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Home , Allied Armies in Italy, Battle of Rapido River, Brian Horrocks, Desert Air Force, Eighth Army (Italy), Frontier Wire (Libya)

jRtttnb, 38937 2879

SUPPLEMENT TO The Gazette OF TUESDAY, 6th JUNE, 1950

Registered as a newspaper

MONDAY, 12 JUNE, 1950 Office, June, 1950. THE ALLIED ARMIES IN FROM SRD SEPTEMBER, 1943, TO DECEMBER; 1944. PREFACE BY THE . PART I. This Despatch was written by Field-Marshal PRELIMINARY PLANNING AND THE Lord Alexander in his capacity as former ASSAULT. Commander-in-Chief of the . It therefore concentrates primarily upon Strategic Basis of the Campaign. the development of the land campaign and the The invasion of Italy followed closely in time conduct of the land battles. The wider aspects on the conquest of and may be therefore of the Italian Campaign are dealt with in treated, both historically and strategically, as reports by the a sequel to it; but when regarded from the (Field-Marshal Lord Wilson) which have point of view of the Grand Strategy of the already been published. It was during this- war there is a great cleavage between the two period that the very close integration of the operations. The conquest of Sicily marks the Naval, and Air Forces of the Allied closing stage of that period of strategy which Nations, which had been built up during the began with the invasion of North Africa in North African Campaigns, was firmly con- November, 1942, or which might, on a longer solidated, so that the Italian Campaign was view, be considered as beginning when the first British armoured cars crossed the essentially a combined operation. The very into on nth June, 1940, the morrow intimate relationship between the three Services of Mussolini's declaration of war. The invasion was undoubtedly one of the governing factors of Italy was part of the next period in in securing victory. European strategy which was destined to cul- The following Despatch was submitted to the minate in the invasion of the West and the Secretary of State for War on iQth April, destruction of the German armies. When the 1947, by HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD- last German fled across the Straits of MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT the first aim of Allied strategy had been ALEXANDER OF , K.G., achieved: to clear the enemy from Africa and G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.S.J., D.S.O., M.C., to open the Mediterranean to the shipping of former Commanding-in-Chiej, the without fear of interruption; Fifteenth . in the next phase the Mediterranean theatre I have the honour to submit my Despatch on would no longer receive the first priority of re- the Allied Annies in Italy during the period sources and its operations would become prepa- from 3rd September, 1943, to I2th December, ratory and subsidiary to the great invasion 1944. based on the . It was now The Despatch is divided into the following called on to break up the victorious team of four parts: armies trained in its hard school and to sur- Part I —Preliminar y Planning and the render to the West the picked divisions which Assault. were to form the spearhead of the assault on Part II—Th e Winter Campaign. the beaches of Normandy. Part III— The Capture of and the The nature of the break between the Sicilian Advance to the Arno. and Italian operations is clear from the con- Part IV—Th e Battles. trast between the directives for them issued by 2880 SUPPLEMENT TO , 12 JUNE, 1950 the Combined Chiefs of . The Casablanca of a German attack through Spain, though conference treated the invasion of Sicily as a already remote by now compared with 1942, continuation of the clearance of iNorth Africa could not be entirely disregarded. Our air and looked no further ahead; its orders were strength, though slightly reduced, particularly clear-cut and definite. The " Trident " con- in heavy bombers, would remain adequate for ference which met in- Washington, in May 1943* the support of operations*. On the sea we were took a wider view. On 26th May, the Combined now not likely to meet the Italian fleet and Chiefs of Staff informed the Supreme Allied fully confident of our ability to defeat it if Commander* in the Mediterranean of their de- met. More serious was the intention to with- cision that the attack on Europe would draw almost all the landing craft from the be made from the United. Kingdom, probably theatre for use in the west; this programme in the early summer of 1944. He was therefore did not take effect until later but it represented a instructed to plan such operations in exploita- severe curtailment of our amphibious mobility. tion of the conquest of Sicily as would be best A further contrast between the campaigns in calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and Sicily and in Italy is provided by the nature to contain the maximum number of German of the planning which proceeded them. For divisions; which of the operations should be Sicily we had had a period of almost six adopted and thereafter mounted would be de- months to study in detail a problem which was cided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Here not, in its essentials, a complicated one. For were no geographical objectives pointed out but the operations in exploitation of success in two desiderata, one political and the other, the" Sicily we were in the first place not given any containing of the maximum number of German definite geographical objectives and the prob- divisions, from its very nature indefinable. It lem of deciding between the available alterna- is essential that this directive -be constantly tives was complicated by a number of unknown borne in mind, for it continued to rule all factors which would only be resolved by the strategy in Italy up to the final surrender of outcome of the preceding campaign. It was the German armies in the field, and the cam- realised from the first that the decision between paign can only be rightly understood if this is the various courses of action which would then firmly grasped. The campaign in Italy was a be open to us would have to be deferred to a great holding attack. The two parts of the later date and might have to be taken rapidly. directive aim at the same purpose: the diversion Our aim in planning was therefore extreme of German strength to a theatre as far removed flexibility and I think it is fair to say that as possible from the vital point, the Channel few operations of war of this magnitude have coast. To eliminate Italy would mean the been so distinguished by the speed with which loss to the Axis of fifty-nine divisions amount- they were mounted and the shortness of the ing to -some two million menf ; they were time between the decision to undertake the in- admittedly not good troops but they were useful vasion and its launching. This speed was as garrisons in occupied territory. To replace made possible by the flexibility of strategy these, and at the same time to provide the permitted by the nature of amphibious opera- troops which would have to be sent to hold the tions and the geographical configuration of the line in Italy, would represent a formidable com- theatre, and it was encouraged by the challenge mitment for Germany at a time when she was of a constantly changing military and political faced once more with war on two fronts. The situation. A certain amount of preliminary comparison with the contribution of the Penin- planning began as soon as the plan for Sicily sular War to -the downfall of (Napoleon is was firmly established. This was done in the hackneyed but fully justified. first place at Allied Force Headquarters, since In order to carry out the tasks assigned by my own staff were fully engaged on the this directive the Supreme Allied Commander Sicilian operation. I shall therefore pass over was allotted all the ground forces available in this preliminary period as briefly as possible, the Mediterranean theatre except for four but in order to understand the background to American and three British divisions, which the operations carried out under my command were to foe held available for return to the it is necessary to give some account of the way United Kingdom by ist November, f and two in which the problem of an invasion of the British divisions held in readiness to fulfil our Italian mainland was first approached and the commitments to Turkey. These forces were basic reasons for the strategy which was eventu- estimated at the equivalent of nineteen British ally adopted. and British-equipped divisions, four American and four French, but of these many were under General Considerations Governing Operations strength in men and material and others were against Italy. not fully trained. Other divisions, again, had To carry out the terms of the directive from to be retained for internal security duties in the Combined Chiefs of Staff one course of the and for garrisons of the princi- action had obviously pre-eminent advantages. pal ports of North Africa, while the threat Italian troops could be found and fought at * General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. (The any point of the deeply indented northern coast- title of his appointment was " Commander-in-Chief, line of the Mediterranean from Thrace to the Allied Force." Another title frequently used was Pyrenees, or in the many off-lying islands, but " Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theatre ". to eliminate Italy from the war an attack on On 9th March, 1944, when General (now Field-Marshal Lord) Wilson held the appointment, the title was the mother country offered clearly the best altered to " Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean solution. We were already committed to the Theatre ". For the sake of clarity the later title is conquest of Sicily, for reasons, as I have ex- used throughout the Despatch). plained, of African and Mediterranean strategy, f Figures as of May 1943; the remained at a round figure of some sixty divisions until * War Office footnote:—Strategic attacks by the it capitulated. Air Forces which were later based on Italy, and other J The formations eventually selected were : British strategic aspects of the campaign, are described in the 50 and 51 Infantry and i Airborne Divisions ; United Supreme Allied Commander's Reports on the Italian States 2 Armoured, i and 9 Infantry and 82 Airborne Campaign (Part I—8th January, 1944 to lotK May Divisions; 7 British Armoured was later 1944; Parts II and III—loth May, 1944 * added to this list. December, 1944) by Field-Marshal Lord Wilson. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2881 but it was the opinion of the Intelligence Staff There was, of course, the objection that a cam- at Allied Force Headquarters that not even the paign in Italy would canalise the whole effort of complete loss of the island would bring Italy Great Britain and the for 1943 to sue for terms. Nor was it likely, in the into a comparatively narrow peninsula. The prevailing state of mind in Italy, that the loss objection, though based on ignorance of our of Sardinia in addition would produce that resources and misappreciation of the general effect. To eliminate Italy from the war we strategy of the war, appears superficially sound should have to land on the mainland of the but omits any consideration of what alternatives peninsula. We should have to do so in any were open; as Mr. Churchill said on a later occa- case as soon as the Italians capitulated, whether sion: "We have to fight the Germans some- or not we had made it our main theatre of where, we can't merely sit and watch the effort, for we should want to occupy the country Russians." It would serve no useful purpose as quickly as possible and begin to put its to keep the forces available in the Mediter- resources to use against the Germans. That ranean in idleness, and plans had already been being the case, our weakness in available for- prepared to make the largest contribution in mations rendered it advisable not to split our men and amphibious means which could be efforts but to concentrate on one geographical transferred in the time available to the Western objective. assault. To say that Italy was a secondary It was my opinion, therefore, that an in- theatre is not a valid objection; it is the nature vasion of the peninsula was Iby far the best and function of a holding force to attack secon- means of carrying out the first part of the dary objectives while the main force is prepar- directive and I decided, after considerable ing to attack the main objective. It would be study, that it would also offer the best chances a valid objection, if it could be proved, that of achieving the second object of our strategy, the Allies employed unduly large forces in to contain as many German forces as attacking a secondary objective: in fact, as I possible. First of all the elimination of Italy, shall show, our forces in Italy never at any time for which an invasion of the peninsula was enjoyed any but the slenderest margin of essential, would of itself, as I have already superiority over the Germans, and usually pointed out, throw a heavy additional not even that, and, above all, the invasion of strain on Germany. In the summer of the West was never deprived of any resources 1943 Italy .was still performing important in -men or materials Iby the needs of the opera- garrison duties for the Axis in the Mediterranean tions in Italy. The Italian campaign fulfilled theatre; she had seven divisions in Southern its function in the strategic scheme of the war France, extending as far west as Marseilles, and against (Germany, and I am convinced that no no less than thirty-two in the Balkans, together other possible strategy would have fulfilled that with many non-divisional anti-aircraft and coast function so well.* defence units in both theatres. If the Germans could no longer count on these forces they would It was clear, therefore, that an invasion of have to replace them at once with German the mainland of Italy was the most advantage- troops: they could not leave south-eastern ous course to pursue in the exploitation of France ungarrisoned with the Allies loose in the success in Sicily. It was also clear, gazing at Mediterranean in overwhelming superiority on the relief map of Southern Italy, that it would the sea and in the air; resistance movements in be an operation of great difficulty. We must the Balkans would also get completely out of get up that -long leg as quickly as possible and hand unless they took over the areas vacated by preferably start as far north as possible, but the the Italians. It was, in fact, not unreasonable limits were laid down by the availability of air to hope that in the Balkans at least, where they cover. I had had experiences in Burma of far outnumbered the Germans, the Italians fighting against an enemy with control of the might attempt to resist; the resistance was not air which I was not anxious to repeat, and likely to be prolonged but it would help in the loss of " Prince of Wales " and " Repulse" diverting German troops. However, apart from off Malaya was a reminder of what could hap- these automatic results of Italian capitulation, pen, in those circumstances, even to great we should be in a position, by invading the warships, let alone convoys of merchant ships peninsula, to force the Germans to a more and landing craft. The experiences of the damaging diversion of effort than the mere in- United States Navy in operations against com- crease in occupational commitments, which paratively isolated Japanese-held islands in the could be entrusted to lower category formations, Pacific under cover of aircraft from large groups including foreigners and satellites. They would of carriers were not applicable to the situation have to put into the field a strong force of good facing me in the Mediterranean, and in any .case quality troops or see Italy lost by default and I was assured by Admiral Cunninghamf that the Anglo-American armies appearing on the there was no chance of getting such a force of southern frontier of the Reich. That southern carriers. My air cover would have to come frontier is strong enough by nature, but to aban- from land-based fighters and, taking the Spit- don Italy, especially the industrial area north fire with 90 gallon long-range tanks as the stan- of the Apennines, would add a serious loss of dard, this gave me a circle of operations of a war potential to a disastrous loss of prestige. * The best alternative available was an invasion of Perhaps even more serious for the Germans the Balkans. To do this it would first have been would be to allow us to make use of the air- necessary, for the sake of air cover, to break into the fields of Ttaly from which our strategic Air " outer ring" of islands from Crete to Rhodes, a Forces could develop attacks against hitherto difficult operation in autumn. Balkan terrain is even worse suited for offensive operations than Italian, and immune targets in Southern and South-eastern it must be remembered that .our amphibious resources Germany, in and against the vital were destined to dwindle to the advantage of the Ploesti oilfields. For all these reasons I felt Western Theatre. A final argument against this course sure that the Germans would not stint troops was that the United States Government was most reluctant to.become involved in a Balkan campaign. for the defence of Italy and .that nowhere else I Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham; now Admiral should we be able to draw in and contain, so of the Fleet The Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, " many. ....-.-. K.T., G.C.B., O.M., D.S.O. 2882 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 hundred and eighty miles. Assuming that we of our range where the risk would be greater could construct sufficient airfields in the north- but vital objectives within closer reach. These eastern corner of Sicily, in the area of Milazzo decisions need not and could not be taken yet; and Messina, where there was at the moment much would depend on the 'progress of opera- only one small landing strip, this would mean tions hi Sicily, which were planned to open in that the area within which an assault landing July. Only then could vital questions be ans- was' possible would be bounded by an arc of wered: what would be the value of Italian a circle drawn across the peninsula from west troops fighting in defence of their native soil, to east through the island of Capri, just north what would be the German reaction to the in- of , north of Potenza in Lucania and creased threat to Italy, what was the value of cutting the shore of the Gulf of some our own amphibious technique and what re- fifteen miles short of Taranto itself. The pros- sources would 'remain to the Allies, in man- pects within this area were not inviting. The power and landing craft, after a successful in- provinces of and Lucania are the vasion of Sicily. poorest and most undeveloped in Italy and In the meantime there was another possible yield to none in the complexity and difficulty operation to be considered, against Sardinia of their mountain structure. In the whole area and Corsica. This had already been studied as so circumscribed, (there were no major strategic an alternative to Sicily and, though rejected in targets the possession of which would be worth this role, still offered certain advantages. To the effort of a full-scale assault and whose loss put it on the lowest terms: if, after the con- would induce the Italians to sue for terms. quest of Sicily, the enemy were found to be so There were two great prizes just outside the strongly posted on the mainland that inva- range of fighter cover; the naval base of Taranto sion would be impracticable, an operation to to the east and the port and city of to capture Sardinia and Corsica would at least the north; but a direct assault on either of mean that we retained the initiative and, since these heavily defended places would be suffi- there was little risk of failure, would score ciently hazardous even with the fullest scale of another encouraging success. Our shipping air support and quite impossible without it. in the Mediterranean would also benefit from the elimination of German air bases in the Calabria was obviously the first objective islands. From a superficial glance at the map to be considered. It was the nearest to Sicily, for one thing, and the Navy was bound to be it might seem that the islands could act as anxious to have the Straits opened as soon as stepping stones for an attack on the South of possible by clearing the opposite shore. Our France, as an alternative to an advance up the forces would be operating from a firm base Italian peninsula. In fact, however, they and, if the attack were made directly across the offered poor bases for such a strategy and the Straits of Messina on to the ports of Reggio and attrition of our dwindling stock of landing San Giovanni, the always hazardous venture craft would mean that the eventual assault of an amphibious operation would be reduced could only be on a small scale. Moreover we almost to the proportions of a river crossing, were not anxious to attract any more German with full support from the artillery deployed forces into France but rather away from it, on the Sicilian shore. If this were considered into Italy and the Balkans. Admittedly it too modest an operation it could be supported would be useful, when the invasion of Northern by landings further up the Toe of Italy which France began, to be in a position to make, or could be given the fullest air support and which at least threaten, a diversionary attack on the would quickly allow a junction with the force French Mediterranean coast. We calculated, which had crossed the Straits. Calabria there' however, rightly as the event showed, that a fore offered a safe but not spectacular invest- successful invasion of Italy would not only ment for the profits of Sicily. The main dis- draw German forces away from France but advantage was that the nature of the ground also give us Sardinia and Corsica with little would permit the enemy to block any north- trouble. If we locked up our whole force in ward advance with the employment of mini- the islands without invading Italy (and we mum forces. The country is