Wumb, 37609 2997

THIRD SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY the nth of JUNE, 1946 * by Registered as a newspaper THURSDAY, 13 JUNE, 1946 The War Office, May, 1946 OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM AUGUST, 1939 TO NOVEMBER, 1940. The following Despatch was submitted to the B. Palestine. Secretary of State for War on 10th (i) 8th Division— December, 1940, by SIR Two Brigades—each of three British ARCHIBALD P. WAVELL, K.C.B., Battalions. C.M.G., M.C., Commander-in-Chief, in the No artillery. Middle East. (ii) Two British Regiments. .. • 1. This despatch covers the period from (iii) Four additional British Battalions the formation of the Middle East Command in (less one Company of one Battalion in August, 1939, to the middle of November, ). 1940, when the war with had lasted C. . approximately 5 months. (i) Three British Battalions. 2. The Middle East Command, with a staff (ii) Sudan Defence Force consisting of 20 of five officers, was formed at the beginning Companies in all, of which the greater part of August, 1939, as a planning staff for the were employed on internal security over the MiddRe East. Its original Charter is given vast area of the Sudan. as Appendix A. General Headquarters Middle East now comprises over 225 graded D. Cyprus. staff officers, exclusive of attached officers and One Company British Battalion. non-graded officers. E. British Somaliland. September, 1939, to April, 1940. H.Q. and three Companies of Camel 3. On the outbreak of war with Germany Corps. on 3rd September, 1939, the Middle East Com- The fighting forces in the Middle. East thus mand assumed operational control over the included no complete formation of any kind. troops in , Palestine, Sudan and Cyprus. There were in all twenty-one battalions of It was responsible for military plans in British infantry, but only 64 field guns. There were Somaliland, but did not assume full opera- only 48 A/T guns and 8 A.A. guns. tional control of this theatre till I3th January, 4. The Egyptian Army comprised: 1940. The garrison of these countries at One Light Regiment, the outbreak of war consisted of the follow- One Light Car Regiment, ing:— One Horsed Cavalry Regiment, A. Egypt. ' One 2-pdr. Anti-Tank Battery, (i) 7th Armoured Division— Two Fortress Anti-Tank Batteries, Two Armoured Brigades (each of two Two Anti-Aircraft Regiments, regts. only). One Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, One Armoured Car Regiment. Two Searchlight Regiments, One Motor Battalion, . Four Heavy Coast Defence Batteries, (ii) 4th Indian Division— Nine Regular Battalions, One Regiment of Artillery. Nine Reserve Battalions, One Infantry Brigade, Two Machine Gun Battalions, (iii) R.A. Group— Eight Light Car Squadrons (Frontier 7th Medium Regiment. Force), 3rd Regiment R.H.A. (A.T.). 4th Regiment R.H.A. and was in many respects much better 3ist Field Regiment R.A. equipped than most of the British forces. But (iv) Eight British Infantry Battalions. Egypt did not declare war on Germany and 2998 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 13 JUNE, 1946 the amount of support to be counted on from These Dominion contingents were magnifi- the Egyptian Army was problematical. cent material, but were only partially trained 5. Since Italy did not enter the war with and equipped. her ally Germany, the Middle East was not the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Anthony immediately engaged in operations. During Eden, paid a special visit to Egypt to greet the the first months of the war I was concerned arrival of these contingents. largely with establishing relations with the 11. On 3rd February, 1940, the East African neighbouring French Commanders in , in Command, which had previously been directly North Africa and in French Somaliland, and under the War Office, was placed under Middle later with the military authorities in Turkey East for operational control, though administra- after that country signed the Treaty of Alliance tion remained under the War Office. on igth October, 1939. I also visited Aden, In March I visited the East African Com- , the Sudan and British Somaliland. mand and then went on to South Africa and The winter of 1939/1940 was mainly occu- j Southern Rhodesia for discussions with the pied with three cornered discussions between Governments and Military Authorities of those the French in Syria, the Turks and ourselves on countries. The Union Government decided to the means of implementing the military clauses send a 'Brigade and an Air Force contingent to of the Treaty with Turkey. Conferences took Kenya. These actually reached Kenya during place at Ankara in October, 1939, in Cairo in June. Their quality was extremely high, and February, 1940, at Aleppo in March, and at they are proving themselves excellent troops. Beirut and Haifa in May. A plan was drawn up for assistance to the Turks in Thrace if 12. At the end of April a valuable reinforce- attacked 'by Germany. This plan was, how- ment of 24 officers and 666 men had been re- ever, conditional on Italy remaining neutral. ceived from Southern 'Rhodesia. These were 6. In December I paid a short visit to Eng- posted to various arms and units in which they land to discuss -the problems of the -Middle East formed, as far as possible, separate sub-units. with the C.I.G.S. General Weygand from The quality of the personnel was high and a Syria was in Paris at the same time and an considerable number have since received com- inter-allied conference on Middle East problems missions. Southern Rhodesia had already, in was held in Paris. September, '1939, sent a number of officers and 7. A conference was also held in March with N.C.Os. to reinforce the Camel Corps in British the Chief of the General Staff and other Somaliland. These were of great value. representatives on a plan for .the landing of a 13. Other British Colonies are also -repre- force at Basra in case of necessity. sented in the Middle East. Malta has supplied 8. Preparations against the eventuality of an efficient A.A. battery which forms part of Italy's joining in the war were impeded by the the defences of Alexandria, and many 'Maltese desire of His Majesty's Government to do are serving in the R.A.S.C. and technical units. nothing which might impair the existing rela- Cyprus has made a very considerable mili- tions with that country. I was not even per- tary effort. A Cyprus Regiment has been mitted to set up a proper Intelligence service in formed which includes an infantry battalion, Italian territory, or to get in touch with patriot Pioneer companies and Pack Transport com- chiefs in Abyssinia. panies. Some of these, which served with dis- 9. During this time the responsibilities of the tinction in France, have now returned to the Middle East Command were growing rapidly. Middle East. A number of Cypriots have also It soon became obvious that operational control enlisted as drivers in the R.A.S.C. and are could not be exercised without at least some doing good service. control over administration, and the Command Mauritius has sent a valuable draft of 100 gradually ibegan to assume a considerable tradesmen for the R.A.O.C. measure of administrative responsibility. Com- The British Mandated Territory of Palestine plete administrative