creagh and Messervy both raised the problem of the RAF’s inability to react

quickly to army requests for support, however, the RAF narrative observed that ‘this criticism

could hardly have sprung from actual operational experience since the Army have failed to make

requests for air support.’78

The Army paid minimal attention to the issue of army-air cooperation when planning

Operation Battleaxe. Brigadier A.F. Harding, the Brigadier General Staff of the Western Desert

Force, issued his directive on RAF cooperation three days before the battle and it contained only

a brief reference to joint operations. The two-page memo was primarily concerned with tactical,

artillery and strategic reconnaissance while the issue of communications between the two

services was limited to the mention of a two-star cartridge flare to be fired as a challenge signal.

Also revealing was the consideration given to fighter protection: ‘Emergency calls for fighter

protection will be signalled to 204 Gp RAF through WQU sets with formations. These methods

will only be used in really serious emergencies [emphasis in original].’79 There was no plan for

76 ‘HQ 4th Indian Division – Operations in the Western Desert, 15-17 June 1941,’ 30 June 1941, TNA WO 201/357. 77 Simon Godfrey, British Army Communications in the Second World War: Lifting the Fog of Battle (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 101, 105, 106, 114. 78 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 175. 79 ‘R.A.F. Co-operation – Operation BATTLE AXE,’ 12 June 1941, Appendix C to Western Desert Force Op Instr No.11, TNA WO 201/2482. 351

close coordination between the two services during the course of the battle. The annex to this

directive contained details on the specific air taskings required by the army. The first two columns provided detailed descriptions of the army’s tactical and strategic reconnaissance requirements, the third column concerned fighter protection while the fourth and fifth columns provided a terse overview of ground strafing and bombing targets. The emphasis in order and detail of the mission annex indicated that the army was least concerned with the offensive potential of the RAF.80 Generals Beresford-Peirse, Creagh and Messervy were right to point out the poor air-ground coordination in their after-action reports but the lack of prior planning for this cooperation was largely the result of the army dictating to the RAF the form its support should take without asking the air force how best it could contribute to the success of the battle.

The problem of poor inter-service communications was particularly acute on 17 June

when the RAF was called to slow the advance of the enemy columns to allow the Western Desert

Force to escape the closing trap. Tedder recognized the problem and did not hesitate to blame the

army.81 RAF calls during the battle for ground formations to display their recognition panels

went unacknowledged and the Army headquarters did not provide regular position updates or

bomb line information to the air force. This made it difficult for the air force to provide close

support due to the risk of hitting friendly forces. Collishaw reported that, ‘great care had to be

exercised at this stage in the operations because the Army Headquarters in the Field was

unacquainted with the dispositions and locations of the 7th Armoured Division and they could

not therefore tell us whether our air reconnaissance was reporting the movements of friend or

80 Appendix A to ‘R.A.F. Co-operation – Operation BATTLE AXE,’ 12 June 1941, Appendix C to ‘Western Desert Force Op Instr No.11,’ TNA WO 201/2482. 81 Telegram, C.A.S. from Tedder, 21 June 1941, TNA WO 106/2161. 352

foe.’82 The best that the RAF could do in this situation was to assume that all traffic moving southeast was friendly while that moving northeast was enemy; if in doubt, attacks were not carried out. Fortunately this was an effective, if inelegant, solution and only one minor case of friendly fire resulted.

Tedder also faulted the army for not making better use of the Bomber Striking Force which maintained aircraft on call to meet army demands: ‘No doubt that opportunities of giving support were lost owing to absence of accurate information.’83 He knew of only one instance

during the battle when close air support was requested – when the cannon-armed Hurricane attacked enemy gun positions at Halfaya. There were also problems with the transmission of information and interpretation of the reports. Reconnaissance reports made by RAF aircraft discovered the advancing German columns, but this information was not acted upon promptly.

This was the case on the afternoon of 17 June when air reconnaissance observed a large, slow- moving column making its way down Halfaya Pass towards Sollum. Army reports indicated this might be a missing column from 7th Armoured Division that had captured the pass in a bid to escape along the coast. Army headquarters could not confirm the identity of this force so no attacks were made. It was subsequently discovered that this was an enemy column which proceed to attack 4th Indian Division in the Buq Buq area.84 Tedder believed that there was ‘no

black art in close support’ but that a lack of training and communications breakdowns due to

inferior equipment were the main reasons for the difficulties experienced.85

* * * * *

82 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the Time of our Retreat through Cyrenaica – including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 8. 83 Telegram, C.A.S. from Tedder, 21 June 1941, TNA WO 106/2161. 84 Telegram, C.A.S. from Tedder, 21 June 1941, TNA AIR 8/582; Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the Time of our Retreat through Cyrenaica – including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 7-9. 85 Telegram, C.A.S. from Tedder, 21 June 1941, TNA WO 106/2161. 353

Operation Battleaxe marked the nadir of army-air relations in the Middle East. The attack was hastily carried out in response to the demands of Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff. On paper, the British were ready for the attack with a large, well-rested force that possessed a number of advantages over the enemy. However, the strength was largely illusory. The 7th Armoured

Division, recently re-equipped with large numbers of new, untried tanks, was not yet ready to be committed to battle. The men did not have the necessary training on the unfamiliar armour. The division even lacked a plan to coordinate the movements of the infantry and cruiser tanks with their different top speeds. Cooperation between the infantry and armour required more time to refine.

The RAF was in a similar situation. Its numerical strength in the Western Desert was high, but the severe losses over Greece and Crete meant that there were many untried replacement pilots and the new squadrons transferred to the theatre had not yet completed the necessary training. The British plan was unoriginal and assumed the enemy defences on the frontier remained relatively static in the aftermath of the failure of Operation Brevity but this was not the case. The German and Italian fortifications were significantly reorganized and strengthened to deal with a renewed British attack. Perhaps the deciding factor in the land battle was the ability of the enemy to react quicker to the developing situation than the British. There were a number of points where the British threatened to rout the enemy defenders but on each occasion Rommel and his commanders rapidly deployed reserves to deal with the crisis.

The one major advantage the British army held during this operation was the support of the RAF which had demonstrated the ability to severely dislocate the enemy on and behind the battlefield. However, rather than exploit its proven offensive potential, the Army demanded that the RAF adopt the tactics of the Italian air force which had been decisively defeated during

354

Operation Compass. The Army insistence on a defensive air umbrella over its troops is

somewhat understandable given its recent experience in Greece and Crete where frequent

Luftwaffe attacks caused considerable anxiety and some dislocation, if not much damage.

The main difference between Compass and Battleaxe was the inability of the RAF and

the Army to agree on a common plan. Wavell consistently demonstrated a poor grasp of air matters but during the first campaign he was willing to defer to O’Connor who had a better understanding of RAF capabilities than did Beresford-Peirse. During Compass Longmore directed and supported Collishaw’s concept of operations which proved so successful. This was not the case during Battleaxe when overarching political considerations forced Tedder to endorse the army’s demands for the defensive employment of the RAF. Collishaw recognised this was a missed opportunity but Tedder, informed by Portal, understood that the RAF could not afford to be seen as the cause for the failure of the operation. By acceding to the army request, the RAF avoided blame for conducting an independent campaign that left the army exposed and unsupported.

This misemployment of the air force was a major factor in the outcome of the battle.

German reinforcements advanced to the frontier rapidly and largely uncontested during the first two days of the battle where they prevented a British breakthrough and contained the attack.

Rommel was then able to launch a series of counterattacks which drove the British back as he committed additional forces to the battle. It was only the timely intervention of the RAF during this final phase of Battleaxe which prevented the retreat from turning into a rout. Heavy air attacks on German columns on 17 June slowed their pursuit and allowed British units the time needed to conduct an orderly withdrawal from the battlefield.

355

It is worth considering how the outcome of the battle may have differed if Collishaw had been allowed to use his fighters and bombers to interdict enemy supply routes during the first two days of the battle. It is possibly there may have been a slight increase in the number of enemy air attacks on the British army but the majority of Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica sorties would have been devoted to defensive tasks in response to the RAF offensive. During

Brevity RAF attacks destroyed sufficient enemy logistical capability that by the second morning of the battle a number of Axis units were immobile and effectively out of the battle due to a lack of fuel. By the time of Battleaxe 204 Group had been significantly strengthened and Rommel was forced to deploy larger forces from the Tobruk area to stop the British offensive. An effective RAF interdiction campaign on 15 and 16 June would have serious complicated the Axis ability to fight the battle successfully.

The failure of Operation Battleaxe was devastating for the British army and Churchill but it proved to be only a minor setback. Of more lasting importance was the impact of the battle in shaping relations between the army and the RAF over the future form of tactical air support.

Prior to the battle, Churchill had cautiously endorsed the army view of air support; his position changed considerably in the weeks after the defeat in the desert. He solicited Portal’s views on

Tedder’s report and the Chief of the Air Staff used the opportunity to forcefully advocate the

RAF position. He conceded that while the umbrella may have been ‘efficacious’ it was not needed and it would have been much better to employ Collishaw’s squadrons offensively:

A defensive policy is bad for marale [sic], expensive in casualties and give[s] the enemy freedom of action which he has to forego when thrown on the defensive. The adoption of offensive mean, however, that the troops must put up with some apparently unopposed bombing which they must deal with as best they can with their own weapons, and must not demand protection whenever this happens. The

356

side which gives way to the cry of the troops and ships for protection will probably lose air superiority, forces being equal [emphasis in original].86

Churchill considered this note of significant importance that he ordered it to be brought before the Chiefs of Staff Committee and printed for the Defence Committee. These ideas, largely based on the experience of the RAF in the Western Desert, would guide Churchill’s reassessment of tactical air support.

86 Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal, untitled note for Prime Minister, 29 June 1941, TNA CAB 20/633. 357

11 – After Battleaxe

The failure of Operation Battleaxe exposed major problems between army–RAF

cooperation in the Middle East. These difficulties had been avoided earlier in the campaign by

the close working relationship of O’Connor and Collishaw but the change in fortunes and

personnel created friction that affected the efficiency of operations. Churchill recognised the

problem as well as the solution. Based directly on the situation in the Middle East he instituted

high level changes to facilitate a better working relationship between the two services. This,

combined with the implementation of the broad theoretical foundations of army-air operations

employed by Collishaw, would provide the basis for Allied tactical air doctrine for the remainder

of the war.

Operation Battleaxe lasted only three days but its repercussions would be felt much

longer. Winston Churchill had placed great hopes in this offensive. He accepted significant risks

in despatching the Tiger convoy to Egypt to deliver his precious ‘Tiger cubs’ but he judged this

an acceptable gamble for the opportunity to relieve Tobruk, destroy Rommel’s Afrika Korps and

push the enemy back beyond Benghazi. For Churchill, the failure of Battleaxe was a ‘most bitter

blow’ and upon learning of the defeat he ‘wandered about the valley disconsolately for some

hours.’1 Jock Colville, one of Churchill’s private secretaries, confirmed that the Prime Minister

was ‘gravely disappointed by the failure of Battleaxe’ which he considered a ‘major defeat.’2 On

another level, Battleaxe illustrated the large gulf that existed between the army and the air force

in their attempts to create an effective system of tactical air support. At the heart of the debate

1 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol.3: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 343. 2 John Colville, Diary, 18 June 1941, quoted in Martin Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol.3: The Ever- Widening War 1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 814. 358

was the question of who should control the air resource. The inter-service problems encountered

during this battle would see a renewal of the debate at the highest levels of government and the

military and result in the establishment of a new paradigm for army-air cooperation.

General Wavell was the first commander to be relieved as a result of the failure of

Operation Battleaxe. On 21 June Churchill, who never had full confidence in Wavell, cabled ‘I

have come to the conclusion that public interest will best be served by appointment of General

Auchinleck to relieve you in command of armies of Middle East.’3 Auchinleck had previously commanded the expedition to Norway and the vital Southern Command in England before becoming Commander-in-Chief in India. Wavell, who would go to the Far East to replace

Auchinleck, was considered by the British official history be a ‘soldier’s soldier’ who would be remembered as ‘one of the great commanders in military history.’4 This may be true, but during

the early battles in the Western Desert he benefitted enormously from some very capable

subordinates and he consistently struggled to understand the role and potential of air power on

the modern battlefield.

The other command change during this period was the replacement of Air Commodore

Collishaw. Tedder believed that in spite of Collishaw’s accomplishments while leading 202 and

204 Groups he was the wrong man for the job and was in over his head. He shared these

impressions in a scrawled, handwritten postscript to a typewritten letter sent Freeman three

weeks after the conclusion of Battleaxe: ‘I am rather worried about the command situation in the

W. Desert. Collishaw has had enough (5 years out here) and in any case I don=t think he is the

right man to tackle the Hun and the Army. He is the village blacksmith slogger, which is grand

3 Telegram, Prime Minister to A.P. Wavell, 21 June 1941 quoted in John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London: Collins, 1964), 504. 4 I.S.O. Playfair, C.J.C. Molony, and S.E. Toomer, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2: The Germans come to the help of their Ally (1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), 246. 359

for village cricket but we are in for first class cricket.’5 Two days later Tedder cabled Portal

about the same issue and stated that while in the past Collishaw ‘had done some fine work,’ he

was now ‘played out’ and believed that the ‘present and future problem is quite beyond him.’

Tedder proposed to relieve him immediately and replace him with ‘a first class man with drive

and judgement,’ qualities he believed Collishaw did not possess.6

Tedder wrote Collishaw on 10 July informing him that he was to be sent back to England:

Now that the Battleaxe phase is over I am proposing to give you the relief that you have so well earned. It may be that they will send out a permanent successor from home but in the meantime I am getting Slatter down from the Soudan [sic] to take over for you. What I am hoping, and I think the people at home will agree, is to let you go back to the U.K. by the first really comfortable ship we can find. I do feel that if anyone earned a standeasy you have and so far as it is within my power I am determined that you get it.7

Collishaw’s time in the Western Desert was finished but the pattern and success of his air campaigns would provide a template for future army-air operations.

* * * * *

An examination of the development of Allied tactical air support doctrine during the

Second World War shows that the underlying principles regarding its use were developed and codified during Collishaw’s command. In the aftermath of the failure of Battleaxe the army and the air force continued to debate the future form of air support. There were three parallel, but related, debates during this period. The first two, shaped by the Army’s Home Forces and by the

RAF’s Army Cooperation Command, took place in England and dated back to the interwar period. The third stream was based on the experiences of the two services in the Middle East.

Terraine was not surprised that the three ‘compartments’ arrived at similar conclusions since the fundamentals of tactical air support were based on ‘common sense’:

5 Letter, Tedder to Air Chief Marshal Sir W.R. Freeman, 7 July 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 6 Telegram, Tedder to Portal, 9 July 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. 7 Letter, Air Marshal A.M. Tedder to Air Commodore R. Collishaw, 10 July 1941, TNA AIR 23/1391. 360

i. Intimate relations between the two Services at key points, i.e. at top Command level (e.g. Tedder and Auchinleck), at important field headquarters (significantly missing in BATTLEAXE) and at the very front of battle…

ii. An independent signals network – vitally important, so that there should be no competition for signals priorities and the minimum of hierarchical delay.

iii. Recognition that at certain times and in certain circumstances Army cooperation would be the function, not of ‘special’ aircraft designed and allocated for the purpose, but of the whole available air power, using all its types: bombers, reconnaissance, transport, special duties [emphasis in original].8

Terraine correctly emphasised these points as fundamental to the smooth provision of tactical air

support, but what was missing was a common understanding of the form that support would take.

The need to resolve the future form of air support reached a crisis point in the aftermath of

Battleaxe as the army attempted to gain direct control of air force assets to support its operations.

In the interwar period, RAF thinking on the issue of air-ground cooperation was led by

John Slessor, a classmate of Collishaw at RAF Staff College. Slessor commanded No.4 (army

co-operation) Squadron for three years after graduating from Andover and developed an interest

in air-ground cooperation. After spending three years at the Plans Branch of the Air Ministry’s

Directorate of Operations and Intelligence, Slessor was posted as an instructor at the Army Staff

College in Camberley. His role was to instruct army officers in the roles and capabilities of air power, especially tactical cooperation. After leaving Camberley for a posting in India, which

included operational flying in Waziristan, Slessor compiled his staff college lectures into an

exposition on tactical air operations called Air Power and Armies (1936).9 This book offered a

8 John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 352. 9 Biographical information on Slessor is taken from John Slessor, The Central Blue: The Autobiography of Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the RAF (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957); John Slessor, Air Power and Armies 361 thoroughly modern appreciation of the potential of air-ground operations and has been described as, ‘the best treatise of airpower theory written in English before World War II.’10 Slessor analyzed Great War operations in considerable detail, especially the role of air power during the

Battle of Amiens in August 1918. He argued that the RAF emerged from the First World War as,

‘the best led, best trained, and most efficient air force in the world,’ but that planning future operations based on that experience must be tempered with the expectation that ‘sealed-pattern, trench-warfare, infantry and artillery battle on the 1914-18 model will never be seen again.’11

Slessor believed that any future war would be marked by much greater manoeuvre and air power would have a central role to play, principally in defeating the enemy air force and interdicting the lines of communications and supply. Though achieving air superiority was the first objective of the air force, others roles, such as strategic attacks, interdiction at the theatre (operational) level and tactical cooperation with the ground forces would also be carried out. Slessor understood that the ability of the air force to carry out these missions in a parallel rather than sequential manner distinguished air operations from those of the army and navy.12

In Air Power and Armies, Slessor espoused the operational-level use of tactical air resources. Air superiority needed to be achieved to facilitate all other operations, both on the ground and in the air. An aggressive campaign to win control of the air was necessary, but this should not distract from other missions. He viewed air superiority not as an end goal, but rather, as a means to an end. Control of the air did not win wars, but it could lose them. Air superiority was something that needed to be attained, and then constantly maintained through the course of

(Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2009 (1936)); Vincent Orange, Slessor: Bomber Champion, the Life of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, GCB, DSO, MC (London: Grub Street, 2006); Phillip S. Meilinger, ‘John C Slessor and the Genesis of Air Interdiction,’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (August 1995), 43-48. 10 Comment by Phillip S. Meilinger in the foreword to Slessor, Air Power and Armies, n.p. 11 Slessor, Air Power and Armies, introduction [n.p.]. 12 Slessor, Air Power and Armies, introduction [n.p.]. 362

the campaign.13 The main contribution that aircraft could make to success in battle was the

interdiction of the battlefield. He observed that modern warfare required a prodigious amount of

materiel to deploy and sustain armies in the field. This meant attacking the enemy as far away from the battlefield as possible. It would never be possible to stop all supplies from reaching the front, but the diversion of some supplies, especially fuel, lubricants and ammunition, could have a paralytic effect on enemy operations. In this vein, it was most profitable to interdict enemy supply columns, and to a lesser extent, enemy troop columns.14 Slessor argued that the air force

should not engage in close support operations except in an emergency. He was very clear on this

point: ‘The first general rule [of any type of warfare]…is that the aeroplane is not a battle-field

weapon – the air striking force is not as a rule best employed in the actual zone in which the

armies are in contact [emphasis in original].’15 In terms of command arrangements, Slessor

believed that the air component commander should be co-equal with the ground component

commander. Each had a specialized role and needed to work together under a theatre commander

to maximize their effectiveness.16

Phillip S. Meilinger remarked that Slessor ‘masterful volume served as a transition

between the RAF of the post-World War I era and the RAF of the pre-World War II era.’17 It

certainly does that, but more importantly, Slessor foreshadowed the development of air-ground

doctrine that took place during the Second World War. His ideas reflected the evolution of army-

air force relations as they would exist by the end of the Second World War. Unfortunately, this

inter-service partnership at the start of the war was characterized by internecine fighting and

13 Slessor, Air Power and Armies, 5-10. 14 Slessor, Air Power and Armies, 90-98. 15 Slessor, Air Power and Armies, 90. 16 This observation was made by Phillip Meilinger in the foreword to the 2009 reprint of Air Power and Armies. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, foreword [n.p.]. 17 Phillip S. Meilinger, ‘Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II,’ in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1997), 66. 363

parochial, inward-looking opinions on relations between the two services. It would take years of

operations to work out a method of cooperation acceptable to both services.18

The relationship between the RAF and the Army at the start of the Second World War

was strained at best. During the interwar period both the Army and Navy viewed the air force as

an ‘aberration’ and wanted ownership of the dismantled pieces.19 Trenchard fought hard to prevent this from happening by advocating an offensive or strategic role for the RAF. The ability to take the war to the enemy through strategic bombing gave the air force a role equivalent to the other two services. However, this theory could not be tested in a period of peace meaning that

‘air control’ was the prime mission of the RAF between the wars. David Hall observed that

‘Imperial policing provided substantial financial savings for the British government and in so doing also secured the RAF’s future as an independent service with its unique contribution to the defence of the United Kingdom – strategic bombing.’20

The competition between the services for resources did not create a harmonious working

relationship. Derek Waldie’s study of relations between the army and the air force during this

period concluded, ‘there is unlikely to be a more extreme example than that afforded by the relations between the British Army and Air Force in the interwar years…There was hardly an area of contact between the two departments throughout this period where there was not, at best, friction, or, at worst, open hostility.’21 The two services did work together on the issue of air

support in the 1920s and 1930s but their divergent paths meant that little was accomplished.

18 B. Michael Bechthold, ‘A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43,’ Journal of Military History 68, no.3 (July 2004), 821-851. 19 David Ian Hall, Learning How to Fight Together: The British Experience with Joint Air-Land Warfare (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Air Force Research Institute, 2009), 9. 20 Hall, Learning How to Fight Together. See also David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); Sebastian Ritchie, The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939 (Shrivenham: Air Historical Branch, 2011). 21 Derek J.P. Waldie, ‘Relations between the Army and the RAF, 1918-1939,’ (PhD Thesis, King's College, London, 1980), 296. 364

There were fundamental disagreements over the form of the air support organization. The army

believed that air support tactics were sufficiently different from other air operations that a

separate army-air organization and training system was required. The Army also feared that

without its own organic air support, the RAF would focus its attacks on targets away from the

battlefield and not provide it with the necessary close air support. For these reasons the Army

demanded that RAF squadrons form an integral component of army formations. The RAF

endorsed a very different concept of air power that was based largely on the ideas of John

Slessor. As well, little progress was made in the development of communications systems which

were crucial to the effective provision of air support.22

This situation meant that the British fought the Battle of France in 1940 without an

effective air support system. The initial army deployment saw a single corps of two divisions

form the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). It was joined by the RAF’s Advanced Air Striking

Force (AASF) and the Air Component of the Field Force. The AASF was composed of 10

squadrons of Fairey Battles and was to focus on the attack of strategic targets. The Air

Component, composed of four squadrons each of fighters, bombers and army co-

operation/reconnaissance aircraft, was to provide direct support to the BEF and was under the

operational control of General John Gort, Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Army complaints

and the Air Staff’s desire to streamline the command and control arrangements led to the

creation of a single air command under Air Marshal Arthur Barratt known as British Air Forces

in France (BAFF). Barratt attempted to co-locate his headquarters with the army but Gort

believed this to be unnecessary.23

22 David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 22-24. 23 Air Ministry (Air Historical Branch), Air Support, Royal Air Force, Air Publication 3235 (London, 1955), 17-19; Hall, Strategy for Victory, 42 365

The Battle of France was a monumental defeat for the British and only the successful

evacuation from Dunkirk prevented a complete German victory. The effect of the battle on army-

air relations was almost as devastating. Poor coordination between the two services confirmed

for the army the need to have its own air force under command. It required fighters that could be

tasked for air umbrella missions as well as light bomber and dive bombers that would provide

close air support against targets ‘of vital tactical importance.’24 The RAF, however, also saw the

battle as a confirmation of its doctrine. The main problem encountered by the air force was its

numerical inferiority which did not allow it to conduct a campaign of its own design. Effective

air support was contingent on air superiority and there were never enough fighter squadrons in

France to achieve this. The Air Ministry believed that more aircraft, better mobility and

improved communications were the only defects in the existing system.25

The poor state of the British air support system in 1940 demanded refinement. The RAF

and Army each remained convinced of the correctness of their approach and neither side was

willing to compromise. Various initiatives were started in the United Kingdom to improve the

situation. Sir Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for War, moved the process forward in mid-

September 1940 when he observed that ‘Progress in this vitally important matter is now the

secondary responsibility of a number of officials. It should surely be the primary responsibility

of highly placed officers of the Army and the R.A.F. working in co-operation.’26 As a result, the

RAF formed Army Co-operation Command in November which was ‘responsible for

24 General the Viscount Gort, ‘Second Despatch on Operations of the British Expeditionary Force, France and Belgium, 1 February 1940 to 31 May 1940,’ 17 October 1941, Supplement to the London Gazette, 5932; see also Hall, Learning How to Fight Together, 11. 25 Hall, Learning How to Fight Together, 11. For a complete discussion of the development of army-air matters during the Battle of France, see: Air Ministry (Air Historical Branch), Air Support, Royal Air Force, Air Publication 3235 (London, 1955), TNA AIR 10/5547, ch.2; Hall, Strategy for Victory, ch.3; L.F. Ellis, The War in France and Flanders 1939-1945 (London: HMSO, 1954), esp.Ch.22; Richards, Royal Air Force, vol.1, ch.5; Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945, chs.12-15. 26 ‘Air Support for the Army. Memorandum by Secretary of State for War,’ 23 September 1940, TNA AIR 20/3706. 366

implementing the policy decided upon by the Air Ministry and the War Office for the

development of all forms of Air Support for the Army.’ The Command would also be

responsible for conducting the necessary training and fostering a commonality in the approach of

the two services to air support.27

The future direction of air support received attention at the highest levels of the British

government in the first half of 1941. In March Churchill told Cabinet that it was the Royal Navy

and especially the RAF that would win the war and the Army had no role to play in the defeat of

the enemy.28 This ignited an extended debate over the summer and fall of 1941 between the two

services over the number and type of aircraft to be devoted to army support operations. Air Chief

Marshal Portal preferred to focus RAF development on the strategic bombing program and

assign a small number of aircraft to the army. Conversely, General John Dill, the Chief of the

Imperial General Staff (CIGS), wanted 109 army support squadrons and various other attack and

transport aircraft dedicated to work with the army. In total, this demand worked out to nearly

4,000 aircraft, more than the existing RAF frontline strength.29 This strategic debate revealed the

acrimony between the highest levels of the services and was focused exclusively on the

allocation of resources and did not consider the employment of army support squadrons at the

operational or tactical levels.

27 ‘Air Support for the Army. Memorandum by Secretary of State for War,’ 23 September 1940, TNA AIR 20/3706. 28 W.P. (41) 69, Annex 1, 26 March 1941, TNA CAB 66/15. 29 This debate may be followed in the following Cabinet papers: C.O.S. (41) 83 (O), War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘The Air Programme. Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff,’ 21 May 1941, TNA CAB 80/57; C.O.S. (41) 89 (O), War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Army Air Requirements. Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,’ 30 May 1941, TNA CAB 80/57; C.O.S. (41) 119 (O), War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Army-Air Requirements. Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff,’ 26 June 1941, TNA CAB 80/58; C.O.S. (41) 129 (O), War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Army-Air Requirements. Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff,’ 26 June 1941, TNA CAB 80/58; C.O.S. (41) 242 (O), War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Army Air Requirements. Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,’ 22 October 1941, TNA CAB 80/60; C.O.S. (41) 119 (O), War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Army-Air Requirements. Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff,’ 2 November 1941, TNA CAB 80/60. See also P.M. McCallum, ‘Army-Air Co- operation,’ TNA CAB 101/136, 1-24. 367

Work was also under way on the development of air support at the tactical level. In

September and October 1940 the Air Staff authorized a series of joint army-air signals trials to experiment with improvements to battlefield communications between the two services. Group

Captain A.H. Wann and Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. Woodall devised a networked system of communications links that would allow the army and air force to converse more effectively in the field.30

At the start of May 1941, Slessor wrote a note for the Vice Chief of the Air Staff on the

question of RAF support for the Army in an attempt to set out the future direction of policy on

the matter. He stated, ‘there has been far too much of a tendence [sic] in all these battles for the

Army to turn around and ask the Air Force to do what it should be doing itself.’31 The role of the

air force was not to destroy enemy tanks, but to make it impossible for them to fight due to lack

of fuel and ammunition. He countered the army contention that the German successes in Poland,

the Low Countries and France were due to close support provided by the Luftwaffe was

inaccurate as its main accomplishment was to isolate the battlefield and dislocate the lines of

communications. Luftwaffe success against battlefield targets occurred because it had first

accomplished the other tasks.32 In his memo Slessor used the example of Luftwaffe air

campaigns to prove his points, but he could just as easily have used Collishaw’s conduct in

Operation Compass as his example.

The creation of Army Co-operation Command and the Wann-Woodall experiments were

positive developments which would aid the process of developing an effective British air support

system. The procedures for the provision of air support were being worked out and the army and

30 Air Ministry (Air Historical Branch), Air Support, Royal Air Force, Air Publication 3235 (London, 1955), 26; Hall, Strategy for Victory, 91-93. 31 Air Vice-Marshal J.C. Slessor to V.C.A.S., 6 May 1941, TNA AIR 39/16. 32 Air Vice-Marshal J.C. Slessor to V.C.A.S., 6 May 1941, TNA AIR 39/16. 368

the air force were slowly coming to understand the needs of the other service, but a crucial

feature was still lacking – success in battle. This would come from operations in the Middle East.

* * * * *

Churchill was the prime figure in sorting out relations between the army and the air force

and Operation Battleaxe was the event which finally triggered his intervention. His view on the

relationship between the two services, which had previously favoured the army, began to change.

He was not pleased with the failure of Battleaxe and on 20 June he was ‘ruminating deeply’

about the fate of Tobruk and how to resume the offensive in the Western Desert.33 He

subsequently wrote to General Hastings Ismay, his chief military advisor, to request in writing

proposals for the ‘more intimate association of the Army and the co-operating Air Force squadrons.’34

In the six weeks after Battleaxe Churchill sought a solution to one of the main problems

evident during the failed operation. Both Tedder and Auchinleck identified difficulties in the

provision of air support during the battle. For the army, the main issue was the defence of its

troops, but for the air force it was a question of ‘opportunity cost’ – aircraft could be used for the

close protection of the army, but Collishaw had shown during earlier operations in the desert that

distant attacks on enemy bases, airfields, ports and lines of communications were more effective

and had the additional benefit of forcing the enemy to adopt a defensive posture and limit their

offensive missions.35 Such a use of air power would achieve the operational goal sought by the

army but it would not provide the comforting sight of aircraft overhead desired by many army

33 John Colville, Diary, 20 June 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol.3, 826. 34 Winston S. Churchill to General Ismay, 20 June 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol.3, 826. 35 ‘Opportunity cost’ is an economics/business phase which describes ‘A benefit, profit, or value of something that must be given up to acquire or achieve something else. Since every resource (land, money, time, etc.) can be put to alternative uses, every action, choice, or decision has an associated opportunity cost.’ , accessed 3 October 2013. 369

commanders. Tedder had ordered Collishaw to provide an air umbrella during Battleaxe in

response to army demands and urging from London, especially Portal, to get along with the

army. After the battle Tedder realised the problems with this approach and though he stated that

the use of the umbrella was appropriate given the circumstances, it was a tactic that should be

avoided in the future.36

Churchill placed primary blame for the failure of Battleaxe on General Wavell. In writing

to South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts on 30 June Churchill observed that though the British

had superiority in tanks and aircraft the enemy was able to move its tanks from Tobruk

unmolested as the Tobruk garrison did not participate in the battle. Churchill did not directly

indict Wavell in the letter but his observation that ‘the battle was hard and even and might easily

have turned our way’ indicated that he thought his commander had handled his forces poorly.37

Churchill also considered Tedder culpable for the defeat. In writing to Auchinleck on 19

July to try to better understand the problems of the battle Churchill remarked that ‘the Air Force

was used as a mere series of small umbrellas’ over the army troops and ‘its large superiority was

frittered away in passive defence by standing patrols, instead of being used in offensive strategic

combination with the Army.’ He continued that this situation ‘no doubt arose from the earnest

desire of the Air Force to protect the Army’ but that did not change the outcome of the battle.38

The War Office in London drew different lessons from Battleaxe and attempted to use

them to shape the air support debate. Following Wavell’s dismissal, Dill wrote to Auchinleck on

36 Telegram, C.A.S. from Tedder, 21 June 1941, TNA WO 106/2161. 37 Winston S. Churchill to General Smuts, 30 June 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol.3, 872. 38 Winston S. Churchill to General Auchinleck, 19 July 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol.3, 962. 370

26 June with ‘a few words on the situation and perhaps of advice.’39 He outlined the

dissatisfaction of the War Office over the issue of air co-operation – ‘Nowhere [sic] is it good’ –

and observed that the RAF has ‘no complete understanding of what is required of them from the

purely Army point of view.’40 Dill then clarified the role he expected Tedder to play in the

Middle East – ‘his main mission in life is to support the Army to the nth degree in any operation

it has to undertake and to support it in the manner most acceptable to the Army Commander

concerned.’41

In this same period Churchill received personal reports from two outside observers on the

RAF-Army relationship in the Middle East. Harriman, an American, was US President Franklin

D. Roosevelt’s special envoy but he also enjoyed a special relationship with Churchill and reported directly to the British Prime Minister. Upon his arrival in Egypt on 19 June, just after the completion of Operation Battleaxe, Harriman interviewed the senior commanders involved –

Wavell, Auchinleck, Tedder and Cunningham as well as Beresford-Peirse and Collishaw. His

main conclusion was that there was a ‘dangerous lack of military cooperation’ between the three

services.42 Battleaxe was the main topic discussed and each service shared its discontent.

Admiral Cunningham observed that the Navy was not notified about the operation and it could

have provided significant naval gunfire at Halfaya which could have made a difference in the

attempts to capture and hold the important pass.43 Beresford-Peirse bitterly complained that the air force had not supported the advance of his troops while Collishaw countered that the army’s

39 Letter, General John Dill to Lieutenant-General Claude Auchinleck, 26 June 1941, quoted in John Kennedy, The Business of War: The war narrative of Major-General Sir John Kennedy, GCMG, KCVO, KBE, CB, MC (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1957), 134. 40 Letter, Dill to Auchinleck, 26 June 1941 quoted in Kennedy, The Business of War, 136. 41 Letter, Dill to Auchinleck, 26 June 1941 quoted in Kennedy, The Business of War, 136. 42 W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975), 69. 43 It should be noted that the use of the navy in such a bombardment role would have required the RAF to provide significant support in the form of air cover for the fleet at a time when there were already too few aircraft to perform the myriad of assigned roles. 371

requests for air support were unreasonable given the existing state of the communications

network. In a cable sent on 5 July Harriman told Churchill that the theatre required a unified

military command but passed along Tedder’s view that ‘Neither the Army nor the Navy

understands the use of the air. If [either one were] given control, the Air Force would be wasted.’44 In his final report submitted to Churchill and the British War Cabinet on 16 July

Harriman declared that ‘Unified command is essential and in my mind cannot be attained to an

effective degree unless one man is charge with responsibility for the defense of the Middle

East.’45

Oliver Lyttelton was the newly-appointed Minister of State in the Middle East sent to

Cairo by Churchill to relieve Auchinleck of the burden of non-operational matters. After arriving

on 5 July he met with the commanders-in-chief. His report to Churchill on 26 July echoed the

findings of Harriman. He commented favourably on the state of the RAF in Egypt but noted the

poor coordination between the three services. He also suggested that a unified command was

necessary for the success of future operations.46

Auchinleck’s first cable to London after taking command in the Middle East reflected the

War Office view of the nature of the relationship between the army and the RAF. He considered

that armoured reinforcements were the ‘first essential’ for a new offensive into Libya but the

‘second essential’ was a large and well-trained air component which would be ‘at disposal [of

the] Army for all its needs including fighters medium bombers tactical reconnaissance and close

support on the battle field. This is non-existent at present [emphasis added].47 His ‘third

44 Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 68-69. 45 Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 71. 46 Orange, Tedder, 145. For a full discussion of Harriman and Lyttelton see Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 68- 71; Tedder, With Prejudice, 135; and Orange, Tedder, 144-145. 47 COS (41) 417, 6 July 1941: Annex I, ‘Copy of Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, Middle East to War Office (Auchinleck to Churchill),’ 4 July 1941, TNA CAB 80/29. 372

essential’ was that the Royal Navy must provide ‘close support of Army and in harrying enemy

sea communications’ and the RAF must be at the ‘disposal of the Navy’ for these operations.48

Auchinleck proposed an army-centric command structure in the Middle East whereby the

RAF and RN would assume subservient roles to the land campaign. He advocated for the RAF air component be placed under command of the Army and take its direction from the Army and that it, along with the Royal Navy, should design their operations almost exclusively in support ground operations.

The Air Ministry was not pleased with Auchinleck’s letter. Group Captain Ronald

Ivelaw-Chapman, the Deputy Director of Plans (Operations) wrote ‘We cannot agree that the formation of what will, in effect, be three separate air forces is either possible or desirable in the

Middle East.’49 This plan for the ‘rigid and uneconomical employment of the Air Force’ led Air

Chief Marshal Portal to raise his objections with Churchill immediately.50

The Prime Minister’s reply to Auchinleck’s telegram of 4 July bore the influence of

Portal, Tedder and Harriman and made it clear that he expected a co-equal role for the air force.

The RAF would fully support the land battle but this did not mean that air resources would be under Army control:

I feel that for all major operational purposes your plans must govern the employment of the whole Air Force through the Middle East, bearing in mind of course that the Air Force has its own dominant strategic role to play, and must not be frittered away in providing small umbrellas for the Army, as it seems to have been in the Sollum battle (Battleaxe). In your telegram you speak of aircraft supporting the Army and aircraft supporting the Navy and aircraft employed on independent strategic tasks. The question is, what are the proportions? These will have to be arranged from time to time by the Commanders-in-Chief in

48 COS (41) 417, 6 July 1941: Annex I, ‘Copy of Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, Middle East to War Office (Auchinleck to Churchill),’ 4 July 1941, TNA CAB 80/29. 49 Auchinleck’s proposal suggested that separate squadrons be devoted to army, navy and air force missions. Minute of D.D Plans (O) in response to COS (41) 417, 6 July 1941: Annex I, ‘Copy of Telegram from Commander-in- Chief, Middle East to War Office (Auchinleck to Churchill),’ 4 July 1941, TNA CAB 80/29. 50 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.2: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, June 1941 to January 1942, TNA AIR 41/25, 13. 373

consultation. But nothing in these arrangements should mar the integrity of the Air Force contribution to any major scheme you have in hand. One cannot help feeling that in the Sollum fight our air superiority was wasted.51

This statement modified Auchinleck’s view on air support and he replied to Churchill

that, in consultation with Tedder, he agreed that the ‘RAF cannot be subordinated exclusively to

implement army plans.’52

To ensure that there was no misunderstanding regarding his orders Churchill summoned

Auchinleck to London for a talk in late July. Tedder, not invited by the Prime Minister, decided

he needed to go to as it was ‘vital that [discussions of land strategy] should not be divorced from

the parallel problems of air strategy in the Middle East.’53 Over the course of two days

Auchinleck and Tedder met with senior officials in London and dined with Churchill at his

country estate.54

The crux of the Auchinleck and Tedder visit to London was their attendance at the War

Cabinet Defence Committee meeting on 1 August. The situation in the Western Desert

dominated the discussion and Churchill remarked that the next three months offered a great

opportunity to press the enemy, possibly to the point of forcing their evacuation from Africa.

Churchill’s intent was to impress upon Auchinleck the importance of the earliest possible

commencement of the next major offensive in the Western Desert, to be known as Crusader. He

believed that sufficient forces were already in place for such an attack and the offensive should

be launched right away. On 22 June the Germans had launched Operation Barbarossa, their

attack on the Soviet Union, and experienced great success in the early days of the offensive.

51 Telegram, Prime Minister to C-in-C, ME, 6 July 1941, quoted in ‘Army-Air Co-operation,’ TNA CAB 101/136, 25. 52 Telegram, C-in-C, ME to Prime Minister, 15 July 1941, quoted in ‘Army-Air Co-operation,’ TNA CAB 101/136, 25-26. 53 Tedder, With Prejudice, 138. 54 Churchill, The Second World War, vol.3, 405. 374

Churchill calculated that a British offensive in the desert would benefit from German distraction.

He also feared that British inactivity at this crucial point would not be respected by an ally

‘bearing the full brunt’ of the German attack.55

Auchinleck agreed that there was a need for an immediate offensive but he was holding

out for reinforcements, especially tanks, and would not commit to an attack before November.

He also pointed out that Battleaxe had failed because the Army was not yet ready to attack.

Churchill countered that the war effort could never proceed by waiting until preparations were complete and he was willing to authorise ‘exceptional measures’ to allow the offensive to proceed earlier.56

The final issue discussed at the meeting concerned the air situation in the Middle East.

Churchill was not pleased that with 50,000 airmen, 2,000 aircraft and 1,500 pilots Tedder was only able to marshal 450 aircraft for battle. Tedder replied that many of the difficulties had to do with the great distances involved as well as the lack of suitable repair and maintenance sections in Egypt. He then detailed the efforts being undertaken to improve the ability of the RAF to

‘provide the Army with the opportunity which they wanted for an offensive.’57 These developments included the formation of an Army Co-operation Wing, a joint training programme with the army and improvements to the communications establishment between the two services. Churchill concluded the meeting by again stressing the ‘vital importance’ of intensifying the air and naval campaign against the enemy lines of communications. He then

55 ‘War Cabinet, Defence Committee (Operations): minutes,’ 1 August 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol.3, 1022. 56 ‘War Cabinet, Defence Committee (Operations): minutes,’ 1 August 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol.3, 1023-1024. 57 ‘War Cabinet, Defence Committee (Operations): minutes,’ 1 August 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol.3, 1024. See also Tedder, Without Prejudice, 139. 375

stated that ‘during the next day or two he would set down the general conclusions which had

emerged from the discussions which had been held in the last two or three days.’58

The meetings were productive for Churchill who came away with a better appreciation of

his Middle East commander, even though he was unable to persuade him to move up the

attack.59 Auchinleck was exhausted by the meetings but was satisfied with the outcome.60 Tedder also considered the meetings a success and felt that he had successfully set forth the RAF Middle

East view to Churchill and the other senior officers in London. An additional benefit was the

opportunity to get to know Auchinleck as ‘the trip had done a great deal to bring us together.’61

During the summer Churchill ‘brooded’ on the necessary steps to obtain success in

Operation Crusader and his meetings with Auchinleck and Tedder ultimately prompted him to

write a directive which would address the major problems he saw in the Middle East.62 He considered the positions presented to him by Portal, Dill, Auchinleck and Tedder and also took into account the independent information he received from Harriman and Lyttelton, among others, in an attempt to mitigate future arguments over the direction of air support in the Middle

East. While aboard HMS Prince of Wales en route Placentia Bay, Newfoundland for the Atlantic

Conference in early August he composed a statement ‘in light of all the reports which I had studied of the spring fighting [Battleaxe].’63 His missive began with the words ‘Renown awaits the Commander who first in this war…’ and focused on defining the roles and relationship of the

Army and the RAF in the upcoming battle.64 Jock Colville recalled that the Prime Minister used

58 ‘War Cabinet, Defence Committee (Operations): minutes,’ 1 August 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol.3, 1024. 59 Churchill, The Second World War, vol.3, 405. 60 Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London: Collins, 1964), 267-269. 61 Tedder, With Prejudice, 138-143. Quotation found on page 143. 62 Churchill, The Second World War, vol.3, 430 63 Churchill, The Second World War, vol.3, 427-430. Quotation found on page 430. 64 The full text of this statement is quoted by Churchill in his memoirs. See Churchill, The Second World War, vol.3, 498-500. 376

this opening to denote ‘masterly documents [which were] well thought out, original in content, clear and to the point’ which Churchill used to ‘direct the conduct and strategy of the war.’65 The

first draft of this note was shown to Generals Dill and Brooke who suggested a few minor

changes that did not affect its main principles and it was then sent to Auchinleck and Tedder in

late August/early September.66 The seminal directive confirmed the independence of the RAF in

the Middle East, put to rest any consideration that it was a junior partner, and settled the pattern

for future army-air co-operation.

Churchill’s memo was entitled ‘A Note by the Minister of Defence’ and began with a

discussion of the importance of anti-tank guns which, he argued, could stop an attack by heavy

armour if used properly. Churchill recognised the threat of German tank attacks but urged that

guns should be ‘fought to the muzzle’ and even if overrun their sacrifice was of the ‘highest

honour’ and the destruction of tanks repaid the loss of any anti-tank guns.67 Churchill considered

anti-aircraft guns essential to provide close air defence of ground forces. To ensure sufficient protection, and relieve the RAF of the need to provide an air umbrella, Churchill sent an additional 250 Bofors anti-aircraft guns to the Middle East to ensure that Auchinleck’s columns could protect themselves from enemy air attack. This meant that:

Nevermore must the ground troops expect, as a matter of course, to be protected against the air by aircraft. If this can be done it must only be as a happy make- weight and a place of good luck. Above all, the idea of keeping standing patrols of aircraft over moving columns should be abandoned. It is unsound to

65 John Colville, The Churchillians (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 146. 66 Auchinleck received a copy of the directive on 29 August 1941. He immediately recognised its importance and added the hand-written annotation ‘Keep as history!’. Tedder recalls in his memoirs that he received it in early September. Memorandum, Churchill to Auchinleck, 29 August 1941, Reference GB 133/AUC/304 found in Papers of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, AUC/182, John Rylands University Library, The University of Manchester; Churchill, The Second World War, vol.3, 498-500; Tedder, Without Prejudice, 169. Both Tedder and Churchill quote extensively from the directive. 67 Winston S. Churchill, ‘A Note by the Minister of Defence,’ 7 October 1941, TNA AIR 8/983. Note: though this copy of the directive is dated 7 October, the original was drafted by Churchill in early August, sent to the Middle East in late August or early September and widely circulated to high commanders in October. The complete text of this important note is reproduced in Appendix 1. 377

‘distribute’ aircraft in this way, and no air superiority will stand any larger application of such mischievous practice.68

Churchill further explained that the RAF would be required to provide the army commander with

‘all possible aid irrespective of other targets’ when a battle was planned. The army and the air

force would then work together to decide on targets for air attack before and during the battle.

Rather than provide an air umbrella to protect the army, the RAF’s primary responsibility would

be to attack ‘all assembly or refuelling points or marching columns of the enemy…by bombers

during daylight with strong fighter protection, thus bringing about air conflicts not only of the

highest importance in themselves but directly contributing to the general result.’69

These instructions fundamentally changed the dynamic of army-air cooperation in the

Middle East and set out the parameters which would guide the provision of air support in future

battles. Hall contends that Churchill provided ‘executive guidance for the air support

arrangements that would be used in Operation Crusader [and] he also established an authoritative

definition of the general precepts of the ‘combined operation,’ which the Army and the RAF

adhered to throughout the rest of the war.’70 The problems of Battleaxe were addressed – the air

force would not be used to provide air cover to the army and the two services would work

closely towards a jointly developed and executed battle plan.

The issue of army-air cooperation was of great interest to Churchill but his directive

marked an almost complete reversal of the position he had held prior to Operation Battleaxe. A

month before the battle the issue of air co-operation with the army was discussed a meeting at 10

Downing Street in London attended by Churchill, Dill, Portal, Lord Beaverbrook and others.

68 Churchill, ‘A Note by the Minister of Defence,’ TNA AIR 8/983. Lord Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, GCB (London: Cassell & Company, 1966), 169; David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008)108. 69 Churchill, ‘A Note by the Minister of Defence,’ TNA AIR 8/983. 70 Hall, Strategy for Victory, 107-108. 378

During the meeting General Alan Brooke recalled that he ‘became a bit heated and attacked the

Air Ministry strongly, as regards recent attitude towards Army Co-operation. PM [Churchill] backed me up strongly and meeting was a great success!’71 Churchill continued his support of

the Army position on 10 June 1941 during a parliamentary debate on the Battle of Crete when

RAF support for the army was discussed. When pressed on the issue, Churchill stated that it was

desirable that every division should have the chance to train with the RAF and have a ‘close and

precise relationship with a particular number of aircraft that it knows and that it can call up at

will and need.’72 He further stated that those aircraft should be under the command of the army

‘for the purposes of everything that is a tactical operation.’73

Battleaxe was the catalyst for Churchill to redefine the relationship between the army and the air force but he did not give the RAF carte blanche to act in its own self-interest. At the same time Auchinleck was making his first declarations on air support in the Middle East, Wavell released his report on 2nd Armoured Division during the retreat in Cyrenaica which was soon followed by the rebuttal report by Brigadier A.F. Harding and Air Commodore L.O. Brown.74

Churchill accepted Wavell’s report but made a number of comments including the observation

that the commander of an armoured division must have a small number of aircraft at his disposal

for the purpose of reconnaissance.75 Portal was not pleased with the criticism of the RAF in

Wavell’s report and made his objections known to Churchill. The Prime Minister agreed that the

71 Entry for 13 May 1941 contained in Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries 1939-1945, Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, eds (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 2001), 157. 72 Winston Churchill, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 10 June 1941, vol.371, cc.157. , accessed 16 June 2013. 73 Winston Churchill, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 10 June 1941, vol.371, cc.157. , accessed 16 June 2013. 74 General A.P. Wavell, ‘Report on the Action of the 2nd Armoured Division during the Withdrawal from Cyrenaica, March-April 1941,’ 11 July 1941, TNA CAB 66/17/32; and Brigadier A.F. Harding and Air Commodore L.O. Brown, ‘On Certain Aspects of the G.H.Q M.E. Report on the Action of the 2nd Armoured Division During the Withdrawal from Cyrenaica, March-April 1941,’ 25 July 1941, TNA CAB 66/18/24. 75 Winston S. Churchill, ‘Note by the Minister of Defence on Report on the Acton of the 2nd Armoured Division,’ 11 July 1941, TNA CAB 66/17/32, 2. 379

air force was not to blame for the defeat but he used the opportunity to tell Portal that ‘the lack of

effective and intimate contact between the air and the ground forces calls for drastic reform. The

needs of the Army should be met in a helpful spirit by the Air Ministry.’76 A week later

Churchill sent Portal another letter which observed that the RAF had been ‘most hard and

unhelpful both to the Army and the Navy in meeting their special requirements’ and he expected

that ‘the Army’s grievances and complaints will be met.’77 Churchill understood that successful

joint operations required willing and helpful partners.

Relations between the RAF and the Army continued to be adversarial during the planning

for Operation Crusader but an agreement was eventually achieved along the lines outlined by

Churchill. On 3 October during a planning meeting for the battle Lieutenant-General Alan

Cunningham, commander of 8th Army, argued strenuously that his corps commanders ‘would

feel lonely and unsupported unless they had a fighter and bomber squadron at their own personal

beck and call.’78 Tedder was not moved by this appeal and countered that ‘to divide up our forces into penny packets would be to fritter away out strength without leaving his

[Cunningham’s] forces any effective support.’79 Tedder described the subsequent debate as a

‘good, friendly but gloves off discussion’ which was eventually settled when Auchinleck stated

he had given the issue a lot of thought and was ‘quite convinced’ that the RAF position was the

correct option.80 Churchill’s directive was not specifically mentioned in the accounts of the

76 Winston S. Churchill to Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, 19 August 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol.3, 1085. 77 Winston S. Churchill to Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, 27 August 1941, quoted in Gilbert, ed., The Churchill War Papers, vol.3, 1117. 78 Letter, Tedder to Freeman, 4 October 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 79 Letter, Tedder to Freeman, 4 October 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 80 Letter, Tedder to Freeman, 4 October 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 380

meeting but his ideas underscored the entire discussion and ultimately underscored Auchinleck’s

acquiescence to the RAF plan.81

Churchill’s pronouncements on air support were influenced directly by events in the

Middle East. Vincent Orange states that he made his rulings on air support and the RAF-Army

relationship ‘in response to Tedder’s arguments, relayed by Portal.’82 Churchill’s first major statement was prompted by Auchinleck’s attempt (influenced by the War Office) to establish the army as the senior partner with the air force under its command and control. His second statement, the ‘Renown awaits the Commander who first in this war’ message, was made in anticipation of the forthcoming Crusader offensive and the need to ensure a smooth working relationship between the two services. The evolution of Churchill’s thinking on the question of army air support was a refinement of the example set in the Western Desert by Collishaw as the only successful air-ground battlefield partnership employed up to that point in the war. Tedder, through Portal, was the main conduit to the Prime Minister for these ideas. During a planning meeting for Operation Crusader Tedder confirmed this point when he advocated an offensive role for the RAF in the upcoming battle based on the RAF’s prior experience:

…in each of the last two operations in the Western Desert [Brevity and Battleaxe], in which air action on both occasions was successful and had very considerable effect, action was taken as a result of direct air reconnaissance and on the initiative of the A.O.C. [Collishaw] after squadrons had been standing by for hours ‘at call’ without any call having come from the Army.83

Tedder referred to Collishaw’s use of offensive air power during these battles, not the air

umbrella that he ordered him to carry out during the first two days of Battleaxe.

81 See ‘Minutes of Meeting to Consider Options in the Western Desert. Held at G.H.Q. Middle East, on 3rd October, 1941,’ TNA AIR 20/2792 and Letter, Tedder to Freeman, 4 October 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 82 Vincent Orange, Churchill and his Airmen: Relationships, Intrigue and Policy Making 1914-1945 (London: Grub Street, 2013), 176. 83 Letter, Tedder to Freeman, 4 October 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 381

At the highest levels, the debate between the Army and the RAF was over the allocation of resources. The RAF was committed to a policy of strategic bombing and wanted to ensure the availability of significant resources for that campaign. Conversely, the army wanted more significant resources devoted to Army Co-operation Command so that it had aircraft available to support its ground operations in support of the defence of the British Isles in the event of a

German invasion, and later in support of Second Front operations on continental Europe.84 This

was the main focus of the army-air debate in London in 1940-1941 and it addressed the strategic

direction of the air war, not the operational level which was the focus of Churchill’s statements

following Battleaxe.

The other avenue of air support debate taking place in the UK was focussed on the

tactical level of coordination. Tests, such as those conducted by Wann and Woodall, devised

better methods of communications, intelligence and organisation to facilitate closer and more

effective cooperation between the army and the air force.85 In 1940 and 1941 there was a

surprising lack of debate or discussion of the operational level issues that proved so troublesome

during Operational Battleaxe. One of the few individuals looking at operational-level questions related to air-ground operations was Slessor, but his views seem to have had little impact on the decision makers.86

As the exchanges were taking place in London, work was proceeding in the Western

Desert to improve the tactical level of co-operation between No.253 Army Co-operation Wing of

204 Group and Eighth Army. The first training manoeuvre, Western Desert Exercise No.3, was

84 There are a number of studies which examine these issues. See P.M. McCallum, ‘Army-Air Co-operation,’ TNA CAB 101/136, 1-24; Bill McAndrew, ‘Preliminary Narrative, RCAF Vol.III, Air/Ground Operations: The Early Debate Part I,’ February 1987, Manuscript held by Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Ontario; ‘Army-Air Support and Photographic Interpretation 1939-1945,’ chs.1-3, 5-6, 1945, TNA WO 277/34; Hall, Strategy for Victory, 89-103. 85 ‘Army-Air Support and Photographic Interpretation 1939-1945,’ 1945, TNA WO 277/34, ch.4. 86 See Slessor’s note to the VCAS as an example of his thinking during this period. Air Vice-Marshal J.C. Slessor to V.C.A.S., 6 May 1941, TNA AIR 39/16. 382

planned and executed under Collishaw and took place on 11-12 July 1941. It examined the

offensive and defensive use of aircraft with the aim of determining the most suitable targets for

air attack as well as how to find, engage and destroy them. A key feature of this and successive

trials was determining how best the two services could communicate in battle and it included

recognition exercises to determine the most suitable method for ground forces to identify

themselves to aircraft.87 By early September sufficient experience had been gained to call a

conference in Cairo to determine the future direction of joint army-air operations in the Middle

East; this meeting resulted in the publication of ‘The Middle East (Army and RAF) Directive on

Direct Air Support,’ jointly issue by GHQ Middle East Forces and HQ RAF Middle East, on 30

September 1941. Hall argues that ‘in the course of the development of army air co-operation it

was perhaps the most important directive issued during the war.’88

According to the literature, publication of this directive marked the beginning of the

creation of the system of air support which would carry to Allies to victory. Its origins and

importance has been remarked upon by many historians. Hall states, ‘Tedder was the thinker

who conceived the new air-support system but Air Vice-Marshal Coningham (AOC WDAF) was

the practitioner who made it work.’89 Orange observes that Churchill’s pronouncements were

‘widely publicised and vigorously enforced by Coningham with Tedder’s wholehearted

support.’90 Terraine relates that ‘Tedder found particular satisfaction in the fact that…his own

views on the use of air power received powerful endorsement from Churchill himself.’91 It is not

surprising that Terraine made this remark because it was taken directly from Tedder’s own

87 Eighth Army, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Cunningham, was formed in September 1941 based on the Western Desert Force. Operations Record Book, 253 Wing, July-August 1941, TNA AIR 26/351; Middle East: Army Co-operation (August-October 1941), TNA AIR 20/2996. 88 Hall, Strategy for Victory, 109. Hall reproduced this complete directive in the appendix to his book. 89 Hall, Learning How to Fight Together, 15. 90 Vincent Orange, Coningham: A Biography of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham (London: Methuen, 1990), 79. 91 Terraine, The Right of the Line, 346. 383

memoirs: ‘I was heartily glad when the perennial controversy about the economical use of airpower was clarified by a directive from the Prime Minister early in September.’ He then quoted verbatim Churchill’s words starting with ‘Never more must the ground troops expect, as a matter of course, to be protected against the air by aircraft…’ and concluded his recollection by relating

I found it most satisfying to be supported in this authoritative way by a ruling which recognized that we could not be so prodigal of our resources as to scatter them in driblets here and there, and which recognized also that apart from the essential aid which the air alone could render to the Army and Navy, there had emerged a new dimension in the Middle East struggle, air warfare in its own right.92

For a variety of reasons Tedder had endorsed the use of the air umbrella during Battleaxe but it is

clear that his operational-level concept of air operations reflected the campaign plan successfully

employed by Collishaw prior to Battleaxe.

In its main points, this commonly accepted version of events correctly credits

Coningham, and to a lesser extent Tedder, with the creation of the Allied system of air support.

But, it is more accurate to use the term ‘refinement’ rather than creation. Coningham took over

command of the Western Desert Air Force at a point where serious study and trials were being

devoted to improving the methods of tactical air support. Experiments were begun under

Collishaw’s direction to devise better methods of communications; the establishment of air

support controls which would facilitate liaison between the army and air force and allow a more

responsive deployment of aircraft to meet army needs, and improvements in the logistics of

providing air support. Coningham’s tenure in the desert also corresponded to a period when

greater resources were available, especially strong reinforcements of modern fighters and

bombers.

92 Tedder, With Prejudice, 169-170. 384

This system was improved and refined starting with Operation Crusader (November

1941-January 1942) and culminating a year later with Operation Lightfoot, the Second Battle of

El Alamein (October-November 1942). Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa launched

in November 1942, did not benefit from the lessons learned in the Western Desert and there were

major problems in army-air relations from the start. General Dwight Eisenhower, the overall

commander, reorganized his air command in early January 1943 drawing on the British

experience in the Western Desert. Following further refinements to the command structure after

the Casablanca Conference, the Allies arrived at the mature air support system which would

carry them through to the end of the war. On 16 February 1943 a meeting of senior Allied

commanders was held in Tripoli to discuss the lessons learned during the Libyan campaign. The

highlight of this meeting was presentations by General Bernard Montgomery, commander of

Eighth Army, and Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham, then commander of the Northwest

African Tactical Air Force. Montgomery unveiled a pamphlet he wrote called, ‘Some Notes on

High Command in War.’ Air Marshal Arthur Tedder, Coningham’s superior, called this

pamphlet the ‘gospel according the Montgomery.’93

In the pamphlet, Montgomery set out his beliefs about air power. ‘Any officer who

aspires to hold high command in war must understand clearly certain principles regarding the use

of air power.’ Flexibility was the greatest asset of air power and allowed it to be applied as a

‘battle-winning factor of the first importance.’ Radical for an army officer, Montgomery argued that centralized control of the resource was essential, as ‘nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resource into small packets placed under the control of

93 Tedder, With Prejudice, 394. Churchill remarks in his memoirs that during his visit to Tripoli at the beginning of February that he ‘chanced to show’ Montgomery a copy of his ‘Renown awaits’ directive. Montgomery had not previously seen it and remarked, ‘It is as true now as it was when it was written.’ Within two weeks Montgomery had written his own pamphlet on air power which shared many traits with Churchill’s missive. Churchill, The Second World War, vol.3, 500. 385

army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not expect, or wish, to exercise direct command over air striking forces.’ Montgomery concluded with the warning that the ground and air forces must ‘work together at the same HQ in complete harmony, and with complete mutual understanding and confidence.’94

Coningham made a presentation after Montgomery and revealed the principles that would

become the foundation of British and American tactical air power for the remainder of the war.95

Indeed, these principles still hold true today. He stated:

The Soldier commands the land forces, the Airman commands the air forces; both commanders work together and operate their respective forces in accordance with a combined Army-Air plan, the whole operations [sic] being directed by the Army Commander…An Army has one battle to fight, the land battle. The Air has two. It has first of all to beat the enemy air, so that it may go into the land battle against the enemy land forces with the maximum possible hitting power…96

He concluded his talk by stating ‘no soldier is competent to operate the Air, just as no

Airman is competent to operate the Army.’97

The tenets of the tactical air system outlined by Montgomery and Coningham at the

Tripoli meeting would guide British and American tactical air operations until the end of the war.

It was the successful partnership of Eighth Army and the Western Desert Air Force, and their

defeat of Rommel, that finally convinced senior army officers that a centralized air support

system, under Air Force command, was the best practice. This doctrine was at the core of the

94 All quotations from B.L. Montgomery, ‘Some Notes on High Command in War,’ 2nd ed., Italy, September 1943, TNA AIR 8/984, n.p. This is a reprint of the original that was first issued in January 1943. The only change was the addition of a new introduction by Montgomery. 95 General Elwood R. Quesada and General William W. Momyer, two US Air Force officers who served in North Africa and were leaders in developing American tactical air doctrine, believed that Coningham was the key figure in the creation of this Allied tactical air doctrine, and it was his force of personality that ensured it would be adopted. For a full discussion see, Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, eds., Air Superiority in World War II and Korea: An Interview with Gen. James Ferguson, Gen. Robert M. Lee, Gen. William Momyer, and Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 30-35. 96 ‘Talk by Air Vice-Marshal Sir A. Coningham to assembled British and American General and Senior Officers,’ Tripoli, 16 February 1943, TNA AIR 8/984. See Appendix 2 for the complete text of this address. 97 ‘Talk by Air Vice-Marshal Sir A. Coningham to assembled British and American General and Senior Officers,’ Tripoli, 16 February 1943, TNA AIR 8/984. 386

successful tactical air operations conducted in Sicily, Italy and Northwest Europe by the British

and American tactical air forces.98

Important changes were made to the British air support system in the period between

Operations Battleaxe and Crusader. The failure of the offensive to relieve Tobruk in June 1941

was caused in part by a misallocation of air resources during the battle. Generals Wavell and

Beresford-Peirse had request continuous air cover over their forces and Air Marshal Tedder

agreed to this allocation. Collishaw understood at the time that this was a misuse of his potent

offensive weapon but he was overruled by Tedder who complied with army requests made in the

wake of defeats in Cyrenaica, Greece and Crete. The army’s perception of these battles was that

the Luftwaffe had very effectively carried out attacks on British troops and the RAF, or ‘Royal

Absent Force’ had been busy on other less important tasks which left the army exposed.

To his credit, Churchill understood that the issue of air support needed to be resolved to

ensure British success in the war. Before Battleaxe he had endorsed the army view of air support

but the failure of the battle exposed problems with that model. His ‘Renown awaits’ directive

clearly and succinctly enunciated the concept of air support executed in the Western Desert by

Collishaw while it explicitly proscribed the air umbrella requested by the army and employed in

Operation Battleaxe. During Operation Compass Collishaw had devoted all the aircraft at his

disposal to the support of the ground offensive. Heavy and medium bombers, along with fighters

were directed to attack targets such as aerodromes, ports, and transportation hubs that would

delay and distract the despatch of enemy reinforcements, both air and ground, to the front and

98 For a full discussion of the North African Campaign and its role as the genesis of Allied tactical air support doctrine, see Bechthold, ‘A Question of Success,’ 821-851; Brad Gladman argues that the lessons learned by the British and their American partners in North Africa led to the creation of ‘the best system of air/land warfare ever seen’ which would become one of the Allies’ ‘great tools for victory.’ See Brad William Gladman, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940-43 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1-18 (quotations found on pages 2 and 18). 387 allow the army to concentrate on defeating the enemy in the zone of contact without interference.

A similar plan was executed during Brevity as well as during the closing stages of Battleaxe.

These latter operations showed the promise of positive results but their short duration did not allow the full impact of air power to be felt before the end of the battle. Much work remained to be done on the technical and tactical details of the air support system though a start had been made towards that process before Collishaw left. However, the broad theoretical foundations of army-air operations employed by Collishaw had been tested and proven during the battles of

1940-1941 and would now be further refined to form the basis of Allied tactical air doctrine employed for the rest of the war.

388

Conclusion

At the start of 1941 the RAF and the army in Egypt remained far apart in their conception

of air support. The Middle East Combined Plan of 1939 had created early harmony between the two services, but this trust and coordination eroded as failures mounted after the initial success of

Operation Compass. The army was dissatisfied with the cooperation it had received from the air

force in France and considered that the only way forward was to have an air force of its own, or at least an air force that was under its command. Relations between the two services were further damaged by the defeats in Greece and Crete, the retreat through Cyrenaica and the failure of

Operations Brevity and Battleaxe. Air Marshal Tedder was aware of the recent troubled history between the two services and for Battleaxe he acquiesced to the army demand to forgo offensive operations and mount a continuous defensive air umbrella over the army. The operation ended in a failure that was deeply disappointing for Prime Minister Churchill who had placed much hope in the effort to relieve Tobruk. Though there were many problems with Battleaxe, Churchill

identified the continuing difficulties between the army and the air force as an immediate issue

that needed to be fixed and made a series of pronouncements in the late summer and fall of 1941

that set the basis for future cooperation between the RAF and the army.

For all the problems between the two services during the first two years of the war, the relationship in the Middle East was remarkably smooth during the first battles in the Desert. Air

Commodore Raymond Collishaw and Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connor formed a close partnership which facilitated a successful campaign against the Italians ending with the capture of Benghazi and the destruction of the Italian 10th Army in February 1941. As the commander of

202 Group, Collishaw was left to run the campaign as he thought best by Air Chief Marshal

389

Arthur Longmore and he fought a model air campaign that embodied all the tenets of successful

tactical air operations that would be codified later in the war. As Collishaw recalled after the war,

they had to ‘outwit and outfight a numerically superior enemy by a combination of deception,

superior tactics and fighting spirit.’1 He understood that before anything else he needed achieve

and maintain air superiority over the battlefield. Once that was accomplished his aircraft could

be sent to attack the logistical lifeline of the enemy – bases, ports, airfields and the lines of

communications. Only when necessary were aircraft used in attacks on the battlefield. He also

understood from past experience, and from what his attacks did to the Italians, that the defensive

use of fighters was unprofitable.

In spite of his successful tenure as the senior RAF operational commander in the Western

Desert Collishaw has been largely forgotten by historians, or when remembered, the importance

of his role is minimized. A good example of this tendency is contained in the Air Ministry

monograph Air Support which stated, ‘The experience of the first six months of the war in the

desert could not easily be applied to the future, as it was not likely that the air superiority which

had been maintained by the Royal Air Force owing to the comparative lack of enterprise of the

much larger Italian Air Force, would persist.’2 The essential subtext of this passage was that the

British victory had more to do with Italian failings than RAF ability. The first successful British

offensive of the war – Operation Compass – was portrayed in much of the literature as a second-

class victory. It was a magnificent accomplishment at a point in the war where the British

desperately needed a victory and the outnumbered forces of Lieutenant-General O’Connor

achieved something near a miracle by routing the enemy in Cyrenaica at a remarkably small cost.

1 Raymond Collishaw with R.V. Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story (London: William Kimber, 1973), 255. 2 Air Ministry (Air Historical Branch), Air Support, Royal Air Force, Air Publication 3235 (London, 1955), TNA AIR 10/5547, 50. 390

The small RAF forces defeated a numerically superior opponent, but the victory was over the

Italians, not the more vaunted Germans. Mussolini’s soldiers and airmen were considered

mediocre, possessed poor equipment and were apt to run away rather than fight. The real war in

the desert did not start until the Germans arrived. In North Africa, Axis military failures were the

result of Italian deficiencies, especially their poor morale, while Axis military success can be

traced to German military excellence. Historian James Sadkovich summarised on the English-

language literature of the North African campaign where:

the Italian war effort is still viewed as vacillating between tragedy and farce; Mussolini is seen as a nasty little dictator and a bit of a mental featherweight incapable of fathoming the industrial and economic exigencies of war or of matching Hitler's tactical ‘genius’; and the Italian soldier, like Italian generals and politicians, serves merely as the object of ethnic jokes. After mid-1941, when the Germans arrived in the Mediterranean and the ‘guerra parallela’ came to an end, Italy's role seems so insignificant to most Anglo-American writers as to be negligible historically. Italian failures in 1940 are projected forward and backward in time in order to discount Italy as a military power of any significance in the twentieth century, and analysis is reduced to comments on Italian morale and fascist ‘bluff.’3

Collishaw’s role in these early victories is thus undervalued. Even the otherwise excellent

RAF narrative on the early war in the Western Desert advocated this perception in explaining the

reasons for the failure of Operation Battleaxe: ‘It should be borne in mind that this was the first

pitched battle fought against the Germans in the desert, and that the contrast between their

fighting powers and those of the Italians was considerable.’4

This view of events ignores the crucial contribution made to the process and development of tactical air support doctrine by Air Commodore Collishaw. The decisive point in the development of Allied tactical air doctrine was the intervention of Churchill following the failure

3 James J. Sadkovich, ‘Understanding Defeat: Reappraising Italy's Role in World War II,’ Journal of Contemporary History 24, no. 1 (January 1989), 29. 4 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 176. 391

of Battleaxe. He chose to endorse the operational level campaign concept that had been

developed and proven in battle by Collishaw as the basis for future army-air cooperation. By the summer of 1941 Collishaw was the sole senior advocate of this system in the Western Desert.

During Operation Compass he had been ably supported in his mission by Air Chief Marshal

Longmore and Lieutenant-General O’Connor who fully sanctioned the offensive use of air power. As a result Collishaw was free to use his aircraft to obtain air superiority over the battlefield and then punish the enemy with wide ranging attacks on his ports, airfields and lines

of communications. The result was the catastrophic defeat of the Italians in Cyrenaica in spite of

their numerical and often qualitative superiority. By May-June 1941, however, Longmore and

O’Connor were gone and Collishaw received his directions from Air Chief Marshal Tedder who,

at this point in the war, was forced to conduct an air campaign defined by political necessity

rather than one based on sound RAF principles. This endorsement of the army view of air power

during Operation Battleaxe meant that Collishaw’s fighter and bomber squadrons were unable to

make a meaningful contribution to the offensive. By the third day of the battle operational

necessity replaced political need and Tedder, with a little prodding from Portal, released

Collishaw to conduct the offensive campaign he desired. Though the battle was already lost, the

large scale RAF attacks conducted in the closing stages of the battle played a major role in

helping the Western Desert Force to extricate itself successfully from the battlefield without

crippling losses. Tedder subsequently endorsed the methods proven by Collishaw as his own and

successfully conveyed them to Portal and ultimately Churchill in London.

There are a number of reasons why Collishaw’s role has been overlooked and/or

forgotten. The main factor has to do with the British tendency to view the Italians as a less

capable foe than the Germans which discounts the importance of any victories over them. A

392

second but potentially more important reason was the animosity with which Tedder viewed

Collishaw. Orange related that Tedder ‘contemptuously dismissed’ Collishaw in his

autobiography and considered him ‘“a bull-headed unimaginative cuss” who busied himself too much with routine duties and was unduly optimistic about what could be done with a handful of men and aircraft.’5 There is not sufficient evidence available to comment on the reasons which underscore the first point, but Operation Compass succeeded in large part due to the fact that

Collishaw was able to do quite a lot with a handful of men and aircraft. The origins of this negative opinion are not known but from his arrival in the desert Tedder consistently criticised

Collishaw.

