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The London Gazette of TUESDAY, the I&H of JANUARY, 1948 by Registered As a Newspaper THURSDAY, 15 JANUARY, 1948 the War Office, January, 1948

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The London Gazette of TUESDAY, the I&H of JANUARY, 1948 by Registered As a Newspaper THURSDAY, 15 JANUARY, 1948 the War Office, January, 1948 38177 309 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY, the i&h of JANUARY, 1948 by Registered as a newspaper THURSDAY, 15 JANUARY, 1948 The War Office, January, 1948. OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM ist NOVEMBER 1941 TO 15th AUGUST 1942. •The following Despatch was submitted to the threat from the north. The scope of the pro- Secretary of State for War on 2fjth January, posed offensive was ambitious, ibut it could be . 1943, by GENERAL SIR CLAUDE J. E. contemplated without running undue risks else- AUCH1NLECK, G.C.I.E., C.B., C.S.I., where, provided that the destruction of most D.S.O., O.B.E., A.D.C., Commander-in- of the enemy forces was effected in Eastern Chief, The Middle East Forces. Cyrenaica. Above all, it was essential that there should be no delay. INTRODUCTION. The offensive was a success, but rather Of the numerous problems of the Middle East slower, more costly, and less complete than I Command two ranked high above all others: had hoped. Nevertheless, of the enemy forces to destroy the enemy in North Africa and to in Cyrenaica over two-thirds were destroyed. secure the northern flank. Even before Cyrenaica had been recon- I had always conceived the former to be my quered, war had broken out iwith Japan, and prime task, for the presence of strong and well- His Majesty's Government were obliged to equipped Axis forces in Cyrenaica was a con- divert to the Far East .two' divisions and certain stant menace to our ibase in Egypt. I planned air force reinforcements intended for the Middle to occupy -the whole of Libya, Tripolitania as East. But there was still no necessity to rescind well as Cyrenaica, so as to leave the enemy the decision to invade Tripolitania. The suc- no foothold whence he anight, at some future cessful Russian counter-offensive in the winter date, revive the threat to Egypt. Moreover, it of 1941-42 offset the loss of promised reinforce- •was always possible that we might eventually ments in point of time, but not as regards the launch an offensive against Italy herself, size of .the forces which would eventually be and as a stepping stone it seemed essential to required to garrison .the whole Command, if •capture Tripoli. This policy had the full the Germans should take the offensive once approval of His Majesty's Government. more and defeat the Russians. We were always handicapped, in our calculations, I may say, The other problem, however, I could not for by lack of knowledge of Soviet capabilities and one moment neglect. The danger that Ger- intentions. However, so important to the con- many might attack Turkey and 'that Turkey duct of the war as a whole were the advan- might collapse was always present. Moreover tages of securing Tripoli, that it was worth lhe German invasion of Russia, which pro- taking further risks. gressed at first with alarming rapidity, meant While we were preparing to resume the offen- •that danger threatened the Northern Front sive, 'two Australian divisions were recalled from the Caucasus also. from Syria and Palestine to the Pacific theatre Swift as their initial advance was, it seemed and several air force squadrons were withdrawn impossible that the Germans should appear in to the Far East. the Caucasus before the early spring of 1942, In January, 1942, the enemy attacked, thus and I thought it might be possible to destroy anticipating oiur proposed invasion of Tripoli- the German and Italian army in North Africa tania. Though our naval forces and aircraft "before that should occur. In November, there had drastically restricted the enemy's build-up were sufficient troops already in the Middle East of supplies in Africa during the latter half of and enough reinforcements promised, to allow 1941, by the end of the year the situation had me to conduct an offensive in the west and yet " changed greatly to our disadvantage. Power- be able to turn in time to stave off a possible ful German naval and air reinforcements now 3io SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 15 JANUARY, 1948 arrived in the Central Mediterranean and for deliberate offensive, knowing that a large num- some months we were no longer able to enjoy ber of tanks and anti-tank guns of greatly im- •the former degree of success against enemy con- proved design, heavy ibombers, and fresh divi- voys. The enemy's improved supply situation sions were on the way. in early 1942 enabled him to exploit his ad- By this time the Germans had reached the vance, which caught us at a critical time