mountainous and could certainly not do both) it would mean a the road-net undeveloped; and there are three long period of inactivity until the early summer isthmuses: Gioia-Locri, Francavilla-Squillace, of 1944 when a threat from Corsica could begin and Scalea-Castrovillari-Villapiana, the narrow- to play its part in the grand strategy of the est of which is eighteen miles from sea to sea invasion of Western Europe. This would be to and the widest only thirty-seven. The massifs give the Germans a welcome breathing space of Aspromonte and the Sila, both rising to six and forgo the chance of inflicting casualties thousand feet in height, would assist the de- on them. To sum up: an operation against fence and the summer season would be draw- Sardinia and Corsica, though clearly feasible, ing to its close before Sicily could be secured would be inconsistent with the directive laid and the first landings in Calabria mounted. down for Mediterranean .strategy. If the loss There was a danger of the strategic effort of of Sicily had,, not caused the elimination of 1943 finding itself stuck for the whiter in a Italy from the war it was unlikely that the cul-de-sac among inhospitable mountains in loss of Sardinia hi addition would do so, and the most barren and least important part of the number of German divisions contained the Italian peninsula. would be small. It was clear to me, therefore, when the first First Stages of Planning. stage of planning was reached in May, that it Detailed planning may be said to have be- was desirable to carry the war to the mainland gun with a memorandum produced by Allied at the earliest possible moment. It was also Force Headquarters on 3rd June, 1943. It was clear that a decision would have to ibe taken recognised that, in view of the considerations -whether the landing -was to be made in an area brought out above, there were two operations where success would lbe comparatively easy but which were likely: against Calabria and, as an unproductive or in an area at the extreme end alternative, Sardinia. For Calabria it might < SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2883 be possible to rely on Eighth Army, assaulting a result of them that further amphibious across the Straits of Messina, but that would operations on a scale large enough to seize depend on what shape it was in after the Sici- •a major port such as Naples or Taranto would lian campaign. It would be better to have be impracticable. The maximum number of fresh forces available for exploitation, if at all divisions we could maintain in Calabria was possible, and our two spare Head- reckoned as six. There were, therefore, now quarters, of 5 and 10 Corps, could plan the two reasons for invading Sardinia: one, if it operation, since Eighth Army was not in a was decided that resistance on the mainland position to do so. It was therefore proposed would be so strong as to make any landing to study two operations, both to be mounted impracticable, and the second if it was appre- from North Africa: against Reggio by 10 Corps ciated that, though a landing could be made, (Operation BUTTRESS) and against Cotrone* the result would be to lock up six divisions in by 5 Corps (Operation GOBLET). These two the Toe of Italy without prospect of being able headquarters came under my command on 5th to exploit rapidly either towards Naples or June, together with one armoured and four Taranto. I was, however, most reluctant to infantry divisions, f The Cotrone landing was be forced back into so unproductive a course. intended to hasten the capture of the airfields in that area, the only useful ones in Calabria, More optimistic possibilities were, of course, and would take place about a month after considered, based on the possibility of an the original landing. Target dates were ist Italian " collapse ", a term never specifically September and ist October respectively. The defined. It was the view of the Joint Intelli- operation against Sardinia (Operation BRIM- gence Committee that, although Italian morale, STONE), only to be undertaken if success on both civilian and military, was then low and the mainland appeared unlikely, was entrusted would sink still further as a result of the loss to the United States under General of Sicily, no complete collapse was likely until Mark W. Clark. He was ordered on loth June the Allied forces had landed on the mainland to prepare a plan for this operation, employ- and had made a considerable advance north- ing VI United States Corps of two infantry wards.* However, it was necessary to be divisions and the British 5 Corps, composed prepared for such an eventuality. If Italian as for the Cotrone landing. General GiraudJ resistance ceased, our aim was to move rapidly on I5th June was asked, and agreed, to nomi- overland on Naples with the minimum force nate a commander and staff to prepare a plan necessary to seize the airfields and port, to for the capture of Corsica (Operation FIRE- build up our forces to a strength of six divi- BRAND). I kept in touch with all this plan- sions and forty-three squadrons of the Tactical ning activity for. operations which, if mounted, Air Force and then to exploit to seize Rome. I should be required to command, but could Subsequent operations could be either into do little more since this -was now the critical North Italy or across the Adriatic. The timing period just before the Sicily invasion. envisaged on the " most optimistic " develop- ment, which gave us Naples by ist October, A clearer conception of the detailed implica- hit on the right day with an accuracy rare in tions of future operations is >set out in a memo- the forecasts of the best inspired oracles. On randum from the Executive Planning Section of the timing considered more likely, that date Allied Force Headquarters dated 30th June. would see us just assaulting Cotrone and, in This represents the stage to which Allied the worst case, we should be just appearing off strategic thought and planning had been the coast of Sardinia. brought before the actual experience of the in- vasion of Sicily allowed modification in a more Effect on Planning of the Progress of Opera- optimistic direction. The possibility of such a tions in Sicily. future modification is fully realised in the open- ing paragraph: experience alone would show the The result of the first few days fighting in value of the Italian forces, the extent to which Sicily brought a breath of actuality into the Germany was prepared to reinforce Italy and process of planning, hitherto tentative and what Allied resources, particularly in landing rather academic, and with it a full gale of craft, would still be available and when. In optimism. Two of the questions which had the circumstances appreciation of Allied capa- dominated previous planning were answered: bilities could scarcely be over sanguine. what was the value of the Italian forces on Exploitation into Calabria was estimated as their own soil and what would remain of our likely to be slow, since the first assaulting force own resources after the reduction of Sicily. was not expected to be within striking dis- Both answers were more favourable than we tance of Cotrone, only eighty air miles from could have hoped. The Italian coastal divi- the original landing point, by the end of the sions, whose value had never been rated very first month and a subsidiary landing was there- high, disintegrated almost without firing a fore planned to seize that port thirty days shot and the field divisions, where they were after the original landing. Even if these two met, were also driven like chaff before the operations should be successful the terrain and wind. Mass surrenders were frequent. More- the weather were likely to offer severe difficul- over, the civilian population seemed well dis- ties to our advance, while the number of land- posed and, when once we were firmly estab- ing craft available would be so diminished as lished, were prepared to welcome the Allies as liberators. On the other hand our casualties * Also known as Crotone, which, as nearer to the in men and equipment, and particularly in classical form, was favoured by Mussolini. the all-important categories of landing craft and f i and 4 British Infantry Divisions for 5 Corps, to be supplemented later by part of 82 (United States) assault equipment generally, were much Airborne Division and 78 Division from Sicily; lighter than had been expected. We were, 7 Armoured, 46 and 56 Infantry Divisions for zo Corps. however, fully prepared - to exploit this J G6neral d'Arm£e -Henri H. Giraud—Commander- in-Chief French Forces in North Africa and Joint * This was a correct reading of popular feeling, President of the French Committee of National which was marked by complete apathy and inertia, but Liberation. *•• '• had failed to allow for a " palace revolution ". 2884 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 success and my staff worked out a plan to So far, however, there was little change from improvise an operation against Calabria. previous conceptions of the progress of future Assuming that Eighth Army continued to make operations except that the speed of the advance such good progress up the east coast as it had was appreciated as likely to be greater; but in the first few days it would, within five days the last two courses for which preparations of the capture of Messina, pass a brigade were now to be made were more ambitious. from 13 Corps across the Straits, assisted by and parachutists. 78 Division An assault on Taranto had been considered would then follow up into Reggio and 46 Divi- earlier but rejected on what then seemed suffi- sion from North Africa would make an assault cient grounds. At the date proposed, ist landing in the Gulf of Gioia. I agreed to this November, the weather was likely to be unsuit- = tentative plan and obtained the concurrence ' able for beach maintenance, we should have lost of Admiral Cunningham—in fact we even con- too many landing craft in the three previous sidered assaulting Calabria before the fall of assaults (i.e., Sicily, Reggio and Cotrone) and Messina', using as a port of departure— air cover would be impossible since Taranto but the premises on which it was based would be out of range of the majority of failed to materialise. German reinforcements our fighters operating from the airfields in blocked the way to Catania and 78 Division, north-eastern Sicily. These reasons were following the original plan, had to be thrown no longer cogent. No degree of success into the heavy fighting for Centuripe. How- could change the November weather in this ever, the feeling of justified optimism' and the stormy part of Italy but it would ensure our positive gains represented by the lightness of being able to mount the assault earlier, and the Allied casualty list still remained. It was a provisional date of ist October could now possible to contemplate bolder strokes which be contemplated with some confidence. More promised more valuable results than the cap- landing craft were now available as a result ture of the incidental objective of Sardinia or of our light losses in the landings in Sicily locking up the Allied forces for a winter in and we had considerable hopes that it might Calabria in circumstances reminiscent of the be unnecessary to carry out one or other Allied situation at Salonica in the 1914-1918 of the assaults at Reggio and Cotrone, per- War. haps even both, with a consequent further saving in resources. As for air cover we now It was with these considerations in mind that had hopes of a rapid advance to seize the air- I attended a conference at Carthage on I7th fields at Cotrone and in any case, if the Italian July with General Eisenhower, Admiral defences in Apulia were as feebly manned as Cunningham and Air Marshal Tedder.* We in Sicily (and the German forces in the area then decided that " the mainland of Italy is were weak), a lesser scale of air support might the best area for exploitation with a view to be acceptable. The advantages of the opera- achieving our object of forcing Italy out of the tion were considerable. It would give us the war and containing the maximum German possession of ports through which a large force forces." In order to retain complete freedom could be built up and it would place us in a of action to avail ourselves of any possibilities geographically protected area on the same side which might offer themselves we agreed to pre- of the Apennines as , the capture of pare for the following eight courses of action: whose numerous airfields for the use of the (a) A quick exploitation across the Straits Strategic Air Force was one of our first objec- .by Eighth Army, assisted by one or more tives in Italy. On 22nd July, therefore, Fifth divisions from North Africa. Army was directed to prepare plans for an (6) A full scale assault landing 'by 10 operation " to seize and secure the Heel of Corps to capture Reggio. Italy east of the line Taranto- inclusive," (c) A quick exploitation from the " Toe " with target date ist October, to .be carried out (Reggio) to the " Ball " (Cotrone). under my command. Planning for the assault (d) A full scale assault landing by 5 Corps on Sardinia had already been cancelled on the to capture Cotrone. 20th and responsibility for this operation, together with that against Corsica, was handed (e) Repeated outflanking operations up the over to the French. With this decision the coast of Calabria by small amphibious western islands passed out of the strategic pic- forces. ture; in the event the Germans withdrew from (/) A large-scale amphibious operation both, with a precipitancy which they probably ' against Taranto by Fifth Army, to be known later regretted. as Operation MUSKET, dependent on suffi- [ cient landing craft being available. The last of the possible courses for which (g) " Introducing a reinforcing force into preparations were to be made provided for the ; Naples after the port has been captured as introduction of a force into the port of Naples , a result of our land advance." after it had been captured by an overland advance; this was given the codename GANG- - In this schedule of future courses (b) was in- WAY. It had been contemplated akeady, but tended as an alternative to (a) and (d) as an only as a possibility which would be open in the alternative to (c), if the overland drive had event of an Italian collapse. What we hoped, become held up before it reached the Cotrone was that, with the Italian forces disintegrating area. Course (e) reflected the healthier situa- and the Germans withdrawing to safer positions tion of our landing craft resources; it was ex- further north, a small mobile force, necessarily pected that we should be able" to unblock our- restricted to the minimum by difficulties of selves if halted by strong resistance and over- maintenance, might be able .to push rapidly come the.difficulties of the Calabrian terrain by across the tangled mountains of Calabria, swift " seaborne hooks " in brigade strength. Lucania and Southern to seize the : .' * Now Marshal of the The Lord port for the entry of Fifth Army. In the first Tedder, G.C.B. optimistic days of the invasion of Sicily Fifth SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2885

Army had been directed '(on 15th July) to pre- for. All our available troops were engaged pare plans for an unopposed landing in Naples. in Sicily, where the two reserve divisions, This directive was still in force, but priority had American gth and British 78th, had just been now been shifted to the operation against committed in order to speed up the completion Taranto. Nevertheless, the great prize of the of the campaign. We hoped to finish in Sicily capture of Naples still glittered; it would give by mid-August, after which the troops there us control of an area capable of maintaining engaged would be available, with the important any Allied force which could be placed in Italy exception of those earmarked for return to in 1943, it would establish our armies well on the United Kingdom. More decisive, for if a the road to Rome and it would oblige the Ger- real opportunity had offered no doubt we could mans to withdraw not only from Calabria but have scraped together some troops to take probably from Apulia as well. But if the advantage of it, was the fact that we had no required conditions were unfulfilled there were craft to move them as we were still dependent weighty arguments against an assault landing on craft for the maintenance of our forces in in so well defended an area; in particular the Sicily. It was calculated that the first week of lack of air cover and the time which must elapse September would be the earliest time by which before our troops advancing from Calabria could sufficient would be available and serviceable. make contact. We were likely to capture The moon would be at its most suitable be- Cotrone, from which we could cover operations tween 7th and loth September. against Taranto, sooner than Scalea, the first place from which we could cover Naples; Plans for Assault Landing in the Naples Area. exploitation overland from Cotrone to Taranto , as the Naples would be much easier than from Scalea to assault was called, was to be carried out by Naples; for the present the priority of the VI United States Corps, organised as for the Taranto operations must stand. invasion of Sardinia, and 10 British Corps.* Theoretically each Corps consisted of one Fall of Mussolini. armoured, two infantry and one airborne divi- On 25th July Radio Roma announced the sion, but this was liable to revision in view fall of Mussolini, the suppression of the Fascist of the difficulties of providing shipping and air party and the accession to power of Marshal lift; we knew, for instance, that we should Badoglio. Although we had often considered only have air lift for at most one airborne divi- the possibility.of this, the actual announcement sion and would probably, as turned out, not came as a surprise, for the secret of the coup be able to lift much more than three divisions d'etat had 'been well kept, as was natural with in craft for the assault wave. There were so few persons involved in the plot. It was not difficulties about the British contingent. Since a case of a popular rising nor even of a wave the plans for Calabria were still in force, and of popular discontent,. for the Italian people we could not yet say whether that was to be in general was still sunk in its usual apathy; the main attack or only subsidiary, it was though, of course, claims to that effect were necessary for 10 Corps to be prepared, at short subsequently put out, mainly by Italian exiles notice, to attack either Naples or Reggio, and in Switzerland. If there had in fact been any only time could show which. The solution such occurrences we should have been less sur- reached was to. devise loading tables common prised, and so would the Germans, who were to both plans and to ensure that 10 Corps' struck with consternation. We had a certain allotment of landing craft was not varied to advantage over them, as we were aware of the meet the exigencies of one or the other. discontent of some senior officers in the Italian The directive of 27th July specified the Gulf services, and there had already been some of Salerno as the site for the initial landings cautious approaches by Italian commanders for the assault on Naples. This choice was much in the Balkans which showed a willingness to argued, both at the time and subsequently, and abandon a lost cause and a now unpopular I think it as well to consider at some length alliance. the reasons for the decision, of whose correct- This dramatic news introduced a new factor ness I am convinced. To sail straight into the into our delicately poised calculations, and one Bay of Naples was impracticable. The sea which clearly brought nearer the long hoped approaches were strongly defended by mine- for collapse of Italy. That. Badoglio had fields and net barrages and the whole area declared " The war continues " deceived no- was heavily covered by permanent fortifica- body and proposals for a capitulation were con- tions, including over forty coast defence guns; fidently awaited. But the Allied side need not moreover, it was almost certain that, whatever wait until Badoglio felt secure enough to move; else the Germans might do, they would hold the optimism of the early days of the Sicilian Naples in strength to deny us so great a prize invasion, which had become dashed with more for as long as possible and to cover the with- sober reflections as the deadlock before Catania drawal of their forces from the south. The continued, was reborn. At a conference at choice therefore fell between landing north or Carthage next day, 26th July, attended by south of Naples. The former course had many General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham, Air advantages and was originally favoured by Marshal Tedder and myself, we decided that General Clark. The plain of Campania, between greater risks might now legitimately be taken. the and Naples, is one of the few Accordingly on 27th July General Clark, com- plains along the west coast of Italy not domi- manding the Fifth Army, was directed to pre- nated by nearby mountains, a fact which would pare plans for seizing the port of Naples " with permit the rapid deployment of large forces and a view to preparing a firm base for further the full use of our armour, and a quick success offensive operations." The target date was to be 7th September and an outline plan was * Throughout this Despatch, Corps printed with Roman numerals (e.g. VI Corps) are American Corps to be submitted by 7th August. The September and those with Arabic numerals (e.g 10 Corps) are date was the earliest we could possibly hope British Corps. 