Part of the problem may have been a personality clash between the quiet, reserved Tedder and the loud, boisterous Collishaw. Tedder possessed a serious demeanor and was a moderate drinker who liked to create ‘Cambridge-like oases of comfort and gossip, neatly decorated and comfortably furnished, for himself and men of similar taste’ and he preferred ‘quiet chat, serious music and solitary walks.’6 In contrast, Collishaw enjoyed his time in the officers’ mess and

recalled that during the First World War the Naval 10 mess was ‘a lively spot after dinner each

night’ and this occasionally resulted in hangovers that lasted into the next morning’s dawn patrol

where ‘the onrush of fresh, cold air into our open cockpits had a remarkable sobering-up effect.’7

Dennis Conroy, a pilot who served under Collishaw in Egypt, recalled:

There were many stories circulating around camp about Collie’s ability to absorb alcoholic beverages…After dinner in the Officers’ Mess he would stand drinking and talking with a group of young officers until they collapsed one by one leaving him still standing, unruffled and alone round midnight or later...the lads [had trouble] trying to keep up with a man who had done his drinking training in a

5 Vincent Orange, Tedder: Quietly in Command (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 126. 6 Vincent Orange, ‘Tedder, Arthur William, first Baron Tedder (1890–1967),’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed, January 2011, , accessed 20 June 2013. 7 Collishaw and Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot’s Story, 94-95. 393

naval fighter squadron and on vodka when he was posted to Russia at the end of the war.8

Collishaw, however, was not one to boast of his accomplishments. Frank Woolley, an officer

who served with him in the Sudan, stated that ‘Although R.C. [Raymond Collishaw] had few

equals as a fighter pilot, he was reluctant to be drawn into discussion on air combat tactics.’9

Woolley also recalled that Collishaw’s ‘boyish enthusiasm was infectious and unlimited, yet he

could be as obstinate as a mule and exasperating beyond bearing.’10 These habits and traits may

have put him at odds with Tedder, a commander with a more restrained personality.

Operation Battleaxe did not fail due to any misconduct by Collishaw, but it offered

Tedder the opportunity to rid himself of a commander he did not trust or respect. Tedder never

hesitated to share this opinion and he was very candid with Air Chief Marshal Freeman about

Collishaw. This lack of endorsement from one of the rising stars of the RAF likely cut short

Collishaw’s wartime career. Tedder continued to recount what he saw as Collishaw’s weaknesses and failures during the post-war period, most notably in his memoirs, and this viewpoint has coloured almost all subsequent considerations of his wartime career. The only historian to see partially beyond Tedder’s portrait of Collishaw was Vincent Orange who presented a more favourable assessment than is generally contained in the historiography.11

What has been lost in this story is that Collishaw successfully implemented and proved in battle the operational underpinnings of the system of tactical air support employed by the Allies in the Second World War. This had not yet been accomplished during the war. The Battle of

8 Dennis Conroy, The Best of Luck: In the Royal Air Force 1935-1946 (Bloomington, Indiana: Trafford Publishing, 2003), 51-52. 9 Letter, Frank Woolley, undated, 4, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Raymond Collishaw Fonds, MG 30, E280, Vol.1. This letter appears to have been written to a friend of R.V. Dodds who was inquiring about Collishaw on Dodds’ behalf. 10 Letter, Frank Woolley, undated, 3, LAC, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, MG 30, E280, Vol.1. 11 Vincent Orange, ‘Getting Together: Tedder, Coningham, and Americans in the Desert and Tunisia, 1940-43,’ in Daniel R. Mortensen, ed., Airpower and Ground Armies: Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine 1940-43 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1998), 6, 8-9; and Orange, Tedder, 126-127. 394

France in 1940 was marked by great disharmony between the two services as were operations in

Norway and Greece. As Terraine shows, a promising start to better coordination between the army and the air force had been made in the UK but had not yet passed the test of battle. The failure of Battleaxe led the army and RAF in the Middle East to work out improved methods for cooperation on the battlefield. This took the form of joint exercises and a conference which produced a joint army-air document on direct air support which would have a major impact on future operations. This was the beginning of a process to design the tools needed to make air support work at the tactical level. However, none of this could take place until the form of air support at the operational level was decided. This was Collishaw’s contribution.

It ultimately took the intervention of Churchill to promulgate the nature of the relationship between the RAF and the army at the operational level. His statements to

Auchinleck in the late summer and early fall of 1941 set the parameters for future cooperation between the two services. He put to rest the notion that the Army should control the RAF and established the principle that the two services were co-equal but interdependent. The air force had a bigger role to play than simply to provide air cover against enemy attacks, and was to use its strength to attack and weaken the enemy far beyond the army’s horizon. But, Churchill also made it clear that at certain times, such as during a major offensive, the RAF was to do everything possible to allow the army to succeed in its mission. This was the pattern of operations utilized by Collishaw during the opening stages of the war in the Western Desert and especially during Operation Compass. It differed significantly from any other British operations up to that point in the war.

The line connecting this pattern of operations from Collishaw to Churchill was not straight. There were no direct communications between the two men but the ideas embodied in

395

Churchill’s pronouncement bear the clear hallmarks of Collishaw’s methods which were

different than anything being employed by the RAF at that point in the war. After the failure of

Battleaxe, Tedder advocated these ideas in London where they ultimately reached Churchill through Portal and were used as the basis for his subsequent directives on army air support.

Collishaw’s role in developing and successfully implementing these ideas during the early battles

in the Western Desert cannot be overlooked.

Collishaw benefited substantially from the knowledge gained during his long career in the RAF. For the battles of 1940-1941 he drew heavily upon his First World War experience

where he had amassed considerable ground attack experience over the Western Front and learned

the types of targets which were profitable for aerial bombing and strafing and those which were

fleeting, hard to find and dangerous to attack. He understood that air power had to be

concentrated to be effective and defensive standing air patrols were too weak to prevent attacks

by an enemy who could marshal his strength and overwhelm a select part of the front. The need

to conserve scarce resources and avoid cost and unnecessary operations was also learned in

1917-1918. He recorded these lessons as early as 1924 when he attended RAF Staff College, an

experience which provided him with the necessary training for high command.12 The importance

of these Great War lessons were confirmed by his successor, Air Marshal Arthur Coningham, in

a 1946 address to the Royal United Services Institute in London where he declared, ‘I stress this

period of 1914-18 because the principles there thrashed out have remained constant, only their

degree and their application changing in accordance with the technical advance of aircraft,

weapons, modern aids and the method of control.’13

12 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Personal Impressions During the Decade Ending 1924,’ 3rd Course, RAF Staff College, 23 September 1924, TNA AIR 1/2387 Part 1. 13 Air Marshal Arthur Coningham, ‘The Development of Tactical Air Forces,’ The RUSI Journal 91, no.562 (1946), 212. 396

Collishaw’s First World War experience was reinforced by his numerous interwar postings where he was involved in operations in South Russia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and the

Sudan. During this period he worked closely with the other services – in 1923 with the Army in

Kurdistan and from 1929-1931 with the Royal Navy aboard the aircraft carrier HMS

Courageous. These experiences, combined with his great familiarity with Egypt and the Western

Desert where he had been posted since 1936, left him uniquely qualified to effectively command

202 Group at the start of hostilities with Italy.

This does not mean Collishaw was an ideal commander. Anecdotal evidence indicates that he had a tendency to micromanage the administration of his command. This was a charge leveled by Tedder and corroborated by others. This command style worked effectively through

Operations Compass and Battleaxe when 202/204 Group was a small organization. Tedder argued that the growing size of the RAF in the Western Desert required a commander who was better able to delegate. His ultimate choice was Air Marshal Coningham who he subsequently had to support by appointing a deputy to handle the administrative/logistical side of the Western

Desert Air Force. Without question Collishaw would have needed to adapt to the changing circumstances of a larger command, but considering his demonstrated growth as a commander during a long career in uniform combined with his Staff College training and the right support personnel, there is nothing in his record or professional conduct to indicate that he could not have excelled at the next level.

None of the supposed faults identified by Tedder prevented Collishaw from being an extremely effective commander. His combat record in the Second World War was virtually unblemished. He conducted an extremely successful air campaign against the Italians starting with their entry into the war in June 1940 and concluded with their decisive defeat in February

397

1941. Air Marshal Sir Roderic Hill commented after the war that the impact of air support

conducted during a period when that support was overwhelming was not the real test. Rather,

‘the really interesting times are when the machine you have is put to the test’ and you have to

meet the situation with ‘careful planning and the clever use of bluff.’14 This was certainly the

situation faced by Collishaw during Operation Compass.

Collishaw was posted out of the desert to the Nile Delta before the initial stage of the

German offensive in March-April 1941 and was not involved in the first attempts to stop

Rommel. Once he returned to combat he conducted an offensive campaign which contributed to

Axis logistical difficulties in Libya. Tedder suggested that Collishaw was a ‘village blacksmith slogger’ who was not fit to ‘tackle the Hun’ but the available evidence shows that in his short exposure to the Germans he held his own.15 Crete was a terrible defeat for the British, but the

limited number of long-range Hurricanes and Blenheims Collishaw was able to despatch to the

island were effective and caused significant problems for the German invasion. Similarly,

although Operation Brevity was a failure for the army, Collishaw’s 204 Group successfully

accomplished their mission during the short duration of the battle. Operation Battleaxe was also

a sharp setback for the British, but when Collishaw was finally released to conduct the air battle

he envisioned, he directed his aircraft in offensive strikes that slowed the forward movement of

Rommel’s armoured columns. These air attacks allowed Beresford-Peirse the time he needed to

successfully extract his forces from the battlefield and prevent their decisive encirclement and

defeat. The total destruction of the British army during Battleaxe may have opened the way to

the Egypt and the Suez Canal for Rommel and may have decisively altered the balance of power

14 Coningham, ‘The Development of Tactical Air Forces,’ 225. Hill made these comments following Coningham’s address. He referred specifically to Coningham’s early handling of the Desert Air Force, but his remarks may be even more applicable to the period when Collishaw was in command. 15 Letter, Tedder to Air Chief Marshal Sir W.R. Freeman, 7 July 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 398

in the Middle East. If Collishaw is to be judged, it should be for what he accomplished in battle,

not for traits that may or may not have prevented him from success in the future at higher levels

of command and responsibility.

Collishaw made a number of important contributions to the development of tactical air

doctrine during his time commanding 202 and 204 Groups. He attempted to facilitate

coordination between fighter and bomber squadrons as well as to improve their ability to work

with the army. He improved communications and attempted to limit the threat of friendly fire

incidents by establishing effective bomb lines that could be identified from the air. The US Field

Manual FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, published in July 1943 benefitted

substantially from British experience in the Western Desert and it enshrined the ranking of

tactical air support missions. The first priority was to establish air superiority; the second priority was interdiction sorties which would be conducted to prevent or limit the movement of enemy troops and supplies to and within the battle area; while the third priority or phase of operations was the support of the army on the battlefield. This last mission was the most expensive and least profitable form of air support and would only take place at critical times.16 FM 100-20 was

considered by the US Army Ground Forces to be a ‘declaration of independence’ by the US

Army Air Forces and was essentially the template for American and British tactical air

operations from the Normandy invasion to the end of the war.17

The pattern of operations outlined in the US manual was established by Collishaw in

1940 during Operation Compass. His First World War experience as well as years of command

16 US War Department Field Service Regulations FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power (Washington: Department of the Army, 21 July 1943), US Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, microfilm reel A1927, frames 1720-1736, copy held by Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. 17 Kent Roberts Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team including Organic Light Aviation, Army Ground Forces Historical Section, Study no.35 (Washington: US Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1948), 47. 399

in Egypt had demonstrated that the use of standing fighter patrols was not profitable and it was

more efficient, and beneficial to the ground forces, to use air resources in an offensive manner to

establish air superiority. Once that task was accomplished a wide range of interdiction missions

followed which targeted enemy ports, airfields and lines of communications. These attacks

caused severe disruptions to enemy operations and aided the maintenance of air superiority by

destroying and distracting the enemy air force and preventing it from launching offensive

missions of its own. Close air support missions against targets on the battlefield were only

attempted in special circumstances such as major operations when air superiority had already

been achieved. This was the case during the opening stages of Operation Compass, at Bardia and

Tobruk in January 1941 and during Operation Brevity and on the third day of Operation

Battleaxe.

Collishaw recognized the importance of a close relationship with the army, and especially

with the army commander. This was achieved with Generals O’Connor and Wilson who

Collishaw worked with over many months but not with Beresford-Peirse. With the latter,

Collishaw did not have time to develop an effective relationship and dissuade him of his army-

centric view of air power. It should not be forgotten that Collishaw was able to wage an effective

and successful campaign against the Axis powers despite having meagre and often second-rate

equipment at his disposal during Western Desert campaign.

The overall relationship between the army and the RAF regarding army co-operation

missions in the first year of the war was poor. The two services had very different ideas about the

form of this support and the failure of the Battle of France in 1940 was used by both sides to

confirm their views and settled nothing.18 Before June 1941 Winston Churchill supported the

18 David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 52-54. 400

army side of the debate but the failure of Operation Battleaxe indicated that there were serious

problems that required immediate remedy in the relations between army and the air force. In a

series of pronouncements between July and October 1941 he reversed his previous views and set

out the basic tenets of the new relationship which largely confirmed the RAF view – co-equality

of the two services, the need for close planning and cooperation, air force responsibility for

conducting an operational-level campaign against the enemy’s logistical structure but the need to

provide close support for the army during major offensives, and army responsibility for its own

anti-aircraft defence and no reliance on an air umbrella provided by the RAF. This pattern of cooperation would become standard for British and American forces, but prior to 1942 the only successful application of these principles was by Collishaw in the Western Desert. Churchill did

not reference this example in his directives, but he was influenced by Portal and Tedder based on

the RAF experience in the Western Desert, a period during which Collshaw was the senior

operational commander.

* * * * *

After Collishaw was dismissed by Tedder he returned to England where he served as the

Duty Air Commodore at HQ Fighter Command from August 1941 until March of the following

year. On 21 March 1942 he was promoted to the rank of Air Vice-Marshal and given command

of 14 Group in Scotland. This group was responsible for the air defence of Scotland as well as

protection of the Royal Navy base at Scapa Flow but by this point in the war the Luftwaffe

seldom ‘made an appearance’ and the group was used as a resting ground for fighter squadrons

that had seen intense action during missions over continental Europe.19 His appointment to

command this group based away from the action was indicative of Collishaw’s diminished

importance to the RAF. The rest of the year passed without event but on 28 February 1943

19 Collishaw and Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot’s Story, 254. 401

Collishaw was admitted to Raigmore Hospital in Inverness for an unknown ailment. After two weeks he was transferred by air to RAF Hospital Halton north of London where he spent the next

12 days. He was subsequently transferred to Dunrobin Castle Auxiliary Hospital in Golspie,

Scotland for convalescence and he returned to duty on 12 April 1943.20

In May and June 1943 Collishaw attended a series of Wings for Victory rallies

throughout Scotland. These local events, in towns such as Aberdeen, Dornoch and Fort William were part of a fund raising program designed to encourage citizens to save money in

Government accounts such as war bonds. Communities were encouraged to contribute money to

buy a Spitfire or a Lancaster and the rallies featured parades by the local Home Guard, Fire

Brigade, air raid wardens and boy scouts while prominent airmen like Collishaw spoke to

motivate the crowd.21 This was valuable work but it did not compare to an operational front-line

command.

On 15 July 1943, 14 Group was disbanded and Collishaw retired from the military with

the rank of air vice-marshal after 27 years in uniform with the RNAS and RAF. The timing of his

retirement is puzzling; he was not yet 50 years old yet he was leaving the service in the middle of

the war. His memoirs offer no illumination on the issue other than to say, ‘I was retired’ which

indicates that his departure from the RAF was not willing.22 It is conceivable that the health

issues which kept him in hospital for nearly two months earlier in the year had forced his

retirement for medical reasons. The other possibility is that the RAF had no further use for him,

but this seems odd for an experienced senior officer in the prime of his career and still able to

20 Operations Record Book, 14 Group, TNA AIR 25/250; and Appendix to Operations Record Book, 14 Group, TNA AIR 25/253. 21 Appendix to Operations Record Book, 14 Group, TNA AIR 25/253; Martin Francis, The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 32; See also ‘Brandon at War – 1943 Wings for Victory Week,’ , accessed 20 June 2013. 22 Collishaw and Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot’s Story, 254. 402

make a meaningful contribution.23 Such an act would not be unique in the RAF as Air Chief

Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, the victor of the Battle of Britain, was forced to retire soon after the

conclusion of the battle.24

Whatever the reason for his retirement, Collishaw remained in the UK for the duration of

the war and served as a regional air liaison officer with the civil defence organisation. He returned to Canada at the war’s end to join his family and following in his father’s footsteps, began a very successful second career in the mining industry.25 In his later years he became

interested in the history of his conflicts and spent a considerable amount of time and effort

creating lists of First World War pilots, tracking aces and their kills, and attempting to solve

mysteries such as establishing the identity of the pilots who shot down German aces such as

Manfred von Richthofen and Karl Allmenröder. He carried out an extensive correspondence with

fellow pilots and other historians of the First World War. He also maintained a long-running

dialogue with Ronald Dodds, a civilian historian who worked for office of the Royal Canadian

Air Force (RCAF) Air Historian. Dodds had been tasked to help draft the First World War

volume of the RCAF and started to correspond with Collishaw in this capacity. Over the years

they developed a relationship which culminated in Dodds helping Collishaw to write his

23 A survey of RAF Staff College graduates of the 1924 class shows that Collishaw was in the middle in terms of age and a number of his classmates who went on to the highest ranks in the RAF were as old or older than Collishaw. Of the 14 members of the 1924 class of the RAF Staff College who achieved the rank of air commodore of above, three retired during the war (plus one who left the RAF but served with British intelligence); two died and eight served through the end of the war. Seven men were younger than Collishaw and six were the same age or older. Both men who died and two who retired during the war were the same age or older and the other retiree was younger. Two officers who served in significant roles until the end of the war were older than Collishaw. Data for this survey was found on the website ‘Air of Authority – A History of RAF Organisation,’ , accessed 24 June 2013. 24 Dowdings’ situation was different than Collishaw’s in that he was 11 years older and had been scheduled to retire before the start of the war but the date kept getting postponed. There were, however, other political factors at play which ultimately lead to his retirement at what was arguably the peak of his career. See Vincent Orange, ‘Dowding, Hugh Caswall Tremenheere, first Baron Dowding (1882–1970)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., May 2008 , Robert Wright, Dowding and the Battle of Britain (London: Macdonald and Co., 1969); Vincent Orange, Dowding of Fighter Command: Victor of the Battle of Britain (London: Grub Street, 2008). 25 Collishaw and Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot’s Story, 254-255. 403

memoirs which were published in 1973.26 Notwithstanding his health problems in 1943,

Collishaw lived a long and productive life and he died in West Vancouver, British Columbia on

29 September 1976.

At the end of his memoirs Collishaw compared himself to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, the acclaimed author who brought Sherlock Holmes to life. Conan Doyle always felt that his painstakingly researched historical novels were the pinnacle of his writing career but that he was destined to be known for the adventures of a fictional detective. In much the same way,

Collishaw recalled that he was most proud of his time in the Western Desert but ‘if I am known

at all to my fellow Canadians and others it is through more carefree days, when as a young

fighter pilot…I had the good fortune to shoot down a number of the enemy without in turn being

killed.’27

Raymond Collishaw made a significant contribution to the development of Allied tactical

air power doctrine in the Second World War that has gone largely unrecognised in the literature.

His ideas on the role of the RAF in the land battle were developed during more than two decades

in the air force and were based on extensive personal experience in France, South Russia,

Mesopotamia and the Middle East. Although his ideas were not unique, he was the first RAF

commander to conduct successfully a campaign based on the principles of using air power to

gain air superiority, interdict the enemy’s lines of communications and support the army on the

battlefield. These same ideas would later be endorsed by Churchill and enshrined as the pillars of

26 Collishaw’s extensive correspondence can be found in his personal papers at Library and Archives Canada as well as the Directorate of History and Heritage, both in Ottawa. These two sources are the prime repository for his correspondence with Dodds, but additional material can be found in the Canadian War Museum archives as well as in The Beatrice Hitchens Memorial Collection of Aviation History, Western Archives, Western University, London, Ontario. Details of Dodds’ career in the office of the Air Historian may be found in Hugh Halliday, ‘The Air Historian – Part II,’ The Canadian Air Force Journal 4, no.4 (Fall 2011), 22-30. 27 Collishaw and Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot’s Story, 255. Ironically, though he considered his time in the Western Desert as the most important of his career, his efforts as a historian were largely focused on issues related to the First World War. 404

Allied air support doctrine and Collishaw should be recognised for his role in their development and operational proofing. Collishaw was proud of his achievements in the desert but the memory of his accomplishments have been tarnished by the view that it was a victory over a lesser enemy and by the ruminations of a commander who considered him the wrong person to fight the

Germans. These views should not be allowed to detract from an appreciation of Collishaw’s conduct of a model air campaign which demonstrated all the core elements of the Allied tactical air doctrine employed later in the war.

405

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406

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407

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Appendix 1 Winston S. Churchill, ‘A Note by the Minister of Defence,’ 7 October 1941

D.O.17 – COPY– SECRET TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

A NOTE BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

1. Renown awaits the Commander who first, in this war, restores the artillery to its prime importance upon the battlefield from which it has been ousted by heavily armoured tanks. For this purpose three rules are necessary: – (a) Every field gun or mobile A.A. gun should carry at least ten rounds of solid armour- piercing shot; thus, every mobile gun will become an anti-tank gun, and every battery possess its own anti-tank protection. (b) When guns are attacked by tanks they must welcome the occasion. The guns should be fought to the muzzle. First of all, H.E. should be fired at the approaching tanks, especially in salvoes, directed by each battery upon, if possible, their tracks; secondly, at close quarters, i.e., within 150 yards, the solid A.P. shot should be fired, and the last shots should be fired at not more than 10 yards range. It may be that some gun crews could affect to be out of action so as to have the superb opportunity of firing A.P. at the closest range. (c) It may often happen as a result of the above tactics, especially when the artillery is working with cruiser tanks, that guns may be over-run and lost. Provided they have been fought to the muzzle, this should not at all be considered a disaster but, on the contrary, the highest honour to the battery concerned. The destruction of a single tank more than repays the loss of two field guns or mobile A.A. guns. The Germans have no use for our captured guns as they have a plethora of their own types which they prefer. Our supplies are sufficient to make good the deficiencies.

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The principle must be established by the Royal Artillery that it is not good enough for tanks to attack a group of British batteries properly posted, and that these batteries will always await their attack in order to destroy a good proportion of the tanks. Our guns must no more retreat on the approach of tanks than Wellington’s squares at Waterloo on the approach of hostile cavalry.

2. The Germans made a practice from the beginning of their invasion of France, and have developed it consistently since, of taking what they call “flak” artillery with their most advanced parties and interspersing all their armoured and supply columns with it. We should do the same. Every battery should have at least one Bofors guns with its modest proportion of armour-piercing shot for tanks, and with its other ammunition for aircraft. Or, alternatively, a battery of A.A. guns can be attached to every Artillery Regiment. Thus every battery or group of batteries will supply a measure of its own A.T. and A.A. protection. This is true of mechanised columns of all kinds, which should be freely supplied with heavy machine-guns as well as with Bofors as the supply of these weapons becomes more plentiful.

3. 250 Bofors are now being sent to General Auchinleck for him to use in the best possible way with all his columns, and at all the assembly points of his troops or refuelling stations required in the course of offensive operations.

Nevermore must the ground troops expect, as a matter of course, to be protected against the air by aircraft. If this can be done it must only be as a happy make-weight and a place of good luck. Above all, the idea of keeping standing patrols of aircraft over moving columns should be abandoned. It is unsound to “distribute” aircraft in this way, and no air superiority will stand any larger application of such mischievous practice.

4. Upon the Military Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East announcing that a battle is in prospect, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief will give him all possible aid irrespective of other targets, however attractive. Victory in the battle makes amends for all, and creates new favourable situations of a decisive character. The Army Commander-in-Chief will specify to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief the targets and tasks which he requires to be performed, both

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in the preparatory attack on the rearward installations of the enemy and for air action during the progress of the battle. It will be for the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief to use his maximum force for these objects in the manner most effective. This applies not only to any squadrons assigned to army co-operation permanently, but also to the whole air force available in the theatre.

5. Bombers may, if required, be used as transport or supply machines to far-ranging or outlying columns of troops, the sole object being the success of the military operation. As the interests of the two Commanders-in-Chief are identical it is not thought that any difficulty should arise. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief would naturally lay aside all routine programmes and concentrate on bombing the rearward services of the enemy in the preparatory period. This he would do not only by night, but by day attacks with fighter protection. In this process he will bring about a trial of strength with the enemy fighters, and has the best chance of obtaining local command of the air. What is true of the preparatory period applies with even greater force during the battle. All assembly or refuelling points or marching columns of the enemy should be attacked by bombers during daylight with strong fighter protection, thus bringing about air conflicts not only of the highest importance in themselves but directly contributing to the general result.

7 October 1941 W.S.C.

Source: Winston S. Churchill, ‘A Note by the Minister of Defence,’ 7 October 1941, TNA AIR 8/983. Note: though this copy of the directive is dated 7 October, the original was written by Churchill in early August and issued to Auchinleck and Tedder about a month later. This version was more widely circulated to British high commanders.

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Appendix 2 Tripoli, 16th February, 1943

Talk by Air Vice-Marshal Sir A. Coningham, to assembled British and American General and Senior Officers at the end of the second day of the Army Exercise. C-in-C Middle East,1 C-in-C Home Forces,2 Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower,3 present.

1. On page 2 of his Notes on High Command in War and in the remarks he has just made, the Army Commander [General B.L. Montgomery] has stated more perfectly than I can hope to do the present position of Army-Air developments in this operational area. But I should like to simplify what he has said because I attach such great importance to proper doctrine. Unless we do keep our doctrine right there will be continual trouble.

2. The doctrine that we have evolved by trial in war over a period of month could, I think, be stated in its simplest form as follows:

3. There are certain fundamental differences between the Army and the Air forces which should be recognized:

The Army fights on a front that may be divided into sectors, such as Brigade, Division, Corps or an Army front. The Air front is indivisible.

An Army has one battle to fight, the land battle. The Air has two. It has first of all to beat the enemy air, so that it may go into the land battle against the enemy land forces with the maximum possible hitting power. We have not, as yet, secured sufficient air superiority to finish the air-to-air battle off completely, but we have been pretty near it and we have been able to concentrate up to 80 or 90% of our hitting power on the enemy land forces.

1 General Sir Harold Alexander. 2 General Sir Bernard Paget. 3 Major-General Walter Bedell Smith. 436

The fighter governs the front, and this fact forces the centralisation of air control in the hands of one air commander operating on that front. I think it is generally accepted that with adequate fighter superiority and bomber forces the air has a governing influence on what happens within reach on the ground or on the sea.

And finally, there is no doubt that in this technical age it needs a life of study and specialising for a sailor, a soldier or an airman to learn his profession. He is never free from the problems of development, particularly in war, and I therefore cannot accept the possibility that any man, however competent, can do the work of the other services without proportionately neglecting his own. In plain language, no soldier is competent to operate the Air, just as no Airman is competent to operate the Army.

It is generally agreed that the fighting efficiency of a service is based upon leadership, training and equipment. The commander is personally responsible for the leadership and training, and no one who has not this power should operate the forces concerned. There is too great a tendency these days to think in terms of numbers and strengths, whereas the real battle forces are properly organised units.

4. You will notice that the Army Commander does not use the word “co-operation.” I submit that we in Eighth Army are beyond the co-operation stage, and that work is so close that we are, in effect, one unit. I hope you won’t mind if I suggest that co-operation often means the other fellow co-operating with you. We in the Air Force have cause to view the word with mixed feelings because in the past co-operation has meant the Air co-operating with the Navy or the Army. The difference in the Eighth Army is that there has been as much air co-operation by the Army as army co-operation by the Air, and the natural result is that we have now passed beyond that stage into a unit or team which automatically helps the other.

5. The use of the words “Air Power” describes the weapon we are trying to use. I should like to give you some examples of what has happened in recent months:

(i) The Battle of Egypt. At the commencement of the battle I commanded approximately 900 aircraft for use in field operations, but behind that force was strategic air power co-ordinated from Cairo and even from England. During the days of hard fighting at El Alamein, bombers were sinking ships, attacking harbours and cutting supplies many thousands of miles away from the battle area. Even

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the Home based Bomber Command was attacking Northern Italy so as to stop the use of Genoa and interfere with reinforcements. This was unknown to the Army at the time, but when, after the battle was won and the advance was taking place through Cyrenaica, hundreds of lorries, tanks and guns were found abandoned through lack of fuel it became obvious how successful strategical bombing had been. Ever since those days nearly four months ago the enemy has been suffering from shortages of supplies, and I hope he will never be free from such worries whilst he remains in Africa.

(ii) Air Support in Battle. It often happens that an Army formation at the front sees a good target which, though reported, is not attacked. To take an instance: a front formation reports a concentration of 200 M.T. and accompanying arms. Its request for air attack is turned down. 15 or 20 miles away, however, there is a concentration of 2,000 or more, indicating an Armoured Division or even larger forces. This concentration, we know from experience, will probably affect the whole battle area perhaps 10, 18, 24 hours later. It is this concentration which is receiving all the weight of air attack, and that is why the comparatively little target on the front is ignored. The smaller formations of the Army must understand that penny packets of air are a luxury which can only be afforded at certain times, and that judgement on the question of targets is the result of agreement between the Army and Air Commanders, and in accordance with the Army Commander’s broad directive on priority.

It is bad luck that the front line soldier cannot always see the main targets that are being attacked, but if he sees the sky full of his own aircraft he can rest assured they are not wasting they are not wasting their time. I think all forces in Eighth Army, when they see the bombers going over, take it for granted that the Hun is being thrashed and that there is something more important than their own small front line targets being dealt with.

(iii) At Marble Arch more than 1,000 mines and booby traps were moved by the Army within eight hours with a loss of ten lives. This is an example of air co-operation by the Army, and

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though the clearing of the landing ground was of mutual benefit to both services it was done unhesitatingly and was primarily an essential air requirement.

(iv) At Hamreit, the New Zealanders detailed 2,000 fighting men to pick stones and make a landing ground. On other occasions a whole Brigade has been detailed for this duty, and there has been no hesitation in postponing operations so as to be able to use fighting troops in this way.

(v) Sedada is a good example of the standard that we have reached. This point was almost midway to Tripoli from the fighter aerodromes South of Tamot, and on the Army axis of advance a possible landing ground site was selected before the attack began. The advance forces of the spearhead of the 7th Armoured Division took with them a landing ground party and one or two specialist personnel. They reached the area at dusk, and on breaking camp next morning threw off the aerodrome party, 18 to 24 prized Bofors, M.T. and the Ambulance Holding Unit. By nine o’clock word was received that a landing strip was ready. Two squadrons of fighters, escorting a transport plane with the necessary R.D.F. and immediate requirements, landed. They flew on their auxiliary tanks which were immediately dropped and they were then at readiness. Two other squadrons flew on a further 80 miles to within 40 miles of Tripoli, where they bombed and landed back at Sedada. By this time air transports were coming in with fuel, ammunition and personnel. The Ambulance Holding Unit had already received a number of the Army’s casualties, and as the transport aircraft unloaded so the ambulance cases when on board and away without delay. By arrangements like these we have during the three months from the Battle of Egypt to the capture of Tripoli give air passage to 5,800 Army medical cases. You can imagine the effect on the morale of the Army when it is known that badly wounded cases, if trundled over the desert, very often die. By that evening the Bofors guns and M.T. which had been loaned, and the same aerodrome specialists had re-joined the Divisional advance forces 30 miles further on, and already the fighters were operating a further 70 miles beyond.

By the following morning two more landing grounds 40 miles ahead of Sedada had been sited and work commenced, and the whole fighter force was operating a further 80 miles than it had the previous day. It was on this day that the Army Commander moved 100 miles forward

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with his Armoured Brigade, so you can judge the importance of this machinery of fighter advance in such highly mobile warfare. It was made possible by careful planning, preparation and complete mutual adjustment of work and resources between the Army and the Air forces concerned.

6. I have just recently been home and was rather distressed to find that the home doctrine of Army-Air operations in confused and the subject of considerably feeling. The main reason I think is obvious. Except for the cold show of Dieppe the Army at home has had and is having no operations. It is not at war, and additionally has the difficult task of maintaining keenness on little else but constant training. The Air Force, on the other hand, has its Fighter Command, Bomber Command and Coastal Command involved in full war operations. The Army therefore, at a time when there are still not enough combat aircraft, wants as much as it can get for training purposes, whilst the Air Force needs its maximum forces for bombing Germany and attacking targets in France and has not had the aircraft to spare. The result is a mutual petulance which somehow clouds the issue and resolves itself into various items of political and service wrangling. We as a force – 8th Army and Western Desert – are more than interested in this sad state of affairs, because the views there held were transferred to Tunisia. The result you know. And now this Army which has done so well, and hoped more or less to catch the boat at Tripoli for a spot of leave at home, has the prospect in front of it of even heavier fighting than it has experienced in the past. The misuse of the Air in Tunisia has contributed to the present lack of success.

7. Incidentally we here still do not understand why some of the Army and Air officers concerned in the planning of “Torch” did not visit the Western Desert and learn at least some of the simple lessons which Eighth Army mastered over 12 months ago.

It may be that the word “desert” led people to think that we indulged in a special type of warfare which would be of no value elsewhere. I suggest this is entirely wrong, because the principles involved are constant, the application of those principles being the varying factor.

440

8. In conclusion, is it too much to suggest that we obey the rules of simple logic and take success in Army-Air development as reached in this theatre as a model on which further development can take place? The Army has little time to waste, for they have still only a tiny veteran force – Eighth Army. We in the air have already taken the measure of our enemy air opponents, and, to all intents and purposes, we have won our war. The potential air power that will thus be used against the enemy ground forces is unbelievably great but it must be used properly, and what better way as a beginning than in accordance with the doctrine the Army Commander and I have explained to you.

441

Chapter 2 – South Russia and Mesopotamia

In 1919 Collishaw was one of the select officers offered a permanent commission in the

Royal Air Force. This chapter will explore his career during the immediate postwar period

relating to his deployments to South Russia and Mesopotamia. The Russian Civil War was very

different from the Western Front and Collishaw, as the commander of No.47 Squadron, was

faced with a new series of command challenges largely related to the vast distances and general

isolation of the Russian theatre of operations. In Iraq Collishaw was given his first significant

non-flying posting and was subjected to Army culture when he accompanied a land expedition as

the RAF liaison officer. These were formative experiences in Collishaw’s development as a

senior commander.

The Armistice with Germany at the end of the First World War did very little to change

Collishaw’s routine. In early 1919 he was thrilled to be offered a permanent commission in the

Royal Air Force. The end of the war saw the rapid demobilization of the RAF. In a matter of

months it went from being the most powerful air force in the world with 188 combat squadrons

and 22,647 aircraft to only 33 squadrons, eight of which were still in the process of forming. In terms of manpower, at the end of the war the RAF stood at 27,333 officers (about half pilots) and

263,827 other ranks; the Air Force List of January 1920 carried the names of 7,032 officers who remained employed on active duty, but at least half of these were of their way to being demobilized. That Collishaw was offered one of these few coveted posts indicates that he was viewed as an officer with potential by the senior leadership of the RAF.1

1 In a letter to Lloyd Breadner, a fellow Canadian who had served with Collishaw in No.3 Squadron RNAS in early 1917, Collishaw wrote, ‘I received a permanent commission in the R.A.F. Bread. Only 1000 were given out; but they have taken on 4000 temporary two and four year service officers.’ Collishaw wrote this letter while he was recovering in hospital from typhus in November 1919. See Letter, Raymond Collishaw to Lloyd Breadner, n.d., Air 61

After accepting his permanent commission, Collishaw undertook the long journey home

to Canada for an extended leave. After sailing across the Atlantic, Collishaw crossed the entire

breadth of Canada by train, from Halifax, Nova Scotia to New Westminster, British Columbia

where his fiancée lived. He had met Juaneita Eliza Trapp during his previous leave to Canada in

the late summer and early fall of 1917. Neita was the sister of George Trapp, a good friend of his

in Naval Ten. On his way to visit his family on Vancouver Island, Collishaw stopped at the

Trapp residence to pay his respects for the loss of another brother, Stanley, who had been killed

while flying with Naval Eight in December 1916. Tragically, George was killed while Collishaw

was in Canada in 1917 and a third brother, Donovan, an RFC pilot, was killed flying with No.85

Squadron in July 1918. The Trapp family paid a heavy cost during the war losing three sons. In

spite of the terrible circumstances of their meeting, Raymond and Neita struck an enduring

friendship and would be engaged before he returned to the war. Collishaw recalled that ‘getting

married during the war seemed tantamount to asking a girl if she would like to become a young

widow and afterwards I had been on foreign postings where wives were not then allowed.’2 After

a long engagement they were married in England in the summer of 1924 after Collishaw returned

from his postings in Iraq.3

Collishaw revealed the difficulties of serving away for home for so long in a letter to

Caroline Breadner, a woman he considered ‘my second mother.’4 Her son was Lloyd Breadner, a

Marshal L.S. Breadner Papers, Folder “B” 1917-1944, 74/707, Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. For a discussion of the demobilization of the RAF, see H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars, 1918-1939 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1976), 49-50 and John James, The Paladins: A Social History of the RAF Up to the Outbreak of World War II (London: Macdonald & Company, 1990), 72-3, 244-5. 2 Raymond Collishaw and R.V. Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story (London: William Kimber, 1973), 223. 3 For details of the courtship, see Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 137-8, 178-9, 222- 3. 4 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to Mrs. Breadner, 20 April 1921, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner Papers, Folder “B” 1917- 1944, 74/707, Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, 1. 62

good friend of Collishaw’s and a fellow Canadian pilot in the RNAS. His letter starts off very

upbeat talking about his experiences in Persia in the fall of 1920 and the winter of 1921 when the

terrible weather and remote, difficult terrain were as much an enemy as the Bolsheviks they were

fighting. He described the Persians as a ‘comic opera people with ancient customs only and filled

with ignorance of passing time. They flew through life on the winged influence of the subtle

opium poppy and remain normal only a small portion of the time. It seems as though a Persian

simply works sometimes in order to be enabled to purchase opium.’5 Not surprisingly, he longs

to return to England and Canada where he hopes that ‘some day I may be lucky’ to marry Neita

Trapp, ‘a girl you will love too.’6 He then revealed the terrible cost of being so far from home:

With the mails just in to-day mother wrote about the death of my beloved youngster brother Clyde of pneumonia on the 28th of December last. Of course, I am astounded and it all seems a bad dream. It seems cruel to have the knowledge only after four and a half months. Clyde was a good lad and I bitterly regret his death. You may have heard me mention him to you as having been a midshipman in the navy. Mother is filled with grief and mourns his loss especially as she had reared him safely almost to manhood. Anyway, I am glad to remember as a brother that I knew Clyde to be innocent of shame and so can meet his God with a comparatively clear conscience.7

He ended his letter by wishing he could visit Mrs. Breadner rather than spend more time in the

‘barren wastes.’8 Collishaw’s extensive writings generally avoid any overt emotion, but this

letter was written at a time when he was acutely homesick and had just learned about the death of

his brother. It betrays the humanity of a man who made a point of always appearing carefree and

jolly in front of his colleagues and men.

5 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to Mrs. Breadner, 20 April 1921, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner Papers, Folder “B” 1917- 1944, 74/707, Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, 2-3. 6 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to Mrs. Breadner, 20 April 1921, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner Papers, Folder “B” 1917- 1944, 74/707, Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, 4. 7 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to Mrs. Breadner, 20 April 1921, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner Papers, Folder “B” 1917- 1944, 74/707, Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, 5. 8 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to Mrs. Breadner, 20 April 1921, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner Papers, Folder “B” 1917- 1944, 74/707, Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, 6. 63

The loss of his brother was heartbreaking, but Collishaw was no stranger to death. During

his time on the Western Front he lost many close friends as well as men under his command. He

was acutely aware of the burden of command and on his visits to Canada in 1917 and 1919 he

made time to visit the families who had lost sons during the war. In making these visits,

Collishaw was ‘somewhat surprised to discover how bravely the parents bore their losses. In some cases the parents had relied upon the strength and services of the son to operate large farms and they could scarcely continue without him.’ In spite of the terrible loss, he ‘never heard one

word of regret or remorse at the loss sustained by the families…All these people showed nothing

but family pride in the achievement of their sons, and I felt proud that I too was a Canadian with

a splendid heritage.’9 A letter home, the typical duty of a commander in war, would have been

sufficient, but it says much about Collishaw’s character that he took the time to visit these

families personally to express his condolences and share their pain.10

The First World War was over, but the British were still fighting in Russia. The

background to the British presence in Russia can be traced to the March 1917 revolution which

forced the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II. The Allies wanted a strong eastern front maintained in

their war against Germany so they despatched vast quantities of supplies, ammunition, weapons,

and eventually troops to support the fight in Russia. The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks and the subsequent armistice with Germany transformed the Allied intervention into support for the anti-communist side in the Russian Civil War.11 In South Russia, the Volunteer Army under

General Anton Denikin, was having some success against the Bolshevik Red Army. The British

9 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 21. 10 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 137-8, 178-9. 11 A full account of the British intervention in Russia may be found in Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, 3 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press for the Center of International Studies, 1961-72); details of the Canadian role may be found in Sydney F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, vol.1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), App.A; Roy MacLaren, Canadians in Russia, 1918-1919 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976); J.A. Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918-1919 and the Part Played by Canada (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1967). 64

committed ground, naval and air forces to support the White Russian effort but the majority of

these units, including two infantry divisions, were withdrawn by June 1919 and left behind was a

small force of tanks and an RAF training team. The White Army possessed an air arm of some strength, but it was inexperienced and required substantial support and instruction from the RAF.

No.47 Squadron was transferred from the Caucasus in the Spring of 1919 to join General

Denikin’s army to fulfill this role.12 By mid-1919 the RAF detachments in South Russia were

war-weary. The first squadrons sent to support the White Russians had been gathered from units

already serving in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The British Air Ministry decided it would be best to replace these men with volunteers from England. Collishaw, an experienced squadron leader, was a natural choice to take over No.47 Squadron and as an RAF career officer, he accepted without hesitation. After collecting a cadre of volunteer pilots and men to accompany him, the group set out for the Caucasus arriving in June 1919.13

No.47 Squadron was organized into three flights and a headquarters unit.14 The South

Russian theatre was vast; it was 700 kilometres from the main British base in Ekaterinodar [now

Krasnodar] to Tsaritsin [now Volgograd]. Orel, which marked the furthest advance out of the

12 Raymond Collishaw, ‘A Review of the Counter-Revolution in South Russia in the period 1917-1918 [sic],’ n.d., Canadian War Museum 19770669-019, 2. [Note: contrary to the title, this report examines the period 1919-1920.] For the background to this period see John T. Smith, Gone to Russia to Fight: The RAF in South Russia 1918-1920 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley Publishing Plc, 2010), 15-48; Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 623-7. 13 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to R.V. Dodds, 11 June 1964, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9; Raymond Collishaw, ‘A Review of the Counter-Revolution in South Russia in the period 1917-1918 [sic],’ nd (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-019, 2. Collishaw noted that most of the airmen selected were British while the pilots were principally Canadian. 14 Each flight operated a different aircraft: Sopwith Camels, Airco DH.9s or Airco DH.9As. British domestic opposition to the mission in South Russia, especially in Parliament, caused the ‘recall’ of No.47 Squadron in October 1919. The squadron was re-designated ‘A’ Detachment, RAF Mission with the same organization, commander, personnel, equipment and task. Collishaw recalled that ‘These events make scant difference to the individuals concerned.’ Raymond Collishaw, ‘A Review of the Counter-Revolution in Southern Russia,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669, 4; see also Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 626-7; Lauri Kopisto, ‘The British Intervention in South Russia 1918-1920’ (PhD dissertation, University of Helsinki, 2011), 123-124. 65

south for the anti-Bolshevik forces on their march to Moscow, was a further 900 kilometres to

the north. By comparison, the main theatre of operations for the RAF on the Western Front,

between Ypres and Amiens, spanned a mere 125 kilometres. With a fluid front that could move

80 kilometres in a day, Collishaw’s squadron required mobility. The solution was to have the

headquarters and each flight live and operate from its own train. The open nature of the Russian

steppes meant that almost any field could be used as a base. Each train, made up of

approximately 50 cars, was self-sufficient. It contained sleeping quarters, dining facilities and

carried all the spare parts, ammunition and bombs, fuel, oil and other necessary supplies to keep

the squadron functioning. Aircraft could be dismantled and carried on flatcars if necessary, but

they would generally operate from a suitable field near a railway siding.15 The squadron was in

the process of becoming operational when Collishaw officially took command on 13 June 1919

and his first weeks in Russia were spent preparing the squadron for operations: ‘There was a

tremendous amount of administrative work to be done. Aircraft, equipment and stores were

arriving and had to be unloaded, checked and sent up to Ekaterinodar. In many instances vital

items of equipment were missing and arrangements had to be made for their dispatch to us.’16 C

Flight, composed of five DH9s, was ready for operations soon after Collishaw arrived and it was

sent to support the White Russian advance on Tsaritsin. In June 1919 the city fell to an attack by

forces under command of Major-General Pyotr Wrangel. The advance to Tsaritsin was slow as a

number of railway bridges had been wrecked by the communist forces. By 20 June C Flight had

established itself about 60 miles from the city and the aircraft flew daily missions ‘bombing and

15 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to R.V. Dodds, 13 August 1964, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9; Raymond Collishaw, ‘A Review of the Counter-Revolution in Southern Russia,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-019, 4; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 22. 16 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 183. 66

strafing a variety of targets, including rail and river transport and concentrations of cavalry and

infantry.’17

On 20 July 1919 Collishaw was informed by General Wrangel’s headquarters of a large

meeting of Bolshevik commanders that was to take place in Tsaritsin. He despatched several

DH9s from C Flight to attack the gathering. One of the aircraft ‘dropped a 112-pound bomb

squarely on a building in which the local Soviet was holding a full session. All but two of the 41

Red officials were killed.’18 One account of the incident stated that Leon Trotsky, the head of the

Red Army, left the building shortly before the attack.19 The squadron supported the White

Russian assault on Tsaritsin through ground attacks on enemy trenches and rear areas as well as

intercepting attempts by the Red Air Force to interfere with their operations. The RAF

contingent was small in comparison to the forces deployed against the city, but their efforts made

a tangible impact. Tsaritsin fell on 30 June and it seemed that the tide had turned against the

Bolsheviks.20

White Russian forces enjoyed their greatest success by June 1919. In addition to the

capture of Tsaritsin, anti-Bolshevik forces captured Kharkov and Kiev and the zone between

Kiev and Odessa was cleared of communist troops. By late summer, Red forces had rallied and

commenced a renewed advance on Tsaritsin. The city was almost recaptured in August, but

17 Josef Stalin, the future Soviet leader, organized the successful defence of this important industrial centre on the Volga River in 1918; the city was renamed Stalingrad in 1925 in honour of this achievement and would withstand an even more savage siege in the next world war. Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 22. 18 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 184. John Ernest Hodgson, the British journalist who wrote With Denikin's Armies: Being a Description of the Cossak Counter-Revolution in South Russia, 1918- 1920, also discussed this incident. A recent history of the RAF in South Russia casts doubt on the veracity of this event based on the lack of evidence in the official records: Smith, Gone to Russia to Fight: The RAF in South Russia 1918-1920, 107. However, British records for this period are minimal due to the chaotic end to the campaign, and as such, this should not be taken as conclusive. 19 Lauri Kopisto, ‘The British Intervention in South Russia 1918-1920’ (PhD dissertation, University of Helsinki, 2011), 121-2. 20 Robert Jackson, At War with the Bolsheviks: The Allied Intervention into Russia, 1917-20 (London: Tom Stacey, Ltd., 1972), 180-2. 67

White forces, supported by the RAF, were able to rally and hold on. A key feature of the

Bolshevik attack on Tsaritsin was the use of a river flotilla to bombard the city. The Volga River was a mile wide near Tsaritsin and this water barrier aided the defence of the city. This changed when the communists collected a large flotilla of approximately 40 destroyers, gunboats, monitors and other assorted vessels at Dubovka, 60 miles north of Tsaritsin on the Volga River.

These craft sailed down the river and anchored around Tsaritsin and were used to bombard

White Russian positions in advance of an assault. The bombardment was effective as the fleet was largely immune to defensive fire from the city as the larger ships, some with guns as large as

9.2 inches, outranged the artillery in the city. Morale was at a breaking point when the RAF intervened. Collishaw was asked by General Wrangel to disrupt the activities of the Red fleet.

Though there was limited precedent for aircraft successfully attacking ships with bombs,

Collishaw pioneered the use of 230-pound anti-submarine bombs in an anti-ship role. He directed his pilots to make ‘near-miss shots,’ so that the underwater overpressure caused by the explosion would rupture the ships’ hulls. For most of the month of September and into early

October, No.47 Squadron made heavy attacks on the Bolshevik flotilla. Collishaw directed his fighters to strafe the vessels to distract the gunners prior to a slow, low-level attack by the bombers. The results were decisive and the Bolshevik assault on Tsaritsin was postponed. It was estimated that 34 ships of the flotilla were either sunk or wrecked at anchor and only six ships were able to retire to Dubovka.21

During the Great War Collishaw always led from the front and this period was no

different. His flying log book shows that he was in the air almost every day in September

21 War Diary, No.47 Squadron RAF, June-November 1919, TNA AIR 1/1959/204/260/28; Raymond Collishaw, ‘A Review of the Counter-Revolution in Southern Russia,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-019, 5-6; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 22; Smith, Gone to Russia to Fight: The RAF in South Russia 1918-1920, 141-2; Kopisto, The British Intervention in South Russia 1918-1920, 122-3. 68

carrying out attacks against Bolshevik ships, ‘bombing and shooting up hostile Cavalry,’ or

conducting reconnaissance missions over the region. He was credited with personally sinking

two gunboats and a large troop-carrying barge.22 Collishaw claimed that his innovative methods

captured the attention of American air power strategist General William ‘Billy’ Mitchell. He

believed that Mitchell used the destruction of the naval flotilla on the Volga ‘as an example of air

expectations, in his struggle to gain approval for the U.S. Army Air Force to have an opportunity

to attack powerfully armed ships.’23

Over the next several months General Denikin’s forces continued to advance and by 13

October had reached Orel, only 250 miles from Moscow. Within a week a Communist offensive

pushed Denikin out of Orel and ‘a long retreat commenced, ultimately to end in the extinction of

his army along the shores of the Black Sea.’24 RAF operations during this period helped to slow

the retreat, but its small size could not change the outcome. Collishaw remained active during

this period and on 3 September he flew two sorties with C Flight and destroyed a steamboat tied

up to the wharf at Tcherni-Yar, bombed a gunboat steaming down the Volga River nearby and

hit an ammunition barge which exploded damaging a nearby steam tug.25 No.47 Squadron

attacked a variety of targets during this period including river vessels, troop concentrations,

railcars and the Red Air Force. Collishaw considered that cavalry were an ideal target: ‘a major

part of the RAF operations in South Russia would be conducted against Bolshevik Cavalry and

22 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Pilot’s Flying Log Book No.2, 1918-1926,’ Canadian War Museum 19770669-019. 23 Raymond Collishaw, ‘A Review of the Counter-Revolution in Southern Russia,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-019, 6. A careful review of the literature regarding Billy Mitchell has revealed no overt references to the events in South Russia. The available evidence indicates that the actions in South Russia and the United States, despite the obvious similarities, developed separately but in parallel. For more on Mitchell, see Mark A. Clodfelter, ‘Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell's Strategic Thought,’ in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1997), 79-114; Phillip S. Meilinger, ‘Alexander P. De Seversky and American Airpower,’ in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 239-78. 24 Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 627. 25 Smith, Gone to Russia to Fight: The RAF in South Russia 1918-1920, 148. 69

just as expected, it was found that the cavalry were completely vulnerable to aircraft.…The

tactics employed were to dive to ground level and then to aim to straddle a cavalry troop

alignment.’26 Collishaw stated that these counter-cavalry operations were so successful that

Trotsky posted placards across Russia ordering that captured RAF pilots were to ‘have their testicles nailed to trees and then cavalry were to draw and quarter them.’27 October would be the

busiest month for the squadron; a total of 37,206 pounds of bombs were dropped and 14,000

rounds of ammunition were fired. General Wrangel observed during the campaign that No.47

repeatedly saved his army and on one occasion the aircraft attacked ‘a battery of twenty-three

limbers and, flying very low, in a very few minutes wiped out all the gun crews, and every horse

but one, within full view of the White Army.’28

Coincidentally, the White Russian collapse corresponded with Collishaw’s temporary

absence. In early October he was flying a reconnaissance mission when his aircraft was hit by

ground fire and he made a forced landing. He was given shelter and food by a Russian farmer who had never before seen an airplane and the next day Collishaw and his observer started the 60 mile trek to the nearest railroad. The nine-day cross country journey ended when they reached the railroad and were able to catch a ride on a Russian troop train. It is likely that Collishaw was bitten by a tick or a flea while in the dirty and crowded railcar.29 He initially developed a fever,

but did not show the classic signs of typhus, so the RAF doctor put him on a train to

Ekaterinodar under the care of two sick RAF ground crewmen who were also being evacuated.

During the five day train journey the condition of all three men deteriorated. At a coaling stop,

26 Raymond Collishaw, ‘A Review of the Counter-Revolution in Southern Russia,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-019, 6. 27 Raymond Collishaw, ‘A Review of the Counter-Revolution in Southern Russia,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-019, 6. 28 John Ernest Hodgson, With Denikin's Armies: Being a Description of the Cossack Counter-Revolution in South Russia, 1918-1920 (London: Temple Bar Publishing Company, 1932), 143. 29 Raymond Collishaw, ‘An Air Reconnaissance in South Russia, 1919,’ n.d., Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9; 70

Collishaw was delirious with fever and his condition had become so critical that he was taken off

the train and entrusted to the care of a local nurse. This woman, who Collishaw remembered to

be a refugee countess, looked after Collishaw and brought him back to health. When he finally

regained consciousness, he was ‘at a loss to account for my strange surroundings and as I could

not speak Russian and my benefactor did not know any English my curiosity continued

unabated.’30 His location and poor health remained unknown to the RAF for a period of six

weeks until he was accidentally discovered by an RAF pilot who made a force landing nearby

and heard about a sick British aviator being cared for in the village. Returned to the fold,

Collishaw completed his recovery in a Russian hospital in Ekaterinodar and returned to duty at

the end of November.31

The three flights and headquarters train of No.47 Squadron were concentrated at

Beketovka, just south of Tsaritsin, for the first time in months. The squadron flew numerous

missions in support of Denikin, but by early December it was clear that the White Russians were

in grave trouble. An offensive by the Red armies approached Tsaritsin by the middle of the month and forced Denikin’s forces to the east side of the river. Other Bolshevik advances

threatened to cut off access to the Black Sea causing a general withdrawal. What started as an

orderly retreat by the White forces soon turned into a rout which caught up with both Collishaw

and the RAF trains. About the middle of December Collishaw ordered B Flight to disassemble its

aircraft and entrain to Taganrog on the Black Sea to avoid being captured in the rapid Red

advance. Colonel A.C. Maund, the senior RAF officer in South Russia, was incensed by these

actions:

30 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 23. 31 Raymond Collishaw, ‘An Attack by Typhus Fever in Russia - 1919,’ n.d., Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 23. 71

On whose authority was ‘B’ Flight ordered to return from the front to Taganrog? You are authorized to move your flights where necessary for carrying on campaign but you may not remove them from the front without orders from here.32

Collishaw may have overstepped his authority to order the move, but he had acted in the

best interests of his men. Maund’s criticism reflected how out of touch his headquarters was with the fluid, and quickly changing, situation at the front.

The new year brought only the certainty that the end was near for the anti-communist forces in South Russia. Most of the RAF contingent had fallen back on Ekaterinodar. This force was reconstituted as the Kuban Group and supported the White armies until late March when a retreat to Novorossisk was necessary. The port was defended long enough to allow British forces to be evacuated. During the retreat in late December, Collishaw’s train with the headquarters section of No.47 Squadron had been separated from the main force when it was unable to cross the Rostov bridge due to congestion. To escape the advancing Bolsheviks the train was compelled to retreat along the only open route which led into the Crimea. During the harrowing journey they had to chop wood and melt snow to keep the train moving, replace track destroyed by the enemy, deal with an outbreak of typhus and fend off repeated Communist attacks. In one case, an unmanned Red train was sent after them and crashed into the rear of their train destroying eight or nine railcars. Fortunately there were no casualties and the train was able to

continue its escape. After reaching Sevastopol on 4 January, Collishaw reconstituted his

command as the Crimea Group and, when the front somewhat stabilized and weather permitted,

continued to fly combat missions.33

32 War Diary, RAF Mission South Russia, November 1919 to January 1920. Copy found in Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9. 33 War Diary, RAF Mission South Russia, November 1919 to January 1920. Copy found in Raymond Collishaw Fonds, LAC MG 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9; Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 25-7. 72

The desperation of this period can be judged by an order Collishaw received in the dying

days of the civil war. General Denikin appointed General Yakov Slashchov to command the

Crimean defences. Collishaw was summoned to meet with Slashchov and was not impressed; he

described him as ‘a real Colonel Blimp – a dope fiend and completely ignorant of air matters.’34

The White Russian commander confirmed this view when he told Collishaw that ‘every pilot

was to be prepared to sacrifice his life to save the Crimea,’ and if that was not sufficient, those pilots ‘must eagerly seek means of sacrificing his life.’35 In this way it was hoped to inspire

Russian defenders to a ‘final and supreme effort.’36 Slashchov issued a series of equally

ridiculous orders to his own forces and was soon relieved of his command by Wrangel.

Collishaw stated that it was not surprising that the Crimean people had a preference for the

communist forces. By the end of March, communist pressure forced Collishaw to disband the

remnants of his unit and evacuate to Constantinople.37

Historians are mixed in their evaluation of RAF operations in South Russia. The official

history of the RCAF in the First World War stated, ‘The RAF had no significant influence upon

the course of events in Russia. Its employment was piecemeal, and bore no comparison to the

massive deployment of air power on the Western Front. Some of its work had a short-term effect upon military operations…but nowhere could the RAF exert any decisive effect.’38 A recent

history of the RAF in South Russia evaluated the campaign more positively. John T. Smith

34 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to R.V. Dodds, 13 August 1964, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9. 35 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to R.V. Dodds, 13 August 1964, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9. 36 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 26-7. 37 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to R.V. Dodds, 13 August 1964, Raymond Collishaw Fonds, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 30-E280, R2492-0-5-E, Volume 9; Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 205-13; Smith, Gone to Russia to Fight: The RAF in South Russia 1918-1920, 159-92. 38 Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, 627. The RAF contingent in South Russia contained a very high proportion of Canadian pilots. In addition to Collishaw, No.47 Squadron contained no fewer than 53 Canadian pilots. 73

observed, ‘The British had played a major part in the fortunes of the Armed Forces of South

Russia…The RAF squadrons…were never very large, but they played a role out of all proportion

to their size. They were the only really effective air units available to the Russians. Number 47

Squadron, operating on the Tsaritsin front, played a significant part in Wrangel’s battles to hold

onto the city.’39 Collishaw’s own appraisal of the campaign fell somewhere in between. He recognized that his one squadron could not possibly influence the outcome of a war fought over such a vast area. He believed that his squadron ‘made a surprising contribution to the White cause, mostly through its attacks on the Red ground forces. The destruction that we were able to wreak on the enemy on numerous occasions boosted tremendously the morale of the White troops in the area and at times caused near-panic in the ranks of the Reds.’40 Conditions were

much less formidable than on the Western Front especially the lack of effective opposition in the

air, but for the main ground support task, the pilots faced intense ground fire any time they

pressed their attacks home at low level.

Collishaw’s time in Russia was an eventful period in his life and had a significant impact on him. He cheated death on a number of occasions; his aircraft was brought down by hostile fire on at least two occasions; he had numerous close calls on his train ride to the Crimea and he survived a serious case of typhus. The influence this period had on his life is reflected his memoirs which contain a surprisingly long chapter on his Russian adventures.41 When Collishaw

was asked to go to Russia, he thought it would be a good posting because of the terrible things he

had ‘heard about the Bolshies [which] led me to believe that they were a thoroughly bad lot.’42

39 Smith, Gone to Russia to Fight, 194-5. 40 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 212 41 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story. In terms of page count, Collishaw only devotes more time to his First World War career. His nine months in Russia are covered in 23 pages. By comparison, his three years each in Iraq and aboard HMS Courageous rate nine and three pages respectively, while his years in Egypt and the Western Desert, the part of his career of which he is most proud, was told in 15 pages. 42 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 179. 74

His experiences did nothing to dissuade him of this view. Collishaw worked closely with the

Russians during his time in the country. He witnessed the good in the people and the excesses of

the communists which confirmed for him that they were fighting for the right reasons. His writings leave no doubt that the experience left its mark:

We all took home with us many memories, and I am sure that I am not the only member of the squadron who has since tried – with little success – to banish some of these from my mind.43

This was the only reference in Collishaw’s extensive writings where he addressed the personal

toll he paid during his many years at war.

His experience in command of No.47 Squadron would prepare him for the future. He was

fighting a war in a faraway foreign land, at the end of an extremely long supply chain. He had to work closely, and depend on, allies who might or might not follow through on their plans. He had limited forces under his command and was responsible for providing air resources for a vast area. He faced an enemy who was often larger, better equipped and had the initiative. He frequently had to act without reference to his higher chain of command because of the time and distance involved. The very landscape was often more hostile than the enemy; extremes of weather, climate, temperature, and distance were major limiting factors on operations. All these conditions combined to demand a commander who was smart, resourceful, adaptable, flexible, decisive and fearless. Collishaw demonstrated all of these traits.

* * * * *

Collishaw’s time in South Russia would not be the last time he was ordered to fight a

Bolshevik insurgency. Following a three-month leave in Canada, Collishaw spent a few months

in England before being posted to the Middle East. Mesopotamia, or Mespot as it was called by

43 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 213. 75

British servicemen, primarily encompassed the area of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in what is

now the modern state of Iraq. This area, formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, had become a

British mandate in the aftermath of the First World War. By May 1920 Britain had committed

over 133,000 troops to the region to deal with a succession of small scale tribal clashes,

insurrections and raids which threatened to explode into a general revolt.44 The RAF committed

four understrength squadrons to the region which were active in operations to help quell the

rebellions. In the second half of 1920, RAF aircraft flew 4,008 operational hours, dropped 97.5

tons of bombs and fired nearly 184,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. This was a significant

pace of operations considering the limited number of aircraft and their small bomb capacity.

RAF casualties amounted to nine pilots and aircrew killed, seven wounded and 11 aircraft lost.

During this same period, the army suffered some 2,269 casualties, including approximately 760

fatalities. It was towards the end of this period that Collishaw arrived to take command of a flight

in No.30 Squadron based in Baghdad.45

Upon arriving in Baghdad, Collishaw was sent to Tehran to join Major-General Sir

Edmund Ironside’s North Persia Force. As he put it, ‘I am back on the old job and the old game

of fighting the Bolshevics [sic].’46 Prior to Ironside’s arrival, the Bolsheviks had gained the

initiative by landing at Enzeli [now known as Bandar-e Anzali] on the Caspian Sea in May 1920 where they captured the White Russian fleet which had been interned by the Persians. A number of British setbacks and Persian defeats followed which resulted in Ironside being ordered to

44 Mesopotamia also includes small areas of northeastern Syria, southeastern Turkey and southwestern Iran. The region was entrusted to Britain in 1920 as a result of the Treat of Sèvres and became known as Mandatory Iraq or the Kingdom of Iraq under British Administration. For full details see Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914–1932, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2007). 45 The smaller size of the postwar RAF meant that officers were typically posted to lower commands than they had held during the war. Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 214-5; Chaz Bowyer, RAF Operations 1918-38 (London: William Kimber & Co. Limited, 1988), 63-75. 46 Letter, Raymond Collishaw to Mrs. Breadner, 20 April 1921, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner Papers, Folder “B” 1917- 1944, 74/707, Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. 76

evacuate his force in December. This could not be accomplished until the spring and Ironside

made good use of the intervening period to prevent further encroachments by the Bolsheviks. A

coup in Tehran in February 1921 led to a new administration in Persia which signed a treaty with

the Soviets. The subsequent departure of the Bolshevik troops allowed the British to withdraw

the North Persia Force on its own terms rather than be driven out.47

Collishaw arrived in November 1920 and found that ‘Persia in the winter is a miserable place.’48 Flying operations were negatively affected by the weather, but so too were hostilities

between the British and the Bolsheviks. Collishaw recalled that his aircraft made some

‘desultory’ bombing attacks, but were mostly involved in reconnaissance of the enemy positions

and maintaining communications between their base at Kazvin, located about 100 miles

northwest of Tehran, and the main British headquarters in Baghdad.49

After returning to Baghdad in the spring of 1921, Collishaw was given command of

No.30 Squadron. His main accomplishment during this period was to help establish an air route

between Baghdad and Cairo. Such a route was seen as essential for communications and the

delivery of supplies to the region, but it was also to be a part of a grand air route linking Great

Britain to the Middle East, India and ultimately, Australia. The first step in creating this route was the construction of a 500 mile-long road across some of the most inhospitable terrain imaginable. Converging convoys set out from Amman and Baghdad with the goal of meeting in the middle. The Baghdad convoy was supported by No.30 Squadron while the Amman convoy worked with Nos.47 and 70 Squadrons. When the convoys met in late June they had created a

47 Edmund Ironside, High Road to Command: The Diaries of Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside 1920-1922, ed. Lord Ironside (London: Leo Cooper, 1972), 133-78. 48 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 216. 49 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 214-6; Edmund Ironside, High Road to Command: The Diaries of Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside 1920-1922, ed. Lord Ironside (London: Leo Cooper, 1972), 133-78. 77

visible route that could be followed from the air with landing grounds every 20 miles. Soon

afterwards, Collishaw’s squadron helped to inaugurate the ‘Cairo-Baghdad Mail Run.’ The importance of this accomplishment should not be underestimated. As one historian remarked,

‘Although such pioneering ventures as the Baghdad Mail Run may not be considered strictly operational actions, the hardships and perils of flying vintage aircraft over untracked tribal territories were no less than any straightforward bombing sortie.’50

In 1923 Collishaw received a new posting that put him in the middle of rising tensions

between Great Britain and Turkey. It also placed him at the frontier of the evolving relationship between the three British services. The cost of administering its empire forced changes to the manner in which Britain conducted its colonial affairs; the expense of maintaining a large army needed to be addressed. Winston Churchill, newly appointed as the Colonial Secretary in

February 1921, had been in consultations with Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air

Staff, regarding the future of the RAF. Trenchard saw an opportunity to secure the future of his service by demonstrating that it could effectively police the Empire at a fraction of the cost of the army. Churchill facilitated this experiment by convening the Cairo Conference of 12-30 March

1921. This meeting, approved by Cabinet, brought together the senior civilian and military leadership responsible for the Middle East. The Air Staff, on Trenchard’s instructions, had prepared a detailed appreciation of the contribution the RAF could make to Imperial defence.

Based on RAF experience in Somaliland and Waziristan it was recommended that ‘the efficiency of the Royal Air Force as an independent arm should be put to proof by the transference to it of

50 Bowyer, RAF Operations 1918-38, 74-5. See also, Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars, 94-96. Collishaw described the development of this route in some detail in his autobiography which lends credence to the importance he placed on this task. Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 217-9. 78

primary responsibility for the maintenance of order in some area of the Middle East.’51 After much discussion, this scheme was approved and all British military forces in Iraq (army, air force and navy) were placed under RAF command. This was a significant event in the development of the Royal Air Force as it marked the first time an air force officer had been given overall command of a theatre. Air Marshal Sir John Salmond was sent to Baghdad in late 1922 where he assumed the role of Air Officer Commanding in Iraq.52

The British position in Iraq was precarious and Salmond needed to use all the resources

at his disposal to stabilize the situation. Tensions were already high in the wake of the Chanak

Crisis of 1922 which saw the United Kingdom issue an ultimatum to Turkey in September 1922

as Turkish forces moved to occupy a demilitarized zone on the Dardanelles established by the

Treaty of Sèvres. Elements of the British government underestimated support for military

operations, both domestically and internationally, and a subsequent negotiated settlement

prevented the outbreak of war.53 The international showdown between Turkey and Great Britain did not lead to conflict, but the two powers remained at an impasse over the Kurdistan region of

Iraq. Turkey was determined to gain control of Kurdistan from British-ruled Iraq. At the same time, a Kurdish independence movement sought to establish an independent nation. Not willing

to confront the British directly over Kurdistan, the Turks conducted a war by proxy. Through the

use of propaganda and political intrigue, the rebellious intent of the Kurds was fuelled by the

Turks who provided them with weapons, ammunition and money and supported their actions

51 Quoted in David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939 (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990), 25. 52 For a full discussion of the implications of the Cairo Conference, see Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, ch.2; Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 22-4. 53 For details on the Chanak Crisis, see Bulent Gokay, A Clash of Empires: Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918-1923 (London: Tauris, 1997); A.L. Macfie, ‘The Chanak Affair (September-October 1922),’ Balkan Studies 20, no.2 (1979), 309-41. 79

with irregular Turkish soldiers. These actions were backed by a significant Turkish military

presence on the northern border of Kurdistan.54

In early 1923 Salmond received intelligence that the Turkish irregulars, under the command of Euz Demir, were planning to launch an offensive supported by Sheik Mahmoud, a troublesome Kurdish warlord. Mahmoud, an erstwhile ally of the British, showed his true loyalties when Salmond summoned him to a meeting in Baghdad. Turning down the British invitation, Mahmoud began to agitate openly against British rule. Demir was established in the strategic town of Rowanduz which controlled the only all-season route from Turkey into northern Iraq. With the arrival of spring Demir planned an attack on Koi Sanjak as a first step towards gaining control of the provincial capital of Mosul. Concurrently, Mahmoud intended to move from his base in Sulaimaniya towards Kirkuk in advance of stirring a general Iraqi rebellion.55

Salmond had limited forces under his command, but he quickly moved the majority of his

troops to Mosul in late February in preparation for an expedition to counter Mahmoud’s

agitations. With the full support of his senior army subordinates, Salmond devised a combined

air-ground plan to pacify the region. The object of his plan included ‘countering Turkish propaganda, driving out bands of Turkish irregulars who were constantly stirring up trouble with the tribes, punishing SHAIKH MAHMOUD in Southern KURDISTAN (the late Governor of

SULAIMANI), and impressing the PISHDER Tribes in the RANIA district.’56 Opposition in

54 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, ch.3; Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, 121-122. 55 The starting point for any examination of this period is Salmond’s despatch published in the London Gazette on 10 June 1924. See, Air Vice-Marshal Sir J.M. Salmond, KCB, CMG, CVO, DSO, ‘Despatch covering the period 15th February to 30 April 1923,’ dated 22 May 1923. Historical examinations can be found in Sebastian Ritchie, The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939 (Shrivenham, UK: Air Historical Branch, 2011); John Laffin, Swifter than Eagles: A Biography of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Maitland Salmond GCB, CMG, CVO, DSO (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd, 1964). 56 Group Captain Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Some Notes on RAF Co-Operation during Operations in Kurdistan, March to June 1923,’ nd but written shortly after completion of the operation, 1, TNA AIR 5/292. 80

northern Kurdistan was estimated at 300 Turks, 700 tribesmen, three artillery pieces and ten

machine guns. Armed with modern rifles, these men were skillfully led to take advantage of

rugged ground where they could defeat an invading force on their own terms. This had been

proven in 1915 when the Turks prevented an advance by a much larger Imperial Russian army

from passing through the Spilik Dagh, a forbidding mountain gorge leading to Rowanduz, and in

1922 when Ranicol, a British-led force of Sikh and Assyrian troops, suffered heavy casualties

and lost a number of artillery pieces when it was overwhelmed by Kurdish tribesmen attacking

from the hills.57 Salmond intended to capture Rowanduz through a pincer movement using two

ad hoc brigade-sized formations. He developed this plan after flying over the region on a

personal reconnaissance:

During this flight I was very much impressed with the natural strength of the Spilik position, and, knowing at the same time that the enemy were holding it in force I formed the conclusion that without an enveloping movement it could not be taken without considerable loss.58

The route to be taken by the expedition was treacherous. Tall 7,000-foot mountains

covered in thick oak scrub dominated the limited routes through the regions. No roads existed

and the only developed paths were unsurveyed mule tracks which became impassable during the

frequent periods of heavy rain which were common at this time of the year. Suitable areas for

landing grounds were limited, and operations using these grassy fields were equally disrupted by

heavy rains which rendered them unfit for operations. The British expedition would have a

57 For the 1915 battle, see Archibald Milne Hamilton, Road through Kurdistan: The Narrative of an Engineer in Iraq (London: Faber, 1937), 62; for the Ranicol mission, see John Gilbert Browne, The Iraq Levies, 1915-1932 (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1932), ch.4. 58 Salmond, Despatch, 4656. A recent RAF publication on small wars observed that aerial reconnaissance was essential to the success of the operation as it allowed Salmond to ‘deploy his quite limited ground forces effectively and economically.’ Ritchie, The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939, 12. 81 difficult time moving through this region under ideal circumstances and the geography aided only the enemy.59

The direct northern approach, through the Spilik Dagh, was made by Frontiercol (Frontier

Column) under the command of Colonel Commandant H.T. Dobbin. It comprised three levy battalions of Assyrian infantry, a levy cavalry regiment, a section of pack artillery and assorted support troops. The much longer indirect approach from the south was made by Koicol (Koi

Sanjak Column) under the command of Colonel Commandant Berkeley Vincent. This ‘Imperial’ brigade was formed by two British infantry battalions, a Sikh infantry battalion, a battery of howitzers and assorted supporting forces.60

An expedition of this nature was only possible with RAF cooperation; deploying two columns incapable of mutual support in rugged terrain where the local tribesmen held all the advantages would have been too risky to contemplate without it. Roads were non-existent in this region and the columns faced a difficult task transiting the rugged terrain. Though outnumbering any potential enemy in terms of overall numbers, each column would be dangerously spread out along the line of march to facilitate and protect various base camps and supply points and the idea of a coordinated assault on Rowanduz would not have been feasible without the communications support provided by the RAF.61

Each column was accompanied by an RAF officer, and Squadron Leader Raymond

Collishaw was the liaison officer attached to Koicol. At the start of 1923 he had completed his tour of duty as commander of No.30 Squadron in Baghdad and was about to depart for England

59 Longmore, ‘Some Notes on RAF Co-Operation during Operations in Kurdistan, March to June 1923,’ 2. 60 Longmore, ‘Some Notes on RAF Co-Operation during Operations in Kurdistan, March to June 1923,’ 2. The British army abolished the rank of ‘brigadier-general’ in 1921 and replaced it with ‘colonel-commandant’ for officers who commanded brigades or equivalent sized formations. The term was replaced in 1928 by ‘brigadier.’ 61 Salmond, Despatch, 4656-57. 82

when Salmond ordered him to join the Kurdish expedition.62 This was a new experience for

Collishaw as he had previously operated only in naval and air force cultures and he now needed

to form a close working relationship with the army and join a ground force making its way

through hostile territory on horseback and foot. As the RAF liaison officer, Collishaw worked

closely with the column commander to advise him on all matters related to the RAF. He was

responsible for selecting landing grounds, overseeing the pack radio operation, assisting in the

use of Popham panels and the message picking up device to allow communications with the

other column and headquarters, and coordinating the air resupply of the column.63 Collishaw

remembered that he rode ahead of the main force to select and oversee the clearing of a landing

ground near the point where the main body would camp for the night. ‘A battalion of men would

then set about to clear the area of obstacles so that our aircraft could begin putting down with

supplies at about the same time that the main body of troops arrived.’ Later, when the terrain

became more mountainous, supplies would be parachuted to the column.64

Four squadrons of light bombers and fighters were available to support the two columns

while an additional two squadrons of transport aircraft were on call. These aircraft performed

many roles during the campaign including attacks on hostile tribesmen and their villages,

reconnaissance and communications duties, air re-supply and medical evacuation. Each column included an RAF liaison officer, and a number of communications methods. The RAF mobile pack radio set was a wireless transmitter with an effective range of 150 miles. Its reliability was hampered by atmospheric conditions and the delicate nature of the equipment. In spite of these problems, the two pack sets relayed over 3,000 messages during the course of the operation.