responsibility was assumed has also contributed a large number of men, in June, 1940. The Command also had to both Arabs and Jews, for service with the watch closely the political situation in Egypt, British forces, either as combatant companies or Palestine, Iraq and the neighbouring countries, in various Services. A Palestinian Pioneer and the work of the Middle East Intelligence Company served in France, where its work Centre was considerably enlarged. It was also earned high praise, and has now returned to the necessary'to form a number of Training Estab- Middle East. lishments. May to June, 1940 10. The only reinforcements received in the 14. Meanwhile our relations with Italy were Middle East between September, 1939, and deteriorating, and during May, as a result of March, 1940, were: the success of the German attack on France, it 5th Indian Infantry Brigade, which arrived became obvious that Italy was likely to enter in Egypt on 4th October, 1939; the war. On 10th June Italy declared wai.' 2nd Battalion Durham , The military situation ait the time of the which arrived in Egypt from China on 3ist entry of Italy into the war was as follows: January, 1940; There were estimated to be over 215,000 1st Cavalry Division (Horsed), which com- Italian troops in and over 200,000 in pleted arrival in Palestine on 24th March, . Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, 1940. It was incomplete in training and and British Somaliland, which had frontiers equipment. with these countries, became at once liable to i6th Australian Infantry Brigade and a attack. Their garrisons at the time of Italy's portion of divisional troops of 6th Australian entry into the war were as follows: — Division, who arrived in Palestine in the Egypt. middle of February. (a) 7th Armoured Division—comprising: 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade with each tw re i some divisional troops of the New Zealand 4th Armoured Brigade / °/ °1 g - 7th Armoured Brifade 1 ™*ts« °?lv . Division arrived in Egypt at the same time. 1 I P^ty equipped. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 13 JUNE, 1946 2999 Support Group (two Battalions). for despatch in May, and of whom some were 3rd R.H.A. (Anti-tank regiment), and actually waiting at Marseilles, were held up and 4th R.H.A. did not reach the Middle East till the end of (&) 4th Indian Division—comprising: August. It was even uncertain whether the Two Regiments of Artillery. long sea route via the Cape might not also Two mixed Infantry Brigades (5th and be rendered unsafe by the action of the enemy nth). air forces and naval forces in Italian East Africa (c) Part of New Zealand Division—com- operating in the narrow waters of the Red Sea. prising : Alternative routes via Basra1, Baghdad, Haifa One Cavalry Regiment (less one and via Mombasa and the Nile Valley were squadron). reconnoitred. Up to date', however, convoys One Field Regiment New Zealand Artil- have used the Red Sea route without loss, lery. in spite of enemy attacks. Three Infantry Battalions. 18. The position on the Western Frontier of One Machine Gun Battalion (incomplete Egypt was that our foremost defended positions in training and equipment). were at , over 200 miles west of (d) Fourteen British Infantry Battalions. Alexandria and about 120 miles from the 7th Medium Regiment-R. A. Egyptian frontier with Libya. There was a 3ist Field Regiment R.A. railway and road as far as Matruh and a good • Total about 36,000. metalled road from Matruh to , Sudan (with 1,000 miles of frontier with about 50 miles from the frontier. Between Italian East Africa). Sidi Barrani and the frontier there was no Three British Battalions and good road. The small harbour of Sollum on Sudan Defence Force. the frontier offered no facilities for the supply Total about 9,000. of a force and had no water supply. It was Kenya (with over 700 miles of frontier with therefore impossible to maintain any large num- Italian East Africa). ber of troops on the frontier, even had they Two East African Brigades. been available, and our policy had always Two Light Batteries. been to allow the enemy to advance on our Total about 8,500. defences at Matruh before meeting him in any (Two Brigades from West Africa had been force. ordered to Kenya and arrived during July.) It was" decided, however, to place a small British Somaliland. covering force on the frontier; and I ordered H.Q. and five Companies Somaliland that this force should, as soon as possible after Camel Corps. the outbreak of war, attack the Italian frontier One King's African Rifles Battalion. posts. Total about 1,475. 19. In the Sudan it was obviously impos- Palestine, Aden Protectorate and Cyprus sible, with the very small force available, to were also liable to attack. Their garrisons cover the long and vulnerable frontier, but I were: directed that small mobile forces should occupy Palestine. the principal places on the frontier until attacked ist Cavalry Division (incomplete in train- by superior forces. Although these small forces ing and equipment). could obviously not resist any attack' which the Two British Cavalry Regiments. greatly superior Italian forces could make, I One Brigade of three British Infantry Bat- considered it desirable that they should fight talions. a delaying action against the enemy rather than Two British Battalions. abandon the frontier posts without any fighting 6th Australian Division—comprising: at all, as had been the previous policy. Two Brigades. The small mobile forces of the Sudan Defence Two Artillery Regiments. Force made several most successful raids on the Divisional Recce Unit (incomplete in Italian frontier posts in the earlier days of the training and equipment). war, and when finally attacked at Kassala on Total about 27,500. 4th July and at on 6th July by greatly Aden. superior Italian forces fought successful delay- Two Indian Battalions. ing actions and inflicted heavy loss on the Total about 2,500. enemy, who did not follow up his success in Cyprus. spite of the great disparity in numbers. One British Battalion. 20. In Kenya a similar policy of holding the Total about 800. frontier posts for as long as possible was fol- 15. Very little equipment had been sent to lowed. The principal engagement took place the Middle East and no single unit or formation at Moyale, where a company of the King's was fully equipped. The're was a dangerous African Rifles held the small fort on the British lack of A.A. guns, A.Tk. guns and other side of the frontier for several- weeks against artillery. an Italian force which amounted to about a 16. The enemy also had a very considerable brigade. It was not until a second Italian numerical advantage in the air. This was brigade was brought up that it was decided to countered by the superior technical qualities of withdraw the Company, which was successfully our machines and by the higher training and done on I5th July, although the enemy had by morale of the pilots of the', R.A.F. and this time practically surrounded the post. S'.A.A.F., who quickly established an ascend- 21. Enemy propaganda exaggerated these ancy over the Italians which they have main- small successes', obtained by sheer force of num- tained ever since. bers, so" loudly that .they succeeded in causing