2886 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 there would cut the communications of all the felt certain that there would be no serious German formations in the south, perhaps forc- German resistance and that the Italians would ing them to evacuate Naples before they had do no better than in Sicily. This proposal was had time to carry out extensive demolitions. accepted at a further conference of Com- The Germans also appear to have expected us manders-innChief on ist August; we agreed that to attack in this area rather than further south; a lodgement in* Calabria was necessary but. they moved two divisions there immediately hoped to 'be able to achieve it without using after the evacuation of Sicily whereas it was 10 Corps at all. In any case our strategy was only shortly before our landing at Salerno that flexible enough to allow us to switch 10 Corps a division was brought across to there from to either objective and this was laid down in Apulia. But there were two serious objections a directive issued after another Carthage con*> to the northern assault area; the beaches were ference on gth August. The relevant paragraph unsuitable for landings, and in parts obstructed directed: " every effort will be made to seize a. by off-lying sandbars, and it would be well bridgehead in Calabria with the resources beyond effective fighter cover. The first might available after the allocation of the necessary possibly have been accepted but the second landing craft to 10 Corps." I informed was decisive. The plans for the landing in- General Montgomery on 23rd August that he volved sufficient risks already, as the event would almost certainly have to undertake the was to show; without fighter cover it might operation with his existing resources and with- well have been a disaster.* out the assistance of an additional assault landing by 10 Corps. On rjth August The Salerno beaches are undoubtedly the 13 Corps Headquarters, with under command best for an assault on the whole west coast i Canadian Division and 5 Division, had of Italy. There is a continuous strip of beach already been withdrawn from operations in twenty miles long running from Salerno south- Sicily in order to prepare for the assault across wards; sea approaches are good and offshore gradients vary between one in forty and one in the Straits. eighty, allowing landing craft to come close inshore, f The coastal defences in the area Final Decisions on Invasion Plans. were not impressive and were almost exclu- At a Commanders-in-Chief conference at sively fieldworks. From the air point of view Carthage on i6th August the final decisions a fine prize was within our grasp in the Monte- were taken on which the invasion of Italy was corvino airfield, capable of taking four fighter based. • The campaign in Sicily was practically squadrons, which lay less than three miles from over and the Germans were being more the shore. Conditions for an assault, therefore, successful than we had hoped in evacuating are ideal but the trouble begins inland from the men and light equipment over the Straits. beaches. The coastal plain is compressed by a Evacuation was actually completed by dawn line of mountains, rising abruptly at distances next day, I7th August. It was known that new varying between two and ten miles from the German troops were pouring into Italy, mainly coast, which would afford the enemy excellent re-formed divisions from the old Sixth Army observation and fire positions commanding the destroyed at Stalingrad. By the end of the plain and a strong defensive position to which month there were to be as many as eighteen to withdraw if our bridgehead were expanded. German divisions in Italy, including five Still more serious is th% fact that, even if the armoured divisions. We should not be able landings should be completely successful, a to get an equivalent number of divisions into formidable obstacle still bars the way to Naples: the country until December. Nevertheless, the the rocky spur of the Monti Picentini which decision was taken to proceed at the earliest runs down into the Sorrento peninsula. Tower- possible moment to a full-scale invasion on the ing sheer above Salerno, this wall of bare moun- lines of the boldest plan which had been con- tain is pierced only Iby two passes, running sidered. First 13 Corps were to land in through narrow gorges offering admirable Calabria; the date, to be as early as possible defensive positions. For all these disad- and probably between ist and 4th September, vantages, however, there was one decisive factor was left to my subsequent decision. Secondly, in the choice of Salerno: it was the furthest the Salerno assault was to be launched with a north and the nearest to Naples that we could target date of gth September. This date could strike without losing fighter cover. be postponed not more than forty-eight hours For the present the proposed landing at if necessary. Fifth Army came under my com- Salerno took second priority to the gaining of a mand on I7th August, just over three weeks lodgement in- Calabria, for General Mont- before it was to assault the Salerno beaches. gomeryj considered he would need 10 Corps as weU as 13 Corps for the latter operation. I Fifth Army's outline plan for the operation, was already of the opinion, however, that we which it had been ordered to-prepare on 27th could exploit into Calabria on a much cheaper July, was presented on I5th August. Only scale, using only the troops from Sicily, for I slight modifications were necessary and the final Operation Order was issued on 26th August. * Enemy air strength •within no miles of Salerno was calculated at 380 German and 225 Italian day The most important change was in the use of fighters and 50 night fighters (German) ; reinforcement airborne troops. We only had sufficient aircraft within two days at 140 Italian fighters from North for one division and 82 (United States) Airborne Italy and up to 60 German from Sardinia; bomber was nominated; in the event this too was' strength at 270 German and 275 Italian aircraft plus 120 German bombers based in Sardinia. For factors removed from the order of battle in circum- governing our own air stiategy see Appendix " L "— stances which will be described iater and there a memorandum by Air Plans, Allied Force Head- was no airborne operation as part of the quarters. assault. The troops to be employed in the t By contrast some of the beaches, for example, had gradients of worse than one in a hundred. initial assault only amounted to three divisions J Now Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of with a floating reserve of one Regimental Alamein, K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O. Combat Team. On the left the British *o Corps, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2887

Lieutenant-General McCreery,* with under opposed, alterations of course would be im- command 46 and 56 Divisions, was to assault possible and the force would have to fight its between Salerno and the Sele River, seize way through. Force " H," comprising four Salerno and the Montecorvino airfield and battleships, two aircraft carriers and I2th establish a firm beach-head, including the moun- Cruiser Squadron, was to cover the assault tain passes north-west of Salerno. When firmly convoy from attack by the Italian battle fleet in established it was to advance and capture the Spezia and while two battleships at port of Naples and the airfields at Capodichino Malta watched Taranto and were available to and Pomigliano. On D-day it was to be replace casualties A support carrier group of assisted by three American Ranger one light fleet and four escort aircraft carriers and two British Commandos, attacking on its was to provide additional fighter cover for the left flank, and on D plus 4 it was to be reinforced landing and was itself covered by aircraft from by 7 Armoured Division. On the right the the fleet aircraft carriers of Force " H ".* United States VI Corps," General Dawley,f was to assault, with 36 Division and one The task of the Air Forces was twofold; first tank , the beaches south of the River and most important to neutralise the enemy Sele, establish a firm beach-head and secure air effort and secondly to disorganise his power the Army right flank. The Army floating of movement. The opening stage in the air reserve consisted of one Regimental Combat plan was designed to force him to evacuate Team of 45 Division under the divisional his air bases in Southern and Central Italy and commander. As a follow-up, when shipping to disrupt the Italian communication system by became available after the assault phase was attacks on key-points. From D minus 7 until over, the remainder of 45 Division was the bridgehead had been firmly established a nominated, and subsequently 34 Division. concentrated effort would be made against the In the original plan a Regimental Combat Team Naples-Salerno area to render useless the air- of 82 Airborne Division was to be dropped fields there and, as far as possible, to isolate north of Naples in the valley of the River the battlefield from enemy reinforcement. When Volrurno to seize the bridges at Triflisco, this was deemed to be accomplished, and de- and Cancello and prevent the arrival of enemy pendent upon the measure of success attained, reinforcements from the north. This drop was close bomber support would become available subsequently cancelled, to the great detriment for general operations. Fighter cover was to of the operations. be provided by a continuous patrol from bases in Sicily, f supplemented by the Seafires of the It will be seen that the forces available for Carrier Support Group, until airfields or emer- the invasion of a hostile coast at the extreme gency, air strips ashore were available. It was limit of air cover and well out of touch with hoped that Montecorvino airfield could be cap- any supporting force were not large, though tured on D-day and that seventy-five aircraft I need not say that they were the largest we could be flown into it by D plus i. could manage. Only three infantry divisions were to make the assault, with an armoured The orders for the Calabrian landing (Opera- division to start disembarking on D plus 4, and tion BAYTOWN) were also issued on i6th subsequent reinforcement would foe slow. The August. It was a simple plan which was carried provision of landing craft was now our acutest out without any but minor variations. The problem. Many of those needed could not be troops to be employed were only two infantry withdrawn from Sicily .before igth August, after divisions, i Canadian and 5 British, reinforced which they had to be hastily refitted at Bizerta, by an armoured and an infantry brigade and undergo such repairs as might be necessary, various units. The artillery sup- and sail to their loading ports; the many uncer- port for the actual crossing, however, was tain factors in the programme made it impos- almost as heavy as Eighth Army had ever had, sible to be sure how many would eventually be including an Army Group , 30 available. We were prepared to strip 13 Corps Corps artillery and four (battalions of American of its craft as soon as it had got itself estab- mediums from assisted by naval lished across the Straits, in fact we took some supporting fire.J In the air, the attack was to Landing Ships, Tank, away on D-day of that be supported by the , with operation. Convoy problems were difficult for elements both of XII U.S. Air Support Com- the Navy. VI Corps was to sail direct from mand and of Tactical Bomber Force temporarily Oran in a single convoy, but 10 Corps had to under its command. be loaded into many different types of ships and craft and sail from and Bizerta in * The additional fighters provided in this way by the Fleet Air Arm made a most valuable contribution a series of convoys of various speeds'and com- to our air cover but they could not have been relied position. All convoys were to pass west of upon to the exclusion of land-based fighters for they Sicily and then proceed, on D minus i, on a could only guarantee eighty sorties on the first day, northerly course, turning eastwards towards the number dropping rapidly thereafter, and the effort could only be sustained for a little over three days. It is Salerno only after last light. A great part of clear therefore that carrier-borne aircraft alone would the route would be along narrow lanes specially have been inadequate to support a landing further north. swept through the enemy minefields where, if t Provided the weather remained fine. Rain would have rendered unserviceable the hastily constructed * Lieutenant-General (later Sir Brian) Horrocks, strips in the Milazzo area and precluded the use of the K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., had been wounded land-based short-range fighters which were to provide in an enemy air raid on Bizerta on 19 August. I the greater part of the fighter protection over the requested the War Office to despatch Lieutenant- assault area. It was one more risk involved in the General (now General Sir Richard) McCreery, G.C.B., operation. K.B.E., JD.S.O., M.C. by air to replace him; he had J Before the assault naval forces, including battle- been my Chief of Staff in Middle East and at ships, heavily bombarded the. .coast defences. The Eighteenth Army Group. assault was supported by three cruisers, three monitors, t Major-General Ernest J. Dawley, United States two gunboats and six destroyers. The naval operations Army, later replaced by Major-General John P. Lucas, were directed by Rear-Admiral (now Admiral Sir . Rhoderick) McGrigor, K.C.B., D.S.O. 2888 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

Italians Open Negotiations for Surrender. and, although their morale was shaken and The military situation on i6th August was their quality inferior, there were sufficient thus clearly denned. The final decisions as to German forces in the country to stiffen them. the manner of the invasion of the Italian main- Resistance was certainly still possible. The land in Calabria and at Salerno had been taken events of the next twenty-one months showed and the planning of the operation was in an that the German forces alone were sufficient to advanced stage. On the next day we received impose a most serious delay on the Allied occu- the news that the political situation had once pation of Italy and the experience of the more undergone a sudden change. On isth Republican Fascist Government showed that an August a General Castellano, of the Italian Italian Government could have continued to Commando Supremo,* presented himself at the function and exercise authority over the greater British Embassy in Madrid; he was travelling part of Italy for a long time to come. under an assumed name as a civil servant and Nor was it true that capitulation was dictated had no written credentials but he claimed to be by internal unrest and popular demand. There an accredited representative of Marshal Badoglio were, indeed, continuous reports during this and .bearer of a message on the latter's behalf. period of disturbances in the industrial towns The Marshal stated that when the Allies invaded of , reports spread for the most Italy the Italian Government was prepared to part by exiled Italian politicians who had also order the immediate cessation of hostilities claimed the credit of provoking the fall of against the Allies and to join them forth- Mussolini by similar disturbances; 'but these with, with all available forces, in the fight reports, like the earlier ones, were known to be against Germany. This was the news we had greatly exaggerated. A reference once more to been awaiting since 25th July, when Mussolini subsequent events will show the unimportance fell. The delay had been caused, not by any of this factor: no unrest among the civilian reluctance to accept the formula of " uncondi- population played any significant role in tional surrender," 'but because Badoglio was diminishing the German capacity to resist in anxious to establish himself firmly in power Italy;* it cannot therefore have been the main and also because this was the first good oppor- factor in disposing the Royal Government to tunity which had presented itself to get in touch capitulate nor, if they had decided to fight on with the Allies unknown to the Germans. The at the side of their German allies, would popular cover employed was that Castellano was going unrest have been any more of an embarrass- to Lisbon as one of the party sent to meet the ment to them than it was to their Republican Italian ambassador returning from Chile. How- successors. The plain fact is that the Italian ever, the date was well chosen since Mr. Government did not decide to capitulate because Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt were at that it saw itself incapable of offering further resist- moment conferring in Quebec, accompanied ance, nor because of any change of heart or by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They were intellectual conviction of the justice of the Allied able, therefore, immediately they were notified and Democratic cause; it decided, as Italian from Madrid of this new development, to direct statesmen had decided in the past, that the time General Eisenhower, in a signal received on had come to " spring to the aid of the victors ". I7th August, to send two representatives to It was largely a General Staff decision. On Lisbon where a further meeting with Castellano a cool calculation, inspired by that " sacro had been arranged at the British Embassy. The egoismo " recommended by Salandra in 1914, two emissaries, Generals Smith and Strong, the chief military authorities had decided that Chief of Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,f the fortunes of war had turned at last against of Allied Force Headquarters, left on i8th the Axis. A similar calculation, false as it August and returned to Algiers on the 20th. turned out, .had brought them into the war in The nature of the Italian capitulation and June 1940. The moment then had been care- the reasons which led to it were not generally fully chosen; now also they hoped that, by understood by the public at the time and have changing sides at this juncture, they would have been widely misrepresented since. This is not just enough .fighting to do to justify a claim, the place for a discussion of the political aspects when the actual end of the war came, to a of the situation but I feel that in order to place among the victorious allies. It would in- explain its effect on our military appreciation volve sacrificing for the present their troops in of the problems of the invasion of Italy and give the 'Balkans and South France but they hoped the proper strategical background to our subse- that their armies in Italy itself would remain quent operations I should deal as briefly as reasonably 'intact. The calculation was acute possible with the motives behind the Italian in one sense, in that they clearly saw that offer. Italy in 1943 was in a very different resistance at the side of the Germans could position from Germany in 1945. Germany still have been .prolonged for some time; but capitulated when the country had been almost there was one serious miscalculation which they completely occupied by the victorious Allies undoubtedly regretted bitterly later on and but and when the prospect of resistance, even for for which they would probably have postponed a few days more, had been almost totally ex- their offer of capitulation. Lacking a proper cluded by the complete disintegration of the appreciation of the difficulties of amphibious armed forces and the disappearance of central warfare, and grossly misinformed by their In- control. This was not the case with Italy; she telligence services of the strength and capabilities still had large armies in the field (her forces in * There was, of course, the insurrection of 25 April the peninsula alone were numerically superior 1945 ; but this was after the German armies had been to anything the Allies could bring against them) destroyed in battle south of the , after they had opened negotiations for surrender and only a week * The Supreme Headquarters of the Armed Forces before their final capitulation. I do not wish to dis- equivalent to our Chiefs of Staff or the German O.K.W. parage in any way the gallant efforts of the Italian t Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Walter Partisans but it is a fact that, up to this date, they did B. Smith, United States Army and Major-General not present a serious military problem to the Germans K. W. D. Strong, C.B., O.B.E. (G-2 = Intelligence and were kept in check mainly by second quality branch.) troops such as Czechs, Slovaks, , etc. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2889 of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean theatre, would broadcast an announcement of the the Commando Supremo assumed that we were armistice; the Italian Government must simul- able to pat on shore, at any point of the Italian taneously make a similar announcement and coastline we chose, a force of such a size that, order its forces and people to collaborate with with the assistance of the Italian troops in the the Allies and resist the Germans, its fleet and country, the Germans would either be destroyed shipping to sail to Allied ports and its aircraft or driven from Italy in rout. The least they to fly to Allied bases, and ensure that all Allied hoped was that the Germans would be forced to prisoners in danger of falling into German hands evacuate all Italy south of the Apennines, the should be released. Italian formations in the later " Gothic " line. In that case the authority Balkans should be ordered to march down to of the Royal Government would continue over the coast preparatory to evacuation. the greater part of the country, the capital would With this Castellano had to be content; there be secured, the Italian Armed Forces, though was a considerable element of bluff in our atti- reduced in size, would remain in being with tude but it seemed likely that the bluff would the position of the Commando Supremo unim- be successful. It was clear throughout that his paired, and Italy would be able to take her place interest was centred, not on the distastefulness among the United Nations. of surrender, but on apprehensions of what the I have dwelt at some length on the military Germans might do. One threat with which the conceptions underlying the Italian offer because, latter had made great play was to employ gas unless they are thoroughly grasped, the pro- against the Italian cities. For our part we did gress of negotiations and subsequent operations not allow ourselves to be carried away by the will be misunderstood.