62 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 34. 63 Longmore, ‘Some Notes on RAF Co-Operation During Operations in Kurdistan, March to June 1923,’ 4. 64 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Koicol and the RAF, 1923,’ n.d., Raymond Collishaw Fonds, LAC MG 30-E280, R2492-0- 5-E, Volume 9; Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 221. 83

Popham panels were another effective method of communications. This process involved laying strips of white cloth in predetermined patterns on the ground to indicate various messages to aircraft overhead. The most effective method involved a message picking up device where two

12 foot poles joined by a cable would be set up in an open field. An aircraft would fly low and catch the cable to retrieve the message.65 These state of the art communications methods were fundamental to the success of the mission. The mountainous terrain and the unsupported nature of the two-pronged advance meant that good intercommunications between the two forces and

Salmond’s headquarters were essential. The pack radios performed well, but without the liaison duties performed by RAF aircraft this mission could not have taken place.

The operation began on 18 March when Koicol left Mosul. Frontiercol, taking a more direct route, set out eight days later. Salmond set up his advanced headquarters at small airfield outside the old walled town of Erbil, between Mosul and Kirkuk. Koicol spent four days resting at Koi Sanjak and then departed 8 April on its final march to its objective. Frontiercol departed

Arbil on the same day. The next two weeks were spent on a challenging passage through difficult terrain. Over hills, through valleys and ravines, all dominated by high ground which offered the enemy many opportunities to interfere with their progress. The Turks waited until 19 April to make their stand against Koicol. An ambush position was established at a point where the column had to transit a narrow wooded valley. The Turks opened fire from prepared sangars and trenches overlooking the valley. Prompt action by Colonel-Commandant Vincent and his troops rescued the situation. Collishaw ensured that the RAF also played an important role. Vincent commented in his after-action report, ‘Aeroplanes co-operated most effectively during the fight.

Air co-operation had been requested from 1000 hrs to 1200 hrs. Planes came over at 1015 hours

65 Longmore, ‘Some Notes on RAF Co-Operation During Operations in Kurdistan, March to June 1923,’ 4-6. 84

just after the fight commenced and helped to keep the enemy’s heads down. They also dropped

bombs on the heights.’66 Salmond’s Despatch echoed Vincent’s words:

Aircraft co-operated most effectively throughout the engagement; the enemy in sangars and trenches were bombed and machine gunned; messages were dropped on the Column indicating concealed positions which were occupied by the enemy. A message requesting continuous air action was picked up from the Column.67

After three hours the Turks retreated leaving behind 30 dead, a large number of weapons and a

cache of artillery shells. Casualties to Vincent’s men were remarkably light with no fatalities and

only five wounded.

While this fight was taking place to the south, Frontiercol arrived at the Turks’ main

position in the Spilik Dagh. Colonel Commandant Dobbin deployed his force to assault the

formidable position at dawn on 20 April. Fortunately for Dobbin and his men, the Turkish

commander, Euz Demir, made the decision to retreat following his setback against Koicol the

previous day. An examination of the Turkish defences revealed well-sited and commanding fortifications that may have been extremely difficult, and costly, to capture. This was the end of the fight for the Turks as Salmond’s two-pronged approach had unhinged their defences and made any resistance futile. By 21 April Demir had abandoned Rowanduz and taken his force over the border into Persia where it was disarmed by the Persian army.68

Frontiercol continued its march to Rowanduz and arrived in the area on 22 April while

Koicol arrived the next day. Vincent, accompanied by Collishaw, wanted to enter the town with

the lead troops so the two men left the main column to join the advance guard. Collishaw

described what happened next:

66 Colonel Commandant B. Vincent, ‘Report on Operations of KOICOL from 10th April to 26th April 1923,’ 29 April 1923, TNA AIR 5/292, 10. Sangars are small, temporary field fortifications constructed from local material such as stone, earth or wood in places where trenches are impractical. 67 Salmond, Despatch, 4657-8. 68 Salmond, Despatch, 4658; Ritchie, The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939, 13. 85

We moved off together, both mounted, but after crossing over the pass found that the mountain track divided. We took what we thought was the correct branch and pressed on, seeing no sign of the advanced guard. Finally we came to Rowanduz and boldly trotted in through the open gates, assuming that our troops had already occupied the town. As it turned out, the track that we had selected was shorter than the other, and we had beaten the advanced guard into the town by some little time. Realizing our blunder, there was nothing for it but to put on a bold front and pay no attention to the hostile looks that we received from the surly tribesmen. They must have thought that we were two very brave British officers to make an entry into the town in such a manner.69

The Royal Air Force had played an important role in the march to Rowanduz. Salmond’s plan for a two-pronged approach to Rowanduz could not have been contemplated without the intimate support provided by the air force. The hazards of resupply and ambush and the need for communications and reconnaissance meant that the independent and mutually unsupported columns would never have contemplated such a dangerous march through the mountains without the RAF to watch over them. The Turkish irregulars and the Kurdish tribesmen held formidable defensive works that may have been costly, if not impossible, to capture through a frontal assault. The pincher movement orchestrated by Salmond compromised the Turkish defences and allowed the campaign to conclude without a major fight or significant loss of life.70

In assessing the importance of these air operations, one recent RAF analysis suggested that, ‘it is impossible to gauge the impact of the many independent air strikes directed primarily against Mahmoud and his followers between February and May 1923, but it seems very improbable that they were not a significant factor in the relative ease with which his forces were defeated.’71 This assessment is undoubtedly correct, but it does not take into consideration the full spectrum of air operations supporting the campaign. Koicol and Frontiercol were supported from the air in a number of different manners including communications, close air support,

69 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 222. 70 Salmond, Despatch, 4658-59. 71 Ritchie, The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939, 15. 86

interdiction, reconnaissance, and air transport. It is worth considering the indirect support given

by the RAF. In one case, a pilot flying a Bristol Fighter patiently used his machine gun to

shepherd a flock of sheep down a mountainside onto a column’s route of march thereby

providing a most welcome source of dinner.72 Group Captain Longmore commented in the RAF

after-action report that:

In spite of adverse weather conditions, almost continuous contact was kept with the Columns by means of low flying aeroplanes who patrolled the surrounding heights and attacked all hostile concentrations and snipers with bombs and machine guns. It was found that low flying aeroplanes patrolling on the flanks and ahead of the line of advance had the effect of stopping all enemy sniping and also obviated in some cases the necessity for picquetting heights.73

The flights were of great importance to the strung-out columns marching through hostile terrain. The aircraft acted as a force multiplier and allowed the soldiers a freedom of action and movement which would not have been possible without RAF support. These operations were essential to the successful conclusion of the campaign.

Collishaw, as the air liaison officer to Koicol, played an integral role ‘of considerable value’ during the advance facilitating cooperation between the army and the air force, especially as the column commander’s air advisor.74 The relationship was effective but not perfect.

Longmore commented in his after-action report that a more senior air advisor should take part in

future missions to ensure that ‘no opportunity should be lost.’75 There had been a tendency for

the column commander to treat air matters as an afterthought and a more senior RAF advisor

would alleviate this problem. Though the two services had to work closely for the mission to

72 Longmore, ‘Some Notes on RAF Co-Operation During Operations in Kurdistan, March to June 1923,’ 6. 73 Longmore, ‘Some Notes on RAF Co-Operation during Operations in Kurdistan, March to June 1923,’ 5. 74 Longmore, ‘Some Notes on RAF Co-Operation during Operations in Kurdistan, March to June 1923,’ 4. 75 Longmore, ‘Some Notes on RAF Co-Operation during Operations in Kurdistan, March to June 1923,’ 7. 87

succeed, and a powerful air force presence facilitated the army mission, there was still a tension

underlying the operation.76

* * * * *

The years immediately after the conclusion of the First World War offered Raymond

Collishaw no respite from active service. Following a brief visit to Canada he again found himself in the middle of major conflict when he was asked to command No.47 Squadron in support of anti-Bolshevik forces during the Russian Civil War. His pilots and aircraft played a

relatively small part in the struggle but they did contribute materially to the support of the armies

of Generals Denikin and Wrangel. He made good use of his experience over the Western Front

primarily by using his small force of fighters and light bombers to provide close air support to

the White Russian forces. These operations were particularly effective in attacking massed

formations of communist troops and cavalry on the wide-open Russian steppes. Collishaw also

showed his innovation by developing tactics and techniques to attack vessels on the Volga River

successfully. Contrary to his previous experience, Collishaw was now required to operate in a

vast theatre that was remote from his supply bases and reliable and regular reinforcements. The

great distances involved meant that he was often out of contact with his higher headquarters and

was left to his own initiative. This generally worked out, but on one occasion he was

reprimanded for making a decision counter to his commander’s intent. This terrible war also took

a toll on him physically as he was incapacitated by typhus for an extended period and he was

later haunted by the atrocities and horrors he witnessed.

After returning to England and Canada for a rest, Collishaw was again sent to an active

theatre. His deployment to Mesopotamia gave him his first experience in colonial policing and

he was also involved in a wide range of non-combat air power activities including the

76 Longmore, ‘Some Notes on RAF Co-Operation during Operations in Kurdistan, March to June 1923,’ 7-8. 88 development of the Cairo-Baghdad Mail Run. In the spring of 1923 Collishaw was ordered to join an army formation as its RAF liaison officer during an expedition to pacify a region in

Northern Kurdistan. The experience was formative for Collishaw as it took him out of the cockpit to provide him with experience on air operations from the army’s perspective. As a pilot over the Western Front and during combat missions in South Russia and Mesopotamia,

Collishaw understood the challenges of army support missions. His time on the ground with

Koicol gave him a better understanding of the needs of the army and its view of how air operations were best conducted. This wide-ranging operational background marked Collishaw as one of the more experienced junior officers in the Royal Air Force. His next posting was to the recently-created RAF Staff College where he would receive the doctrinal and institutional grounding which would complement his considerable operational experience and prepare him for higher command.

Chapter 3 – RAF Staff College, HMS Courageous and the Sudan

This chapter will explore Collishaw’s transition from an active operational career to that

of a senior officer. This process started with his attendance at the RAF Staff College in 1924-

1925 which exposed him to the doctrinal and academic foundations of the Royal Air Force and

culminated with his deployment to Sudan as a wing commander during the Abyssinian Crisis of

1935. In between he spent three years as the senior RAF officer on board the Royal Navy aircraft

carrier HMS Courageous. His experiences during this period, some of the most varied and

challenging of his career, would be crucial in preparing him for the challenge of senior command

during the opening stages of the Second World War.

Iraq and Persia would mark the end of Collishaw’s front line combat experience, but his

career was far from over. Upon his return to England, he was given command of No.41

Squadron based at Northolt. While there his squadron was the first to receive the Armstrong

Whitworth Siskin, one of the new postwar fighter designs. The squadron transitioned from First

World War-surplus Sopwith Snipes to the Siskins, the RAF’s first all-metal biplane fighter, which offered a significant upgrade in performance.1 At Northolt, Collishaw spent considerable time studying for the entrance examination to the RAF Staff College at Andover. The Staff

College was established in April 1922 by Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air

Staff, to train the future commanders of the air force. Its first commandant, Air Commodore

H.R.M. Brooke-Popham, a founding father of the Royal Flying Corps, saw the Staff College as an essential preparation for officers aspiring to higher command. The staff college would ‘“train officers in staff duties” and offer “a general education which will serve as a sound foundation for

1 Raymond Collishaw and R.V. Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story (London: William Kimber, 1973), 223. 90

the building up of a school of thought in the Royal Air Force.”’2 Potential candidates were given

a suggested reading list of six or seven core books along with a supplemental list of an additional

20 books. A few months before the course commenced, candidates wrote a series of six

examinations, each three hours long, over a period of three days. Of the approximately 50

officers who sat for the exams, 20 men, including Collishaw, were admitted.3 There were a

limited number of the coveted spots available at the staff college each year and selection to

attend was a ‘sign of high favour.’4

The nascent RAF Staff College was still trying to establish itself when Collishaw

attended the third course running from 1924-25. Students spent time on academics, studying 22 topics including the nature of war, air, land and sea tactics, history, science and range of other subjects designed to give them a broad education. Outside the classroom, students were expected to participate in sports and other physical endeavours such as horseback riding. Visits were made to various military bases and related civilian establishments, army and navy exercises were observed and exchanges were conducted with the students at the other service staff colleges at

Camberley and Greenwich. Of course, time was also spent flying aircraft available at the

College.5

In addition to the education of its students, Trenchard expected the staff college to play a

significant role in the development of the doctrine of the RAF. Collishaw had mixed feelings

regarding the effectiveness of the program at Andover. He reflected in his memoirs that most of

2 Allan D. English, ‘The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of British Strategic Bombing Policy, 1922-1929,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 16, no. 3 (1993), 410. 3 English, The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of British Strategic Bombing Policy, 1922-1929, 419; R.A. Mason, History of the Royal Air Force Staff College, 1922-1972 (Bracknell, UK: RAF Staff College, 1972). In addition to the 20 RAF officers, there were an additional nine officers on the course from the army (including the future Lord Ismay), Royal Navy as well as the Royal Canadian and Royal Australian Air Forces. 4 This comment was made about John Slessor, a classmate of Collishaw at the Staff College. Vincent Orange, Slessor: Bomber Champion, the Life of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, GCB, DSO, MC (London: Grub Street, 2006), 27. 5 English, The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of British Strategic Bombing Policy, 1922-1929, 411. 91

the students and directing staff maintained a loyalty to either the army or navy and considered

the air force to be ‘an auxiliary service whose proper role was to act in a subordinate capacity to

the navy or the army. Individuals who dared to think in terms of the RAF evolving into a truly

independent force, able to undertake the roles that it did in fact assume during the Second World

War, were likely to be frowned upon as visionaries filled with extravagant notions.’6 Collishaw

believed that the directing staff tended to look for conservative solutions based on

practical/historical experience. He found this ironic considering the embryonic state of air power

meant that there was still much to learn about the broader application of air power for which

there was no historical precedent.7 Collishaw was not alone in this view of the staff course. John

Slessor, who attended Andover with Collishaw, recalled in his memoirs that ‘there was much

that today seems quaint and primitive in the teaching at the Staff College…We had to feel our

way towards a doctrine of air warfare. There was little practical experience to guide us.’8 Orange

further elaborated on the experience of Slessor and Collishaw who were ‘left in no doubt as to

the wisdom of accepting and regurgitating the opinions of the directing staff, shaped by

Trenchard. These opinions emphasized the need for incessant offensive and minimized the

resources devoted to home defence; they declared as “an accepted doctrine” that a well-drilled formation of day bombers would always get through to its targets even if unescorted by fighters; and that those targets should be ‘vital centres’ rather than enemy aircraft of airfields.’9 Like

Slessor, Collishaw came away from the Staff College as an ‘air enthusiast’ who was able to

6 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 225. 7 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 38. 8 John Slessor, The Central Blue: The Autobiography of Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the RAF (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), 41. 9 Orange, Slessor, 28. 92

parrot back the party line when required, but saw the true potential of air power to act in a

manner that was independent of the army and the navy.10

The record of the third course at Andover was impressive. Of the 28 RAF officers who

composed the student body and directing staff 17 reached air rank (air commodore and above)

with seven achieving the top ranks of air chief marshal and marshal of the RAF. Among

Collishaw’s classmates was a roster of officers who went on to prominent postings. Marshal of

the RAF Sir John Slessor commanded No.5 Group and Coastal Command during the Second

World War and was promoted to Chief of the Air Staff in 1950. Air Chief Marshal Sir Norman

Bottomley succeeded Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris as the head of Bomber Command in 1945.

Air Chief Marshal Sir George Pirie held commands in Northern Ireland and Southeast Asia during the war and served as the Inspector-General of the RAF in 1948. Air Marshal Sir Thomas

Elmhirst served in the Western Desert after Collishaw and was Air Chief Marshal Arthur

Tedder’s second-in-command in the Desert Air Force and in Northwest Europe. Air Chief

Marshal Sir Leslie Hollinghurst commanded No.38 Group, the transport command for airborne forces in Northwest Europe and succeeded Pirie as Inspector-General of the RAF. The acquisition of the coveted ‘psa’ post-nominal, awarded for the completion of the staff course, demonstrated that officers were able to articulate the doctrine on which the RAF’s wartime strategy was based and many went on to senior air staff and command positions in the air force.

This was exactly what was planned by Trenchard and the college commandants who chose the

10 Both Collishaw and Slessor use the term ‘enthusiast’ to describe themselves and those who maintained a similar ‘big picture’ view on the future role of air power. See Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 34; Slessor, The Central Blue, 41. 93

‘best and brightest minds in the fledgling RAF for their “cradle of the brain”’ to attend the staff

college.11

In April 1925 after completing RAF Staff College Collishaw was posted to the

headquarters staff of the newly reformed No.6 (Fighter) Group commanded by Air Commodore

Charles R. Samson, another former RNAS pilot. This short posting ended after only two months and Collishaw was next appointed the commanding officer of No.23 Squadron and ordered to reconstitute the squadron at Henlow. For the first year this fighter squadron had to make due

with old Sopwith Snipes but in July 1926 Collishaw and his pilots received brand new Gloster

Gamecocks, the first squadron to receive them. Collishaw described the Gamecock as ‘a trim,

stubby little fighter…which was highly maneuverable if somewhat tricky to fly.’12 In February

1927 the squadron was moved to Kenley, south of London, where it was assigned a night fighter

role working with the London anti-aircraft defences. Much of their training was spent flying

night intercept missions to practice intercepting an attacking enemy bomber force and its supporting fighters. This experience in night flying would serve Collishaw well during his time aboard HMS Courageous.

Collishaw left No.23 Squadron in November 1927 and joined the headquarters of Air

Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) as the Head of Operations and Intelligence where he would

spend the next two years.13 ADGB had been formed in 1925 with the responsibility for homeland

defence. It controlled all the squadrons of the Metropolitan Air Force, including fighter and

bomber squadrons, along with anti-aircraft defences, searchlight units and observation posts.

Immediate control of all but the bomber force was delegated to secondary command known as

11 Orange, Slessor, 27; Slessor, The Central Blue, 40; English, The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of British Strategic Bombing Policy, 1922-1929, 412-3. 12 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 226. 13 Collishaw’s discussion of his time at ADGB can be found in Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 41-2. 94

Fighting Area.14 Though nominally a defensive organisation, ADGB maintained a ratio of two

bomber squadrons for each fighter squadron. Trenchard justified this policy as he valued the

bomber over the fighter: ‘Although it is necessary to have some defence to keep up the morale of

your own people, it is infinitely more necessary to lower the morale of the people against you by

attacking them wherever they may be [emphasis in original].’15 Air Marshal Sir John Salmond, whom Collishaw had worked for in Iraq in 1923, commanded ADGB during this period while the commander of the Fighting Area was Air Vice-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the commandant of the RAF Staff College during Collishaw’s residency.16

The infamous pronouncement that ‘the bomber will always get through’ made by British

Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin was still a few years in the future,17 but ADGB was dealing

with that reality in the mid to late 1920s. Bombers were not necessarily faster than the fighters of

the day, but the amount of warning time prior to an attack was limited. In the period before radar,

ADGB was reliant on a chain of observers along the coast to send word of an attack. Anti-

aircraft guns and searchlight batteries installed in belts would be the first line of defence, but

fighters would also be scrambled and have only minutes to intercept the attacking force before it

reached London.18

The planners were under no illusion of the difficult task which faced them. As historian

Basil Collier stated, ‘The problems of air defence had changed considerably since the Armistice

and were bound to change still more in the future. Moreover the instrument devised for their

14 Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London: HMSO, 1957), 16-17. 15 Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, Address at Cambridge University, April 1925, quoted in Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London: Collins, 1962), 520. 16 Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, 17; Barry D. Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy 1914-1939 (London: Croom Helm, 1976), 190. 17 ‘Mr. Baldwin on Aerial Warfare – A Fear for the Future,’ London Times, 11 November 1932, 7. 18 H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars, 1918-1939 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1976), 149-150; John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 20-22. 95

solution was both untried and inherently imperfect.’19 There were serious fiscal restraints which

prevented the RAF for developing the full spectrum of defensive measures it deemed necessary

for the successful air defence of the UK and there were cumbersome command and control

issues with the army’s anti-aircraft defences.20

One important lesson that Collishaw drew from his time at ADGB was the impracticality

of maintaining standing patrols of fighters waiting to intercept marauding bombers. This tactic was wasteful of resources and would soon wear out the defence. A second lesson he drew from the organization of ADGB was the desirability of having different aircraft types grouped together in the same command. In 1936 ADGB was dissolved and replaced with functional commands:

Fighter, Bomber, Coastal and Training. There were efficiencies to this new system, but it meant each command tended to become ‘separate Air Forces, each with its exclusive technique, pattern and traditions.’21 The division created barriers which prevented the various commands from

working together as efficiently as might have been possible if they served in the same command.

A corollary to this was that officers tended to become streamlined in their chosen specialty and this limited their versatility for senior command as they needed to have knowledge of the air force as a whole.22 It should be no surprise that Collishaw was later able to command effectively

No.202 Group in the Western Desert which was a mixed group composed of bomber and fighter

squadrons. He was also strongly against using his fighters to provide an air umbrella over the

19 Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, 17. 20 Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule, 190-191; Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, 12, 17; Robin Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime: Britain, 1918-1940, a case study (London: G.T. Foulis & Co. Ltd, 1962), 163- 164. 21 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940). Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 42. 22 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940). Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 41-2; See also The Growth of Fighter Command 1936-1940, chs.1-2, TNA AIR 41/14, also published as T.C.G. James, The Growth of Fighter Command 1936-1940 (London: Cass, 2002). 96

front line of the army, a tactic demanded by some ground commanders to protect against enemy

air attacks, as he knew it to be a waste of precious resources.23

In July 1929 Collishaw was promoted to wing commander and the following month was

sent to serve with the navy. He was appointed Officer Commanding, Flying, the Senior RAF

Officer on HMS Courageous, the Royal Navy’s most capable aircraft carrier.24 He replaced

Wing Commander Robert Leckie, a fellow Canadian and another RNAS veteran.25 Collishaw

would spend the next three years at sea interrupted only by a brief stint in 1930 to attend a Senior

Officers’ Technical Course while Courageous was in port for scheduled maintenance. Collishaw,

by his own admission, found himself in a ‘delicate position’26 during this posting. The birth of the Royal Air Force through the combination of the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air

Service (RNAS) in April 1918 meant that the Royal Navy no longer had its own flying service.

This created difficulties for the operation of Royal Navy aircraft carriers. The resulting ‘Dual

Control’ policy created the compromise situation that RN aircraft carriers deployed squadrons of

23 Collishaw repeatedly remarked upon the unsuitability of the fighter umbrella in his two after-actions reports on the period of Operations Compass and Battleaxe and the point is reiterated in his memoirs. See Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475; Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the Time of our Retreat through Cyrenaica – including the Operation Battleaxe,’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474; Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 243. 24 HMS Courageous was originally launched in February 1916 as the lead ship in a new class of cruisers to challenge the Germany navy in the Baltic Sea. The ship was decommissioned at the end of the First World War and subsequently converted to an aircraft carrier in response to the limitations of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1925. The transformation of the ship began in June 1924 and she was re-launched in February 1928. After completing her workup trials, Courageous sailed for Malta to join the Mediterranean Fleet. R.A. Burt, British Battleships, 1919- 1939 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1993), 274-85. 25 Robert Leckie commanded No.228 Squadron during the First World War. The year after the war he was the commanding officer of the short-lived two-squadron Canadian Air Force which was disbanded in 1920 when the British government ceased its funding and the Canadian government deemed a peacetime air force unnecessary. He was subsequently seconded to the RAF and spent time afloat as the OC Flying of HM Ships Hermes and Courageous. His last major posting before the Second World War was air officer commanding RAF Mediterranean at Malta. Upon the outbreak of the war he returned to the Royal Canadian Air Force where he served a number of postings ultimately becoming the chief of the air staff in 1944. See Robert Leckie personnel file, Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Ontario; W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, the Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, vol.2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 229; the biographical details of Leckie’s career on the website Air of Authority - A History of RAF Organisation , accessed 14 January 2012. 26 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 229. 97

Royal Air Force aircraft commanded by RAF officers. This would not change until the navy

formally assumed command of the Fleet Air Arm on 24 May 1939.27

The RAF and RN maintained an uneasy partnership regarding naval aviation in the

interwar period. The senior service realized, somewhat reluctantly, that air power was now an

integral component of maritime operations. The navy had embraced the concept of aircraft

carriers during the First World War, but the Royal Navy was still a ‘gun club’ ruled by

‘battleship admirals’28 where the battleship versus carrier debate was often seen as a zero-sum

game. Of course the reality was more nuanced, but the embryonic development of naval aviation

was not easily integrated into a service which traced its roots to the 16th century.

A ‘taxi service owned by the RAF, [and] chartered by the Navy,’ was how the working

relationship between the navy and the air force was described by one contemporary.29 Historian

John Buckley charitably refers to this as a ‘curious situation.’30 The demise of the RNAS and the

transfer of some 55,000 air-minded officers and men that occurred with the formation of the

RAF in 1918 meant that the Navy had lost a significant amount of accumulated experience of air

operations. This led to justifiable concerns about how the navy’s air needs would be met in the

future. The Navy considered itself the sole authority responsible for the conduct of a war at sea

while the RAF believed ‘the air was the air wherever it was and took on no special quality when

27 The Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Air Force, comprising RAF units and aircraft embarked on ships of the Royal Navy, was created on 1 April 1924. In 1937 a committee chaired by Sir Thomas Inskip was set up to arbitrate the dispute between the air force and the navy over the control of naval aircraft. The Inskip Award returned full control of training, organization and equipping back to the Admiralty. See Ian M. Philpott, The Royal Air Force: An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years, Vol. 2. Rearmament - 1930-1939 (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2008), 246-9.; S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, vol.1: The Defensive (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), 29-31. 28 Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles, American & British Aircraft Carrier Development 1919-1941 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 4. 29 Don Baker quoted in Ray Sturtivant, British Naval Aviation: The Fleet Air Arm, 1917-1990 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 14. Baker was a naval officer who started flying with the Fleet Air Arm as an observer in 1926 and had risen to the position of Commander (O) by the start of the Second World War. 30 John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 92. 98

it was over the sea.’31 This difference in opinion would set up a major disagreement over who

knew how best to utilize naval aviation. One manifestation of opposing views can be seen in the

personnel policy. Admiral of the Fleet David Beatty, the aggressive commander of the

battlecruiser squadron at Jutland, was reputed to have remarked that the Navy wanted ‘sailors

who could fly, not pilots who were in the Navy.’32 Conversely, the RAF argued that its pilots

should not be specialists; any pilot could be trained in the special techniques of the war at sea,

and a roster of pilots who were generalists would lead to a stronger and more flexible air service.

This debate was never really settled before the creation of a separate and distinct Fleet Air Arm

under the auspices of naval command in 1939.

After a sometimes acrimonious high level debate in the mid-1920s it was agreed that the

RAF would provide 30 percent of aircrew (primarily pilots) and 100 percent of the maintenance personnel. The Navy would provide the balance of the aircrew (pilots, observers and air gunners) as well as non-specialist ground crew. Naval pilots were in short supply because it was seen as a dead-end career move. Those naval officers who volunteered for the flying duty were given temporary RAF commissions due to the time they would spend training on RAF stations. Most

of the commissioned observers were naval officers who received training from the RAF while a

number of naval ratings were also trained by the RAF to serve as telegraphist/air gunners

(TAGs). In 1932 HMS Glorious, a sister ship to Courageous, had a complement of 1,100 officer

and men which included a Fleet Air Arm (FAA) contingent of 70 officers and 280 men. Of the

FAA officers, 20 were RAF, 30 were naval officers temporarily attached to the RAF as pilots

and 20 were naval observers. The majority of the men were RAF maintenance crews and ground

31 Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945: A Historical Survey (London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1979), 31. 32 John James, The Paladins: A Social History of the RAF Up to the Outbreak of World War II (London: Macdonald & Company, 1990), 119. 99

staff though a few were naval ratings trained as TAGs. While onboard ship RAF personnel who

were generally baffled by ship routines and rhythms were subject to naval discipline but ashore

they reverted to RAF regulations.33 Naval pilots and observers were expected to fulfill all the

duties of a regular officer so when not flying they stood watch and participated in general life of

the ship. This was the less than ideal situation in which Collishaw found himself.

The convoluted relationship between the navy and the air force caused numerous

problems, especially for the senior RAF officer. Collishaw described the situation as a

‘ridiculous’:34

The naval view was that naval flyers could do a better job at sea than those of the RAF. If [the senior RAF officer] did not support this thesis he was reactionary and anti-navy. If he did, he was likely to come into disfavor at the Air Ministry.35

This situation was further complicated by the lack of actual power exercised by the senior

RAF officer. Collishaw explained:

The interlocking of Naval and flying duties was inclined to make the senior R.A.F. officers’ post a tricky one, particularly as the King’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions made no provision for him to exercise any disciplinary powers, notwithstanding that he was officially in command of the R.A.F. on board ship.36

Collishaw relied heavily on his experience to see him successfully through this posting.

His six years in the Canadian Fisheries Protection Service prior to the First World War, where he

climbed from cabin boy to the rank of first officer, were of great value. So too were his years

with the Royal Naval Air Service. Both these appointments provided the knowledge of the Navy

he would need to liaise with naval officers effectively and it would also have made him seem

less an ‘outsider’ and more accepted by his naval peers while on the carrier.

33 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 228-30; Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, ch.2; Sturtivant, British Naval Aviation: The Fleet Air Arm, 1917-1990, 15-6. 34 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940). Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 43. 35 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 229. 36 Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ 44. 100

The mission of the Fleet Air Arm was indicated by its unofficial motto of ‘Find, Fix and

Fight.’ This accurately captures the Admiralty’s view of the role of air power at sea. Some

commentators have argued that the Navy was too reactionary to appreciate the potential of

aircraft to change the naval battle space significantly.37 Geoffrey Till argues that while the

Admiralty was unquestionably cautious and skeptical about the role of air power, it embraced the

aircraft as an integral component of all future fleet actions. Admiral Sir William Boyle, the

commander-in-chief of the Home Fleet, went as far as to state in 1933 that ‘It is difficult to

conceive of any naval operation in war where there will not be a call for aircraft.’38 There was a

caveat. The Admiralty clearly saw aircraft as a force multiplier, not a battle-winning force in its

own right. Aircraft were there to support the fleet, primarily in a reconnaissance and spotting

role. Once the enemy fleet had been located by aerial reconnaissance, a strike would be launched

which would aim to slow the enemy fleet so it could be brought to battle. The engagement would

then be decisively concluded by the big guns of the battle fleet, with the fall of shot directed by

spotter aircraft.39

During the period 1929 to 1932 HMS Courageous embarked six flights of aircraft

comprised of up to 48 aircraft.40 Nos.404 and 407 Flights operated the Fairey Flycatcher, a

rugged little biplane that handled well and was the standard first-line naval fighter from 1924 to

1932. The Fairey IIIF, ‘a classic design in the history of British Aviation,’ was widely used in the

37 Clark Reynolds offered an extreme example of this viewpoint when he states, ‘conservative battleship admirals thus returned to the old pre-war anti-intellectualism, their naval colleagues and Fleet maneuvers looking to another Jutland and virtually ignoring the promise of the aeroplane and submarine.’ See Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York: Morrow, 1974), 484. The loss of HM Ships Repulse and Prince of Wales solely to Japanese aircraft confirmed for many the Admiralty’s failure to understand the changing nature of air power. 38 Quoted in Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945: A Historical Survey, 161. 39 For a full discussion of the Admiralty’s view of air power, see Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945: A Historical Survey, ch.6. 40 At the time Collishaw joined Courageous the six flights were: Nos.404 & 407 (Fairey Flycatchers), Nos.445 & 446 (Fairey IIIFs) and Nos.463 & 464 (Blackburn Darts). 101

Fleet Air Arm.41 An effective spotter-reconnaissance aircraft which equipped Nos.445 and 446

Flights, it carried a crew of three (pilot, observer and telegraphist/air gunner) and operated primarily as the eyes of the fleet, though it could carry up to 500 pounds of bombs. The only true strike aircraft on Courageous was the Blackburn Dart of Nos.463 and 464 Flights. It was a single-seat torpedo aircraft that was easy to fly and land, but was somewhat lacking in performance even when compared to its contemporaries.42

The types of aircraft carried by Courageous clearly demonstrate the Admiralty’s concept of naval air power which was confined largely to a reconnaissance role. The RAF, and especially

Collishaw, argued that aircraft could play a much greater offensive role. Collishaw recalled that,

In retrospect, it is only fair to the Royal Air Force to recollect that the Admiralty displayed scarcely any perceptible interest in the potential employment of the Fleet Air Arm to provide air power to sink capital ships. Naval interest in aviation was confined almost exclusively to its ability for reconnaissance duties. Senior Royal Air Force officers in the Fleet Air Arm continued to press for the adoption of a plan to embrace the lethal role of an air striking force for the Fleet Air Arm, but they were often discouraged by Senior Naval Officers who could conceive of no useful purpose to which Naval aircraft could be used offensively, except perhaps to slow down hostile vessels, so our own ships’ guns could be decisive.43

The events of the Second World War would validate this viewpoint.44

Collishaw, a fighter pilot by nature, envisioned a more offensive role for naval aviation.

His experience in South Russia had demonstrated that aircraft could effectively engage small vessels. He reasoned that larger fleet units could be similarly engaged with larger bombs. An incident occurred during Collishaw’s time on Courageous which he used to press his case for a

41 Owen Thetford, British Naval Aircraft since 1912 (London: Putnam & Company, 1958), 130. 42 Thetford, British Naval Aircraft since 1912, 46-7, 118-31. 43 Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ 43. In his autobiography, Collishaw added a sarcastic note to this passage when he stated, ‘The role of the Fleet Air Arm’s carrier aircraft…was to slow down [enemy] ships, in order that the navy might come up and sink them in proper fashion.’ Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 229. 44 This capability was demonstrated most clearly during the attack by British Fleet Air Arm Swordfish torpedo bombers on the Italian fleet at Taranto where one battleship was sunk and two others damaged for the minimal cost of two aircraft lost. See Angelo N. Caravaggio, “The Attack at Taranto: Tactical Success, Operational Failure,” Naval War College Review 59, no.3 (Summer 2006), 103-127. 102

more offensive role for aircraft. During a training exercise, an aircraft accidentally released a

small smoke bomb, used to mark fall of shot, near a Royal Navy cruiser. The device exploded adjacent to a water intake on the ship and caused severe damage to the ship’s condensers, putting the ship out of action for a number of weeks. During the subsequent court of enquiry, Collishaw, the senior air force officer in the fleet, was called to testify in front of the Admiral to explain what had happened. Collishaw used to opportunity to question the admiral: ‘“If a detonator of a seemingly harmless smoke bomb was able to disable a Cruiser, would I be right in assuming that a 5,000 lb. bomb might seriously damage a battleship?” The Admiral’s bushy eyebrows flared as he explosively answered, “No – you damn fool, no.”’45

Several Fleet Air Arm officers on Courageous authored a paper in 1930 which argued

for a greater offensive role for naval aircraft. They believed that every FAA reconnaissance

aircraft should carry a bomb or torpedo so as to ‘have a sting in the tail.’ This proposal generated

much discussion in the Admiralty and Air Ministry and eventually resulted in the design of the

Fairey Swordfish, a multi-role aircraft that could carry out the dual tasks of reconnaissance and

attack.46

Collishaw joined Courageous at Malta in early August and familiarized himself with the

ship and its routines during a cruise and fleet maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean. Soon after

the ship returned to Malta, trouble broke out in the Middle East. Tensions between Arabs and

Jews turned into violence in August 1929 in Jerusalem after a clash over worship rights at the

Wailing Wall. The immediate origins of this conflict can be traced to British authorization for

Muslim construction at the Wailing Wall in June 1929. Jewish protests grew over the next two

45 Raymond Collishaw, untitled autobiographical manuscript, n.d., CWM 19770669-044, 101. 46 Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945: A Historical Survey, 102 Information on this paper comes from an interview Till conducted with Captain H. St J. Fancourt in 1978. There is no direct evidence linking Collishaw to this paper, but given his known penchant for offensive action and his role as commanding officer of the paper’s authors during this period, it would be surprising if he was not involved. 103

months and culminated in a series of public orations and a march on the Wailing Wall by the

Jewish Youth Organizations on 15 August. A counter Muslim protest march the next day also

ended with no widespread violence but Arab dissent spread outside Jerusalem over the next few

days and erupted in violence against Jewish settlers on 23 August.47 One of the worst massacres

occurred in Hebron, the oldest Jewish settlement in Palestine, where 66 villagers were killed. By

the time the violence ended approximately 133 Jews and 116 Arabs had been killed. The British

garrison in Palestine, including a contingent of RAF armoured cars, and the local constabulary

were unable to stop the violence and reinforcements were summoned. The initial British

response was to strengthen the area with troops and aircraft from Egypt to defend the scattered

Jewish settlements from Arab attacks. The RAF in Palestine was very active in the early days of

the crisis posting nearly 600 flying hours between 23 and 29 August.48

Courageous received notification to sail to Palestine within two hours at 0147 hours on

24 August. Departure was repeatedly delayed over the next 48 hours as preparations were made

for the deployment. The 2nd Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment, including 15 officers, 734

men and all their heavy stores were embarked for the passage. Preparations were completed by

0630 hours on 26 August and the ship departed Malta. The voyage, at a sustained speed of 27

knots, was completed without incident and Courageous anchored off Jaffa at 0325 hours on 28

August. Captain Studholme Brownrigg, the commanding officer of Courageous, received a

signal while at sea that his aircraft were desperately needed and he was to fly them off

immediately. Unfortunately, night was approaching and the ship was too far from shore so it was

47 Group Captain P.H.L. Playfair, MC, ‘Report on the Palestine Riots, 23rd August, 1929 to 11th September, 1929,’ 11 November 1929, TNA AIR 5/1243, 1-3; Avraph Sela, ‘The “Wailing Wall” Riots (1929) as a Watershed in the Palestine Conflict,’ The Muslim World 84, nos.1-2 (1994), 60-94. 48 The total casualties come from David E. Omissi, ‘Technology and Repression: Air Control in Palestine 1922-36,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no.4 (1990), 47, while the Hebron numbers are cited in Sela, ‘The “Wailing Wall” Riots (1929) as a Watershed in the Palestine Conflict,’ 82. 104

decided that it was too risky to send the aircraft. No.404 Flight was flown off the carrier to

Ramleh Aerodrome the next morning upon reaching Jaffa. The South Staffordshires and their

supplies were disembarked over the course of the day and Courageous then sailed for Haifa

arriving at 0630 hours on the 29th.49 Collishaw left the ship soon after arriving at Jaffa on 28

August to meet with Sir Harry Luke, the officer administering the government. By the end of the

day he shared with Brownrigg a plan to base the aircraft at Gaza where they would be available

to fly missions over the entire area of Palestine. This request was initially denied by Rear

Admiral Reginald Drax, the naval squadron commander, who was under orders to ‘keep

“Courageous” and the destroyers at short notice to return to the Fleet and, therefore, he could not

concur in any scheme which landed all the aircraft and the entire flight personnel.’50 Drax

viewed the imperial constabulary role as a distraction and was determined to keep the mission as

short as possible lest more important matters, such as sea training and efficiency of the fleet

suffer.51 Early on 30 August HMS Courageous received a signal from Sir John Chancellor, the

High Commissioner for Palestine, requesting that all remaining aircraft be sent to Gaza. After confirming the deployment with Drax, Brownrigg took Courageous to sea where the aircraft were flown off just before noon.52

The Imperial Airways aerodrome at Gaza proved to be a very practicable base for

operations though its creature comforts were few. The force under Collishaw’s command

consisted of 48 aircraft, 47 officers and 385 other ranks. For the next week the Fleet Air Arm

49 Sturtivant, British Naval Aviation: The Fleet Air Arm, 1917-1990, 14-5; Omissi, Technology and Repression, 47- 50. 50 Captain Studholme Brownrigg, commanding officer of Courageous, ‘Report of Proceedings during Emergency in Palestine 1929,’ 7 September 1929, TNA AIR 5/1243. The Officer Administering the Government was also known as the Chief Secretary of Palestine. Rear Admiral Drax, whose full name was Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett- Ernle-Erle-Drax, was the commander of the 1st Battle Squadron, with his flag onboard the battleship HMS Barham. 51 Paul G. Halpern, The Mediterranean Fleet, 1919-1929 (Farnham, Surrey: The Navy Records Society and Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), 462. 52 Captain Studholme Brownrigg, commanding officer of Courageous ‘Report of Proceedings during Emergency in Palestine 1929,’ 7 September 1929, TNA AIR 5/1243. 105

aircraft would be very busy flying over Palestine. They were asked to undertake a variety of

missions including patrols, reconnaissance, cooperating with the army during raids and

distributing proclamations. Palestine was small in area allowing the Fairey IIIFs and Darts to

patrol the entire region without refueling. The Flycatchers were provided with a refueling base at

Samahk for northern patrols. Lieutenant Owen Cathcart-Jones, a pilot in 404 Flight at Ramleh, recalled that their orders were to ‘keep a look-out for marauding tribes of Arabs who had recently committed the most terrible outrages on Jewish farmers and on the inhabitants of the village of Hebron. At the first sign of shooting, our instructions were try to separate the conflicting parties and then take offensive actions.’53 One typical mission recounted by Cathcart-

Jones was a sortie against a hostile tribe in the desert. These tribes would be rendered immobile without their camels and thus become easy prey for an armoured car patrol. Cathcart-Jones thought this kind of flying was ‘too good to be true and set off…full of glee. For an area of some

200 square miles there wasn’t a camel in the whole of Palestine which hadn’t been zoomed and dived at in our efforts to disperse them.’54 In total, Collishaw’s aircraft logged over 340 hours of

operational flying time and another 100 hours of non-operational flying.55

The air contribution to the Palestine emergency has been characterised as a failure by

historian David Omissi who argued that the inability of the air force to stop or deter the violence

and the subsequent replacement of RAF Group Captain P.H.L. Playfair by army Brigadier

W.G.S. Dobbie early in the mission was a tacit admission by the Air Ministry that they were

53 Owen Cathcart-Jones, Aviation Memories Including Australia and Back and Other Record Flights (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1934), 180. 54 Cathcart-Jones, Aviation Memories, 180-1. 55 ‘Schedule of Flying carried out in Palestine by “Courageous” Flights,’ 7 September 1929, enclosure to Captain Studholme Brownrigg, commanding officer of Courageous ‘Report of Proceedings during Emergency in Palestine 1929,’ 7 September 1929; Wing Commander Raymond Collishaw, ‘Report on Air Operations by Aircraft from H.M.S. “Courageous” operating from Gaza, Palestine,’ 5 October 1929, TNA AIR 5/1243. 106

unable to handle the situation.56 This view was first put forward by Dobbie in his after action report when he stated, ‘Any effectiveness there may have been in the steps taken to restore order was due entirely to the extreme mobility of the battalions.’57 Both Omissi and Dobbie are correct

that the conflict was ended by the presence of armed troops on the ground. It could not be solved

in any other manner in a built up area where antagonists and innocent parties mingled and could

not be identified from the air. The success of air control in previous conflicts in Iraq, Transjordan

and Aden was achieved under very different circumstances and to label Palestine a failure of air

control does not take into consideration the wide range of air missions employed in addition to

purely offensive attacks.

In spite of the difficulties of applying air power in Palestine, both Dobbie and Playfair

used air power offensively. Between 25 and 31 August no fewer than 11 attacks were made on

hostile targets. Some of the attacks were pre-planned to support ground operations, others were

requested by the ground commander while some were initiated by the pilots on the scene.58

There is no mention of the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of these attacks in the operational

reports, but on 4 September John Chancellor, the High Commissioner, issued a memo on the

rules of engagement (ROE) for the air force. Omissi argues that authorities were aware of the

‘unselective nature of the air weapon…[and] exercised a thoughtful restraint upon its use.’59 A

close reading of the ROE shows that it does not do anything more than justify the air actions that

had already been taking place. While the ROE offered a few cautions to pilots it could also be

56 Omissi, Technology and Repression, 47-50. 57 Brigadier W.G.S. Dobbie, ‘Palestine Emergency. Narrative of Operations Between 24th August and 12th September, 1929,’ 7 October 1929, TNA AIR 5/1243, 11. 58 ‘List of Occasions upon which Air Action was taken 23rd to 31st August, 1939,’ Appendix B to Air Vice Marshal H.C.T. Dowding, ‘Report on Operations,’ 22 November 1929, TNA AIR 5/1243. 59 Omissi, Technology and Repression, 49-50. 107

interpreted to allow pilots the freedom to act when they deemed it appropriate. As the orders

stated:

The action which may be taken by aircraft during the present emergency is to be limited as follows:

A. Machine Gun fire only will be used.

(i) When looters and incendiaries are caught in the act. (Note:- In certain instances Jews have been allowed to return to abandoned colonies to recover their possessions and the greatest care must be taken not to attack them in mistake for looters).

(ii) When persons are caught flagrante delicto committing acts of violence.

B. Machine Gun Fire and Bombing.

(i) When large bodies of armed men are seen crossing the frontier into Palestine, are obviously hostile, and do not go back when fire in opened in front of them. (Note:- Bodies of Arabs, armed and without women and tents should be treated with suspicion – almost certainly they are not on legitimate business).

(ii) When ground troops are in serious difficulties and ask for assistance.60

The limited number of attacks by aircraft in the second week of operations resulted from

changes in the nature of the conflict. The majority of air attacks were conducted early in the

conflict when there were no ground troops in the area and no other option to deal with the

marauders. Attacks on Jewish colonies at Bir Tovia, Haifa and Beit Alfa were driven off by air

action while looters and incendiaries caught in the act were machine gunned at Khulda, Safed

and Zicheron Jacob. Within a few days, most daylight attacks on Jewish settlements ceased and

were confined to times when aircraft could not fly at night.61 The air force was well aware of the

strengths and limitations of its aircraft, even if the army was not. Collishaw reported that on a

60 Memo to Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force Units, Transjordan & Palestine from J.E Chancellor, High Commissioner, and Commander-in-Chief, 4 September 1929, Appendix J to Group Captain P.H.L. Playfair, MC, ‘Report on the Palestine Riots, 23rd August, 1929 to 11th September, 1929,’ 11 November 1929. TNA AIR 5/1243. 61 Air Vice Marshal H.C.T. Dowding, ‘Report on Operations,’ 22 November 1929, TNA AIR 5/1243. 108

number of occasions his flight commanders received orders from headquarters that they were to

‘proceed to attack natives alleged to be looters or incendiaries.’ In each case a cautious approach

showed that punitive measures were not to be undertaken because the individuals showed

themselves to be peaceful and not raiders.62 Captain Brownrigg seconded this view in his covering letter to Collishaw’s report:

An interesting point disclosed by these operations is the difficulty aircraft have in carrying out pure police work of preserving order among civilian population, apart from morale effect. An outstanding example is that when aircraft are sent to drive off incendiaries, and arrive on the scene sometime later, it is practically impossible for an airman to know whether the crowd round a burning house are looters, or the legitimate owner and their friends salvaging property.63

In contrast to the regular RAF contingent which machine gunned Arab insurgents on

numerous occasions, and requested permission to bomb Arab looters caught in the act, Collishaw

handled his force with much greater restraint. His flight commanders were empowered to

conduct attacks on looters or ‘incendiaries’ but to be sure that hostile action was warranted.

Though instructions were frequently received to attack suspected insurgents, in each case the

flight commanders were able to determine ‘the natives under observation were peaceful and not

raiders.’64 As such, no Fleet Air Arm aircraft engaged in attacks on inhabitants. Instead, the force was very active during its four weeks ashore flying reconnaissance missions and presence

patrols. The nature of the insurgency meant that targets could not be reliably engaged with the

62 Wing Commander Raymond Collishaw, ‘Report on Air Operations by Aircraft from H.M.S. “Courageous” operating from Gaza, Palestine,’ 5 October 1929, TNA AIR 5/1243. 63 Captain Studholme Brownrigg, ‘Report on “Courageous” Air Operations in Palestine,’ 5 October 1929. TNA AIR 5/1243. 64 Wing Commander Raymond Collishaw, ‘Report on Air Operations by Aircraft from H.M.S. “Courageous” operating from Gaza, Palestine,’ 5 October 1929, TNA AIR 5/1243, 4. 109

assurance that the target was valid and/or no collateral damage would occur. This point was

remarked on by both Collishaw and Brownrigg in their reports.65

Collishaw and his Fleet Air Arm contingent completed the mission as ordered. On 7

September Collishaw received word that his force would soon be released and two days later the aircraft returned to Courageous ending their part in the operation. Collishaw noted in his autobiography that though their mission was largely a ‘show of force’ it seemed to have a

‘definite effect.’66 Historian David Omissi judged that as an example of air control the Palestine

mission was an Air Force failure as it had been unable to prevent the outbreak and spread of

violence. However, he also stated that the restraint shown by Collishaw’s men was the correct

choice as punitive attacks on the Arab agitators would undoubtedly have caused casualties

among the general population which would have made a bad situation even worse.67

Collishaw was pleased with the rapid disembarkation at Gaza which demonstrated the

mobility and flexibility of carrier-borne aircraft. His force experienced no major problems during

the deployment, but in terms of lessons learnt he remarked that future operations of this nature would benefit from the availability of a portable W/T [wireless telegraphy] station that could be deployed to facilitate communications with Courageous. He also commented that had his aircraft

been engaged in full scale operations the supply of available bombs would have been depleted in

less than two days. He recommended that changes be made so that Courageous carried a

minimum of one week’s supply of ordnance.68 Collishaw’s report was forwarded to the

Admiralty in January 1930. A covering letter indicated that his recommendation for portable

65 Wing Commander Raymond Collishaw, ‘Report on Air Operations by Aircraft from H.M.S. “Courageous” operating from Gaza, Palestine,’ 5 October 1929; Captain Studholme Brownrigg, ‘Report on “Courageous” Air Operations in Palestine,’ 5 October 1929, TNA AIR 5/1243. 66 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 230-1. 67 Omissi, Technology and Repression, 47-50. 68 Wing Commander Raymond Collishaw, ‘Report on Air Operations by Aircraft from H.M.S. “Courageous” operating from Gaza, Palestine,’ 5 October 1929. 110

W/T sets had been acted upon and Type 30A wireless sets were supplied to HM Ships Hermes,

Furious and Courageous. The second recommendation regarding carriage of bombs was rejected. Captain Brownrigg studied Collishaw’s suggestion but ultimately concluded that an increase in bomb stowage for ‘subsidiary operations’ might be desirable, but any increase in bomb stowage should be ‘for the purpose of increasing outfit of A.P. [armour piercing] and

S.A.P. [semi-armour piercing] bombs for use against ships.’69 The navy was clearly focused on fleet encounters and Brownrigg, like Rear Admiral Drax was not terribly interesting in anything that interfered with that mission.

One of Collishaw’s first acts when he joined Courageous in August 1928 was to quality for his carrier rating and he continued to fly regularly during his time aboard the ship.70 He was

well aware of the inherent dangers of deck landings and worked tirelessly throughout his

deployment to reduce the risk. Collishaw would pioneer a simple expedient to ease the training

of new carrier pilots. Prior to his arrival, all carrier pilots made their first landings solo. An

exercise involving Courageous before Collishaw joined the ship illustrated the problem. In June

1928 a group of pilots based at Hal Far airfield in Malta were instructed to make their initial

carrier landings on Courageous. The first pilot made his approach in a Blackburn Dart, an

aircraft described as a good, stable carrier plane that was ‘easy to land on a deck.’71 The pilot

misjudged his approach and landed off the deck’s centerline. The wing of his Dart struck the

palisades smashing the aircraft. Fortunately the pilot and deck crew escaped injury. A Fairey

Flycatcher pilot made the same error later in the morning and his plane swung off the deck and

69 Captain Studholme Brownrigg, ‘Report on “Courageous” Air Operations in Palestine,’ 5 October 1929. TNA AIR 5/1243. 70 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Pilot’s Flying Log Book No.3, 1927-1938,’ Canadian War Museum 19770669-041. Collishaw did the majority of his flying in the single seat Fairey Flycatcher. He made his initial carrier trials flying from Hal Far to Courageous between 15 and 18 August before the ship was deployed to Palestine. His log book notes frequent flights in Fairey IIIFs, generally flown by another pilot. 71 Thetford, British Naval Aircraft since 1912, 46. 111

landed on its nose in the netting at the side of the ship. A third accident occurred when a Fairey

IIIF pilot made too flat an approach and struck the turtle deck aft of the main flight deck. This collision caused the aircraft to bounce back into the air, stall, and crash into the bridge. The aircraft subsequently plunged over the starboard side of the ship. The three occupants required hospitalization after they were picked up by an escorting destroyer. A fourth landing accident transpired when another Fairey IIIF swung on landing and struck the palisades.72

Over the course of one day’s flight training for new carrier pilots, four aircraft were

destroyed. It was only through luck that none sustained serious injuries. This was an accident

rate which could not be sustained. Collishaw worked hard to improve the training for new pilots.

At the end of the First World War he had been posted to join RAF Canada, a training

establishment for new pilots. In preparation for this assignment he had spent over two weeks

touring training bases in the UK to learn the best practices in use for training new pilots.

Collishaw reorganized the preliminary deck landing training system by introducing the use of a

dual elementary training aircraft. This allowed pilots to make their first carrier landings in an

aircraft where an instructor could talk him through the process, and in the event of a problem,

take over control of the aircraft. As Collishaw observed, ‘This procedure brought about a rapid

increase in Fleet Air Arm flying efficiency.’73

Collishaw attended the Senior Officers’ Technical Course in Portsmouth in May 1930

while Courageous was undergoing an extensive refit on its boilers. Following the course he took

leave in Canada where he had the opportunity to visit the US aircraft carrier USS Saratoga and

observe flying operations on the big ship. He was most impressed with the American system of

72 Cathcart-Jones, Aviation Memories Including Australia and Back and Other Record Flights, 159-61. 73 Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ 45. 112

arrester gear and advocated for such a system on British carriers upon his return to service.74 In the early days of carrier operations aircraft landed at a relatively slow speed for which the available deck length was sufficient to allow aircraft to stop safely. As aircraft became larger and faster they began to run out of room on the carrier deck. The British extensively tested arrester

wires in the mid-1920s. They experimented with a fore and aft system in which a series of cables

ran along the length of the flight deck. This system relied upon a slow landing speed and wire

barriers to prevent aircraft from slipping over the side. It was designed to catch aircraft and stop

them from bouncing back into the air rather than slow their excessive speed. The system proved

cumbersome and dangerous and the British abandoned the idea in 1927.75

Following the success of the US Navy in developing an athwartship system the Royal

Navy conducted trials of a similar system on Courageous in June 1931. This method, in use today, placed a number of cables across the width of the carrier deck. An landing aircraft was stopped when a hook attached to its tail caught the cable. Collishaw oversaw the tests using his aircraft and pilots. The first Royal Navy arrester wire carrier landing was successfully conducted in June 1931 by Lieutenant-Commander Henry Fancourt flying a Fairey IIIF. The early trials made use of a single arrester wire. In total Fancourt made seven approaches to the ship. It was found that the wire was located too far back as the pilot tended to land further up the deck. The trials showed the ship needed to be steaming downwind so that at least 18 knots of wind went over the deck so the pilot had sufficient lift to take off in the event of an aborted landing. Later trials aboard Courageous in September 1931 added two additional wires and showed the

74 Letters, Collishaw to Clayton-Kennedy, 30 May and 27 September 1965, Kenneth Edgar Clayton-Kennedy Fonds, Canadian War Museum 19900346-150. 75 Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945, 69-70 Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and their Aircraft (London: Conway Maritime Press Limited, 1988), 110. 113

viability of the system and the technology was subsequently adopted by all RN carriers.76 The

adoption of a workable system of arrester wires improved the efficiency of operations on the

ship. It allowed the British to adopt the American practice of using the front deck as an aircraft

park, a simple expedient that substantially increased the pace of launch and recovery operations

as aircraft could simply be rolled to the front of the ship after landing rather than stowed below

in the hangar deck, a significantly slower practice.77

Another advance achieved during Collishaw’s tenure on Courageous was trials on the

feasibility of night landings. The first night landing on an aircraft carrier had been carried out on

6 May 1926 when Flight Lieutenant Gerald Boyce set his Blackburn Dart down on the

illuminated deck of HMS Furious. Subsequent trials were carried out aboard Courageous in

November 1929 soon after the completion of the Palestine deployment. Taking off from Hal Far

airfield in Malta, Lieutenant Owen Cathcart-Jones, a Royal Marine aviator, piloted a Fairey

Flycatcher to the first night landing by a fighter aircraft aboard Courageous. The carrier,

steaming off Malta on a bright starlit night, was easily found as it was illuminated and visible

from a great distance. Cathcart-Jones remarked that he had some difficulty establishing his

height above the carrier due to a lack of reference points, but ultimately ‘there was no difference

between landing at night and in daytime’ because of the floodlights on the ship. Cathcart-Jones

and another pilot, Flying Officer Keary, RAF, made three additional landings that evening and

he was ‘satisfied that we had been instrumental in still furthering the progress of the Fleet Air

Arm.’78 These trials proved so successful that the following year No.463 Flight (Blackburn

76 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940) Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 45; Obituary, Captain Henry St. John Fancourt, The Telegraph, 13 January 2004 , assessed 8 January 2012. Fancourt was present as a midshipman at the Battle of Jutland, took part in the hunt for the Bismarck, and died in 2004 at the age of 103. 77 Friedman, British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and their Aircraft, 110-1. 78 Cathcart-Jones, Aviation Memories Including Australia and Back and Other Record Flights, 185-6. 114

Darts) aboard Courageous was designated to operate at night and their aircraft received a special

night camouflage scheme.79

The three years Collishaw spent aboard Courageous were important in the development

of his skills as a commander. This was his first time commanding an organization larger than a squadron and it required him to be equal parts warrior and diplomat. Collishaw recalled that the posting placed him in a delicate position where he needed to answer to two masters with different agendas. His prior nautical experience in the Canadian Fisheries Protection Service and the Royal Naval Air Service prepared him for his time aboard ship, but the requirement to walk the line between the competing requirements of the Navy and Air Force would have been completely new. His three years as the OC Flying attest to his success at this task.80 This

challenging assignment went against Collishaw’s view of air power as an offensive weapon. He made clear in his writings that he believed that naval air power could on its own prove decisive in an engagement against ships. The experience of the Royal Navy off Norway in 1940, in the

Far East in 1941 and in the Mediterranean throughout the war showed Collishaw to be right. His

ability to function in a position where he was required to carry out a mission with which he did

not fully concur was a testament to his growth and maturity as a commanding officer. The skill

set he refined aboard Courageous would serve him well during his subsequent appointments.

After leaving Courageous Collishaw joined Bomber Command when he was posted to

command RAF Station Bircham Newton.81 The two squadrons on the base, Nos.35 and 207, were equipped with the Fairey Gordon. The Gordon, classed as a light day bomber, was

79 Thetford, British Naval Aircraft since 1912, 46, 120-1. 80 A survey of RAF officers who went on to hold the rank of air commodore and above shows that only three of 11 men remained aboard an RN aircraft carrier as OC Flying/Senior RAF Officer for a longer period of time than Collishaw. Most postings were in the one to two year range. 81 Collishaw referred to the organization as ‘Bomber Command’ in the account he wrote of his experiences in 1940 even though the organization was not officially formed until 14 July 1936. Prior to that, the squadrons under Collishaw’s command belonged to the bomber element of Air Defence of Great Britain. See Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940). Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 47-48. 115

essentially and up-engined version of the Fairey IIIF which Collishaw knew well from his time

onboard HMS Courageous. These two squadrons were designated as special service units and

were organized on a mobile basis so they could be despatched overseas in time of crisis. Though

his squadrons were busy and involved in interesting work, Collishaw was happy to move on. He

referred to his time at Bircham Newton as ‘perhaps the dullest of my career.’82 A promotion to

group captain on 1 July 1935 coincided with a move to command RAF Upper Heyford, another

bomber station, which was home to Nos.18, 33 and 57 Squadrons flying the Hawker Hart.

Collishaw’s time in Oxfordshire was short as a deteriorating international situation meant that he

was needed elsewhere.

Benito Mussolini, the ruler of Italy, held aspirations for his country to become a great imperial power. He hoped to resurrect the imperial glory of ancient Rome by creating a new empire in Africa. This policy was bound to lead Italy into conflict with Britain and France who had long held sway in that part of the world. Egypt was the centerpiece of Mussolini’s ambitions.

Libya had already been conquered and it seemed that Abyssinia was next. Trouble between Italy

and the Abyssinians had flashed into a deadly border incident at Walwal in December 1934,

leading the Italians into a long military buildup in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.83 By 1935 it was clear that Italy intended to invade Abyssinia and Britain, worried that this Great Power showdown might lead to war between their two nations, reinforced its Mediterranean forces beginning in the late summer. By 20 September the British had deployed 120 ships to the

Mediterranean and Red Seas including the carriers Courageous and Glorious and the battleships

Revenge and Valiant. The chief British concern during this period was that their attempts to stop

Italy through the League of Nations, including the possibility of an oil embargo, would lead Italy

82 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 232. 83 John Gooch, Mussolini and His Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch.5. 116

to make a ‘mad dog’ retaliatory attack against British interests in the region.84 Sir Samuel Hoare,

the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, attempted to assure Mussolini that Britain did

not intend to destroy the Italian fleet or otherwise cause humiliation but rather the reinforcements

were a ‘precautionary measure’ and there was no intent to block the Suez Canal to Italian

shipping.85

The Royal Air Force and the army were also reinforced throughout the region. Additional

troops, anti-aircraft guns and light tanks were sent to Egypt; the defences at Malta and Aden

were bolstered and 11 RAF squadrons were despatched from England in secrecy.86 Collishaw was appointed to command No.5 Wing being formed in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Air Chief

Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, his former commandant at the RAF Staff College, would be the overall RAF commander for the mission. Time was a factor in this deployment and

Collishaw was given 24 hours’ notice to pack his belongs and only a little longer to depart. He

was initially told that his wife could accompany him so they made arrangements to send their

two daughters to boarding school only to have that directive rescinded.87 After a relatively quick

voyage of just over a week aboard the RMS Strathnaver, a Royal Mail ship, Collishaw arrived in

Alexandria on 18 October 1935 where he was briefed by Brooke-Popham and his staff about the

current situation. Two days later Collishaw and Wing Commander F.H. Coleman, his Senior Air

Staff Officer, were flown to Khartoum. Three squadrons had arrived from England and were in

84 For ‘mad dog’ comment, see Steven Morewood, British Defense of Egypt, 1935-1940: Conflict and Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 24; for the general British response to the crisis see Morewood, British Defence of Egypt, chs.2-3; N.H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, Vol. I: Rearmament Policy (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), ch.VI; John Gooch, Mussolini and His Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Ch.5. 85 Morewood, British Defence of Egypt, 41. 86 Gibbs, Grand Strategy, 192-8; James, The Paladins: A Social History of the RAF Up to the Outbreak of World War II, 238-9. The British movements were made quietly for a number of reasons: to avoid intentionally provoking Italian, to avoid alarming the British public about the dire situation and, in the case of the RAF, to avoid advertising the Metropolitan air force had been gutted to send the necessary squadrons, aircraft and personnel. 87 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 48. 117

the process of being made flight ready when Collishaw arrived while a fourth was already in

theatre.88 The squadrons were a familiar lot to Collishaw. Two of the bomber squadrons, Nos.35

and 207, Collishaw had recently commanded at Bircham Newton, while the third was his old

command from South Russia, No.47 Squadron. He also had at his disposal No.3 Fighter

Squadron. The primary task of Collishaw’s wing was the protection of trade routes through the

Red Sea. As Brooke-Popham described, ‘Communications through the Red Sea were of great

importance because it was the channel along which came the oil for the Fleet, and in the event of

passage through the central Mediterranean being rendered hazardous owing to enemy

submarines or aircraft, communications through the Red Sea would become vital to the Army

and to the Air Force as well as to the Navy.’89 The Fairey Gordons of Nos.35 and 207 Squadrons

were to accomplish this by attacking enemy aerodromes and aircraft maintenance facilities. The

two bomber squadrons, along with No.3 Fighter Squadron, would also conduct anti-submarine

patrols over the Red Sea. Close cooperation with Aden Command as well as the Royal Navy’s

East Indian Squadron and the Red Sea Sloops was an essential component of this mission. No.3

Squadron’s primary task was to provide close protection of the No.5 Wing facilities, and No.47

Squadron, also flying Gordons, was under the nominal control of the General Officer

Commanding the Sudan Defence Force. This squadron could only be used by Collishaw for tasks

not directly connected the defence of Sudan with the consent of Sir George Stewart Symes, the

Governor-General of Sudan. In the event of an Italian invasion of Sudan, the primary task of

88 Operations Record Book, Middle East Command, Air Staff, HQ Unit, Volume 1: August 1935-December 1941, TNA AIR 24/1051. 89 Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, ‘Notes on the Emergency in the Near East, September 1935 to June 1936,’ 15 July 1936, TNA AIR 23/810, 5. 118

No.5 Wing would become the defence of the region and attacks were to be carried out against the

invaders, in consultation with the governor-general.90

Initially all four squadrons were located at or near Khartoum, but operational

requirements changed this. In April 1936 Collishaw moved his headquarters and two bomber squadrons (Nos.35 and 207) to Gebeit, a small village near the Red Sea. No.3 Squadron was based at Port Sudan while No.47 Squadron remained in Khartoum. A number of advanced bases for refueling and rearming were established right on the Red Sea, and a possible base location was scouted on the frontier with Eritrea.91

The British were aware of the Italian use of poison gas against the Abyssinians. Marshal

Pietro Badoglio used gas shells as early as 20 December 1935 when his campaign became bogged down. The Italians soon found it more efficient to deliver gas by aircraft and made use of both gas bombs and aerial sprayers, similar to crop dusters, to deploy the chemicals. The British

were aware of the stocks of poison gas the Italians had shipped into the theatre as the cargo had

been declared by ships as they transited the Suez Canal. As early as 14 November 1935 a War

Office chemical weapons expert, Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. Kent, visited Brooke-Popham’s

headquarters in Egypt. He also made the trip to Khartoum in early February to brief Collishaw

on the potential effects of the chemical weapons.92

Collishaw recalled the overall efficiency of the mission. The transfer of the bomber

squadrons to the Sudan had gone according to plan: ‘The movement of the two bomber

squadrons was carried out in accordance with the Air Ministry instructions covering these two

90 Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, ‘Notes on the Emergency in the Near East, September 1935 to June 1936,’ 15 July 1936, TNA AIR 23/810, 8-9. 91 Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, ‘Notes on the Emergency in the Near East, September 1935 to June 1936,’ 15 July 1936, Appendix A, TNA AIR 23/810; Operations Record Book, Middle East Command, Air Staff, HQ Unit, Volume 1: August 1935-December 1941. TNA AIR 24/1051. 92 Morewood, British Defense of Egypt, 78-80; Operations Record Book, Middle East Command, Air Staff, HQ Unit, Volume 1: August 1935-December 1941. TNA AIR 24/1051; Operations Record Book, Headquarters, No.5 Wing, 1935-1936, TNA AIR 26/19. 119

special service units and it was interesting to note that it took place smoothly and without a hitch,

a tribute to the staff work and training that had been done.”93 This comment may have been

slightly self-serving as Collishaw had commanded these squadrons for three years prior to their

deployment. Once in country, it was found that the facilities, while pre-existing, were primitive

and much improvisation and ingenuity were needed to prepare the squadrons for operations. The

most difficult part of the deployment for Collishaw was the need to work closely with British

administrators who were following a policy of ‘Sudan for the Sudanese’:

I can hardly disagree with the policy and do not doubt that the resident administrators were conscientious and dedicated men. However, I was much dependent on their cooperation and it seemed to me that in view of the seriousness of the crisis they tended to overdo things a bit by viewing almost everything in terms of whether it was good for the Sudanese or not. Added to this was the fact that the air age hardly seemed to have arrived in the minds of some of the British officials who had a hard time understanding my needs and the basic concepts of military aerial operations. The result was endless delays and procrastinations which were extremely frustrating.94

In the end, none of this mattered as the crisis passed without serious incident for the

British by the summer of 1936. The Rhineland crisis of March 1936 changed the focus of the

British government and the defence of the United Kingdom became the top priority. Italy completed its conquest of Abyssinia and the immediate threat of a wider conflict in the region passed.95 No.5 Wing received orders to disband on 10 July 1936 and the next month was spent

finalizing arrangements and preparing Nos.3, 35 and 207 Squadrons for shipment back to the

UK. On 14 August No.5 Wing was officially disbanded.96 While his unit returned to England by

ship, Collishaw received orders to report to Egypt where he took command of RAF station at

93 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 233. 94 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 233. 95 Gooch, Mussolini and His Generals, 343-345; Gibbs, Grand Strategy, Ch.6. 96 TNA AIR 24/1051; Operations Record Book, Headquarters, No.5 Wing, 1935-1936, TNA AIR 26/19. 120

Heliopolis in Nile Delta near Cairo. He would spend the next five years as one of the senior RAF

commanders in region where his main task would to defend Egypt and the Suez Canal.97

Reflecting on his first deployment to Africa, Collishaw stated, ‘The experiences gained in

the year in the Sudan proved most valuable to me ultimately during the campaign in the Western

Desert. Many of the lessons learned there were retaught to the enemy to our advantage.’98 It is

difficult to overlook the many similarities Collishaw faced. He was working in a desert

environment, from primitive airfields with aircraft that were not ideal for the task. The theatre

was large and the forces at his disposal were small. He commanded a mixed force of fighters and

bombers that were employed on a variety of tasks covering virtually the entire spectrum of air

operations: air defence, reconnaissance, close support, bombing operations, and maritime patrol.

Though no shots were fire in anger while in the Sudan, the experience would provide many

lessons for the future.

* * * * *

The RAF was fighting for its very survival in the 1920s and 1930s but it was a

remarkably eventful period for Collishaw. His successful command experience in the Great War

brought him to the notice of senior officers and assured him of a permanent commission in the

RAF at time when the service was drastically cutting its manpower. Operational commands in

South Russia and Mesopotamia expanded and tested Collishaw’s abilities as a commander. He

was frequently required to operate independently and at the end of a long supply line.