i^. The shortest'-route by which the Middle them to (be accepted in some "quarters as British East could be reinforced \ through the Mediter- defeats. ranean, now became too precarious; over. 7,000 22. Such preparations as possible had been badly rieede'd reinforcements which were ready made with a view to assisting the patriot leaders 3000 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 13 JUNE, 1946 in Abyssinia on the outbreak of war with Italy. Operations on Western Frontier of Egypt. For the reasons stated in paragraph 8 above, June-November, 1940. our preparations had been considerably" ham- 26. The force sent to the Western frontier of pered, but a number of arms had been collected Egypt was the 7th 'Armoured Division less one and a Mission had been formed to get in touch armoured brigade. Actually the troops to pro- with the patriots as soon as possible. The ceed to the frontier were the 7th Hussars, a light Emperor, His Majesty Haile Selassie, arrived in tank regiment of the 4th Armoured Brigade; the Sudan, with .the object of providing a focus the nth Hussars, armoured car regiment; the for the rising. Arrangements were made for ist King's Royal Rifle Corps and 2nd Rifle him to be accommodated at Khartoum until it Brigade, motor battalions; and two regiments should be possible for him to enter Abyssinia. of Royal Horse Artillery, one of which was 23. Meanwhile, on T7th June, the French an anti-tank regiment with 37 mm. Bofors Government had asked for armistice terms, guns for which only a limited supply of which they accepted on 22nd June. It was at ammunition was available. The 6th Royal first hoped that the French Colonies and Over- Tank Regiment, the second regiment of the 4th sea territories would continue the struggle; but Armoured Brigade, was kept in divisional General Nogues in North Africa, after a little reserve. The 4th Armoured Brigade had no hesitation, decided to obey the orders to capitu- third regiment, and all its units were much late, and his example was followed shortly after- below establishment. wards by General Mittelhauser in Syria, who 27. Just east of the Egyptian frontier an only a few days earlier had declared to me at escarpment several hundred feet high runs from Beirut his unalterable determination to continue Sollum south-eastwards for about 30 miles, and the straggle. General 'Legentilhomme at Jibuti is passable to mechanised vehicles only at a few held out for nearly a month longer. places. At Sollum itself the road up. the The collapse of the French in North Africa escarpment is steep with a number of hairpin meant that the Italians could employ the whole bends. South and west of the escarpment the weight of their large ground and air forces in ground is generally easily passable by all types Libya against the Western frontier of Egypt. of mechanised vehicles. Between the escarp- The defection of Syria meant that Palestine no ment and the sea the going is more difficult longer had a secure and friendly northern flank and movement is generally confined to certain and that the French force of three divisions tracks. which had constituted the general reserve of the Our force on the frontier was operating at Middle East for assistance to Turkey or Greece, a distance of 120 miles from the railhead at or for the defence of Egypt if required, could Matruh which made the administrative pro- no longer be counted on. blem an extremely difficult one and limited the A certain number of officers and men from number of troops that could be employed. Syria, including the greater part of a Colonial 28. On the night of n/i2th June the nth battalion which had, at the request of the Hussars crossed the frontier and captured a French, been stationed at Cyprus, joined the detachment of two Italian officers and 59 other British forces and were formed into a mobile ranks. On I4th June the enemy's two frontier battalion which is now engaged on the 'Western forts at Capuzzo and Maddalena were attacked Frontier of Egypt. and captured by the 7th Hussars, nth Hussars A Polish force of some 4,000 men, which had and a company of the King's Royal Rifle been formed and was under training by the Corps, about 220 prisoners being captured. French in Syria, came to Palestine and joined the British Forces. 29. On i6th June a most successful action A note on the foreign contingents which have was fought by the 7th Hussars and nth joined the Forces in the Middle East is given in Hussars supported by a troop of " J " Bat- Appendix B. tery R.H.A. nine miles north of Sidi Omar. 24. Thus before the end of July it became Twelve enemy were destroyed, and a con- obvious that unless reinforcements in men and siderable number of the enemy killed and about material were sent to the Middle East forthwith, 160 prisoners taken. Three guns and a number there was grave danger of our being unable to of lorries were also captured or destroyed. On withstand the enemy's attacks. I received the same day a troop of the nth Hussars inter- orders to visit England to discuss the situation cepted a convoy on the - road, with the military authorities and the War Cabi- destroyed 30 lorries and captured a number of net. As a result of the discussions reinforce- prisoners, including a general officer. ments were despatched to the Middle East. The Several other successful patrol actions were greater part of the forces available who were fought during the next few weeks. An opera- sufficiently equipped and trained were moved to tion to capture the Jerabub Oasis was planned the Western Desert. This included a New Zea- for the beginning of July, but abandoned owing land Brigade Group and later an Australian to great heat. Meanwhile large enemy forces, .Brigade Group. amounting to at least two divisions, had •advanced towards the frontier. An enemy Italian Attack on Somaliland brigade reoccupied the ruins of , . 25. Meanwhile in French Somaliland General which had been destroyed, and advanced Legentilhomme had found himself unable, in towards Sollum, but was repulsed. The spite of his gallant efforts, to induce the Colony enemy's position • at Fort Capuzzo was made to continue to fight. The Italians were thus extremely uncomfortable for him. His force enabled to concentrate the whole weight of their was continually shelled by our artillery, and very numerous forces in the East of Italian East transport bringing up supplies from Bardia was Africa against British Somaliland, which they constantly attacked or shelled, with the result invaded early in August. The operations, that the enemy undoubtedly suffered extremely which resulted in the temporary loss of British heavy casualties both in men and in vehicles. Somaliland, have already been described in a By the middle of July the enemy had two despatch dated isth September, 1940. divisions, and elements of two more, on the SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 13 JUNE, 1946 3001 Egyptian frontier; but our small force continued the coast road with two divisions in the front to dominate the situation and to inflict con- line and two in support, and one more and a siderable casualties. Mobile Force () in close reserve. 