* They were clearly prospect of invading Italy with Italian assist- brought out at the meeting in Lisbon between ance. I was sceptical as to the amount of assist- Castellano and General Eisenhower's emissaries. ance we should actually receive and determined The latter began by presenting the Allied not to attempt any rash operation, such as try- Armistice terms; these had already been pre- ing to land our three divisions out of range pared on the news of the fall of Mussolini in of air cover, in reliance on such assistance. anticipation of an approach by the Italians and This judgment, based on past experience, was the approval of the Allied Governments ob- justified in the sequel; I had expected a little tained on ist August. They were short and more resistance to the Germans than was actu- straightforward, dealing only with military ally offered, but not much more. Any help, matters; the full terms were not yet presented however, was welcome, for the German forces but the Italian Government, in accepting the in Italy were growing at an alarming speed. short terms, was to undertake to sign the more At any rate the Italian Government was clearly comprehensive instrument at a later date. in earnest, as it proved by the subsequent des- Castellano's reaction was as might have been patch to Lisbon of General Zanussi and General expected from the circumstances of the Italian Carton de Wiart.* decision;. almost .disregarding the question of Our next direct contact with General Castel- surrender terms, which he said, indeed, he was lano was on 3ist August at Cassibile in Sicily. I not authorised to discuss, he declared that his had moved my headquarters there on the 28th. purpose was to concert the means by which The scene of a (historic disaster in 413 B.C., Italy would transfer her allegiance from the which marked the downfall of the Athenian emr German to the Allied side.| What he was pire, it was now destined to be the scene of the interested in was our plans for the invasion of signature of an armistice which sealed the dis- Italy, to see what help we could give to the solution of the Italian empire and the disappear- Italian forces in resisting the Germans. He was ance of Italy from the ranks of the Great told that there was no question of our revealing Powers. General Smith, representing General our intentions; not only was this an obvious Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham, Air Marshal measure of security in so dubious a situation Tedder and I were present, and General Clark but also, and more important, if the Commando also attended. It was clear that the Italian Supremo had been apprised of the fact that Government was prepared to accept any terms the utmost we could do was to land three we offered but that it was obsessed by the fear divisions no further north than Salerno they that the Germans would be able, when the would undoubtedly have decided to postpone armistice was announced, to seize control of capitulation to a more propitious date. the whole country in spite of any resistance Castellano was therefore merely informed that, their troops might offer. German troops con- if the Italian Government accepted our terms, tinued to pour in; from Naples southwards there cessation of hostilities would take effect.from a were the four divisions which had been evacu- date and hour to be notified later; this would ated from Sicily, reinforced by two armoured be five or six hours before the main Allied land- divisions .which had not yet been engaged, but ings, which would be in considerable strength. there were between ten and twelve divisions in At that time the Supreme Allied Commander the rest of Italy, including two well placed for a stroke against Rome. Castellano now said * For instance the time which elapsed between that his government could not accept our terms 18 August, our first contact with the Italians, 3 September, the signing of the armistice and 9 Sep- unless we revealed our intentions, so that they tember, the Salerno landing, has been ascribed to our could judge whether we were coming in sjifii- intransigent insistence on, and Italian reluctance to cient force. He pleaded with us at least to accept, the principle of unconditional surrender. In assure him that the landing would be made fact the Italians never, raised any difficulties on this ;. their delay was caused possibly by natural hesitation north of Rome and. in strength not less than and certainly by their desire to discover our plans be- fifteen divisions: he even seemed to think that fore committing themselves finally. The date of 9 we could land a force of that size in the area September, of course, was determined by the avail- ability of landing craft and the phases of the moon. * The former was sent, apparently on his own t General Castellano has published an account of initiative, by General Roatta, Chief of the Army General these negotiations under the title " Come Firmai Staff ; Lieutenant-General (now Sir Adrian) Carton de 1'Armistizio di Cassibile ". It is strikingly factual and Wiart, V.C., K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., a prisoner sober. of war in Italy, was released as a pledge of good faith. 2890 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 of Leghorn.* To show our hand was obviously enemy forces opposing us and the strategy impossible; the bluff must be played out to which they had decided to adopt. On the latter. the end for we too were deeply concerned by point we were fairly well informed and 'had-; the German reinforcement of Italy; but unless acquired an additional source of information in . we could do something to counter this fear General Castellano who told us all the Germans- of the Germans all might yet be lost. An offer had so far revealed to their allies. In order .- was therefore made that we would fly an air- to give a true picture I must step back a little borne division into the Rome area, to land on in time and fill in the background of the general ,r airfields already seized by the Italians, which German strategic position in 1943. •• would co-operate with the five Italian divisions At the beginning of the year the German High around the capitalf in holding it against the Command saw themselves faced with the cer- Germans until our invading force could effect tainty of a serious defeat in South Russia and: a juncture. The risk was obvious; not only the high probability of complete disaster in might we lose the division flown in (82 United Africa. The loss of Stalingrad would tear a . States Airborne Division was nominated) but great gap in the southern end of the Eastern it would also mean that it would not be avail- Front; the loss of would open all able for its very important role in the Saleino southern Europe to the attack of the Anglo- assault, the forces for which were already quite American forces in North Africa. For the weak enough. We decided, however, that the moment the danger in the east was the greater. risk must be taken and on ist September ; Tunisia was still holding out and was expected General Eisenhower informed me of a message to continue to do so; indeed both Kesselring received from the President and the Prime 1 Minister: " We highly approve your decision and Jodl have since stated that they had ex -' to go on with AVALANCHE and to land an pected to be able to retain the bridgehead in' airborne division near Rome on the conditions Tunisia indefinitely; all the available reserves -; indicated ". therefore, less- those already allotted and eh route for Africa, must be sent to Russia. These- An unexpected difficulty now arose because reserves came, as always previously in timeS! Castellano claimed he had no authority to sign of stress on the Eastern Front, from France,' the armistice and must first consult his Govern- which was still, being used as the place where ment. He was told plainly that our terms, in- battered divisions were re-formed and new divi- cluding the new offer, must be accepted or le- sions activated. No less than nineteen divisions jected by the night of ist-2nd September and were despatched in January and February; that, whatever their decision, we should proceed from France to Russia; they were successful; with our plan for carrying the war to the aided by the coming of spring, in stabilizing1 Italian mainland. I have wondered since the front. But as the thaw on the steppes, j whether we should have been able to make brought Hie long opposing battle lines to aj good those bold words if the Italian decision had standstill, 7 Armoured Division entered Tunis.' been negative, but at the time I had no doubt through the Bardo Gate and a German Com-/ they would accept. On the other hand the mander-in^Chief wandered disconsolately down military situation had been changing to our from the low hills of Cape Bon to surrender disadvantage every day since the plan for to an officer of 4 Indian Division. To the twenty, Salerno had first been proposed, in view of the divisions lost at Stalingrad there were now to constant arrival of fresh German forces.J How- ever, the bluff was not called; within our be added over one hundred and thirty thousand . specified time on ist September the King and men* swallowed up in Tunisia, as a final item Badoglio agreed to our terms and at a quarter in the balance of losses already sustained in. past five on 3rd September General Smith, two years of fruitless campaigning in Africa. : on behalf and in the presence of General Eisen- The first German reaction was to reinforce hower, and General Castellano, on behalf of the Balkans. By the end of May their forces' Marshal Badoglio, signed the Military Terms of there had risen from seven to thirteen divisions Surrender. The scene of the signature was a and by the end of August to nineteen; in par- • tent in an almond grove near Cassibile; thir- ticular a strong corps of four divisions, includT ' teen hours before,, to the thunder of six ing a crack armoured division from France, was ' hundred guns in the Straits of Messina, the formed in the Peloponese. It was necessary, Eighth Army had begun the first invasion of however, to give some attention to Italy. It • the continent of Europe. might be felt that the Alps were sufficient pro-' German Dispositions in Italy. tection to the Reich without a glacis to the' Before proceeding to an account of our opera- south of them but there were disadvantages/ tions in Italy I must complete the picture of involved in the abandonment of Italy which- the problems which faced us by detailing the rendered such a course intolerable except in \ extremis. The loss of an ally, involving.the,1 * Marshal Badoglio wanted us to land also at disappearance of the' Rome-Berlin Axis from . Amphibious operations are difficult for the non-expert to understand, as has been clearly demon- the political scene, the loss of useful auxiliary strated by the published works on the Italian campaign. troops who were, numerically, playing the. It may give a better sense of proportion to point out greater part in the garrisoning of the Balkans, that the seaborne assault force for the Normandy the direct threat to the Balkans themselves; landings, the supreme effort of the United Kingdom from attack either across the Adriatic or' and the United States, was five divisions. 1 t One motorised and three infantry divisions and across the relatively lower Julian Alps, the- an armoured division in process of re-formation which loss of airfields from which strategic attacks.- was being equipped with German tanks. against Germany herself could be greatly aug- > J An alternative plan for Fifth Army had been prepared for study on 24 August, in case the increase mented and directed against hitherto immune I in enemy strength should make AVALANCHE areas, and the loss of Italian industrial producr.. impracticable. It was suggested that Fifth Army tion, were dangers to be avoided at almost ajl should substitute a direct assault. on the Heel of Italy for the landing at Salerno ; this operation could * German losses only. Total Axis prisoners in the" not have been carried out before 21 .September. final -capitulation amounted to 248,006. ' * •'* ;•' '• SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2891 costs. There were also two psychological fac- i5th August, a conference attended by Roatta, tors which weighed strongly with Hitler, on the Italian Chief of Staff, and three other whom the decision rested; the well-known Italian Generals on the one hand and by reluctance, exhibited both previously and sub- Rommel, Jodl and Rintelen on the other*. • sequently, to yield any ground without a fight, After some ugly bickering between Roatta and •and, to some extent at least, loyalty to his okl Jodl over the question of German troops being ally Mussolini. It was decided, therefore, that used for the " protection " of the Brenner German troops should assist in the defence of route the two plans for the defence of the Italy and that the Allies should be held as far country were produced. The Italians wished south as possible. * for twelve German divisions of which nine By this time good progress had been made were to be in Southern and Central Italy, one with the re-formation, in France, of the twenty in Corsica, and only two in Northern Italy and Liguria; this figure excluded the four divi- divisions destroyed at Stalingrad, and other sions from Sicily. This plan might reasonably exhausted divisions from the Eastern Front appear to be based on the Italian desire to were resting there. If the precedent of 1942 had have the defence of the whole pensinsula pro- been followed these re-formed divisions should vided for; but after the capitulation it was used have been employed once more in Russia; in- by Hitler as the basis of a charge that Bado- stead, any idea of a serious offensive in the glio had schemed to draw the German forces east was renounced and they were to be made far down into Italy, as far as possible from available for the defence of the southern front. their bases, and dispersed in small groups There were no organisational difficulties in their which could be easily dealt with by the Italian employment in Italy for there were already in troops in the same areas. The German plan existence there the installations which had for the disposition of their sixteen divisions served for the transit of divisions bound for (i.e. including the four from Sicily) put eight the war in Africa and Kesselring, the Com- in Northern Italy under Rommel, two near mander-in-Chief, South (Oberbefehlshaber Siid), Rome and six in Southern Italy; the latter two was already on the spot. The first necessity forces were to be under Kesselring. This plan was to provide for the security of the islands; was the one adopted in the event. Proposals two divisions went to Sicily and one to Sardinia for the employment of Kesselring's forces, as and an S.S. brigade to Corsica. More were to reported to us by General Castellano, were still follow, when available, for the defence of the fluid and would be based on the Germans' own peninsula but at the Feltre conference on igth strength when the invasion came and their July Hitler informed Mussolini that he could appreciation of the Allies' strength. In prin- not spare more than twenty divisions and could ciple they intended to defend the line of the not guarantee more than to hold northern Italy Apennines from Massa Carrara to Pesaro, the north of a line roughly from Pisa to . later " Gothic " line, though if the Allies were The first week of the Sicilian campaign had to attack this in great strength they would with- already shown the uselessness of the Italian draw to the Po. If, however, the Allies showed Army. little strength -the Germans would attempt to The fall of Mussolini came as a great shock hold a line'from Grosseto, through Monte Amiata to the Germans, who had 'had no warning of its to and thence to Ancona.f Finally, imminence. Orders were hurriedly issued to if the circumstances and relative strengths were all German troops in Italy to avoid any be- particularly favourable, an attempt would be haviour which might appear provocative and made to stand south of Rome on the line Gaeta, many observers report how apprehensive and Isernia, . This was a line which the nervous all ranks appeared. For the moment Italians had already surveyed, and defences there . was no open cause for alarm since were already being prepared at certain points.f Badoglio had declared " The war continues " There is no need to detail the various stages but it was perfectly clear mat the Italians had of the German reinforcement of Italy and I lost confidence in an Axis victory. It was will pass on to the situation as it presented it- necessary, therefore, to provide for the safety, self on 3rd September. § For the immediate pur- not only of the southern frontier of the Reich, pose dispositions in South Italy are the most but also of the German troops in Italy who important, and they were the best known at might at any moment find themselves at the the time. Four divisions had been evacuated mercy of a hostile population and attacked in from Sicily; of these 29 Panzer Grenadier Divi- force by their erstwhile brothers in arms. The sion remained in Calabria, 15 Panzer Grena- programme of reinforcement had already been dier and Hermann Goering Divisions moved to laid down; it was necessary to speed it up and the Naples area to refit and I Parachute Divi- throughput July and August, while the German sion, less certain elements, moved to Altamura troops in Sicily were holding a line around in Apulia. In addition to these there were two and while they withdrew across newly formed armoured divisions south of the Straits of Messina into Calabria, new Ger- Naples: 26 Panzer Division|| in Calabria, man forces continued to pour into Italy over based on the isthmus of Catanzaro and 16 the Brenner, out of France and over the north- Panzer Division covering the Gulf of Salerno. eastern passes. The main concentration was in * The minutes of the meeting were found among the Mussolini papers. northern Italy, where Field-Marshal Rommel f This was, roughly, the Trasimene line on which was appointed to command; he was also to be they offered delaying resistance in June 1944 on their responsible for Slovenia and Northern Croatia, withdrawal from Rome to the " Gothic " line. from which Italian troops were to be with- I It formed the basis for the German " Winter " line of 1943-1944. drawn. § The German order of battle at this date is given The last occasion on which the Germans and at Appendix " B ". || Less its armour. I Battalion of its tank , Italians consulted together on their plans for equipped with Panther tanks, never came to Italy. the defence of Italy, as far as can be ascer- II-Battalion, with Mark Ill's and IV's, was at this tained, was at Casalecchio near , on time north of Rome with 3 Panzer Grenadier Division. 2892 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

In the general area of Rome there were 2 There was also the danger of a complete break- Parachute Division on the coast near Ostia down of all (facilities, such as transport and and 3 Panzer Grenadier Division around power, with an additional strain on German . These were Kesselring's eight divi- resources in consequence which might be more sions already mentioned; they were organised, than they could stand unless control was limited under Headquarters (- to the (Northern Italian area. This was a factor General von Vietinghoff), into two corps: on which we also placed some hopes; it seemed XIV Panzer Corps north and LXXVI Panzer reasonable to expect that the workers in these Corps south. Directly under Kesselring was industries would, even if they took no other XI Flieger Corps (Air Corps); this had been action, at least achieve a high degree of moved from Avignon when the two parachute " absenteeism ". It was natural, therefore, in divisions, ist and 2nd, came to Italy. It was the midst of such dangers and uncertainties, responsible for the training and administration that the German High Command should decide of all parachute units (and directly com- to restrict its ambitions to what seemed within manded 2 Parachute Division) and for the its powers and not wish to risk disaster by defence of the Rome area and the west coast attempting too much. between a point north of the Gulf of Gaeta and I must touch, in closing, on a question which Kesselring's northern boundary. was hotly debated both at the time and sub- sequently; whether the Germans expected us In North Italy was Army Group ' B ', Field- to land in the Naples area and, more par- Marshal Rommel, with headquarters on Lake ticularly, at Salerno. It is essential to be Garda, commanding all forces in Italy and clear what is meant by the question.* Cer- Italian-occupied Slovenia north of a line from tainly the Germans expected us to land some- Grosseto to Rimini. By the beginning of Sep- where in Italy and almost certainly on the tember it totalled an equivalent of ten divisions west coast. It is standard form for all armies (including one and a half divisions in Sardinia to prepare appreciations to meet all possible and Corsica which were technically under the cases and there was undoubtedly somewhere local Italian commanders) of which two were in Kesselring's headquarters an appreciation armoured divisions. Reinforcement had been based on the assumption that we should launch proceeding throughout August and at the same an assault on Naples and one of the sub-head- time an extensive development of lines of com- ings undoubtedly considered a landing in the munication and administrative facilities had Gulf of Salerno. What we have to consider in been rapidly pushed ahead, in particular the order to-arrive at a just conclusion is not all creation of a very large staging and mainten- the possibilities that passed through the mind ance area around . There were four of' the Commander-in-Chief but what actual Corps Headquarters under the Army Group, physical steps he .took; his dispositions will the most important being LXXXVII Corps give the answer. As I have already pointed •which, wiih four divisions, was responsible out, he had -made dispositions to meet attacks for the protection of Liguria and . in the Naples area, the iRdme- The effect of these dispositions was, first of area and the Genoa-Spezia area. .Turning to all, to ensure German control of Northern the first mentioned, the reasons, which I need Italy. For the rest forces were disposed to not detail again, that urged Naples as an objec- meet an Allied invasion at the points con- tive so strongly on us must have been obvious sidered most threatened: Calabria, Gaeta- to the Germans as well. In the circumstances Naples-Salerno, the Rome area and Genoa- I consider it surprising that they should have Spezia. All these points were considered as allotted only three, divisions, two of which had possible Allied objectives with the degree of scarcely recovered from their severe losses in probability increasing towards the north. Any Sicily, to cover the whole stretch of a hundred landing we made, except in Calabria, would and fifty miles of coast from Gaeta to Agropoli. be strongly opposed. The chief lesson the That they knew of our intention to land Germans claimed to have learned from Sicily actually in the Gulf of Salerno I do not believe, was that it was vital to destroy the assaulting nor do I believe that they even considered forces actually on the beaches and not to hold it the most likely hypothesis. They had dis- back defending forces for a deliberate counter- posed two divisions to cover Naples and the attack. But an intention to (resist a landing beaches to the north, either side of. the Volturno, in the hope of a spectacular victory is quite and had only brought over the third ,ai6 Panzer consistent with a decision on general prin- Division, from Apulia to Salerno at the end of ciples not to hold Southern and Central Italy August. Actions speak louder even than if an invasion were successful. It was a de- wisdom after the event. I have already described cision rather at variance with ordinary German, the excellence of the Salerno' beaches. Four and • in -particular Hitlerian, psychology and battalions of infantry and a battalion of tanks, appears to have been based on two misappre- even adding in the divisional reconnaissance ciations; the usual over-estimate of Allied and engineer battalions, are a very slender strength and too gloomy a judgment of the force to defend over thirty miles of coast; dangers which Italian treachery would involve. although there were. Italian troops also in th$ Although the Germans had no higher an opinion line Sicily had clearly demonstrated their lise- of their Axis partners than had the Allies they lessness and the Germans' should ha've sus- realised that Italian defection would at least pected, though the evidence is clear.that they leave many doors open for the invader and, did not know, that'Marshal Badoglio was about in the worst case, Italian arms turned against to follow the example of General' Y.orck- in them might lead to more serious disaster; they i8±2. -. . '' --•'•• •'-•'•; also expected, as we did to a certain extent, * The fact that we gained strategic surprise is that the allegedly turbulent population of sometimes obscured by'the fact that .we did ndt gain, Northern Italy would present them with a grave nor had hoped for, tactical surprise. To sail, so large a fleet into the Gulf of -Salerno without attracting jhe security problem which would engage the atten- attention of somebody on" shore would have been too tion of all the troops allotted to that area. much to expect: - -•••*' SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2893

