The British Defence of Egypt 1935–1940

The British Defence of Egypt 1935–1940 This book offers a comprehensive and challenging analysis of the British defence of Egypt, primarily against fascist Italy, in the critical lead-up period to the Second World War. The security of Egypt, a constant of British imperial strategy, is a curiously neglected dimension of the still burning appeasement debate. Yet it was a factor which demanded constant consideration by British policy-makers and figured in the crises of the period over Abyssinia, Czechoslovakia, Albania and Poland. By giving equal weight to the perspectives and assessments of the men on the spot, Steven Morewood adds to the originality of his interpretation by suggesting the old view should be reinstated: that Mussolini should and could have been stopped in his empire-building at the Abyssinian hurdle. Thereafter, as Nazi Germany tore the Versailles peace settlement to shreds, the drift to war accelerated as British resolve and credibility were brought into question. The fascist dictators in Rome and Berlin held no respect for weakness and Mussolini became the conduit through which Hitler could apply pressure to a sensitive British interest through reinforcing Libya at critical moments. Steven Morewood is lecturer in International History in the School of Historical Studies at the University of Birmingham. Cass series: Military history and policy Edited by John Gooch and Brian Holden Reid This series will publish studies on historical and contemporary aspects of land power, spanning the period from the eighteenth century to the present day, and will include national, international and comparative studies. From time to time, the series will publish edited collections of essays and ‘classics’. Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle Writing the Great War: Sir James East, 1917–1919 Edmonds and the Official Histories, Matthew Hughes 1915–1948 Andrew Green Alfred von Schlieffen’s Military Writings Robert Foley (ed. and trans.) 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The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, Caporetto 1917: Victory or Defeat? 1950–59 Mario Morselli Behcet Kemal Yesilbursa Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age 1945–1952: A Special Type of Warfare Matthew Hughes and Gaynor Johnson (eds) Tim Jones The Evolution of Operational Art, The British General Staff: Reform and 1740–1813: From Frederick The Great Innovation 1890–1939 to Napoleon David French and Brian Holden Reid (eds) Claus Telp The British Defence of Egypt 1935–1940 Conflict and crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean Steven Morewood FRANK CASS London and New York First published 2005 by Frank Cass 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Frank Cass 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Frank Cass is an imprint of Taylor & Francis © 2005 Steven Morewood All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-49512-8 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0–714–64943–0 (Print edition) To my parents, Ronald and Doreen Morewood, for their love and consideration Contents List of maps x Foreword xi Acknowledgements xiii Abbreviations xvi Introduction: defending Egypt in the era of appeasement 1 The lingering strategic significance of Egypt 1 The appeasement debate and Egypt 2 The nature of the Italian threat to Egypt 5 Sir Miles Lampson and the security of Egypt 6 The decision-making process 8 1 The British defence of Egypt in the interwar period: strategic imperatives and rationale 11 No surrender 12 The role of Egypt in imperial defence 18 2 The defence of Egypt and the onset of the Italo-Abyssinian Emergency 24 The emergence of the Italian threat 24 The origins of the Italo-Abyssinian Crisis: the Egyptian dimension 27 The British response to the growing Abyssinian Crisis 30 The position in Egypt 33 Countdown to war 36 viii Contents 3 Defending Egypt during the Italo-Abyssinian Emergency: first phase, August–December 1935 44 Policy imperatives and dilemmas 44 Preparations for war 48 A clash of attitudes: the men on the spot and the Chiefs of Staff 54 The imperial defence dimension and the Hoare–Laval Pact 57 4 Defending Egypt during the Italo-Abyssinian Emergency: second phase, January–July 1936 65 The capacity to defend the Egyptian power base 66 Too far and too fast 69 An oil embargo: so near and yet so far 73 The Suez Canal closure issue 76 The end of the emergency 82 5 The making of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance: the military aspects 86 The background to negotiations 86 Commencing negotiations 87 The military negotiations 89 The finale 93 An assessment 95 6 Securing an exposed flank: the defence of Egypt in British diplomacy, June 1936–April 1938 98 The debate over the way forward 98 Defence planning priorities and Egypt 101 Assessing the Italian threat 102 From Eden’s resignation to the Easter Pact 107 7 ‘Bloodless War’ 112 The Egyptian dimension of the Munich Crisis 112 The aftermath 117 More harm than good: the Rome visit 119 Bloodless war begins 121 Preparing for war 125 Improving the intelligence picture 129 Contents ix 8 The approach of war in the Mediterranean 132 A summer of tension 132 Anglo-French incongruity 136 Preparing for battle 137 War comes closer 141 The onset of war 145 9 Implementing the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance: Anglo-Egyptian relations, 1937–1940 153 Implementing the Treaty: immediate achievements and complications 153 A changed leadership 156 Munich and after 159 The power struggle in Egypt 162 The lead up to war in Europe 165 Egypt stays out 168 The lead up to war in the Mediterranean 171 The removal of Ali Maher 173 10 The Suez Canal and the defence of the Far East, 1919–1940 180 The origins of the Suez Canal Defence Plan 180 The Suez Canal Defence Plan 186 The Suez Canal Defence Plan and interwar crises, 1937–1939 188 The advent of war in the Mediterranean 193 The Canal at war 199 Italo-German-Japanese motives for closing Suez 200 11 Conclusion 205 Notes and references 213 Select bibliography 241 Index 268 List of maps 1.1 The Mediterranean and Red Sea after I. S. O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume I (London: HMSO, 1954) 19 2.1 Abyssinia and surrounding territories, Naval Staff Intelligence Department, January 1935, after TNA ADM 223/828 29 3.1 Egypt and surrounding countries, Naval Staff Intelligence Department, February 1935, after TNA ADM 223/828 49 3.2 The Western Desert of Egypt 1940 after Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume I (London: HMSO, 1954) 52 4.1 The Western Desert Strategic Arena after source unknown 67 11.1 The Suez Canal Route to Singapore after S. Roskill, British Naval Policy between the Wars, Volume II (London: HMSO, 1976) 183 Foreword During the 1920s and 1930s the British Empire reached its greatest territorial extent, dwarfing the scale of any other empire and encompassing a quarter of the world. The lynchpin of that empire lay in Egypt where the Suez Canal provided the narrow but vital link between the key components of this geographically dispersed maritime giant. For all its importance, however, the role of Egypt in British policy during this period has either been neglected or dealt with superficially. Steven Morewood’s book breaks important new ground not only in our understanding of British policy in the eastern Mediterranean in the lead up to the Second World War, but also in addressing fundamental issues of strategy and policy, the nature of diplomatic-military relations, our understanding of the problems of policy formulation and decision making, the difficulties with sanctions, and the question of when, or when not, to use force. From the time Napoleon and Nelson fought over the fate of Egypt, the eastern Mediterranean has attracted the rivalry of the world’s Great Powers. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, promising that this would be a temporary measure. In the four decades that followed, it repeated this pledge sixty-six more times.

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