30. During the remainder of July operations He was supported by a numerous artillery and continued on the same lines. The enemy by about 200 light and medium -tanks. continued to suffer heavy casualties but The part of our covering force which was gradually moved forward his camps and estab- north of the escarpment and on which this lished a force of at least four divisions within attack fell consisted of the 3rd Coldstream easy reach of the Egyptian frontier. During Guards, one battery 3rd Royal Horse Artillery this period the 8th Hussars relieved the 7th and one section of the 7th Medium Regiment. Hussars, who went back for a rest, and H.Q. It was subsequently supported by a detach- of the 7th Armoured Brigade relieved H.Q.. ment of the ist K.R.R.C. and a company of the 4th Armoured Brigade. All vehicles were French battalion.* The remainder of our beginning to show considerable signs of wear, covering force was south of the escarpment to and replacement was difficult owing to the provide against an enemy movement from that distance from railhead and the almost entire flank. The ist , which absence of spares in Egypt for the armoured was south of the escarpment, was moved to the fighting vehicles. For this reason about the northern flank when the direction of the enemy end oi July I gave instructions that track advance became evident, but for various reasons vehicles should be withdrawn from the frontier arrived too late to take any part in the actions for overhaul and rent, as I was afraid that during the withdrawal. otherwise when the enemy advanced our 33. For four days, from I3th September to armoured fighting vehicles would be very 16th September, our small force withdrew along largely out of action. Of 306 tanks on the the coast road from Sollum to the east of Sid! War Establishment 200 were normally avail- Barrani. The enemy reached Sidi Barrani, able with units, the remainder being under which is merely a collection of a few houses and repair in workshops. There was no reserve of a landing ground, on i6th September and there tanks to meet war wastage. halted. 31. After the withdrawal of the Armoured Although the enemy had large numbers of Brigade the frontier was held by a force medium and light tanks with his forward troops under the command of the Support Group of and the leading infantry was in M.T., his ad- the Armoured Division, consisting of the 3rd vance was slow and unenterprising. He made from the Matruh garrison, little attempt to use his immensely superior the ist K.R.R.C., 2nd Rifle Brigade, nth numbers or his mobility to outflank and over- Hussars, one squadron ist Royal Tank Regi- whelm our small force. His artillery was boldly ment and two batteries of Royal Horse Artil- used, even in front of the leading infantry, but lery (one of anti-tank guns, one of 18-25 pdrs.). their fire, though reasonably accurate, was in- A section of the 7th Medium Regiment was also effective. His tanks were mainly used for the brought forward to harass the enemy. This protection of the infantry columns, and only on small force was distributed over a front of one occasion, on i6th September, was any some 60 miles from Sollum to Fort Maddalena. attempt made to use them to outflank our The troops continued the same policy of active troops; and even on .this occasion their timidity patrolling, but the enemy's numbers were now and hesitation lost them an opportunity. very much increased, his artillery was 34. The withdrawal of our small force was numerous and active and the opportunities for effected with admirable skill, and there is no effective action were fewer. Nevertheless this doubt whatever that very serious losses were small force continued to inflict heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy, both by the artillery, on the enemy with practically no loss to itself, which was boldly and effectively handled, and, and to hold in check a force of four or five whenever opportunity offered, by machine gun divisions for a further six weeks. A skilful and small arms fire. Our own losses were use was made of dummy tanks to deceive the under 50 men and a small number of vehicles. enemy. The greatest possible credit is due to 32. By loth September it became obvious W. H. E. Gott, M.C., commanding the Support that an enemy advance across the frontier was Group, and to Lieut.- J. C. Campbell, imminent. All preparations had already been M.C., commanding the Artillery, for the cool made for the withdrawal of our frontier force and efficient way in which this withdrawal was and the first stage of this was now put into carried out, also to the troops for their endur- execution. On I3th September the enemy ance and tactical skill. advance began, a large force being deployed Since their advance to Sidi Barrani the enemy under heavy artillery preparation against the has remained practically stationary for the last escarpment above Sollum, which had for some two months. Small mobile columns formed time past been held only by a platoon and from the 7th Armoured Division have continu- had by now been evacuated. At the same time ally engaged and harassed the enemy in the time another enemy column advanced on the same manner as on the frontier and with similar Half ay a Pass down the escarpment towards success. The enemy has, in the same way as Sollum. Both these columns were engaged by on the frontier, placed his troops in a number our artillery, which inflicted considerable losses of defended camps with all round perimeters, on them. from Maktila on the coast, 10 to 15 miles east of It had been uncertain whether the enemy Sidi -Barrani, to Sof af i on the escarpment south- would make his main advance along the coast west of Sidi 'Barrani. He is undoubtedly suffer- road, or would attempt a wide movement south ing considerable administrative difficulties and of the escarpment. There is some reason to it is at present uncertain whether he will con- believe that the latter may have been the tinue his advance. enemy's original intention, but in the event his advance was made on a narrow front along * See Appendix B. 3002 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 13 JUNE, 1946 35. I wish to draw special attention to the and have behind them higher features. work of the small covering force on the Western Gallabat had, as already related in para. 19, Frontier of Egypt during the period from the been occupied by the Italians since July. The outbreak of war with Italy in June to the middle Italian troops in the Gallabat- area of September, when the Italian advance halted consisted, at the time that the attack was at Sidi Barrani. For over three months in hard planned, of five Colonial Battalions with a and difficult climatic conditions this force not battery, a machine-gun battalion, an anti-tank only held in check an Italian force many times platoon, and a number of irregulars, totalling its superior in numbers, but established a defi- about 5,300 men. nite ascendency over it, penetrating well into 38. The operation was originally intended to enemy territory, taking the offensive whenever take place on 8th November, but at the end the least opportunity offered, and inflicting very of October information was received of a large heavy losses at trifling cost to itself. The pub- convoy from approaching the Metemma lished Italian casualties in Libya for the period area. Air action was taken to delay