Eighth Army Landings in Calabria. easy gains at small initial expense. I was While the negotiations for the armistice were particularly reluctant to see Corfu go by de- in progress planning for 13 Corps' assault had fault. But none of these subsidiary opera- proceeded rapidly under great and tions would bear close examination; however overcoming continual crises. It was difficult inexpensive they might appear in the early to work strictly within the craft limitations im- stages the subsequent cost was bound to be posed by the necessity of giving priority to the high and, above all, by dispersing strength to Salerno operation and there were times when secondary objectives we should offend against there were considerable differences of opinion the great principle of concentration. With an between the military and naval staffs. Every assault force of only three divisions a comman- effort was made to mount the attack as early der must choose carefully his course and, when as possible; for some time it looked as though chosen, persevere in his choice without dis- the night of 4th /5th September would be the sipating his resources. " War," said Wolfe, earliest, but we managed eventually to put it "is an election of difficulties." I have given forward to 0430 hours on the 3ird. The attack the reasons why we had decided on the main- was a complete success. Opposition was light land of Italy as our next objective and we had and we met no Germans; by the" morning of no troops to spare for any other objective, how- D-day Reggie had been captured and in the ever attractive. Every available man who evening of the same day iBagnara was in our could be lifted in every available craft was hands. The reinforcement and supply of our already earmarked for the Salerno operation forces were exceeding *expectations. Demoli- and there was no-one who did not from time tions were the main factor delaying our to time fear that even this might prove too advance and there was reason to hope that little. AVALANCHE had already been if these enemy tactics were continued, and weakened by the withdrawal of 82 Airborne providing Eighth Army pressed resolutely for- Division for the Rome operation; it would be ward, it would not be as far out of supporting impossible to weaken it any further. distance of Fifth Army's Salerno landings as There were, however, two other areas where had 'been feared. It must be emphasized, how- action on the small scale possible for us could ever, that the roads were few and inferior, the have useful and lasting results. Sardinia and Army was on a light scale of transport and the Corsica had already been prepared for, as I further it advanced the more difficult would have explained, and General Giraud's task was be its maintenance. I will deal with this point likely to be made much easier by the Italian later, when I come to discuss the administra- surrender as there were four Italian divisions tive crisis which developed late in September. to one German in Sardinia and three to a Ger- Attention and interest could now be switched man brigade in Corsica; encouraging odds since to the major operation impending on the gth. in these islands, if nowhere else in Italy, the In order to exercise proper control, I found Italians would be in direct touch with Allied it necessary to move back to JBizerta where 1 sea-power. But over and above the forces the opened a small Tactical Headquarters on 7th French could scrape together for the liberation September. This was dictated mainly

add to those risks. If we allowed the Italians The Battle erf Salerno. to break the agreement with us there was a The news of the Italian armistice could not danger that, when they saw the smallness of be kept from the troops who were even then our force, they might repudiate it altogether. heading up the Gulf of Salerno nor was it either It was not true that they had had insufficient honourable or advisable not to inform them time to make the necessary military disposi- that the Italians were now pledged to fight on tions, and in the frame of mind which then our side. But in spite of the fact that they reigned it is doubtful if. any further allowance were warned that the assault would continue of time would have produced a (better result. as planned and that they would certainly meet resistance on shore from the Germans there was Marshal Badoglio was therefore reminded in a definite feeling of optimism among the assault- vigorous terms of the obligations he had ing troops. The Germans were also surprised assumed and the dishonour which would fol- by the news with opposite results; the shock low their repudiation. Although the airborne was the greater as they had just heard that our operation, on his own showing, would have invasion fleet was at sea. That afternoon at to be cancelled, we were eager to undertake it 1600 hours, two and a half hours .before General again as soon as possible; in the meantime his Eisenhower's broadcast, 16 Panzer Division five divisions should suffice to provide tem- had been informed that thirty-six ships, escorted porary protection for the capital. Whatever by destroyers, had been sighted twenty-five Badoglio did, finally, the Allies would announce miles south of Capri; the division ordered the existence of the armistice at the hour " State of Alarm II."* When the news of originally planned. No reply came to this sig- the surrender came, however, there was still nal and when at the appointed time, 1830 hours, nine hours in which the Germans could act. Badoglio did not broadcast as arranged it They at once proceeded to take over the Italian seemed that the worst had happened. But it coast defence positions and disarm the troops. was only a final instance of vacillation; at 1945 By the time the first Allied troops landed the hours he at last was heard reading in a de- Germans were ready for them. pressed and subdued voice his statement that The fighting on the beaches of Salerno was Italy had surrendered unconditionally. That among the fiercest of the whole Italian cam- night he and the King fled from Rome (by car paign, in spite of the fact that the advantage to and thence in a warship to Brindisi. of strategic surprise enabled us to bring three They left no orders .behind for the defence of divisions against one; but war is never a Rome, where all was in confusion, and scarcely matter of mathematics and least of all are any response was -made by the Italian armed amphibious operations. Of the Allied forma- forces or civilian population to the rather tions only 46 Division had had much previous vaguely worded order in Badoglio's broadcast experience in action and that experience had that, whilst ceasing resistance to the Allies, they been occasionally unlucky; 56 Division had had were to resist " any attack which might come only a few days fighting on the Enfidaville line from another quarter ". It was only at the in Tunisia, with varied success; 36 Division last minute that Badoglio had decided that he was entirely inexperienced. The time avail- could not honourably order his people directly able for training and planning had been to take action against the Germans. very short; some units landed on the wrong beaches. This was the first time we had met The result was a fatal apathy and disorgani- real resistance, including the use of German sation. Only the fleet carried out whole- tanks actually on the beach. The result of heartedly the surrender terms. The air force the tactics employed by 16 Panzer Division was endeavoured to do so, but with only partial that, at the cost of severe casualties to itself, success. On land no real resistance was it succeeded in imposing serious delay and some offered to the Germans and we derived degree of disorganisation and thereby gained little positive benefit from the armistice time for reinforcements to arrive. Once given as a result. The five divisions in the this breathing space the German rate of rein- Rome area made only a brief and unco- forcement iby land was bound to be greater ordinated resistance to 2 Parachute Division than ours by sea. They determined to devote and the hastily summoned 3 Panzer Grenadier all their efforts to throwing us back into the Division; all was quiet there by loth Septem- sea and for a week they disregarded all other ber, so much so that the Panzer Grenadiers factors for this purpose, including the steadily could be sent on almost immediately to the growing threat from Eighth Army. front in Campania. In North Italy the Ger- The first three days of the operation went mans were faced with a considerable logistical relatively successfully though our progress was and organisational problem in the mere not as great as we had hoped. In the next physical difficulties of taking over control of so three days the Germans launched a series of extensive an area with so many large industrial counter-attacks which produced a very serious cities; but these difficulties were not aggra- crisis on the I4th. By the I5th the Germans vated, or only insignificantly, by the resistance had admitted defeat. It was a dramatic week. either of the armed forces or of the civilian * The Germans had three pre-arranged " states of population. The great city of , for in- alarm " (Alarmzustande) for troops on coast defence. Alarmzustand I meant merely that the possibility of stance, with a strong garrison of regular troops an invasion existed and appropriate measures were and an allegedly turbulent and liberty-loving to be taken; II meant that an invasion fleet was at proletarian population, surrendered to a small sea, destination unknown, and all units were to make preparations to be able to move at short notice; force of S.S. troops. We had not expected III meant that a landing on the unit or formation's much from the Italians; twenty-one years of actual sector was imminent. State of Alarm II was Fascist corruption and inefficiency had nothing new for the German coastal troops ; it had often been'ordered in the past weeks, particularly by quenched any spark of patriotic feeling in a units in the Gulf of Gaeta. It is not known when, if not naturally warlike people. ever, State of Alarm III was ordered at Salerno. B 2896 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

The first reports spoke of heavy fighting on the Albanella to a shorter line on the La Cosa beaches but steady progress. The greatest creek to conform with the withdrawal on its gain in ground was made on the southern flank left. Our lines had been pushed back at where VI Corps by the night of nth September one point to within a thousand yards of the had captured a line from Altavilla to Albanella beach. Even more dangerous was the attack and back to the coast at Agropoli; at its furthest on the 10 Corps front. On the iath the enemy point this {represented an advance of some ten succeeded in driving us out of Battipaglia, in- miles inland. .Resistance in this sector had been flicting heavy losses on 167 Infantry Brigade very heavy on the beaches but considerably which had to toe relieved by 201 Guards lighter when the first beach-head had been con- Brigade. In a signal .which I received early on solidated. The enemy resisted much more the I3th from General Clark he described 10 strongly on 10 Corps' front, both on the beaches Corps' situation as unfavourable and 56 and further inland; Salerno was captured on Division as exhausted. The enemy pursued his the morning of the loth and Montecorvino air- advantage; regrouping his forces he attacked field, one of the Corps' most important objec- again in strength from Battipaglia and Eboli tives, on the evening of the nth, but it could on the night of the I3th/141*1, clearly intend- not be brought into operation as yet since it ing to break right through to the beaches. The was still .under artillery fire. Very heavy I4th was the critical day and the attacks on fighting raged on the loth and nth around all parts of our front were pressed with the Battipaglia, the most important road junction greatest vigour. We suffered heavy casualties in the plain; by the night we had a battalion and lost ground in some places, but by ^the in the town, fiercely engaged by the enemy. use of every remaining reserve and by employ- Fighting of this intensity showed how differ- ing administrative troops hi the line the enemy ent the Sicilian campaign would have been was held. It was an impressive example of had we been opposed on the beaches by stubborn doggedness in defence, for the sea German troops and seemed to augur ill for the at our ibacks was very close and all troops time when enemy reinforcements should arrive. were exhausted -by six days of uninterrupted On the afternoon of loth September, I signalled struggle.. to General Montgomery to the effect that if We had taken such steps as we could to the Germans had dealt successfully with the improvise extra assistance but there was not Italians in the Naples-Home area I was anxious much we could do which would have immediate about their possible rate of concentration- effect. Admiral Cunningham ordered against Fifth Army. It was of the utmost " Warspite " and " Valiant " at full speed to importance that he should maintain pressure the Gulf, in spite of the danger of German air upon the Germans so that they could hot move attacks, which had been scoring some suc- forces from his front and concentrate them cesses with the new radio-controlled bombs. against AVALANCHE. Their accurate and deadly shooting against the The Germans were indeed reinforcing fast. troop concentrations at Battipaglia and Eboli, From the north-west the Hermann Goering reinforciiig the fire of the British and United Division and part of 15 Panzer Grenadier States cruisers and destroyers already on the Division were rushed down to oppose 10 Corps, spot, undoubtedly contributed very consider- followed by 3 Panzer Grenadier Division, its ably to the defeat of the counter-offensive in task of pacification in the Rome area completed. the most dangerous area. An equally valuable LXXVI Panzer Corps was ordered to accelerate contribution was made by heavy bombing its disengagement from Calabria and despatch attacks by the Strategic Air -Force. To bring to the Salerno battlefield 29 Panzer Grenadier sea and air power to bear was a relatively Division, all but a battle group of 26 Panzer easy and rapid affair, but other reinforce- Division and the third regiment of I Parachute ment could not be so speedy. On the I2th Division from Apulia. Eighth Army's advance I had ordered Eighth Army to press on with was henceforward to be delayed almost entirely all possible speed, accepting the administrative by geographical and logistical difficulties while risks involved, and sent General Richardson'*, Kesselring sought to snatch a quick success over my Chief of Staff, to General Montgomery to Fifth Army. There was an obvious danger explain the full urgency of the situation. Oh that the German ibuild-up would be quicker the I3th I made arrangements to put 82 Air- than ours at a time when only our initial objec- borne Division into the bridgehead as quickly as tives had been reached and we had neither a possible and bring 3 United States Division from port nor an airfield, and to meet the threat Sicily on top priority. A Regimental Combat all means of increasing our fighting troops in Team of 82 Division was dropped by the bridgehead, even at the expense of their parachute behind our own lines on the administrative units, must be sought. It was night of the I3th-i4th and went into fortunate, therefore, that there were at Oran action at once, another was dropped in the eighteen Landing Ships, Tank, en route for same way the next night and the third came in India; permission was asked and granted on by landing craft on the I5th. We also dropped nth September for these to be employed at a battalion of parachutists in the Avellino Salerno; they were to be released again by area to disrupt enemy communications there; I2th October -at the latest. this was originally requested for the night of Before this reinforcement programme could the I2th-i3th but could not be mounted before take effect large-scale German counter-attacks the night of the I4th-T5th. This was fairly had begun and soon caused grave anxiety. The quick work; the first elements of 3 Division, critical period was I2th to I4th September. on the other hand, could not begin to arrive On the I2th a strong attack drove VI Corps out before the i8th. of Altavilla and on the I3th the enemy advanced I went to the bridgehead myself on i4th down both banks of the River Sele, threaten- September and was able to see both the acute ing to cut our bridgehead in half. This latter difficulties of the situation and the gallant attack made dangerous progress and on the night of the I3th/i4th VI Corps withdrew from * The late Major-General A. A. Richardson. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2897 efforts of the defence. By the evening of that brought up and the new axis of supply estab- day I felt that the crisis was past and the lished through the Heel ports. 5 Corps Head- situation beginning to turn in our favour. quarters had landed at Taranto on i8th Septem- 7 Armoured Division had begun to disembark ber and on the 22nd a special .force under in 10 Corps' area on that day and a Regimental command of Headquarters 78 Division, and Combat Team of 45 Division also landed and including elements of that division and of 4 came into Army reserve.