when Caucasus and only Stalingrad, where the de- our forward troops were unavoidably weak and fenders were slowly losing ground, stood be- our armo'ured units in the forward area inex- tween the Middle East and the gravest danger. perienced. After an unsuccessful attempt to It was then proposed to remove Persia and oppose the enemy advance, the Eighth Army Iraq from the Middle East Command and to withdrew to a defensive position covering set up a separate command, in order to allow Tobruk. This withdrawal naturally made still the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to con- {more difficult the problem of; jattacking the( duct an offensive in North Africa without having enemy's convoys, and he was able to bring in to take thought for his northern flank. I could supplies in increasing quantities in preparation not agree, that this was any solution to the for a renewed offensive. problems of the Middle East as a whole. I at once began to plan afresh for an offen- This is the theme of 'the general narrative sive in Libya, although to do so it was neces- of events which forms Part I of this Despatch. sary drastically -to revise our arrangements for The campaigns in Cyrenaica and the Western defending Syria, Iraq and Persia. It soon be- Desert were only one, although the most im- came evident, however, that our armoured portant, of the many activities in my command. forces would certainly not be strong enough to A c'ontinuotus narrative of these operations is take the field /with any prospects of success for therefore given separately in Part II, so that at least another three months. This caused they may be described in appropriate detail profo'und concern in London, where it was without overshadowing matters of general feared that unless we acted quickly, Malta policy. might be starved into submission. Grave as Part III deals with organisation, training Malta's position had undoubtedly become, I and administration. Many of our difficulties believed that by launching the offensive pre- are attributable directly to faults or deficiencies maturely we should risk an even greater in one or other of these. In niy previous calamity, that we might lose Egypt. Despatch I mentioned some of the administra- His Majesty's Government were at length tive and constructional enterprises undertaken. persuaded that the delay was inevitable. They The building of railways, ports, roads and pipe- were warned that even 'then the attack could lines continued. Some of these enterprises gave- be launched, only if no more of our forces were an immediate return, the benefit of others will withdrawn to the Far East. Moreover it was be experienced later. imperative that both Malta and the Middle East As .far as training was concerned, we had should be reinforced -with aircraft, and heavy much to learn. In November, 1941, a British bombers in particular, so that we might effec- Army for the first time took the field against tively impede enemy shipping to Libya which the Germans with a [superiority in numbers, for our existing naval and air forces were prac- the first time we possessed an imposing array tically unable to do. But, when His Majesty's of tanks, for the first time the Army enjoyed Government found themselves unable to pro- full air support in a major offensive against the vide the reinforcements we asked and were Germans. All commanders and troops had to obliged to order more of our air forces to be learn to use these unaccustomed benefits. An sent to the Far East, .the Middle East Defence adequate system for controlling air support Committee were compelled to represent to them had been devised, liaison was close, and head- that the offensive could not now be undertaken quarters of land and air forces formed one before the middle of June. We pointed out the camp; but manj^ improvements were possible. grave dangers to which the northern liank would Our experience with tanks was less happy: be exposed in the event of Soviet resistance there was much that there was no time to learn collapsing and our continuing with the offensive and much that could be learned only in action. in North Africa. The whole matter was To learn to handle tanks cost us dear, particu- thoroughly reviewed, and His Majesty's Govern- larly when we found that ours were no match ment ruled that the offensive should be la'onched for the German tanks and that our own anti-tank by 'the I5th June notwithstanding. guns were greatly inferior to the Germain. In the middle of May we found that we had not (been able to prevent the enemy reinforcing On the ist November, 1941, the area covered his North African army and it became clear by my Command included Syria, Cyprus, that our offensive would be forestalled. The Palestine and Trans-Jordan, Egypt, the Sudan, enemy advance began on the 26th May. The part of Eritrea, and Aden.
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