the march were approximately 3,500, while our total casu- of this column but was only partially successful. alties were just over 150. Over 700 prisoners It was therefore decided to advance the date were taken, and a considerable number of guns, of the attack to 6th November in the hope of tanks and lorries were captured or destroyed. forestalling the arrival of the reinforcements. Major-general ffli. O'Moore Creagh, M.C., 39. The operation, although it resulted in our Commander of the 7th Armoured Division, retaking Gallabat and inflicting very heavy directed these operations with admirable skill losses on the enemy, was not as successful as and initiative, and was ably seconded by his had been hoped owing to certain factors which brigade and regimental commanders. Of the could not be foreseen. units which took part, the nth Hussars, the The first of these was the breakdown, mainly Armoured Car Regiment, was continuously in from mechanical causes, of all the tanks except the front line, and usually behind that of the one light tank during the capture of Gallabat. enemy, during the whole period; its tireless and The chief causes of the breakdown were daring search for information and constant damage to the tracks by the rough ground, or harassing of the enemy showed a spirit and by enemy mines. The second factor was a efficiency worthy of the best traditions of this temporary loss of command of the air due to fine regiment. The light tank'regiments, first six of our fighter aircraft being .shot down in the 7th Hussars, later relieved by the 8th a combat with the enemy. Hussars, showed a similar eagerness to take 40. Gallabat was captured early on 6th opportunities and skill to make the most of November by the 3rd Garhwal Rifles and the them, while the ist and 6th Royal Tank Regi- squadron of the Royal Tank Regiment with lew ments backed up the light tank regiments most casualties, one enemy colonial battalion being efficiently when required. The batteries of the practically destroyed. The further advance on R.H.A. were handled with great dash and most Metemma had, however, to be postponed owing effectively; they unquestionably made them- to the breakdown of the tanks. The enemy selves feared by the enemy and inflicted heavy positions at Metemma were very heavily wired losses on them. The engineer work of the Force and defended by a large number of machine was effectively carried out by 2nd Cheshire guns, and without tank support it was con- Field Squadron, which had been borrowed from sidered inadvisable to attempt their capture. the ist Cavalry Division. Finally, the infantry The further advance was therefore postponed battalions in or attached to the Support Group, till the afternoon when it was hoped that some the 3rd Coldstream Guards, 1st Battalion of the tanks would be repaired. K.R.R.C. and the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, 41. During the morning, however, the enemy provided a solid backing of fire power when re- gained control of the air and developed an quired, were readily mobile, and gained a com- extremely heavy bombing attack on our for- plete mastery of the debateable area between ward troops, the Garhwal Rifles who had cap- themselves and the enemy by active night tured Gallabat and the ist Essex Regiment patrolling. who were in process of relieving them. There Operations in the Sudan. October-November, was little cover and the ground was too rocky 1940. to dig shelter trenches. Both battalions 36. Soon after the arrival of Indian reinforce- suffered heavy casualties and their morale was ments in the Sudan I instructed 'Major-General temporarily affected. Also the workshop lorry W. Platt, C.B., D.S.O., to make plans for of the Tank squadron was destroyed by a bomb minor offensive operations as soon as he could and three fitters were wounded, which greatly do so, and indicated the recapture of the hampered the task of repairing the tanks. frontier post of Gallabat as a suitable objective. 42. The Brigade Commander therefore A plan was accordingly prepared by Major- decided that he must cancel the attack on General L. M. Heath, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., Metemma, and that in view of the enemy's M.C., commanding .the 5th Indian Division, for continued command of the air and the target an operation against the Italian troops in the offered by Gallabat it would be necessary to Gallabat-Metemma area, to be carried out by withdraw the somewhat shaken troops from the loth Indian Brigade and a squadron of the that area. 6th Royal Tank Regiment, which had been sent A withdrawal was therefore made to the to the Sudan early in September when an enemy high ground west of Gallabat on the evening advance from the Kassala area with armoured of 7th November. fighting vehicles appeared possible. 43. Gallabat has since been reoccupied as an 37. The two frontier posts of Gallabat and outpost position, the main position being Metemma, the former in the Sudan and the established on the high ground to the west latter in Italian East Africa, face one another of it. The enemy fort at Metemma has been across a khor (ravine) ia a valley about two practically destroyed and rendered untenable miles wide. Both posts are on forward slopes by artillery fife and he has also withdrawn SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 13 JUNE, 1946 3003 his troops to the high ground to the east. to be neutral and if she did enter the war could Minor actions still continue between the main be neutralised by the French forces. Little positions. equipment of any kind was received during 44. I should like to call special attention to this period and the reinforcements sent -(ist the behaviour of the personnel of " B " Cavalry Division and the Australian and New Squadron of the 6th Royal Tank Regiment in Zealand contingents) were not equipped for this action. The attack on Gallabat was made modern war and were only partially trained. with great dash and the way in which the Therefore the second stage, after the entry of men of the squadron stuck to their task of Italy into the war and the collapse of France, trying to get their tanks which were broken was one of considerable danger, during which down into action again under extremely heavy the frontiers of Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya, and bombing was admirable. British Somaliland were threatened by vastly 45. Our losses on 6th and 7th November superior forces, and the communications be- in killed, wounded and (missing were 86 British tween the and the Middle East and 88 Indian, of which only about 20 were were long and doubtful. That the Italians failed incurred in the original attack and most of the to take advantage of their opportunities was remainder were" due to air bombing. The action due (firstly to our Air Force, who in spite of showed again how necessary protection against inferior numbers everywhere took and kept the air attack is for all forward troops. Owing to initiative; and to the stout action of the small the general shortage of anti-aircraft guns in the covering forces in Egypt, Sudan and East Middle East, none were available for the sup- Africa; and finally to the enemy's lack of port of the loth Brigade, and after our fighter preparation or desire for