* These moves were Armoured Brigade, was due to land at Bari for part of the original programme and the emer- mobile operations against Foggia. i Airborne gency moves on which we had decided were Division had reached a line from forward of also beginning to show their effect. Before I Bari to near Matera, where they were in contact left on the 15th I signalled to General Eisen- with i Canadian Division; all -the area south- hower to the effect that although I was not east of this line, including the ports of Bari, actually happy about the situation I was Brindisi and Taranto, was clear of the enemy. happier than I had been< twenty-four hours The Italian fleet and air force had surrendered earlier. The troops were tired but on the whole in accordance with the terms of the armistice in good heart. I informed him that I had in so far as they were not prevented by the issued certain instructions, details of which I action of the Germans but the Italian army had would give on my return next day. I also said been eliminated except for a few poorly equipped that I had asked for 1,500 British Infantry formations in the south and the troops in Sar- replacements from Philippeville to come as early dinia and Corsica. Mussolini had been rescued as possible. I asked 'him to inform Admiral from his prison on the Gran Sasso but this, Cunningham and Air Marshal Tedder that our though irritating, was not considered likely to air bombing and ships' gunfire had been great add to our difficulties in Italy, an appreciation morale raisers to .the troops. which proved wholly justified. The " Quad The Germans in their counter-attacks had rant " conference at Quebec had broken up and been working under definite limitations of I was informed of its main decisions regarding time. They had, deliberately, as good as the .Mediterranean on i8th September. No broken contact with Eighth Army in order to change was made in the allotment of forces fling the troops coming up from Calabria to the theatre; this involved the withdrawal to against Fifth Army, but they could not ignore the United Kingdom of. eight good divisions, Eighth Army's advance beyond a certain to be replaced in part by French divisions as date. By the I5th they decided that they had the latters' equipment progressed, reduction of failed; on that day reconnaissance elements of the bomber strength by about a hundred and 5 British Division were at Sapri, about fifty seventy aircraft by December 1943 and a con- miles south of the VI Corps position, with siderable withdrawal of troop-carrying aircraft patrols forward, and by the i6th the whole and assault shipping and craft. division was concentrated in the area Lagonegro- My plan of campaign had to be based on these Sapri-Maratea with a brigade at each place. considerations. It had to be flexible and general On the same day patrols of 5 Reconnaissance in terms and as I put it to my Army Command- Regiment made contact with patrols from VI ers it was rather a general directive on the Corps five miles west of Vallo and the method of conducting the coming operations Canadians were in a position to threaten and an indication of the bounds of our advance. Potenza. The enemy had already begun to Our object I defined as " the seizing of withdraw in front of VI Corps, and with that certain vital areas which contain groups of all- confession of his inability to destroy our bridge- weather airfields, ports and centres of road com- head our hold on the mainland of Italy could munications. On these firm bases the Annies be considered firm. can be regrouped, reorganised and balanced, and from them strong offensive operations can be developed to destroy the German forces in the field. Light mobile forces and patrols will be PART II. operating ahead of these bases against the enemy THE WINTER CAMPAIGN continuously. This advance screen harasses the Planning. hostile rearguards, obtains information of all On 2ist September I issued instructions to natures, and aids us to keep the initiative ". both Army Commanders giving the broad basis I indicated four phases into which our of our plan for future operations. The situation advance could be divided. The first was the at that date was briefly as follows. Fifth Army consolidation of our present position on the line had just advanced VI Corps, on its right, north- Salerno-Bari; the second was to give us-the port wards to follow up the German withdrawal of Naples and the airfield centre of Foggia. which was taking the form of a great wheeling The third aimed at securing Rome and the air- movement, pivoting on the Salerno peninsula; fields round it and the important road and rail 10 Corps was regrouping and reorganising after centre of Terni. For the next phase I indicated the heavy fighting of the past week and was as eventual objectives the port of Leghorn and preparing to launch a direct attack on the Naples the communications centres of and plain through the gorges north of Salerno. ; but this was well in the future, depen- Eighth Army was halted in the Potenza area, dent on the enemy reaction, the strength of having made contact with Fifth Army on its our own forces, how our ports and communica- left and 5 Corps on its right; it was now neces- tions were functioning and so on. Throughout sary to pause after the rapid advance to the the advance I planned " to take full advantage assistance of Fifth Army while the administra- of our control of the sea and skies to put ashore tive " tail " of the fighting troops could be small but hard-hitting mobile forces behind the enemy so as to cut.him off ". In the event I * The arrival of the craft bringing these reinforce- ments apparently suggested to the Germans that we was only able, for reasons which will appear were re-embarking; their broadcast propaganda later, to carry out two of these amphibious claimed a " Second Dunkirk ". operations, at and Anzio. B 2 2898 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

Capture of Naples and Foggia. Fifth Army averted when* the expected diffi- The first phase of this plan was already prac- culties materialized and Eighth Army found tically completed when I wrote and, after the itself with virtually no reserves at all. pause, we proceeded with the second phase. Taranto and Brindisi, however, were now Fifth Army had a hard struggle for the passes available so that if our administrative tail could leading down into the plain of Naples but by be switched from the Toe to the Heel there 28th September 10 Corps was through and the would be the considerable advantage of a King's Dragoon Guards entered the great city shorter line of communication and better roads at 0930 hours on ist October. Eighth Army's and ports, and even railways, with which to principal objective, - Foggia and its airfields, operate. On the other hand to carry out this had fallen four days before on the 27th. On switch and at the same time continue to support both fronts the pursuit went on, but it was the Army in its operations was an extraordin- slower now. On 6th October Fifth Army stood arily difficult task and placed a tremendous along the line of the Volturno River and strain on the very limited resources avail- realised that it would have to force a crossing able. It was a great achievement and against strong resistance; Eighth Army had also it took the rest of the month of Septem- left behind the early days of rapid advance ber before the situation could be said to across the open country of Apulia and the line be stabilized again, though even then it ran clear across Italy through the mountains was far from satisfactory. On the 2Qth from Termoli to Benevento and Capua and General Montgomery informed me that when down to the Tyrrhenian at . My he had reached a line from Termoli through plan had been based on the German intention to Vinchiaturo he would have to to withdraw to the Pisa-Rimini line and that pause for ten or fourteen days as he had abso- Intention had now been revoked on the highest lutely no reserve stocks. Our administrative authority; but before proceeding to discuss the machinery had been overdriven and could not effect of this new situation I must pause to des- sustain any more shocks for the moment; as cribe the problems of administration which I told the Chief of the Imperial General Staff* now faced us. hi a signal on the 30th " Men can go hungry but a truck just won't ". Administrative Problems.* Eighth Army were thus rather breathless after The most serious and most urgent problem their splendid gallop through Calabria, Lucania was the imminent danger of the complete break- and Apulia; Fifth Army had had sterner down of the maintenance of Eighth Army. This fighting -but then" maintenance position was situation, though no doubt it should in theory much easier, for they could use the ports and never be allowed to occur, did not reflect any beaches at Salerno and Torre Annunziata, discredit on anyone but was the result of a which were close behind then* front line, and deliberate decision to accept an administrative would shortly be able to bring Naples into risk for the sake of urgent and vital operational use. At first sight this looked a disheartening advantage. It would obviously be absurd at problem. The port had been most thoroughly such a time, to sit down and do nothing until blocked and all the port facilities—cranes, our administrative resources and plans were quays, lighters, etc.—destroyed. Ships of all perfect, nor was there any simple solution avail- sizes, including ten thousand ton cruisers, able, for we had rightly decided not to create hospital ships and two large liners, had been a proper base in Sicily and were therefore still sunk alongside nearly all the quays and in the based on North Africa and Middle East and, to fairway inside the moles. In all, some three a certain and increasing extent, directly on the hundred lighters, the total number available United Kingdom and United States. It v/ould in the port, and all the tugs and small craft have been equally absurd to confine our opera- had been sunk at their berths. I need hardly tions to Calabria until we could build up a 'mention that mines and booby traps were cun- cast-iron administrative backing. The early ingly dispersed everywhere from the harbour days of the landings had gone smoothly gates to the water's edge. But we had had -enough; the small ports of Reggio, San Venere fair experience in opening demolished ports and and Cotrone were put into use for the main- by the second week in October the discharge tenance of the forces in Calabria and although capacity was already reaching five thousand the initial maintenance of the hastily planned tons per day. This was a splendid effort and operations at Taranto was not entirely satis- entirely removed any apprehension as to Fifth factory this was natural enough in the cir- Army's maintenance. cumstances, f The administrative staffs were Our next problem, now we were firmly estab- 3. little surprised to get their first positive con- lished in Italy, was the rate at which we could firmation of the operation simultaneously with reinforce or, in the universally accepted expres- the news of the landing but were soon mollified sion of this war, our " build-up ". We were by reflecting on the importance of the speedy definitely inferior hi numbers to the Germans •capture of Taranto and Brindisi undamaged; and their land communications would enable indeed this was of vital importance in averting them to reinforce much faster than us. The the threatened breakdown. It was when I solution of the problem depended on avail- began to be worried about the situation at ability of formations' and shipping to move Salerno that I ordered General Montgomery to them. The former consideration was not likely push ahead at all risks and he complied in to influence the situation before 1944 since, spite of the warnings of his staff that so rapid although the number of formations in the an advance would risk a complete administra- Mediterranean was in fact limited, and although tive breakdown. Hardly was the danger to the majority of these were deficient, in one way * See Appendix " K ". or another and would therefore only become t Up to 14 September the total transport of i Air- available for operations with a varying degree borne Division amounted to seven jeeps and two trailers, two requisitioned cars, one motorcycle and * General Sir Alan Brooke (now Field-Marshal The £wo bicycles. Viscount Alanbrooke, K.G., G.C.B., O.M., D.S.O.). SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2899 of delay, there were at present as many fit for success of the campaign in Italy; the move of battle as the means of transport could deal the Strategic Air Force, on the other hand, was with. An estimate prepared for r"* on 6th dictated by considerations of general European September showed that by the end of the month strategy outside Italy, that is the furtherance we should have available in the Mediterranean of POINTBLANK, the strategic bombing pro- one armoured and eleven infantry divisions and gramme against German Europe which was in an airborne brigade; this figure did not in- full swing from the United Kingdom. In it- clude the divisions due to return to the United self, therefore, from the purely local point Kingdom but included one division earmarked of view, the move represented a positive dis- for operations against the Dodecanese.* By advantage to the progress of the Italian cam- ist January this figure should have risen to paign, though the capture of Foggia and its twenty infantry divisions, five armoured employment in this manner had been one of divisions and possibly one airborne division. I the main objects of the invasion of Italy. The must emphasise, however, that this was the necessary lift for the Strategic Air Force came total for the whole theatre and out of it must to rather more than the equivalent of two divi- be deducted the four divisions required for the sions and their maintenance requirements were garrison of the Middle East and North Africa nearly as great as those of Eighth Army on the and the forces intended and promised for the east coast. We eventually decided to slow down support of Turkey if that country should enter the move and spread it out until March, with the war.f Our position is therefore clearer if the proviso that six heavy bombardment groups we contrast these forces not merely with the (equivalent to about two hundred and fifty nineteen German divisions already in Italy but four-engined aircraft) should be in Italy and with the fifty-odd in the Mediterranean theatre operative by the end of the year. from South France to the Balkans. Our build-up in Italy could not be very fast. The vital question in all discussions of build- A paper prepared on 2nd October estimated that up was the availability of shipping. I have by mid-October we should have on the main- already pointed out that the Mediterranean now land ten infantry divisions, one and a third took second priority to western waters and that, armoured divisions, two airborne divisions and besides surrendering eight veteran divisions, the equivalent of five independent brigades. we were to lose most of our amphibious equip- Three of the infantry divisions had had heavy ment. The effect of the reduction was to casualties and were considered only seventy- remove eighty per cent, of our Landing Ships, five per cent, effective; one armoured division Tank and Landing Ships, Infantry and two- and one airborne division were due to be with- thirds of our assault craft of all natures. The drawn to the United Kingdom and in the event loss of Landing Ships, Tank was most serious the other airborne division went also, leaving for we could move a vehicle across the Medi- only a brigade group behind. By February, terranean in a week by craft that would take 1944, we expected to have in Italy eighteen and a month to do so by ship. The careful destruc- a half divisions (of which two were armoured). tion by the Germans of Italian lighters had left In actual fact we managed to increase this us terribly short of small craft for harbour work- figure to the equivalent of over twenty-one divi- ing. We wanted a minimum of fifty-eight sions (as against a German total of twenty- Landing Craft, Tank but it looked as though three) but of these, two infantry divisions and we should, on this programme, be reduced to an armoured brigade were only in process of nine; by vigorous representations I got this arriving and an infantry division was leaving. increased to twenty-four but even this was This increase was due to the allotment of extra still below the number required. I mention these shipping and the delaying of the move of the details not with any intention of querying the Strategic Air Force. The move of the latter decision to concentrate the maximum resources represented a serious slowing down of our build- in the west, which was obviously the right one, up and required a very nice adjustment of but to show more clearly the difficulties of our priorities. position in Italy and, in particular, why we were unable to make greater use of our com- It had originally been intended to move the Strategic Air Force to bases in the Rome area mand of the sea. when captured but on 1501 September this Enemy Change of Plan. was changed and it was now to be moved to Up to the beginning of October we had been Italy as quickly as possible and based on the planning on the assumption that the Germans many airfields around Foggia. It was planned were intending to withdraw by gradual stages to move the whole of the , to a line in the northern Apennines but in the the whole of the Strategic Air Force, elements first week of that month we became aware that of the Coastal Air Force, the Photographic a radical change had been made.* Hitler had Reconnaissance Wing and the Troop Carrier decided that the withdrawal should stop and Command, together with most of the Service Kesselring was to hold a line as far south as Command and the supporting services, to the possible in Italy. There had been time enough Italian mainland by the end of December, 1943. to recover from the gloomy apprehensions with This could only be done at the expense of which the Germans had regarded the situation the Army, both the build-up of the formations on the Southern Front at the time of the Italian jtlready engaged and the reinforcing formations. surrender. The country was perfectly quiet, The Tactical and Coastal Air Forces, the Recon- except for the north-east where the Slovenes laissance Wing and Troop Carrier Command were giving trouble, so that the internal security jvere, of course, of vital importance to the commitment was much reduced, and a better * In addition on 13 October I was promised knowledge of the Allied Order of Battle showed 5 Canadian Armoured Division and Headquarters with its complement of Corps troops. * German sources show that the definite order to f We were at the time pressing hard to get Turkey stand on the line Gaeta- was given on 10 to declare war and two armoured divisions were October but this apparently confirmed an order which standing by in the Middle East for her defence. had been given slightly earlier. 2900 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 that the Germans enjoyed a considerable timing. It was, as can be seen, a positive assist- numerical advantage and were likely to con- ance to me in carrying out the Combined Chiefs tinue to do so. The terrain of southern and of Staff directive, for if the Germans had central Italy is admirably suited for defensive adhered to their original intention it would have •warfare; the whole of the area between Rome made it very difficult for me to carry out my and Naples, except for the Volturno plain at mission of containing the maximum enemy its southern end and the at forces. An orderly withdrawal up the penin- its northern end, is mountainous and unfavour- sula would have required only a comparatively able to manoeuvre and offers on the east coast small force, aided by the difficulties of the ter- a continuous series of river lines. The weather rain, and although a larger force would be in autumn and winter would hamper Allied eventually required to hold the selected line, offensive operations and curtail the value of even this would not be immediately required our air superiority. To hold a line south of since our build-up in front of that line would Rome was eminently practicable; from the be necessarily slow. This peculiar feature of German point of view, therefore, it was the strategy of the Italian campaign remained eminently desirable. The forces under command unchanged to the end: we had the initiative in of Field-Marshal Kesselring had been engaged operations but the Germans had the initiative in in a continuous retreat for almost a year, since deciding whether we should achieve our object November, 1942, a retreat which had brought since they were free, other considerations, them from just short of Alexandria to just psychological or political, being excluded, to north of Naples and it was time to put a stop refuse to allow themselves to be contained in to it. I have mentioned the other reasons Italy. Had they decided to withdraw altogether, which urged the retention of as much of Italy for instance, they could have defended the line as possible; there was now an additional reason, of the Alps, or one of the strong river lines to give a certain semblance of authority to the in north-eastern Italy, with the minimum recently created Republican Fascist Govern- forces and, instead of us containing them, they ment by retaining as much territory as possible would be containing us. All danger of such for it to govern under German supervision. an alarming result was removed by Hitler's The line which it was decided to hold, known decision. From the moment of that decision as the " "*, had been reconnoitred the German Army undertook a commitment as by the Germans before the armistice. It was damaging and debilitating as Napoleon's Penin- based on the east coast on the River Sangro sular campaign, the final result of which was and on the west on the backed by that it saw itself next summer under the deplor- the Mountains on the coast and the able necessity of pouring troops into Italy to strong position rising to the massif of retrieve disaster there at the very moment when ; the centre of tile peninsula, the the Allied invading forces were storming the rugged mountains of the Abruzzi, where bears breaches of the crumbling Western Wall. roamed in the fastnesses of the National Park, was considered too difficult to admit, of One further result of the German decision to manoeuvre by large forces. On this line "the stand was to remove the necessity, and the Italian peninsula is at its narrowest, only eighty- possibility, of a Balkan campaign. I had con- five miles from sea to sea. Delaying positions sidered at one time a possible plan of first could be held in front of it in order to gain time capturing Naples and Foggia and then, from for the weather to deteriorate still further and this firm base in South Italy, launching an allow artificial defences to be constructed to add operation across the Adriatic. The Germans to the natural strength of the position. There placed much greater importance on the reten- was little hope of holding! permanently die tion of the Balkans than on the defence of Volturno and Biferno, but a stronger defence Italy as was shown by the way in which, of these positions could reduce the Allied im- while withdrawing hastily from Sardinia and petus and give still greater depth to the Winter Corsica, they turned and struck with all the Line. This new decision involved a reorganisa- strength they could collect at a minor British tion of the command. Rommel's Army Group incursion into the Dodecanese. If they con- " B " in the north was dissolved and on 2ist tinued to withdraw in Italy it would be diffi- November Kesselring assumed command of the cult, as I have just explained, to contain any whole theatre. The armoured divisions in large force there but we should be certain of a North Italy, which would be of little use hi the violent reaction if we landed on the eastern mountains, were relieved for employment in shores of the Adriatic. We should also get Russia, to be replaced by infantry, including some military support from the Partisans, a Mountain Division from the Leningrad front, though by October the Germans had a pretty and the remainder of the forces were put at firm hold on the coastal areas at least. It Kesselring's disposal, f would have been a good way, therefore, of This German decision to stand south of Rome carrying out our directive, though we should did not affect my general plan of campaign have required a large increase in our allot- though it was, of course, destined to affect its ment of amphibious equipment and reinforce- * German " Winterstellung " which means more ment in troops. However, now the Germans properly winter position; it was not a line but a had decided to allow themselves to be contained series of defended positions in depth. in Italy, there was no need for us to go further | Field-Marshal , a regular artilleryafield; Campania and were .far enough officer who transferred to the Luftwaffe when it was recreated, first came to the Mediterranean in late from France. And if there was no need there 1941 as commander of Luftflotte 2. In April 1942 he was certainly no possibility; now that all the became " Commander-in-Chief South " with authority German divisions in Italy were to be made over all the shores of the Mediterranean and all arms; available for the southern front we were actu- he was particularly responsible for the campaign in ally outnumbered and would remain so for some Africa. He now took the title of Commander-in-Chief Southwest (Oberbefehlshaber Siidwest or OBSW) ; months; there was even the possibility that the the Army ground forces under bis command were enemy might, if we let him, assume the initia- known as Army Group " C ". tive in an attempt to snatch a hasty victory, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2901 which would have come as a very welcome right and i Canadian Division left while 5 present to the German people at the beginning Corps took command of the remaining forma- of a hard winter. I devoted my attention, tions, i Airborne, 5 Infantry and 8 Indian therefore, to the exclusion of adventures further Infantry Divisions, with the task of organising afield, to the task of containing, and man- the administrative build-up, securing the Army handling as far as possible, the German forces lines of communication and protecting the left facing us in Italy.