Replacements of men and machines were often not forthcoming and he needed ingenuity and

perseverance to prosper. While supporting the White Russian armies he learned to work with an

allied military which complicated the process of command. In Kurdistan he traded his airplane

97 Raymond Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 49; Morewood, British Defense of Egypt, 123-124, 145-146. 98 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 233. 121

for a horse and spent weeks travelling through mountainous and hostile terrain as part of a

ground expedition. Both these experiences imbued valuable lessons of working and cooperating

outside of the RAF environment. As a pilot with extensive experience flying low-level battlefield

attack missions, the opportunity to witness air support from perspective of the army was

particularly valuable.

After spending more than four years on overseas deployments Collishaw returned to

England in 1924 and was offered the opportunity to attend the nascent RAF Staff College which

exposed him to the doctrinal and academic foundations of the RAF. After earning the coveted

‘psc’ designation, Collishaw commanded No.23 Squadron as it introduced a new fighter, the

Gloster Gamecock, an aircraft with a reputation as a difficult to fly. His next appointment was an

important staff posting as the Head of Operations and Intelligence at HQ ADGB where he

worked closely with two of his previous commanding officers, Air Marshal Sir John Salmond

and Air Vice-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. This challenging position required him to work with the army officers of the anti-aircraft units and his views on the inadequacy of the air

umbrella which he had first learned over the Western Front were reinforced.

In 1929 Collishaw again left England, this time to join the Royal Navy aircraft carrier

HMS Courageous in the Mediterranean where he served three years as the senior RAF officer.

This challenging posting required a delicate balance between serving the competing needs of the

air force and the navy which maintained significantly different visions about the role of air

power at sea. The length of Collishaw’s tenure aboard Courageous testifies to his success at this

task. An operational deployment to the Middle East to deal with Arab-Jewish tensions

demonstrated his maturity as a commander. The impetuous and aggressive instincts which made

him an exceptional fighter pilot were not in evidence as he urged restraint and caution to his

122

pilots in dealing with the uprising. This reaction was in contrast to the regular RAF contingent

which made liberal use of bombs and machine guns in an unsuccessful attempt to stop the

rioters. During his time at sea Collishaw also demonstrated his forward-looking nature by

devising techniques to improve carrier pilot training, develop night flying capabilities and

improve the efficiency of naval air operations by testing a new arrester cable system. Collishaw’s

ideas on the offensive use of naval air power were at odds with current thinking in the Admiralty,

but the validity of his proposed tactics was proven during the Second World War.

There then followed a succession of uneventful RAF station commands which

demonstrated his growth as a commanding officer. This period was interrupted when he was

selected on short notice to take command of No.5 Wing being deployed to the Sudan as part of

the British government’s response to Italian aggression in Abyssinia. Though a shooting war did

not develop, Collishaw learned much about deploying and operating RAF squadrons in a harsh

desert environment. With the outbreak of war in 1939, Collishaw, with his extensive operational

and command experience, knowledge of naval and army matters and specific familiarity of

desert operations was ideally placed as the commander of the Egypt Group. All of this varied knowledge would assist him in the most challenging command assignment of his long and eventful career.

123

Chapter 4 – The Western Desert 1939-1940

Egypt and the Suez Canal were strategically important to Britain but the resources

available for the defence of this area were less than ideal. This situation was recognized by the

Middle East Combined Plan of 1939 which attempted to overcome the material deficit with close

cooperation between the Army and the Royal Air Force. This chapter will examine Collishaw’s

role in this process prior to June 1940 as preparations were made to deal with the potential of

Italian aggression.

The Middle East was not immediately affected by the start of the Second World War in

Europe. Egypt was a secondary but strategically important area for Britain. Its most important

feature was the Suez Canal and the general defence of Egypt could not be separated from the

defence of this important waterway. The strategic and commercial importance of this trade route

made British defence of the Suez Canal a ‘central tenet of British foreign policy from 1882 to

1954.’1 The canal was viewed by the British as the ‘lifeline of Empire.’ It offered the shortest

trade route to India and the Far East and the natural resources of the region, primarily oil, were

growing in importance.2 The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 granted Egypt sovereignty, but

with the caveat that Britain retained the right to base troops in the country to protect the canal.

The British vowed to defend Egypt in the event of unprovoked aggression. Italy was not

specifically mentioned, but in the wake of the Abyssinian crisis, Mussolini’s imperial aspirations

were seen as the greatest external threat to British interests in Egypt. Britain faced a conundrum

as it was not willing to lose the region, but it was stretched thin to protect it. 3

1 Steven Morewood, British Defense of Egypt, 1935-1940: Conflict and Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 1-2. 2 Roderic Owen, The Desert Air Force (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1948), 16-18. 3 Morewood, British Defense of Egypt, 1935-1940, 3, 86-97, 101-102. 124

Events in Abyssinia had demonstrated the vulnerability of Egypt to an attack by Italy.

The Western Desert shielded Egypt from Libya and its Italian masters, but it was an inhospitable

environment that was difficult to defend. The expanse of desert also caused problems for an

attacker. There were limited roads and tracks navigable by modern mechanized forces through

the desert from Libya to Alexandria. The main route followed the coastal highway from the

border at Sollum through the Halfaya Pass to Mersa Matruh and on to Alexandria. The wide,

metalled highway was occasionally interrupted by uneven stretches but it remained the most

direct path to Egypt. Its main drawback was its proximity to the coast which made the possibility

of naval and air interdiction a real concern. The only other possible approach was for the Italians

to use the Siwa Oasis as a staging point for an advance on Mersa Matruh from the south.4

In anticipation of possible attacks along these routes the British had moved their forces forward into the desert during the Abyssinian crisis. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-

Popham, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RAF Middle East, planned to take advantage of his air assets if hostilities with Italy broke out. In the event of an Italian attack on British interests,

Group Captain Wilfred McClaughry, the Officer Commanding RAF Mersa Matruh (designated

Truforce), was instructed to work with the navy to attack a Libyan port for the first 48 hours and then switch his focus to destroying the ability of the Italian air force to operate in the theatre.

These first two priorities would be set aside if the Italian army attacked and all effort would be devoted to supporting the army.5 The balance of power in the desert was favourable to the

British in the fall of 1935; Truforce was composed of five bomber, two fighter, a bomber-

transport and two army cooperation squadrons while the Italians had only deployed three fighter

4 Saul Kelly, The Lost Oasis: The Desert War and the Hunt for Zerzura (London: John Murray Publishers Ltd, 2002), 124; Morewood, British Defense of Egypt, 1935-1940, 50-52. There were two other existing tracks through the desert leading to Cairo but they were not suitable for large mechanized formations. 5 Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, ‘Notes on the Emergency in the Near East, September 1935 to June 1936,’ 15 July 1936, 8, TNA AIR 23/810. 125

and one bomber squadron to Libya. This was a very different situation from June 1940 when

Collishaw’s 202 Group was of comparable size but the Italian air force had been reinforced to

more than twice the strength of the RAF.6

As it turned out, the only enemy encountered by the British was the harsh environment.

The deployment successfully proved the ability of the air and ground forces to operate in the

Western Desert, but it was an unforgiving place. Among the numerous difficulties encountered

were dust storms which could last from three days to three weeks which tormented man and

machine. Vacuum cleaners were necessary to clean the dust out of the aircraft. The dust and

debris thrown up on the makeshift airfields also took a toll on aircraft engines and other moving

parts.7 The travails of McClaughry’s Truforce would prove invaluable as ‘exercises were carried

out from the forward landing grounds, a supply system was set up and the experience served as a

preliminary canter for the war which was to come.’8

Following the end of the Abyssinian Crisis, the threat posed by Italy to British interests in

the Middle East was re-evaluated. The Committee of Imperial Defence directed in July 1937 that

action be taken to protect Egypt from Italian imperial ambitions. A note to Cabinet stated that

‘Italy cannot be considered as a reliable friend and…steps should be taken to bring

[Mediterranean defences] up to date and increase their efficiency.’9 The rationale for this

directive was confirmed in November when Mussolini joined Germany and Japan in the Anti-

Comintern Pact and subsequently withdrew from the League of Nations. The Air Ministry

6 Morewood, British Defense of Egypt, 1935-1940, 66; I.S.O. Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1: The Early Successes against Italy (to May 1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), 262. 7 Group Captain Wilfred McClaughry, ‘Truforce General Report,’ March 1936, TNA AIR 23/777. 8 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 2, TNA AIR 41/44. 9 ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,’ Cabinet 30 (37), 14 July 1937, TNA CAB 23/89, 10. 126

examined the problem in March 1938 and confirmed that the British were at a decided

disadvantage in the theatre so steps were taken to defend against a possible attack.10

It was estimated that an initial Italian offensive would be led by two motorized divisions with strong air support. The close proximity of Italy to North Africa meant that within two months Italy would be able triple the 174 aircraft currently in Libya. To counter this threat it was expected the British could eventually muster approximately 250 aircraft by transferring squadrons from Palestine, Iraq and India. This force would act as a deterrent to an attack but it was not believed sufficiently robust to stop an Italian attack. The ability of the Italians to strengthen and supply their forces in Libya rapidly from Italy contrasted with the prospect of a slow and gradual reinforcement from the United Kingdom. In late 1937 British forces were bolstered with the addition of an anti-aircraft brigade and a light tank battalion; in February 1938 further steps were taken to bring the British army in Egypt up to strength in men and transport, and an infantry brigade was sent to Palestine where it would be available on short notice. The

RAF also benefited from this rearmament with the addition of a squadron of Gladiator fighters,

12 medium bombers and two squadrons of light bombers. This was an important step as the

British government had given priority to the growth of forces in the UK in an effort to deter

Hitler from aggression and the deployment of even these small forces would hinder that rearmament program. The two years before the commencement of war in the Middle East was dominated by planning based on the assumption that Italy would be the principal enemy.11

10 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 11-12; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 3; Owen, The Desert Air Force, 21-22; Morewood, British Defense of Egypt, 1935-1940, 107. 11 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 11-12; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 3; Owen, The Desert Air Force, 21-22; Morewood, British Defense of Egypt, 1935-1940, 98-111. 127

The threat of Italian aggression and general British weakness in Egypt led to the creation

of the Combined Plan in 1939 which called for the army and the air force to ‘co-ordinate their

over-stretched resources for a combined defensive effort against Italian forces of vastly superior

numbers.’12 This document provided the basis for a close working relationship between the two

services, both in planning and operations, and focussed all British strength in the theatre on the

defence of Egypt. This unity of action was judged to be the only practical method of offsetting

the numerical and qualitative inferiority of British forces when compared to Italian strength.13

The Combined Plan of 1939 identified the isolated and outnumbered nature of British defences

in Egypt and ensured that the army and the air force co-operated to diminish those deficits. This

Plan set relations between the two services on a very different path than was occurring as a result of the Battle of France.14

After the Sudan deployment, Collishaw was posted to Egypt where he was given command of the RAF station at Heliopolis. Collishaw described this period as ‘the most pleasant

of all those I spent in uniform. Heliopolis was one of the RAF’s major overseas bases and there

was much to do.’15 As Egypt gained priority in the defensive schemes of the Empire, Collishaw,

newly promoted to Air Commodore, assumed greater command responsibilities. Changing

administrative arrangements in the RAF confirmed the increased importance of the region. The

commander of RAF Middle East was raised to the rank of Air Marshal in April 1938 and gained

12 David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 69. 13 According to the British official history, there were 250,000 Italian and Libyan troops supported by 313 aircraft in Libya, and 350,000 Italian and native troops supported by 325 aircraft in Italian East Africa. In between, the British deployed 36,000 men in Egypt and 27,500 in Palestine, supported by 205 aircraft along with 19,000 men in Sudan, Somaliland and Kenya supported by 163 aircraft. See Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 93- 96. 14 For a full discussion of the Combined Plan see, RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 3-7; and Hall, Strategy for Victory, 68-72. 15 Raymond Collishaw and R.V. Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story (London: William Kimber, 1973), 234. 128

authority over the RAF in Iraq, Aden and Malta as it affected matters in the Egypt. The

following April the post was given the status of Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief when Air

Marshal Sir William Mitchell assumed command. The importance of operations in the Western

Desert was formally acknowledged on 18 April 1939 by the creation of the Egypt Group, under

command of Collishaw. The mission of the organization was to ‘exercise control over

operational units allocated to it by H.Q. R.A.F., Middle East, for operations in the Western

Desert, and to exercise operational supervision of such maintenance and administrative units as may be allocated in the field for the servicing of operational units.’16

Mitchell outlined Collishaw’s new responsibilities in a set of operational instructions

issued when Egypt Group was created. The instructions are notable for the details of the close

working relationship with the army. In peacetime, Collishaw maintained operational control over

the three main RAF Stations in Egypt (Heliopolis, Helwan and Ismailia) as well as the Advanced

Wing and Nos.1 and 2 Bomber Wings. In time of war, the Advanced Wing (composed of two

bomber, one army cooperation and one fighter squadron) would deploy to the desert. Liaison

between the Mobile Division17 and the RAF would be conducted through the commander of the

Advanced Wing who would co-locate his headquarters with the army. To facilitate effective communications between the army and the RAF a Senior Air Staff Officer was attached to

Mobile Division. He was instructed to:

keep himself informed at all times of the military situation on the land and of the situation with regard to air forces, in order that he may be able, at any moment, to advise the GOC Mobile Division, as to what air support he may be afforded and similarly, he must be able to advise the Advanced Wing Commander as to the existence, or anticipated existence, of suitable objectives for air attack, or vital points calling for air defence.18

16 Quoted in Owen, The Desert Air Force, 22-23. 17 The Mobile Division, later known as the Armoured Division, ultimately became 7th Armoured Division. 18 Egypt Group Standing Operational Instructions, April 1939, TNA AIR 23/6813, 2. 129

The instructions further noted that Collishaw and the commander of the Advanced Wing

should not solely rely on the liaison officer and ‘should take every opportunity possible’ to

establish personal contact with the commander of the Mobile Division who, it was suggested,

should endeavour to locate his advanced headquarters near a suitable landing ground to facilitate

such communications.19

The Standing Operational Instructions for the Egypt Group declared that the first priority

in the event of an Italian attack was to provide urgent close support to the army in the face of what was expected to be superior enemy forces. The Group would also cooperate with the navy

to attack more distant land targets. After the initial crisis period had passed, or in the event of no

land attack, the Advanced Wing would operate in conformity with the overall RAF Middle East

plan. These instructions to Collishaw highlighted the finite resources available in the theatre but

allow him the freedom to act when necessary:

In view of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of replacing wastage in pilots and aircraft, the Air Officer Commanding, Egypt Group, should, as a general principle, economise as far as possible in the use of his aircraft, but bearing in mind always that, if the opportunity offers for striking a severe blow at the enemy land forces or air forces, a successful result might materially contribute to the defeat of the enemy and hamper their continuance of operations.20

In other words, be careful, but not too careful.

In September the Egypt Group was redesignated 202 Group and its war mission was

modified. RAF HQ in Cairo believed that the strength of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean

would prevent the timely resupply of Italian forces in Libya. This was a major change from

earlier assumptions regarding the Italian ability to send reinforcements across the Mediterranean

Sea. This meant they would have to rely on existing stocks to supply their forces. It was also

19 Egypt Group Standing Operational Instructions, April 1939, TNA AIR 23/6813, 3. 20 Egypt Group Standing Operational Instructions, April 1939, TNA AIR 23/6813, 3. 130

thought that the best method of dealing with the Italian superiority in aircraft was to attack their

air bases and repair facilities. This assessment led to a new operational plan which shifted the

primary role of Collishaw’s aircraft from close support of the army to attacks against Italian air

bases as well as working with the navy to interdict the sea lines of communications across the

Mediterranean. The army would still be provided with close support on a priority basis when

necessary, but this operational order more clearly established the flexible and wide ranging

nature of air power.21

Despite the changed nature of 202 Group’s operational plan Collishaw continued to focus

his training on a close working relationship with the army. This pattern of training which

continued from November 1939 until his forces were put on high alert in May 1940 reinforced a

long standing tradition of good relations between the army and the air force in the Middle East and stands in marked contrast to the situation that existed in Britain at this time. Differing doctrine and a competition for resources led to a rather adversarial relationship between the air force and the army at home.22 The situation was quite different outside the home islands where

operational necessity, scarce resources and a genuine need to work together fostered a more

harmonious bond between the services. The senior army commander in Egypt in the early 1930s,

General Sir Jock Burnett-Stuart, uncharacteristically for an army officer, favoured close relations

with the RAF. He believed that air officers knew how best to employ their resources and the

army commander should depend on that knowledge. Joint training schemes in Egypt in the mid-

1930s reflected this attitude.23

21 RAF HQ Middle East Air Staff Operational Record Book, September 1939, Appendix 2, TNA AIR 24/1066. 22 For details of conditions in England see Brad William Gladman, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940-43 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), Ch.1, esp. 33-4; Hall, Strategy for Victory, Ch.2. 23 Harold R. Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armoured Doctrine, 1927- 1938 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1988), Ch.6; Gladman, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two, 34. 131

The senior leadership of the RAF in Egypt was also predisposed to close relations with

the army. Air Chief Marshal William Mitchell, and his successor Air Chief Marshal Arthur

Longmore, had significant experience directing RAF colonial policing operations which required

an understanding of army support operations. Collishaw was also very comfortable working in

this joint environment. Extensive experience in ground support missions during the First World

War and various operational deployments in the interwar period where he worked closely with the army prepared Collishaw well to work closely with the army in the Western Desert.24

The command of the Army and Navy underwent a similar rationalisation process on the

eve of the war. For the army, General Archibald Percival Wavell was appointed general officer

commanding-in-chief, Middle East in July 1939. Previously there were three separate commands

in the region – Egypt, the Sudan, and Palestine and the Transjordan. The War Office recognized

that a central commander would be needed so Wavell was sent to Cairo to take command of

those three areas as well as assume responsibility for Libya, Iraq, East Africa and the Persian

Gulf. The large size of this command was matched by its strategic importance, but it was

severely under-resourced. Wavell was highly regarded in the interwar army where he excelled as

a commander and was an innovative thinker and outstanding instructor. He had previous

experience in the Middle East where he commanded in Palestine and the Transjordan during

24 Gladman, Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two, ch.1. Gladman developed the idea in some detail that the interwar colonial experience gained by senior army and air force officers such as Bernard Montgomery, Claude Auchinleck, Jack Slessor, Arthur Coningham and Arthur Tedder was key to the ‘spirit of cooperation’ which ‘proved important when Britain had to evolve an effective air support system during 1941- 1942.’ ibid., 35. See also Robin Woolven, ‘Mitchell, Sir William Gore Sutherland (1888–1944)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., January 2008 , accessed 11 February 2013; David Lee, ‘Longmore, Sir Arthur Murray (1885–1970)’, rev. Christina J. M. Goulter, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., January 2012 , accessed 11 February 2013. Detailed descriptions of postings and commands held by senior RAF commanders (Air Commodore and above) can be found at . 132

outbreak of Arab-Jewish troubles in July 1937 to April 1938.25 Under Wavell was Lieutenant-

General Henry Maitland Wilson, ‘Jumbo’ to his friends, who was the General Officer

Commanding British Troops in Egypt. Wilson enjoyed the confidence of Sir Anthony Eden, the

Secretary of State for War, and would later earn the respect of Winston Churchill who described him as ‘one of our finest tacticians, and few will now deny that quality.’26

During Operation Compass, the first British offensive in the Western Desert launched in

December 1940, the lines of command authority in the army were rather confused. In June 1940

Major-General Richard O’Connor transferred to Egypt from Palestine with the headquarters of

6th Division. He was a capable battlefield commander who did very well on the Western Front

and in Italy during the First World War. In the interwar period he served in India and Palestine

and was commended for his service. Upon his transfer to Egypt he was given command of all

troops in the Western Desert, relieving Wilson of this responsibility, and his formation was

redesignated HQ Western Desert Force. In this capacity O’Connor was the primary operational commander of Operation Compass, and the author of its success, but he served two masters,

Wavell and Wilson.27

25 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 31-32; Bernard Fergusson and Judith M. Brown, ‘Wavell, Archibald Percival, first Earl Wavell (1883–1950),’ rev. Robert O'Neill, Judith M. Brown, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., January 2011 , accessed 12 January 2013. For more details on Wavell, see John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London: Collins, 1964); Harold E. Raugh, Wavell in the Middle East 1939-1941: A Study in Generalship (London: Brassey's, 1993); Ian Beckett, ‘Wavell,’ in John Keegen, ed., Churchill's Generals (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 70-88. 26 This reference was made shortly after the successful completion of Operation Compass. Winston Churchill, speech to the nation, quoted in The Glasgow Herald, 10 February 1941, pp.5-6. For more on Wilson, see J.W. Hackett, ‘Wilson, Henry Maitland, first Baron Wilson (1881–1964),’ rev. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., January 2011 , accessed 12 January 2013; Field Marshal Lord Wilson, Eight Years Overseas 1939-1947 (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1948); Michael Dewar, ‘Wilson,’ in John Keegan, ed., Churchill's Generals (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 166-182. 27 For more on O’Connor, see Michael Carver, ‘O'Connor, Sir Richard Nugent (1889–1981),’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., January 2011 , accessed 12 January 2013; John Baynes, The Forgotten Victor: General Sir Richard O'Connor, KT, GCB, DSO, MC (London: Brassey's (UK), 1989); George Forty, The First Victory: General O'Connor's Desert Triumph, Dec 1940-Feb 1941 (London: Guild Publishing, 133

The principal Royal Navy command for the region was held by Admiral Andrew

Cunningham who was Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, a position he considered ‘the finest appointment the Royal Navy has to offer.’28 His responsibility to keep the Italian navy in check

was significant, but he felt well prepared: ‘I probably knew the Mediterranean as well as any

naval officer of my generation.’29 Naval command of the region was split and the Red Sea, Suez

Canal and Gulf of Aden were the responsibility of Admiral Sir Ralph Leatham, Commander-in-

Chief, East Indies Station. This division created some liaison problems for Wavell who would

have preferred to deal with one naval commander with an overlapping area of responsibility.30

A series of exercises conducted in October-November 1939 tested the working

relationship of the army and the air force. The basis of existing RAF doctrine was largely

confirmed but a number of areas for improvement were identified. The exercises brought

together the Armoured Division and 253 Wing (formerly known as the Advanced Air Wing) to

test the Combined War Plan that would be executed upon the commencement of an Italian

offensive from Libya. Westland, an imaginary force representing Italy, was to launch an invasion

of Egypt with two divisions, one moving along the coast road from Sollum to Mersa Matruh and

the second crossing the frontier further south at Fort Maddalena and moving across the desert to

Mersa Matruh. Eastland, represented by the Armoured Division, was to resist the invasion and

defend Egypt. The Eastland air force would be responsible for reconnaissance tasks as well as

bombing targets which might present themselves such as convoys on the coast road or troop and

vehicle concentrations in the desert. If necessary, the Eastland air force would cover a

1990); Barrie Pitt, ‘O'Connor,’ in John Keegan, ed., Churchill's Generals (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 183-199. 28 Michael Simpson, A Life of Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham: A Twentieth-Century Naval Leader (London: Routledge, 2004), 42. 29 Viscount Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope (London: Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1951), 203. 30 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 32-33. 134

withdrawal of the Armoured Division. A command post exercise without troops or aircraft was conducted from 23-25 October. This was followed by a second exercise from 28-31 October

where a fictitious Westland army attacked Eastland whose forces were represented in the field by

the Armoured Division and 253 Wing. Exercise No.3 postulated a different mission where a

Westland armoured brigade conducted a raid on an enemy’s defended post located two day’s

march from the attacker’s base. A long range bombing raid would be synchronized with the final

attack on the enemy’s post.31

The exercises proved to be a useful training tool for the air force and served to confirm

the beliefs of the air staff regarding the conduct of air operations in support of the army. A

number of important issues were identified which needed correction. Collishaw wrote an

extensive report on the exercises and highlighted a number of lessons learned. The outcome largely confirmed Collishaw’s experience in these types of operations and indicated areas where the army needed to be better educated in the application of battlefield air support. Bombing experiments showed that attempts to destroy moving armoured vehicles were not profitable.

Rarely would bombing front line troops achieve good results and it was suggested that if such missions were requested by the army targets along the lines of communication would be a better option.32

The exercises also revealed a number of RAF vulnerabilities. It was found that aircraft

were at their most exposed, and suffered their greatest losses, during enemy attacks on their

airfields. Greater efforts needed to be taken to use satellite fields and disburse aircraft as much as

31 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Command Exercises, Matruh – 1939,’ 12 October 1939; and Wing Commander E.B. Addison, ‘Egypt Command Exercises – 1939, Report on Air Aspect of Exercise No.3: 3rd-4th November 1939,’ 23 November 1939, Appendix 3A to 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803. 32 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Egypt Command Exercise, 1939,’ 6 November 1939, 3, Appendix 3A to 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803. 135

possible. Another outcome was the complete vulnerability of the army cooperation aircraft. The

Westland Lysanders were too slow to operate in the face of an enemy air threat and as a result

had to be escorted on all their missions by fighter aircraft. This increased the complexity of the

operations and led to a shortage of fighters to perform all that was asked of them.33

One aspect of the plan for the Westland attack on Mersa Matruh was the operational

employment of mustard gas by aerial spraying. This was no doubt influenced by the Italian use

of poison gas in Abyssinia four years earlier. A training liquid was released during the exercise

but Collishaw recommended a live trial as ‘our knowledge of mustard gas for operational

employment in tropical climates is extremely limited. We ought to experiment to discover

whether daylight conditions will dissipate this gas when released at 3,000 feet, before it reaches

the ground. Night releases also ought to be made.’34 Gas was never employed by the Italians in

the Western Desert, but Collishaw was right to plan for the worst. Following the capture of

Tobruk British troops discovered an Italian cache of poison gas. It was never used operationally

against the British but the potential was there.35

Coordination problems between the army and air force were exposed during the

exercises. Communications breakdowns were frequent and in one case Group Captain Leslie

‘Bingo’ Brown, the commander of 253 Wing, had to go forward personally to learn the position

of the Eastland troops so he could then lead a support mission that would avoid friendly fire

casualties. Collishaw observed in his report that it was essential for the army to maintain fully briefed air liaison officers at each advanced airfield so that all aircrew could benefit from correct

33 The use of satellite or auxiliary air fields allowed aircraft to be spread out over a larger area making them more difficult to locate and destroy by enemy air action. Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Egypt Command Exercise, 1939,’ 6 November 1939, 6, Appendix 3A to 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803. 34 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Egypt Command Exercise, 1939,’ 6 November 1939, 8, Appendix 3A to 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803. 35 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, January-February 1941, TNA AIR 24/1072. 136

and timely intelligence before each mission. The RAF had difficulty getting timely information

from the army to allow them to plan their missions and outfit aircraft with the appropriate

munitions. The RAF experienced problems in the mobility of the squadrons employed in the

exercise. A number of the squadrons had moved forward into the desert from their home bases in

the Delta and encountered operational problems due to a shortage of mechanics and spare parts.

The headquarters staff of 253 Wing found themselves overcommitted due to the extra work

needed while engaged in active operations. Collishaw recommended an increase in the

headquarters staff as well as the forward deployment of large detachments from each squadron to

facilitate mobile operations.36

Collishaw made clear in his report that the army staff officers needed to be better informed regarding the proper employment of air support. There were numerous requests for

fighter cover which would unnecessarily dilute the amount of available air support. The army

tended to view the RAF in much the same manner as the artillery:

Military Staff Officers seemed somewhat inclined to visualise the proper employment of an Air Striking Force to be the Air bombardment of minor military targets such as strong entrenched positions and dispersed moving armoured vehicles. This type of target is very difficult to hit and there appears to be good reason to suppose that as good or better results could be obtained by the use of artillery…It is important, therefore, that the RAF adviser to the GOC-in-C should resist any tendency to tactical misemployment of our striking force on targets unlikely to achieve vital results by air bombardment.37

Part of these unrealistic expectations was the tendency of the army to have ‘great

expectations’ from the RAF and request support for all manner of tasks. Collishaw, cognizant of

the finite air resources he commanded, realized that the ‘result would probably be that the RAF in Egypt would suffer serious casualties during the early part of the campaign. It is important to

36 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Egypt Command Exercise, 1939,’ 6 November 1939, 11-12, Appendix 3A to 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803. 37 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Egypt Command Exercise, 1939,’ 6 November 1939, 11, Appendix 3A to 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803. 137

realize that our Air Force will have to conduct the campaign on a declining effort and

subsequently we ought to husband our air resources from the outset.’ This meant that air attack had to be reserved for targets of the utmost importance ‘unless the military situation is such that added risks must be taken.’38

For a training exercise, this series of manoeuvres went remarkably smooth and proved to

be a good indication of what to expect in the upcoming conflict. Lieutenant-General Wilson was

pleased with the attention given to developing closer ties with the RAF and attempts to improve

communications between the two services. This showed that the intent of the Combined Plan was largely confirmed. Of greater concern to him were the small numbers and obsolescent state of the aircraft available and the lack of the modern aircraft available in Egypt.39 Collishaw

demonstrated a solid understanding of the strengths and weakness of his command. He knew the types of targets his aircraft could profitably attack, the types of missions that should be avoided and he recognized that the closest possible partnership with the army was needed to ensure that intelligence was shared in a timely manner and to provide guidance to the army on the best way to employ the air assets. Overall, Collishaw came away from the exercises convinced that the

British army in Egypt was strong enough to stop and contain any conceivable Italian advance. He believed that the army could accomplish this defensive task without any need for significant amounts of air support which left his aircraft free to conduct a counter-offensive against the

Italians upon the outbreak of war.

Soon after the completion of these exercises the three Commanders-in-Chief met in Cairo in mid-November 1939 to review the strategic situation and plan for the defence of Egypt in the event of an Italian attack. Air Chief Marshal Mitchell outlined the implications of the decisions

38 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Egypt Command Exercise, 1939,’ 6 November 1939, 13-14, Appendix 3A to 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803. 39 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas 1939-1947, 35. 138

made at the meeting for 202 Group. He told Collishaw, ‘the primary role of the Royal Air Force

striking force operating from Egypt is to be the destruction or neutralization of the Italian air

forces, and that their secondary function is to co-operate with the land and sea forces.’ He warned Collishaw that the weak state of the RAF meant that he would have to conserve his forces until such time as the Italians conducted a major air campaign against Egypt. This meant that ‘bomber units in Egypt will not be required to provide close support to the land forces unless the military situation is so critical that air assistance becomes imperative.’40 The decision to

divert aircraft from the primary role of defeating the enemy air forces to close support would lay

with Mitchell’s headquarters and would not be made by Collishaw in response to a request from

the army commander. Collishaw accepted these orders without question as they reflected RAF

policies at the time and reinforced his own experience from the Western Front and the recent

desert training exercises.

This directive was forwarded to Lieutenant-General Wilson’s headquarters with a covering letter by Air Vice-Marshal Peter Drummond, the Senior Air Staff Officer, RAF Middle

East, which raised serious concerns for the army regarding the level of close support it could expect from the RAF:

You may, of course, have already heard from our G.H.Q., M.E., that the chief concern of our bombers will be the destruction or neutralization of the Italian air forces in LIBYA. From this it naturally follows that we shall not be able to provide as much close support for the Army in the Western Desert as has hitherto be contemplated, though naturally if the military situation becomes really acute and air assistance becomes absolutely necessary, we should do our best to provide it.41

This letter, with its apparent dismissal of RAF support of the land battle, quickly received

high level attention from the army. On 23 November General Wavell wrote a sharply-worded

40 Letter, Air Chief Marshal W.G.S. Mitchell to Air Commodore R. Collishaw, 16 November 1939, TNA WO 201/335. 41 Letter, Air Vice-Marshal Peter Drummond to Brigadier A.R. Selby, 18 November 1939, TNA WO 201/335. 139 reply to Air Chief Marshal Mitchell stating that his understanding of the decisions made at the commanders-in-chief meeting was quite different: ‘While respecting your opinion, I do not myself entirely agree’ with your suggestion that the destruction of the enemy air force was the primary task of the RAF, and I ‘did not, I am sure, give approval to it at the conference.’42

Wavell understood and expected that there would be cooperation of the closest kind between the

RAF and the army during any campaign in the Western Desert, not only if the situation turned critical. Mitchell was unapologetic in his reply but offered to convene another meeting between the three services to ensure that everybody was in agreement with the template for future operations.43 The instructions issued to 202 Group by RAF Headquarters Middle East were subsequently modified in a minor way to allow Collishaw the discretion to respond to requests for air support from the military commander without reference to higher headquarters.44 This debate was typical of exchanges between the army and the air force over the nature and type of air support to be provided to the army. Any difficulties during Operation Compass were avoided by the close personal working relationship between the personnel in the field, especially

Collishaw and O’Connor.

For Collishaw and his men the first six months of 1940 passed quietly. After a period of high tension following the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, life in the desert returned to a routine of training and boredom. Shortages were rife but attempts were made to make do with the resources available. Air Vice-Marshal A.C. Maund arrived in Egypt in

December 1939 to take over the post of Air Officer Administrative at Mitchell’s headquarters.

Maund was an officer with a great deal of experience. He had joined the Canadian Expeditionary

Force as a private in 1914, went overseas with the 8th Canadian Infantry Battalion and

42 Letter, General A.P. Wavell to Air Chief Marshal W.G.S. Mitchell, 23 November 1939, TNA WO 201/335. 43 Letter, Air Chief Marshal W.G.S. Mitchell to General A.P. Wavell, 27 November 1939, TNA WO 201/335. 44 Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Plan, HQ RAF ME, 14 September 1940, TNA WO 201/335, 7. 140

eventually transferred to the Royal Flying Corps as an observer in March 1916. In mid-1917 he

was sent to support to the RFC mission Russia and by 1919 he was General Officer

Commanding the RAF Training Mission to Russia; Collishaw’s No.47 Squadron came under his command. In 1924 Maund was a classmate of Collishaw at the RAF Staff College and they again served together in HQ ADGB in 1927 and 1928.45

Maund was faced with a major task to prepare the repair and replacement facilities for the

increased tempo of wartime operations. He discovered that the capacity did not exist to deal with

the volume of aircraft engine repairs that would be required. He also took steps to deal with the

most serious problem of operating in the desert – dust. Blenheim bombers required their engine

filters to be cleaned after five hours of flying time, a job which took nearly three hours. The

simple replacement of the filter took only 15 minutes, but there were only six spares in all of

Middle East Command. Mitchell sent Maund to England in January 1940 to make the case for

extra resources to deal with their personnel and equipment issues. Maund was initially told that he would have to scale back his establishments due to the great need for the same items in

England. It was thought in London that Italian neutrality would allow the Middle East to be starved of resources in favour of other theatres. The danger of this proposal was soon realized and Maund was told he could expect to receive suitable war establishments to meet the needs of

Middle East Command. The importance of this decision cannot be overemphasised. The disparity of forces meant that Mitchell and Collishaw needed to have every possible aircraft serviceable and ready for operations.46 To understand the crippling effect of a poor repair and

maintenance organization, one need look no further than the Italian air force which abandoned

45 Details of Maund’s career may be found at ‘Air of Authority – A History of RAF Organisation,’ , accessed 1 June 2013. 46 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 15-16. 141

thousands of aircraft in the desert during the early stages of the war due to repair issues. The

RAF, in contrast, abandoned very few aircraft during the first German offensive in April-May

1941.47

On 13 May 1940 Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore arrived to take over command

of the RAF Middle East from Mitchell. He arrived at a time of great change in the strategic

situation. Germany had launched its surprise attack on the West three days earlier. In less than a

week the Netherlands and half of Belgium was lost and by 21 May German spearheads had

reached the Channel coast setting in motion the great evacuation at Dunkirk. Italy was not idle

during this period. Mussolini had been anticipating war for a number of weeks and by the time of the German attack his military was ready. The Italian navy and air force were prepared for operations and the army had been fully mobilized including the reinforcement of Libya. The defeat of France in June changed the balance of power in North Africa freeing the Italians to transfer troops away from Tunisia to reinforce Cyrenaica and East Africa.48

The Air Ministry issued a directive outlining Longmore’s responsibilities. He was to

command all British air forces in Middle East including the surrounding territories and seas. This

included full control of Egypt, the Sudan, Palestine and Transjordan and operational control of

47 For details of Italian aircraft abandoned during their retreat from Libya in 1941 see Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475; and RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 92. MacGregor Knox observed that a ‘crippling’ weakness of the Italian air force was its basing and logistical arrangements which led to the abandonment of large numbers of repairable aircraft and large stocks of fuel and supplies during their retreat in 1940-1941. See MacGregor Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940-1943 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 140-141. For details on the small number of British aircraft abandoned during Rommel’s first offensive in April 1941, see Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Operations Carried out by the R.A.F. Cyrenaica during Enemy Advance,’ 22 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6486. 48 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol.1, 88. Knox confirms this state of readiness but noted that while Mussolini was keen to join the war, other voices, including Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Generals Rodolfo Graziani, Pietro Badoglio and Italo Balbo, urged caution. MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 98-100. 142

Aden, Iraq and Malta. Longmore would be responsible for any operations which took place in

East Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya), Cyprus, the Balkans (Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria

and Romania) and over the Persian Gulf, Mediterranean and Red Seas. This vast territory,

encompassing some four and a half million square miles, was too much for one man to control,

but this was the challenge he faced.49

Longmore and Collishaw were both products of the Royal Naval Air Service. Longmore

joined the service before the First World War and taught Major Hugh Trenchard how to fly in

1912. In 1918 he was appointed Senior Air Staff Officer to the Commander-in-Chief

Mediterranean (Naval) where he was responsible for all RNAS units in the region including

Malta, Italy, Gibraltar and Egypt. In Iraq in 1923 Longmore served on Air Marshal Sir John

Salmond’s staff and oversaw operations against the Turks and Kurds, including the Rowanduz

expedition where Collishaw was the RAF Liaison Officer. Longmore spent the decade before the

Second World War primarily in the UK as the commandant at the RAF College and

subsequently the Imperial Defence College.50 Upon taking command in the Mediterranean,

Longmore embarked on a visit to his various and far-flung commands. Before the start of

hostilities he visited most of the units under his command, but his first visit on 27 May was to

Collishaw’s units in the Western Desert. He started his tour with a visit to Group Captain Brown

and 253 Wing at Maaten Bagush and then moved on to Qasaba where ‘C’ Flight of No.208

Army Co-operation Squadron was based. His next stop was Mersa Matruh, the centre of the

49 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 25; Christopher Shores, Giovanni Massimello, and Russell Guest, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, Vol. 1: North Africa - June 1940-January 1942 (London: Grub Street, 2012), 11-13. 50 Arthur Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946); David Lee, ‘Longmore, Sir Arthur Murray (1885–1970)’, rev. Christina J. M. Goulter, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed., January 2012 , accessed 23 August 2012; ‘Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore,’ Air of Authority – A History of RAF Organization . 143

positions held by the Armoured Division and the base of No.33 Fighter Squadron. The following

morning Longmore flew to the frontier to see the advanced landing grounds near the border and

then went back to inspect No.45 Bomber Squadron at Fuka and No.211 Bomber Squadron at

Dhaba. Overall, Longmore was content with the quality of the pilots and the competence of the ground crews.51 He was surprised at the Spartan existence of the air personnel:

Desert airfields provide few amenities for aircrews in their leisure hours; they were probably more comfortable in the cockpits of their aircraft in the air chasing or bombing Italians, then they were on the ground sitting in sand-blown tents, improvised huts or dugouts. Accommodation was certainly primitive and Collishaw’s headquarters at Maaten Bagush consisted of a couple of portable wooden huts and a few tents, in addition to an underground operations room which had been neatly excavated out of the sandstone…Luckily most of these airfields were close to the coast where most excellent bathing was possible.52

The conditions at Collishaw’s headquarters may have been basic, but the location was

important. Collishaw was situated beside the headquarters of the Western Desert Force as well as

close to the airfields where his squadrons were based. This arrangement greatly facilitated a

close working relationship between O’Connor and Collishaw and their respective staffs during

first months of the war and the planning stages for Operation Compass. Immediately prior to the

commencement of counter-offensive O’Connor moved his advanced headquarters into the desert

to remain close to his forward divisions. Collishaw’s preference was to keep his headquarters

collocated with that of O’Connor but the communications infrastructure was not terribly reliable

at that point in the war and would not allow him to stay in close contact with his airfields if he

moved forward.53 General Wilson recalled that the radios had a ‘habit of fading out about

51 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, June-November 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 26-27. 52 Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945, 226. 53 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 1. 144

sundown just when information for deciding the next day’s operations was badly needed.’54 A

compromise was stuck by despatching Group Captain ‘Bingo’ Brown along with a signals detachment to accompany O’Connor. General Wilson took over command of O’Connor’s main headquarters where he facilitated communications with the RAF and the Royal Navy.55

At the beginning of June the 7th Armoured Division (as the Armoured Division had been

renamed in February 1940) was deployed in a series of defended posts south and east of Mersa

Matruh. This location offered the best defensive position to defend Egypt as there were good rail

and road connections back to Alexandria and Cairo. A good road continued west to Sidi Barrani,

but the quality of the track past that to the frontier was poor. The border area was initially

defended by 7th Armoured Division less one of its armoured brigades. After returning from his visit, Longmore decided to concentrate Collishaw’s 202 Group in the desert. All leave was cancelled and RAF units were warned to be ready for operations on 48 hours’ notice. The

imminent collapse of France was set to change the entire situation in Egypt. The loss of the

French colonies of Tunisia and Syria gave Italy the freedom to concentrate its forces against

Egypt without having to worry about attacks on other fronts in Libya and East Africa.56

On the eve of the Italian declaration of war Longmore outlined RAF objectives in the

Middle East once hostilities commenced:

1. Offensive action against enemy air bases with a view to reducing their numerical superiority in aircraft and destroying their repair organization. 2. Offensive action against enemy ports to destroy or damage submarines, shipping and port facilities. 3. Destruction of resources of all sorts in Italian East Africa. 4. Full support of British army operations.

54 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas 1939-1947, 49. 55 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt.General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d, TNA WO 106/2148., 3, 6. 56 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol.1, 97; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 24, 27-28; Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Middle East from August, 1939 to November, 1940,’ The London Gazette, 13 June 1946. 145

5. Strategic reconnaissance for all the services.57

The first task of 202 Group was to conduct reconnaissance to keep the British command informed concerning Italian actions, and attacks were to be made against Italian targets, especially aircraft and airfield infrastructure. Overall direction of the air campaign was vested in

Longmore who established targets for air bombardment but Collishaw exercised operational control of those missions. To facilitate coordination between the army and Collishaw and simplify the chain of command, Longmore combined 253 Wing with 202 Group and Group

Captain Brown, freed of his command, became the full time liaison officer between Collishaw and Major-General Sir Michael O'Moore Creagh, the commander of 7th Armoured Division.

This close liaison between the two services would be crucial to the conduct of effective air operations in support of the ground campaign.58

There was a great disparity in the strength of the opposing forces in the Western Desert.

On the ground it was estimated the Italian Tenth Army deployed approximately 10 divisions consisting of 215,000 troops and there were an additional 200,000 troops in Italian East Africa.

Lieutenant-General O’Connor’s Western Desert Force consisted of fewer than 36,000 men. A qualitative difference between the two forces helped to balance some of the disparity as the

Italians were considerably less mechanized than the British force.59 Historian MacGregor Knox

observed that the Italian army reinforcements sent to Libya were a ‘well-intentioned measure’ but the Italian high command failed to understand that the quality and quantity of its equipment was more important than ‘mere numbers.’ The increased size of the Italian army in North Africa

57 ‘R.A.F. M.E. Operation Instruction No.5,’ 7 June 1940, contained in Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, June-November 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051. 58 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, June-November 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051; Operations Record Book, 253 Wing, August 1939 to August 1945 - Appendices, TNA AIR 26/351. 59 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 28-29; Wavell, Operations in the Middle East from August, 1939 to November, 1940, 2997-3006. 146

did not improve its combat power and only ‘swelled the British “bag” [capture of prisoners]’

during Operation Compass.60

In the air, the Italian 5th Squadra, commanded by Generale Squadra Aerea Felice Porro,

was estimated to have some 200 bombers and 200 fighters which could be rapidly reinforced

from the Italian mainland. An Italian exercise in late 1939 demonstrated that 400 bombers could

be deployed from Italy for long range strikes on Alexandria on short notice in the event of a

crisis.61 The strength of the RAF in Egypt at the start of June 1940 was 63 Gladiators and 1

Hurricane in three fighter squadrons (Nos.33, 80 and 112), 72 Blenheims in six bomber squadrons (Nos.11, 45, 55, 113, 211 and 30 (in reserve)), 24 Bombays and Valentias, 24

Lysanders and 10 Sunderland flying boats. Of this total, Collishaw deployed 81 aircraft at his

forward airfields, most near Mersa Matruh. The British maintained a considerable advantage in

the area of replacement aircraft and spare parts. The RAF squadrons in Egypt were operating at

full strength and maintained a reserve of 100 percent.62

The fall of France greatly complicated the despatch of reinforcements from England.

Fighter aircraft did not have the range to fly directly to the Middle East, and it was slow and

dangerous to send a convoy through the Mediterranean. At best, it would take two weeks for a

convoy to make this voyage where it would be exposed to German U-boats, the Italian Fleet and

Axis land-based air power operating from France, North Africa, Italy and Sicily. It was safer to

send a convoy around the Horn of Africa but that journey would take even longer. The Takoradi route was developed by the British prior to the war as an overland route to Khartoum. Aircraft

60 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 99. 61 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 18-19. 62 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 28-29; Wavell, Operations in the Middle East from August, 1939 to November, 1940, 2997-3006. 147

would now be shipped to the West African port of Takoradi aboard transport ships. After being assembled, the aircraft would fly across the breadth of Africa to Khartoum in the Sudan and then turn north to follow the Nile River valley to Egypt. This route was the best way to get fighter aircraft to Egypt when a voyage through the Mediterranean Sea was contested but it took a tremendous toll on the men and their aircraft. The supply of twin-engine aircraft was somewhat easier to manage as they had the range to fly directly from England, refuelling at Gibraltar and

Malta.63

From a supply point of view, the Italians had it better, and worse. Their proximity to

home meant that replacement aircraft and spare parts could be supplied in a matter of hours.

However, the Regia Aeronautica’s maintenance system was far inferior to that of the British. At

the start of the campaign, Italian squadrons could claim only 60 percent of their aircraft as

serviceable and this number declined substantially following the start of operations.64

The air war in the desert in 1940-1941 was reminiscent of the Great War. Open cockpits, dogfights between biplanes and poor communications were the norm rather than the exception and the equipment was largely outdated and obsolescent as it was a secondary theatre of war. In

1940, the fighter squadrons of the metropolitan RAF were equipped with sleek new Spitfires and

Hurricanes. These high-performance, eight- and twelve-gun aircraft were among the best in the world. RAF Bomber Command was similarly equipped with modern aircraft such as the

Wellington, Whitley and Sterling. Few of these aircraft could be spared for distant operations as

63 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 38-39; Denis Richards, Royal Air Force, vol.1: The Fight at Odds (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), 247-248. 64 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 28-29; Richard Townshend Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939-1945 (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), 17-18; Denis Richards, Royal Air Force, vol.1, 247-248. 148 they were needed to support the British Expeditionary Force in France, and to defend the British

Isles against the expected German invasion.65

The RAF in Egypt had to make do with what was available and its front-line fighter was the Gloster Gladiator – the last British biplane fighter. The Gladiator had a top speed of 242 mph and was armed with four .303 machine guns. It was a sturdy aircraft that performed well in the hands of a pilot who knew the aircraft. The army cooperation aircraft operated by the RAF in

Egypt was the Westland Lysander. This aircraft was intended to work closely with the army to provide reconnaissance, communications and light attack support. However, it was slow and vulnerable, with a cruising speed of less than 200 mph. It was armed with one .303 machine gun in the rear cockpit and two fixed forward firing machine guns. After initial losses proved its helplessness, the Lysander required a fighter escort to operate in the face of enemy patrols. The primary British bomber in the Middle East was the Bristol Blenheim I. It was one of the fastest twin-engine bombers in the world when it was introduced in late 1936 but it was approaching obsolescence by the start of the war. Nevertheless it carried a maximum 1,000 pound bomb load over a range of 1,125 miles at a maximum speed of 265 mph and provided yeoman service in the desert. A secondary bomber was the Bristol Bombay, a slow, awkward transport-turned bomber.

It would have been slaughtered in the skies over Europe, but in the Middle East it was able to operate quite effectively, though only at night. The obsolescence of the aircraft under

Collishaw’s command was matched by those of the Italians. The primary fighter of the Regia

Aeronautica (Italian Royal Air Force) was the Fiat CR42. This biplane was evenly matched with the Gladiator, though it was slightly more manoeuvrable and was more heavily armed with two

12.7 mm machine guns. The Savoia-Marchetti SM79 carried out most of the bombing operations

65 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 29; Richards, Royal Air Force, vol.1, 241. 149

for the Regia Aeronautica. It was one of the fastest aircraft in the theatre, with a top speed of 270

mph, a range of 1,243 miles and could carry up to 2,200 lbs of bombs.66

* * * * *

By May 1940 the RAF in the Western Desert was prepared for war. Longmore and

Collishaw controlled an air force that was composed of a small number of obsolescent aircraft at

the end of a long supply line with no hope of immediate replacements or reinforcements. The

Italians, by comparison, possessed a superior number of aircraft and benefitted from a relatively

short logistical line to the home country. Relations between the British army and RAF were not

ideal but there were indications their different concepts regarding the role of airpower could be

overcome. Joint exercises conducted in October-November 1939 had shown a number of strengths and weaknesses in the provision of air support for army operations. The RAF after-

action reports demonstrated that the air officers came away from the exercises with a solid

understanding of what needed to be done when hostilities commenced. Air Marshal Mitchell

issued instructions to 202 Group which set out clear operating instructions based on the RAF’s

understanding of air operations and incorporated the lessons learned during the desert exercises.

The first task would be to destroy the enemy air force while the provision of air support to the

army would be secondary and only receive priority in an emergency. When General Wavell

protested the instructions which appeared to minimize the army’s need for close air support,

Mitchell did not back down. The orders issued to 202 Group were modified to allow Collishaw

more discretion to conduct army support missions, but the emphasis of its attacks would remain

on targets beyond the army’s battle space. This incident demonstrates the competing

66 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 29-30; Richards, Royal Air Force, vol.1, 269; Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939-1945, 19-20. Details on aircraft range, performance and armament are taken from Enzo Angelucci and Paolo Matricardi, World War II Airplanes, 2 vols. (New York, Rand McNally, 1978). 150 philosophies of the army and the RAF over the proper use of air power during a land campaign.

Mitchell believed that Wavell had understood his position as a result of previous conversations but this was not the case. It is important that Mitchell, and Longmore after him, stood up to army demands for air support and left Collishaw free to conduct the air campaign according to the

RAF concept of operations. The extensive inter-service experience possessed by the senior RAF leadership in the desert played an important role in facilitating the relationship with the army.

The RAF would play an important role in the upcoming battles and the working relationship between the army and the air force established during this period was crucial in allowing this to happen.

151

Chapter 5 – The Western Desert and the Start of the War

The central focus of this chapter is the transition from peace to war in the Middle East and the stress this placed on the British military. The numerical and qualitative inferiority of the

British forced them to adopt a cautious approach to dealing with Italian ambitions in Africa.

This created a conundrum for Collishaw who was required to use his meagre forces to harass the

Italians, but avoid wastage that could fatal weaken RAF strength in the Western Desert. He

employed all of his accumulated skill to achieve this goal, but he was still criticized for acting

rashly. This chapter demonstrates that the RAF operations directed by Collishaw played a significant role in demonstrating British strength in the Middle East when the reality was very different. As a result of his actions, Collishaw was recognized by his commander, Air Chief

Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, as one of his few indispensable commanders.

The British were aware by the middle of May 1940 that the Italians were actively preparing for war. The combined British and French Mediterranean fleets outnumbered the

Italian navy but the balance of land and air forces in Libya and Egypt was tilted towards the

Italians. The warning signs prompted the British to place all three services on alert. Major-

General Richard O’Connor’s Western Desert Force was despatched to the area of Mersa Matruh with advanced units sent to the Egyptian frontier. Air Chief Marshal Arthur Longmore supported this deployment by stationing all but one of his bomber squadrons in the Western Desert.1 The

wait for the declaration of war ended late on the evening of 10 June when it became apparent that

hostilities would soon begin. At 1830 hours Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw paraded the

202 Group personnel at Maaten Bagush to inform them that it was believed Italy had declared

1 I.S.O. Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1: The Early Successes against Italy (to May 1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), chs.5-6. 151

war. Just before midnight Collishaw was ordered to ‘come to immediate readiness for war with

Italy, but await (repeat await) further instructions before initiating hostile acts.’2 At midnight it

was confirmed that a state of war existed between Italy and Great Britain and nine minutes later

Longmore sent a signal to Collishaw advising that, ‘A state of war with Italy exists. Carry out reconnaissance as arranged. Bomber formations as available should accompany reconnaissance in northern areas. Favourable targets observed, especially concentrations of aircraft.’3 The men

of 202 Group were ready to carry the offensive to the Italians, but aircraft were ordered well

dispersed in case of enemy attack.4

At first light on 11 June six Blenheims of No.211 Squadron took off to scout six pre- arranged areas but they found no sign of enemy army concentrations. Later in the day Blenheims

of Nos.45, 55 and 113 Squadrons were sent to attack the harbour at Tobruk.5 When no visible

signs of the enemy could be found,6 the aircraft diverted to a secondary target – the airfield at El

Adem. The first aircraft over the target attacked at low-level and encountered no flak or defending fighters. Instead, the Italian aircraft were parked neatly in rows, ideal for peacetime convenience, but disastrous in time of war. A total of 18 Italian aircraft were confirmed destroyed.7 Crews claimed that their attack found the men of the base lined up on parade astride the main runway. As the bombs began to fall, the men ran in all directions trying to find cover. It

was later surmised that the base commander had ordered his troops out so he could read them

2 Roderic Owen, The Desert Air Force (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1948), 30. 3 Richard Townshend Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939-1945 (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), 21. 4 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June 1940, TNA AIR 25/801. 5 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June 1940, TNA AIR 25/801. 6 Collishaw’s orders were explicit that civilian casualties must be avoided: ‘It is the policy of His Majesty’s Government to confine air bombardment to military objectives only, which must be identifiable as such, and which it is possible to bomb with reasonable chance of confining damage to them.’ The order went on to state that while all steps would be taken to avoid civilian casualties, enemy action might force a departure from this policy. Egypt Group Standing Operational Instructions, April 1939, TNA AIR 23/6813, 3. 7 Italian losses on 11 June were derived from an account by Generale di Squadra Aerea G. Santoro as quoted in Playfair et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 112. 152

Mussolini’s official announcement of war against England.8 Italian fighters scrambled and were

too late to prevent the British attack but shot down two Blenheims with the loss of their crews.9

As late as 12 June British air raids on Italian airfields met little resistance and often found

aircraft on the ground undispersed and vulnerable. The first small Italian raid was not launched until nearly 36 hours after the start of hostilities and it took nearly two weeks after the declaration of war for the Italians to mount their first major attack. Their target was the port

facilities at Alexandria and the RAF maintenance depot at Aboukir. The Gladiators launched in defence were too slow to catch the S.79 bombers but they disrupted the attack so the bombing was scattered and ineffective.10

A high tempo of operations by the British was continued on 12 June when a joint RAF-

Royal Navy operation was directed against the port of Tobruk. The raid was ordered after a reconnaissance flight by No.113 Squadron reported the harbour full of ships. Air attacks on the port and its airfield were designed to divert attention from a Royal Navy sweep down the coast.

It was also hoped that the air attacks would flush ships from the harbour into the path of the

Royal Navy. Blenheims from Nos.45, 113, and 211 Squadrons were impeded by fog and low cloud and though some aircraft were unable to find the target, others were driven off by a strong

Italian fighter umbrella of some 50 aircraft over the main airfield at Tobruk. One success was achieved when nine Blenheims of No.113 Squadron were able to find the harbour and bombed the Italian warship San Giorgio, setting it on fire. This old 9,000 ton cruiser, employed as a

submarine depot ship, was forced to run aground on a sandbar to prevent it from sinking. The

8 Raymond Collishaw with R.V. Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story (London: William Kimber, 1973), 241; Bickers, The Desert Air War, 22; Owen, The Desert Air Force, 31. 9 Christopher Shores, Giovanni Massimello, and Russell Guest, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, vol.1: North Africa - June 1940-January 1942 (London: Grub Street, 2012), 23. 10 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command, 242. 153

ship was subsequently used as an anti-aircraft gun platform in the harbour and never sailed again.11

With the preliminary phase of the war over, Longmore and Collishaw planned their next

move. The dim prospects for receiving replacement pilots and aircraft forced Longmore to adopt

a defensive posture. The period from mid-June to the end of July was marked by a slower pace

of operations compared to the start of hostilities. Collishaw, however, did his best to achieve the

illusion of superiority by keeping the enemy off balance. Described as ‘Collie’s War,’ operations were conducted on the basis of ‘hit ‘em hard, then hit ‘em again. But don’t let ‘em know where you’re going to hit.’12 In general, the RAF attacks were small in scale, but wide in scope. Small

groups of aircraft were sent to attack as many targets as possible. By 22 June, the main

aerodrome outside Tobruk, El Adem, had been attacked 10 times by a total of 43 aircraft. The

raids generally caused limited physical destruction, but the damage to Italian morale was much

greater. The constant attacks compelled the Italians to mount standing patrols over their military

bases, ports and airfields. Italian army commanders demanded that an air umbrella cover their

troops in the field.13 This policy was to have a number of long-reaching effects. It was terribly wasteful of resources. Aircraft employed in standing patrols could not be used offensively. As well, the wear and tear on the aircraft and aircrew was cumulative. Italian serviceability rates, never high, plummeted due to the strain of maintaining the patrols. A good indication of the success of Collishaw=s attacks can be seen in the period leading up to the Italian offensive in mid-September. At a time when the Regia Aeronautica should be launching numerous attacks

11 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June 1940, TNA AIR 25/801; see also Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War, 24; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 112-113. 12 Philip Guedalla, Middle East 1940-1942: A Study in Air Power (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1944), 85. 13 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June 1940, TNA AIR 25/801; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 37- 39. 154

against the British to prepare for their main ground offensive, very few offensive raids were

made because almost their entire strength was devoted to defensive patrols.14

In spite of the limited success of these Italian attacks, Collishaw remained concerned

about future raids. He considered the Gladiator to be wholly inadequate for the task of bomber

interception and requested a flight of Hurricanes to deal with this threat. At a time when there

were only four Hurricanes in all of Egypt, Longmore could not supply this request in full, but

Collishaw did get one of the modern fighters.15 At the time, the Hurricane outperformed

everything else in the North African sky, but obviously one aircraft could not make much of a

difference. Collishaw tried to get as much as possible from this aircraft. He shifted it frequently

from one landing ground to another to try and bluff the Italians into believing there were more of

these high performance aircraft available. ‘Collie’s Battleship,’ as this aircraft was christened,

was used to great effect. The most skilled pilots in the Group were tasked to fly it and they were

ordered to be very aggressive in their attacks, primarily to frighten the enemy. The order issued

by Collishaw stated: ‘Success will adversely affect Italian morale as he will be fearful that

Hurricane fighters may attack at any moment.’16

To further address the issue of the fast Italian S.79 bombers which the Gladiators were having trouble catching, Collishaw ordered the Blenheim Is of No.30 Squadron to be converted to fighters by the addition of four forward-firing .303 machine guns under the nose. This added armament, coupled with the existing machine gun in the wing, made the fast Blenheim capable

14 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801; Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, June-November 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol.1, 113-118; Owen, The Desert Air Force, 33; Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939-1945, 36. 15 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801; Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, June-November 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051. The other three Hurricanes were assigned to No.80 Squadron tasked with defending the Suez Canal zone. Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 13; Bickers, The Desert Air War, 25-26. 16 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Memorandum on the Tactical Employment of Hurricane Aircraft,’ contained in Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801. 155

of catching and killing bombers. On patrol, the Hurricane was always teamed with a pair of

Blenheims. As well, a flight of Gladiators was added to protect the Blenheims from the more manoeuvrable Italian fighters.17 This new fighter team achieved its first success on 19 June when

the Hurricane, two Blenheims and four Gladiators intercepted a formation of 12 Italian fighters

(most likely CR42s, but identification was not confirmed). Four Italian fighters were downed, for

the loss of one Gladiator. Later in the day the Hurricane supported by four Blenheim fighters

intercepted another formation of Italian fighters. This time the Hurricane destroyed two CR42s

while the Blenheims, despite their relative ungainliness, accounted for another two of the nimble

fighters. A further two CR42s were seriously damaged by the big Blenheims and likely did not

make it back to base. These successes caused Longmore to signal Collishaw to congratulate him

‘on the splendid work of the fighters this morning. The results are most encouraging.’18

The Blenheim bombers used innovative tactics to harass the Italians. In order to achieve

surprise during an evening attack on the airfield at El Adem, three Blenheims of No.113

Squadron approached the airfield from the sea. While still over water, they put their aircraft into

a dive and shut down their engines so they could approach the target area silently. The first the

enemy knew of the attack was the sound of explosions on the airfield. This became a standard

tactic for RAF attacks in the desert.19 The success of this approach can be judged by the fact that

the Italians quickly adopted it for their own attacks. In their hands it was less successful as they

pressed the attacks from a much higher altitude.20

17 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 37-38. 18 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, June-November 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051. For more on the employment of the Blenheim fighters, see Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940- 1945, 16; Bickers, The Desert Air War, 25-26. 19 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801; Bickers, The Desert Air War, 25. 20 Bickers, The Desert Air War, 29. 156

The small but constant attrition caused by the British air raids worked to keep the Italians

off balance. Late on the afternoon of 28 June Blenheims from Nos.55 and 211 Squadrons

attacked El Gubbi airfield outside of Tobruk. The nine aircraft approached the target at low level

from the northeast at about 1730 hours. The raid surprised the defenders who only managed to

fire a few shots at the last aircraft as they departed the area. A few minutes after the attack two

aircraft approached the airfield from the west out of the setting sun. Thinking these were the

British aircraft returning for a second run, the Italian gunners were ready. The first aircraft was

shot down as it approached its target and it crashed and burned on the edge of the airfield.

Unfortunately, this aircraft was an Italian S.79 flown by Air Marshal Italo Balbo, Governor-

General and Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Armed Forces in Libya. Balbo was greatly

respected by both sides and his loss was a huge blow to the Italian war effort. Longmore had met

Balbo during an official visit to Rome in 1933 and he ordered Collishaw to despatch an aircraft

to drop a note and wreath of condolences. The note stated, ‘The British Royal Air Force

expresses its sympathy in the death of General Balbo – a great leader and gallant aviator,

personally known to me, whom fate has placed on the other side. [signed] Arthur Longmore.’21

Ironically, this aircraft was fired on as it overflew the funeral but the Italian anti-aircraft gunners

were unable to bring it down. Marshal Rodolfo Graziani was appointed to replace Balbo.22

Collishaw=s offensive spirit during this period was not without its costs. The difficulty in

obtaining replacements and spares from the United Kingdom meant that pilots, aircraft, parts and

equipment in theatre were a finite resource. On 5 July nine Blenheim IVs of No.113 Squadron

21 Claudio G. Segrè, Italo Balbo: A Fascist Life (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), 402. 22 The best account of Balbo’s death can be found in Segrè, Italo Balbo: A Fascist Life, ch.18; Collishaw reported on 1 July, ‘To A.O.C.-in-C. Your letter despatched satisfactorily.’ Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801; For details on Longmore’s visit with Balbo in Rome and his great respect for the man see Arthur Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946), 154-158; other aspects may be found in Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 113, 207; Denis Richards, Royal Air Force, vol.1: The Fight at Odds (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), 243. 157

‘successfully bombed large enemy troop and M.T. [motor transport] concentration’ near Bardia.

All the aircraft returned but Flight Lieutenant A.M. Bentley was wounded and his observer,

Flight Sergeant J.F. Taylor was killed by ground fire.23 Longmore was dismayed by this action

and sent a message on 8 July to Collishaw which stated,

Whilst fully appreciating the initiative and spirit shown by the squadrons operating under your command in the Western Desert, I must draw your immediate attention to the urgent necessity for conserving resources. Instances are still occurring when Blenheims are being used for low machine gun attack against defended camps and aerodromes…I consider such operations unjustified having regard to our limited resources of which you are well aware.24

Collishaw replied that his pilots were acting in contravention of his orders and he took steps to prevent the reoccurrence of such actions. In spite of what has been termed a

‘reprimand’25 and ‘sharp criticism’26 from Longmore, Collishaw recommended Bentley and a number of other pilots in his squadron be awarded an immediate Distinguished Flying Cross for

‘valour, courage and devotion to duty in air action with the enemy.’27 This could be viewed as a

contemptuous act by Collishaw in the face of criticism he felt was not warranted, but this type of

action was not in his nature. Collishaw recorded the award of these commendations in the 202

Group Operations Record Book the day after the operation and two days before receiving

Longmore’s telegram.28

On 17 July Longmore sent another cautionary message to Collishaw – ‘We are rapidly consuming available resources of all types of aircraft in the Command, and must in consequence exercise still greater economy in their employment.’ This was followed on 13 August by a

23 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801. 24 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, June-November 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051. 25 David Ian Hall, Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 73. 26 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 44. 27 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801. 28 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801. 158

message directed to the army stating ‘Owing to necessity of conserving R.A.F. resources in

Middle East, [Longmore] directs that requests for bombing military targets will not be made to

H.Q. 202 Group unless there are clear indications of enemy offensive action.’29 The RAF official

history again termed the 17 July message to Collishaw a ‘rebuke’ and mused that his ‘gay

aggressiveness’ stemming from his fighter pilot roots led him to waste his pilots and aircraft

recklessly in meaningless attacks.30 This interpretation is not supported by an examination of 202

Group records between 5 and 17 July which reveals that the vast majority of missions flown during this period consisted of reconnaissance flights and attacks against strategic targets such as

harbours, airfields and supply dumps. These attacks were consistent with the priorities set out by

Longmore at the start of the campaign. One Blenheim was shot down on 13 July while providing

air cover to the Royal Navy, two more were lost to anti-aircraft fire when attacking Italian

airfields in the Tobruk-Gazzala area and two Bombays crashed due to unknown causes in the

desert during night missions. Collishaw was conscious of the need to conserve his resources and

he was careful not to order wasteful mission.

Collishaw understood the problem of overextending resources in combat from his First

World War experience. In a two-month span ending in July 1917 Naval 10 lost 19 pilots during a

period of intensive operations where Collishaw thought the men had been pushed too hard.31 He

put these lessons into practice the following year when he exercised discretion during the time he

commanded No.203 Squadron and he continued to understand this concept two decades later as

29 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, June-November 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051. 30 Richards, Royal Air Force vol.1, 246-247. 31 Between late April and the end of July 1917, Naval 10 lost 12 pilots killed, four to serious injuries and three as prisoners of war. For details on this period see Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command 90, 117; Collishaw, ‘Notes on Experiences,’ n.d., (ca.1940), Canadian War Museum 19770669-025, 8; and ‘Appendix E – Casualties, Crashes and Incidents,’ Westrop, A History of No.10 Squadron Royal Naval Air Service in World War 1, 176-177. 159

demonstrated in the exercise report he wrote in November 1939.32 Most of his interwar career

was spent at the end of a long and tenuous supply line. He may at one time have been a brash,

happy-go-lucky fighter pilot but those days were long in his past. It is clear that Longmore was

concerned that Collishaw might act too aggressively. He commented, ‘Collishaw’s squadrons in

the desert had one general complaint, they weren’t getting enough work. It was one thing to

decide on a policy of conserving resources, it was quite another to get Collishaw and his braves

to take kindly to it.’33 But, it is equally clear that the operations of 202 Group, and the losses it

sustained, were unexceptional and fully in keeping with the directives issued by Longmore’s

command. The documentary record shows that the losses suffered by 202 Group during this

period were not caused by reckless attacks on low priority targets. Context is important and a

superficial reading of the cables sent by Longmore to Collishaw could be interpreted as a

response to reckless behaviour. The absence of such acts, however, indicates that the cautions

were of a preventative nature to remind Collishaw of the danger of such unbridled action and

were driven by the slow rate of reinforcements which were not expected to arrive in any

significant numbers well into September. Longmore’s telegrams were not reprimands intended to

reign in a reckless or careless commander.34

Most histories of the air campaign in the Western Desert use this series of cables to question Collishaw’s suitability for command or his ability to curb his aggressive fighter pilot tendencies.35 If Collishaw was truly acting as a renegade and needlessly wasting pilots and aircraft he would have been quickly removed from command. However, the opposite was the

32 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Command Exercises, Matruh – 1939,’ 12 October 1939, Appendix 3A to 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803. 33 Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945, 226. 34 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 11. 35 For example see RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 44-45; Hall, Strategy for Victory, 73; Richards, Royal Air Force, 246-247; Bickers, The Desert Air War, 34-35. 160

case. In October 1940 Longmore made a point of informing Portal that, ‘on no account do I want

to release Collishaw who is really doing magnificently in the Western Desert and maintaining a

very high morale in the six squadrons there opposed to a vastly superior enemy air force. I

cannot risk a change.’36 Longmore’s support of Collishaw followed a cable sent to him from the

Directorate of Personnel in London two days earlier which suggested that Collishaw should be sent back to the UK as ‘tour expired’ to make way for Grigson who was due for promotion to air commodore. Longmore immediately replied, ‘COLLISHAW doing splendidly with No.202

Group in Western Desert and is very fit and well. I am very much against moving him from his most responsible post at this critical period in which the Italian offensive may be renewed at any time now. I will make suggestion re. GRIGSON’s posting when he is promoted.’37 This series of exchanges makes it clear that Collishaw enjoyed Longmore’s full confidence.

The support of naval operations was an important secondary role for 202 Group. The

Royal Navy in the Mediterranean was focussed on operations against the Italian Navy but it also devoted resources to the support of land operations in the Western Desert. These missions would

assume greater importance once the British launched their offensive in December 1940, but

earlier operations helped to keep the Italians off balance. The first major coastal bombardment

took place on 21 June. An international naval task force composed of the British cruisers Orion

and Neptune, the Australian cruiser Sydney and the French battleship Lorraine, supported by four

destroyers, were sent to shell the port of Bardia. This would be the last combined Anglo-French

36 Letter, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore to Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, 14 October 1940, TNA AIR 23/1337, 5. 37 Message A.484, personal for D. of P. from A.O.C-in-C, 14 October 1940 sent in response to Message X.739, Personal for C-in-C from D. of P., 13 October 1940, TNA AIR 23/1337. 161

naval operation before the French surrender the next day. The targets were coastal batteries, the

wireless station, ammunition dumps and the power and pumping stations.38

The Naval Staff in Alexandria approached Longmore’s headquarters on 20 June to

request air support for the operation. Air Vice-Marshal Peter Drummond, Longmore’s Senior Air

Staff Officer, was initially against the operation as he thought the risk was not worth the return.

He was soon convinced and late on the afternoon of 20 June a Blenheim of No.113 Squadron

photographed Tobruk harbour and the airfield at El Adem to provide up-to-date reconnaissance

images of the target area. At dawn the next morning Collishaw provided support in the form of a

diversionary attack on Tobruk and fighter cover for the ships and naval spotting aircraft. The

harbour and the airfield at El Adem were bombed by 15 Blenheims from Nos.55 and 211

Squadrons; as a result of the air raid heavy smoke was reported coming from a large ship in the

harbour.39

Three Gladiators of No.33 Squadron were sent to provide air cover to the naval spotting

aircraft. Upon arriving in the area the aircraft immediately attacked an Italian aircraft found

loitering in the vicinity of the fleet. Unfortunately, this aircraft turned out to be the Seagull

amphibian spotter aircraft launched from HMAS Sydney. The pilot of the aircraft, Flight

Lieutenant T. McBride Price, was able to coax his damaged aircraft to a safe landing at Mersa

Matruh. The identification error was compounded when the battleship Lorraine opened fire on the British fighters and drove them off. The results of the naval bombardment were judged to be effective, but it was noted that loss of the spotting aircraft early in the mission had degraded the

38 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 40-41; G.A. Titterton, The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. vol.1: September 1939-October 1940 (London: Whitehall History Publishing in association with Frank Cass, 2002 [1952]), 27. 39 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, June-November 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051; Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801. 162

accuracy of the naval gun fire. The diversionary attacks on Tobruk were successful and played a

role in preventing Italian air and naval forces from interfering with the operation. This joint

operation would prove to be a model for future naval expeditions, but there were significant

problems in coordination that needed to be worked out in the future.40

A second major naval bombardment was arranged for 17 August. Italian preparations for

their upcoming offensive had become clear to the British and the fleet was ordered to ‘assist the

Army by causing as much damage as possible to the material and morale of the Italian military

concentrations.’41 Large numbers of Italian troops had been detected in the vicinity of Fort

Capuzzo on the frontier and numerous dumps of ammunition and other supplies were located at

Bardia. The bombardment force for this operation was considerably stronger than the previous

operation consisting of the battleships Warspite, Ramillies and Malaya, the heavy cruiser Kent

and 12 destroyers. Air support took the form of a strong fighter screen supplied by Nos.80 and

112 Squadrons and a section of Fleet Air Arm fighters. The shoot was conducted according to

plans and good concentrations were observed to fall in the target areas.42 Admiral Sir Andrew

Cunningham, the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, recalled that the detailed planning with the RAF had resulted in everything going according to plan. He said that watching the deliberate bombardment was ‘a satisfactory spectacle and we hoped had good results.’43

40 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, June-November 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051; Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 40-41; Titterton, The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, vol.1, 27; Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 29. 41 ‘Operation “M.B.2,”’ Office of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station, HMS Warspite, 14 August 1940, TNA ADM 199/446. 42 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801; ‘Operation M.B.2 – Narrative. Bombardment of Italian Forward Positions on the Libyan Coast on 17th August, 1940,’ 12 October 1940, TNA ADM 199/446. 43 Viscount Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope (London: Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1951), 271. 163

Aerial reconnaissance later revealed that Capuzzo and the southern defences of Bardia had been

well hit, but the town itself escaped serious damage.44

There was no significant opposition from coastal batteries or the Italian air force during

the bombardment which lasted from 0658 hours to 0720 hours. The Italian air force finally made

an appearance during the return voyage to Alexandria. At approximately 0945 hours an Italian

Cant Z.501 flying boat was shot down as it shadowed the fleet. Less than an hour later the first

S.79 bombers found the fleet. The initial attacks were driven off by No.112 Squadron Gladiators.