hard fighting. We aircraft had been put out of action the enemy thus escaped these dangerous months with the bombers were unopposed. loss only of British Somaliland—where our 46. It is known that casualties of well over small garrison of a few battalions was driven 600 were inflicted on the enemy. Two guns to withdraw, after a short but gallant resist- and much material were captured in Gallabat ance, by an Italian force of seven brigade Fort. groups—and a few unimportant frontier posts 47. During the month of October and the in the Sudan and Kenya. During this period first half of November our mobile troops in all available equipment and troops were being the Kassala sector fought many successful retained in the United Kingdom against the patrol actions and inflicted heavy losses on the threat of invasion; and it was not until the enemy at small cost to themselves. The largest second half of September that reinforcements of these small engagements was in the area in men and material began to reach the Middle north of Kassala, in which over 300 of the East in any quantity. enemy were taken prisoner. The third stage has now begun, when the defence of our positions in the Middle East Occupation of Crete—November, 1940. is reasonably assured and offensive operations 48. On 28th October, Italy made an unpro- are being planned and undertaken. voked attack on Greece. To enable more effective control of the Aegean to be exercised 51. The Middle East Command has to keep by the Navy, it was decided to establish a in close touch with the political situation in the naval base at Suda Bay at the north-western countries included in the Command, particu- end of Crete. With the full approval of the larly in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq. The work Greek Government, the British forces in the of the Middle East Intelligence Centre, under Middle East assumed responsibility for the the able direction of Colonel W. J. Cawthorn, defence of Crete. The ist battalion York and has been of the greatest value in this respect. Lancaster Regiment, some A.A. artillery and The situation in Egypt has often been difficult, a Field Company were despatched on 3ist since it is the main base of operations for the October to Suda Bay. On i7th November Middle East, yet the country is not at war, and another battalion, 2nd The Black Watch, was has still large numbers of enemy subjects at large. Close touch with the Embassy is main- sent. tained by weekly meetings of the Ambassador Visit of Secretary of State. and the Commander-in-Chief, while the 49. At the end of October the Secretary of Embassy staff, the staff of Headquarters State for War, Mr. Anthony Eden, paid a British Troops in Egypt, and my staff are in visit to the Middle East, in the course of daily consultation on matters of common in- .which he went to the Western Desert, Palestine, terest. There has been no serious difference Trans-Jordan, and the Sudan, and saw many of of opinion on any matter of importance. the troops. His visit was of the greatest value for the discussion of future plans and was a Co-operation of other Services. source of much encouragement to the troops. 52. I desire to acknowledge the indebtedness At Khartoum he met General Smuts who had of the Middle East Command to the work of flown up from South Africa to visit the East the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, the Red African front. Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Commander- Summary. in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Sir 50. From the above brief account of events Andrew B. Cunningham, K.C.B., D.S.O., has it can be seen that the Middle East Command always afforded the Army the closest support has passed through three stages during the both in planning and in actual operations. period of-some 15 months under review. The The work of H.M. ships in the East Indies first period, from the outbreak of war 'with Command under Vice-Admiral R. Leatham, Germany till Italy entered the war in June, C.B., in bringing the convoys for the Middle 1940, was one of comparative inactivity. Plans East across the Indian Ocean and through the in the Middle East were directed mainly to- Red Sea without the loss of a ship has earned . wards the support of Turkey against a German the gratitude and admiration of the large num- advance in S.E. Europe. Italy was assumed bers from all parts of the Empire who have 3004 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 13 JUNE, 1946 thus appreciated the power and efficiency of the people. His sound knowledge and imperturb- Royal Navy. I have already spoken of the able common sense have enabled him to deal work of the Royal Navy in the operations in effectively with all these problems and he has Somaliland in the despatch dealing with that obtained the confidence and liking of the Egyp- campaign. tians with whom he has had to work. It is 53. It would be difficult to speak too highly largely due to his direction that the small of the work of the in the British .force in the Western Desert has so Middle East and of their support of the Army effectively delayed and checked the Italian to the limit of their capacity. Both the original advance. A.O.C.-in-C., Air Chief Marshal Sir William 58. Major-General W. Platt, C.B., D.S.O., Mitchell, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., has commanded the troops in the Sudan A.F.C., and his successor, Air Chief Marshal throughout the period with marked efficiency. Sir Arthur Longmore, K.C.B., D.S.O., have He kept his head during the dangerous period co-operated wholeheartedly in combining the when the Sudan was exposed to the attack of operations of the Army and the Air Force to greatly superior Italian forces and used his the best advantage; and the relations between slender resources to the best effect to meet the the two Services, at G.H.Q. and in the various danger. With the arrival of reinforcements Commands, have been always close and cordial. he has initiated offensive action against the It has become more obvious with every enemy whenever possible, though still inferior phase of the war in the Middle East both that in numbers. the development and reinforcement of the 59. Lieutenant-Generals M. G. H. Barker, R.A.F. must keep pace with the growth of the K.C.B., D.S.O., G. J. Giffard, C.B., D.S.O., ground forces, which it has not done up to and P. Neame, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., have in date, and that co-operation between the ground succession held the command in Palestine. I and air forces in all stages of any operation need consider that all three have shown ability and the closest study. tact in dealing with the military and political 54. Co-operation in planning between the problems of the country. three Services is maintained by the Joint Plan- 60. Major-General D. P. Dickinson, D.S.O., ning Staff, whose work has been uniformly O.B.E., M.C., did most valuable work in the excellent. They have never failed to produce early part of the war in organising our war an agreed solution of any problem put to them. effort in East Africa under difficult conditions. 