* flank of 13 Corps. On 3rd October the landed 2 Special Service Brigade (Com- Battles of Termoli and the VoUurno. mandos) at Termoli ahead of the advance of Now that the Foggia plain had been over- 78 Division and captured the town and port run the sector allotted to Eighth Army was a intact, together with a number of prisoners. mountain and foothill region separated from They made early contact with the leading the t>y a narrow coastal plain. brigade of 78 Division across the Biferno but The lower slopes of this area offer only moder- the difficulties of the crossing rendered this ate difficulties to an advancing army; but on contact precarious. A brigade of 78 Division the left the centre of the pensinsula is in all was therefore landed in the bridgehead area places steep and precipitous, completely un- on the night 3rd/ 4th October and a suited to the manoeuvre of armour, for all further brigade was taken in by sea on 5th movement is confined to the roads. The October. The enemy reacted violently and coastal plain with its gentle slopes presents rushed over 16 Panzer Division from Army greater opportunities but here trees and in- reserve in the western sector. Fierce fighting tensive cultivation also favour the defence by continued for some days. The Biferno rose in limiting the field of view and the effectiveness flood and cut communication by road, but by of weapons. Major rivers cross the whole the 7th the enemy had accepted defeat and region at approximately ten mile intervals, drew off westward to his next line behind the at right angles to our line of advance; in the River Trigno.* mountains they are swift-running streams While the fighting at Termoli was in progress usually between high banks and in their lower I Canadian Division was advancing up Route reaches they spread out into broad sandy and 17 against skilfully conducted German rear- gravel beds where the streams meander widely, guards who. forced our troops to deploy against normally shallow but liable to sudden flash every defensible position without themselves floods. We could expect plenty of rain in the imperilling their withdrawal. 5 Division came autumn, up to five inches a monthf, and snow under command of 13 Corps on gth October; above two thousand feet as early as December. it was put in on the right of the Canadians on This would assist the effectiveness of bridge nth October and on the I3th entered Casa- demolitions and render movement off the roads calenda on Route 87. On the I4th the most difficult. The only good continuous Canadians captured Campobasso and on< the roads forward lay on either side of the Army I5th Vinchiaturo. The first part of the Army sector, forty miles apart; these were the coast Commander's plan was thus completed and road through Termoli and Vasto (Route 16) the necessary pause ensued. and a mountain road through Vinchiaturo and ^ On 'the west Fifth Army's maintenance posi- Isernia (Route 17). A number of first or tion, from its nearer bases, was much easier second class laterals connected these roads by and by the end of the first week in October tortuous routes over mountains and along both 10 and VI Corps had reached the River river valleys, and between them lay other less Volturno. They were now faced with a diffi- direct routes forward which could be used by cult military problem in the crossing of this up to one division. broad and swiftly flowing river and the recent Eighth Army's maintenance situation was change in enemy intentions made it certain now better and likely to improve and General that the defence, though not pushed to the last Montgomery decided to seize with light forces extreme, would be stubborn and protracted. a line including Termoli, where there was a The weather was miserable. It was originally small port which might be of use, and Vinchia- hoped that VI Corps would be able to force a turo, a communications centre on Route 17. crossing on the night gth/ioth October and 10 After this it would be necessary to pause to Corps on the following night, but delays were establish our administrative facilities on a imposed by heavy rain and bad going, com- firmer basis before advancing to contact the bined with extensive demolitions and mining. main German winter line on the Sangro. The The enemy forces opposing Fifth Army con- enemy on this front consisted of the LXXVI sisted of XIV Panzer Corps with, from east Panzer Corps with I Parachute and 29 Panzer to west, 3 Panzer Grenadier, Hermann Goering Grenadier Divisions, holding a front from the Panzer and 15 Panzer Grenadier Divisions. Adriatic to Benevento. 26 Panzer Division, In the lower reaches they had the advantage originally under command of XIV Panzer of a higher flood bank on the northern side of Corps in the Benevento area, came under com- the river and superior observation from Monte mand after the beginning of October, operat- Massico, just in rear. Sites for a crossing were ing south of the Benevento-Isernia road with a restricted, by the difficulties of the going, to detachment operating on the Foggia-Isernia existing sites and the river continued to rise road. General Montgomery's plan was to em- and fall in a baffling manner. ploy 13 Corps for his advance with 78 Division The attack eventually went hi on the night * I have here dealt with the proposed operations of the I2th. 10 Corps made diversionary in the Balkans from the purely military point of view. attacks with 56 Division at Capua and 7 There were, of course, political reasons both for and against such a course. Armoured Division at Grazzanise and a main f For those to whom such statistics mean little, attack by 46 Division at Cancello. The latter the.mean annual rainfall of London is 23$ inches. was successful but heavy fighting followed in The Italian whiter climate came as a great disappoint- difficult and open country while 56 Division ment to-all those who were only acquainted with it from tourist propaganda. • Known as the " Barbara " line. 2902 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 at Capua, as had been feared, was unable to proceeded to do. There was no practical limit force a crossing. VI Corps, however, got across to the number of troops they could bring into in the more mountainous area east of Capua Italy; it was calculated that their lines of com- and by the use of its bridges 56 Division also munication were adequate to support up to sixty crossed on the I5th. By the 25th both Corps divisions should they wish to employ such a had firmly consolidated their bridgeheads and force there. Our build-up, on the other hand, were ready to engage the next enemy delay- was severely limited, as I have already ex- ing line, based on the ridge of mountains from plained; we expected to have thirteen divisions Monte Massico on the sea coast, through Monte by the end of November, fourteen or fifteen by Santa Croce to the Matese Mountains on the the end of December and sixteen to seventeen boundary between Fifth and Eighth Armies. by the end of January. Since the Germans Only two passes pierced the line of hills, at had decided to stand we were committed to the two denies followed by Routes 6 and 7 " a long slogging match " with no possibility, and called after Mignano and Sessa respectively. in. view of the shortage of landing craft, actual On 4th October I moved my headquarters or about to exist, of amphibious operations to the small village of Santo Spirito, north- against the enemy's flanks. west of Bari. J intended to move eventually Admittedly the disparity of our relative to the Naples area but there was no hope of strengths showed that we were doing our duty accommodation there for the moment and if in containing the enemy. Indeed he seemed I wanted to move to Italy, as was clearly neces- to be going out of his way to assist us in attain- sary, the relatively undamaged areas of Apulia ing that object; I pointed out in my apprecia- offered the only suitable sites. tion " the German reinforcement of Italy seems greater than warranted by the internal situation Plans for the Winter Operations. or by purely defensive requirements ".* There Both at Termoli and on the Volturno. the was a serious possibility, which I 'had to con- Germans had shown a new determination and sider, that if he saw a chance of seizing an stubbornness, and this, together with the slow- easy success in Italy he would take it, for its ness of our build-up, made the decision as psychological value at such a time would be to the correct strategy to be adopted in Italy very great. Any relaxation of effort on our part still more difficult. My most recent directive would allow him to seize the initiative and use from General Eisenhower, called for the cap- it either, as just suggested, for a strong counter- ture of air bases in the Rome area; the general offensive—aiming for instance at the recapture directive under which all forces in the Mediter- of Naples, a glittering prospect—or to reduce ranean, and mine in particular, were working his forces on the defensive front to a minimum was to tie down and divert from other fronts and make available for elsewhere the divisions the maximum German strength; it was not thus saved. This same result, the relieving easy to see how, with the forces available or of German forces from Italy for the Eastern or, in prospect, either of these objects could be subsequently, Western front, would also follow, attained or to what extent the pursuit of one and in greater measure, from a successful enemy might hinder the achievement of the other. counter-offensive, provided it were delivered be- One thing was certain; for either purpose it fore the spring of 1944. On the other hand, if was essential to retain the initiative which we we could keep the enemy " on his heels " until then had. It would mean a hard and costly then, we should be certain of retaining in Italy fight, now that it was known that the Germans the divisions already there; we might even no longer intended to withdraw iby stages to (and this, though unexpected, actually the north, but for the sake of the greater occurred) draw stiH more into ithe theatre, objects in view it was necessary to accept this while still keeping him sufficiently off-balance cost and not give the enemy any rest. to be unable to seize the initiative from us; I reviewed the situation in the light of these finally, if he were to launch a great counter- considerations on 2ist October. In Southern offensive next spring, we should welcome it, Italy eleven Allied divisions were opposing for the more successful it was the more troops nine German in a position eminently suitable it would draw off from the defence of France, for the defence, while in the north there were and success there was well worth the price some fourteen more, a known total of twenty- of a possible set-back in Italy. three divisions.* Eleven against nine was no I presented this appreciation at a confer- great numerical superiority and with thek great ence at Carthage with the Commanders-in- resources in the north, where .the internal Chief on 24th October. It was agreed by security commitment was now quite unim- General Eisenhower and signalled to the Com- portant, the Germans could easily convert it bined Chiefs of Staff. The conference agreed into a positive inferiority; at the least they could that it was essential to retain the initiative carry out constant reliefs of their formations in and approved my plan of campaign which I the battle area and oppose our attacks with reported at the same time. Eighth Army's constantly fresh troops. This was -what they advance up the east coast was running into * Not all these were in fact available to Kesselring a cul-de-sac of rather .unimportant country; whose actual strength available for Italy was nineteen divisions and one brigade group. There was a good but General Montgomery was of „ the opinion deal of movement going on in North Italy at the that if he could establish himself on the high time : one infantry and three armoured divisions ground north of Pescara, after crossing the were in process of moving to Russia and three infantry Trigno, Sangro and Pescara rivers, he could divisions were moving into the country to take their place. There was also some doubt whether the two then strike south-westwards down Route 5, the divisions in the Alps on the Franco-Italian border, Via Valeria, to Avezzano and threaten Rome which actually came under C-in-C West, were not to from the east. In conjunction with this south- be considered as available for Italy and a motorized westerly attack by Eighth Army, Fifth Army division which had moved down into the area between Nice and Modane was also regarded as a likely arrival. * Actually the Germans were over-estimatingo our A certain amount of over-estimation was in the strength, as usual; captured German sources show that circumstances not unnatural and in any event the they credited me in November with three more divisions disparity of strength was striking enough. than I in fact had. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2903 was to attack north, directed on Rome. Both . In order to carry out these contem- attacks were to be assisted, if at all possible, plated manoeuvres it would be necessary to by amphibious flank attacks, on the east in the move in for Fifth Army two French divisions strength of about a brigade group and on Fifth plus the necessary services and non-divisional Army's front of at least an infantry division troops in order to maintain the impetus of the with some armour. Since landing craft were attack: the bulk of the troops in Fifth Army so short the latter attack would have to wait had been fighting continuously, and heavily, until those used in the former had been brought since Qth September. Moreover, their mobility round to the west coast; even then they might and maintenance were severely hampered by not be sufficient for the scale of attack I the fact that about two thousand five hundred proposed. The signal to the Combined Chiefs urgently needed vehicles were still held up at of Staff therefore concluded: "it is certain Bizerta awaiting landing craft to move them. that more landing craft will be required for a In reply to a signal sent at the conclusion of limited time if we are to capture Rome in the the conference we were authorised by the near future and avoid a slow, painful and Combined Chiefs of Staff to retain the sixty- costly series of frontal attacks." eight landing craft until I5th December. A further review of the situation produced With'this, planning could go ahead with greater more definite proposals. On 3ist October, confidence. General Eisenhower again approached the Combined Chiefs of Staff with a full review Advance to the Winter Line. of the need for landing craft and the resources After the advance to the Termoli- necessary to meet those needs. The tasks for Vinchiaturo line Eighth Army continued active which the craft were required were threefold. patrolling while they reorganised for the attack The first was the build-up of auxiliary units on the Winter Line. 5 Corps took over the to complete formations already in Italy. right flank on nth October with 78 and 8 Secondly it was essential to be able to mount Indian Divisions under command; the latter an assault behind the enemy lines in the was a new formation, though of experienced strength of about a division, probably on the units, but distinguished itself in this its first west coast. Thirdly it was necessary to meet action. 78 Division managed to sejze a bridge- the demands of the Strategic Air Force, which head over the River Trigno, on the axis of included not only the move of the operational Route 16, on the night of the 22nd-23rd, and formations themselves but also large numbers by the next night all the enemy in the Corps of airfield construction and servicing units. sector were back behind the river. The main The Foggia airfields, though the principal base position here was on the ridge, a in South Italy for the , were dominant feature overlooking the west bank. not all-weather and very large quantities of The Trigno near the coast is a broad stream, steel plank had to be transported. The require- liable to very sudden flooding and the ground ments of the Strategic Air Force had also been on either bank is a very heavy clay soil in largely increased by the decision, communi- which it was almost impossible to construct a cated on 23rd October, to set up the XV firm track. The first attack on San Salvo, on United States Air Force in Italy. With our the night of the 27th, was frustrated largely owing present resources, that is adhering to the to these difficulties, aggravated by a heavy .fall existing programme of returning craft to the of rain, and a full-scale attack was therefore United Kingdom, the first of these tasks would necessary. This opened on the early morning not be completed before 15th December and of 3rd November, when 78 Division attacked there would remain only sufficient lift for one San Salvo and 8 Indian Division, on their left, brigade or regimental combat team, which the village of Tufillo on a high spur above the would be quite inadequate. If, however, we river. There was heavy fighting for both could keep until I5th December all the British villages but San Salvo was clear by the 4th Landing Ships, Tank (between forty-eight and and Tufillo by the 5th. The enemy, having fifty-six) and twelve United States, it would be now offered as much delay as possible on this possible both to complete the build-up of pre- line—and 16 Panzer Division, which was not sent formations and to mount a divisional fresh when it went into action, had had heavy amphibious assault. Even then only about a losses—began to withdraw to his next, the third of the task of establishing the Strategic " Bernhardt " line, which on Eighth Army's Air Force in Italy would have been carried front ran from north of Isernia along the range out; but if the craft could be retained for a .of mountains forward of the Sangro. In the further three weeks, until 5th January, the Sangro defences itself Kesselring had disposed whole programme could be completed. 65 Infantry Division which he had brought Another Commanders-in-Chief conference down from the north. As a result of this with- was held at Carthage on 3rd November. I drawal we were able to enter unopposed the confirmed the plan presented at the previous important road junction of Isernia on 4th conference with the proviso that Eighth Army November. would have to make a short pause after the On the Fifth Army front the first task, which capture of the Pescara line before exerting fell to 10 Corps, was now to secure Monte pressure south-westwards down Route 5. Massico, the high razor-back ridge north-east Fifth Army was to press on up Route 6, the of . Apart from being an impor- Via Casilina, and attempt to break through tant stage in our advance northwards, this the enemy opposition on that axis coincident position was also vital to complete the covering with Eighth Army's drive on Rome; it was screen defending Naples if it should be neces- hoped that it would retain sufficient impetus sary at any time to go on to the defensive; to reach the Frosinone area. At this point present enemy strength and his constant rein- we would, if we had the means, launch an forcement had, as I have already mentioned, amphibious assault south of the Tiber and brought such considerations more into the fore- subsequently other assaults north of the ground. Two new German divisions, 305 and 94 2904 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