Later attacks managed to penetrate the fighter screen but the bombing was inaccurate.45

The Italian air force suffered heavy losses in their attempt to strike the British fleet. Of

the 25 bomber sorties, three enemy aircraft were confirmed destroyed and at least eight others

were severely damaged but made it back to base. The British suffered no losses. The lessons

learned in June were clearly incorporated in the plan for this new operation. Group Captain

Brown went to sea aboard Warspite alongside Admiral Cunningham to facilitate coordination

between the navy and the air force. There was no case of mistaken identity between the naval

aircraft, the fleet and the RAF fighters. Admiral Cunningham signalled Longmore afterwards

that success on the day was due in great measure to the support provided by the RAF.46

The Royal Navy also requested aircraft of 202 Group to support purely naval operations.

At the end of August naval reinforcements were despatched from Gibraltar to Alexandria by way

of Malta to make the first complete passage of the Mediterranean since Italy entered the war.

44 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801. 45 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 25/801; ‘Operation M.B.2 – Narrative. Bombardment of Italian Forward Positions on the Libyan Coast on 17th August, 1940,’ 12 October 1940, TNA ADM 199/446. 46 ‘Operation M.B.2 – Narrative. Bombardment of Italian Forward Positions on the Libyan Coast on 17th August, 1940,’ 12 October 1940, TNA ADM 199/446; Titterton, The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean vol.1, 61, 63-64; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 55; Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940- 1945, 47-48. 164

This operation was fraught with danger as Italy possessed strong surface and submarine fleets as

well as significant air forces with which to menace the fleet. On 30 August Admiral Cunningham

sortied his fleet including the battleships Warsite and Malaya and the aircraft carrier Eagle from

Alexandria to meet the reinforcements. Collishaw issued a warning order that same day for his

squadrons to be at a ‘high state of readiness’ the next day. Collishaw’s Blenheim squadrons

(Nos.55, 113 and 211) mounted a major effort and flew 55 sorties directed at the main Italian

landing grounds in Cyrenaica (Timimi, Tobruk, Gazala, Bardia, Derna and the seaplane base at

Derna). The Blenheims were despatched in pairs throughout the day and these ‘fumigation’

attacks (i.e. to keep the pests down) prevented the Italian bombers from interfering with the fleet,

which was within easy reach of their aerodromes, and distracted the enemy fighters. Three RAF

fighter squadrons (Nos.33, 80 and 112) also supported the operation.47

The RAF and the RN both considered the air cover mission a success as no African-based

Italian aircraft interfered with the fleet and the RAF lost only one aircraft which crash-landed due to an apparent engine failure. Collishaw conveyed his appreciation to his squadrons at the end of the day, ‘Excellent results obtained during today’s operations. A very important British convoy was protected by your attacks against E.A. [enemy aircraft] attention. THANK YOU.’48

Five days later Collishaw’s aircraft supported Cunningham’s ships during their return passage

from Malta to Alexandria on 4 September. A similar pattern of ‘fumigation’ operations was

mounted by the RAF and no Italian air attacks from Cyrenaica developed. These missions were

more costly for the RAF as two Blenheims were shot down and one of the crew, including

Squadron Leader A.R.G. Bax, the commander of No.211 Squadron, was taken prisoner. The

47 RAF HQ Middle East Air Staff Operational Record Book, Appendices, August-September 1940, TNA AIR 24/1068; 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803. For an overview of the naval convoy see Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, 271-273; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 201-204. 48 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803. 165

pilot of a third Blenheim was killed during a clash with Italian fighters but the navigator was able

to fly the aircraft back to base.49

Interdiction missions designed to protect the British fleet were again carried out on 18

September to protect the disabled cruiser HMS Kent. The ship was torpedoed during a moonlight

attack by Italian aircraft as it was taking up position to bombard Bardia. The torpedo disabled the

vessel and it required a substantial effort by British destroyers to tow it back to Alexandria. The

ships were extremely vulnerable to air attacks during this period so Cunningham requested RAF

support. Collishaw diverted his aircraft from attacks on Italian army positions to concentrate on

suppressing the Italian air force. Blenheims of Nos.55, 113 and 211 Squadrons were directed to

attack landing grounds between Bardia and Tobruk while fighters from Nos.30, 80, 112 and 274

Squadrons were sent to provide air cover for the immobilized cruiser. Additional aircraft were

despatched on reconnaissance missions over the Mediterranean Sea to search for a reported

enemy submarine that could pose a threat to the rescue mission. No significant Italian attacks against Kent developed during the two days it took to reach the safety of Alexandria and the

RAF played an important role in making this happen.50

Mussolini was described by MacGregor Knox as ‘the most impatient of all Italians’ and

he was keen to enter the war.51 Contrary to the standard interpretation that Mussolini only declared war in June to reap the spoils of the German victory in the Battle of France, Knox contends that Mussolini always intended to fight a short war. Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the Italian

Chief of the General Staff, urged caution but Mussolini believed that the British leadership in the

49 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803; RAF HQ Middle East Air Staff Operational Record Book, Appendices, August-September 1940, TNA AIR 24/1068. 50 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 60; Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, 274; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 211-2. 51 MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 87. This quotation is used as the title of chapter 3 in this book. 166

desert was poor and a ‘swift Italian drive on Suez’ had a good prospect of success. Before his

death at the end of June Air Marshal Balbo had received permission from Mussolini to attack at

any time but he delayed as he built up his forces.52

The hesitations continued when Marshal Graziani assumed command of the Italian

military in Libya. He continued preparations for an offensive and he was briefed that the

situation was very much in Italy’s favour but still he did not attack. The greatest threat to Libya

came from the French to the west in Tunisia. The British were correctly viewed as presenting a

very small offensive threat. The fall of France and the signing of the Italo-French armistice on 24

June removed the menace in Tunisia but it took the Italians time to reorient their forces to the east to confront the British. The Italian army leadership saw no need for haste as they greatly

outnumbered the British in both the air and on the ground, and the Italian Navy was numerically

superior to the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet. It was seen as just a matter of time until the

British were completely thrown out of Egypt. Badoglio even went so far as to state at an invasion

of Egypt would be ‘easy and foolproof’ now that France was not a threat.53

Graziani was in no rush to attack and he was ‘deploying all his ingenuity’ to convince

Rome that such an attack was impractical.54 Based on assessments by his generals he argued that

time was required to prepare for the offensive and it would be the end of October at the earliest

before he could attack. Mussolini was not prepared to wait that long and persuaded Graziani that

quicker action was necessary. In mid-August Graziani, prompted by this pressure from Rome,

52 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 122-123. See also John Gooch, Mussolini and his Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 516-518. 53 Quoted in Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 137. See also Ministero della Difesa Stato Maggiore Esercito, In Africa Settentrionale: La Preparazione al Conflitto l’Avanzata su Sidi el Barrani, Ottobre 1935 – Settembre 1940 (Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1955), 94-6; Galeazz Ciano, The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazz Ciano Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1946), 268-273; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, chs.3-4. 54 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 150. See also Ministero della Difesa, In Africa Settentrionale: La Preparazione al Conflitto, 102-103; Ciano, The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazz Ciano Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943, 285-286, 290-291. 167

ordered preparations to be made for a limited advance on Sidi Barrani rather than the expected

march to Alexandria. This proposal was accepted by Mussolini and Graziani’s generals and

scheduled for mid-September.55

Graziani’s commitment to the offensive was severely shaken on the night of 31 August

when the RAF ‘thoroughly and repeatedly’ bombed his headquarters in Tobruk.56 For two-and-a- half hours he endured his first air attack and was trapped in an underground shelter. He considered the experience to be ‘one of the most dangerous in my life,’ and as soon as the aircraft left he relocated his headquarters further to the rear in Cirene where deep tombs carved out by the ancient Greeks offered superior protection.57 Graziani blamed the attacks on

espionage and betrayal but he was caught up in the air raids launched by 202 Group to screen the

passage of the British fleet.58

The British had read the signs pointing to the Italian offensive for weeks. Lieutenant-

General O’Connor, in consultation with Generals Wavell and Wilson, pulled his units back from

the frontier and left only small screening forces to slow an Italian advance. The main British

defensive position was organized at Mersa Matruh at the end of the rail line from the Nile.

O’Connor planned to stop any Italian advance on this line and use Matruh as a jumping off point

for his counter-offensive. In response to reports that Italian formations were massing, Collishaw

ordered his bomber squadrons, Nos. 55, 113 and 211, to step up their attacks. On 9 September,

raids were made on enemy airfields, concentrations of transportation and supply dumps. The

55 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 160-163; Gerhard Schreiber, ‘Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939-1940,’ in Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 246-259, 266-277; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol.1, 207-209. 56 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 163. 57 Rudolfo Graziani Diary, 31 August 1940, quoted in Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 163. 58 202 Group Operations Record Book, August 1939 to November 1940, TNA AIR 25/803. 168

largest attack, composed of 21 aircraft, was made on Tobruk’s El Adem aerodrome. Collishaw reported that,

When the enemy’s concentration for an offensive was apparent in the forward area…vigorous R.A.F. action was taken to retain local air superiority and to prevent the enemy from using Apollonia, Derna, Gazala, Tobruk, Bardia and Sollum as sea bases. Also to hamper the enemy in his use of Benghazi. Successful heavy air attacks were delivered against the enemy’s principal air bases at Benina and a number of hangars full with aircraft were destroyed while a large number of aircraft were destroyed on the ground. 59

The scale of these attacks was never large but the constant attacks over a wide area

allowed the RAF to force the Italian air force to cede the initiative and mounting standing fighter

patrols over a large area. Collishaw credited this factor with causing the Italians to lose air

superiority and ultimately cause ‘the final breakdown of the Italian fighter force in Cyrenaica.60

The Italian offensive was launched on 13 September following a spectacular artillery

barrage at the Libyan-Egyptian frontier. Graziani moved five divisions into Egypt and his forces

sustained moderately heavy casualties from mines and harassing artillery fire as they advanced

along a predictable route. The British held the frontier with weak forces and made way as the

Italians advanced. Inexplicably to the British, Graziani halted his offensive at Sidi Barrani, a

mere 50 miles from the Libyan border and 100 miles short of the main British defensive position

at Mersa Matruh. The Italians proceeded to build large fortified camps. It appeared that they

intended to use this position as a jumping off point for their final assault on Egypt. The British

had no intention of letting the Italians maintain the initiative.61

59 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 2. 60 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 2. 61 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, August-September 1940, TNA AIR 25/801; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 164. 169

A German history of the campaign calls this limited offensive ‘one of Italy’s most

grievous errors in the Second World War.’62 Graziani accomplished little to improve the

dispositions of his forces by advancing to Sidi Barrani while greatly complicating his supply

situation; the British had systematically destroyed buildings, roads and water supplies during

their retreat and the Italian army had to build fortifications in the empty desert and transport all

their supplies over poor roads. The limited Italian advance into Egypt did not disturb the

defensive preparation of the British Army, but it did have a significant impact on the conduct of

RAF operations. For the British, the move strengthened the defensive posture of the army by

relieving O’Connor of the need to garrison the frontier.63

The RAF was negatively impacted by the loss of its forward airfields. Fighters were

restricted by over 100 miles in the distance they could fly to provide support on bomber missions

and tactical reconnaissance missions suffered the same loss of range. Collishaw’s bombers had

made good use of the advanced aerodromes to refuel for distant missions leaving Benghazi, the

main Italian port in Cyrenaica, at the extreme range of his Blenheims. Support for naval

operations was also limited as the ability of the Blenheims to conduct harassing missions was

restricted and naval bombardments of Bardia and Sidi Barrani would not benefit from fighter air

cover. Longmore’s strategic flexibility was also limited by the inability to transfer Hurricanes

between the desert and Malta. Reinforcing Hurricanes could previously make the long overwater

journey with the addition of long-range fuel tanks, but this became impossible. These benefits of

62 Gerhard Schreiber, ‘Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939-1940,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 277. The authors do admit, however, that this assessment was made based on 20/20 hindsight and knowledge of the outcome of the British counter-offensive from December 1940 to February 1941. 63 Ministero della Difesa, In Africa Settentrionale: La Preparazione al Conflitto, 132-143; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 212. 170

location subsequently accrued to the Italians along with the added benefit of reduced warning

times for attacks on Alexandria.64

Air Vice-Marshal Drummond told a gathering of the Royal United Services Institute in

London in 1943 that ‘the “motif” of our operations in the Middle East would be a battle for

aerodromes. Repeatedly throughout the campaign this truth was driven home. Whoever held the

airfields on the shores of the Mediterranean could pass his own ships through that sea with

reasonable safety, and could forbid the route to the ships of the enemy.’65 Air power could not win the campaign on its own, but without control of the air, success would be difficult, if not impossible to achieve.

The continued shortage of aircraft available to Collishaw saw him use unconventional tactics in order to strike at the Italians. Shortly after the Italian advance, a member of Collishaw’s command discovered a large stock of old 20 pound anti-personnel bombs in a rear depot.

According to Collishaw, ‘they were quite obsolete and doubtless by all the regulations should have been properly disposed of as being unsafe to handle.’66 The only possible method of

employing these bombs was to load them aboard a Bombay where they would be fused and

deployed individually by the crew. The first operational use of these bombs was made on the

night of 19-20 September 1940 when two Bombays from No.216 Squadron based at Heliopolis

attacked the forward Italian camps at Sidi Barrani. The 202 Group Operations Record Book

recorded the aircraft, ‘released 320 – 20 lb. bombs in to the area where 1200 M.T. [motor

64 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 2-3; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 63-64; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 212. 65 P.R.M. Drummond, ‘The Air Campaign in Libya and Tripolitania,’ The RUSI Journal 88, no.552 (1943), 250- 251. 66 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command, 244. 171

transport] were grouped at BARRANI. Sustained bombing continued for 4 hours. Important

physical and moral[e] results bound to accrue from our tactics.’67

The attack was repeated the next night when No.216 Squadron again attacked two Italian

defended positions four miles south of Sidi Barrani. The area was observed to contain over 600

vehicles and the attack was timed to correspond to a raid by 7th Armoured Division. The process

to drop the bombs was delicate. Each bomb had to be individually fused by a crewman in the

Bombay before being passed to another member to toss out the open door of the aircraft.

Collishaw estimated that the bombs could be dropped at a rate of about one per minute. The scale

and intensity of these attacks would never cause substantial damage to the enemy but it had a

significant harassment factor. Collishaw recognized this but thought the morale effect was

significant:

Whether these bombs ever actually hurt anyone on the ground I do not know but we had ample evidence that their use lowered the morale amongst the Italian troops and increased the demands for aerial protection. These raids, despite their near-comedic aspect, called for much fortitude and determination on the part of our crews. Not only did they have to expose themselves to continued anti-aircraft fire for lengthy periods and possible interception by enemy fighters, but there was always the possibility that one of the bombs would explode in the aircraft.68

This type of attack was common for 202 Group in the period following the Italian advance into Egypt. What was lacked in numbers was made up in variety. Small scale raids were directed at a multitude of Italian targets: harbours, airfields and fortified camps and the lines of

67 Operations Record Book, 202 Group, September 1940, TNA AIR 25/801. 68 Collishaw with Dodds, Air Command, 244. The comedic aspect of these raids was fully exposed in an article in the October 1966 issue of Stag, a men’s adventure magazine. In an article title, ‘“Bessie the Bombing Bitch”: Zaniest Air Raid of WWII,’ Martin Caidin and Lino Morris recount a sensationalized account of the raid. Many details are wrong including the date (stated as the night of 10 June when the Italians declared war), the aircraft (a Vickers Valencia [sic] rather than the Bristol Bombay), and the weapon (hand grenades). But, the other details including the target of the attack are correct. The initial erroneous telling of this episode appears to date to an article in the June 1963 issue of the RAF Flying Review by Keith Hine titled ‘Bessie’s Night Out.’ This article also gets the above details wrong and it even has Collishaw piloting the Valencia on the first British attack of the war on the Italians. It makes for great reading even if it only contains a kernel of the truth. 172

communications.69 A focus by Collishaw on the main supply ports in Cyrenaica compelled the

Italians to devote a large proportion of their fighter force to mount standing defensive patrols.

This reduced the offensive potential of the Italian air force so that by October it was largely

reduced to sending single aircraft on low level raids. Only three of 20 raids during this period

were reported to have caused minimal damage to British targets.70 The success of the air attacks

on the Cyrenaican ports, especially Tobruk, forced the Italians to disembark many of their tanks and other armoured vehicles at Benghazi and drive them to the front, a distance of nearly 700 kilometres. This long trek had a significant effect on the mechanical reliability of the Italian armour and contributed to the high rate of breakdowns suffered during the British offensive which commenced in December.71

The strategic situation in the Middle East was a matter of grave concern for the British

following the defeat of France and the Italian declaration of war. General Wavell, responsible for

a large and vulnerable area which included the Mediterranean, Egypt, the Suez Canal, the Middle

East and East Africa, was desperately short of troops to meet all these demands. Wavell was

called back to England to meet with Churchill and the Ministerial Committee on Military Policy

in the Middle East72 in early August to discuss the state of affairs. The exchange resulted in

reinforcements, including aircraft, being despatched to the Middle East. It would take some time

for this help to arrive as the direct Mediterranean was too risky for large convoys. As a result,

69 In the period from 13 September to 9 December 1940, Collishaw’s aircraft conducted 98 sorties against ports and bases, 52 sorties against airfields and 58 sorties against fortified camps and the lines of communications. See RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 73. 70 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 69. 71 The first stage of the eastward movement from Benghazi to Barce, a distance of 108 kilometres, made use of a local railroad. Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 3. 72 In July Churchill, recognizing the importance of the Middle East, established a Ministerial Committee composed of the Secretaries of State for War, India and the Colonies, to monitor the situation in the region and report back to him. Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 186. 173 most of the troops and equipment were shipped around the Cape while aircraft were landed at

Takoradi in the Gold Coast where they would be assembled and flown across the continent to

Egypt.73

In early October Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for War, visited the Middle East to investigate the needs of the commanders. He met with Wavell and Wilson for three hours on the morning of 15 October and was fully briefed on the situation in Egypt.74 The army commanders were satisfied that their forces in the Western Desert were sufficient to stop any renewed Italian offensive towards Alexandria. Reinforcements had brought the army up to a strength that would hold any further Italian advances, and expected deliveries in the near future would prepare the army for its counter-offensive. Their only caveat was that a successful defence was contingent on the availability of adequate air support. The RAF was having great success in harassing the

Italians, but it was doubted that it had sufficient strength to support the counter-offensive. Wavell was confident that the threat from the Italian army had been contained, but he was worried about the potential of the Italian air force. Intelligence estimated that 700 Italian aircraft were deployed in Libya and this number could be rapidly increased by reinforcements from Italy. Longmore believed that three additional fighter squadrons were needed in the desert to protect the army from air attack. This weakness in the air led Wavell to consider postponing the offensive indefinitely. Eden reported to Churchill and General Sir John Dill, the Chief of the Imperial

General Staff that:

73 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 185-190, 197-201; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 50. Wavell was to receive three armoured regiments along with other reinforcements which were expected to arrive by the end of September and be ready for action by the middle of October. Aircraft were to be sent to Egypt at a rate of 36 Blenheims, 6 Wellingtons, and 18 Hurricanes per month, along with a number of other deliveries including an additional 24 Hurricanes delivered by the aircraft carrier HMS Argus and 36 Hurricanes (including 12 to Egypt) for the South African Air Force. 74 Eden had met with Wavell and Longmore the day before. 174

General Wilson’s ability to defeat the enemy in any attack that he may make in the near future is dependent entirely upon adequate air support. Liaison between Army and Air Force is excellent and R.A.F. are giving support, for which no praise can be too high, within their existing limited resources. But both C.-in-C. [Wavell] and A.O.C.-in-C. [Longmore] are emphatic that present strength of Air Force in Middle East does not permit of that support being given to the Army in battle which is essential for success. Reinforcement of the R.A.F. is the pressing need of the hour here and will, I am convinced, prove to be the decisive factor.75

Eden argued that while steps had been taken to increase the numbers of guns and tanks, it

was imperative that the air force be strengthened as well. The Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed

with this assessment and quickly directed the Air Ministry to send the reinforcements. This

personal intervention by Eden, based on his first-hand knowledge of the situation, was essential

in securing the aircraft needed to allow the planned offensive in Egypt to proceed on schedule.76

In mid-October Longmore took the opportunity to write the newly appointed Chief of the

Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, to provide him with a ‘brief summary of the

situation out here.’77 Longmore’s report filled six-and-a-half pages of foolscap which gives some

indication of the complexity and diversity of his command. Longmore went into considerable

75 Letter from Secretary of State for C.I.G.S. and P.S. to S. of S. for Prime Minister, 15 October 1940, Annex to C.O.S. (40) 837, 16 October 1940, TNA CAB 80/20. 76 Letter from Secretary of State for C.I.G.S. and P.S. to S. of S. for Prime Minister, 15 October 1940, Annex to C.O.S. (40) 837, 16 October 1940, TNA CAB 80/20; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 68; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 250-252 The plan for the air reinforcement of the Middle East was made two days after Eden’s telegram. Longmore requested three additional fighter squadrons and the Air Ministry agreed to send them but it would take time for these new units to arrive. In the short term Longmore’s command was strengthened by replacing obsolescent types with modern aircraft as well as by expanding the establishment of the two heavy and 12 medium bomber squadrons from 12 to 16 aircraft. To make this happen, the monthly quota of aircraft was raised to 48 Blenheims and 24 Hurricanes while 23 Wellingtons would be flown out in October. A further step was the allocation of American aircraft (149 Glenn Martin bombers and 227 Mohawk fighters) previously destined for the French air force. The bombers would not arrive in sufficient quantities until early 1941 while the American fighters were found to be defective and were relegated to a training role. See ‘Air Reinforcements in the Middle East, Note by Air Staff,’ 17 October 1940, C.O.S. (40) 838, TNA CAB 80/20. 77 Letter, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore to Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, 14 October 1940, TNA AIR 23/1337, 1. Portal officially took up the post of Chief of the Air Staff on 25 October 1940. The previous CAS, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, left the position on 2 October 1940 and two days later Portal, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, was notified that he was to be the next CAS. See Denis Richards, ‘Portal, Charles Frederick Algernon, Viscount Portal of Hungerford (1893–1971),’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edition, January 2011 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.remote.libproxy.wlu.ca/view/article/31561, accessed 16 September 2012]. 175

detail regarding the state of the defences in the Western Desert, Egypt, Sudan, Aden, Kenya,

Palestine, Malta and Iraq as well as the situation in Italian East Africa. Overall, Longmore was

satisfied with his various commands though he noted some areas of friction. The political

situation in Egypt required constant attention. He stated that even though the King and his

entourage were pro-Italian, the government overall was supportive of the British effort. Egyptian

military support could not be assured in the event of an Italian attack. Relations with the navy

were difficult. Admiral Cunningham spent much of his time at sea which was great for

facilitating naval command but made liaison with the other services difficult. In spite of the

important support provided by 202 Group for naval operations off the coast of North Africa,

Cunningham was very critical of the overall amount support provided by the RAF in the

Mediterranean, especially at Malta.78

Relations with the army were much better though Longmore was concerned that Wavell

‘still hankers’ for air force units to be placed directly under army operational control. However,

‘it is quite obvious that we cannot afford such luxuries and that what we’ve got must be used in the common interest, Navy, Army and Air, and not uneconomically locked up for one particular

Service.’79 Longmore’s chief fear was that Italian air strength in the Libya would overwhelm

Collishaw’s numerically smaller force.

The final page of Longmore’s summary concerned personnel issues in the Middle East.

Longmore was anxious about who would take over his command if he became a casualty. He

had requested the appointment of a second-in-command from the Air Ministry in June and again

78 Letter, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore to Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, 14 October 1940, TNA AIR 23/1337, 3-4. See also Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, 267-268, 316-317. 79 Letter, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore to Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, 14 October 1940. TNA AIR 23/1337, 4. 176

in August but nothing had yet happened.80 A dearth of surplus officers in his command left him

few options to replace casualties. His first choice as his deputy would be Air Vice-Marshal Sir

Ranald Reid, the Air Officer Commanding British Forces in Aden. Air Commodore Sir John

D’Albiac would then be sent from Palestine to Aden and Group Captain J.W.B. Grigson,

Collishaw’s Senior Air Staff Officer at 202 Group, would go to Palestine. As discussed earlier,

Longmore took this opportunity to inform Portal Collishaw was one of the few untouchables in

this command.81

* * * * *

The period following the Italian declaration of war could have been disastrous for the

small British army in Egypt. Marshal Graziani held the advantage on the ground and in the air

but his reluctance to attack ceded the advantage to the British. The Royal Navy’s Mediterranean

Fleet continued to influence matters at sea and the Italian navy was hesitant to offer a challenge.

In the air the RAF launched an interdiction campaign against Italian ports and airfields in Libya.

Though small in scale, this air effort took the initiative away from the Italians who responded by

deploying their air force in a defensive role that was largely ineffective and wasteful of

resources. The use of the air umbrella also came with a significant opportunity cost for the

Italians by limiting their ability to conduct offensive air operations of their own. The limited

offensive launched by Graziani in September may have complied with Mussolini’s orders but it

did nothing to improve the tactical position of the Italian army in the Western Desert.

80 Air Vice-Marshal O.T. Boyd was appointed to be Deputy AOC in C, HQ RAF Middle East on 8 November 1940 but when he flew out from England to take up the post his aircraft mistakenly landed in Sicily rather than Malta and he was taken prisoner. Air Vice-Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder was subsequently appointed to the post on 29 November and arrived in Cairo in 10 December. See Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945, 225; Richards, Royal Air Force, vol.1, 269-270; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 81; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, GCB (London: Cassell & Company, 1966), ch.1. 81 Letter, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore to Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, 14 October 1940. TNA AIR 23/1337, 5. 177

The RAF during the period played a significant role in demonstrating British strength when the reality was not quite so robust. Royal Navy operations to bombard Italian coastal positions received important air support to prevent interference by the Italian air force and to facilitate air observation for the naval gunfire. Perhaps most importantly, early difficulties in coordination were corrected in later operations by closer liaison between the two services. The aerial interdiction campaign conducted by 202 Group would be small by the standards established later in the war, but its effectiveness was apparent at the time. Collishaw enjoyed

Longmore’s full confidence during this period and was considered the only ‘untouchable’ during the reorganization of RAF leadership in the Middle East just before the launch of the British counter-offensive.

Postwar histories have focused on two telegrams sent to Collishaw by Longmore which appeared to reprimand the First World War ace for being too aggressive and wasteful of his scarce resources. This criticism has become one of the key pillars in assessments of Collishaw’s command ability. The reality of the situation was quite different. Before the start of the war

Collishaw showed a keen awareness of the finite resources at his command and knew that pilots and aircraft could not be wasted. An examination of the air operations conducted by 202 Group does not demonstrate a wasteful use of resources. It is true that Collishaw was an aggressive commander in the Western Desert, but this was dictated by the nature of the conflict rather than any inherent bias of his fighter pilot background. This characterization does Collishaw a great disservice. It is true that he was one of the leading aces during the First World War, but he was not recklessly aggressive in this role. If he had been it is likely his name would be remembered along with the countless other aerial pioneers who did not survive the war. Staff College and years of command at very senior levels and operational experience in various theatres had

178 imbued him with a rational understanding of the limits of his resources. Collishaw’s conduct of the early air campaign reflected the realities of the situation. He adopted offensive tactics to counter a numerically superior enemy but he ensured that no exceptional risks were taken; the overall low RAF loss rate during this period confirms the viability of these actions.

The halt of the Italian offensive at Sidi Barrani offered the British the opportunity for a counterstroke. General Wavell considered that the time was right to launch a limited offensive to push the Italians back out of Egypt. The RAF support would be a crucial aspect of this plan.

179

Chapter 6 – Operation Compass I: The Battle of the Camps and Bardia

The caution of the Italian military in the preliminary stages of the Western Desert

campaign during the summer of 1940 provided an opportunity for a British counteroffensive.

This chapter will examine the first stage of Operation Compass to show that the success of the

plan was considerably aided by the close working relationship established between Lieutenant-

General Sir Richard O’Connor, the army commander of Compass, and Collishaw. RAF

operations helped to provide the necessary conditions for the initial success of the Battle of the

Camps and the subsequent Battle of Bardia was a model of combined operations where RAF and

RN support were crucial to the quick capture of the port.

Planning for Operation Compass, the first British attack in the desert, started in the

aftermath of the Italian advance in September. General Archibald Wavell ordered Lieutenant-

Generals ‘Jumbo’ Wilson and Richard O’Connor to prepare a counteroffensive to be launched

once the enemy reached Mersa Matruh. When the Italians stopped and proceeded to build camps

in the desert around Sidi Barrani, Wavell recalled that, ‘I began to consider the possibility of an

early offensive action. The enemy’s defensive arrangements, which I studied daily on a map

fixed to the wall facing my desk, seemed to me to be thoroughly faulty. He was spread over a

wide front in a series of fortified camps, which were not mutually supporting and separated by

wide distances.’1 The British attack would take advantage of this Italian weakness by exploiting a gap in the line of camps to loop around behind the line and attack from the west. In the period

leading up to the offensive O’Connor’s forces actively patrolled the gap to prevent the

establishment of any defences in that sector. The RAF plan was conceived by Collishaw.

1 A.P. Wavell, ‘Operations in Western Desert October to December 1940 (Notes on Genesis and Working Out of “COMPASS” Plan),’ 15 December 1940, TNA WO 201/2691, 3. 180

Longmore ordered Collishaw to use his Hurricanes for low-level attacks on the enemy lines of communications once the offensive began, and when in range, also to use Hurricanes for low-

level attacks on the Italian fighter airfields. This would continue to force the Italian fighters into

a defensive role and prevent attacks on British troops. Aside from these instructions, Collishaw

was left free to work with O’Connor to plan the air offensive.2

Operation Compass was the first major British offensive of the war. It was conceived and

planned in a short time period and little was committed to paper to preserve its secrecy.

Lieutenant-General O=Connor envisioned a limited counterattack to recover the Egyptian

territory lost in the Italian attack in September. The immediate objectives were the Italian fortified camps south of Sidi Barrani, along with the town itself. He had at his disposal only two

divisions – 4th Indian and 7th Armoured – along with some other assorted units.3

This short five-day operation was divided into three stages. The first phase would see the

4th Indian Division, supported by the 7th Royal Tank Regiment, move through the 24-kilometre-

wide Nibeiwa-Rabia gap and sequentially attack the fortified camps established by the Italians at

Nibeiwa, Tummar East and Point 90. This main attack would be supported by 7th Armoured

Division which would prevent interventions from either Buq Buq or Sofafi while Selby Force, the British garrison from Matruh, would advance along the coast to fix the Italian garrison in

Maktila. In the second phase of the operation 4th Indian Division would capture Sidi Barrani while in the final stage 7th Armoured Division would attack either the remaining Italian camps around Sofafi or complete liberation of Egypt by advancing to Sollum. Air support was to be

2 A.P. Wavell, ‘Operations in Western Desert October to December 1940 (Notes on Genesis and Working Out of “COMPASS” Plan),’ 15 December 1940, TNA WO 201/2691, 6; Arthur Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946), 245; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 75. 3 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148. 181

provided by Collishaw’s 202 Group and elements of the Royal Navy would support the attack by

shelling coastal towns and fortifications held by the Italians.4

In the period following the Italian advance into Egypt, the RAF’s attacks were designed

to interfere with the enemy’s ability to sustain and continue offensive operations. Air raids were

made on Bardia, Tobruk, Derna and Benghazi to make the ports unusable, coastal shipping was

interdicted and Italian infrastructure such as camps, supply depots and airfields were targeted.

The scale of these attacks increased in the days leading up to Compass while airfields were

attacked. The small number of available fighters was directed to fly offensive sweeps to prevent

Italian air reconnaissance from discovering the approach march as well as to keep the Italian air

force on the defensive. The navy would support the offensive through the bombardment of the enemy camps.5

The size of Collishaw’s command had not changed significantly since the Italian entry into the war, but it had become more powerful. Older, obsolescent aircraft were replaced by

newer types which gave the British a qualitative advantage in the air. In June 1940 Collishaw

commanded nine squadrons. On the eve of Operation Compass, his establishment had increased

to ten squadrons according to most accounts, though this included a number of partial units.6 The

Gloster Gladiators remained in small numbers, but two squadrons of Hurricane Is had been

4 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148; Field Marshal Lord Wilson, Eight Years Overseas 1939-1947 (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1948), 46-48; I.S.O. Playfair et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1: The Early Successes against Italy (to May 1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), 260-62. 5 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 3-4; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 75-76, TNA AIR 41/44; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 260-62. 6 June 1940: Nos.30, 45, 55, 113 & 211 Squadrons (Blenheim I), No.70 Squadon (Valentia), No.216 Squadron (Valentia and Bombay), No.208 Squadron (Lysander), No.33 Squadron (Gladiator). December 1940: No.45 Squadron (Blenheim I), Nos.55 & 113 (Blenheim IV), Nos.33 & 274 (Hurricane I) and No.208 Squadron (Lysander and Hurricane I), and No.3 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) (Gladiator & Gauntlet) were the only full squadrons, plus elements of No.112 Squadron (Gladiators), Nos.11 & 39 Squadrons (Blenheim I & IV) and No.6 Squadron (Lysander). 182

added. The Hurricane had been one of the victors of the Battle of Britain but it was well on its

way to obsolescence in the skies of Western Europe. However, in the Western Desert in

December 1940, it was the fastest, most powerfully armed fighter and had no peer. The strike

component of 202 Group had also been upgraded. The Blenheim I was being phased out for the

Blenheim IV. This new variant boasted a longer range and larger bomb load while increasing

crew survivability with cabin armour and more defensive machine guns. The army support

squadrons had begun to switch from their Lysanders, which made excellent reconnaissance

platforms but were too vulnerable to enemy fighters and anti-aircraft defences, to Hurricanes.

The biggest change in the offensive power of the RAF was the addition of three heavy bomber

squadrons of Vickers Wellingtons.7 These squadrons remained under the administration of

Longmore but were under the operational control of Collishaw.8 The range and striking power of

the Wellington was significantly more than the Blenheim and allowed the British to hit Italian

ports and airfields further afield.9

This qualitative increase in Collishaw’s command would be essential once Operation

Compass began as the Italians boasted a significantly larger air force that could be rapidly

7 Two useful sources on aircraft performance are Enzo Angelucci and Paolo Matricardi, World War II Airplanes, 2 vols. (New York, Rand McNally, 1978) and Philip Guedalla, Middle East 1940-1942: A Study in Air Power (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1944), 223-234, which contains a useful appendix, ‘Aircraft Who’s Who,’ which give details of aircraft speed, range, armament, etc. Other discussions of the relative merits of the aircraft employed in the Middle East may be found in most histories, but the following sources are recommended: RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 28-29; John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 303-304; Roderic Owen, The Desert Air Force (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1948), 27, 34-35. 8 The bomber squadrons were nominally under the direct command of Longmore, but he made it clear in his Despatch that he had delegated full operational control to Collishaw. See Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Middle East Air Operations, 13 May 1940 to 31 December 1940,’ 1 February 1941, TNA AIR 23/808, 15. 9 The Wellington IC had more than twice the range and four-and-a-half times the bomb load of the Blenheim I (2,550 miles and 4,500 lbs compared to 1,125 miles and 1,000 lbs). Guedalla, Middle East 1940-1942, 227, 229. The Wellington was considered a heavy bomber early in the war, but the advent of the Avro Lancaster and Handley Page Halifax led to its reclassification as a medium bomber. 183

reinforced across the Mediterranean. At the start of the battle Collishaw’s force stood at 48

fighters and 116 bombers compared to 191 fighters and 140 bombers available to the Italians.10

While Operation Compass was the main effort of British forces in the Middle East, it was not the only active front. Air Chief Marshal Longmore’s RAF Middle East command was conducting operations against the Italians in the Sudan and East Africa and his squadrons based in Aden and Malta were also engaged. The main diversion from Egypt was Greece. Relations between Italy and Greece deteriorated in the fall of 1940 and on 28 October Mussolini launched a pre-emptive invasion of the neighbouring country. Britain pledged to support the Greeks and the only source of troops and squadrons to provide immediate aid was Egypt. Air Chief Marshal

Longmore did his best to balance the competing demands placed on his forces. On 31 October he despatched No.30 Squadron (Blenheim fighters and bombers) to Greece, an action applauded by

Churchill as a very bold and wise decision, but as the RAF staff history observed, the transfer

‘was the thin edge of a substantial wedge.’11 The British Chiefs of Staff subsequently directed

Longmore to send three Blenheim squadrons along with two Gladiator squadrons which arrived

in Greece by mid-November.12 Longmore expressed his misgivings about this move to the

Chiefs of Staff as the loss of these squadrons was a significant drain on his resources but there were larger issues at play. The immediate impact of these moves was to delay the start of

Operation Compass from November to the end of the first week of December. This was not the

10 These are the numbers quoted by Playfair and Collishaw. Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 262; Raymond Collishaw and R.V. Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story (London: William Kimber, 1973), 244. The British estimated before the operation that the Italians had 250 fighters and 250 bombers available to them. RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 76. 11 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 70. 12 This directive included No.30 Squadron. The other units were Nos.84 and 211 Squadrons (Blenheim) and No.80 Squadron (Gladiators). 184

last time that affairs in Greece would negatively impact the conduct of operations in the Western

Desert.13

In the week leading up to the counterattack, the RAF launched a variety of missions to

prepare for Operation Compass. Despite poor weather during this period, Collishaw continued to

send small numbers of aircraft to attack a wide range of Italian targets. The intent was to

maintain the initiative and keep the Italian fighter force on the defensive. Starting on 4 December

with an attack on Tobruk’s El Adem airfields the raids increased in scale. The Wellington

squadrons based in Egypt had primarily operated against targets in support of the Greek

Campaign during November but starting on 7 December, two days before the start of Compass,

they were directed against Italian airfields in Libya. On that same day Wellingtons from No.148

Squadron based in Malta attack airfields near Tripoli. The Italians were caught by surprise and

the Wellingtons were able to bomb from low level claiming to have destroyed or damaged 29

Italian aircraft. The cost was two Wellingtons damaged by Italian fighters which scrambled late

and chased the bombers over the Mediterranean.14 The next night, on the eve of the

counteroffensive, the attacks against Italian airfields continued. At dusk 12 Blenheims attacked

Benina airfield at Benghazi while later that night a further 29 sorties were carried out by

Blenheims and Wellingtons based in Egypt. The British claimed 10 Italian aircraft destroyed on

the ground.15 Longmore believed that these attacks ‘had considerable effect in reducing the scale

of the [Italian air] attack at the beginning of the British Offensive.’ These attacks forced the

13 Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Middle East Air Operations, 13 May 1940 to 31 December 1940,’ 1 February 1941, TNA AIR 23/808; see also RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 69-71; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, ch.12. 14 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 74-75; Christopher Shores, Giovanni Massimello, and Russell Guest, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, vol.1: North Africa - June 1940-January 1942 (London: Grub Street, 2012), 491. British claims were very close to the actual number of aircraft reported damaged or destroyed by the Italians during the attack. 15 Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 86. 185

dispersion of the Italian fighter force and muted the Italian air response to the start of the

offensive.16

In immediate support of the army, Collishaw’s three fighter squadrons flew patrols over

the British concentration areas to prevent interference and discovery by the Italians. The day

before the commencement of the offensive was a vulnerable period for O’Connor’s forces as

they concentrated in the desert before the assault. Surprise was an essential element of the plan and it would only take one Italian reconnaissance aircraft to discover the plan. On the night before the attack the RAF was busy conducting a number of diversionary operations. RAF

Blenheims and Fleet Air Arm Swordfish worked with HM Ships Terror and Aphis to bombard the Italian camp at Maktila and HMS Ladybird to bombard Sidi Barrani. Collishaw again used his Bombays and their small bombs to attack the Italian camps at Sidi Barrani and Bardia with the intention of hindering the despatch of reinforcements. The four Bombays each carried 600

20-pound bombs. As an added security measure, a loud, lumbering Bombay was flown over

British lines to drown out the sounds being made by the advancing British columns. As a result of these efforts, there were virtually no Italian air attacks prior to the commencement of Compass on 9 December and the few attacks that occurred caused no significant damage.17

One of the more remarkable aspects of Operation Compass was the ability of the Western

Desert Force to set up two large undefended supply points, cross a wide expanse of open desert

and arrive on the doorstep of the Italian camps without detection. The British had taken great

16 The quotation is from the AHB narrative but see also Longmore’s account in his memoirs. RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 75; Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945, 245. 17 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 4; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 77; Collishaw and Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 245; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol.1, 266, 272; Denis Richards, Royal Air Force, vol.1: The Fight at Odds (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), 270-71. 186

care to establish two Field Supply Points in the desert 40 miles west of Matruh. Only a thin

screen of British forces lay between them and the Italians, and their discovery or destruction

would have spoiled the British offensive. On 6 December the 4th Indian Division departed from

Maaten Baggush and halted in the desert near Bir Kenayis for 36 hours. On the morning on 8

December the formation crossed 60 miles of desert and arrived at a point about 15 miles from

Nibeiwa before dusk.18

The inability of the Italian air force to discover this move has received much comment in

the literature. The British official history indicated that Italian air activity was minimal during

the approach march on 7-8 December: ‘Only one Italian aircraft was seen, at about midday [on 8

December], but nothing occurred to suggest that it had observed anything unusual.’19 The war

diary of the 4th Indian Divisional Artillery concurred with this observation, but the after-action report of the Western Desert Force reported that, ‘during the approach march and assembly stages on 7th and 8th December, Italian aircraft were in the air above units and formations, both when halted and on the move, yet the subsequent complete surprise of the enemy suggests that his suspicions were not aroused.’20 This was the important point. The British movements in the

desert were observed but no alarm was raised the enemy.

Italian sources reveal that their air force had discovered and reported the British presence

in the desert. The Italian commander, Marshal Graziani, received a number of reports of unusual

British activity at the beginning of December, but he interpreted these moves as British

18 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 262. 19 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 267. This comment was likely derived from an observation by O’Connor made in the report he wrote when he was a prisoner of war. See ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 6. 20 ‘Report of the Lessons of the Operation in the Western Desert December, 1940,’ 31 December 1940, TNA WO 201/352, 4; ‘Report of Capture by 4th Indian Division of Enemy Positions at Nibeiwa, the Tumars, etc., South of Sidi Barrani, Culminating in the Capture of Sidi Barrani Itself, 9, 10, 11 December 1940,’ n.d. (ca. January 1941), Appendix B – ‘War Diary of 4th Indian Divisional Artillery Covering Period 7 Nov 40 to 14 Dec 40,’ TNA WO 201/352, 3. 187

preparations to counter the renewed offensive that he planned. Other Italian intelligence reports,

including information from captured prisoners, indicated that a British offensive could be

expected in the near future. Two interrelated factors contributed to the Italian intelligence failure;

the inability of the Italians to make sense of the various intelligence sources and the disruption of

Italian reconnaissance flights by the RAF. While the British did not achieve operational surprise,

they were able to maintain tactical surprise. Though some Italian aircraft were able to report on

the British rear area, additional Italian reconnaissance flights were prevented from completing

their flights which may have provided the necessary corroborating evidence of the impending

British attack.21

No.208 Squadron, the army cooperation squadron assigned to work with the Western

Desert Force, conducted extensive reconnaissance of the Italian camps in the weeks leading up to

the commencement of Compass. Air photos showed the position of the camps, the layout of the

defences and the progression of construction as the Italians improved the quality of their

defensive works. These air photos were invaluable during the planning for the offensive.

Lieutenant-General O’Connor remarked that due to the short planning period for the operation as well as the need to preserve security, ‘no continuous close reconnaissance of the objective was possible, [so] information would be restricted to what could be supplied by aerial photography, and specially selected officers’ patrols lying out for period of at least 24 hours.’22

21 Italian sources included aerial reconnaissance reports as well as prisoner of war interrogations and limited signals intelligence. Ministero della Difesa Stato Maggiore Esercito, La Prima Offensiva Britannica in Africa Settentrionale (Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1979), 102. These details are confirmed by F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.1: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979), 375; and Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 273-275. 22 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., 3, TNA WO 106/2148; the appendices to the Operations Record Book of No.208 Squadron for November and December 1940 contain thousands of images of the Italian camps. See TNA AIR 27/1249-1252. 188

The first objective for the 4th Indian Division was the Italian camp at Nibeiwa. It was the

strongest of the defended camps and was the base for the Maletti Group, the main Italian

armoured force. Lieutenant-Colonel A. Anderson, commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion,

Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, the first group of infantry to follow the tanks into the camp,

described the camp as:

roughly rectangular in shape, and covered an area of approximately 2,400 by 1,800 yards. The defence perimeter was complete all the way round except for a small gap in the north-west corner, and built up in the form of a wall with sangars. The absence of loose rock probably accounted for the shortage of ‘Dragons’ Teeth’ around the camp. A special type of anti-tank obstacle had been constructed on the eastern and southern faces. Anti-tank minefields were laid all around the camp except in the north-western face. There were no wire obstacles. Machine gun and ant-tank gun emplacements were built in every twenty-five yards of perimeter, about a hundred and fifty in all – twice as many emplacements as any other camp possessed. The centre of the camp was a mass of earthworks with a few tents and about 250 vehicles widely dispersed.23

The camp’s chief weakness was first discovered in the air photos; a supply route through

the mine fields led into the northwest corner. A British patrol confirmed the unmined entrance 24

hours before the commencement of the operation. Shortly after sunset on 8 December, the 11th

Indian Infantry Brigade, with 7th Royal Tank Regiment (7th RTR) in support, set out on the final

march to capture Nibeiwa camp. As this force advanced the Italian garrison was distracted by

Bombays from No.216 Squadron which harassed the camp with small bombs. The attack

commenced at 0500 hours when a small Indian detachment opened fire on the camp from the

east. The Italians thought this to be a small scale raid and were not overly concerned until the 72

guns of the 4th Divisional Artillery opened fire at 0715 hours. The barrage was timed to cover

the main attack from the west by 48 Matilda tanks of the 7th RTR.24

23 G.R. Stephens, Fourth Indian Division (Toronto: McLaren and Sons, 1948), 16. 24 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 4; ‘Report of Capture by 4th Indian Division of Enemy Positions at Nibeiwa, the Tumars, 189

Nibeiwa had been chosen for the initial attack in part because it harboured the main

Italian armoured force in Egypt composed of 35 M11/39 medium tanks and 35 L3/35 light tanks.

The attack out of the mist from the rear so completely surprised the Italians that two-thirds of the

medium tanks, which had been deployed outside the camp to protect the camp’s vulnerable

entrance, were destroyed in ten minutes before they could be fully manned. The camp was then

breached by the British tanks and two battalions of infantry. The Matilda, classed a heavy tank in

1940, was slow but boasted 78 mm of frontal armour which made it impervious to almost every

weapon deployed by the Italians. Its 40 mm main gun was able to penetrate any Italian tank. The

Italians offered stubborn resistance but they had no means to stop the British armour and the

camp was captured by 1040 hours. The commanding general, Pietro Maletti, was killed and

2,000 prisoners were captured. The British and Indian forces lost eight officers and 48 men as

casualties.25

Before the capture of Nibeiwa camp was complete, the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade

bypassed it to attack Tummar West. Aerial reconnaissance revealed this camp was built in much

the same way as the first including an unmined entrance in the northwest corner. Consequently,

the plan for the assault was a replay of the first attack. By 1100 hours the 4th Divisional Artillery

was on the move though it was bombed from the air while in transit. The 7th RTR lost six tanks

in the minefield as it exited Nibeiwa and mechanical issues with other tanks meant that the

original 48 Matildas had been halved but they were ready to attack Tummar West by 1300 hours

following an hour-long preparatory artillery barrage. The Matildas were again able to gain easy

etc., South of Sidi Barrani, Culminating in the Capture of Sidi Barrani Itself, 9, 10, 11 December 1940,’ nd (ca. January 1941), TNA WO 201/352, 6-8. 25 ‘Report of Capture by 4th Indian Division of Enemy Positions at Nibeiwa, the Tumars, etc., South of Sidi Barrani, Culminating in the Capture of Sidi Barrani Itself, 9, 10, 11 December 1940,’ n.d. (ca. January 1941), TNA WO 201/352, 6-8; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 266-268; Ian W. Walker, Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts: Mussonlini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa (Marlborough, Wiltshire: Crowood Press, 2003), 62; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 78. 190

access to the Italian camp, but they found resistance by the camp’s garrison significantly stronger

than at Nibeiwa. The arrival of two battalions of infantry as well as truck drivers from a company

of the New Zealand Army Service Corps enabled the capture of the majority of the camp by

1600 hours.26

Though there was some fear of an Italian counterattack, the momentum of the attack was

maintained by sending six Matildas on to Tummar East. Again the unsupported armour was able

to force its way into the Italian camp. The attack was to have been reinforced by a battalion of

Indian infantry (4th Battalion, 6th Rajputana Rifles), but this was delayed when it was

counterattacked by a force of Italian infantry and light tanks which advanced from Tummar East.

The Indian infantry, along with a platoon of British Vickers machine guns from the 1st Battalion,

Royal Northumberland Regiment, concentrated their fire on the advancing Italians and in ten

minutes 400 of the enemy had been killed or wounded and the counterattack was contained. This

delay meant that the capture of Tummar East could not be completed before nightfall but the

tanks and Indian infantry partially secured the position. The next morning the remaining Italian

garrison surrendered.27

On the second day of the offensive O’Connor and Major-General Sir Noel Beresford-

Peirse, commander of the 4th Indian Division, continued to pressure the Italians. The 16th

British Infantry Brigade of the 4th Indian Division was ordered north to cut the road west of Sidi

Barrani. In spite of opposition in the area of Alam el Dab and a dust storm which reduced

26 ‘Report of Capture by 4th Indian Division of Enemy Positions at Nibeiwa, the Tumars, etc., South of Sidi Barrani, Culminating in the Capture of Sidi Barrani Itself, 9, 10, 11 December 1940,’ n.d. (ca. January 1941), TNA WO 201/352, 9-10; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol.1, 267-69; Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941, ’ The London Gazette, 26 June 1946, 3263- 3264. 27 ‘Report of Capture by 4th Indian Division of Enemy Positions at Nibeiwa, the Tumars, etc., South of Sidi Barrani, Culminating in the Capture of Sidi Barrani Itself, 9, 10, 11 December 1940,’ n.d. (ca. January 1941), TNA WO 201/352, 9-10; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol.1, 267-69; Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ The London Gazette, 26 June 1946, 3263- 3264. 191

visibility and hindered communications, the coast road was interdicted by 1330 hours, effectively

isolating the Italian garrison in Sidi Barrani. Brigadier Cyril Lomax, commander of 16th

Brigade, quickly put together an attack on the town. The advance commenced at 1615 hours led

by two British infantry battalions supported by the divisional artillery and some tanks of the 7th

and 4th RTRs. The town was quickly captured and the Indian Division found ‘an embarrassing

number of prisoners on our hands.’28 Selby Force continued to apply pressure from the east and

by 11 December the remains of 1st and 2nd Libyan Divisions had been encircled and joined the

men of 4th Blackshirt Division as prisoners of the British.29 The number of Italian troops

captured was so great that it was difficult to get an accurate count. A tally sent from the

headquarters of the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards could only estimate that ‘there were about

five acres of officers and two hundred acres of other ranks.’30

By the end of the second day the battle was essentially over as the Italians ceased to offer

serious resistance. A captured Italian officer was sent into the Italian camp at Point 90 on 10 June

to demand the surrender of the garrison. The commanding officer initially agreed with this

request but soon changed his mind and refused to capitulate. Beresford-Peirse ordered an

infantry attack to be prepared but following an artillery bombardment the British discovered

2,000 Italians formed up as if on parade to surrender. It seems the commander’s ‘honour had

been satisfied’ by the show of force.31 The British were prepared to assault the remaining Italian

28 ‘Report of Capture by 4th Indian Division of Enemy Positions at Nibeiwa, the Tumars, etc., South of Sidi Barrani, Culminating in the Capture of Sidi Barrani Itself, 9, 10, 11 December 1940,’ n.d. (ca. January 1941), TNA WO 201/352, 15. 29 ‘Report of Capture by 4th Indian Division of Enemy Positions at Nibeiwa, the Tumars, etc., South of Sidi Barrani, Culminating in the Capture of Sidi Barrani Itself, 9, 10, 11 December 1940,’ n.d. (ca. January 1941), TNA WO 201/352, 13-15; Playfair et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 270. 30 Cited in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), 610-611. 31 Stephens, Fourth Indian Division, 23; ‘Report of Capture by 4th Indian Division of Enemy Positions at Nibeiwa, the Tumars, etc., South of Sidi Barrani, Culminating in the Capture of Sidi Barrani Itself, 9, 10, 11 December 1940,’ n.d. (ca. January 1941), TNA WO 201/352, 15. 192

camps of Rabia and Sofafi but the Cirene Division retreated on the night of 10 December under

the cover of a sandstorm. O’Connor sent 7th Armoured Division across the desert to Buq Buq

where it captured additional large groups of Italians. By 12 December only a small number of

Italians remained in Egypt where they guarded the approaches to Libya at Sollum and Sidi Omar.

Even these outposts were abandoned in the face of British probes and by 16 December Bardia

marked the Italian frontier in the desert.32

The Battle of the Camps, or the Battle of Marmarica as it is known to the Italians, was an

overwhelming British success. In an operation largely concluded within 72 hours, O’Connor’s small force of two divisions had routed a much larger Italian army. As the British official history records: ‘the Western Desert Force captured no fewer than 38,300 Italian and Libyan prisoners,

237 guns, and 73 light and medium tanks. The total of captured vehicles was never recorded, but more than a thousand were counted. The British casualties were 624 killed, wounded and missing.’33 The British gained the initiative early in the operation and the off-balance Italians

were never able to recover. The 4th Indian Division after-action report offered this appraisal of

the battle:

The operations were favoured by good fortune. Generally speaking, everything went according to plan as far as 4 IND DIV was concerned; the enemy was undoubtedly completely surprised; Italian aircraft were over us during our approach to the battle area, and still we were able to surprise the Italians. Nevertheless this brief campaign may well become a classic as a successful campaign, utilizing our modern mobility and resources to good advantage, showing the success which can attend on secrecy, boldness in planning and care in staff duties, and above all, on courage and dash by officers and men in actual battle.34

32 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 270-271. 33 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 273. 34 ‘Report of Capture by 4th Indian Division of Enemy Positions at Nibeiwa, the Tumars, etc., South of Sidi Barrani, Culminating in the Capture of Sidi Barrani Itself, 9, 10, 11 December 1940,’ n.d. (ca. January 1941), TNA WO 201/352, 28. 193

In London, Churchill enthusiastically supported a continuation of the offensive into

Libya. Writing to Wavell on 17 December he stated,

Your first objective now must be to maul the Italian Army and rip them off the African shore…We were very glad to learn your intentions against Bardia and Tobruk, and now to hear of the latest captures of Souum and Capuzzo.

I feel convinced that it is only after you have made sure that you can get no further that you will relinquish the main hope in favour of the secondary action in the Sudan or Dodecanese…but neither of them ought to detract from the supreme task of inflicting further defeats upon the main Italian army.35

This was problematic due to the competing resources for British forces currently in the

Western Desert. On the cusp of the victory at Sidi Barrani Wavell had surprised O’Connor on 11

December by withdrawing 4th Indian Division, which was being sent to the Sudan, and replacing

it with the inexperienced 6th Australian Division. Operations also continued in Greece and it was

clear that further diversions of men and material would soon be needed there.36

With the liberation of Egypt complete and the Italian army in full retreat, O’Connor could

have ended Compass and been entirely satisfied with the results but he saw a greater opportunity.

After consulting with his commanders and receiving full support from Wavell and London, he

decided to press on. The objective of phase two of Compass was the capture of the fortified ports

of Bardia, Tobruk and Derna. These ports, needed for the shipment of supplies, were essential

for any further advance. Sollum, a small, but useful port, was captured on 16 December and it

was soon apparent that the Italians intended to make a stand in Bardia.37

For the RAF, the capture of Sidi Barrani meant an opportunity to scale back the tempo of

operations. Collishaw’s fighters had been flying as many as four sorties a day at the start of

35 Quoted in John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London: Collins, 1964), 298-299. 36 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 8-9. 37 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 10. 194

Compass and that rate was not sustainable. RAF casualties in the first week were remarkably

low; only four Blenheims and six fighters had been destroyed. Losses on the Italian side were

considerably higher. It was estimated that 74 Italian aircraft had been destroyed in aerial combats

with British fighters and an even higher number had been destroyed on the ground. Though

British combat losses were minimal, the serviceability rate was dropping. The desert was an

unforgiving environment and the forward airfields had limited facilities to overhaul aircraft.38

The stress of these intensive operations was soon felt on 202 Group. Longmore wrote to

Collishaw four days into the operation to caution him: ‘Our reserves of Gladiators are now

practically exhausted. You must consider adjusting your operations according to the fighter

situation, relying if necessary on night bombing.’39 Collishaw responded by curtailing close support missions by his fighters and concentrating on offensive sweeps intended to continue the disruption of the Italian air force.40

The Italian air force appeared to recover from the initial shock of the British offensive

around on the middle of December. Heavy bombing attacks were directed at the British army and

Collishaw’s aircraft were frequently called to intervene. On 13/14 December units of 4th

Armoured Brigade were delayed during a night move past Sidi Omar and Bardia to cut the road

to Tobruk. As a result the column did not arrive at their first objective, Sidi Asseiz, until after

daybreak and were subjected to what Lieutenant-General O’Connor referred to as ‘the worst

day’s bombing of the campaign.’ The Italians directed over 20 separate attacks at the column but

38 Even taking the notorious unreliability of pilots’ claims into account, it is clear that there was a large discrepancy in the fortunes of the British and Italian air forces by this point in the campaign. See Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 4; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 272. 39 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, December 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051. 40 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 2; Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, December 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051. 195

‘casualties, in view of the severity of the attack [were] extraordinarily light.’41 Two days later the

Italians conducted another large scale raid directed at British armoured units in the Sidi Omar –

Azeiz – Bardia area. A number of large formations of S.79s supported by fighters attempted to

support the retreat of the Italian army. In particular, this air support was directed to help the

besieged Italian garrison at Sidi Omar. The British estimate that some 57 Italian bombers

supported 36 fighters attacked during the course of the day’s fighting. Hurricanes from No.274

Squadron, with pilots attached from the newly-arrived No.73 Squadron, shot down three Italian bombers. The day proved particularly costly for the Italians who lost a group commander and two squadron commanders in the ill-fated raid. British losses, in the air and on the ground, were negligible.42

British and Indian army records from this period record numerous instances of Italian air attacks during the initial phase of Operation Compass but the overall impact of these raids on

ground operations was minimal. There were some casualties and material and equipment

destroyed, but the losses did not impact operations. Many of the attacks were disrupted by the

RAF presence over the battlefield. Collishaw’s fighters conducted offensive patrols which

damaged and destroyed a significant number of Italian aircraft and upset the attack of many

others.43 On 13 December Collishaw requested additional Hurricanes for No.3 Squadron RAAF to ‘protect forward troops against enemy air attack’ but it was not possible to introduce new

41 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 11. 42 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 81; Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940- 1945, 96-97; Hakan Gustavsson and Ludovico Slongo, Desert Prelude: ‘Operation Compass’ (Petersfield, Hampshire, UK: Stratus/MMP Books, 2010). 43 Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 86-102; Gustavsson and Slongo, Desert Prelude: ‘Operation Compass’, 72-78. 196

aircraft in the middle of operations.44 Though this request was denied, British aircraft continued

to account for more enemy aircraft damaged and destroyed than they lost.45

The 4th Indian Divisional Artillery reported a strafing attack by three Breda Ba.65

aircraft on the morning of 9 December which killed one gunner and wounded another from 31st

Field Regiment. The next day a number of CR.42s machine gunned positions occupied by 1st

Field Regiment without effect. Shortly afterwards 31st Field Regiment was again attacked by 12

fighters and a gun tractor was destroyed.46 The 7th Medium Regiment of 4th Indian Division was

targeted numerous times on 10 December, but each time the Italians were repelled as the troops

‘replied vigorously’ with Bren light machine guns and Bofors cannons. It was remarked that the

ability to return fire was ‘a great morale stimulant to our troops, whatever the damage to the

enemy may have been.’47 Like the infantry, 7th Armoured Division was not greatly bothered by

the Italian air force during Compass. There were numerous reports of air attacks but no serious

damage was caused. The after action report of the division also highlighted the importance of

being able to fight back:

One point was brought out which seems to be worthy of consideration: that there is a definite moral effect in having light A.A. artillery dispersed actually among the troops which they are detailed to protect instead of, for example, out on the flanks.48

44 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, 13 December 1940, TNA AIR 24/1051. 45 This accounting is based on the recent examination of British and Italian records conducted by Christopher Shores and his team in their recent book as well as another new book that provides a very detailed examination of air operations in Operation Compass based on British and Italian documentary evidence. See Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945; Gustavsson and Slongo, Desert Prelude: ‘Operation Compass’. 46 ‘Report of Capture by 4th Indian Division of Enemy Positions at Nibeiwa, the Tumars, etc., South of Sidi Barrani, Culminating in the Capture of Sidi Barrani Itself, 9, 10, 11 December 1940,’ n.d. (ca. January 1941), Appendix B – ‘War Diary of 4th Indian Divisional Artillery Covering Period 7 Nov 40 to 14 Dec 40,’ TNA WO 201/352, 5, 7. 47 ‘Report of Capture by 4th Indian Division of Enemy Positions at Nibeiwa, the Tumars, etc., South of Sidi Barrani, Culminating in the Capture of Sidi Barrani Itself, 9, 10, 11 December 1940,’ n.d. (ca. January 1941), TNA WO 201/352, 14. 48 ‘Report of the Lessons of the Operation in the Western Desert December, 1940,’ 31 December 1940, TNA WO 201/352, 22. 197

The ability of the ground troops to fight back against attacking aircraft, rather than absorb

the attacks without recourse, significantly raised the morale of the troops.49

Italian bombers scored one notable success on Christmas Eve when Sollum harbour was

attacked. Following its capture on 16 December this small port was used by the British to help

supply their forces and relieve the strain on the overland logistical system. The port was an obvious target and was bombed by Italian aircraft and shelled by a long-range gun known as

‘Bardia Bill.’ The need to send anti-aircraft batteries to Greece left the Western Desert badly under-represented and only one battery of 3.7-inch guns (four guns) could be spared to defend the port. Collishaw had three fighter squadrons at his disposal, but his force was too weak to maintain a standing patrol over Sollum and the British lacked any kind of early warning system to provide notice of incoming raids and allow time for fighters to be scrambled. The Italian raid on the 24th was carried out by three squadrons on SM.79 bombers escorted by 22 CR.42s.

Physical damage was minimal as the jetty was struck and one lighter was hit and subsequently beached, but 17 men were killed and a further 30 wounded in the attack.50 Overall, minimal

damage was caused by the many Italian attempts to stop the flow of supplies at Sollum. The navy

reported that the primary impact of the air attacks and shelling was a delay in landing supplies.

49 The phenomenon of men breaking down under constant air attack was a problem during the siege of Tobruk but it was found that those most susceptible to battle exhaustion were those with no ability to fight back. Very low levels of battle exhaustion were experienced by the anti-aircraft crews at Tobruk. For a more detailed discussion see E.L. Cooper and A.J.M Sinclair, ‘War Neuroses in Tobruk: A report of 207 patients from the Australian Imperial Force Units in Tobruk,’ Medical Association Journal of Australia, 1 August 1942, reprinted in Terry Copp and Mark Osborne Humphries, Combat Stress in the 20th Century: The Commonwealth Perspective (Kingston, Ontario: The Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010), 163-176; and 9th Australian Division ‘Report on Operations in Cyrenaica, March-October 1941, Including the Defence of Tobruch,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/353. There is also a discussion of this issue in Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 62-63. 50 The casualties were primarily sustained by two Cypriot pioneer companies and a New Zealand MT Company. RAF Middle East Operational Summary No.198, ‘Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 25th December, 1940,’ TNA AIR 23/1071; RAF Middle East Operational Summary No.199, ‘Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 26th December, 1940,’ TNA AIR 23/1071; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 280; William F. Buckingham, Tobruk: The Great Siege, 1941-42 (Stroud, Gloustershire, UK: The History Press, 2008), 92; Gustavsson and Slongo, Desert Prelude: 'Operation Compass,' 95-96. 198

There was not much the British could do to diminish the threat of air attack on Sollum, other

than destroy the Italian air force, but the artillery menace was dealt with on 31 December when

‘Bardia Bill’ was put out of action by British artillery directed by air observation conducted by

No.208 Squadron.51

Offensive RAF operations during the first phase of Compass largely blunted any serious

attempts by the Italian air force to stop the British advance. The majority of Italian sorties during

this period were flown in defensive operations in reaction to Collishaw’s moves. Minimal attacks

were made against the British army in the field, and the Italians made no attempt to attack targets

further afield, like Alexandria, which had been largely stripped of their defensive fighter

squadrons in order to provide the strength necessary in the desert.

The British next turned their attention to the reduction of Italian fortress at Bardia. The

Italians had been constructing the defences of the port since 1937 and no expense had been

spared. The port was protected by a 29-kilometre perimeter which featured an anti-tank ditch, extensive belts of barbed wire and two lines of prepared defences. In the forward line the

defended posts were spaced every 450 to 700 metres. Each concrete post, protected by its own

anti-tank ditch and barbed wire, featured one or two anti-tank guns, two to four machine guns and deep trenches. The inner line of defences was sited to cover the front line and act as a fallback position. Six large minefields covered the perimeter and additional mines were scattered throughout the belts of barbed wire.52 Lieutenant-General Annibale Bergonzoli’s XXIII Corps mustered elements of five divisions and he was determined to hold Bardia. Mussolini sent a

51 ‘Artillery Reconnaissance at Bardia, 23 Dec 1940 to 8 Jan 1941,’ annex to Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Army Co-Operation Carried Out in Connection with the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya,’ 31 January 1941, TNA WO 201/348. 52 ‘Summary of the Battle of Bardia,’ ca.1945, TNA CAB 106/833; Gavin Long, To Benghazi (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1961 (1952)), 147-148.; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 282; Craig Stockings, Bardia: Myth, Reality and the Heirs of Anzac (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2009), 109-115. 199

message to Bergonzoli on 22 December 1940: ‘I have given you a difficult task, but one suited to

your courage and experience as an old and intrepid soldier, the task of defending the fortress of

Bardia to the last. I am certain that ‘Electric Beard’ and his brave soldiers will stand, at whatever

cost, faithful to the last.’ Bergonzoli replied: ‘I am aware of the honour and I have today repeated

to my troops your message – simple and unequivocal. In Bardia we are, and here we stay.’53 He

had good reason to express such confidence. Bardia was a natural fortress and his garrison was

strong and well supplied. The defences were of considerable strength and Bergonzoli was

prepared to endure a long siege. Craig Stockings notes that Italian morale was shaken by the

unexpected British victory in December and many of the formations in the garrison had been

badly mauled in the fighting. He further observed that ‘tonnage of concrete was not the secret of

a tactically sound position. Much would depend on the troops charged with attacking and

defending the fortress, and much more on the quality of the plans directing those men.’54

The British captured plans of the Bardia fortress when they occupied Sidi Barrani. It was

estimated on 17 December that the garrison totalled approximately 15,000 to 20,000 men and

100 guns. If the British had been aware of the true strength of the garrison – over 40,000 men

and 400 guns – they might have been more cautious in their approach to Bardia. To capture this

strongly-held port the British had available two divisions, 6th Australian and 7th Armoured, as

well as 16th Infantry Brigade and some other assorted infantry, armoured and artillery units.

Overall, the attackers numbered some 20,000 troops, 122 guns and 26 tanks – a significantly

smaller force than the defending garrison.55

53 ‘Summary of the Battle of Bardia,’ ca.1945, TNA CAB 106/833, 11-12; Also quoted in Long, To Benghazi, 201. Bergonzoli was nicknamed ‘Barba Electrica,’ (Electric Whiskers or Beard) due to his ‘spiky white beard parted down the middle. Stockings, Bardia, 63-64. 54 Stockings, Bardia, 114-115. 55 The strength estimate for the Bardia garrison comes from a situation map dated 17 December. This estimate was increased to 24,100 men and 130 guns on 24 December but was then revised downward again on 26 December to 17,215 men. See ‘Operation ‘COMPASS’: situation and operational reports.’ TNA WO 106/2136. 200

O’Connor, aggressive as always, sent 4th Armoured Brigade forward to cut the Bardia-

Tobruk road on night of 13/14 December. General Wavell, however, was more cautious regarding an attack on Bardia. On 16 December he sent a telegram to General Sir John Dill, the

Chief of the Imperial General Staff, which outlined three options for Bardia: induce the garrison to surrender, isolate and lay siege, or leave the Tobruk road open and allow the enemy to retreat.

Wavell considered surrender unlikely and British forces too weak to attempt the second, even

with the low estimate of the garrison, so he proceeded with the third option.56 The 4th Armoured

Brigade was subsequently recalled and sent to capture Sidi Omar on 17 December. By 19

December it was apparent that the Italians intended to hold Bardia so O’Connor ordered the

Support Group of 7th Armoured Division to advance and close the road to Tobruk. This was accomplished by 20 December completing the encirclement of the Italian garrison. O’Connor instructed Major-General Iven Mackay, the commander of the newly-arrived 6th Australian

Division, to the capture of the port.57

During the pause between the capture of Sidi Barrani and attack on Bardia Collishaw was

struck by a ‘miserable bout of the flu that greatly weakened’ him.58 On a visit to the front on 21

December, Longmore discovered Collishaw in his weakened condition and ordered him back to

Cairo to convalesce. In the course of his week away from the front Collishaw was invited by

Longmore to spend three days at Luxor, the former ancient Egyptian capital of Thebes. They

joined a group of officers, their wives and Freya Stark, an English explorer and travel writer who

was working for Ministry of Information. Longmore recalled, ‘we rode donkeys, saw the sights

56 Telegram, Personal for C.I.G.S. from General Wavell, dated 16 December 1940. ‘Operation ‘COMPASS’: situation and operational reports.’ TNA WO 106/2136. 57 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 11; General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ 3265, Supplement to The London Gazette, 25 June 1946; Middle East Training Pamphlet No.10, ‘Lessons of Cyrenaica Campaign, December 1940-February 1941,’ n.d., Copy in author’s possession; also found in TNA WO 201/2586, 18. 58 Collishaw and Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 247. 201

and, as one would expect in such pleasant company, it was altogether a most refreshing interlude

in a very strenuous period.’59 It was a welcome, and needed, break from the stress of operations

for Collishaw.

Collishaw was temporarily replaced by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder who had

recently been sent to Egypt as Longmore’s deputy commander. Tedder used this as an

opportunity to gain ‘an insight into that part of the job which I could never have hoped to acquire

any other way.’60 He spent his time visiting units and talking with people and came away

‘tremendously impressed by our high morale.’ Tedder commented on the quality of Collishaw’s

headquarters staff. Group Captain J.W.B. Grigson, the Senior Air Staff Officer, and Wing

Commander Charles ‘Freddy’ Guest, who was about to replace him, were both considered assets

to the group. Tedder remarked that the group was fortunate to have ‘three first-class liaison

officers in the two soldiers and the sailor, who were clearly invaluable in arguing our case’ with

the army and navy.61 Tedder was not required to assume much command responsibility during

his time with 202 Group as his tenure in command corresponded with a break in operations.