55. I desire to express my gratitude to the Commander-in-Chief in India, General' Sir 61. I have been fortunate in my staff and Robert Cassels, G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., and to desire to place on record my appreciation of the Army in India for the manner in which their work, their willingness and their efficiency. requests for assistance in units, officers or In particular, I owe a deep debt of thanks to material have invariably been met to the limit Major-General A. F. Smith, D.S.O., M.C., of India's capacity. The Indian' troops sent to Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who has the Middle East are well maintaining their high been the chief General Staff Officer of the reputation in the camp and in the field. Middle East Command since its;beginning. He has shown himself an admirable staff officer 56. The co-operation of the Egyptian Army in every way, and his personality and unfail- in the defence of Egypt has been- hampered by ing cheerfulness has made its influence felt the lack of a definite policy by the Egyptian throughout the staff and has impressed the Government, who have never quite decided the many foreign officers with whorri he has had point at which resistance to the enemy by the Egyptian Army should begin. For some time to deal. Egyptian units-formed part of the garrison of Major-General B. O. Hutchison, C.B.E., Matruh, and an Egyptian A.A. unit did excel- Deputy Quarter-Master General, joined Middle lent work in defending Matruh against air East in October, 1939, as principal administra- attack though frequently subjected to heavy tive officer and has directed the expansion of bombing. its administrative responsibilities ever since. At present part of the Egyptian Frontier His capacity for hard work, organizing ability Force is defending the Siwa Oasis, and an and foresight have been most marked. He is Egyptian Mobile Force, under Prince Ismail an outstanding administrative staff officer. Daoud, is in readiness to support the garrison of Siwa. Egyptian A.A. and C.D. units are APPENDIX A. assisting in the defence of the Fleet Base at Army Council Instructions to the General Alexandria; the Egyptian Army provides a Officer Commanding-in-Chief in the Middle force for the defence of Wadi Haifa against East. possible enemy raids, and guards vulnerable 1. You are appointed General Officer Com- points in the Delta. manding-in-chief in the Middle East. Appreciation of Services. 2. The area over which your command extends in peace comprises: — 57. I should like to call particular attention to the services of Lieuteriant-General Sir H. M. Egypt. Wilson, K.C.B., D.S.O., G.O.C.-in-C. B'ritish The Sudan. Troops in Egypt. He has had a very onerous Palestine and Trans-Jordan.. task in providing for the defence of Egypt Cyprus. with inadequate resources, in fitting for war 3. In these areas you will exercise general the troops sent to his Command, in organising control over all British land forces in matters the expansion of the base in Egypt, in securing of high policy in peace and will, in particular, the co-operation of the Egyptian Army, and be responsible for the review and co-ordina- in dealing with many difficult and delicate tion of war plans for reinforcements in emer- problems in the relations between the forces in gency, including, the distribution of available Egypt and the Egyptian Government and land forces and material between these areas. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 13 JUNE, 1946 3005 4. In addition you will be responsible for with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Medi- the preparation o± all war plans, in co-opera- terranean, the Naval Commander-in-Chief, tion with the local military or air force com- East Indies Station, and the Air Officer Com- manders, for the employment of land forces manding-in-chief, Middle East, for co-ordinat- in British Somaliland, Aden, Iraq, and the ing the British war plans with the war plans shores of the Persian Gulf. of Allies of His Majesty's Government in the 5. In carrying out these tasks you will where Near and Middle East and North Africa. appropriate consult and co-operate with the This will involve at present co-ordination Naval Cpmmander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, with the French military authorities in North the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Africa, Syria and French Somaliland; the Station, the Commander-in-Chief in India, the Turkish General Staff; and possibly ultimately Inspector General, African Colonial Forces, and the Greek and Roumanian General Staffs. the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in the You will arrange to exchange visits with Middle East. these authorities as may be required. 6. You will maintain close touch with Kis 11. To assist you in these tasks you will Majesty's Ambassador in Egypt; His Majesty's be provided with a staff for your own use. Of Ambassador in Iraq; the Governor General in this Staff, the Senior General Staff Officer will the Sudan; the High Commissioner for Pales- also be a member of the Joint Planning Staff tine and Trans-Jordan; the Governors of for the Middle East, which will include the Cyprus, Aden and British Somaliland; and the Chief Staff Officers of the Commander-in-Chief, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. Mediterranean, and the Air Officer Command- ing-in-chief, Middle East. 7. The policy of His Majesty's Government The Joint Planning Staff will be responsible with regard to the Egyptian Forces is that for the inter-service co-operation of all war they shall be developed into efficient modern plans as may be directed by the Commanders forces capable of co-operating with the British concerned, namely, the Commander-in-Chief, forces in the defence of Egypt. You will main- Mediterranean, the Commander-in-Chief, East tain close touch with His Majesty's Ambas- Indies, the Air Officer Commanding-in-chief, sador in Egypt, the Head of the British Military Middle East and yourself. Misson, and the Egyptian General Staff in all matters of high policy affecting the development 12. Your requirements as regards intelligence and employment in war of the Egyptian Army, will be provided by the Middle East Intelligence with due regard to. the existing responsibilities Centre, which is being established in Cairo. of the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, 13. Your headquarters will be located at Egypt in such matters as local defence, co- Cairo. operation between British and Egyptian troops, 14. Should war break out the area of your and training. You will delegate to the General Command will be extended to include all mili- Officer Commanding-in-chief, The British tary forces in British Somaliland, Aden, Iraq Troops in Egypt, such matters as are, in your and the shores of the Persian Gulf, with the opinion, best arranged by him direct with the exception of those which are normally under appropriate Egyptian authorities and, subject the control of the Royal Air Force. to the" agreement of the Egyptian Government 15. Your tasks in war are to co-ordinate (in at the time, command of the Egyptian Army consultation with the Air Officer Commanding- in war. in-chief, Middle East, for matters affecting Iraq The agreement of the Egyptian Government and Aden) the action of the land forces in the to place the Egyptian Army under the com- areas under your command and the distribu- mand of the General Officer Commanding-in- tion of available resources between them. You chief in Egypt will be obtained by His will be guided by the policy for the conduct Majesty's Ambassador through whose inter- of operations which will be communicated to mediation all requests to the Egyptian Govern- you from time to time. ment will be made. You will co-ordinate the operations of the 8. You should bear in mind that His forces under your command with the operations Majesty's Ambassador must retain in all cir- of the various allied forces in the areas men- cumstances his existing position vis-a-vis the tioned in paragraph 10. Egyptian Government. This does not exclude For this purpose you will work in direct co- direct communication between the General operation with allied military commanders Officer Commanding-in-chief, British Troops concerned. in Egypt, and the Egyptian authorities on By Command of the Army Council. routine matters agreed by His Majesty's Ambas- H. J. Creedy. sador. The same considerations will apply as regards The War Office, your relations with His Majesty's Diplomatic 24th July, 1939. Representatives in the other countries included APPENDIX " B." in the area over which your command will extend in war. In the case of Iraq, this will Co-operation of Allies. not preclude direct communication with the On 28th June, 1940, General Mittelhauser, Inspector General of the Iraq Army on such the Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces matters as may be agreed by His Majesty's in the Middle East, decided to accept the Ger- Ambassador to Iraq. man terms. Jn consequence a number of French 9. You will visit all areas which are included sub-units and individual French soldiers imme- in war in your Command (vide paragraph 14 diately made their way into Palestine to join below) to study local situations and inform the British forces. In addition, the Polish Car- yourself of local problems. pathian Brigade which had been serving with 10. Subject to the direction of the Chiefs of the French in Syria, and a large party of Czechs Staff, and of the War Office in respect of the who had been awaiting onward passage to land forces, you are responsible, in conjunction France, decided to continue the. struggle. These 3006 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 13 JUNE, 1946 formed the nucleus of the various Allied Con- Battalion (on British W.E.), a training depot tingents in the Middle East, details of which and a small contingent headquarters. At are given below: present there are some 35 surplus officers, but the contingent is nearly 600 under strength in (a) French. other ranks. After a short stay in Palestine, it was The chief source of supply for Czech volun- decided to bring the French contingent to teers is S.E. Europe. Owing to German pressure Moascar. There they have been reorganised and to the fact that there are no Czech legations into: in the Balkan countries, the Military Attache1 (i) A motorised infantry battalion, Ankara considers that the maximum flow from (ii) A squadron of Spahis. the and Russia will not exceed 100 (iii) A training depot. per month. There are at present over 600 One Company of the Infantry Battalion was potential Czech volunteers in Russia; but owing put under the command of 7th Armoured to financial difficulties few have as yet arrived. Division on 8th September, 1940, and has General Gak, the Chief of the Czechoslovak taken its part in operations in the Western Military Mission in the Middle East, arrived in Desert. The remainder of the battalion was August, and he and his staff are responsible for sent to Daba on 23rd October, 1940, for further co-ordinating the recruiting of Czech volunteers training before joining the (first Company. from Egypt, Palestine, Iran and the Balkans. The Spahis were sent to the Sudan a week (d) Spanish. later, and it is hoped that they will shortly be There is no separate Spanish contingent. engaged in active operations on the Abyssinian Spanish volunteers, who are ex-members of the frontier. ! French Foreign Legion, are accepted for train- In Cairo there is a very active French ing at the Free French Depot. When a party National Committee under the presidency of of twenty-five has been collected, they are Baron de Benoist. The Chief of the Cabinet drafted into a Commando after formal enlist- Militaire is Commandant des Essars, who has ment and attestation into the . very ably carried out the responsible duties of There are at present some fifty Spanish volun- General de Gaulle's military representative in teers serving with 50 (ME) Commando. the Middle East. He has recently been appointed Chief of Staff to General Catroux, (e) Belgians. the new Delegate General of in Owing to the comparatively small size of the the Middle East. Commandant des Essars is Belgian communities in Egypt and elsewhere in in close touch with the situation in Greece the Middle East, and to the fact that many men (where there is a strong French Committee), in were already serving with the Belgian Army Syria and in French Equatorial Africa. prior to the French collapse, it was not possible to form a separate Belgian contingent. Indi- (b) Polish. viduals with special qualifications, however, The Polish Brigade was originally stationed have been accepted for service in the British at Latrun in Palestine, but early in October it Army—notably as officers in the British Arab was moved to Egypt to take up a defensive Force. Recently a small party of Belgian position on the Western outskirts of Alexandria. volunteers left to join the Belgian forces in the A reserve Depot was left at Latrun and here U.K. It was decided, for the present, not to new arrivals from the Balkans are equipped accept offers of service from Belgian units or and trained before joining the Brigade. individuals in the Congo, as they could best The flow of recruits from the Balkans fluctu- help the common cause by maintaining the ates with the political situation; according to a situation in Central Africa. recent estimate by the Military Attache at Ankara, the maximum rate we can expect at (f) Greeks. present is 100 per week. The Brigade is still Negotiations are now in progress with the over 1,000 under strength in other ranks, but Greek authorities for the raising and training has a surplus of officers. It has now been of units of the Greek Army in Egypt. It is decided (at General Kopanski's suggestion) to proposed to form as soon as possible technical form these surplus officers into an Officers' units initially for service with the British Army. Legion for garrison duties in Alexandria. It In addition, it is proposed to organise a train- has also been decided that the Brigade should ing depot with a view to the ultimate formation ultimately be organised on a British W.E.—as of a Greek Brigade Group, when more equip- and when equipment becomes available. ment is available. The Greek Government is prepared to send a liaison mission of 15 officers (c) Czechoslovak. and 20 cadets to assist in training. Colonel The Czechoslovak contingent is stationed at Oeconnomopoulos has already arrived as Chief Gedera in Palestine; it consists of an Infantry Liaison Officer.

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