No.55 Squadron flew one operation between 19 and 28 December and overall only 50 bombers

sorties, largely directed at the main Italian airfields at Gazala, Derna and Timimi, were flown

from 23-30 December. This reduced level of operations corresponded with the Christmas

holiday, the army’s pause before continuing its offensive, as well as a period of poor weather.62

59 Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945, 247. 60 Lord Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, GCB (London: Cassell & Company, 1966), 44. 61 Tedder, With Prejudice, 45-46, 55. 62 No.55 Squadron Operations Record Book, December 1940, TNA AIR 27/516; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 82. 202

Collishaw returned to his headquarters on New Year’s Eve in time to coordinate RAF

support for the attack on Bardia.63 Prior to falling ill, Collishaw had directed his bombers to

concentrate on the reduction of the Bardia garrison. The British briefly hoped that a strong

demonstration on the ground towards Bardia combined with concerted air attacks on the port

would drive the Italians out without a fight, but the enemy intended to hold Bardia. The air

programme against the port began on 11 December when Collishaw’s Blenheim squadrons

attacked Bardia in the morning and afternoon. This pattern continued for the next three days

without loss until 14 December when an attack by three squadrons – Nos.55, 211 and 113 – was

intercepted by a large formation of Italian CR42s. The Italian biplanes, generally not a

significant threat to the Blenheims, had surprised the British force owing to poor visibility over

the target area. The resulting combat cost the British one aircraft shot down, three men killed and

seven aircraft damaged. Subsequent operations were not affected as the aircrew losses were light

and the aircraft were replaced with spares. Future daylight raids on Bardia, however, were

largely avoided.64 On the night of 14/15 December nine Wellingtons struck the port, but the largest attack occurred on the night of 15/16 December when 36 aircraft drawn from six squadrons – five RAF and one Fleet Air Arm – attacked at the town’s main defences, troop concentrations and supply dumps. According to No.55 Squadron’s Operations Record Book, this was Bardia’s ‘Night of Hell.’65 Over the next five nights a further 150 sorties targeted the port.

The British continued to attack Italian airfields at Tobruk, Castel Benito, Benina and Berka to

63 Tedder, With Prejudice, 55. 64 This incident would lead Squadron Leader Tony Dudgeon, the commanding officer of the Blenheim squadron that was shot to pieces, to criticize Collishaw’s command abilities severely. Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 94-95; Gustavsson and Slongo, Desert Prelude: ‘Operation Compass’, 60; Playfair et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol.1, 13; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 80. 65 No.55 Squadron Operations Record Book, December 1940, TNA AIR 27/516. 203

attrite the Italian air force.66 It was reported by Italian sources that no fewer than 44 of their

aircraft were destroyed in the raids between 18 and 22 December.67

Collishaw’s return to the desert corresponded with a substantial increase in the tempo of

operations. The army’s attack on Bardia was planned for the early morning of 3 January and the

RAF stepped up their bombing attacks in anticipation of the Australian assault. Between 31

December and 2 January 202 Group flew 100 sorties against targets in and around Bardia. On

New Year’s Eve 27 Blenheims struck the port. The next night the Wellingtons of Nos.37, 38 and

70 Squadrons dropped 18,000 pounds of bombs. To ensure accuracy the Wellingtons used dive- bombing tactics and released their bombs at an altitude of only 2,500 feet. Bombays from

No.216 Squadron and Swordfish from the Fleet Air Arm also attacked Bardia that night. The day before the attack 44 Blenheims carried out ‘sustained bombing attacks on BARDIA from 06.00 to 16.00 hours, inflicting heavy damage to Italian M.T. vehicle concentrations and encampments inside the BARDIA defences.’68 The attacks continued into the night and on the eve of the

Australian assault, the Wellingtons and Bombays combined to drop 30,000 pounds of munitions.

Over 80,000 pounds of high explosives were directed at the port in the days before the battle.69

The intensity of these bombing raids made an impression of the war diarist of the 16th Australian

Infantry Brigade who recorded, ‘RAF bombers hailed loads of bombs on Bardia throughout the

66 Details of these attacks may be found in the daily operational summaries compiled by HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071. 67 Giuseppe Santoro, L'aeronautica italiana nella IIa Guerra mondiale (Rome: Danesi, 1950), 397 quoted in Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 278; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 79- 81. 68 ‘Operational Summary No.207 – Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 3rd January 1941,’ HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071. 69 Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, 4674, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809]; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 83; Gustavsson and Slongo, Desert Prelude: ‘Operation Compass’, 106-116; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 284. 204

night…[which gave] our enemy a sleepless, tortured night before the battle.’70 This sustained bombing had a significant effect on the Italian garrison. An Italian doctor recalled that: ‘The bombing was very terrifying; the Libyan troops were almost completely demoralized and the

Italian troops were almost as bad. Half of their food supply had been destroyed by bombs on the port area, and for two days before the surrender certain units had no food. Casualties from the bombing were slight, but the material damage was large.’71 This heavy scale of preparatory bombing would be an important factor in levelling the odds of a small assault force attacking a much larger entrenched garrison.

An integrated air and naval plan was worked out to support the Australian attack on

Bardia. O’Connor’s staff discovered that the weakest point in the Italian perimeter was 4,000 yards south of the Bardia-Tobruk road. His plan was based on ‘comprehensive air photographs…taken of the Bardia defences’ which were supplied by No.208 Squadron.72 The

16th Australian Infantry Brigade would breach the line after the engineers cleared the mines. The

RAF would deliver ‘sustained heavy bombing and fighter attacks against the point of entry’

while enemy positions immediately in front of the advancing troops would also be targeted.73

While the attack was taking place Bardia was to be isolated from outside Italian interference.

Tobruk would be bombed and British fighters would attack the route between the two ports to

interdict the movement of reinforcements. Counter-air operations were conducted by Collishaw’s

bomber squadrons against the principal Italian aerodromes between Derna and the frontier to

minimize interventions by enemy aircraft. No.55 Squadron sent out pairs of Blenheims at ten-

70 War Diary, 16th Australian Infantry Brigade, 2 January 1941, Australian War Memorial 52, 8/2/16. 71 Quoted in Owen, The Desert Air Force, 37. 72 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 4b. 73 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 83. 205

minute intervals throughout the day to interdict Italian aerodromes.74 These offensive operations

allowed the RAF to take the Italian air force out of the battle. The air superiority achieved by

Collishaw’s fighters was commented upon by the Australians: ‘We had expected heavy enemy air co-operation with his own troops. Savoia’s, Caproni’s, CR42’s and Macchi’s or any other type of Italian aircraft with which we have been familiar, were, as they say, conspicuously absent.’75

The Royal Navy contributed significant units to support the land battle. The Inshore

Squadron, composed of the monitor HMS Terror, and the Insect-class gunboats Ladybird, Aphis

and Gnat, bombarded the northwest sector of the Bardia perimeter most of the day before the

assault, and again at dawn on 3 January. This force retired to make way for the battleships

Warspite, Valiant and Barham, supported by seven destroyers, which pummelled the Italian

defences with 246 rounds of 15-inch shells and over 500 rounds of 6-inch and 4.5-inch shells for

45 minutes commencing at 0810 hours. It was reported that the Italians subjected to this heavy

fire ‘appeared dazed.’ After the big ships left the area, the Inshore Squadron returned and

continued to shell Italian positions for the rest of the day.76 The Australians observed after the

battle that the naval bombardment had a significant material and morale effect on the Italian

defenders. Craters six metres wide and three metres deep were left in the hard ground by the

impact of the 15-inch rounds. One Italian vehicle park hit by the naval bombardment looked like

74 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 4b; No.55 Squadron Operations Record Book, December 1940, TNA AIR 27/517; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 83, TNA AIR 41/44. 75 War Diary, 16th Australian Infantry Brigade, 3 January 1941, Australian War Memorial 52, 8/2/16. 76 G.A. Titterton, The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. vol.2: November 1940-December 1941 (London: Whitehall History Publishing in association with Frank Cass, 2002 [1952]), 57-58. 206

a ‘giant wrecking yard.’77 The Australians encountered weak resistance from the Italian

defenders who had been subjected to such devastating naval gun fire.

The British feared that the Italian Air Force would commit large forces to defend Bardia, and it did try to intervene. Their aircraft were grounded early in the morning of 3 January by a sandstorm. When it lifted just before noon bombers and their fighter escorts were despatched to the Bardia area. The Italians concentrated on attacking British naval forces off Bardia, a tactic that offered no relief to the besieged garrison. Just before noon a flight of three to four SM.79s escorted by 14 fighters attacked HMS Terror as it shelled Bardia. The aircraft encountered heavy naval anti-aircraft fire and dropped their bombs without effect. A second formation of five

SM.79s with no escort approached the monitor at 1310 hours and was intercepted by a single

Hurricane from No.73 Squadron. In the resulting combat, the pilot shot down three of the Italian bombers and damaged the other two so severely that they crashed before they could return to base. Terror reported a number of other Italian air raids, but no bombs caused any damage and at least three bombers were downed by naval gunfire. No effective Italian air raids on the

Australians were recorded on 3 January.78 The absence of any significant Italian aerial presence

led Bardia’s defenders to issue a desperate plea for help requesting ‘All our aircraft in Libya.’79

This message was intercepted and the headquarters of 6th Australian Division issued a warning

to its units to expect heavy reprisal attacks the next day. The Italians made a number of

determined attempts to strike at the Australians, but most of the raids were driven off by patrols

of British Hurricanes and Australian Gladiators. One exception occurred when a large formation

77 Stockings, Bardia, 358-359. 78 ‘Operational Summary No.208 – Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 4th January 1941,’ HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071; Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 104-106; Gustavsson and Slongo, Desert Prelude: ‘Operation Compass’, 112-117. 79 War Diary, 16th Australian Infantry Brigade, 3-4 January 1941, Australian War Memorial 52, 8/2/16. 207

of 17 Italian bombers escorted by 20 fighters attacked the Australians. The raid targeted an area

near the headquarters of the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade and six men were killed and

several others wounded.80

The Australians attacked with the benefit of significant support from the air force and the navy. To this fire power, Mackay made generous use of his own artillery. On the day of the

attack, 3 January 1941, Mackay used his artillery to offset the numerical disparity and mask his

men as they crossed the open ground of the desert. The 2/1st Battalion was the first unit to attack

at 0530 hours and it quickly breached the anti-tank ditch and barbed wire barriers in the

northwest sector of the Italian perimeter. The other two battalions of the 16th Australian Infantry

Brigade, supported by 26 Matilda infantry tanks, were then committed to continue the battle.

While this was taking place the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade made a diversionary attack on

the southern perimeter into the teeth of the Italian defences. Progress in this area was slow and

costly. The main attack made good progress and quickly outflanked and overcame the Italian

infantry and artillery positions northeast of the Bardia-Capuzzo road. The RAF and Royal Navy

supported the attack by suppressing the defenders in Bardia and in the area north of the Bardia-

Tobruk road. By 1745 hours the next day the town of Bardia had been captured and all resistance

ended on 5 January when the strongly-held positions in the southern portion of the perimeter

surrendered. The capture of this well-defended fortress was a substantial accomplishment for the

Australians. The battle was concluded with the capture of 45,000 Italians troops, 462 guns, 117

light and 12 medium tanks. The cost for the Australians was a relatively modest 456 casualties.81

80 Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 106-107. 81 General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ 3265, Supplement to The London Gazette, 25 June 1946; Middle East Training Pamphlet No.10, ‘Lessons of Cyrenaica Campaign, December 1940-February 1941,’ n.d., 17-20. Copy in author’s possession; also found in TNA WO 201/2586; Long, To Benghazi, chs.7-8; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 282-287. 208

The RAF provided a wide range of support during the attack on Bardia. During the

course of 3 January Collishaw’s Blenheim squadrons (Nos.39, 45, 55 and 113 Squadrons)

repeatedly attacked the main Italian landing grounds at Martuba, Gazala, Tobruk, Derna, Tmimi

as well as the seaplane base at Bomba to minimize interference by the Italian air force.

Additionally, Blenheims from No.55 Squadron effectively bombed enemy troop concentrations

south of Bardia to support the Australian advance. The fighter squadrons (Nos.33, 73 and 274)

maintained offensive patrols to screen the battle area. This was essential to allow the army co-

operation aircraft, especially the Lysanders, as well as the Fleet Air Arm aircraft spotting for the

naval task force, to conduct their missions. No.208 Squadron flew low over the battlefield to

direct the guns of the artillery and No.3 Squadron RAAF conducted low level offensive patrols

over the battle area to cover the advance of the infantry.82

British Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden adapted Churchill’s famous quote about the

Battle of Britain to describe the capture of Bardia: ‘Never has so much been surrendered by so

many to so few.’83 The victory is often portrayed as the remarkable achievement of a green

infantry division supported by a small armoured force. To read these accounts is to understand

the battle as an infantry/armour victory. In fact, the successful assault of Bardia was the result of

a comprehensive modern joint operation using the combined resources of the army, air force and

navy. When Wavell thought his attacking force was approximately the same size as the Bardia

82 ‘Operational Summary No.207 – Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 3rd January 1941,’ HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071; ‘Operational Summary No.208 – Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 4th January 1941,’ HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071; Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 4b; Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, 4674, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809]. 83 Telegram, Foreign Minister to Prime Minister, 6 January 1941 quoted in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 14. Churchill’s original quote about the Battle of Britain was: ‘Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.’ See Richards, Royal Air Force, 196. 209

defenders he did not intend to attack Bardia. He believed the strength of its garrison was too

great and he preferred to occupy the port by allowing its defenders to flee. Conventional military

wisdom states that an attacking force needs to outnumber the defenders by a ratio of 3-1 to

ensure success, and this ratio should be even higher when attacking a prepared fortress

position.84 Original British estimates of the size of the Bardia garrison were wrong and the

defenders actually outnumbered the attackers by more than 2-1 in manpower, and nearly 4-1 in

artillery. All things being equal, this was a recipe for disaster for the attacking force unless it

possessed some type of force multiplier. This was present in the form of the air force and the

navy. The RAF isolated the battlefield, neutralized the Italian air force, bombed the garrison and

supported the land battle with direct support, reconnaissance and artillery spotting while the RN

used its considerable firepower to neutralize the Italian defences inside the perimeter. The battle

still had to be fought and ultimately it was the army that breached the Italian defences, reduced

the garrison and captured the objective. It can reasonably be concluded that without the support

of the air force and the navy, the army’s battle for Bardia would have been very different. This

does not take away from the impressive achievement of the Australians in their first battle in the

Western Desert but rather, it helps to explain how such a small force could so quickly and

efficiently capture a strongly defended fortress.85 The successful joint nature of the Bardia operation should have become a model for future operations between the three services, but the

84 For a full discussion of the 3-1 ratio see, John Mearsheimer, 'Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and its Critics,' International Security 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989), 54-89. 85 Conventional accounts of this battle abound. The British and Australian official histories concentrate on the ground battle, though Playfair does describe RAF operations leading up to the ground assault. Even the official RAF history does not provide a detailed description of the battle. The capture of Bardia does not rate a mention in the RN official history though there is better coverage of naval operations in volume 2 of the Naval Staff History. See, Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 282-287; Long, To Benghazi, chs.7-8; Richards, Royal Air Force, vol.1, 272-273; Titterton, The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. vol.2, 56-58. A recent book by Craig Stockings provides the most comprehensive account of the battle that is likely to be written and recognizes the importance of the RAF and RN contribution to this battle. See Stockings, Bardia, ch.18. 210

lessons seem to have been almost immediately lost and it would take considerable time, effort

and cost to again achieve such close cooperation.

The first phases of Operation Compass were a complete and unexpected success.

O’Connor and Collishaw were keen to continue the offensive and Wavell sought approval from

Churchill. The Italians were in full retreat but the continuation of the offensive was not a

certainty. The situation in Greece continued to reduce the size of British forces in the Western

Desert. Four days after the capture of Bardia Air Chief Marshal Portal ordered Longmore to

reinforce the air contingent in Greece with the despatch of three fighter and two bomber

squadrons; the Gladiators of No.112 Squadron and the Blenheims of No.11 Squadron were

withdrawn immediately. Portal fully understood the impact this would have on operations in the

Western Desert but his view corresponded with that of Churchill who considered Greece to be a more important theatre. Operations continued towards Tobruk but there was no certainty on the part of either the air force or the army how long this would continue in the face of the continuing reinforcement of Greece.86

86 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 286-288; Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier, 303- 307; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 84-85. 211

Chapter 7 – Operation Compass II: Tobruk and Beda Fomm

The second phase of Operation Compass followed naturally from the overwhelming

success of the initial battles. British planners took advantage of the disorganised and demoralised

state of the Italian army to push them out of Cyrenaica. This chapter analyses the air support

provided by Collishaw’s aircraft for the continued advance and demonstrates that the RAF

played a significant role in keeping the Italians from recovering and was an important factor in

allowing an increasingly exhausted and extended British army to continue its advance.

The Italian defeats in the Western Desert in December and early January 1941 had shaken the morale of the Italian public and left the Italy’s king, Victor Emmanuel III, pessimistic about stopping the British advance. He advocated a withdrawal from Cyrenaica to prevent their already weak forces from being destroyed but Mussolini remained resolute that this was a mere setback and the war would end with a German victory over the British. He had great confidence that the Italian garrison in Tobruk would succeed in halting the British.1

While this discussion what taking place in Rome, General Wavell was planning his next attack. He had set his sights on Tobruk even before the conquest of Bardia had been completed and Lieutenant-General O’Connor had ordered 7th Armoured Brigade to continue its westward advance on the morning of 5 January. The aerodrome at El Adem, the main Italian airfield and repair depot in Cyrenaica, was captured almost without opposition that same day. The British found 87 aircraft abandoned at the airfield. Most had sustained bomb and/or machine gun damage and the Italians lacked the facilities to return them to service. By 7 January the

Australian 19th Brigade Group had disengaged itself from the fighting at Bardia and had reached

1 Galeazzo Ciano, The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1946), 333-334, 336. 212

the eastern defences of Tobruk. The fortress was surrounded. The attack on Tobruk would be

delayed for more than two weeks, primarily for logistical reasons. The Field Supply Depots at

Capuzzo and Sollum were too far back and it took time to bring forward the daily needs of the

divisions, build reserves for the attack and prepare stocks to support a continued advance until

the port of Tobruk could be made operational.2

The campaign had been successful for the RAF but it posed challenges that needed to be

addressed. Collishaw took advantage of the pause following the capture of Bardia to reorganize

his forces. The rapid advance from Egypt had strained the RAF supply system as much as that of

the army. The move forward to the outskirts of Tobruk left RAF airfields at least 150 miles from

the front. Commencing on 10 January Collishaw moved his forces forward. He established his

headquarters in the old police headquarters near the airfield at Sollum. His bomber and fighter

squadrons occupied aerodromes in the Sollum-Bardia area and the army support squadrons

moved forward to Gambut, halfway between Tobruk and Bardia.3 The bomber and fighter

aircrew as well as the ground personnel responsible for servicing the aircraft had worked hard

since the start of Compass with only a brief respite over Christmas. Collishaw took this

opportunity to rest his men for the upcoming battles. Between 11 and 18 January all the

Blenheim squadrons were rested except for No.55 Squadron which carried out one raid on the

barracks and aerodrome at Derna on 16 January. The fighter and army cooperation squadrons

were more active but their operational tempo was significantly less than the period before or

2 General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ 3265, Supplement to The London Gazette, 25 June 1946; I.S.O. Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol. 1. The Early Successes against Italy (to May 1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), 287- 290; Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War: volume III - the Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 650-651. 3 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 85-86. 213

after. Only the Wellington squadrons kept up their regular nightly attacks on the Italian ports,

airfields and other establishments during this period.4

Tobruk was the second major garrison that Marshal Graziani ordered to be held in the

face of the British advance. He had considered evacuating the Bardia garrison to Tobruk, but was

overruled by Mussolini who ordered that both ports were to be held with the aim of delaying and

grinding down the enemy until fresh army and air force units could be deployed from Italy.

Tobruk was the more important of the two ports, but its defences were considerably weaker.

Compared to Bardia its perimeter was twice as long – 27½ miles – but defended by half the

number of men and guns – 25,000 troops and 200 guns. The defended line extended between 8

and 9 miles in a semi-circle from the apex of the port. The forward defences, not as complete as

at Bardia, consisted of a double ring of defended concrete positions behind a continuous barbed

wire fence. An anti-tank ditch protected some sections of the perimeter and mines and booby-

traps were liberally used in the defence. The inner line of defence was anchored on the forts at

Pilastrino, Solaro, Airente and Marcucci as well as a number of other defended localities.

Significantly, the main aerodrome of El Adem was located outside the defences.5

The British advance had major repercussions for the Italian air force besides the loss of

El Adem. The airfield at Derna had to be abandoned due to its proximity to the front. The closest

Italian airfield to Tobruk was Maraua, 170 miles to the front. This was a great distance for the

4 Details of operations carried out during this period may be found in the daily operational summaries compiled by HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071. 5 Middle East Training Pamphlet No.10, ‘Lessons of Cyrenaica Campaign, December 1940-February 1941,’ n.d., 20-1. Copy in author’s possession; also found in TNA WO 201/2586; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 85, TNA AIR 41/44; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 281, 287-288; 214

short endurance Italian fighters and added to the operational difficulties of an air force that was

hard pressed to keep up with the current tempo of operations.6

On the British side, close coordination with the army continued. O’Connor’s XIII Corps

(as the Western Desert Force was now known) had moved its headquarters forward to Gambut,

while the advanced headquarters of British Troops Egypt was established side by side with

Collishaw’s HQ to continue close liaison. While the forward deployment eased the distance to

the front and facilitated communications with the army, supply continued to be a major problem

for Collishaw. His squadrons had not been organized as mobile forces. They lacked the transport,

communications, stores, workshops and other important factors to be truly mobile. However,

operations continued as the situation demanded due to the perseverance of the men. A major

factor in the continued operations of the RAF during this period was the large stocks of material

captured from the Italians. Enemy trucks were crucial to keep the supply lines open, aircraft ran

on Italian aviation fuel and dropped Italian bombs and the men dined on Italian rations.7

The RAF worked closely with the army to plan the capture of Tobruk. The army plan for

the assault was made based on the comprehensive photo reconnaissance conducted by

Collishaw’s units. Air attacks during the first week after the investment of Tobruk were limited

by a number of factors. Raids on the port were initially suspended on 10 January in anticipation

of the early capture of the town. Missions resumed when it became clear the Italians intended to

fight. The forward movement of RAF units in the first half of January limited their availability

for missions. So too did the weather. A series of major sandstorms affected air operations and in

6 MacGregor Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940-1943 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 138-141. 7 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 16; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 85-87; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 288-290. 215

particular affected the serviceability of the Hurricane squadrons. As well, the diversion of

aircraft across the Mediterranean hindered operations in the Western Desert; from 12 January

Collishaw was allotted only six Wellington bombers per night as the rest were devoted to

supporting the British army in Greece. On the eve of the Tobruk operation Longmore was forced to transfer two additional squadrons from 202 Group to Greece, No.11 (Blenheims) and No.112

(Gladiator). In spite of these distractions, starting on 19 January Collishaw directed a third of his

available bomber effort against Tobruk while the remainder of the sorties were directed at the

Benghazi airfields where the main Italian bomber force was based, and Derna which still

functioned as a port and seaplane base.8

On 16 January Lieutenant-General O’Connor relayed a request to RAF HQ Middle East through Collishaw’s headquarters that additional Wellington bombers should be made available

to attack Tobruk. Air Chief Marshal Longmore concurred and the next day released ten

Wellingtons to Collishaw’s control. Air attacks were carried out on the nights of 19, 20 and 21

January against various targets in and around Tobruk, the port, and various defended localities

including Pilastrino and Sidi Mahmud, the junction where the roads to Bardia, Tobruk and El

Adem meet. Over the course of two nights and one day 202 Group flew approximately 100

sorties and dropped 60 tons of bombs on the port. On eve of the ground assault, Wellingtons of

Nos.37 and 38 Squadrons attacked various targets between 0330 and 0600 hours to mask the

assembly of the assault force.9

8 The impact of the sandstorms was so serious that Collishaw was forced to fly single fighter patrols. This resulted in a question from RAF HQ Middle East to which Collishaw replied that ‘four days sand storms had rendered majority of Hurricanes under [my] command unserviceable.’ Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, January 1941, TNA AIR 24/1051; see also RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 86-87; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 290-291. 9 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, January 1941, TNA AIR 24/1051; Middle East Training Pamphlet No.10, ‘Lessons of Cyrenaica Campaign, December 1940-February 1941,’ n.d., 20-1, & App.E. Copy in author’s possession; also found in TNA WO 201/2586; Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch 216

The air plan for Tobruk was closely integrated with the army plan. The 16th Australian

Brigade, supported by infantry tanks, was to pierce the Italian defences in the south-eastern edge

where the anti-tank ditch was shallow. This lead brigade was to advance 4,000 yards to overrun

the forward Italian artillery positions in this sector. The advance would then be continued by the

19th Australian Brigade which was to advance to the junction of the two main roads (Tobruk-

Bardia and Tobruk-El Adem). The 2/3rd Battalion of the 16th Australian Brigade commenced

the attack at 0540 hours on 21 January.10

Lessons learned at Bardia were integrated into the new plan. The biggest change saw the

artillery concentrate on counter-battery targets. It was found that the infantry supported by tanks

were capable of neutralizing the Italian defended positions and far greater casualties were caused

by enemy barrages. The RAF was also directed to deal with the Italian guns. The area around

Sidi Mahmud contained a concentration of Italian artillery and a line of 37 dug-in tanks.

Collishaw’s Blenheim squadrons, Nos.45, 55 and 113, were directed to attack three areas

(Pilastrino, Tobruk harbour and Sidi Mahmud) until 0800 hours when it was expected the 19th

Australian Brigade would have reached Sidi Mahmud. At that point air attacks would continue on the first two targets until 1400 hours.11

During the course of the day the three Blenheim squadrons made 87 sorties over Tobruk

and dropped 85,000 pounds of bombs from heights ranging from 5,000 to 16,000 feet. One

Blenheim was shot down and a second was damaged in these attacks. A third aircraft crashed on

on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, 4674, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809]; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 87. 10 Gavin Long, To Benghazi (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1961 (1952)), Ch.9. 11 Middle East Training Pamphlet No.10, ‘Lessons of Cyrenaica Campaign, December 1940-February 1941,’ n.d., 21-2 & App.F. Copy in author’s possession; also found in TNA WO 201/2586; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 87-88. 217

take-off killing the crew. While this was taking place the Gladiators of No.3 Squadron, Royal

Australian Air Force, and the Hurricanes of Nos.73 and 274 Squadrons would prevent the

intervention of the Italian air force, and if time permitted, seek out ground targets before

returning to base. The Blenheims alone flew 87 sorties in direct support of the army during the

course of the first day.12

The Royal Navy also played a significant part in the capture of Tobruk. The Inshore

Squadron actively bombarded Italian positions in and around the port for two nights prior to the

ground assault and destroyers stood ready at sea to contain a possible breakout by the cruiser San

Giorgio. On the night before the attack Terror fired over 100 rounds at an area containing a large

concentration of Italian troops to the northwest of the port. The Squadron retired to Sollum

before dawn to avoid possible air attack.13

By the end of the first day the Australians had fought through the main Italian defences

and reached the crest of the escarpment overlooking the port. The battle was not yet over, but it

was clear that the Italians had been defeated. Late in the day columns of smoke and explosions in

Tobruk indicated that the Italians were destroying the town in anticipation of their capitulation.

Australian troops entered the town by mid-morning on 22 January and the last Italian defended

position surrendered at 1545 hours. The cost of the victory was relatively light for the

Australians – 49 men killed or died of wounds and 306 wounded. The British sustained an

12 Details of these attacks may be found in the daily operational summaries compiled by HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071; Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, 4674, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809]; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 87-88. 13 G.A. Titterton, The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. volume 2: November 1940-December 1941 (London: Whitehall History Publishing in association with Frank Cass, 2002 [1952]), 58-59; Middle East Training Pamphlet No.10, ‘Lessons of Cyrenaica Campaign, December 1940-February 1941,’ n.d., 20-1, & App.F. Copy in author’s possession; also found in TNA WO 201/2586. 218

additional 45 casualties. The number of Italians killed and wounded is not known, but 27,000

prisoners, 208 field and medium guns, 87 tanks and over 200 vehicles were captured.14

In his after-action report, Collishaw commented on the close cooperation between the air force and the army. Aircraft were directed to drop their bombs in advance of the forward troops and provided additional fire support when the heavy artillery was unavailable as it deployed closer to the front.15 General Wavell commented that ‘Co-operation by Royal Air Force and

Royal Naval units was excellent and invaluable.’16 One army report considered the RAF

contribution as the number one factor in the success of the action and stated: ‘The R.A.F.

obtained and maintained complete air superiority, so that our troop concentrations and the land

attack were at no time hampered. The air superiority enabled photographs to be taken from a low

altitude of all enemy battery positions, strong points and headquarters.’17 Aerial reconnaissance

before the battle provided invaluable intelligence to the army regarding Italian defences and

minefields. Aircraft helped to neutralize the Italian artillery by direct action, and by working

closely with the Australian and British artillery to direct their fire. Fighters and medium bombers

flew dozens of sorties at low level in direct support of the army. The army report stated that the

air attacks ‘undoubtedly had an enormous effect on the morale of the enemy.’18 The overall

damage done to Tobruk was cumulative, caused largely by months of aerial bombardment. The

14 General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ 3266, Supplement to The London Gazette, 25 June 1946; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 87- 88; Long, To Benghazi, ch.9; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 291-293 15 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 5. 16 General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ Supplement to The London Gazette, 25 June 1946, 3266. 17 This paragraph is the first point listed under the heading ‘Factors of Success.’ ‘Summary of the Battle of Tobruk,’ ca.1945, TNA CAB 106/834, 1. 18 ‘Summary of the Battle of Tobruk,’ ca.1945, TNA CAB 106/834, 8. The impact of the heavy bombing on the Tobruk garrison is confirmed by the Italian official history. See Ministero della Difesa Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, La Prima Offensiva Britannica in Africa Settentrionale (Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1979), 291, 306. 219

destruction of warehouses caused logistical problems for the Italians, including a shortage of

food. A total of 18 ships were found sunk in the harbour including the cruiser San Giorgio and

two large transports, the Marco Polo and the Liguria. As at Bardia, the capture of Tobruk was

the result of a coordinated, joint assault.19

The steady British advance would turn the Italian retreat from Cyrenaica into a rout. The capture of Tobruk denied Marshal Graziani his last major prepared defensive position, but his forces in Libya had not yet been defeated. Derna on the coast and Mechili some 50 miles inland were held in some strength as the Italians prepared to impose the maximum delay on any British passage through the Jebel Akhdar or Green Mountains. This area, located in the bulge of

Cyrenaica roughly north of the line Bomba–Mechili–Soluch, was very different from the surrounding deserts. The high ground was a centre of Italian colonization due to its fertile soil, temperate climate and moderate rainfall. The region contained good roads and communications including a section of the Italian-Libya Railways which ran 108 kilometres from Barce to

Benghazi and then another 56 kilometres to Soluch. South of the Jebel the harsh desert resumed and the roads and tracks through the area, on the direct line from Tobruk to Agedabia, ranged from good to terrible. The Italians considered this region largely impassable and left it weakly defended. Lieutenant-General O’Connor believed that the Italian armoured brigade with its two battalions of medium tanks at Mechili posed the greatest threat. He sent 4th Armoured Brigade to destroy this force while 6th Australian Division advanced along the coast to keep pressure on the defences backed by Derna. On the night of 26 January, before the British arrived, the Italian armoured brigade escaped to the northwest. The 4th British Armoured Brigade pursued this force for the next two days. Hurricanes of Nos.73 and 274 Squadron maintained offensive patrols over

19 Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, 4674, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809]; Long, To Benghazi, 238. 220

the forward area on 27 January and attacked two convoys of Italian vehicles withdrawing from

Mechili to Slonta and slowed their progress. The Italians, however, were able to escape as heavy

rains made the already poor roads impassable. This, combined with maintenance issues and a

lack of petrol for the British tanks, ended the chase. O’Connor was disappointed by this

development but he quickly realized another option was open – the possibility of trapping the

remaining Italian forces in Cyrenaica.20

After the fall of Tobruk, 202 Group again moved forward. Nos.73 and 274 Squadrons

went to Gazala, Nos.208 and 3 RAAF Squadrons moved to Tmimi; Collishaw’s headquarters

and the Blenheim squadrons were established at Sidi Mahmoud just outside of Tobruk. The

move brought the squadrons closer to the battle area, but there were serious difficulties in

keeping the necessary stocks of supplies. The logistical network was hampered by the distance

and lack of infrastructure, and aircraft were getting worn out through long hours of operation and

the harshness of the desert environment. The amount of available motor transport was well

below the needed quantities. Had it not been for the large number of trucks and great stocks of

bombs and petrol captured from the Italians, it may have been impossible for Collishaw to maintain the current tempo of operations.21 Air Chief Marshal Longmore commented in his

20 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.232. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 28th January 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071; General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ 3267, Supplement to The London Gazette, 25 June 1946; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 351-353 For information on the Italian Libya Railway, see Stefano Maggi, ‘Le Ferrovie Nell’Africa Italiana: Aspetti Economici, Sociali e Strategici,’ found in R. Astuto, Il problema ferroviario dell’Africa (Milano: ISPI, 1943), 1-25. 21 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 5-6. O’Connor’s headquarters was located at Bomba at this time. 221

Despatch that the ‘over ponderous standard squadron organisation did not lend itself to such

conditions, and, moreover, very few transport aircraft were available.’22

The fragile nature of the RAF was demonstrated twice during this period. During a four-

day period just prior to the attack on Tobruk most of Collishaw’s Hurricanes were rendered

inoperable by a fierce sandstorm. This forced Collishaw to mount one-aircraft patrols, a tactic of

last resort. On 3 February the fragility of the aircraft repair system in the desert was again

revealed when the Hurricane squadrons were pulled from operations due to a shortage of Merlin

engines.23

As it became clear that the Italians were on the run at the end of the month, the main air

effort was directed at interdicting the enemy attempt to escape from Cyrenaica. This focus away

from targets in direct support of the army was agreed to by General Wavell and Air Chief

Marshal Longmore; the main targets for Collishaw’s bombers would be the Italian landing

grounds in the Jebel – Maraua, Derna, Apollonia, Barce, Soluch and El Magrun.24 Overall, the

air effort was small but it was sufficient to drive the Italian air force from the region and prevent

any significant hostile air action as the campaign drew to a close. The absence of any significant

Italian air defence of the region allowed the Blenheims to return to regular daylight attacks. The

22 Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, 4674-4675, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809]; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 90; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 353. 23 Operations Record Book, RAF Middle East, Air Staff, HQ Unit, January 1941, TNA AIR 24/1051. Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 357. There were no replacement Merlin engines or spare parts available in Egypt, and 32 engines awaited overhaul in the depots. This measure removed the Hurricanes from one day of the battle, 4 February; on 5 February all flying operations were suspended due to a sandstorm and on the 6th the campaign had ended. Full details contained in Letter, AVM Longmore to AC Collishaw, 4 February 1941, TNA AIR 23/1391. 24 General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ 3267, Supplement to The London Gazette, 25 June 1946; Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, 4675, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809]. 222

Italian armoured force suffered losses on 26 and 27 January as it was attacked by Hurricanes and

Blenheims as it withdrew from Mechili to Slonta.25

Derna fell to the Australians on 30 January but the small port was not bombed during the

final assault as it had already been heavily hit. Fighters provided close support to the Australians

as they advanced on the port. Starting on 2 February Collishaw directed all his squadrons to

concentrate on interdicting the Italian retreat. All traffic on the routes between Derna and

Benghazi was bombed and strafed and the railway received special attention. Enemy columns

numbering in excess of 300 vehicles on the road from Giovanni Berta to Maraua were attacked at

low level by Blenheims from No.113, 45 and 55 Squadrons. Hurricanes also harassed the

retreating columns. It was estimated that at least 50 trucks and other vehicles were disabled in

these attacks, and only intense Italian anti-aircraft fire prevented greater losses. Two Blenheims from No.55 Squadron were lost in these attacks and three others were damaged by the flak. The attacks continued on the next day as Blenheims and Hurricanes bombed and machine gunned the retreating columns.26

A prime target for air attack was the flatcars carrying Italian tanks found on the rail line

near Barce. Wellington heavy bombers contributed to the destruction by attacking the railway

station at Barce and the airfield at Berka on the night of 3/4 February. More than 40 Blenheim

sorties were directed against road and rail targets in El Faidia, Maraua and Barce. On 4 February

Blenheim attacks were made on Italian convoys withdrawing westward from Barce to Benghazi

as well as along the railway. Hurricanes from Nos.73 and 274 Squadron destroyed at least ten

25 Details of these attacks may be found in the daily operational summaries compiled by HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071. 26 Details of these attacks may be found in the daily operational summaries compiled by HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071; Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 6. 223

vehicles in an enemy column near Barce. The Benghazi aerodromes at Berka and Benina were

successfully attacked by Wellingtons of No.70 Squadron on the night to 4/5 February with large

fires observed.27 General Wavell records that these attacks were designed to ‘interfere with the

move of enemy tanks to what might become a decisive flank.’28

Marshal Graziani stated after the war that constant harassment from the air caused

significant losses which delayed the evacuation and impacted the already fragile morale of his

men.29 The Italian official history further elaborated that these RAF attacks affected the combat

effectiveness of the Italian troops, and destroyed or damaged many trucks and other vehicles.30

By early February Marshal Graziani concluded that Cyrenaica was lost and any further

delay risked the loss of the remaining elements of his 10th Army. On 3 February he handed over

command of the remaining Italian forces to Lieutenant-General Giuseppe Tellera and ordered him to establish a new defensive position along the southern shore of the Gulf of Sidra.31 At the

same time the British contemplated their next move. Generals O’Connor and Wilson planned a

15-day pause to allow the supply lines and reinforcements to catch up and to give the men and

machines a chance to rest and be repaired. The Italians continued to hold in the Jebel but there

were indications that this was merely a strong rear guard action. The direct route from Mechili to

27 Details of these attacks may be found in the daily operational summaries compiled by HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071; Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 6; General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ 3267, Supplement to The London Gazette, 25 June 1946; Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, 4675, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809]; RAF Middle East Weekly Intelligence Summary No.33, February 1941, TNA AIR 23/6769. 28 General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ 3267, Supplement to The London Gazette, 25 June 1946. 29 Rodolfo Graziani, Africa Settentrionale, 1940-1941 (Rome: Danesi, 1948), 223. 30 Ministero della Difesa Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, La Prima Offensiva Britannica in Africa Settentrionale (Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1979), 349. 31 William F. Buckingham, Tobruk: The Great Siege, 1941-1942 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2009), 123. 224

Benghazi was not ideal for tanks and favoured the defence. The maps indicated another option

for Lieutenant-General O’Connor – an advance to Msus through the desert to the southwest.

From Msus, O’Connor would have the option of conducting a short envelopment of the Italians by continuing west to the coast at Soluch-Ghemines or advancing further south to Antelat or

even Agedabia.32 This route was not expected to be defended, but the distance and poor quality

of the track made it a risky option. British forces in Libya, including Collishaw’s squadrons,

were badly in need of time for rest and repair; the long and rapid advance from Egypt to Tobruk

had worn out the units and created significant logistical difficulties. The British official history

clearly set out the questions facing O’Connor: ‘Could the 7th Armoured Division be launched in

its mechanically doubtful condition across 150 miles of unreconnoitred desert? If so, could it be

maintained?’33

Air reconnaissance first identified the Italian retreat on 1 February and over the next two

days this was confirmed as additional reports indicated large convoys, well protected by anti-

aircraft guns, heading west. A force of some 60 tanks was discovered being loaded onto railcars

at Barce.34 O’Connor thought there might still be time to cut off the Italian retreat and was forced

to abandon his operational pause. On the morning of 4 February he despatched 7th Armoured

Division from Mechili to Msus. The British were established just east of Msus by daybreak on 5

February and by mid-afternoon a small force had cut the coast highway west of Beda Fomm just

as the first Italian column reached them. Over the next two days 4th Armoured Brigade fought a

pitched battle to prevent the breakout of the retreating Italian Army. It was a near-run victory but

32 General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ 3267, Supplement to The London Gazette, 25 June 1946; Field Marshal Lord Wilson, Eight Years Overseas 1939-1947 (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1948), 58-60.; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 355-356. 33 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 356 34 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 90. 225

by the morning of 7 February the battle was over. The usually staid British official history

painted a vivid picture of the carnage:

The battlefield was an astonishing scene of wreckage and confusion – fifteen miles of lorries, guns and tanks in abandoned jumble. Everywhere were herds of prisoners, reckoned at 25,000, amongst them the mortally wounded General Tellera, commander of the 10th Army, his entire staff, and General Bergonzoli, commander of the 23rd Corps, who, having long avoided capture, surrendered at last to the Rifle Brigade. More than 100 medium tanks and well over 100 guns were destroyed or captured. The success of the plan to cut off the 10th Army…could not have been more complete; hardly a man or a vehicle escaped.35

The RAF contributed significantly to this final victory. On 5 February the Blenheims and

Hurricanes of 202 Group made repeated attacks on the railway station at Benghazi to harass the retreat and the aerodromes at Benina and Agedabia to prevent interference from the Italian air force. Attacks were made on the Italian column trapped on the road between Ghemines and Beda

Fomm. Blenheims of Nos.55 and 113 Squadrons along with Hurricanes of No.73 Squadron carried out low-level machine gun attacks on the exposed trucks and other vehicles.

Additionally, the Hurricanes provided air cover to the advancing British troops.36

The aerial reconnaissance provided to Lieutenant-General O’Connor was critical in helping him to make his bold decision to cut off the Italian retreat. Timely air reports of Italian movements spurred the British move. There was no time to scout the way ahead, and the British did not want to give away their intentions, so the only physical examination of the route across the desert was conducted by low flying aircraft which reported that ‘the “going” looked possible, though very difficult.’37 On 4 February further aerial reconnaissance reports informed Major-

General Michael O’Moore Creagh, commander of 7th Armoured Division, that the Italian retreat was now desperate and in full swing. Based on this information, Creagh ordered a small force

35 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 361. 36 Details of these attacks may be found in the daily operational summaries compiled by HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1071. 37 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 357. 226

due west to slow down the Italians while the main force headed southwest towards Beda Fomm.

Lieutenant-General O’Connor credited this timely decision for the scale of the victory.38 Close

air support and reconnaissance for this force was provided by a flight of Hurricanes and

Gladiators from No.208 Squadron that was sent forward to Mechili.39

The contribution of the RAF to the ultimate victory at Beda Fomm cannot be overestimated. The units of 7th Armoured Division were free to conduct a dangerous and exposed manoeuvre without fear of being discovered or attacked by hostile air forces. The same was true for the overextended British logistical system. Any type of concerted attack on the recently captured ports or the vulnerable, and predictable, overland routes, may have had serious ramifications for the British offensive. Following the capture of Tobruk, 202 Group concentrated its resources on attacking the remaining Italian airfields in Cyrenaica. After a few days of these raids, which built upon months of previous attritional attacks, it was clear that the Italian air force had ceased to be a factor in the battle and air superiority had been decisively achieved.

During the final days of the battle the majority of the RAF sorties were directed to

interdict the Italian withdrawal. These free-ranging attacks sought out targets of opportunity as

well as attacked the infrastructure in the region – communications hubs such as ports and towns

and the railway between Barce and Soluch. These attacks served the dual purpose of delaying the

movement of Italian forces as well as preventing any Italian attempt to advance south and

interdict the British advance from Mechili. In effect, Collishaw had been assigned the task of

securing the long, exposed open right (northern) flank of the British advance to trap the Italians.

This action foreshadowed the role assigned to Major-General Otto P. Weyland’s US XIX

Tactical Air Command which protected the exposed flank of Lieutenant-General George S.

38 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 24-26. 39 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 357-358. 227

Patton’s Third Army as it broke out of the Normandy perimeter and raced to trap the German army in August 1944.40 The delay imposed on the Italians by these air attacks was crucial to the outcome of the battle. The lead elements of 7th Armoured Division reached the coast road in the vicinity of Beda Fomm at almost the same time as did the Italians. For most of the afternoon of 5

February the British blocking force was vastly outnumbered by the retreating enemy, but the confusion of the situation prevented the Italians from taking advantage of their numerical advantage. It can reasonably be concluded that even small delays imposed on the movement of the Italian columns by air attack made a crucial difference in the inability of the Italians to break through the British lines and escape in greater numbers.

* * * * *

By any standard, Operation Compass was a huge success. A British force that never totalled more than two divisions had advanced 500 miles and destroyed an army of 14 divisions.

Over 130,000 prisoners were captured, along with nearly 500 tanks and more than 800 guns. All this came at a cost of only 2,000 British Commonwealth casualties including 500 fatalities. The

Italian air force in Libya ceased to exist as an effective force. The RAF contributed substantially to this victory. Nearly 400 sorties were flown in support of the offensive during the first week with the loss of only six aircraft and the pace of operations was intense with Collishaw’s fighters flying as many as four sorties per day. Air superiority was maintained through the period. The

Blenheim and Wellington bombers concentrated their attacks on the airfields around Tobruk while the fighter squadrons flew offensive patrols as far west as the Gulf of Bomba. These flights served the dual purpose of attacking targets of opportunity as well as gathering intelligence on enemy movements. The importance of this control of the air cannot be overstated. O’Connor’s

40 For a full discussion of this period see, David Spires, Air Power for Patton's Army: The XIX Tactical Air Command in the Second World War (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002). 228

formations enjoyed the freedom to act without fear of potentially devastating air attacks. The

Italians did not have this luxury. The Italian air force was active during this period and the war

diaries of British units record frequent attacks, though most of these attacks caused only minor

damage.

Collishaw’s aircraft interfered significantly with the ability of the Italians to resupply

their forces. An active interdiction program against Italian coastal shipping was effective at

destroying enemy vessels. Two Fleet Air Arm torpedo bomber squadrons under Collishaw’s

command sunk four ships at Gazala and six at Tobruk. The advance to Benghazi revealed the

overall success of these air attacks. At Tobruk 19 ships were found in the harbour that had been

sunk or put out of action by air attack. In addition, three ships were discovered at Bardia, four at

Gazala, one in Derna, and five in Benghazi. This interdiction program forced the Italians to rely

on trucks to meet their supply needs. Collishaw reported that hundreds of vehicles were shot up

and destroyed by his bombers and fighters as they made the long, exposed trek across the

desert.41

The close cooperation provided by the RAF was viewed by O’Connor as crucial to the

success of the operation:

The R.A.F. was intimately connected with every phase of the Campaign, and it is mainly owing to its offensive tactics against enemy aerodromes and enemy formations encountered in the Air, that the Army was able to carry out its plan of campaign with so little interference from the enemy Air Force. This was greatly due to the personality and determination of its Commander, Air Commodore Collishaw, to whom this campaign owes much of its success.42

41 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 3. 42 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 30. 229

O’Connor was quite blunt in this report and did not hesitate to criticise problems and

people who came up short during the operation. For instance, he was very critical of the

command arrangement with Wilson; he was very much against the diversion to Greece which

halted a further advance past El Agheila; and he was ‘bitterly disappointed’ that he was not

permitted to continue the advance and capture of Tripoli.43 He also damned the Royal Navy

support with faint praise: ‘The Navy co-operated as far as it was able, but always its full co-

operation was restricted by commitments elsewhere.’44 In this context his praise for the RAF and

Collishaw can be seen as genuine and not dictated by the need for service niceties and future

cooperation.

O’Connor continued his praise of Collishaw and stated that he was ‘mainly responsible for making the Campaign possible by his persistently offensive tactics against the enemy Air

Forces. Whatever the odds he attacked them both on their aerodromes and in the Air, and

literally drove them out of Lybia [sic] and out of the sky.’ O’Connor lamented that Collishaw,

‘would have been in his element’ if the advance to Tripoli had been sanctioned by Churchill.45 It is not surprising that O’Connor had a great deal of admiration for Collishaw as they shared a common command style. A recent history of the Western Desert campaign observed that:

By-the-book operating procedures sat especially badly with O’Connor, who routinely modified or simply ignored Field Service Regulations and set great store in operational initiative and flexibility. He arranged conference discussions to ensure that his intentions were clear to subordinates, after which they were allowed plenty of latitude to perform their individual tasks within the larger scheme while O’Connor maintained control with a combination of succinct and

43 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148: For his comments on Wilson see page 31; for his comments on Greece see page 29; for his comments on the advance to Tripoli see pages 27-29 (quotation on page 29). 44 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 30. 45 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 33. 230

concise orders and contact in person or via liaison officers. His HQ arrangements were optimised for this mode of command.46

Change the name and this description works equally well for Collishaw as his command

style was very similar to that of O’Connor and he was closely involved with all aspects of the

operation of 202 Group. Wing Commander J.W.B. Judge, one of Collishaw’s senior staff officers in the Western Desert, had this to say about him at the end of the Compass campaign:

I saw the A.O.C. Air Commodore Collishaw walking towards me about 50 yards distant. I had no previous knowledge that he was on his way so it was a pleasant surprise. Studying him as he approached I received an impression which I shall retain for many years. This man, commanding a very inferior force had by personal effort, character and sheer determination, driven the Italian Air Force from Cyrenaica. His task had been to get Benghazi and here he was. It was expressed in his face, walk and manner. As he approached his manner seemed to say ‘I told you I’d do it’ and he had. Many times back at Ma'aten Bagush he had said to me in the Operations Room ‘We’ll fox ‘em Judge. We’ll fox ‘em.’ In those days I’ve known him to stay in the Operations Room until nearly 3 a.m. waiting for the night bombers to return in order that he might personally speak to each pilot. Then when they were all home he would turn to me and say ‘I’m going to bed now Judge, call me at 5.30 a.m.47

Echoing Judge’s appraisal, Air Vice-Marshal Elmhirst commented favourably on the command and control arrangements of 202 Group which he discussed in some detail in his report on the lessons of Operation Compass. He noted that while the HQ staff was of the smallest possible size it functioned effectively and was able to issue short and concise operational orders to the squadrons in a most satisfactory method.48

46 Buckingham, Tobruk, 90. 47 J.W.B. Judge, ‘Airfield Creation for the Western Desert Campaign,’ ca.1940s http://www.laetusinpraesens.org/guests/jwbj/jwb1.htm [accessed 10 March 2013]. Judge was an Australian who served with the RAF in the Middle East for almost his entire air force career. He wrote this account of his wartime experiences in the 1940s and it was subsequently posted online by his son in 2009. 48 Air Vice-Marshal T.W. Elmhirst, ‘Report on Lessons Learnt during Air Operations in the Western Desert, August 1940 – February 1941,’ 17 March 1941, TNA AVIA 15/2376, 1-3. 231

Elmhirst’s report was a comprehensive 17-page examination of the lessons learned

during air operations in the first desert campaign. His opening comments on the lessons of the

campaign were a strong confirmation of Collishaw’s leadership:

When in early December the Italian Forces appeared to waver, they were never allowed to get into their stride again. They and their supply posts were hammered consistently both by day and night up to the limits of endurance of Royal Air Force aircraft and crews. The failure of morale and consequent collapse of the Italian Air Force was due to this hammering, coupled with the daily fear that their aerodromes were likely to be surprised and captured by our ground forces.

Throughout the operations every effort was made by those in control to mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy. These efforts were obviously successful in the tactical sphere and also in making the enemy believe that our air forces were much larger than they actually were.49

Overall, Elmhirst confirmed the success of operations under Collishaw’s management and offered suggestions to improve matters which were out of his control. His balanced appraisal of the campaign highlighted a number of areas that needed to be improved or changed, but he also commented extensively on what worked.

Based on these assessments of Collishaw’s leadership ability, it can be seen that he lead by example and did not ask his staff to do anything that he was not willing to do himself. This command style first emerged in the skies over the Western Front where as a flight commander and squadron leader he excelled at introducing new pilots to combat. He would personally lead new pilots on their first operational sorties and ensure that they were carefully shepherded through one of the most dangerous periods of their career. Flight Lieutenant William Melville

‘Mel’ Alexander, a member of Collishaw’s Black Flight in 1917, recalled that Collishaw would allow an inexperienced pilot to attack a relatively benign enemy two-seater and while thus occupied he would slide in behind and shoot down the aircraft. After returning to base Collishaw

49 Air Vice-Marshal T.W. Elmhirst, ‘Report on Lessons Learnt during Air Operations in the Western Desert, August 1940 – February 1941,’ 17 March 1941, TNA AVIA 15/2376, 1. 232

would ‘selflessly slap the newcomer on the back and congratulate them on their first aerial

victory.’50 This style served him very well in his various appointments at the squadron and wing

level. It may not have been the ideal way to command a group-sized formation, and it certainly

was not the ‘Staff College’ model, but it cannot be denied that Collishaw was an effective

commander.

General Wavell was not an ardent supporter of an independent RAF and would have preferred to have direct command of the air forces, but nonetheless he was pleased with the support afforded him during the first Western Desert campaign. He recognized the important role played by the RAF in defeating the Italian air force and the consequent freedom it conferred on the operations of his forces and he was satisfied with the intelligence gathered by RAF reconnaissance flights and the attrition to Italian forces caused by aerial bombing. He concluded

his despatch by noting that the Army owed ‘a special debt’ to Collishaw for ‘his whole-hearted co-operation and for the energy and optimism which were an inspiration to all.’51

Longmore may have cautioned Collishaw in a move that some historians interpreted as

an attempt to ‘rein him in’ but Longmore recognized that his aggressive use of the fighter force

was the key to the victory:

With an estimated numerical superiority in fighter aircraft in favour of the Italians amounting to nearly four to one I considered that we were justified in taking substantial risks to neutralise their advantage in numbers by making use of our Hurricanes with their superior performance in low flying attacks on Italian lines of communications immediately in rear of their forward troops. Later in the operations they were also employed for low attacks on Italian fighter aerodromes.

There is little doubt that these methods contributed largely to our success in forcing the Italian fighters on the defensive from the very commencement. Thus is

50 Quoted in David L. Bashow, ‘Four Gallant Airmen: Clifford Mackay McEwen, Raymond Collishaw, Leonard Joseph Birchall, and Robert Wendell McNair,’ in Bernd Horn, ed., Intrepid Warriors: Perspectives on Canadian Military Leaders (Toronto: Durdurn, 2007), 170. 51 General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ 3269, Supplement to The London Gazette, 25 June 1946. 233

was that as the operations proceeded, less and less air interference was experienced by Imperial forces operating far forward who suffered very few casualties from air attack.52

Longmore concluded his despatch by asserting that Collishaw, ‘deserves the highest credit for the efficient and effective manner in which he employed his squadrons in full support’ of the

Western Desert Force.53

The second despatch on the Western Desert campaign written by Longmore was no less

effusive in its praise of the job done by Collishaw: ‘He maintained the high standard of resource

and initiative which I had grown accustomed to expect from him, and he was an inspiration to all

those under his command.’54

Collishaw’s aggressive tactics in the Western Desert Campaign were based on his

previous experience. He recalled in his memoirs that ‘it was proved in France in the Great War

that it was essential for an air force to remain on the offensive for successful results, as a long

term policy, to be achieved. This experience was borne in mind when conducting the Cyrenaican

campaign and the R.A.F. continued on the offensive notwithstanding that it was confronted with

a numerically superior enemy.’55

Collishaw clearly understood the risks facing his command and he adapted his tactics to match the situation. Early in the campaign his air force was outmatched in terms of the number and quality of aircraft compared to his own. He primarily employed his fighters on short range patrols over British lines. As he received larger numbers of Hurricanes he was able to task them

52 See Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Middle East Air Operations, 13 May 1940 to 31 December 1940,’ 1 February 1941, TNA AIR 23/808, 16. 53 See Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Middle East Air Operations, 13 May 1940 to 31 December 1940,’ 1 February 1941, TNA AIR 23/808, 16. 54 Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, 4678, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809]. 55 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 12. 234

with attacking the fast enemy bombers while leaving the Italian fighters to the Gladiators. This

tactic, combined with the continuing bomber attacks on Italian aerodromes forced the enemy

onto the defensive and granted the British control of the air. As even larger numbers of

Hurricanes became available, Collishaw used them on offensive patrols to attack enemy

aerodromes and strafe vehicles on the ground. While it was the bomber attacks on the

aerodromes that forced the Italians on the defensive, it was the low level Hurricane attacks that

destroyed the largest number of Italian aircraft.56 Hurricanes sent to attack targets of opportunity

behind the lines, on what would later be classed as ‘armed reconnaissance’ missions in

Normandy, also met with great success. Italian doctors interviewed after their capture reported

that a large percentage of their casualties during their final retreat were caused by low level

Hurricane attacks.57 These types of attacks on aerodromes and road convoys would not have been profitable in the early stages of the campaign in the face of a strong Italian air force and a small number of Hurricanes. As the conditions changes, however, Collishaw modified his tactics with the desired effect on the Italians:

The fighters put out to sea from their bases, climbed to their maximum height and re-crossed the coast at their radius of action. The object was for all fighters to scour the main roads so as to shoot up everything moving on the roads with the object of paralyzing the enemy’s ground activities. This policy caused the Italian generals to call upon the Italian air force to prevent our fighters from interfering with the lines of communications. The result was that the maximum number of enemy aircraft were kept on patrol over wide stretches of the lines of communications in an attempt to intercept our individual fighters. Our fighters’ tactics of crossing the coast at maximum height and then losing altitude at maximum speed to shoot up the M.T. [motor transport] columns while homeward bound, prevented the enemy from having any important success in interception. The enemy fighters rapidly became unserviceable because of the stress of their activities and as the campaign developed, less enemy fighters were encountered…The Italian fighter units became so involved in trying to thwart our

56 Air Vice-Marshal T.W. Elmhirst, ‘Report on Lessons Learnt during Air Operations in the Western Desert, August 1940 – February 1941,’ 17 March 1941. TNA AVIA 15/2376, 10. 57 Air Vice-Marshal T.W. Elmhirst, ‘Report on Lessons Learnt during Air Operations in the Western Desert, August 1940 – February 1941,’ 17 March 1941. TNA AVIA 15/2376, 5. 235

air offensive against his ground forces that he was unable to provide any important fighter force to dispute air superiority over our advancing army.58

The risk of this aggressive campaign was high, but, as it turned out, the reward was equally high.

The suppression of the Italian air force benefitted the army, but it also granted the RAF a

freedom of operations that would not otherwise have been possible. The Lysander, which

equipped the army cooperation squadrons, was hopelessly out of date by 1940. It was slow and

lacked maneuverability and as a result had been shot down by the Luftwaffe in large numbers

over France in May 1940. The main Italian fighter in the Western Desert, the CR.42, though also

antiquated, still maintained a significant advantage over the Lysander. In the absence of a hostile

air threat, however, these same qualities made the Lysander a very fine army cooperation

aircraft.59

Group Captain L.O. Brown, a South African-born veteran of the Royal Naval Air Service in the First World War, was Collishaw’s primary intermediary with the army during Operation

Compass. He attended RAF Staff College in 1929, and served for a considerable period in the

1930s in various army co-operation postings. He arrived in Egypt just prior to the start of the war

and was appointed Collishaw’s Senior Air Staff Officer.60 For the British offensive, Brown was

acted as the Air Liaison Officer attached to the Western Desert Force and commander of the

Army Co-Operation Unit where he forged a very close working relationship with the army. This was an essential component of success air-ground operations. O’Connor thought highly of

Brown: ‘An Officer of great character and determination, who carried my full confidence and

58 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 12-13. 59 Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Army Co-Operation Carried Out in Connection with the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya,’ 31 January 1941, TNA WO 201/348, 3. 60 Details of Brown’s career may be found on the website ‘Air of Authority – A History of RAF Organisation,’ , accessed 5 June 2013. 236

that of his subordinates…I found him excellent to work with, and the excellence of the Units

under his command were [sic] greatly due to his inspiring example.’61

Brown’s two army cooperation squadrons, Nos.208 and 3 RAAF, were commanded by

202 Group, but operationally took their direction from the Army corps headquarters. Planning

estimates before the battle assumed that the Lysander would be too vulnerable for tactical

reconnaissance missions. Experiments with the Hurricane found that it was a suitable

replacement, but the limited number available would not meet the intelligence needs of the

Army. Operational necessity during the opening stages of Operation Compass saw the Lysander

used cautiously at first, but more aggressively as the battle progressed. As Group Captain Brown

stated, ‘The inability of the Italians to use their air forces to the best advantage has enabled us to

make more use of the Lysanders than was considered possible at the outset of these operations.’62 During the first stage of the campaign, up to the capture of Sidi Barrani, the

Lysander was not used over the actual area of operations, but at Bardia and Tobruk the

Lysanders were used to provide continuous tactical reconnaissance over the battle area. These

aircraft, with their slow speed and ability to loiter, were able to provide friendly and hostile troop

locations as well as detailed intelligence on enemy defences. The Lysander was more adept at

this task than the faster Hurricane.63

The Hurricane did prove its worth as a reconnaissance aircraft in the penetration of better

defended Italian positions. Most tactical reconnaissance flights were conducted at less than 6,000

feet, an altitude which made the aircraft vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire. The high speed of the

61 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 32. 62 Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Army Co-Operation Carried Out in Connection with the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya,’ 31 January 1941, TNA WO 201/348, 3. 63 Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Army Co-Operation Carried Out in Connection with the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya,’ 31 January 1941, TNA WO 201/348, 3. 237

Hurricane, combined with special route planning, allowed a careful study of enemy defences

with the least amount of risk to the pilot and aircraft. The need for intelligence, however,

exceeded the limited number of aircraft available to Group Captain Brown. He worked closely

with Collishaw and his staff to see that fighters and bombers returning from other missions were

routed home over areas of interest to the army. This was not a normal task for these squadrons,

but as Brown stated, ‘It was found that pilots and observers of bomber squadrons became very

efficient in reconnaissance work even from the high altitudes in this country.’64 The use of these

squadrons worked well enough that the Blenheim squadrons were specifically tasked to conduct

reconnaissance when the need arose.

Not all agreed with this assessment. From the time Tedder arrived in Egypt in December

1940 he had expressed misgivings about Collishaw. First impressions are lasting and the

evidence indicated that Tedder formed his opinion of Collishaw during the brief time he took

over 202 Group in late December 1940. Tedder recalled in his memoirs that though Collishaw

had enjoyed some success early on against the Italians with his ‘irrepressible “gay

aggressiveness,”’ he came away from the experience believing that Collishaw was:

‘the village blacksmith in the village cricket match’ with the warning that before long we looked like having to compete in a much more serious contest on a wider field than the village green. There is no doubt that Collishaw had his points, but on the other hand he was a ‘bull in a china shop’ with little of the administration without which operations cannot function properly. Moreover, he had a tendency to go off half-cock. To listen to Collishaw while plans were being drawn up for the next advance one would think that the advance would be to Tripoli non- stop!65

In using this English metaphor, Tedder ranked Collishaw as an amateur unsuccessfully trying to compete at a professional level.

64 Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Army Co-Operation Carried Out in Connection with the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya,’ 31 January 1941, TNA WO 201/348, 3-5. 65 Lord Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, GCB (London: Cassell & Company, 1966), 55. 238

In a letter to Air Chief Marshal Freeman on 11 March 1941 Tedder outlined the reasons

for the success of Operation Compass. It was ‘a first class game of poker, successful bluffing a

full house with a couple of pair.’66 He explained how the constant pressure on the Italians led to

the breakdown of their morale and their ultimate defeat. In spite of this, he complained that,

by the time Benghazi fell the whole force, personnel, aircraft and transport, was literally worn right out. To some extent this was inevitable but much quite avoidable wear and tear was due to Collishaw’s much advertised ‘drive’ – which consisted to no small extent of bullocking units about at little or no notice, issuing orders for operations and moves without consideration or warning. Despite repeated pressure Collishaw flatly refused to use the quiet periods to give any of his personnel or equipment any rest. We’ve had to pay a heavy price in withdrawing squadrons for rest and re-equipment when we ought to have been worrying about the Hun.67

This damning indictment of Collishaw’s leadership is a very different interpretation of the campaign than is found in most other sources and it is not supported by the evidence. An examination of the RAF HQ Middle East Operational Record Book for the period shows no indication that Collishaw was warned to change or modify the employment of his squadrons.

Such a serious problem would surely have been recorded as were Longmore’s earlier cautions to

Collishaw in July.68 The British victory in Operation Compass, in the air and on the ground, was

based on a bold and aggressive offensive against the Italians. All the commanders, including

Longmore, Wavell, O’Connor and Collishaw, were well aware of the risk of pushing men and

machines so hard, but it was deemed an acceptable and necessary risk.69

66 Letter, Air Marshal A.W. Tedder to Air Chief Marshal Sir W.R. Freeman, 11 March 1941. TNA AIR 20/2792. 67 Letter, Air Marshal A.W. Tedder to Air Chief Marshal Sir W.R. Freeman, 11 March 1941. TNA AIR 20/2792. 68 RAF HQ Middle East Air Staff Operational Record Book, July 1940 to February 1941, TNA AIR 24/1051; RAF HQ Middle East Air Staff Operational Record Book, Appendices, June-July 1940, TNA AIR 24/1067; RAF HQ Middle East Air Staff Operational Record Book, Appendices, December 1940, TNA AIR 24/1071; RAF HQ Middle East Air Staff Operational Record Book, Appendices, January-February 1941, TNA AIR 24/1071. 69 Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, 4673-4675, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809]; Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475. 239

There were a number of pauses during the campaign to deal with maintenance issues, bring forward supplies and rest the men. One of these periods was the two weeks before the attack on Bardia when the reduced level of operations corresponded with the Christmas holiday,

the army’s pause before continuing its offensive, as well as a period of poor weather. This period

saw a noticeable respite in RAF operations and it partially corresponded with the time when

Tedder replaced Collishaw who was on sick leave.70

Tedder did not agree with the overall conclusions reached by Elmhirst in his report and

he condemned it as a ‘half-baked production [that was] of little real value.’71 In his covering

letter to the report, Tedder emphasised that Elmhirst ‘brings out clearly many of the defects in

our organisation for operations of this nature.’72 He did not comment on any of the positive

aspects of the report but chose to highlight the main problems experienced during the campaign:

a squadron organisation which led to its inherent immobility during operations, the lack of an

adequate warning network with observation units and radar, as well as a shortage of anti-aircraft

units for airfield defence. The absence of any credit for the job done by Collishaw was indicative

of Tedder’s opinion of his subordinate and echoed the portrait he painted in the earlier letter to

Freeman. It also stands in marked contrast to the opinions of Longmore, Wavell and O’Connor

who were effusive in their praise for the job done by Collishaw. The rationale behind Tedder’s

critical reports to London cannot conclusively be proved but may be an attempt by Tedder to

highlight problems in the Middle East in order to draw on more significant reinforcements for

the theatre.

70 The operational pause began before Collishaw departed on sick leave. No.55 Squadron Operations Record Book, December 1940, TNA AIR 27/516; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 82. 71 Comment found in Air Ministry File No. CS 8981, ‘Extract of letter from Air Vice-Marshal Tedder to D.O.,’ dated 25 March 1941, TNA AIR 20/5466. 72 Covering Letter, Air Marshal A.W. Tedder, 24 March 1941 to Air Vice-Marshal T.W. Elmhirst, ‘Report on Lessons Learnt during Air Operations in the Western Desert, August 1940 – February 1941,’ 17 March 1941, TNA AVIA 15/2376, 10. 240

Tedder believed that Collishaw was unable to delegate or use his staff effectively and

stated in his memoirs, ‘I could not help feeling sorry for the Staff at 202 Group. Collishaw did

not know how to use them, which left them feeling frustrated and miserable.’73 This opinion was supported by then Wing Commander Kenneth Cross, who was the commander of 252 Wing responsible for the air defence of western Egypt. He recalled going forward to Maaten Bagush to meet with Collishaw and being in his office where they were:

repeatedly interrupted by a succession of corporal clerks bearing signals from all and sundry. Collishaw would read the signals, dictate a reply, sign it and off went the corporal to despatch it. It thought it was a bit odd that none of his staff were consulted, and wondered how they knew what was going on. I heard later that Collishaw had conducted business this way whilst supporting the O’Connor advance earlier in the war…and had refused to change now even though the force had more than doubled.74

A similar viewpoint was rendered by then Squadron Leader Frederick Rosier who considered

that Collishaw had ‘initially done well against the Italians but when the Germans arrived he was

soon out of his depth. His efforts to thwart them were amateur in the extreme and he lacked the

professionalism needed for the task.’75 Rosier had arrived in the Western Desert following

Operation Battleaxe and served under Collishaw for only a very brief period when there was

little activity. Thus, Cross, based on one short meeting and some hearsay, and Rosier based on a

short period of service, were willing to dismiss Collishaw’s command abilities. It is worth noting

that both Rosier and Cross served in senior roles under Tedder in North African and Northwest

Europe and thought very highly of him. It is not surprising that their memoirs, written decades

after the war, mirrored the opinion of Tedder. Another issue at play is the tendency to dismiss the

combat abilities of the Italians. Here we have two officers who successfully fought against the

Germans commenting unfavourably about an earlier period in the war when the opponent was

73 Tedder, With Prejudice, 55 74 Kenneth Cross, Straight and Level (London: Grub Street, 1993), 147-148. 75 Frederick Rosier and David Rosier, Be Bold (London: Grub Street Publishing, 2011), 70-71. 241

considered less competant.76 These snapshot views of Collishaw by Rosier and Cross are

enlightening when placed in the proper context, but their opinions have been used by some

historians as a blanket condemnation of Collishaw’s command abilities.77

* * * * *

The issue of close air support was (and continues to be) one of the most contentious and

vexing aspects of air force operations. During the interwar period, and the early stages of the

Second World War the RAF and the Army maintained differing views on the proper employment

of aircraft on the battlefield. This led to inefficiencies and conflict between the two services as

they attempted to work out a system that was acceptable to both sides.78 Prior to the war the RAF

had devoted a large proportion of its resources to the development of strategic bombers while

army-air cooperation received much less attention. RAF prewar doctrine was opposed to exactly

the kind of support sought by the Army. Group Captain John Slessor was at the forefront of the

RAF development of tactical air power doctrine in the interwar years. In 1936 he wrote a book

called Air Power and Armies where he argued that the air force should not engage in close

support operations except in an emergency. He was very clear on this point: ‘The first general

rule [of any type of warfare]…is that the aeroplane is not a battle-field weapon – the air striking force is not as a rule best employed in the actual zone in which the armies are in contact.’79 He

described how interdiction, the attack of troops and vehicles in the communications zone, as they

approach the battlefield by road or rail, offered the most practical targets for aircraft.80 These

76 These comments appear to be based largely on minimal personal experience backed up by gossip and were committed to paper many decades after the war. 77 These observations are being used, along with Tedder’s impressions, as evidence of Collishaw’s apparent failings. See Christopher Shores, Giovanni Massimello, and Russell Guest, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940- 1945, vol.1: North Africa - June 1940-January 1942 (London: Grub Street, 2012), 94, 128-129. 78 It should be noted that the Middle East Combined Plan of 1939 ensured that better relations existed between the army and air force than was in the case in the UK. 79 John Slessor, Air Power and Armies (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2009 (1936)), 90. 80 Slessor, Air Power and Armies, 90-98. 242 were lessons that Collishaw had long known to be true. His extensive experience in flying air- ground missions over the Western Front during the Amiens offensive and the Last Hundred Days of 1918 had taught him that the use of aircraft over the battlefield to attack troop concentrations and artillery positions – the targets of the greatest importance to the army – was difficult and costly. Aircraft flying over the battlefield had trouble finding small, often camouflaged, targets on the battlefield, and attacking those targets brought aircraft low over the battlefield where they were dangerously exposed to ground fire. In the Western Desert this task was complicated by the vast, featureless expanse of the desert where pilots had trouble identifying friend from foe in the confused space of a battle in progress.

Collishaw’s understanding of the issue of close air support was reflected in the conduct of his squadrons during the campaign. Very few sorties were devoted exclusively to close support missions. On the eve of Operation Compass he issued a memo to his fighter squadrons which outlined his standing orders for low level attacks. When ordered to attack transport or motorized troops, pilots were to avoid well defended targets such as the main Italian camps or halted columns with deployed anti-aircraft guns which could offer serious resistance. Patrols were to be made at high altitude (20,000 feet) and when dust revealed an enemy column the pilot was to dive at high speed and attack along the length of the column. The aircraft would then exit the target area low and at high speed. Under no circumstances were aircraft to maneuver or climb near anti-aircraft positions as that would make the aircraft an easy target for enemy guns.

Collishaw summed up his strategy as ‘(a) To seriously damage the enemy by casualties to personnel and equipment. (b) To hit him hard at his weakest point. (c) To place E.A. [enemy aircraft] Fighters on the defensive so they will by ordered to be withdrawn to ineffectively chase

243

Hurricanes withdrawing at higher speed.’81 These very sensible orders were at the core of the

success experienced by 202 Group in Operation Compass and do not reflect the dangerously

aggressive carelessness of an ex-fighter pilot.

An analysis of the scope of operations carried out by 202 Group shows a campaign plan

which first sought to gain and maintain air superiority, then carried out interdiction missions and

infrequently devoted sorties to close support missions. This distinct ‘priority’ of missions would

later be honed by the Desert Air Force under Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham and

formalized in US War Department Field Manual 100-20, ‘Command and Employment of Air

Power.’ This manual, published in July 1943, was based largely on British experience in the

North Africa in 1942-1943 and would provide the basic structure for American (and British)

tactical air operations for the remainder of the war.82 Brown addressed the issue of close support

missions in his after action report. While the primary mission of his squadrons was to support the

army by providing reconnaissance and preventing interference by enemy aircraft, a secondary

mission was the provision of close support to army when needed. This led to the specialization of

his two squadrons. No.208 Squadron largely acted in the traditional army co-operation role

providing tactical and artillery reconnaissance to the army. No.3 Squadron RAAF, in accordance

with instructions issued by Longmore’s headquarters, was designated to ‘provide the army some

measure of close support either by low flying attacks or by protecting our land forces against

81 ‘Signal to No.33 Squadron from HQ 202 Group,’ 6 December 1940. Reproduced in RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, App.XXII. 82 For a full discussion of the development of British and American air support in North Africa and Normandy see: B. Michael Bechthold, ‘A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43,’ Journal of Military History 68, no.3 (July 2004), 821-851; B. Michael Bechthold, ‘“The Development of an Unbeatable Combination”: US Close Air Support in Normandy,’ Canadian Military History 7, no.4 (Autumn 1998), 7-20. 244

enemy low flying attacks.’83 In this role the Australian squadron utilized two flights of

Gladiators and a flight of Gloster Gauntlets as specialized dive bombers. Prior to the start of the

battle the Australians were trained in close support attacks and dive bombing. They worked

closely with the army to demonstrate their tactics and to acclimatize the troops to air attack and

allow them the opportunity to train with their anti-aircraft weapons.84 During the first stage of

Operation Compass the Gladiators were used to patrol over the army at medium height to intercept Italian aircraft that evaded the Hurricanes flying high cover. The Gauntlets initially provided close air support and later were directed to attack enemy columns retreating from Sofafi to Sollum. The dive bombers were subsequently withdrawn from service before the end of 1940 due to a combination of the age and poor condition of the aircraft and the realization that the

‘need for low dive bombers was not of sufficient importance to justify persevering with the maintenance and use of the Gauntlets.’85 Fighter aircraft, even older Gladiator biplanes, were

more flexible and useful in the types of missions conducted by the RAF. They were not limited

to the close support missions of the dive bombers but could engage in air superiority mission, fly

defensive patrols and conduct tactical reconnaissance as the need arose.

The provision of effective close air support was limited by the ability of the pilots to

identify targets on the ground. Not only was it difficult to identify targets when flying over a

battlefield but it was easy to misidentify those targets. This occurred during the early battles

when RAF aircraft attacked British troops on a number of occasions. British troops chasing the

83 Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Army Co-Operation Carried Out in Connection with the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya,’ 31 January 1941, TNA WO 201/348, 1. 84 The squadron was fully trained in army cooperation work and possessed a flight of Lysanders, but these aircraft remained in the Alexandria area to train reinforcement pilots. By the end of December both the Lysanders and Gauntlets had been withdrawn from the squadron and replaced with Gladiators. In January 1941 the Squadron began to reequip with Hurricanes following the capture of Tobruk. Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Army Co- Operation Carried Out in Connection with the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya,’ 31 January 1941, TNA WO 201/348, 6-7. 85 Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Army Co-Operation Carried Out in Connection with the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya,’ 31 January 1941, TNA WO 201/348, 6. 245

retreating Italians were strafed by RAF Hurricanes as well as bombed by Blenheims near Sofafi

on 10 and 11 December. The fluidity of the battle made it difficult for pilots to identify forces

accurately by their geographic location. Fortunately no serious damage was caused in the attacks.

Brown attributed the errors to the remoteness of HQ 202 Group from the battlefield. It was

located at Maaten Bagush approximately 110 miles behind the battlefield. Orders for these

attacks were issued by 202 Group without consulting Brown who had a better grasp of the

tactical situation due to his co-location with the Army Corps HQ. Brown suggested that any

close support operations in the tactical area requested by Advanced HQ of British Troops Egypt

(co-located with 202 Group) be controlled by the Corps HQ. This request was refused and aside

from one incident at Bardia in early January there were no further reports of attacks on friendly

forces. The problem of identifying troops and controlling aircraft on the battlefield did not go

away, but close support missions by units other than the army support squadrons were rarely

flown for the remainder of the campaign.86

Air Chief Marshal Longmore clearly enunciated his views on the value of close air support in a letter to Collishaw on 23 January 1941. He understood that fighters were needed to protect the advance of the army and he acknowledged that Collishaw had directed his pilots to avoid unnecessary low level attacks. Longmore continued, ‘The fighter’s right place is high up; it is I am sure a fallacy to think that the soldiers are such fools as to think that the fighters are not doing their job unless they are seen flying about low down – they have had enough experience to know better. I think you should be pretty curt to any of the chaps who amuse themselves by shooting up ground troops. We cannot afford to waste our fighters on such amusements, except

86 Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Army Co-Operation Carried Out in Connection with the Land Operations in the Western Desert and Libya,’ 31 January 1941, TNA WO 201/348, 7-8. 246

of course on very special occasions such as the S.B. [Sidi Barrani] road.’87 The only other time during the campaign when the fighters again engaged in low level attacks was at the end of the

campaign when the tactical situation dictated such an employment. The threat from the Italian air

force was low and there was an abundance of tempting targets as the Italian ground forces

attempted to flee Cyrenaica. In these circumstances the great risk of low level operations was

justified to slow the exodus and provide time for the army to complete their drive to trap the

enemy.

One of the main constraints in this campaign was the vast distance covered during the advance. The straight-line distance from the El Daba area, west of the Nile Delta where the main

RAF bases were located, to El Agheila was nearly 700 miles. There was no prewar planning, or

existing air force doctrine, that contemplated the need to move and supply squadrons over such a distance. The standard squadron establishments were not organized for such movement nor were the RAF supply and transport units able to meet the needed requirements over such a distance.

The RAF’s motor transport had already been found wanting during the Phoney War in France, and the lack of transport was completely exposed during the Battle of France in May and June

1940. And this was in Northwest Europe with its relatively short distances and dense network of good roads and railways. It was estimated that a single-engine fighter squadron required over 70 trucks to move its petrol, ammunition, bombs, stores and personnel. The number of lorries to keep a squadron supplied was also significant. It was estimated that a fighter squadron’s allotment of 3 million rounds of ammunition, suitable for 104 sorties (or 20 days) of operations, required 690 trucks to transport it. The lack of transport in France in June 1940 meant that many

87 Letter, AVM Longmore to AC Collishaw, 23 January 1941, TNA AIR 23/1391. 247

RAF squadrons were able to escape only with their serviceable aircraft and personnel.

Everything else was abandoned and lost.88

The RAF lacked a modern mobile repair organization in 1940. As a result 174 damaged,

but repairable, Hurricanes were abandoned in France – 34 percent of the force committed to the

battle.89 Two inferences can be drawn from this comparison to the experience of the RAF during

the Battle of France. The ability of Collishaw’s 202 Group to operate effectively while

advancing hundreds of miles across a hostile desert environment was a stunning achievement.

His squadrons were not designed, equipped or staffed for such mobility, yet they made it work.

Though the distance and environment took a heavy toll on the men and machines, aircraft

continued to fly throughout the campaign and the RAF maintained the initiative. The second

point concerns the criticisms levelled at the Italian air force for its low serviceability rates and

the large number of abandoned aircraft captured by the advancing British formations which was

not drastically different from the losses suffered by the RAF in a similar campaign, the Battle of

France, where it too had lost the initiative.90 In many respects it was not the failure of the Italian

air force during this campaign that was surprising, but rather the success achieved by the RAF.

For this, a great deal of the credit can be given to the leadership and initiative demonstrated by

Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw.

Operation Compass, the first British offensive of the war, culminated in the expulsion of

the Italians from Cyrenaica and was a model of cooperation between the army and the air force.

The results far exceeded even the most optimistic forecasts made prior to the campaign. A

88 Robin Higham, Unflinching Zeal: The Air Battles Over France and Britain, May-October 1940 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 133. 89 Higham, Unflinching Zeal: The Air Battles Over France and Britain, May-October 1940, 234 90 The RAF lost 1,079 aircraft in France in May and June 1940. Higham, Unflinching Zeal: The Air Battles Over France and Britain, May-October 1940, 192. For a full discussion of the serviceability issues afflicting the RAF during the Battle of France see Higham, chs.4-5. 248

British force of only two divisions had advanced 500 miles and destroyed an army of 14

divisions. Over 130,000 prisoners were captured, along with nearly 500 tanks and over 800 guns.

This success came at the cost of only 2,000 casualties including 500 men were killed. As well,

the Italian air force in Libya virtually ceased to exist as an effective force.91 While the Italian military had its problems during the campaign much of the success should be attributed to the leadership of Lieutenant-General O’Connor and Air Commodore Collishaw who drove their forces hard, but not recklessly, to overcome the challenges of a harsh environment, obsolescent equipment, inferior numbers, vast distances, as well as severe maintenance and supply issues.

What started as a limited five-day offensive to capture a series of Italian camps in Egypt on 9

December 1940 ended with the fall of Benghazi and the complete destruction of the Italian 10th

Army at Beda Fomm less than two months later which sealed an improbable victory.

The role played by Collishaw’s 202 Group was crucial to the success of Operation

Compass. As a first attempt at harnessing the joint efforts of the land and air forces, Compass

was a model operation. From the outset, Collishaw and O=Connor worked closely together to plan operations. Collishaw even went so far as to collocate his headquarters with that of

O=Connor and to advance his HQ as necessary. After the initial phase of the operation was over, the chief enemy of the RAF became distance, not the Italians. As British forces advanced across the desert, the RAF had to continually move forward to new landing grounds to keep their aircraft within striking distance of the retreating enemy. This was a type of operation for which plans had not been made in the pre-war period. Squadrons were previously seen to be largely static organizations not designed for quick advances into unprepared areas. However, Collishaw realized that war in the desert was a war of mobility and the air forces must be able to keep up.

91 David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them: The British Army in the Second World War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983), 121-124. 249

Ad hoc solutions were devised during the course of operations which, while not ideal, allowed

air support to continue. For instance, it was found that insufficient motor transport was available

to move equipment, supplies and personnel forwards. The disorganised retreat of the Italians

contributed to the British advance by abandoning large numbers of functioning trucks and

vehicles, tons of supplies and along with significant stocks of petrol and bombs.92 The old station

basis of organizing squadrons was too cumbersome for the conduct of mobile operations.

Instead, it was more efficient to split squadrons into two parts: an advanced HQ which operated

with the aircraft at a forward landing ground while the more bulky administrative HQ and repair

facilities remained behind at a rear landing ground.93

Tedder, Cross and Rosier may not have liked or agreed with Collishaw’s command style but it is difficult to argue with his success. Anecdotal evidence suggests Collishaw did not always make the best use of his staff and on occasion he drove them hard but those qualities may reflect an operational pattern dictated by the shortages of the early war years. In contrast to these negative views, both Wing Commander Judge, a staff officer who worked closely with

Collishaw in the Western Desert, and Air Vice-Marshal Elmhirst, who wrote a detailed after-

action report on Operation Compass, commented favourably upon Collishaw’s command

arrangements. With such diverging views on his leadership abilities, it may be best to allow his

operational record to tell the story. Collishaw’s long experience in army operations gave him a clear vision of how best to utilize his limited forces to defeat the Italian air force, destroy the morale and capabilities of the Italian army and support the British army in its advance across

Cyrenaica. The first task was to impede the ability of the enemy air force to resist the advance, and this would permit uncontested attacks on the Italian logistical network to isolate the troops at

92 Philip Guedalla, Middle East 1940-1942: A Study in Air Power (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1944), 98; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 281. 93 Richard Townshend Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939-1945 (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), 43-44. 250

the front and impair the movement of supplies and reinforcements on the battlefield. In special circumstances, such as the assaults on Bardia and Tobruk, close support attacks could be carried out on targets immediately in front of the army. This pattern of operations worked exceptionally well and was reflected in the positive reports on Collishaw’s conduct made by Wavell,

Longmore and O’Connor.

251

Chapter 8 – Reversal of Fortune: The Retreat to the Frontier

British fortunes would change significantly after April 1941 when General Erwin

Rommel launched his first counter-offensive in the Western Desert. The unexpected success of

this small German foray exposed major problems in the command structure established

following the end of Operation Compass. Collishaw and O’Connor were both reposted away

from the front lines to give them a well-deserved rest and this corresponded with the

development of a new antagonistic relationship between the army and the RAF that had not

previously existed. The central issue of this chapter focuses on the growing inter-service

antagonism which was magnified by the first of what would be a series of significant British

defeats in the Middle East and Mediterranean theatres.

The victory over the Italians was facilitated by the effective partnership of the army and

the Royal Air Force during the first successful British campaign of the war. Lieutenant-General

Richard O’Connor and Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw shared a common vision during the

operation and worked well together. Both senior army commanders were effusive in their praise

of this close working relationship. General Wavell wrote the Prime Minister following the initial

victory over the Italians in the Egypt in December 1940 to report that ‘the operation could not

have been executed without the magnificent support given by the Royal Air Force and the Royal

Navy.’1 He later concluded his official despatch on Operation Compass by stating, ‘The Army

owes a special debt to Air Commodore R. Collishaw, commanding air forces in the Western

Desert, for his whole-hearted co-operation and for the energy and optimism which were an

1 Telegram, A.P. Wavell to Prime Minister, 14 December 1940, contained in Principal War Telegrams and Memoranda, 1940-1943: Middle East, vol.1 (Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 1976), 15. 252

inspiration to all.’2 General O’Connor also credited Collishaw and the RAF with a significant

role in the victory:

Since the war began you have consistently attacked without intermission an enemy air force between five and ten times your strength…until finally he was driven out of the sky…you have co-operated to the full in carrying out our many requests for special bombardments, reconnaissances and protection against enemy air action, and I would like to say how much all this had contributed to our success.3

Longmore was similarly impressed by the partnership with the army and described

O’Connor as ‘the man really responsible for the dash and initiative displayed in this Libyan

victory.’4 Collishaw was more candid in his assessment recalling that ‘the army had not

handcuffed us and made it impossible for us to carry out our true purpose by insisting on the

misuse of our squadrons, as had the Italian commanders of their own air force.’5 In March 1941

the King appointed Collishaw to the Most Honourable Order of the Bath in recognition of ‘the

recent successful combined operations in the Middle East.’6

The relationship between the two services would be sorely tested by events in March and

April. The victory over the Italians in Cyrenaica created a strategic question for the British: continue the offensive to Tripoli or rest their tired forces and shift the emphasis to other areas.

Intelligence indicated that only one partially formed Italian division and minimal artillery stood

in the way of a British march through Tripolitania. So long as the Royal Navy prevented enemy

2 Archibald P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Western Desert from December 7th, 1940, to February 7th, 1941,’ The London Gazette, 26 June 1946, 3269. 3 Quoted in Air Ministry (Air Historical Branch), Air Support, Royal Air Force, Air Publication 3235 (London, 1955), TNA AIR 10/5547, 41. 4 Arthur Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946), 259-260. 5 Raymond Collishaw and R.V. Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story (London: William Kimber, 1973), 248. 6 The London Gazette, 4 March 1941, 1303. Generals Wavell and O’Connor and Air Chief Marshal Longmore were also appointed to the order on the same list. It is interesting to note the use of the phrase ‘combined operations’ in the award notice. When Air Marshal Arthur Tedder and Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham were admitted to the order the next year it was for ‘distinguished services in the campaign in the Middle East.’ The London Gazette, 24 November 1942, 5149. 253

reinforcements from landing in Libya there was nothing to stop a British advance to Tripoli. ‘No

half-hearted measures,’ Lieutenant Richard O’Connor said, ‘would be any good; nothing could ensure our success except a wholehearted effort on the part of all three Services, with no other commitments of importance to detract from that effort.’7 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw

agreed, ‘We possessed the momentum and our foe was completely demoralized. Such a decision

would have involved risks but it is the responsibility of every military commander to assess all

the risks and to decide which are acceptable and which are not. The rewards to be gained were so

vast that I felt…that a continuance of our offensive involved calculated risks that should have

been accepted.’8

Any further British offensive would have been risky. The tanks and other vehicles of 7th

Armoured Division had been pushed to the limit and in General Wavell’s opinion were

‘mechanically incapable of further action.’9 As such the entire division was withdrawn to the

Delta region of Egypt for rest and refit. The squadrons of 202 Group had also been pushed hard

and Air Chief Marshal Arthur Longmore had no substantial reinforcements to replace losses and

worn out aircraft.10 It was not clear how such an advance across more than 600 miles of desert

would be supplied.11

7 ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 27. 8 Collishaw and Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 249. The language in his official report was more guarded, ‘It appeared to the Germans and Italians at the time that the British would be able to advance upon Tripoli without much difficulty,’ but Collishaw’s contemporary interest in continuing the advance to Tripoli was confirmed by Tedder. See Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 9; and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, GCB (London: Cassell & Company, 1966), 55. 9 General Sir A.P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941,’ Supplement to the London Gazette, 3 July 1946, 3424. 10 Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809], 4675. 11 William F. Buckingham, Tobruk: The Great Siege, 1941-42 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2008), 142-143. 254

But, as weak as the British were, the Italians were in even worse shape. Wavell

concluded that the Italians had been ‘so completely defeated’ and had lost nearly all their armour

and artillery that there was no serious possibility of a counterattack for a considerable period.12

In spite of this, both Wavell and Longmore were cautious about continuing forward. O’Connor

persuaded Wavell to seek permission for a continuation of the mission from London, but the text

of Wavell’s telegram indicated he did not fully support such a plan. The reply from General Sir

John Dill, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, told Wavell to wait as it was likely that a

mission to Greece and/or Turkey would preclude further operations in the Western Desert.13

Longmore was relieved when other commitments released him of the necessity to support an

advance to Tripoli.14

Air Marshal Tedder expressed disappointment in his memoirs that the ‘Balkan mirage’

had closed the door on Tripoli and consequently ‘opened the door to Rommel and Cyrenaica’15

but he made this judgement with the benefit of hindsight. At the time Tedder was critical of

Collishaw’s push to continue the advance as he thought Collishaw had recklessly worn out his

units and as a result they were not fit for further employment until refitted.16 O’Connor and

Collishaw had been right in December 1940 that Operation Compass should be extended into a

12 Wavell, ‘Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941,’ 3424. 13 A.P.Wavell to C.I.G.S., 10 February 1941: ‘Extent of Italian defeat at Benghazi makes it seem possible that Tripoli might yield to small force if despatched without undue delay…Further advance will also involve naval and air commitments and we are already too far stretched. Navy would hate having to feed us at Tripoli and Air Force to protect us. On other hand possession of this coast might be useful to both.’; and C.I.G.S. to A.P. Wavell, 11 February 1941, quoted in John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London: Collins, 1964), 326-327. 14 Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946), 257. 15 Tedder, With Prejudice, 59-60. 16 Letter, Air Marshal A.W. Tedder to Air Chief Marshal Sir W.R. Freeman, 11 March 1941. TNA AIR 20/2792; see also Tedder’s critical comments about Collishaw’s desire to advance to Tripoli in Tedder, With Prejudice, 55 255

pursuit to take advantage of the weak Italian position, but their advocacy of a continued advance

on Tripoli became moot with the British decision to send substantial reinforcements to Greece.17

The RAF in the Western Desert was reorganised as a result of the changing priorities in the theatre. To prepare his ‘Balkan Reserve,’ Longmore recalled Collishaw and his 202 Group

HQ along with Nos.45, 113 (Blenheims) and 274 (Hurricanes) Squadrons from the Western

Desert and reassigned them to the Delta in Egypt in mid-February; No.208 Army Co-operation

Squadron followed at the end of the month. A new command under Group Captain ‘Bingo’

Brown, Headquarters RAF Cyrenaica, was formed to control the small number of squadrons remaining in Libya. These included No.3 Squadron RAAF (Hurricanes) at Benina, No.73

Squadron (Hurricanes) at Tobruk, No.55 Squadron (Blenheims) at Maraua and No.6 Army Co- operation Squadron at Barce (Lysanders) and Agedabia (Hurricanes). The demands on these squadrons were substantial in February and March as the Luftwaffe began operations in the theatre and the German Afrika Korps deployed to Libya. The two fighter squadrons were hard pressed to defend Benghazi and Tobruk from air attack. The Blenheim squadron was the only bomber unit available in the forward area and it also provided the only long range aircraft that could conduct reconnaissance of Tripolitania.18

17 Historians remain divided over this question. Correlli Barnett argued in 1960 that Churchill made a ‘disastrous’ mistake by committing forces to Greece, an action which prevented the early capture of Tripoli and condemned the British to two additional years of fighting in the desert. Barnett maintained this view as more evidence became available. More recently, Niall Barr and William F. Buckingham have argued that the decision to stop was correct as there was no way the British could hope to sustain an advance over such a great distance. See Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals (London: Pan Books, 1983 (1960)), 60-65; Correlli Barnett, ‘“The Desert Generals”: An address by Correlli Barnett, British Commission for Military History Annual General Meeting, 5 February 2005, , accessed 5 February 2013; Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004), 5-8; William F. Buckingham, Tobruk: The Great Siege, 1941-42 (Stroud, Gloustershire, UK: The History Press, 2008), 141-142. 18 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 12; Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809], 4673-4674; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East 256

After its success at Beda Fomm, 7th Armoured Division was sent back to Egypt and was

replaced by 2nd Armoured Division. This inexperienced formation was a division only in name.

It was left with only one under-strength armoured brigade after its other armoured brigade and

much of its support group were sent to Greece. The 6th Australian Division had proved itself

during Operation Compass without suffering serious losses and for this reason it was sent to

Greece. Its replacement was the newly-formed 9th Australian Division, which would later

distinguish itself in Tobruk, but it was not yet ready for combat. Its two best infantry brigades

were detached for Greece and replaced with two partially trained brigades that were short of

equipment. The divisional headquarters was understaffed and undertrained and the formation

lacked sufficient artillery, Bren guns, anti-tank guns, communications equipment and transport.

The gamble to hold Cyrenaica with this weak force was based on the assumption that

reinforcements and additional units would be available before the enemy was ready to attack.19

The British success over the Italians in Cyrenaica coincided with a deterioration of the

situation in Greece. Italy had invaded the small Mediterranean country on 28 October 1940 but a

Greek counterattack two weeks into the invasion reversed most of the Italian gains and by

January 1941 a substantial portion of southern Albania was occupied by the Greeks. The British

had provided limited support, mostly RAF units, during this period, but strengthening Italian

forces combined with poor Greek logistics prompted the Greeks to review the issue of British

support. Through January and February a lively debate raged between London, Cairo and Athens

regarding the size, form, and timing of British support to Greece. Churchill was in favour of a

Greek deployment as was Wavell. The growing evidence of a German buildup in the Balkans

Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, 97-99, TNA AIR 41/44; Wavell, Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941, 3423-3444 19 Barton Maughan, Tobruk and El Alamein (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1965), 3-12; I.S.O. Playfair, C.J.C. Molony, and S.E. Toomer, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2: The Germans come to the help of their Ally (1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), 2-4. 257

spurred a British decision. Churchill was keen to avoid another debacle like Norway but

supported a deployment if success could be achieved at a reasonable cost.20

The British Defence Committee met on 10 February to consider its policy for the Middle

East. There were not sufficient forces in the theatre to meet all the current challenges so the

options were carefully reviewed. An advance to Tripoli was attractive as it would remove the

Italian and German threat to Egypt without first requiring a major seaborne invasion, and it

would provide a base for air operations over the Mediterranean and especially against Sicily. The

occupation of Tripoli, however, would be difficult to supply and defend and would preclude

additional commitments to Greece. The other option was to hold Cyrenaica as a secure flank

with minimal strength to allow an expeditionary force to be sent to Greece.21 The destruction of

the Italian army and air force in Cyrenaica had removed the immediate threat to Egypt and

General Wavell estimated that it would take at least two months for Axis forces to gather

sufficient strength to threaten the British in the Western Desert.22 By that time, Wavell’s position

would have been substantially strengthened by the arrival of reinforcements from the UK, the

rehabilitation of forces worn out during Operation Compass, and the release of formations due to the completion of operations in the Sudan. Churchill decided on the second plan and on 7 March

Wavell received official confirmation for the Greek deployment; British troops landed at Piraeus later that day.23

20 For the background to the Greek deployment, see I.S.O. Playfair et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1: The Early Successes against Italy (to May 1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), Chs.12, 18 and 20; Robin Higham, Diary of a Disaster: British Aid to Greece, 1940-1941 (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1986); Harold E. Raugh, Wavell in the Middle East 1939-1941: A Study in Generalship (London: Brassey's, 1993), ch.7. 21 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 1. 22 Wavell, ‘Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941.’ 23 The British deployment to Greece was based on helping an ally, but the concomitant US support for such a mission was a major part of the British calculation. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941,’; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, 371-372, 388-389; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol. 2, 1-2. 258

Wavell prepared the strongest possible force based on his limited resources to send to

Greece in the expectation of a German intervention. The fighting component of W Force, the

unofficial name assigned to the troops under the command of Lieutenant-General H.M. Wilson,

was composed of the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions, the New Zealand Division, the Polish

Brigade Group and an armoured brigade group drawn from 2nd Armoured Division. A large

contingent of non-combat troops would accompany the force. This left only two weak and

inexperienced formations to hold the line south of Benghazi – 9th Australian Division and 2nd

Armoured Division. Overall command of these troops was vested in Cyrenaica Command led by

Lieutenant-General Philip Neame, which replaced O’Connor’s veteran 13th Corps headquarters.

Neame had been awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions at Neuve Chapelle in 1915 and he

had a commendable First World War and interwar career, however, he lacked recent experience

in the desert. As well, he was not well served by his headquarters which was deficient in trained

staff and communications equipment, factors which would prove a serious handicap in the

upcoming battle.24

The situation in Libya changed significantly in 1941 with the commitment of German

forces to bolster the Italians. On 11 January Hitler despatched an expeditionary force under

General Erwin Rommel to prevent their complete defeat. This force was comprised of the 5th

Light Division supported by a Panzer regiment along with 245 aircraft of Fliegerkorps X which

had recently deployed to Sicily. Rommel’s force, known as the Afrika Korps, was later reinforced by the addition of 15th Panzer Division.25 The British had expected the arrival of the

24 Officially the British Expeditionary Force to Greece was known as British Troops Greece, but the use of the name W Force was common at the time, and in histories since. Wavell, Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941, 3423-3444; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 2-4. 25 Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 658-659, 673-674. 259

Germans in North Africa since December and the first operational Luftwaffe units were

identified in mid-January. By mid-February German air attacks were regularly directed at

Benghazi and Tobruk.26 Allied intelligence had great difficulty tracking the arrival of German troops in Africa but fragmentary evidence indicated a slow buildup. Wavell’s best estimate was

that an attack would not be forthcoming before mid-April and it was more likely to occur in

May. This evaluation was remarkably close to the timetable envisioned by German and Italian

commanders regarding the start of the next offensive. The intelligence estimates, however, could

not account for the aggressive nature of the German commander.27

Lieutenant-General Neame and Group Captain Brown were given the task of defending

Cyrenaica against an enemy attack. They were to hold as long as possible, but to conserve their

forces to prevent a complete defeat. This meant that territory was to be traded for time, even if it

meant the loss of the important and prestigious port of Benghazi. Wavell and Neame discussed at

great length the various options for the defence of the region. It was expected that an enemy

attack could be directed at the capture of Benghazi or a more ambitious trek across the desert to

Mechili might be attempted with the goal of cutting off the British in the Jebel Mountains.

Neame prepared plans to meet either situation. The lack of an effective and flexible supply

system meant that any movements would be tied to pre-stocked depots containing essential

supplies of food, ammunition, water, and most importantly, fuel.28

26 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 99-108; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 9-15. 27 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 99-108; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 9-15; Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3, 654-678. 28 Lieutenant-General P. Neame, ‘Operations in Cyrenaica from 27th February, 1941, when Lt.Gen. P. Neame assumed command until his capture on 7th April 1941,’ n.d., but circa May 1941, TNA CAB 106/767; Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Operation Carried out by the R.A.F. Cyrenaica during Enemy Advance,’ 22 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6486. 260

One of Collishaw’s final tasks before returning to Egypt was to organise the air defence

of Benghazi. The British capture of the port in early February corresponded with the arrival of

the Luftwaffe in Libya and as a result, the British noted a significant increase in the number of

air attacks against Benghazi and Tobruk as well as strafing attacks against troop positions, road

convoys and airfields. The British intended to use Benghazi as their main harbour to supply the

region but these plans soon had to be re-evaluated as a result of German air attacks. Collishaw

ordered that a radar station and an Air Observer Screen be established along the coast to provide

warning of incoming air attacks but there was not much more that could be done. The majority of

army anti-aircraft units had been sent to Greece and the lone fighter squadron at Benghazi was

not strong enough to prevent the attacks.29

The first coastal supply convoy reached the port on 18 February, though two of its ships were diverted to Tobruk due to the lack of adequate air defence capabilities at Benghazi. HMS

Terror accompanied the supply ships to provide increased anti-aircraft fire, but the transports were sent to Tobruk after two days without unloading as the local stevedores refused to work due to the threat of air attack. Terror, along with the corvette HMS Salvia and minesweeper HMS

Fareham, remained in Benghazi to provide anti-aircraft protection for the naval clearance parties working to improve the condition of the harbour. German attacks continued during this period and on the morning of 22 February a bombing attack narrowly missed Terror but still caused severe damage and flooding to the ship. The ship’s captain, Commander Henry John Haynes,

29 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 9. The RAF were in the process of setting up a mobile radar unit at Benghazi but it only arrived on 21 February and was not operational until 25 February. The radar would have increased the effectiveness of the fighter and anti-aircraft defences by providing warning of approaching raid and directing fighter patrols to intercept the bombers. RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 103-105. 261

reported to Admiral Cunningham that ‘With no (repeat) no dawn fighter protection as at present,

I consider it only a matter of time before the ship receives a direct hit.’30

The ships were ordered to sail that night for Tobruk but as they left the harbour two

aerial-dropped magnetic mines detonated close to Terror and caused additional flooding. The

next day a German reconnaissance aircraft discovered the ships off Derna prompting another air

attack. Three German Junkers Ju 88s bombed the ships at 1830 hours. No direct hits were scored

but three near misses were sufficient to break the back of Terror and the ship was subsequently

scuttled early on 26 February.31 The navy was bitter at the loss of the most important ship of the

Inshore Squadron and blamed the RAF: ‘Thus, through a lack of adequate A.A. defences and

particularly fighter protection, at a critical period, we lost a ship which had done more than any

other naval unit to start the western advance and keep it going.’32

The loss of Terror was unfortunate but it cannot be blamed on the RAF. Contrary to the naval report, a patrol of three Hurricanes was over Benghazi from 0645 hours to 0905 hours on the morning of 22 February when Terror was first damaged. Squadron Leader A.D. Murray, the commander of No.73 Squadron, joined two aircraft from No.3 Squadron RAAF. At 0730 hours he engaged and destroyed a German Ju 88. A second German aircraft was observed but not

intercepted.33 The next morning No.3 Squadron RAAF provided air cover for the ships as they

sailed from Benghazi to Tobruk. Three Hurricanes escorted the ships from 0655 hours until 0920

30 ‘Operations in Support of the Army off the Western Desert, 7th December 1940 – 31st May 1941,’ 1 January 1942, TNA DEFE 2/822, n.p., but Phase IV, Section N. 31 ‘Operations in Support of the Army off the Western Desert, 7th December 1940 – 31st May 1941,’ 1 January 1942, TNA DEFE 2/822, n.p., but Phase IV, Section N. For additional details see [accessed 24 January 1941]. 32 ‘Operations in Support of the Army off the Western Desert, 7th December 1940 – 31st May 1941,’ 1 January 1942, n.p., but Phase IV, Section N, TNA DEFE 2/822. 33 Operations Record Book, No.3 Squadron RAAF, February 1941, Appendix J: Detail of Work Carried Out, 22 February 1941, National Archives of Australia digital record, , accessed 24 January 2013. Note: the ORB entry for the engagement records the Ju 88 was damaged but not seen to crash, while App.J recorded the enemy aircraft as destroyed. Christopher Shores confirms the German aircraft was destroyed, see Christopher Shores, Giovanni Massimello, and Russell Guest, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, vol.1: North Africa - June 1940-January 1942 (London: Grub Street, 2012), 134. 262

hours and were relieved by two additional Hurricanes who remained on station until 1130 hours.

Unfortunately no air cover was available in the afternoon when the Luftwaffe attacked.34

Admiral Cunningham was aware that the Benghazi anti-aircraft defences were still being improved when he ordered the despatch of the convoy and HMS Terror. The Germans frequently targeted Benghazi during the period 12-22 February, but few of the 13 raids could be consider heavy.35 The loss of Terror contributed to a worsening of relations between the navy and the air force which would climax during the battle of Crete when German aircraft would sink a large number of Royal Navy ships.

The navy’s decision to abandon Benghazi as a forward supply base would ‘severely handicap’ RAF operations in February and March 1941.36 All supplies, including important stocks of fuel and bombs, would have to be delivered to the main RAF base in Tobruk and transferred to Benghazi by road. The ongoing shortage of trucks made this final stage of the supply line tenuous. Collishaw reported that ‘the non availability of supplies of petrol at

Benghazi in the early days after it was captured prevented the R.A.F. from further demoralising the enemy’s routed troops which were escaping westward of El Agheila in crowded masses on

the main road.’37

* * * * *

The buildup of the German army and its move towards Cyrenaica was detected as early

as the end of February by air reconnaissance. Group Captain Brown had myriad tasks to

34 Operations Record Book, No.3 Squadron RAAF, February 1941, National Archives of Australia digital record, , accessed 24 January 2013. 35 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 103-105. 36 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 9. 37 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6475, 9-10. 263

accomplish with his limited air resources, but he despatched regular sorties by long-range

Hurricanes and Blenheims to watch Tripoli and the coastal road leading to El Agheila, the

westernmost British position. Tactical reconnaissance reports relayed to Lieutenant-General

Neame’s headquarters on 21 and 22 February indicted the presence of German troops in the forward area within 15 miles of El Agheila. Air reports of the eastward movement of Axis forces from Tripoli continued to increase. General Wavell signalled the War Office in London on 2

March with a remarkably accurate assessment of German and Italian capabilities in Libya. His intelligence accurately identified the Axis reinforcements being landed in Africa as well as their limited ability to engage in offensive operations east of El Agheila.38 It was expected that the

Germans would eventually launch a large-scale attack but ‘shipping risks, difficulty of communications and the approach of hot weather make it unlikely that such an attack could develop before the end of the summer.’39

In the same telegram Wavell outlined his defences in the region which were based on

‘two incompletely trained and equipped units,’ – 3rd Armoured Brigade and 9th Australian

Division.40 This report was remarkably accurate regarding the readiness of the enemy but the

threat was discounted by assumptions regarding the likelihood of such an attack.

Air Chief Marshal Longmore contributed the air threat assessment to Wavell’s telegram

and he estimated that the Italians and Germans deployed 170 bombers, 90 dive bombers, 60

fighters, 18 reconnaissance aircraft and 180 transport aircraft to support operations. This air

threat was weakly contested by inadequate anti-aircraft defences and a small RAF contingent of

38 The intelligence indicated that the reinforcements comprised ‘two Italian Infantry Divisions, two Italian Motorized Arty. Regts., and German Armd. Troops estimated at maximum of one Armd. Bde. Gp’ and ‘he can probably maintain up to one Inf. Div, and Armd. Bde. along the coast road in about three weeks.’ Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, Middle East to the War Office, 2 March 1941, TNA CAB 65/22/11. 39 Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, Middle East to the War Office, 2 March 1941, TNA CAB 65/22/11. 40 Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, Middle East to the War Office, 2 March 1941, TNA CAB 65/22/11. 264

approximately 48 aircraft augmented by the periodic support of Wellington bombers from Malta

and Cyrenaica.41 Longmore’s chief concern was not the loss of Cyrenaica as he thought that was

unlikely but he was concerned about the impact a growing Luftwaffe presence would have on the

ability of British convoys to transit the Mediterranean. In addition, German attacks were

increasing against British targets in Libya and there was a potential threat to Egypt and the Suez

Canal from Luftwaffe aircraft based in Sicily and Southern Italy which could operate out of the

Dodecanese. RAF did not possess sufficient resources to deal with these pressures.42

In mid-March Group Captain Brown became increasingly worried about the signs of an impending enemy attack. Details were vague but the westward movement of Italian forces had ceased and was reversed as substantial enemy traffic moved east along the southern shore of the

Gulf of Sirte. In response to these reports on 22 March Brown instructed his forward squadrons to be ready to move at short notice, and he established reserve aerodromes to accommodate this contingency. This order was issued two days prior to the first German probe.43

In spite of the warning signs Wavell continued to believe that no imminent move was

likely against his defences south of Benghazi.44 Aerial reconnaissance conducted by Brown’s

squadrons continued to report the eastward advance of enemy forces. Blenheims of No.55

Squadron flew daily reconnaissance missions to the limits of their range while the Hurricanes

and Lysanders of No.6 Squadron based at Agedabia, reinforced by No.3 Squadron RAAF, made

41 Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, Middle East to the War Office, 2 March 1941, TNA CAB 65/22/11. 42 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 106-107. 43 The flight of No.6 Squadron at Agedabia established reserve airfields at Antelat and Msus while No.3 RAAF Squadron was prepared to fallback from Benina to Got es Sultan. Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Operation Carried out by the R.A.F. Cyrenaica during Enemy Advance,’ 22 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6486, 16-17; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 108-109. 44 Wavell was aware of the German build-up but intelligence, especially Ultra, was telling him that a German advance was unlikely and if there was an attack it would be limited in scope. F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.1: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979), 388-391. 265

an average of three reconnaissance flights a day in support of 2nd Armoured Division.45 On 9

March a concentration of at least 1,600 vehicles was reported between Nofilia and the frontier.

Less than a week later No.55 Squadron Blenheims indicated the presence of 1,300 vehicles

including medium tanks dispersed along the shore of the Gulf of Sirte; reports of large number of

vehicles continued to be made almost daily.46 The mounting evidence of Axis intentions did

nothing to prompt Wavell or Neame to adjust their defensive preparations.

General Rommel was keen to exploit what he interpreted as a major weakness in British defences and appealed to OKH Headquarters in Berlin for permission to launch an attack on 24

March to recover Cyrenaica and possibly advance to the Suez Canal.47 This request was refused

as being over-ambitious. Instead, Rommel was reluctantly permitted to conduct a minor

offensive against El Agheila which would be allowed to develop into a larger advance to

Benghazi and Tobruk if the conditions were favourable. He was not to launch this attack until

after the arrival of 15th Panzer Division in May.48 In spite of these orders Rommel directed his

3rd Reconnaissance Battalion to attack El Agheila based on intercepted British radio messages

which indicated that the position was weakly held. Rommel’s instincts proved correct and his

probe on 24 March caused the British garrison to retreat leaving the fort, and its valuable water

supply, in German hands.49 Group Captain Brown’s response to this attack was immediately to

increase the number of reconnaissance flights made by No.55 Squadron along the Libyan coast

45 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 107. 46 ‘RAF Reconnaissance Reports Supplied to the Army, February-March 1941,’ Appendix XXV to RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44. 47 Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) was Nazi Germany's High Command of the Army. It was commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Brauchitsch until December 1941. 48 Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3, 673-674. 49 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 15-16; Raugh, Wavell in the Middle East 1939-1941, 187-188 266

west of El Agheila. These missions indicated a substantial enemy buildup was underway. On 25

and 26 March over 1,000 vehicles were reported at Ras Lanuf moving east and on the morning of

27 March a convoy of 100 vehicles was detected just 20 miles west of El Agheila. RAF reports

also indicated a buildup of enemy aircraft on airfields in the region.50 This substantial increase in

enemy forces posed an immediate threat to British defences in the region.

General Wavell still ignored the warning signs. His Director of Military Intelligence,

Brigadier John Shearer, produced an estimate on 24 March predicting that one German armoured

division and one Italian motorized division would be able to launch a counteroffensive against

Cyrenaica by 16 April with additional divisions ready by 14 and 24 May.51 Churchill was quite

concerned about the German attack and cabled Wavell on 26 March: ‘It is their habit to push on

whenever they are not resisted. I presume you are only waiting for the tortoise to stick his head

out far enough before chopping it off. It seems extremely important to give them an early taste of

our quality.’52 Wavell, however, was still convinced that there was no imminent threat to

Cyrenaica and believed the available intelligence indicated no imminent threat of a significant

German or Italian attack at Agheila. He understood that he was taking a significant risk by

leaving Cyrenaica weakly defended but no other choice was possible given his other

commitments.53

The cost of the decision to support Greece became apparent on 31 March when Rommel

launched a major attack against the main British position at Mersa Brega. A cautious probe of

50 ‘RAF Reconnaissance Reports Supplied to the Army, February-March 1941,’ Appendix XXV to RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44. 51 ‘Counter Offensive from Tripolitania,’ 24 March 1941 contained in War Diary, General Headquarters, Joint Planning Staff, Middle East, March 1941, TNA WO 169/914. 52 Telegram, Prime Minister to A.P. Wavell, 26 March 1941, contained in Principal War Telegrams and Memoranda, 1940-1943: Middle East, vol.3 (Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 1976), 73. 53 Telegram, A.P. Wavell to Prime Minister, 27 March 1941, contained in Principal War Telegrams and Memoranda, 1940-1943: Middle East, vol.3, 77. 267

the defences was repelled in the morning, but a renewed attack in the afternoon threatened to

turn the flank of the position and forced a British withdrawal. The combined German and Italian

force advanced on multiple axes – along the coast to Benghazi, from Msus to Mechili and further

south along the desert track that ran from Maaten el Grara to Tobruk. What followed was a rapid

two-week advance by Rommel which took advantage of weakness, confusion and hesitation in

the British command and ended with the British pushed almost completely out of Cyrenaica. One

of the few bright spots during this period was Rommel’s failure to capture Tobruk.54

Wavell later claimed that his available intelligence was ‘meagre’ and he was ‘working

almost entirely in the dark as to the possibility of German formations being sent to Libya.’ In

fact, he even stated that the available evidence indicated that no German troops had yet been

sent.55 The evidence does not support this line of reasoning. Wavell was aware of the German

buildup in Libya as early as 2 March as indicated in his cable to Churchill. The decision which

confirmed the commitment of troops to Greece on 7 March was made with the full knowledge

that a German deployment to Libya was underway. Evidence, primarily from aerial

reconnaissance, but also from small engagements on the ground, reinforced the news that

Germans were not content to remain in Tripoli, but were quickly advancing towards the British.

British signals intelligence provided another layer of information for Wavell regarding German

and Italian capabilities and intentions during this period.56 Wavell was largely correct in his

estimations of the expected timing of a German attack and the mid-April/early-May timetable was substantiated by Axis logistical preparations and directives issued to Rommel by the

54 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, Chs.1-2. 55 Wavell, Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941, 3425. 56 Hinsley and Bennett noted that Ultra (the Allied code word for the intelligence gained from the decryption of the top secret German Enigma machine) provided some useful intelligence but was not yet able to provide the quality of information available later in the war. See F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.1: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979), 380-399; Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc, 1989), 36-40. 268

German high command. What Wavell could not know was that Rommel would disobey his

orders and launch an early attack. This, however, does not absolve Wavell of his neglect to

provide a stouter defence in Cyrenaica.57 It can also be inferred from Wavell’s argument that he

is shifting the blame for the debacle onto the RAF who, in his estimation, did not provide him

with the intelligence necessary to make better decisions during this period.

The experience of the 2nd Armoured Division from 31 March to 8 April was disastrous.

The plans prepared by Neame and Wavell for a fighting withdrawal designed to buy time to

establish a new line of defence were upset by the rapid advance of the enemy, the lack of

essential supplies such as petrol and confusion regarding the situation which was compounded

the inexperience of the units and their commanders. On the morning of 8 April the remaining

elements of 2nd Armoured Division and 3rd Indian Motor Brigade were trapped and destroyed

by Italian and German forces while the fortress of Tobruk was surrounded by the enemy advance

three days later. By 13 April Rommel’s spearheads took Bardia and pushed into Egypt where

Sollum and the important Halfaya Pass were captured. Though these positions were recovered on

15 April, a renewed German attack on 25 and 26 April forced the British to retire to the general

area of Buq Buq and Sofafi. All the gains made by O’Connor at the start of the year had been

erased in just over two weeks and the only British possession remaining in Libya was the port of

Tobruk defended by a garrison of approximately 24,000 combat troops anchored by the 9th

Australian Division. Rommel was determined to eliminate this threat to his lines of

57 A recent PhD thesis by Norman Murphy on the Battle of Mersa Brega makes a convincing case that Wavell and Neame had a number of options to reinforce the forward British positions which would have had a good chance of stopping the initial German success on 31 March and possibly forestalling Rommel’s entire offensive. See Norman Kenneth Murphy, ‘The “Lost” Battle of Mersa El Brega, Libyan Desert 31 March 1941,’ (Ph.D Dissertation, University of Hull, 2011). 269

communications and launched a number of poorly planned attacks on the fortress. Each one was

defeated and the British maintained their hold on Tobruk.58

The RAF experience during the retreat was troubled, but less chaotic than that of the

British army. Group Captain Brown was disturbed by the state of British defensive preparations

as early as mid-March and as a result made extensive plans for the rapid withdrawal of his air

units if it became necessary. As a result of this planning, the small number of available

squadrons was able to render excellent support given the circumstances. On most days No.55

Squadron employed its Blenheims to provide strategic reconnaissance while the Hurricanes and

Lysanders of No.6 Squadron conducted tactical reconnaissance. Following the pattern that had worked so well during Operation Compass, numerous attacks were made on enemy aerodromes by the Blenheim squadrons, and the Wellingtons based in Malta and Egypt joined in these attacks when available.59

The majority of the RAF’s air activity during the first week of April covered the

withdrawal of the army and conducted attacks on enemy columns to slow their pursuit. No.3

RAAF and No.73 Squadrons flew regular offensive patrols to prevent Luftwaffe and Italian

interference, especially when bottlenecks of Allied columns occurred at choke points in the

mountainous Jebel region. Brown observed that ‘the enemy’s knowledge that our fighters were

58 For details of the army during this period see General A.P. Wavell, ‘Report on the Action of the 2nd Armoured Division during the Withdrawal from Cyrenaica, March-April 1941,’ 11 July 1941, TNA CAB 66/17/32; Lieutenant-General P. Neame, ‘Operations in Cyrenaica from 27th February, 1941, when Lt.Gen. P. Neame assumed command until his capture on 7th April 1941,’ n.d., but circa May 1941, TNA CAB 106/767; Wavell, Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941, 3423-3444; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, ch.3; William F. Buckingham, Tobruk: The Great Siege, 1941-42 (Stroud, Gloustershire, UK: The History Press, 2008), 350. Lieutenant-General Neame wrote his report immediately after his capture and had it smuggled back to Britain by Mr. Wadsworth, Chancellor of the American Embassy in Rome. 59 Appendix 92, Royal Air Force, Middle East, Fortnightly Operational Summary No.1 (Period 24th March to 6th April, 1941), contained in Operations Record Book, Air Staff, HQ RAF Middle East, June 1941, AIR 24/1075; Appendix 85, Royal Air Force, Middle East, Fortnightly Operational Summary No.12 (Period 7th April to 20th April, 1941), contained in Operations Record Book, Air Staff, HQ RAF Middle East, June 1941, AIR 24/1075; Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Operation Carried out by the R.A.F. Cyrenaica during Enemy Advance,’ 22 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6486, 15-16. 270

operating over our vulnerable areas was sufficient to deter him from using his aircraft in those

areas. This is borne out by the fact that whenever our fighters were engaged in protecting the

Australian Division withdrawing to the BARCE area, our Armoured Division, withdrawing on

MECHILI, was attacked in the open country south of the hills.’60

Regular attacks were made against enemy columns during this period in an attempt to

slow their advance. On 31 March No.55 Squadron sent five Blenheim bombers, escorted by two

Blenheim fighters, to attack a concentration of enemy trucks and tanks in the area of Mersa

Brega and Agheila. The bombers bombed from medium altitude and the fighters made a low- level strafing attack. On 2 April another attack in the same area resulted in a big column of black smoke when five Blenheims bombed a concentration of vehicles. That afternoon seven

Blenheims bombed and strafed a convoy near Agedabia and damaged at least 20 vehicles. On 7

April the arrival of a second Blenheim squadron, No.45, heralded an increase in the tempo of

attacks. The fighting was costly, especially for the fighter squadrons, and by 6 April No.3

Squadron RAAF and the attached flight on No.73 Squadron had been reduced to only three

flyable aircraft. The squadrons were rested that day but following operations the next day only

one or two aircraft were available for action.61

Air Marshal Tedder promised more aircraft so it was decided to commit the Hurricane

squadrons to the ground battle even if this might prove expensive in aircraft. A severe sandstorm

limited operations on 9 April but the next day the two Blenheim squadrons were joined by the

Hurricanes of No.73 Squadron in attacking enemy motor columns. One Hurricane was lost to

60 Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Operation Carried out by the R.A.F. Cyrenaica during Enemy Advance,’ 22 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6486, 17. 61 Appendix 92, Royal Air Force, Middle East, Fortnightly Operational Summary No.1 (Period 24th March to 6th April, 1941), contained in Operations Record Book, Air Staff, HQ RAF Middle East, June 1941, AIR 24/1075; HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, March-April 1941, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1073. 271

ground fire but the combined attacks inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and the RAF

claimed the destruction of over 85 vehicles. For the next three days the Blenheim and Hurricane

squadrons continued to operate at a high tempo in an attempt to slow the enemy advance. Good

to excellent results were claimed each day, but there was a cost for these operations. On 12 April

two Hurricanes were lost to ground fire and one pilot killed, and the next day two Blenheims were lost during attacks against enemy transport south of Tobruk.62 Overall RAF losses during the retreat from 31 March to 14 April were costly but not crippling. A total of 12 Hurricanes, 2

Blenheims and 1 Wellington were lost in combat.63

In spite of the chaos of the retreat, the army and the air force were able to operate jointly

during the battle. Group Captain Brown stated that army requests to attack enemy columns were

regularly carried out. When the plight of 2nd Armoured Division and 3rd Indian Motor Brigade

trapped at Mechili became known the RAF concentrated on providing support to these

formations. On 7 April the RAF were notified that a breakout attempt was to be made.

Blenheims from Nos.45 and 55 Squadrons attacked enemy columns in the vicinity of Msus-

Mechili while No.3 Squadron RAAF provided air cover as well as low-level attacks. When the breakout did not occur that day, the RAF was prepared to mount a major effort on 8 April to again support the armoured division but this proved impossible as a major dust storm grounded most aircraft.64

62 Details of these attacks may be found in the daily operational summaries compiled by HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, March-April 1941, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1073; see also Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Operation Carried out by the R.A.F. Cyrenaica during Enemy Advance,’ 22 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6486. 63 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, Appendix 32 – British Operational Air Losses in the Desert, 7 February – 18 June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44. 64 Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Operation Carried out by the R.A.F. Cyrenaica during Enemy Advance,’ 22 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6486; HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, March-April 1941, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1073; see also Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, 30. 272

Lost in the encirclement at Mechili were some 2,700 prisoners along with Major-General

Michael Gambier-Parry, commander of 2nd Armoured Division, Brigadier Edward Vaughan,

commander of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, and most of their headquarters establishments.65

This was the largest loss suffered by the British during the retreat. In another example of close

cooperation between the army and the air force, a raid was planned to release a large group of

British and Australian prisoners held at Martuba. The RAF supported this operation by attacking

the landing ground at Derna where six Me 110s and two other aircraft were destroyed. No.73

Squadron provided air patrols to protect this operation.66

General Wavell asserted that the overall effectiveness of the Luftwaffe and the Italian air

force during this battle was low. His report made numerous references to the damage and

dislocation caused by those air attacks and maintained the enemy achieved air superiority during

the battle. Though there were numerous low level and dive bombing attacks on British troops

during the retreat, little serious damage was caused. These raids were of a ‘tip and run’ nature

rather than a sustained interdiction campaign. The enemy made no concerted attempt to

neutralize the RAF. British aerodromes were only attacked once with any success when on 5

April eight German Me 110 twin-engined fighters made a strafing attack on the Derna landing

ground and damaged four Blenheims, a Hurricane and a Lysander. These aircraft were

subsequently destroyed by the RAF to prevent their capture when the airfield was abandoned.

The Blenheim squadrons were very active in support of the British retreat but were not

intercepted a single time by enemy fighters during their many attacks on enemy ports, airfields

65 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 30; ‘I Bersaglieri in Africa Settentrionale,’ , accessed 27 January 2013. 66 Information about the RAF support provided for this mission is found in Brown’s report but no mention of it can be found in army sources or the secondary literature. It is possible that the attempt was cancelled after the air portion of the mission had been executed. See Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Operation Carried out by the R.A.F. Cyrenaica during Enemy Advance,’ 22 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6486; HQ RAF Middle East contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, March-April 1941, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1073. 273

and battlefield targets and most of the aircraft were lost to ground fire rather than air to air

combat. Group Captain Brown stated that his fighter squadrons were largely able to keep the

enemy air forces at bay. He was particularly pleased by the absence of attacks on the Australian

division at Benina and Tocra when its retreating columns were backed up, concentrated and

exposed as they moved up the escarpment.67

The one outstanding success achieved by the Luftwaffe was the destruction of a British

petrol convoy on 5 April. The 3rd Armoured Brigade was desperately in need of fuel as it

attempted to escape the battlefield and a convoy containing 8,000 gallons of petrol was

despatched from divisional headquarters at El Abiar to resupply the brigade. On its way south the

column joined with a second convoy heading north that was evacuating supplies from Msus

including an additional 8,000 gallons of petrol. At 1300 hours this combined group was bombed

and machine gunned by 18 Me 110s and Ju 88s for over 35 minutes. All 21 vehicles were

destroyed and the loss of this valuable fuel sealed the fate of 3rd Armoured Brigade. The success

of this raid was not repeated by the Luftwaffe.68

Brown recognized on 5 April that Luftwaffe attacks were concentrating on 3rd Armoured

Brigade in the Mechili area and were not interfering with the withdrawal of 9th Australian

Division. He took advantage of this situation by sending the Hurricanes of No.3 RAAF and No.6

Squadrons further south where they intercepted a number of attacks by German JU87 Stuka dive

bombers. In the first instance two Hurricanes from No.73 Squadron and three from No.3

Squadron RAAF claimed five Stukas destroyed and two damaged. Later in the afternoon nine

67 Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Operation Carried out by the R.A.F. Cyrenaica during Enemy Advance,’ 22 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6486; Operations Record Book – Appendices, March-April 1941, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1073; Colonel H.B. Latham, ‘An Account of the Operations carried out by the 2nd Support Group in Cyrenaica from March 31st to April 7th 1941,’ 7, n.d., TNA CAB 106/619; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, Ch.2, especially 24 and 31 68 War Diary, 3rd Armoured Brigade, April 1941, TNA WO 169/1278. See also the attached Appendix D – ‘Report by Lieutenant A.C. Doyle, R.T.R.,’ 22 April 1941 who was the officer in charge of the supply column sent from divisional headquarters. 274

Hurricanes from the two squadrons intercepted an attack by a dozen Stukas resulting in nine

additional claims. The cost was two Hurricanes lost and one Australian pilot killed. After the war

it was revealed that the Germans lost only eight dive-bombers that day, not 14, but as

Christopher Shores makes clear, ‘High claims or not, eight losses by the single gruppe [sic] in

one day represented an unsustainable rate of attrition.’69 As the Germans had discovered during

the Battle of Britain, unescorted Stukas could not operate in the face of an enemy fighter

presence.

A week into the German offensive Longmore ordered Collishaw to take command of

RAF forces responsible for the defence of Egypt. The first week on April had not been good for

the British and Longmore recalled that on 6 April ‘the whole outlook was depressing.’70 In

addition to Rommel’s offensive the British faced a number of other serious threats in the

Mediterranean. On 6 April the Germans commenced their invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia

and within days had captured Thrace and Macedonia.71 Also in early April a long simmering

dissatisfaction with the British mandate in Iraq led to a coup d’état on 1 April 1941 which was

conducted with Nazi support. Within two weeks the new Iraqi government had sent troops to

besiege the RAF base at Habbaniya and fighting erupted in early May when the British moved to

break the siege. The conflict subsequently widened to include the Vichy France mandate of Syria

in June and July when Germany attempted to support the Iraqi coup by moving forces through

the region. The British also feared the Germans would use Syria as a jumping off point for an attack against Egypt. As a result Wavell and Longmore were forced to commit scarce ground and

69 Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 144. 70 Longmore, From Sea to Sky, 1910 to 1945 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946), 272. 71 For an overview and introduction to the British deployment to Greece and the German invasion see Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, chs.4 and 5. See also Detlef Vogel, ‘German Intervention in the Balkans,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3, 497-526. 275

air forces to deal with these emerging threats.72 During this period Longmore also had to contend

with an ongoing campaign in Italian East Africa.73

It is no coincidence that in the middle of these crises Longmore turned to his most trusted

commander to deal with the main threat to Egypt. Longmore asserted during the Operation

Compass that Collishaw had ‘maintained the high standard of resource and initiative which I had

grown accustomed to expect from him, and he was an inspiration to all those under his

command.’74 He was the natural choice to assume command of a key front during these difficult

times.

HQ RAF Cyrenaica had been created primarily as a caretaker force to hold the front west

of Benghazi. The rapid German and Italian advance had eliminated that mission and it was

necessary to return to the original task of the RAF in the Western Desert which was the defence

of Egypt. Longmore’s confidence in Collishaw was confirmed when he was ordered to

reconstitute his old command.75 On 8 April Collishaw was ordered to proceed to Mersa Matruh

to establish the advanced headquarters of 204 Group. Within a week Collishaw’s new command

was operational and HQ RAF Cyrenaica was dissolved and absorbed by 204 Group. This new

organization, essentially the re-formation of his old group, was to prepare an ‘Air Striking Force’

ready to operate at short notice against enemy air and mobile forces. The underlying intent of

72 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, chs.9 & 10; Gerhard Schreiber, ‘Politics and Warfare in 1941,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3, 589-618. 73 For details on the campaign in Italian East Africa see Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.1, chs.22 and 23. For the German perspective, see Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War: vol.3, 643-653. 74 Air Chief Marshal Arthur M. Longmore, ‘Despatch on Air Operations in the Middle East From January 1st, 1941 to May 3rd, 1941,’ 1 November 1941, Second Supplement to The London Gazette, 17 September 1946, 4678, [also found in TNA AIR 23/809]. 75 Roderic Owen, The Desert Air Force (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1948), 52. 276

Collishaw’s new orders was to ensure the enemy advance stopped at the Egyptian border, but the

directive clearly established that this was not a defensive mission.76

For the RAF, operations in the period before the first major German attack to capture

Tobruk on 14 April were primarily of a defensive nature designed to cover the withdrawal of the

British and Australian troops from the forward area. Once the situation had stabilized Collishaw

launched an offensive against enemy aerodromes, ports and shipping and the lines of

communications.77 In his after-action report, Collishaw stated, that these ‘intensive air

operations’ against the enemy’s ‘faulty L. of C. [line of communication] from Tripoli to Sollum

would retard his advance.’78 He realised that any enemy advance beyond the Egyptian frontier would require a significant buildup of supplies and this could be slowed or prevented by interdicting vehicles on the axis El Agheila – Benghazi – Tobruk – Bardia. RAF bombers and fighters were immediately directed to focus on this vulnerable route. Orders were given to make low-level attacks against only thin-skinned vehicles, especially ten-ton fuel trucks, which were on the move. This would keep the risks of such attacks to a minimum as armoured fighting vehicles were difficult to destroy and halted convoys were able to deploy substantial anti-aircraft

defences. Collishaw used the differing ranges of his aircraft to interdict the entire length of the

German supply line. The Blenheims, which had the largest radius of action, were directed to

attack the route between El Agheila and Benghazi; long-range Hurricanes would re-fuel at

76 Letter, Air Vice-Marshal A.C. Maund to Air Commodore R. Collishaw, 8 April 1941 contained in file ‘HQ RAF Middle East (Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief’s Files) – Formation of Western Desert Air Command,’ April- October 1941, TNA AIR 23/902. 77 Appendix 39, ‘Royal Air Force, Middle East, Fortnightly Operational Summary No.13 (Period 21st April to 4th May, 1941),’ contained in Operations Record Book, Air Staff, HQ RAF Middle East, June 1941, AIR 24/1075, 7. 78 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the Time of our Retreat through Cyrenaica – including the Operation Battleaxe,’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 1. 277

Tobruk and concentrate on the sector between Benghazi and Tobruk; and the short-range

Hurricanes would attack targets closer to the frontier.79

From 8 April the number of sorties devoted to these interdiction missions steadily

increased as did the claims of destroyed enemy columns. Sorties by small groups of bombers and

fighters in the early days of April increased to multi-squadron missions which caused significant

damage to axis port and airfield facilities. Daylight attacks by the Blenheim and Hurricane

squadrons were complemented by heavy night time raids by Wellingtons from Egypt and

Malta.80 Rommel’s Afrika Korps had become overextended in its advance to the frontier and

supply problems would limit future operations. The logistical situation was manageable through

April, but by early May the situation had become so severe that Rommel himself, a commander

who expected his subordinates to deal with logistical issues, was forced to write to the Army

high command on 10 May about the issue: ‘Because of concentrated pressure on ships and ports,

with present protective measures arrival of supplies by ship cannot be guaranteed.’81

The offensive conducted by the RAF during this period also forced the enemy air forces to adopt a largely defensive posture. German air attack on Tobruk continued but everywhere else the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica flew defensive patrols to protect shipping, port facilities and aerodromes. This enemy tactic was largely futile and a wasteful use of air resources. RAF

reports showed that very few of their offensive missions were intercepted and even fewer aircraft

79 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the Time of our Retreat through Cyrenaica – including the Operation Battleaxe,’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 1. 80 Appendix 85, Royal Air Force, Middle East, Fortnightly Operational Summary No.12 (Period 7th April to 20th April, 1941), contained in Operations Record Book, Air Staff, HQ RAF Middle East, June 1941, AIR 24/1075; Appendix 39, ‘Royal Air Force, Middle East, Fortnightly Operational Summary No.13 (Period 21st April to 4th May, 1941),’ contained in Operations Record Book, Air Staff, HQ RAF Middle East, June 1941, AIR 24/1075. 81 Quoted in Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 692; See also translated enemy document quoted in RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 141; and Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 135-137. 278

damaged or destroyed by aerial combat. RAF losses during this period were low and the majority

were suffered as a result of ground fire or mechanical issues.82

The overall effectiveness of the enemy air forces during the battle was less than expected,

especially considering they faced an opposing air force that was straining under the burden of a

retreat. The Luftwaffe and the Italian Air Force achieved some success, but there were many

missed opportunities. The British official history speculated that the ad hoc nature of Rommel’s

offensive left the Luftwaffe less than prepared for the impromptu battle into which it was

thrust.83 This assessment was confirmed by a German analysis which showed that the Luftwaffe

in North Africa possessed too few aircraft to accomplish its wide range of missions; army

support was at the bottom of the list.84

The RAF accomplished all that could be asked of it. Intelligence was gathered for the

army, air cover prevented most interference by the enemy air forces, and attacks were conducted

on a variety of targets, both in the battle area and beyond, which helped the retreating British

army to extricate its forces and prevent a total collapse. The decision to hold Tobruk was the

deciding factor in avoiding a catastrophic disaster for the British. Actions by the 2nd Armoured

Division supported by the RAF gained the 9th Australian Division sufficient time to retreat

behind the Tobruk defences and prepare the garrison for a siege. Rommel’s inability to capture

the port greatly hindered his future operations. Containing the British at Tobruk consumed a

82 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the Time of our Retreat through Cyrenaica – including the Operation Battleaxe,’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 3; Appendix 85, Royal Air Force, Middle East, Fortnightly Operational Summary No.12 (Period 7th April to 20th April, 1941), contained in Operations Record Book, Air Staff, HQ RAF Middle East, June 1941, AIR 24/1075; Appendix 39, ‘Royal Air Force, Middle East, Fortnightly Operational Summary No.13 (Period 21st April to 4th May, 1941),’ contained in Operations Record Book, Air Staff, HQ RAF Middle East, June 1941, AIR 24/1075. 83 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 30. 84 In summary, Malta represented the focal point of operations by Fliegerkorps X during the first five months of 1941 (50 percent of sorties). Naval reconnaissance and naval interdiction represented the second priority (29 percent). Convoy protection represented the third priority (12 percent). The remaining sorties, less than 10 percent, were devoted to supporting Rommel’s Afrika Korps. See Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 119-124. 279

major portion of his combat power and, combined with the threat to his lines of communications,

prevented a deeper incursion into Egypt.

* * * * *

One of the major outcomes of the retreat from Cyrenaica was a breakdown in relations

between the RAF and the army. During the period of success, Collishaw and O’Connor had

developed a close relationship where the needs of both services were met. The conduct and

outcome of that first campaign created a large degree of trust and understanding between the

senior commanders of the army and the air force. Unfortunately, the realignment of forces

necessary to support operations in Greece dismantled this successful team. O’Connor and

Collishaw were reassigned, 7th Armoured and 6th Australian Divisions were reallocated and

new forces were moved into the desert. All the senior army commanders were new. The only senior officer remaining was Group Captain ‘Bingo’ Brown who was given command of the newly-formed HQ RAF Cyrenaica. During the dark days of Rommel’s attack, when confusion and a lack of knowledge dominated events, relations between the two services deteriorated, especially at the higher levels. Lieutenant-General Neame blamed the defeat on the weakness of his command, deficiencies in the signals infrastructure and a lack of air reconnaissance and air support. Neame lamented the weak air forces he had supporting his command which could provide minimal reconnaissance and air support while he had to face 100 German fighters and

100 German bombers and dive bombers.85 The after-action report of the 9th Australian Division

echoed these sentiments:

85 Neame made these comments in his report which was written while he was a prisoner of war. This report did not circulate in the UK until sometime in 1944 and would not have had a direct impact on army-RAF relations in the way that the Wavell report did, but it does show the mindset of the senior army leaders at the time of the defeat. See Lieutenant-General P. Neame, ‘Operations in Cyrenaica from 27th February, 1941, when Lt.Gen. P. Neame assumed command until his capture on 7th April 1941,’ n.d., but circa May 1941, TNA CAB 106/767, 5 and 14. 280

Air support too, was quite inadequate for the purpose. We were unable both to obtain information of enemy movements or to prevent aircraft flying low over our own area because of our shortage in planes and anti-aircraft guns. 6 Squadron R.A.F., operating from AGEDABIA, was under orders 9th Aust Div, but it was greatly understrength.86

This was a very different outcome compared to the harmonious relations of Operation Compass

and the gratitude for RAF support expressed in the after-action reports of Wavell and O’Connor.

A key sign of this friction was contained in the report submitted by General Wavell detailing the actions of 2nd Armoured Division. The report attempted to make sense of the confusion that engulfed the division at the start of April. One of its major conclusions was that on 3 April, ‘a day of mischances, misunderstandings and counter-orders,’87 a false air report

indicated that an enemy column was approaching Msus, a key supply point for the armoured

division. The 3rd Armoured Brigade was in the process of deploying to create a blocking

position along the Sceleidima ridge but the dump at Msus was too important to lose. As a result

of the threat to the dump, the brigade’s previous orders were cancelled and it was sent to Msus.

By the time it arrived the next morning Msus had already been abandoned. It was not held by

British or enemy forces. The company of Free French Marines who had been guarding the dump

had withdrawn and had destroyed the fuel cache to deny it to the enemy. As a result of the loss of this petrol 3rd Armoured Brigade was largely out of the battle by 5 April as the majority of its tanks had been lost or destroyed due to mechanical breakdowns and lack of fuel. Wavell contends that this situation resulted largely as the result of the false air report.88

86 9 Australian Division, ‘Report on Operations in Cyrenaica, March-October, 1941 including the defence of Tobruch,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/353, 4. 87 General A.P. Wavell, ‘Report on the Action of the 2nd Armoured Division during the Withdrawal from Cyrenaica, March-April 1941,’ 11 July 1941, TNA CAB 66/17/32, 8. Note: This is not the original version of the report but one amended by Wavell based on his telegram of 20 June 1941. The revisions have been clearly marked in the text of the report. 88 General A.P. Wavell, ‘Report on the Action of the 2nd Armoured Division during the Withdrawal from Cyrenaica, March-April 1941,’ 11 July 1941, TNA CAB 66/17/32. 281

Wavell was also critical of a second air report made on the evening of 5 April which

indicated an enemy column was on the move north from Msus. This information caused

Lieutenant-General Neame to issue an order for a general withdrawal but this was subsequently

countermanded when a second report indicated that there was no approaching enemy column.

Wavell attributed these erroneous reports to partially trained pilots and an ineffective system of relaying air to ground signals from reconnaissance aircraft. At the end of his report Wavell listed the eight main factors which contributed to the disaster; three of his points directly blamed the failure of the RAF while all but one of the remaining factors was exacerbated by those air force shortcomings. Thus, in large measure, Wavell was blaming the RAF for the disaster.89

As might be expected, this report angered the RAF leadership. Wavell had ‘warmly

praised’ the tactical reconnaissance reports provided by No.6 Squadron in the immediate

aftermath of the disaster but his views on the overall RAF support changed after further

reflection.90 The negative tone of the report surprised the air force as Wavell submitted it to the

British Cabinet without consulting Air Chief Marshal Longmore, Air Marshal Tedder, Group

Captain Brown or Brigadier A.F. Harding, the Brigadier General Staff of Cyrenaica Command.91

89 Wavell’s points were: 1. The mechanical defects of A.F.Vs. of the 3rd Armoured Brigade, and in particular among the cruiser tanks of the 5th R.T.R; 2. The shortage of transport, which tied Divisions to the dumps, with all the inevitable anxieties which their existence caused; 3.The false air reports on the 3rd April about the enemy being at Msus; 4. The frequent changes of orders and regrouping consequent on these air reports, which resulted in the disintegration of formations and units; 5.The failure of the petrol supply, due to the decision to change the line of withdrawal; 6.The complete breakdown of signal communications, partly due to the loss of vehicles and partly to lack of opportunities of charging batteries; 7.Lack of tactical reconnaissances, particularly in the latter stages; 8. Lack of topographical knowledge, and the consequent failure to appreciate that the SCELEIDIMA escarpment afforded neither good positions nor good tracks. See General A.P. Wavell, ‘Report on the Action of the 2nd Armoured Division during the Withdrawal from Cyrenaica, March-April 1941,’ 11 July 1941, Appendix B, TNA CAB 66/17/32, 14-15. 90 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 133. 91 Tedder was made Acting Air Officer Commanding in Chief Middle East in early May 1941 when Longmore was recalled to England. He was confirmed in this position on 1 June 1941. The Brigadier General Staff (BGS) was responsible for matters related to operations and intelligence including coordination with the air force. RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 134. 282

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, sought clarification from Air

Marshal Tedder, who had recently taken over from Longmore as the Air Officer Commanding in

Chief Middle East, two days after the report was released. Portal wanted to understand the facts

behind Wavell’s assertions, but he was most concerned about the future ramifications to army-air

force relations. Churchill, in his role as Minister of Defence, wrote a scathing note appended to

the start of the report making it clear that he placed the blame for defeat on the poor state of

preparedness and general weakness of British forces in Cyrenaica. Though he did not blame the

RAF for the failure, he accepted Wavell’s criticisms and stated that there was ‘an imperative

need for every armoured formation to have attached to it, and working with it, aircraft whose

pilots and observers have been for some time in intimate association with the armoured unit, and

who have the military knowledge and experience necessary to enable them to report as correctly

as possible, in all the difficulties of war, what they see.’92 The implementation of this

recommendation had potential implications regarding the future autonomy of the RAF.93

‘Bingo’ Brown, who had been promoted air commodore and was Air Officer

Commanding, HQ RAF in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, wrote two reports in response to Wavell’s

comments. His first report addressed the questions posed to Tedder by Portal and was openly

critical of the army’s performance in the battle. The second report, written in conjunction with

Brigadier Harding, covered many of the same points but adopted a more balanced approach to

rebuffing Wavell’s remarks.94 The reports examined in great detail the circumstances

92 Winston S. Churchill, ‘Note by the Minister of Defence on Report on the Acton of the 2nd Armoured Division,’ 11 July 1941, TNA CAB 66/17/32, 2. 93 Portal wrote to the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair to recommend that Wavell’s report needed to be addressed at the Cabinet level as it ‘may be quoted against the R.A.F. in the future.’ Chief of the Air Staff to Secretary of State for Air, 6 August 1941, TNA AIR 8/585. 94 Brown also wrote an initial report immediately after the battle. Group Captain L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Operation Carried out by the R.A.F. Cyrenaica during Enemy Advance,’ 22 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/6486; Air Commodore L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Certain Aspects of the Air Operations in Cyrenaica,’ 19 July 1941, TNA AIR 8/585; Brigadier A.F. Harding and Air Commodore L.O. Brown, ‘On Certain Aspects of the G.H.Q M.E. Report on the 283

surrounding the ‘false air report’ made on 3 April which, according to Wavell, led to such

confusion amongst British forces during the battle. Brown and Harding confirm that at 1400

hours a tactical reconnaissance flight was made from Msus by Flight Lieutenant H.G. Fletcher,

one of the senior pilots in No.6 Squadron. He discovered ‘a column consisting of a few armoured

cars and between 50 and 60 large Italian lorries filled with troops’ only five miles south of Msus.

After the column opened fire on his aircraft Flight Lieutenant Fletcher strafed the column and

then returned to Msus.95

The Harding and Brown report demonstrated that the timing of the flight made it impossible for this information to have been responsible for the change in orders given to 3rd

Armoured Brigade which occurred shortly after 1400 hours. To report his discovery, Fletcher

flew to the aerodrome at Barce, a distance of over 60 miles, where he gave his findings to the air

intelligence liaison officer. This army officer then despatched a courier to convey this

information to command headquarters from where it would be transmitted to HQ 2nd Armoured

Division. If the system was working perfectly the information would not have arrived before the

3rd Armoured Brigade’s orders were changed, and given the chaotic state of communications at

that time it was well-nigh impossible.

Captain A.H.P. Hore-Ruthven was the British liaison officer with the Free French

detachment guarding the fuel cache at Msus. He talked to Flight Lieutenant Fletcher before he

departed Msus at 1400 hours. Fletcher promised to return and share the details of his

reconnaissance mission but at 1430 hours Hore-Ruthven saw Fletcher’s Lysander fly over Msus

but it did not land. Hore-Ruthven was not privy to Fletcher’s discovery of the enemy convoy but

Action of the 2nd Armoured Division During the Withdrawal from Cyrenaica, March-April 1941,’ 25 July 1941, TNA CAB 66/18/24. 95 Brigadier A.F. Harding and Air Commodore L.O. Brown, ‘On Certain Aspects of the G.H.Q M.E. Report on the Action of the 2nd Armoured Division During the Withdrawal from Cyrenaica, March-April 1941,’ 25 July 1941, 2, TNA CAB 66/18/24. 284

the fact that the aircraft did not land influenced his decision to blow the dump based on his own

assessment of the situation.96 Regarding the false air report of 5 April, Harding and Brown point

out that there was no report made of enemy troops advancing north from Msus but that another

report was made at the same time of enemy troops advancing east in the vicinity of Churruba. A

withdrawal based on this report was ordered but then cancelled when army reports indicated that

the column was British. Events the next day proved that the column was in fact German and the

withdrawal was again ordered. Harding and Brown countered Wavell’s contention that there was

a shortage of air reconnaissance by demonstrating all requests for tactical and strategic

reconnaissance made by 2nd Armoured Division were met during the battle.97

While the jointly authored report is relatively neutral in tone, Brown’s private report to

Tedder argued more forcefully that it was army confusion and poor decision-making that caused

the difficulties. On the night of 2 February the 2nd Armoured Divisional headquarters, which

was collocated at Antelat with the forward flight of No.6 Squadron, had retreated. The squadron

awoke the next morning to discover themselves alone without any support or protection between

themselves and the enemy.98 The disorder and confusion during the army’s retreat was again

shown by their decision to ignore the RAF reports on 5 April that detailed the advance of a large

enemy column eastwards along the El Abia – Churruba – Mechili road. Based on this

information Brown ordered his headquarters and Nos.3 RAAF and 6 Squadrons to move from

96 The war diary of 3rd Armoured Brigade indicated that a convoy carrying 8,000 gallons of petrol had left the dump before it was destroyed on 3 April. Unfortunately, this was one of the convoys destroyed by air attack on 4 April. War Diary, 3rd Armoured Brigade, April 1941, TNA WO 169/1278; ‘Report by Captain the Hon. A.H.P. Hore- Ruthven 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade Concerning the Situation at Msus on 3 April 1941,’ attachment to Appendix XXXI RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns. vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44. Note that App.XXXI is a copy of the Harding and Brown report. The Hore-Ruthven report does not appear as an appendix to the version of the report reproduced in the Cabinet papers. 97 Brigadier A.F. Harding and Air Commodore L.O. Brown, ‘On Certain Aspects of the G.H.Q M.E. Report on the Action of the 2nd Armoured Division During the Withdrawal from Cyrenaica, March-April 1941,’ 25 July 1941, 3- 4, TNA CAB 66/18/24. 98 Air Commodore L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Certain Aspects of the Air Operations in Cyrenaica,’ 19 July 1941, 2, TNA AIR 8/585. 285

Maraua to Derna. Neame’s headquarters also issued orders for a general withdrawal. Later that

night Brigadier Harding telephoned Brown to tell him his pilots had misidentified a column of

British forces; he ordered Brown to return his squadrons to Maraua where the division

headquarters would remain. Brown interrogated his pilots who were convinced the column was

German. The next day it was discovered this column was in fact German and a general

retirement was once again ordered. Brown stated that this incident ‘directly’ resulted in the

capture of Generals O’Connor and Neame along with Brigadier Combe. It also resulted in

considerable disorganization caused by the frequently changing orders.99

Brown described the process for the conveyance of intelligence gathered by RAF pilots.

Upon landing pilots were interviewed by an air intelligence liaison officer (AILO) who gathered

the information to report to army headquarters. It was the AILO, an army officer, who was

responsible for the interpretation of any information provided by the RAF. Brown stated that

‘one elementary principle laid down regarding air reconnaissance is that the pilot only reports

what he sees and that it is for the army to interpret the information in the light of their

knowledge…The point, therefore, is that any confusion arising out of air reports is the

responsibility of the Army and that the reports were not incorrect.’100

According to Brown 2nd Armoured Division ceased to be an efficient fighting force soon after the start of the German attack. This resulted in the breakdown of communications and the absence of accurate intelligence upon which to base plans for the duration of the battle. His

99 Air Commodore L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Certain Aspects of the Air Operations in Cyrenaica,’ 19 July 1941, TNA AIR 8/585, 3-4. General Wavell summoned Lieutenant-General O’Connor to the front on 2 April to deal with the crisis caused by Rommel’s advance. His intention was to replace Neame, but after consultations it was agreed that Neame would remain in command but O’Connor would stay and act in an advisory role. On the evening of 6 April the staff car carrying O’Connor and Neame made a wrong turn while returning to their headquarters and ran into a German patrol and they were captured. For details on this episode see ‘Report on Operations in Libya by Lt. General R.N. O’Connor, from September 1940 to April 1941 (written when Prisoner-of-war in Italy,’ n.d., TNA WO 106/2148, 40-46 and Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 20-21, 29, 34. 100 Air Commodore L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Certain Aspects of the Air Operations in Cyrenaica,’ 19 July 1941, TNA AIR 8/585, 4-5. 286 squadrons met all the demands made for reconnaissance and any problems with that intelligence were not the result of ‘false reports’ but rather the failure of the army to ‘interpret the information received and to arrive at a correct appreciation of the situation.’101 Brown provided

Air Chief Marshal Portal with the evidence he required to prove that Wavell was wrong in his criticisms of the RAF. Wavell subsequently withdrew his accusations and despatched a telegram to London which stated: ‘Regret A.O.C.-in-C. not consulted. False deductions may have been made from air reports but please withdraw suggestion that false air reports were rendered by

R.A.F. and that there was a lack of TAC.R. [tactical reconnaissance] in latter stages.’102

* * * * *

The two months following the destruction of the Italian 10th Army at Beda Fomm marked a reversal of fortune for the British in Cyrenaica. A fleeting opportunity existed to complete the expulsion of Axis forces from Libya but this risky option, supported by Collishaw and O’Connor, was rejected. British army units and RAF squadrons were in a poor state of preparedness after the demands of the previous campaign, no substantial new units or reserves were available and the great distance from El Agheila to Tripoli was a logistical nightmare.

Ultimately, the decision not to proceed was made by the commitment of forces to other theatres in the Middle East, primarily Greece. Cyrenaica, as the gateway to Egypt, was to be held by a weak screening force justified by intelligence estimates which showed the Italians to be a defeated force and German reinforcements not yet ready for offensive operations. General

Wavell expected that in two months’ time, when General Rommel’s formations were ready to attack, substantial British forces would be available to reinforce Cyrenaica Command as operations in other theatres such as Italian East Africa were concluded.

101 Air Commodore L.O. Brown, ‘Report on Certain Aspects of the Air Operations in Cyrenaica,’ 19 July 1941, TNA AIR 8/585, 5-6. 102 Telegram, C.-in-C. Middle East to War Office, 26 July 1941, TNA AIR 8/585. 287

No one was able to predict Rommel’s aggressive nature as he recklessly drove his forces

forward without a secure logistical base. The weakened state of the British, however, allowed

this bold move to succeed and by mid-April the Axis forces had advanced across the bulge of

Cyrenaica all the way to the Egyptian border with only the fortress of Tobruk resisting their

assault. The loss of territory was costly for the British, but overall the retreat had been conducted

with more control than the Italian reverse and the forfeiture of men and equipment was minimal.

Robert Citino declares that German advance was largely meaningless because there had been no

‘victory of annihilation’ – Rommel’s small force ‘had overrun a vast wasteland, but it hadn’t

destroyed anything.’103 Egypt and the Suez Canal were still safe from Axis predations and the

possession of Tobruk threatened the supply lines of any further enemy advance.

Early in the withdrawal Longmore brought Collishaw forward to take over command of the RAF response to the German attack. The reversal in Libya was serious for Longmore but he also had to contend with active campaigns in Greece and Italian East Africa along with a developing situation in Iraq. He needed a trusted commander to oversee the defence of Egypt and he did not hesitate to recall Collishaw for this task. By the time Collishaw officially took command on 12 April Rommel had advanced more than 400 kilometres across the bulge of

Cyrenaica and threatened to recapture the port of Tobruk, a key component of any further

German advance towards the Suez Canal. RAF operations were severely hampered by the loss of air bases which placed many Axis targets out of range of their single seat fighters and medium bombers. Collishaw’s immediate response was to conduct an offensive campaign against

Rommel’s vulnerable lines of communications. Interdiction missions were launched against convoys of vehicles transiting the exposed route to the front, the port of Benghazi was bombed

103 Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 124. 288

day and night to prevent the unloading of supplies and all Axis airfields in range of RAF aircraft

were repeatedly attacked to keep them on the defensive. The Afrika Korps had significant

challenges in keeping its forces at Tobruk and the frontier supplied and the constant RAF

harassment made a bad situation worse and helped to protect Tobruk and forestall any renewal of

the offensive.

The decision to send the best British divisions to Greece and leave a weak and

inexperienced ground force supported by only four RAF squadrons created the conditions in

which a bold thrust by the enemy could succeed. The lost territory was a setback for the British

but more troubling was the breakdown in relations between the army and the air force. The

month of April had not been kind to the British in the Mediterranean. On 6 April, a week after

the launch of the Libyan offensive, the Germans attacked in Greece and quickly routed W Force.

By 21 April General Wilson was compelled to order the evacuation of Commonwealth forces to

Crete and Egypt. The small number of RAF squadrons sent to Greece could do little to prevent

the catastrophe but in the eyes of many soldiers, who were subjected to seemingly constant

attacks by the Luftwaffe, the air force earned the sobriquets ‘Royal Absent Force’ or ‘Rare As

Fairies.’104 Army post-mortems on this campaign were quick to blame the lack of RAF air

104 This name ‘Royal Absent Force’ was first been bestowed on the RAF at Dunkirk when the army felt it had been abandoned to its fate and not provided with sufficient air cover to prevent enemy attacks. The name reappeared in Greece where it was inscribed in the diary of a British soldier captured by the Germans. ‘Rare As Fairies’ was bestowed by Anzac troops in Greece who also came up with a derogatory poem which said in part, ‘We marched and groaned beneath our load, Whilst Jerry bombed us off the road, He chased us here, he chased us there, The bastards chased us everywhere, And whilst he dropped his load of death, We cursed the bloody RAF, And when we heard the wireless news, When portly Winston aired his views, The RAF was now in Greece, Fighting hard to win the peace, We scratched our heads and said “Pig’s Arse,” For this to us was just a farce, For if in Greece the air force be – Then where the Bloody Hell are we?’ John Sadler, El Alamein: The Story of the Battle in the Words of the Soldiers (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley Publishing Plc, 2010), 45. For Dunkirk see, Norman Franks, Air Battle for Dunkirk, 26 May - 3 June 1940 (London: Grub Street, 2006); for Greece see Hans-Otto Behrendt, Rommel's Intelligence in the Desert Campaign (London: William Kimber & Co., Ltd, 1985), 55. 289

support for this failure. General Wilson went so far as to claim that events in Greece

demonstrated ‘the need for an Army Air Force.’105

The setbacks in Greece combined with the loss of Cyrenaica exposed a rift between the army and the RAF. The chaos of these retreats caused the army to blame the air force for a lack

of support. Wavell, who should have known better, took this issue all the way to the British

cabinet. Though he was ultimately proven wrong and censured by Churchill, the damage to the

previously good army-air relations had been done. The close working relationship of 13th Corps

and 202 Group developed by Collishaw and O’Connor during Operation Compass was replaced

by a climate of distrust which would be further exposed by upcoming operations in Tobruk,

Crete and the Western Desert.

105 Quoted in Stockings and Hancock, ‘Reconsidering the Luftwaffe in Greece, 1941,’ 772. Stockings and Hancock demonstrate that the Luftwaffe was not the decisive factor in the British defeat but rather point out that it was natural for the army to seek to shift the blame for the disaster onto the RAF and at the same time use the perceived failure to again lobby for subordinating the RAF to army control. Fortunately, the inter-service report on Greece concluded that an RAF controlled by the army would have made no difference to the outcome of the campaign and these demands went nowhere. See also, RAF Air Historical Branch, ‘The Middle East Campaigns, vol.6: The Campaign in Greece, 1940-1941,’ TNA AIR 41/28. 290

Chapter 9 – The Siege of Tobruk, Operation Brevity and Crete

May 1941 would not bring any significant improvement for the British in the Western

Desert. This chapter examines the further breakdown of relations between the two services that

developed as the British suffered further setbacks in the Middle East. The port of Tobruk would

continue to hold against German and Italian attacks but the RAF was criticised by the Australian

commander of the garrison for not doing enough to prevent enemy air attacks. A limited attack

by the British towards Tobruk would be defeated in mid-May but the air support provided by

Collishaw’s aircraft achieved many of its aims and prevented an even worse defeat on the

ground. These events, set against a backdrop of the loss of Greece and Crete, led to much blame

and recrimination directed at the RAF by the army for not providing the type and quantity of air

support it desired.

‘Disaster seemed to follow on disaster’ was how Collishaw described immediately after

he took command of 204 Group in the Western Desert.1 The British loss of Cyrenaica was followed by the evacuation of Greece in late April. The Australian defenders of Tobruk had repulsed a number of early German and Italian attempts to capture the port but the German and

Italian air forces continued to bomb the garrison on a daily basis and a renewed assault was imminent. The size of 204 Group at the outset was relatively small and comprised only four heavy bomber, three medium bomber and two fighter squadrons. In spite of this Collishaw used his meagre forces to the fullest extent to interfere with enemy plans. As the RAF staff history remarked, ‘A remarkable feature of the last half of April was the high scale of effort maintained

1 Raymond Collishaw and R.V. Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story (London: William Kimber, 1973), 251. 291

by this comparatively small force working under the difficulties imposed by the Axis advance,

the chief of which was the great distance of the air bases from the target area.’2

The air offensive launched by Collishaw targeted enemy ports, airfields and the lines of

communications. The port of Benghazi was one of the prime targets but Tripoli was also struck

repeatedly by Wellington squadrons operating out of Malta. A number of large Italian ships were

sunk by these attacks and the capacity of the port of Benghazi seriously diminished.3 The low-

level raids on the enemy aerodromes in Libya were effective at distracting the Luftwaffe and

Regia Aeronautica. Though Tobruk remained a regular target for air attack, few other offensive

air missions were carried out by the enemy during this period. Regular attacks were also carried

out against enemy motor convoys travelling between Benghazi and the frontier.4

The strength of 204 Group grew slowly during this period. Collishaw recalled that ‘one

cheering note was the arrival of new squadrons, including two from South Africa.’5 Replacement

aircraft and aircrew also became available and were posted to the operational squadrons. Less

glamorous than fighters and bombers, but just as valuable were the non-combat echelons.

Collishaw, concerned that another retreat might be necessary but also remembering the lessons

of Operation Compass where his squadrons travelled great distances during the advance, ensured

that his squadrons had all the necessary motor transport to facilitate such move. He also

improved the capability of the salvage and repair organisation in his group.6 Overall these

2 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 146. 3 Appendix 85, Royal Air Force, Middle East, Fortnightly Operational Summary No.12 (Period 7th April to 20th April, 1941), contained in Operations Record Book, Air Staff, HQ RAF Middle East, June 1941, AIR 24/1075; Appendix 39, ‘Royal Air Force, Middle East, Fortnightly Operational Summary No.13 (Period 21st April to 4th May, 1941),’ contained in Operations Record Book, Air Staff, HQ RAF Middle East, June 1941, AIR 24/1075. 4 Operations Record Book, HQ 204 Group RAF, April 1941, TNA AIR 25/815. 5 Collishaw and Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 251. 6 Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on Royal Air Force Operations in the Western Desert from the Outbreak of War with Italy - the Capture of Cyrenaica to the Time of the Enemy Counter Offensive,’ 19 April 1941, 13-14, TNA AIR 23/6475; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and 292

improvements allowed the RAF squadrons to ‘face the enemy in the air with some degree of

confidence.’7

Rommel’s offensive halted at the Egyptian border in mid-April as he finally had to stop

his advance to prevent his advanced troops from completely outrunning their logistical support.

The British decision to hold Tobruk created an operational dilemma for Rommel. The port was

not central to his main ambition to drive the British from Egypt and capture the Suez Canal, but

it sat astride his main supply line and thus could not be ignored. Rommel was determined to

capture the port but he did not accord its 24,000 defenders much respect. Starting on 12 April he

launched a series of ill-advised, impromptu attacks on the Tobruk perimeter which made limited

gains at the cost of high casualties.8 The 9th Australian Division supported by the remaining tanks of 2nd Armoured Division and the RAF were determined to repel any attack. After the destruction of the German Machine-gun Battalion 8 on the morning of 14 April and abortive attacks by the Italians on 16 and 17 April, Rommel ordered his forces to dig in as he prepared a new plan.9 As the British official history record, the enemy’s failure to capture the port left them

‘surprised, disappointed, widely dispersed, and in difficulties with the stony ground.’10

Rommel’s impetuousness had served him well at the start of his offensive, but at Tobruk it

‘seriously weakened’ his overextended forces.11 He was widely criticized by his superiors, his

the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 161; Collishaw and Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 251. 7 Collishaw and Dodds, Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story, 251. 8 William F. Buckingham, Tobruk: The Great Siege, 1941-42 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2008), 215-239; I.S.O. Playfair, C. J. C. Molony, and S. E. Toomer, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2: The Germans come to the help of their Ally (1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), 37-38. 9 Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 681-684; 10 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 38. 11 Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 683. 293

junior officers and his Italian allies for not taking the time to prepare a proper attack on the

fortress. It would be nearly two weeks until his next major attempt to dislodge the Australians.12

On 25 April Longmore despatched a plan for the reorganization of 204 Group to Air

Chief Marshal Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, for approval. This plan, written by Air Marshal

Tedder, argued that RAF command arrangements in the Middle East were over-centralised and

the units deployed in the Western Desert (and projected to be deployed in the near future) were

too large for the current structure. It was suggested that a new headquarters, Western Desert Air

Command, be created to remove the burden of direct command from HQ RAF Middle East and

assume administrative control of RAF units in the Western Desert. It was proposed that Tedder

would assume control of this new organisation. The component units of the new HQ – 204

Group (the main striking force), 253 Wing (Air Component – close air support) and 257 Wing

(strategic reconnaissance and heavy bombing) – would then have a purely operational function.13

Tedder’s official rationale for this administrative reorganization was to ‘reduce our

vulnerability to attack, to increase our mobility, and to facilitate the operation of sudden

reinforcements in an emergency.’14 He may also have been motivated to propose this re-

organisation in an attempt to create a better position for himself.15 The plan, however, was not

12 Martin Kitchen, Rommel's Desert War: Waging World War II in North Africa, 1941-1943 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 90-93; Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 683685; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 38; Buckingham, Tobruk: The Great Siege, 1941-42, 250-269. 13 Tedder was the author of this plan and it was agreed to by Longmore. Telegram, For C.A.S. from A.O.C. in C., 25 April 1941, contained in file ‘HQ RAF Middle East (Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief’s Files) – Formation of Western Desert Air Command,’ April-October 1941, TNA AIR 23/902; ‘Administrative Instruction W.D.3. (Reorganisation of Air Forces in the Western Desert),’ 27 April 1941 contained in file ‘HQ RAF Middle East (Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief’s Files) – Formation of Western Desert Air Command,’ April-October 1941, TNA AIR 23/902. 14 Lord Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, GCB (London: Cassell & Company, 1966), 78. 15 In a handwritten postscript on a letter to Air Chief Marshal Wilfrid Freeman on 11 March 1941 Tedder wrote: ‘I have no clear cut job but have managed to get pretty well inside the whole show by acting for L. [Longmore] when he has been away in Greece etc. by acting as S.A.S.O. [Senior Air Staff Officer] and A.O.A. [Air Officer Adminstration] while Drummond and Maund have been on leave and also by having 10 glorious days with 202 294

implemented as the Air Ministry cancelled the reorganization at the beginning of June as they

believed that the existing command structure in the Western Desert was working effectively.16

Collishaw was confirmed as the senior operational commander in the Western Desert. He

continued to lead 204 Group effectively and direct operations of the heavy bomber squadrons

and other squadrons put at his disposal without the need for an extra layer of command between

his headquarters and HQ RAF Middle East. This reorganisation would be implemented in the

future when the number of squadrons increased significantly, but the present command

arrangements were functioning well.17

For the army, Lieutenant-General Neame’s HQ Cyrenaica Command ceased operations

in Tobruk on 13 April and Major-General Leslie Morshead, the commander of 9th Australian

Division, assumed command of the besieged garrison. Neame’s old HQ was subsequently

reformed the next day at Maaten Bagush as the Western Desert Force under the command of

Major-General Noel Beresford-Peirse who had previously led 4th Indian Division during the

opening stage of Operation Compass. The common feature of these changes was the

reintroduction of experienced commanders. Both Neame and Major-General Gambier-Parry,

commander of 2nd Armoured Division, were criticized for their lack of desert experience and the

loss of Lieutenant-General O’Connor was acutely felt. On the air force side, Brown had

considerable experience and had performed as well as could be expected but Collishaw was

Group just before Bardia while Collishaw was sick. So I suppose I can’t complain!’ Letter, Tedder to Air Chief Marshal Sir W.R. Freeman, 11 March 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 16 Message, Air Ministry to HQ RAF Middle East, 4 June 1941, contained in file ‘HQ RAF Middle East (Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief’s Files) – Formation of Western Desert Air Command,’ April-October 1941, TNA AIR 23/902. 17 Message, Air Ministry to HQ RAF Middle East, 4 June 1941, contained in file ‘HQ RAF Middle East (Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief’s Files) – Formation of Western Desert Air Command,’ April-October 1941, TNA AIR 23/902. This reorganization would ultimately be put into effect in the fall of 1941 on the eve of Operation Crusader when Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham commanded 204 Group and Tedder commanded HQ RAF ME. 295

highly respected by Longmore and was considered a better choice to re-establish the air

dominance that had previously been experienced by the RAF.

The repulse of the initial attacks on Tobruk led to a period of relative quiet for

Morshead’s men as they worked hard to improve their defences, but the RAF was hard pressed.

The Luftwaffe did not have sufficient forces to be strong everywhere in the Mediterranean but

the importance of Tobruk led to a major commitment of its air assets. The Germans dive bombed

the harbour, airfield, and defensive positions while the RAF did its best to contest the air space.

The air raids were generally large scale affairs designed to overwhelm the defenders. For

example, on 19 April a force of 20 Ju 88 twin-engine bombers escorted by five fighters attacked;

three days later 13 Hurricanes scrambled to intercept a force of 50 Ju 87s escorted by 30 Me

110s, 12 Me 109s and 12 Italian G.50s; and a raid of the same scale was again made on 23

April.18 In spite of this large commitment by the Luftwaffe, Rommel was unhappy with his

strength in the air. RAF bomber attacks plagued his ground forces and the British fighters

appeared to operate without opposition. The problem was deemed serious enough that the first

Me 109 units were despatched to North Africa in mid-April in response to the uneven contest at

Tobruk. These reinforcements sufficiently increased the pressure on the RAF units in Tobruk

that they were soon forced to withdraw.19

Two British squadrons, Nos.6 and 73, were based at El Gubbi airfield just outside Tobruk

but it soon became clear that the task was too demanding. By 21 April the pilots of No.73

Squadron were exhausted and only five serviceable aircraft remained. Two days later the

squadron lost three aircraft shot down and three others damaged in crash landings or strafed on

the ground. As early as 14 April Collishaw advised Tedder that the squadrons needed to be

18 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Daily Operational Summaries, April 1941,’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1073. 19 Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 134-136. 296

withdrawn as the situation was too dangerous. The Army, however, argued that it was essential

that aircraft be retained in Tobruk to fly air defence and reconnaissance missions. Tedder supported the army request and ordered that a minimum of ten Hurricanes be kept in Tobruk.

This would not be the last time that Tedder acceded to the demands of the army over the objections of Collishaw. On 23 April Collishaw again appealed to Tedder for permission to withdraw the Hurricanes from Tobruk; he understood the importance of air cover for the port, but the small number of aircraft available could only fight a losing battle unless significantly reinforced. He was finally given permission on 24 April to evacuate No.73 Squadron to Sidi

Hanesh near Mersa Matruh.20 Henceforth, air cover over the port would be provided by fighters

based near Mersa Matruh and refuelled at Sidi Barrani. This decision conceded air superiority

over Tobruk to the Luftwaffe but there was no other option. Air operations using aircraft based

within perimeter was untenable for the RAF.

Not surprisingly, Major-General Morshead was incensed at this move. The RAF liaison section in Tobruk cabled 204 Group on 25 April to report ‘GOC here [Morshead] considers present fighter policy precludes adequate measures for defence of TOBRUCH [sic] as it

impossible to carry out Lysander air shoots without escort thus rendering our artillery vulnerable to enemy counter battery action. Considers policy also hampers return of our raiding parties and will lower morale of troops.’21 Morshead also appealed directly to Major-General Beresford-

Peirse: ‘I view with gravest concern change in air policy resulting in withdrawal of fighters to

BAGUSH area. This must give enemy aircraft considerably greater freedom to operate against troops and port and will affect morale more quickly than anything else. Most strongly urge that

20 Letter, Air Commodore R. Collishaw to Air Marshal A.W. Tedder, 23 April 1941, TNA AIR 23/1391; Operations Record Book, HQ RAF Middle East, April 1941, TNA AIR 24/1051. 21 Message, RAF Liaison Section Tobruch to 204 Group, 25 April 1941, Appendix K – ‘Air Situation at Tobruch,’ attached to Major-General L. Morshead, ‘Operations 9 Aust Div – Cyrenaica,’ 27 April 1941, Appendix to War Diary, 9th Australian Division, April 1941, Australian War Memorial 52, 1/5/20. 297

despite risks at least one squadron be stationed here.’22 Beresford-Peirse sympathized with

Morhead’s concerns but supported Collishaw’s action. He pointed out that the RAF had lost 27

of 32 aircraft based in Tobruk and only 11 Hurricanes remained in the Western Desert for all

types of missions – tactical reconnaissance, naval escort and fighter cover. He assured Morhead

that this decision was not taken lightly but ‘until fighter strength increase your ‘drome cannot be

maintained…I know it is deplorable from your point of view – but it is hard necessity.’23 Tobruk

continued to suffer from the frequent air raids until mid-May when Luftwaffe units were

reassigned for the Crete operation.

Despite the withdrawal from Tobruk the RAF continued to provide a high level of

support. Hurricanes from Nos.73 and 274 Squadrons flew regular patrols over the besieged port

where they intercepted enemy air raids and took a heavy toll on enemy motor transport by

making low-level machine gun attacks. Blenheims of Nos.45 and 55 Squadrons interdicted

enemy transport around Tobruk as well as strike enemy airfields.24 These raids significantly

impacted German operations against Tobruk. On 13 and 14 April the medium bombers

maintained a high tempo of operations against Axis forces preparing to attack the fortress. Low-

level attacks with small bombs took a heavy toll on the enemy. Contrary to the view of

Morshead, the Afrika Korps war diary recorded on 14 April that:

During the entire period since the encirclement of Tobruk, the British had complete air superiority and daily attacked the investing forces with successive

22 Message, TOBFORT to DESFORCE, 25 April 1941, Appendix K – ‘Air Situation at Tobruch,’ attached to Major- General L. Morshead, ‘Operations 9 Aust Div – Cyrenaica,’ 27 April 1941, Appendix to War Diary, 9th Australian Division, April 1941, Australian War Memorial 52, 1/5/20. 23 Letter, Major-General W. Beresford-Peirse to Major-General L. Morshead, 26 April 1941, Appendix M, and Message DESFORCE to TOBFORT, 25 April 1941, Appendix K – ‘Air Situation at Tobruch,’ attached to Major- General L. Morshead, ‘Operations 9 Aust Div – Cyrenaica,’ 27 April 1941, Appendix to War Diary, 9th Australian Division, April 1941, Australian War Memorial 52, 1/5/20. 24 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Daily Operational Summaries, April 1941,’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1073. 298

waves of bombers…The Commander, 10th Air Corps gave the Commander Afrika Corps a verbal undertaking to provide fighter aircraft at an early date.25

It was hoped that these offensive operations would help to check enemy air attacks on

Tobruk. Morshead, however, continued to be dissatisfied with the level of air support provided

as he found that the request system was not responsive enough to attack targets of opportunity. It

took too long to transmit requests and fighters and bombers were not available on call and

support could only be provided if aircraft were available.26

By the end of April Rommel was ready to make another attempt to capture Tobruk. On

30 April he ordered his two German divisions, 5th Light and 15th Armoured, to break into the

Australian line west of Ras el Medauar. The breach would then be expanded by the Italian Ariete

and Brescia Divisions while the Germans renewed their attack on the port. In advance of the

attack an additional Gruppe of dive bombers were transferred from Sicily to North Africa to

compensate for the Afrika Korps’ lack of artillery. The preparatory bombardment was largely

concentrated in the eastern portion of the bridgehead to take attention away from the actual point

of the assault. The Stuka attacks were similarly directed at the area in front of the demonstration

being made by the 5th Light Division in the southwest corner as well as targeting the main road

junctions at Sidi Mahmud and the roads leading into the town. The German assault was launched

at 2000 hours and quickly breached the outer defensive line but their advance was halted by

stubborn Australian resistance and an unknown minefield. Major-General Morshead deployed

his reserves to contain the attack and requested RAF support on 1 May. Hurricanes from Nos.73

and 274 Squadrons flew standing patrols over the enemy penetration where they were met by

25 Quoted in RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 128-129. 26 Appendix K – ‘Air Situation at Tobruch,’ attached to Major-General L. Morshead, ‘Operations 9 Aust Div – Cyrenaica,’ 27 April 1941, Appendix to War Diary, 9th Australian Division, April 1941, Australian War Memorial 52, 1/5/20; 9th Australian Division ‘Report on Operations in Cyrenaica, March-October 1941, Including the Defence of Tobruch,’ n.d., TNA WO 201/353. 299

large numbers of enemy fighters and dive bombers. The British aircraft disrupted the attacks and

shot down three enemy Me 109s and one Stuka at the cost of one Hurricane lost and two

damaged. By 4 May the battle was over as Rommel realized no further gains were possible. The

small area captured (three miles wide by two miles deep) came at a high cost for the Axis forces

who suffered 1,200 German and 500 Italian casualties. The Australians also suffered heavily for

their defence of the perimeter incurring nearly 800 casualties.27

The failure of this attempt to capture Tobruk led British intelligence to conclude that the possibility of further offensive operations directed against Egypt in the near future was minimal.

This pause was essential to allow the regeneration of British combat power in the desert. Wavell

was desperately short of tanks and possessed only two weak units, one in Tobruk and the other

near Matruh, compared to an estimated 150 enemy tanks. The RAF was also greatly weakened

and by early May 204 Group possessed only 40 serviceable aircraft, well below half-strength. By

12 May, however, Collishaw’s squadrons had been brought up to nearly full strength. Given the

circumstances, Air Chief Marshal Longmore ordered Collishaw to return to a policy of offensive

interdiction missions that had proven effective at the start of the war. Enemy lines of

communication would be attacked in an effort to delay or prevent a renewed attack.28

* * * * *

27 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary, 1 May 1941,’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1074; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, 155-156; Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 686-692; Barton Maughan, Tobruk and El Alamein (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1965), ch.6; Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 139; Ministero della Difesa, La Prima Controffensiva Italo-Tedesca in Africa Settentrionale (15 Febbraio-18 Novembre 1941) (Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1974), Schizza n.13. The German casualty figures are taken from Rommel’s report to the German army high command cited in Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo- German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 693; the Italian figures come from the British official history, Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 156; and the Australian figures from Maughan, Tobruk and El Alamein, 235. 28 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the time of our retreat through Cyrenaica including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 1-4; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 140-141, 143. 300

General Wavell retained his command in the wake of the loss of Libya but Air Chief

Marshal Longmore did not. Longmore had performed a masterful juggling act during his time in

the Middle East matching his meagre resources to the many competing demands. Churchill and

Portal, however, began to lose confidence in him in early 1941 as differences over strategy and

questions over the supply of aircraft led them to doubt his suitability for command.29 When Air

Marshal Tedder was sent to the Middle East in late 1940 to become Longmore’s deputy

commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, asked him to ‘Tell Longmore that we fully appreciate all his difficulties, but we are becoming tired of moan, moan, moan.’30 Tedder passed on the message to Longmore that his messages were causing ‘irritation and antagonism’ and for a while his cables to London were more temperate, but on 30 April he sent yet another demand for more aircraft to London on 30 April which raised the ire of Churchill who had long been dissatisfied with the number of aircraft available to operational squadrons compared to the number despatched to the Middle East.31 This last cable asked about the availability of a number of new aircraft types including the Typhoon,

Beaufighter, Whirlwind, Manchester and Stirling. Freeman had long been a supporter of

Longmore but this latest request revealed ‘a fundamental failure to understand the vital contribution that salvage and repair could make to keeping the squadrons supplied…[and] asking for unproven new aircraft with all the problems of maintenance and spares at the end of such a tenuous supply line, was inane.’32 The next day Longmore was recalled to London for

consultations and he would not return to the Middle East. Tedder immediately became the acting

29 John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 337-338. 30 Tedder, With Prejudice, 82. 31 Tedder, With Prejudice, 81-82. 32 Anthoney Furse, Wilfrid Freeman: The Genius Behind Allied Survival and Air Supremacy 1939-1945 (Staplehurst, Kent: Spellmount, 1999), 177-178. 301

Air Commander-in-Chief and was confirmed in the position on 1 June.33 This development

would have significant implications for Collishaw as Longmore had been a stalwart supporter

who had fought to keep him as his commander in the Western Desert; Tedder had consistently

criticized Collishaw in personal letters sent to Air Chief Marshal Freeman between January and

June 1941 and would seek to replace Collishaw as soon as possible.34

May began as a period of relative quiet for the RAF in Egypt and Libya. The Wellington

squadrons based near the canal continued nightly attacks against the Cyrenaican ports, especially

Benghazi, while the Blenheim and Hurricane squadrons made occasional raids on the Axis

supply lines and airfields between the Egyptian frontier and Tripoli. Typical for this period were

the operations which took place on 5 May; eight Blenheims from No.14 Squadron operating in

pairs bombed and machine gunned enemy motor transport convoys near Gambut, Bir Chleta and

Capuzzo and destroyed and damaged a number of vehicles. No.39 Squadron conducted strategic

reconnaissance of Benghazi, Giarabub and Derna while tactical reconnaissance flights over

Acroma and Capuzzo were made by Nos.6 and 274 Squadrons. That night ten Wellingtons

bombed the port at Benghazi along with the airfields at Berka, Benina, Derna, Gazala and

Bardia. One Maryland from No.39 Squadron was lost when it was shot down by a German

fighter near Acroma.35

Low-level Hurricane attacks were very effective at interdicting the movement of German

and Italian convoys. A large fighter sweep took place on 17 May when Hurricanes of Nos. 73,

33 ‘The Middle East Command of the Royal Air Force, May 1941-January 1943. Draft for Despatch by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, G.C.B.’ n.d., TNA AIR 20/5532, 1. Noted on the cover in pencil: ‘prepared by S/L J.N. White. Lord Tedder never wrote a despatch as A.O.C. in C. M.E. therefore this draft was never used although it was submitted to him.’ 34 For this correspondence see Vice-Chief of the Air Staff files, ‘Middle East: Correspondence with Air Vice- Marshal Tedder,’ TNA AIR 20/2791 and AIR 20/2792 35 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.331. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 7th May 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1074; Christopher Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, Vol. 1: North Africa - June 1940- January 1942 (London: Grub Street, 2012), 178. 302

274 and 1 South African Air Force (SAAF) interdicted the Tobruk-Bardia-Capuzzo area. The operational summary for the day recorded, ‘The Hurricanes destroyed nineteen vehicles and

severely damaged a number of others. They also shot up several staff cars and motor-cyclists on

the road and destroyed a petrol dump on BU AMUD landing ground. The enemy’s M.T.

movements were considerably disorganized by these operations.’36 Collishaw appreciated that

any further advance by Rommel into Egypt would require the transportation of a considerable

stock of supplies to the frontier. It would be considerably easier to destroy these soft targets

rather than repel an invasion. The road convoys, especially the petrol and troop-carrying lorries,

were very susceptible to machine gun attacks. Collishaw ordered that only moving convoys be

attacked as they were least likely to be protected by anti-aircraft guns which could only be

deployed when the convoy halted. The normal tactic was for

two Hurricanes to leave the base [Mersa Matruh] at brief intervals, refuel at Barrani, and then proceed at maximum height out to sea, crossing the coast in the neighbourhood of GAZALA and having located M.T. vehicles by the dust cloud, to descend at high speed and shoot up the convoy. Our aircraft then proceeded homeward along the main roads, keeping low and attacking all vehicles as they came to them. When the ammunition became low our aircraft put out to sea.37

Collishaw was correct in his estimation that the most profitable target for his aircraft was the enemy lines of communication. Rommel was notorious for ignoring his logistics, and his advance in April took place in spite of his tenuous supply line, but his staff officers realized this vulnerability. Between 8 February and 1 May the Germans transported 33,549 men, 11,330 vehicles and 36,332 tonnes of supplies and equipment across the Mediterranean Sea to Tripoli, but 12 of the 29 ships involved in this passage were sunk and another five put out of action indefinitely. This amounted to the loss of 59 percent of the total shipping tonnage available. The

36 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.342. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 18th May 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1074. 37 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the time of our retreat through Cyrenaica including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, 2, TNA AIR 23/6474. 303

1,500 kilometre road trek from Tripoli to Tobruk was equally vulnerable as the Germans

possessed enough trucks to move normal supplies to the front, but it did not have the capacity to

transport reinforcements and the large quantity of ammunition necessary for a renewed

offensive.38 As early as 20 April General Stefan Fröhlich, commander of Fliegerführer Afrika, the main Luftwaffe command in North Africa, signalled General Otto Hoffmann von Waldau, the Chief of the Operations Branch of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, to express concern over the air situation. He declared that the British enjoyed air superiority and the supply lines and airfields were vulnerable and highly susceptible to air attack. He also lamented the lack of anti-

aircraft guns available in the theatre as well as the fact that many of the AA batteries possessed

by Rommel were unavailable for air defence as they were committed to an anti-tank role.39

Benghazi was a prime target for the British interdiction campaign. The long overland

route from Tripoli combined with a shortage of trucks forced the enemy to use Benghazi and the

other smaller ports to shorten the road distance. Axis attacks on the port in first months of 1941

were never able to close Benghazi to Allied shipping but they had forced the British to make

alternate arrangements. Collishaw hoped for a similar outcome by directing his Wellington

squadrons to make regular nightly attacks augmented by occasional daylight raids by his

Blenheim bombers. In the last two weeks of April 12 separate raids composed of 44 sorties were

made on Benghazi and intelligence reports indicated the port’s capacity had been sufficiently

reduced that the enemy could not rely on it to supply his continued advance. This pattern

continued in May though commitments to Greece and Crete meant that Wellington operations in

38 Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 687-690 39 Translated enemy document quoted in RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 141. See also Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 135-137. This last point is interesting. The German 88 mm gun was a very effective weapon in either its designed anti-aircraft role or as an effective anti- tank weapon but due to operational demands it could often not be employed in both roles at the same time. 304

the Western Desert were largely confined to attacks on Benghazi. A total of 24 raids (45 sorties)

during the month continued to cause considerable damage to the port and limit its usefulness to

the enemy. A signal from the Luftwaffe in North Africa sent of 9 May confirmed the success of this campaign: ‘Supply position of D.A.K. (Africa Corps) very serious owing to continued and successful pressure by British fleet and Air Force on communications via Benghazi and

Tripoli.’40 Prior to being diverted to Crete, Collishaw’s Blenheim squadrons contributed to the

interdiction campaign by regularly attacking Axis airfields in Cyrenaica as well as targeting

columns of motor transport.41

The effectiveness of this denial campaign, combined with the Royal Navy’s success in

interdicting enemy supply ships, was manifest in an increasing German use of air transport to

augment the amount of supplies delivered to Rommel. In February and March an average of 20-

25 transport flights crossed the Mediterranean, but in April this had more than doubled and some

days saw in excess of 100 aerial supply sorties. These transports were targeted by 204 Group fighters and bombers whenever their presence in Cyrenaica was detected and RAF records mention numerous successful attacks in April, May and June.42

The continued RAF attacks on the enemy lines of communication worked to keep the

German and Italian air forces largely on the defensive. The Luftwaffe in North Africa had many

40 Quoted in RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 153. 41 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the time of our retreat through Cyrenaica including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 1-4; Operations Record Book, 204 Group, April-May 1941, TNA AIR 25/815; ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Daily Operational Summaries, April-May 1941,’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1074; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 146, 153-154. 42 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Daily Operational Summaries, April-June 1941,’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1074 & 1075; Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the time of our retreat through Cyrenaica including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 3; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 143-144. 305 tasks and most of its fighter aircraft were devoted to protecting the air bridge to Libya as well as providing air cover for their ports and airfields. The small number of offensive sorties made by the Luftwaffe were directed at Tobruk and British naval forces attempting to resupply the garrison, with a small number of largely ineffective raids on Alexandria and the Suez Canal. As in the past, the Italians devoted the vast majority of their aircraft to maintaining standing air patrols over their ports and airfields as well as along the main roads. As a result of this defensive posture attacks on British airfields and troop positions were rare outside of the Tobruk perimeter.

An indication of the effectiveness of the British attacks on the lines of communications was the enemy decision to place armoured vehicles every five miles along the main road between Tobruk and Capuzzo as well as along the Trigh Capuzzo between El Adem and Sidi Aziez. These pickets did not destroy many British aircraft but they achieved their purpose:

The flak fire from a single A.F.V. may be expected to have little effect against a fast low flying aircraft, but the stationing of these vehicles five miles apart severely handicapped our operations and our tactics, because our aircraft had previously enjoyed freedom from flak while flying homeward at ground level along the roads in search of further prey. Each A.F.V., opening fire successively as our aircraft flew low along the road, had the effect of disconcerting our low- flying attacks, and to that degree was effective.43

Pilots were warned not to engage these armoured vehicles as previous experience had shown that such attacks were largely ineffective and costly. It was much better to attack soft- sided motor transport, especially the ten-ton fuel bowsers, which were largely undefended and easily destroyed. The enemy also countered the British attacks by limiting movements to the hours of darkness and halting during the day with vehicles widely dispersed to limit their exposure. This tactic helped to minimize losses to air attack but it imposed its own delays on enemy resupply efforts. British casualties in these low-level attacks were remarkably low and

43 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the time of our retreat through Cyrenaica including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 3. 306

very few aircraft were lost with one notable exception. On 21 May the RAF was busy attacking

large concentrations of enemy vehicles in the Capuzzo area. Hurricanes of Nos.73, 274 and 1

SAAF made attacks along the main road destroying numerous vehicles including two petrol or

ammunition lorries which burned furiously. One Hurricane from No.73 Squadron was lost when

attacked by six German Me 109s. The British claimed one enemy fighter shot down in flames.

Later in the morning seven Blenheims from No.14 Squadron were sent out individually to continue the attacks on a large enemy convoy estimated at 350 vehicles. The first two aircraft

bombed successfully claiming a number of vehicles destroyed, but the remainder were bounced

by enemy fighters. Over a span of 10 minutes the five trailing aircraft were shot down by

German Me 109s and all 15 crew members were killed.44

In late April Generalleutnant Friedrich Paulus, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations on the Army General Staff, was sent to North Africa to report on Rommel. General Franz

Halder, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, was concerned that a crisis had developed at the Egyptian frontier near Sollum where the British were preparing an offensive. Following the failure of the most recent attacks on Tobruk Paulus ordered Rommel to adopt a defensive posture and to seek permission before again launching any offensive operations. He then reported to

Halder that, ‘the crux of the problem in North Africa is not Tobruk or Sollum, but the organization of supplies…By overstepping his orders Rommel has brought about a situation for which our present supply capabilities are insufficient.’45 At this point in the war the British were

able to read coded Enigma messages sent by the Luftwaffe and within two days of its

44 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the time of our retreat through Cyrenaica including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 1-3; ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.346. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 22nd May 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1074; Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 191-192. 45 Quoted in Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 692. See also Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 139-140. 307

transmission Paulus’ full report was being read in London and Cairo. In addition to confirming

German supply problems the cable revealed that the German 15th Panzer Division was being

sent to Libya but had not yet arrived. This intelligence ‘directly influenced’ Wavell’s decision to

launch a minor offensive, codenamed Operation Brevity, to take advantage of the situation in

mid-May.46

Brigadier William ‘Strafer’ Gott, the commander of the Support Group of 7th Armoured

Division, was ordered to strike a rapid blow across the frontier with the objective of capturing

the Halfaya Pass, Sollum and Capuzzo and then exploit towards Tobruk without endangering his

force. The plan was for three parallel forces to advance: the 7th Armoured Brigade Group on the

desert flank to Sidi Azeiz, the 22nd Guards Brigade Group in the centre to clear the top of the

Halfaya Pass and then advance to Capuzzo and beyond, and the third group to advance along the

coast and occupy the bottom of the pass and then exploit to Sollum.47

During the planning for Brevity there was a disagreement between the army and the RAF

over the proper employment of aircraft during the battle. Due to the relative weakness of his

attacking forces, Brigadier Gott urged Major-General Beresford-Peirse to demand the RAF play

a major role in this operation. He requested the main effort of the RAF by both bombers and

fighters ‘should be conducted directly against the A.F.V.S. of the enemy, the intention being that

the R.A.F. should act as artillery with the object of putting enemy A.F.V.s out of action.’48 In

effect, he was requesting that the aircraft attack targets which they would have difficulty finding,

hitting and destroying, and such attacks would come at a high cost to the attacking aircraft.

46 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.1: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979), 396-397. 47 General Sir A.P. Wavell, ‘Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941,’ Supplement to the London Gazette, 3 July 1946, 3441. 48 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the time of our retreat through Cyrenaica including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 4. 308

Collishaw realized this problem and sensibly replied that the Italian air force had dropped thousands of bombs on 7th Armoured Division but caused little damage. Rather, the RAF would be better employed attacking ‘the thin-skinned vehicles in the rear of the A.F.Vs., on the ground that the A.F.Vs. cannot fight without petrol and ammunition, and the paralyzing of the L. of C.

[line of communications] would automatically bring about the breakdown of the fighting services.’49 Beresford-Peirse agreed to this plan with the stipulation that the RAF would

intervene directly on the battlefield if the army encountered serious resistance.50

The RAF plan for Operation Brevity was a clever plan designed to isolate the battlefield

and prevent the movement of enemy reinforcements and supplies. Prior to the battle attacks were

made on enemy concentrations in the Tobruk area as well as low-flying attacks on the lines of communications from El Agheila to Benghazi and Tobruk. Once the battle commenced, low-

level fighter and bomber attacks were concentrated in the area immediately behind the

battlefront, essentially between Sollum and Tobruk, which were designed to disrupt the

movement of enemy reinforcements and supplies. The intensity of attacks meant that no fighter

aircraft could be diverted to provide air cover during the battle. Continual reconnaissance was

carried out in the Tobruk area during the course of the battle in an effort to discover the

movement of any significant enemy forces to the frontier. In that event, Collishaw was prepared

to concentrate his attacks on those targets but no movement of that nature developed.51

The attack was launched on the morning of 15 May and initially surprised the German

and Italian frontier defenders. The 7th Armoured Brigade Group pushed aside weak screening

forces to advance to Sidi Aziez while the Guards Brigade Group captured the top of Halfaya Pass

49 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the time of our retreat through Cyrenaica including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 4-5. 50 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 160. 51 Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the time of our retreat through Cyrenaica including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 4. 309

before proceeding to Bir er Regima, three miles south of Bardia, before retiring to Fort Capuzzo.

The coastal group met stubborn resistance at the bottom of the pass but this was overcome and

by evening the force was established in Sollum. The attack, though it had been expected by the

Germans, caused a crisis for them as it was feared this was a major operation to relieve Tobruk.

By 0800 hours forward German units were demanding the strongest possible support from the

Luftwaffe, however, the weak air attacks which developed were defeated by small offensive

patrols from Nos.73 and 274 Squadrons which Collishaw had tasked to defend the advancing

troops.52

RAF operations during the first day had successfully prevented the intervention of the

Luftwaffe on the battlefield. The only significant attempt by 17 Ju 87s escorted by 10 Me 109s was intercepted before it could make its attack. At noon eight Blenheims from No.14 Squadron, newly deployed to the Western Desert, along with eight Blenheims from Nos.45 and 55

Squadrons, bombed and machine gunned Italian troops holding up the advance of the coastal group in the Halfaya-Sollum area. Later in the afternoon Hurricanes made numerous low-level

attacks along the Bardia-Tobruk road and destroyed a number of enemy vehicles including a

petrol or ammunition lorry which burned fiercely.53

A local counterattack on the first afternoon by the 2nd Battalion 5th Panzer Regiment recaptured Capuzzo and forced the British back to Musaid but both sides remained uneasy during

52 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 156; Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 160- 162; Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber et al, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 697-700; Thomas L. Jentz, Tank Combat in North Africa: The Opening Rounds - Operations Sonnenblumme, Brevity, Skorpion and Battleaxe, February 1941 - June 1941 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing Lt., 1998), 132-133. 53 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.340. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 16th May 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1074; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 155; Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 142-143. 310

the night of 15/16 May. The local German commander, Colonel Maximilian von Herff, prepared

to withdraw but Rommel sent forward an additional armoured battalion and ordered a

counterattack in the morning. Brigadier Gott felt his forces at Musaid were too exposed so

ordered them to withdraw to the Halfaya Pass early on the morning of 16 May. The German

reinforcements arrived in the area of Sidi Azeiz by 0300 hours and Fort Capuzzo by 0800 hours

but both columns were immobilized for most of the day due to a lack of fuel.54

Collishaw’s aircraft were busy on the second day as he mounted a major effect to

interdict and isolate the battlefield. Hurricanes of Nos.73, 274 and 1 SAAF along with

Blenheims of Nos.45 and 55 Squadrons conducted low-level attacks from the Bardia-Sollum area as far west as Barce-Derna road where a large convoy of over 100 vehicles was attacked by fighters and bombers. The entry in the 204 Group Operations Record Book for the day records that these attacks destroyed or damaged more than 100 vehicles and motorcycles including at least three fuel convoys with the confirmed destruction of nine petrol lorries. Heavy attacks by

RAF Wellingtons on Axis airfields in Cyrenaica on the night of 15/16 May contributed to the absence of the Luftwaffe over the battlefield on the second day; enemy fighters did not appear over Capuzzo in strength until late in the day and caused no problems for the British army but three British aircraft engaged in strafing missions were shot down. Though the RAF was not able to stop the flow of reinforcements to the front, their destruction of enemy petrol lorries helped to stall the German counterattack during a period when British forces were at their most vulnerable.55

54 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 162; Jentz, Tank Combat in North Africa, 140. 55 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.341. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 17th May 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1074; Operations Record Book, 204 Group, May 1941, TNA AIR 25/815. 311

Operation Brevity concluded on 17 May as British forces withdrew to new positions

anchored on Halfaya Pass and Bir el Khireigat. The British retreated in good order and the

Germans advance were unable to bring them to battle. The Germans subsequently established a

new defensive line at Sidi Omar – Sidi Suleiman – Sollum. Though the ground combat was

finished, the RAF continued to take a toll on the enemy as it reinforced its frontier garrisons.

Low-level attacks were made in the area between Tobruk and Sollum with 19 vehicles set on fire

on 17 May. The next afternoon a large enemy column estimated at 100 vehicles and 75 tanks was

discovered advancing from Capuzzo towards Sidi Suleiman and Halfaya. A call for air support

was quickly answered and 28 Blenheims and Marylands from Nos. 14, 24 SAAF, 45 and 55

Squadrons were despatched to attack the enemy force. Initial contact between the Germans and

British drove the 7th Armoured Brigade and 7th Support Group from the pass but repeated

attacks by the medium bombers destroyed a number of German vehicles and caused the

abandonment of at least three tanks. As a result of the RAF invention the enemy column retired

leaving the pass in British hands.56

The British official history considered Brevity to be a ‘failure’ but all the immediate post-

mortems on the battle were not as negative.57 Churchill cabled General Wavell immediately after

the conclusion of the battle and expressed his satisfaction with its outcome: ‘Without using Tiger

cubs you have taken offensive, have advanced 30 miles, have captured Halfaya and Sollum, have

taken 500 German prisoners and inflicted heavy losses in men and A.F.V.s upon the enemy. For

56 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.343. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 19th May 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1074; Operations Record Book, 204 Group, May 1941, TNA AIR 25/815; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.1: Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941, TNA AIR 41/44, 156. 57 Hinsley also referred to the battle as a failure. Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 162; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 398. 312

these, 20 ‘I’ tanks and 1,000 or 1,500 casualties do not seem to be all too heavy.’58 The Germans also considered the outcome of the battle a setback. Rommel felt the loss of Halfaya was the key to the battle:

The Halfaya and Sollum Passes were points of great strategic importance, for they were the only two places between the coast and Habata where it was possible to cross the escarpment—of anything up to 600 feet in height—which stretched away from Sollum in a south-easterly direction towards Egypt. The Halfaya positions gave an equal command over both possible roads. In any offensive from Egypt, therefore, possession of these passes was bound to be of the utmost value to the enemy, as they offered him a comparatively safe route for his supplies. If, on the other hand, he were to attempt to attack Bardia without holding them, he would be thrown back on a supply route through Habata which would be vulnerable to attack and harassing action by us.59

The loss of the pass forced the Germans to stage a major attack with strong support from

the Luftwaffe on 27-28 May to recapture the important position. They were also forced to commit much stronger forces to garrison the frontier than had previously been the case.60

Overall, though Operation Brevity did not achieve its stated goal of relieving the besieged

port of Tobruk, the RAF contribution must be considered a success. Its interventions could not

turn the tide of the battle, but it prevented a much poorer outcome. No effective enemy air

attacks on British forces developed during the battle due to the air cover and interdiction

missions flown by the RAF. Interdiction of the enemy lines of communications during the first

two days of the battle successfully disrupted the Axis ability to refuel and resupply its armoured

58 Quoted in John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London: Collins, 1964), 478. ‘Tiger cubs’ refers to the special ‘Tiger’ convoy that Churchill despatched to the Middle East to provide reinforcements for an upcoming attack. The convoy arrived in Egypt on 12 May with its precious cargo of 82 cruiser, 135 ‘I’ and 21 light tanks as well as 43 Hurricanes. These reinforcements would allow the RAF and 7th Armoured Division to be rebuilt in time for Operation Battleaxe. See Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 107-119, 162. 59 B.H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers (London: Arrow Books Ltd, 1987 (1957)), 136-137. 60 Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol.2, 163; Bernd Stegemann, ‘The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa,’ in Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 700; Karl Gundelach, Die Deutsche im Mittelmeer, 1940-1945 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981), 142-143. RAF aircraft were not available to support the army during this battle due to the commitment of squadrons to the Crete operation. ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Operational Summary No.351. Period 24 hours ending 1800 hours 27th May 1941’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1074. 313

forces and air reconnaissance kept a close watch on the battlefield and Collishaw was prepared to

destroy any large enemy forces that attempted to move from the Tobruk area to the battlefront.

The Germans suffered serious fuel shortages on the second day of the battle. This resulted in a number of German units being immobilised at a point in the battle when an aggressive thrust may have destroyed the Guards Brigade Group. This British unit was left in an exposed position as it was mauled the previous day and was cut off the 7th Armoured Brigade which had been

ordered to hold its position at Sidi Azeiz in order to protect the flank of the Guards Brigade. The

RAF destruction of German petrol lorries undoubtedly contributed significantly to the German

fuel shortage. Finally, a German attack on 18 May which forced a British withdrawal was turned back by quick and aggressive action by Collishaw’s medium bomber squadrons following the abandonment of Halfaya Pass by the British. This air action forced the enemy to retreat and the

British were able to hold the pass. RAF actions in Operation Brevity cannot be considered

decisive, but the evidence shows that the air support materially impacted the outcome of the

battle and prevented a defeat from becoming a rout or worse.

The situation in the Mediterranean did not improve for the British after the failure of

Operation Brevity as the German airborne invasion of Crete commenced on 20 May. The

Luftwaffe heavily bombed the island in the week leading up to the invasion and on the morning

of 20 May a large fleet of Ju 52 transport aircraft conveyed a force of paratroopers to commence

the attack.61 The British and Commonwealth garrison was a motley force comprised largely of

Australian and New Zealand troops who had been evacuated from Greece. The German paratroopers suffered heavy casualties as the defenders fought hard to hold their positions; the

outcome of the battle was in doubt until 26 May when the Commonwealth troops were forced to

61 Detlef Vogel, ‘German Intervention in the Balkans,’ in Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 527-533. 314

concede defeat and evacuate. The RAF could provide only limited support to the Cretan

defenders. The small force of fighters and bombers stationed on the island were quickly

overwhelmed by the Luftwaffe attacks and the subsequent loss of the airfields.62

The inability to base the RAF on Crete gave the Germans air superiority over the island.

Subsequent RAF operations over Crete were conducted from bases in Egypt. British aircraft had

the range to make the long trip over the water but their loiter time was non-existent. This meant

that ‘hit and run’ raids could be conducted but it was impossible to maintain any type of effective

air cover over the island. Air Marshal Tedder recognized the challenge posed by the distance:

‘The bulk of our operations had necessarily to be based on Africa, near the operational limit of

the Blenheims and Marylands, and outside the range of Hurricanes and Tomahawks. All this

meant diverting practically the whole of our effort from the Western Desert to Crete, but I felt

this was unavoidable at so critical a juncture.’63 The recent loss of Cyrenaica materially impacted this operation. The round trip distance from the main RAF bases in the Western Desert at Mersa

Matruh to the centre of Crete was approximately 1,000 kilometres; the distance from the lost bases at Derna and Martuba was some 250 kilometres shorter.64

Ordered by Tedder to do everything he could to support Crete, Collishaw halted most

missions in the Western Desert and commenced distant operations with his Blenheims and

Hurricanes. The confused situation early in the invasion restricted the ability of the RAF to

attack targets with confidence, but by 23 May a clear delineation between enemy and friendly

troops was discernible and air attacks were concentrated on the airfield at Maleme which was

62 On 11 May the RAF contingent on Crete consisted of six Hurricanes and ‘approximately fourteen very old Blenheim Is and Gladiators.’ RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.7: The Campaign in Crete, May 1941, TNA AIR 41/29, 19-22. 63 Tedder, With Prejudice, 101. 64 The range difference was even more marked to locations on the western part of the island: Derna to Suda Bay – 660 km; Mersa Matruh to Suda Bay – 1,100 km. Distances calculated on Google maps. 315

being used as the main landing ground for German transports. Low level strafing attacks by

Blenheim fighters and long range Hurricanes were most effective but success was also achieved

by Blenheims dropping small bombs and spikes.65 A slow but steady attrition was suffered by

the RAF during these attacks. A Blenheim and a Hurricane were shot down over Crete on 23

May; two Hurricanes were lost at sea the next day; and the following three days saw the loss of

23 aircraft. By the conclusion of the campaign 47 RAF aircraft had been destroyed including 30

from 204 Group. The losses were particularly crippling to the Blenheim squadrons and Nos.45

and 55 Squadrons were so decimated that they were withdrawn from operations to regenerate;

they would be unavailable for the upcoming Operation Battleaxe.66

The RAF attacks on Crete did not change the outcome of the battle but they did cause

significant problems for the Germans. By 26 July the British air attacks had taken a heavy toll on

German aircraft at Maleme. Luftwaffe General Alexander Löhr, commander of XI Air Corps,

was deeply concerned that his aircraft would be unable to deliver the necessary quantity of

troops and supplies to sustain the attack. He ordered a renewed attack near Heraklion to capture

the airfield and remove the threat of British aircraft using it to refuel and rearm. Partially in

response to the effectiveness of the air attacks a German request for Italian assistance was

initiated; Mussolini was pleased to come to the aid of his ally and two days later an Italian

brigade landed on the eastern part of the island. The RAF threat was finally neutralized as the

campaign drew to a close and the German VIII Air Corps sent additional fighters to provide

65 The spikes were effective at denying the enemy use of the airfield by puncturing aircraft tires. Operations Record Book, HQ 204 Group, May 1941, TNA AIR 25/815. 66 Operations Record Book, HQ 204 Group, May 1941, TNA AIR 25/815; Operations Record Book, HQ RAF Middle East, May 1941, TNA AIR 24/1051; RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.7: The Campaign in Crete, May 1941, esp. Appendices, TNA AIR 41/29; Tedder, With Prejudice, 101-105; Shores et al, A History of the Mediterranean Air War 1940-1945, 194-207. 316

cover.67 Though the British suffered heavy losses in the battle, the German XI Air Corps was

crippled: 150 aircraft were totally destroyed, 165 heavily damaged and only 185 remained

operational.68

After a week of desperate fighting with heavy casualties on both sides the British again found themselves conducting a seaborne withdrawal. Much went wrong during these battles but

one unifying factor was the army’s dissatisfaction with the support provided by the RAF. ‘I

deeply regret failure to hold Crete and fully realize grave effect loss of it will have on other

problems in Middle East,’ began General Wavell’s cable to London on 27 May. His second

paragraph blamed the defeat on the enemy’s ‘overwhelming air superiority’ with the unstated

criticism that the RAF was not able to match this air effort.69 Sir Miles Lampson, the British

Ambassador to Egypt, communicated these misgivings to London where they reached the Chief

of the Air Staff. Portal subsequently cabled Air Marshal Tedder and suggested that he needed to do a better job of communicating the reasons for the problems with the army and other officials in the region.70 Tedder replied that he would do this but a week later he cabled Air Chief

Marshal Sir Wilfrid R. Freeman, the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, and told him, ‘There is, as I

expected, a first class hate working up in the Army against the Royal Air Force for having “let them down” in Greece and Crete. Wavell is very worried about it and is doing his best to stamp on it. But I am not sure that even now the real reasons for the lack of air support are appreciated

67 Detlef Vogel, ‘German Intervention in the Balkans,’ in Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 549-550. 68 Detlef Vogel, ‘German Intervention in the Balkans,’ in Schreiber, Stegemann, and Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol.3, 550. German aircraft losses were caused by a combination of British air attack, anti- aircraft defences, artillery barrages and through accidents. It is not possible to attribute definitive numbers to any one source but both British and German sources acknowledge that the British air attacks were very effective. 69 Letter, Wavell to General Sir John Dill, 27 May 1941, TNA AIR 8/545. 70 RAF Air Historical Branch, The Middle East Campaigns, vol.7: The Campaign in Crete, May 1941, TNA AIR 41/29, 70-72. 317

in higher places in the Army here.’71 Though Wavell gave this assurance to Tedder, it did not

prevent him from criticizing RAF support in the Western Desert (see Chapter 8) and at Crete.

Tedder and Collishaw countered this criticism by linking the inability of the RAF to provide a

better fighter defence over Crete to the loss of local air bases. ‘This was primarily,’ stated

Tedder, ‘a battle for aerodromes.’72

Collishaw directly blamed the army for this problem: ‘The R.A.F. was unable to obtain air superiority over the area of operations in Crete because our Army was unable to safeguard the aerodromes against attack by German forces operating on the ground.’73 In a paper written after

the war Collishaw expounded on the problems of the Crete campaign. He maintained that the

inability of the army to protect the landing grounds condemned the mission to failure. The loss of

the airfields severely curtailed RAF operations over Crete due to the distance from bases in

Egypt. Short range Hurricanes could not be utilized and even long range fighters had a limited

endurance over the island. He identified five lessons from the Crete operation:

a. There is NO substitute for Air protection against an airborne invasion. b. An Island loses its insular immensity when air superiority is lost c. The Army by itself is not equipped to withstand an air invasion. d. Expect air invasions to develop upon aerodromes e. The Navy can do nothing to interfere with an air invasion of an island.74

Tedder blamed the failure at Crete on a number of factors including the distance of the island from bases in Egypt, the lack of sufficient numbers of aircraft due to conflicting commitments (support of Crete operation, air cover for RN vessels in the Mediterranean, continuing operations in the Western Desert and Syria) as well as poor coordination between the

71 Letter, Tedder to Air Chief Marshal Sir W.R. Freeman, 3 June 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 72 Letter, Tedder to CAS, 30 May 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. 73 An unknown commentator underlined this passage in the report and wrote ‘Infamous libel!’ Air Commodore R. Collishaw, ‘Brief Report on the Royal Air Force Operations from the time of our retreat through Cyrenaica including the Operation “Battleaxe,”’ 12 August 1941, TNA AIR 23/6474, 4. 74 Raymond Collishaw, ‘A Brief History of the Crete Campaign, 1941,” n.d., The Beatrice Hitchens Memorial Collection of Aviation History, Western Archives, Western University, London, Ontario, Collishaw correspondence file, III-15. 318

three services.75 He suggests that the turning point in the battle was the loss of the airfields on

Crete which ceded the advantage to the Germans who were then able to reinforce the island by

air. He remarked that the RAF put up a good fight, but ‘on far too small a scale to be really

effective.’76

In spite of all the things that went wrong for the RAF over Crete, Tedder singled out

Collishaw for special criticism. On 29 May Tedder cabled a post-mortem to Air Chief Marshal

Freeman and shared his views on the outcome of the operation. He thought that the RAF put up a

‘magnificent show’ over Crete and caused heavy losses to the Luftwaffe but the overall effort was too small to be really effective. He worried that the heavy losses in aircraft and aircrew had seriously weakened the RAF in the Western Desert, especially the Blenheim squadrons, which he called a ‘broken remnant.’ In the next sentence Tedder shifted the responsibility for the losses onto Collishaw: ‘I feel I am to blame in not having kept a tighter rein on Collishaw but it is not easy to control detailed operations up here.’77 It is not clear what Tedder expected Collishaw to do differently. Tedder ordered Collishaw to devote the majority of his aircraft to supporting operations in Crete and that is exactly what he did.78 The aircraft made a minor contribution to

the battle but the long range and overwhelming odds meant high losses for the British aircraft.

During the period 23-30 May virtually all of Collishaw’s aircraft were devoted to the Crete mission. A small number of reconnaissance and air cover missions were carried out over the

Western Desert and no offensive attacks were made. A single aircraft, a Lysander supporting the army, was lost. Even after the conclusion of operations over Crete, Collishaw’s aircraft were tasked with covering the Royal Navy during the first days of June and it was not until about a

75 Letter, Tedder to Freeman, 3 June 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 76 Letter, Tedder to Freeman, 29 May 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 77 Letter, Tedder to Freeman, 29 May 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 78 Telegram, C.A.S. Personal From TEDDER, 23 May 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. 319

week before Operation Battleaxe that offensive missions over the Western Desert resumed.79

The only serious losses suffered by Collishaw’s command during this period occurred over

Crete. It appears Tedder’s primary motivation for the negative comments was to build a case for

the removal of Collishaw.

May 1941 marked a pivotal transitional month for British forces in the Mediterranean

theatre. The success of Operation Compass was lost to the German counterattack in April which

had reclaimed Cyrenaica and presented a renewed threat to Egypt and the Suez Canal. Greece

and Crete had also been lost to German assaults and the only positive factor was the escape of

substantial numbers of troops, albeit without their equipment, vehicles or tanks. Perhaps the

biggest casualty during these setbacks was the damage done to the relationship between the army

and the RAF. Unlike the relationship between the two services in England and during the Battle

of France in 1940 where acrimony and distrust were common, the men under the command of

Wavell and Longmore had worked out an effective partnership. Unfortunately this harmony was

broken in Cyrenaica during the German offensive when Wavell blamed the RAF for contributing

to the defeat by not providing the necessary aerial reconnaissance and in Greece and Crete where

the army and Royal Navy thought that the lack of RAF air cover had affected the outcome of

those battles. Tedder’s letters to London in late May and early June related numerous incidents

which demonstrated the strained relationship between the RAF and the other services. Wavell

and Cunningham both expressed their dissatisfaction to Tedder and Captain Louis Mountbatten,

the future Chief of Combined Operations, argued forcefully with Tedder about the lack of RAF

air support for the Royal Navy which contributed to the loss of his destroyer, HMS Kelly.80

79 ‘Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East Daily Operational Summaries, April-June 1941,’ contained in Operations Record Book – Appendices, RAF HQ Middle East, TNA AIR 24/1074 & 1075. 80 See correspondence between Tedder, Freeman and Portal in TNA AIR 20/2791 and AIR 23/1395, especially Letter, Tedder to Freeman, 29 May and 3 June 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792 and Telegram, C.A.S. Personal from 320

Another setback during the month was the failure of Operation Brevity to relieve the besieged garrison at Tobruk. The army had been checked in their assault by German and Italian forces which garrisoned the frontier in greater numbers than had been expected. The army had counted on the RAF to augment their own limited strength during the battle by destroying enemy tanks and other vehicles on the battlefield. Generals Gott and Beresford-Pierse were disappointed when they were told by Collishaw that this was not possible. Collishaw then proceeded to fight the kind of air battle that the RAF was designed for: sealing off the battlefield and limiting the movement of enemy reserves, reinforcements and supplies as well as interfering with enemy air force operations. Though the duration of the battle was too short for the full impact of these measures to be felt and change the course of the battle, German freedom of movement on and behind the battlefield was significantly impacted and air action made a difference at a number of key points during the battle. Air operations during Brevity should have served as the pattern for future battles but Wavell and his commanders in the Western Desert did not appreciate the lessons displayed. This breakdown in relations between the two services would play a major role during Operation Battleaxe, the next major battle to be fought in the Western Desert.

For Collishaw May was a busy month as he was responsible for a number of disparate tasks. He continued to prevent the German advance towards Egypt, supported distant operations against Crete, defended the isolated port of Tobruk, and participated in a renewed British attack to relieve the garrison. These multiple operations were conducted with exhausted units, limited resources and in a cautious manner to prevent unnecessary, and irreplaceable, losses. Overall, the operations of 204 Group during this period have to be considered a success. The interdiction

TEDDER, 23 May 1941, TNA AIR 23/1395. For Tedder/Mountbatten discussion see Tedder, With Prejudice, 107- 8. The fallout over the perceived lack of RAF air support over Greece and Crete would continue to resonate for months. New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser, advised that his forces had not received the necessary air support in Greece and Crete, appealed directly to Churchill in October to receive assurances that his country’s forces would not again be committed to battle without adequate air support. See Tedder, With Prejudice, 176-7. 321

missions against targets in Libya were a success and continued to frustrate the logistical situation

of the German Afrika Korps and Tobruk continued to hold out. Operations against Crete were

conducted at the Hurricanes’ extreme range which meant that time over the island was at a

premium but RAF air operations caused heavy losses to the Luftwaffe and the consequent

commitment of additional forces. The severe loss in aircraft helped to turn the German capture of

Crete into a Pyrrhic victory. Operation Brevity was in many ways an ideal air campaign and

though the battle was lost on the ground, RAF operations prevented a worse defeat. Much of the

RAF success during this period can be attributed to Collishaw’s veteran leadership.

Tedder, however, was not impressed by Collishaw’s actions during this period. As early

as 4 January 1941, after taking over 202 Group for a brief period when Collishaw was sick,

Tedder was considering sacking him. He wrote to his wife, Rosalinde that ‘Collishaw no doubt has his points but he is an awful bull in a china shop, has no conception whatever of the administration without which operations cannot function and goes off half-cock in an appalling way.’81 Tedder was also consistently critical about Collishaw in his regular letters to Air Chief

Marshal Freeman. On 11 March he criticised Collishaw’s ‘much advertised “drive”’ and blamed

it for causing much ‘quite avoidable wear and tear’ on his units.82 At the end of May he lamented

that he had not been able to ‘keep a tighter rein on Collishaw’ and that had resulted in a ‘very

serious’ weakening of the strength of the Blenheim squadrons.83 The available evidence

indicates that though Tedder appreciated some of Collishaw’s qualities, overall he considered

that his lack of administrative skill did not recommend him to higher command.

81 Quoted in Vincent Orange, Tedder: Quietly in Command (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 127. 82 Letter, Tedder to Air Chief Marshal Sir W.R. Freeman, 11 March 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 83 Letter, Tedder to Air Chief Marshal Sir W.R. Freeman, 29 May 1941, TNA AIR 20/2792. 322