Infantry, had akeady been brought down into of September and were steadily increasing, the line from North Italy. The operation, making roads and by-passes extremely difficult which led to the capture both of Monte Massico and turning the open country into a sea of and Monte Santa Croce to the north, began on mud. The mountains in front were the most 28th October and was successfully completed formidable we had yet encountered and the by 4th November, at which date 46 and 7 enemy, who had akeady reinforced his flanks Armoured Divisions reached the lower with two fresh infantry divisions, was now Garigliano between the bend opposite Monto bringing over part of 26 Panzer Division from luga and the sea. The enemy had intended Eighth Army's front. This meant that there to offer delay on this line, the soulthern were five enemy divisions opposing our five, extremity of the " Barbara " line, as shown and the Fifth -Army troops were more tired by his reinforcing; but the dangers inherent than the enemy. The Germans were showing in standing for long with a broad river a stubborn spirit of resistance at all parts of immediately in rear, coupled no doubt with the front and it was clear that a co-ordinated apprehensions of a seaborne outflanking move, effort would foe required to drive them from decided him to pull back his right, when then* positions. I therefore directed Fifth Army, pressed, behind the Garigliano. In the mean- on the completion of its present operations, to time VI Corps had pushed forward up, and pause and regroup, allowing Eighth Army to then across, the Volturno and driven the left strike first. The latter was to get astride Route wing of XIV Panzer Corps back to the 5 from Pescara to Popoli and Collarmele and " Bernhardt " line based on Monte Camino, be prepared to threaten the enemy lines of Monte Maggiore and the hills on the north communication via Avezzano. Then Fifth side of the Mignano defile from above Venafro Army would attack up the valley of the (captured on 4th November) to above and Sacco to reach Frosinone. This is the Isernia. classical route for an army marching on Rome The idea of an amphibious landing continued from the south and the only practicable one for to be entertained. On 23rd October General a large force; the Via Appia, Route 7, becomes Clark signalled to me (I was then at the Com- too involved with the and manders-in-Chief conference in Carthage) that the Pontine Marshes. Our troops, I think, got he was contemplating a landing near Formia a little tired of hearing the Liri Valley described in the Gulf of Gaeta in the strength of a regi- as " The gateway to 'Rome " during the long mental combat team and two Ranger battalions, months when the gate was shut so firmly in in connection with the attack of 10 and VI their faces, but the description is true neverthe- Corps. Naval opinion, however, condemned less. Finally, when the main -body reached this as impracticable owing to the strength of Frosinone, a seaborne landing would be made the coast defences and minefields. The only south of Rome, directed on the .* apparent alternative, a landing between Gaeta All available air support would go to jpighth and Sperlonga, was clearly impossible as yet, Army in the first phase and to Fifth Army in and until the forces advancing overland were the succeeding phase. within supporting distance. Between 5th and I5th November Fifth Army Attack en the Winter Line. continued their attempts to break into the Winter Line in their sector. This enemy posi- On 8th November I received a new directive tion, as I have akeady explained, was not so from General Eisenhower. It began by re- much a line as a belt of terrain about nine affirming the objectives given on 25th Sep- miles wide; its forward edge, in front of which tember, the capture of Rome and the mainten- our troops now stood, was the " Bernhardt" ance, subsequently, of maximum pressure on line, its rear, (based on the high ground behind the enemy. Rome, of course, 'had great politi- the Garigliano and Rapido, was the " Gustav " cal value but we did not regard it primarily line, with the key fortress of Cassino. On the as a prize to be won but rather as something south the two lines coincided and the German which we knew the enemy intended to defend defences utilised the plain forward of the Garig- and for which we could make him fight his liano, the river, swift-flowing and deep, and the hardest. To draw him into battle and destroy Aurunci Mountains to the west of it which com- his forces was our real object. The directive mand every part of the plain. To the north recognised that the enemy "intends to resist are the mountains commanding the Mignano our occupation of Southern Italy to a greater Gap through which Route 6 passes, dominated degree than hitherto contemplated." Priority, by Monte Camino to the south and Monte Sam- was therefore given, in- the first phase, to the mucro to the north; in the gap itself there are build-up of our land forces and of such, air three isolated masses of high ground, Monte forces as were specifically required to assist Lungo, Monte Porchia and Monte Trocchio, them in their task. However, six heavy .bom- rising abruptly like rocks in a fairway. North bardment groups of the Strategic Air Force of Monte Sammucro the mountains rise even must be in Italy and operating by the end of higher to the central ridges of the Apennines, the year for use in the bombing programme impossible country for large-scale operations. against Germany. Finally I was directed, after the capture of Rome, to secure possession by The first objective was the Monte Camino occupying a general line to cover Civitavecchia massif, including the two subsidiary peaks of and Terni, the former being taken into use as Monte La Difensa and Monte Maggiore, and the a port. task of the assault was given to 56 British and 3 American Divisions under 10 and VI Corps On the same day I also issued a directive respectively. From 5th to I2th November the intended in particular for the guidance of Fifth attack was pressed against rock-hewn defences, Army in the operations to secure their objec- steep slopes up which all supplies had to be tives. My directive must be read against the man-handled, constant enemy counter-attacks background of the severe exhaustion of Fifth Army. The winter rains had started at the end * Also known as the Colli Laziali or Hills. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2905 and tbad weather. Ground was gained >by both it had been as hurriedly sent when Fifth divisions, -but it was impossible to remain and Army's attack looked serious, and 90 Panzer impossible to push on in the weakened con- Grenadier Division was brought down from dition to which the divisions had been reduced.* northern Italy. On the I2th General Clark decided to with- General Montgomery's plan for the attack draw, an operation which was successfully envisaged a heavy, well-prepared assault on the accomplished on the night of the I4th. Mean- coastal end of the line. 5 Corps was to com- while VI Corps had been driving at the northern mand the main thrust with 78 and 8 Indian defences of the Mignano Gap. 3 Division Divisions, and the recently arrived New had already been successful in capturing Monte Zealand Division, under Army Command, was Cesima, an outlying hill mass on the north co-operating on their left. 8 Indian Division side of the gap, and 45 and 34 Divi- had continued to advance on the left of the sions -battered their way into the mountains Corps' front until the Sangro was reached; it in front of them to extend the line northwards. was then relieved by the New Zealanders and But Monte Lungo, in the mouth of the gap, went into reserve behind 78 Division. The latter was a harder nut to crack. It is a great, bare, was to seize a bridgehead, the Indians were to scrub-covered mountain ridge dominated from break into the line, then 78 Division was to either flank -by higher enemy-held ground and come into the lead again and exploit on to 3 Division was tired after fifty-six days of Pescara and simultaneously the New Zealanders continuous operations. On rjth November were to strike across the river directed on General Clark represented to me that the time , from where they were to swing south- had come to pause and regroup; any further west dowta Route 5 to develop the desired repetition of the attacks we had been making threat against the Avezzano area. D-day was would exhaust divisions to a dangerous degree. laid down as 20th November in orders pub- While Fifth Army was attempting to break lished on the i6th, but both the tuning and into the Winter Line on the west coast, Eighth execution of the plan were strongly affected Army in the east was advancing to make con- by the weather. It was essential to make full tact with the left flank of the same line. This use of our command of the air and our was -based in their sector on the line of the superiority in armour, and both' depended on River Sangro from the mouth for some'fifteen reasonably fine weather. On the 20th the miles upstream and then on the forward slopes weather broke completely and we could only of the great Maiella massif behind .the - establish a small bridgehead; on 23rd Novem- Pescocostanzo road. The strongest part of the ber the river was in flood and rendered all line was the extreme north, where defences bridges useless; the same happened on 25th had been under construction since early Octo- November • when the attack had again been ber. The Sangro here runs in a channel vary- scheduled. The main attack eventually went ing from three hundred to four hundred feet in on the 27th with 8 Indian Division leading. wide and a foot deep but after heavy rain it , a key point in the defences, was rises rapidly, filling the entire river bed with captured on the 29th and by the next day a . a depth of five feet or more and a rate of flow bold use of our armour against ground con- measured on one occasion at seven knots. sidered impassable by the Germans gave us the There are steep hills on the right bank, giving whole ridge above the Sangro from there to the good observation; on the left bank there is a sea. In the meantime the New Zealanders had flat plain for about two thousand yards and then got across the river and on 2nd December cap- a steep escarpment, rising abruptly some tured Castelfrentano. The Division's next hundred and fifty feet. It was on this escarp- objective was , which was attacked un- ment that the main enemy defence works were successfully on 7th December and again on the established. " Our position," wrote the Com- i4th equally without success. The enemy had mander of the German 65 Division in an Order been reinforced and the weather was abomin- of 'the Day, " is naturally very strong and it able. Further to the right 8 Indian and 78 is rendered considerably stronger by our Divisions advanced to the River Moro, cap- numerous and excellent defence works." turing and on 3rd December, i Canadian Infantry Division now relieved 78 78 Division reached the right bank of the Division, which had suffered ten thousand river from the mouth to as far south as battle casualties in the last six months. on 8th November and immediately began to organise patrols across it to dominate the plain The battle of the Sangro had driven the enemy on the left -bank. 8 Indian Division, the left from strong prepared; positions and inflicted hand formation of 5 Corps, was longer in form- on him heavy casualties. But thanks to the ing up to the line and the enemy did not with- difficult nature of the ground and the violence draw completely across the river in their sector of the winter weather, and the enemy's ability until igth November. At that time the coastal to relieve tired troops with fresh, Eighth Army sector was held by the recently arrived 65 In- had been unable to break through the enemy's fantry Division, a relatively inexperienced dispositions or seize any vital ground. The formation, with 16 Panzer Division supporting difficult " ridge and furrow." country of the it in reserve. To the south i Parachute Divi- Molise offered few chances of a decisive suc- sion held a front of some twenty-five miles in cess to an Army attacking, as Eighth Army the mountains. Before the mam Eighth Army had always done, across the grain of the coun- attack began 16 Panzer Division was withdrawn try. The further north we pushed our advance to proceed to the Eastern front; after the attack the more numerous and close together were went in 26 Panzer Division had to be hurriedly the river lines. The prospect was little better brought back from the Mignano sector, where for the time when the Army should have turned westwards into the gap between the * 56 'Division had been fighting continuously since the landing at Salerno on 9 September. It was under Gran Sasso and the Maiella where the Via strength then and its subsequent losses had been heavy, Valeria runs through a series of terrifying de- particularly in officers and N.C.O.s. files. It was one of our most serious handicaps 2906 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 in this winter campaign that our front was i Special Service Force and 36 Division divided so rigidly into two by the spinal barrier attacked the northern third of the mountain of the Apennines. It meant an inevitable loss mass to gain Monte La Difensa and Monte of flexibility, for the .two armies were often Maggiore. Air support on that day was heavy fighting what were almost independent battles and for the first time was not reduced by and, owing to differences in nationality and weather. Both Corps' attacks were successful. equipment it was not easy for me, as it was On 6th December 10 Corps captured the summit for Kesselring, to switch units and formations of Monte Camino, which they had almost from one side of the barrier to the other. secured on the 3rd but failed to hold against During the period of Eighth Army's attack on counter-attacks, and on the Qth Rocca the Adriatic sector Fifth Army had been rest- d'Evandro was captured. This brought 10 ing and regrouping its troops in accordance Corps to the Garigliano all along its front. with the orders of i6th November. The next II Corps captured La Difensa on 3rd December operation was divided into three phases. The and held it against strong counter-attacks, and high ground dominating the Mignano Gap was on the 8th captured and mopped up Monte La to be captured in sections, first that to the south, Remetanea. 36 Division's attack on Monte and then that to the north; in Phase I, that is Maggiore, the northernmost and lowest peak, to say, Monte Camino, Monte La Difensa and had succeeded by the night of the 3rd; Monte Maggiore were to be captured and in counter-attacks were repulsed and by the 7th Phase II Monte Sammucro, combined with an the position could be considered secured. attack westwards along the Colli—Atina road; Between then and the nth 10 Corps took over Phase III, the main advance into the Liri the whole of the feature from II Corps. valley, was only to be initiated on Army orders Between 29th November and gth December after the completion of the first two phases. VI Corps on Fifth Army's right made diversion- Of the three British and six United States ary attacks along the axes of the Colli—Atina divisions in Fifth Army at the beginning of the and Filignano—Sant' Elia roads. Very little period, two, 7 Armoured and 82 Airborne, ground was gained in tangled and difficult (less one Regimental Combat Team) were being country, with peaks rising to over twelve withdrawn to the United Kingdom, i United hundred metres. 2 Moroccan Division began States Armoured Division began arriving at to relieve 34 Division on the Corps' right Naples and i Special Service Force, six on 8th December. Phase I of the Army battalions of specially trained mixed American Commander's plan was now, however, com- and Canadian troops, also came under pleted with the capture of the Camino massif command.* 2 Moroccan Division was due to and Phase II was ordered to start on 7th arrive in the first week of December. II Corps December. In this phase 10 Corps had a minor Headquarters arrived from Sicily in October defensive rdle; the principal objective was the and took over command of the centre of the line clearing of Monte Sammucro and this was with 3 and 36 Divisions on i8th November; VI assigned to II Corps. VI Corps was to continue Corps now commanded on the extreme right to drive westwards along the roads to Atina and with 34 and 45 Divisions, i Armoured Division Sant' Elia but on a larger scale facilitated by remained in Army reserve; it was not expected the accession to its strength of the fresh and that it would be used until the Liri valley was mountain trained Moroccan Division. It was reached, when it would debouch through II hoped that by attacking on so wide a front the Corps. The Germans had also been reinforcing; enemy would be sufficiently stretched to pre- 29 Panzer Grenadier Division came in from vent him massing for the defence of Cassino. reserve and 44 Infantry Division, an Austrian The bitterest fighting took place for Monte formation, from Slovenia. 5 Mountain Division Sammucro and the village of San Pietro in Fine arrived from Russia in December. below it. The attack began on 7th December; The first phase of the new attack, the capture the first two high points on Sammucro were of the mountains on the south side of the seized without exceptional difficulty but after Mignano Gap, was planned as a very deliber- that our troops were held until the i3th by ate operation, as an example of how a severe German counter-attacks and heavy large, semi-isolated mountain mass should be mortar and artillery fire. On the 8th the Italian captured. The assault was to be made by two Motorised Group failed in an attack on Monte Corps, 10 south and II north, supported by Lungo, in the throat of the gap. The second very heavy artillery fire and the greatest weight tbattle for San Pietro opened on the U5th possible of air attack. The enemy was to be and succeeded, though at heavy .cost in made to believe that our intention was to casualties, by the i7th; Monte Lungo was also attack further south, across the lower Garig- occupied and, north of the village, we forced liano, by various measures, including naval our way further along the knife-edge of Monte bombardment between Minturno and Gaeta Sammucro. This was bitter mountain fight- and feint attacks by 23 Armoured Brigade ing, with great use of artillery and gains in in- the plain between Monte Massico and territory small compared with the time con- the river. The operations began with a sumed and the losses suffered. There was still subsidiary attack on the southern end of the another enemy position, almost equally as mountains on the night of ist December and strong as San Pietro, just a short distance on the next night, while the Jheaviest concentra- ahead, based on the western end of Monte tion of artillery yet fired in the Italian campaign Sammucro and the lower hills covering the pounded the enemy positions on the heights, village of San Vittore. But 36 Division was 56 Division started for the second time up the exhausted and on 2gth December had to be steep slopes of Monte Camino. Simultaneously relieved 'by 'the 34th before San Vittore was taken. The VI Corps attack on the right had * i Italian Motorised Group, in about brigade also made little progress 'against difficulties of strength, which came under command on 31 October, was used once in an offensive role, but was subsequently ground and stubborn enemy defence; by the employed on less active sectors for which its state of end of the year it could only be said to have armament and training made it more suitable. kept level with the advance of II Corps with SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2907 gains of approximately three miles. The Ger- experience in negotiations with various nation- man Winter Line had been broken into but alities made him the natural first choice for not broken; there were still some miles of the command of Allied Force Headquarters in mountain before the rear line of the position, view of its new r61e; in particular his know- the " Gustav " line, should be reached and ledge of the Balkans made it essential that he the difficulties of that line were already the should continue to be in charge of that area subject of serious study. which was now under Algiers. My military re- It was during this period that we received lations with him were slightly different in the only serious blow which the German Air principle, as I have explained, from those with Force was ever able to strike us during the General Eisenhower but our personal rela- campaign. On the night of and December an tionship was excellent and I must record my air raid by about thirty aircraft on the port gratitude here for the comprehension and sup- of Bari took the defences by surprise and port which he never failed to afford me. caused very heavy damage. Seventeen ships of » various sizes were sunk and thirty thousand The Cassmo Position. tons of cargo lost, mainly by the explosion of I have already described the Liri.valley as two ammunition ships. The port was not per- the gateway to Rome and alluded to the manently damaged but we lost five days' strength of the defences of the gate. A des- working. cription of the terrain now facing us will make At the turn of the year the Mediterranean clear the reasons why this one sector was the theatre, which had already lost so many of its only place where we could hope to develop an best troops, now lost two of its senior com- advance in strength and why I was obliged to manders -for the benefit of the Western cam- transfer there ever-increasing forces until by paign. On loth December, 1943, General next May the bulk of my Armies was disposed Eisenhower was informed of his appoint- in the Tyrrhenian sector. The Adriatic coastal ment as Supreme Commander, Allied Ex- plain in which Eighth Army had been operat- peditionary Force; he actually handed over ing leads nowhere except, eventually, to to General Wilson* on 8th January, 1944. Ancona. The centre of the peninsula is filled General Wilson's appointment was announced by the Apennines which here reach their great- on 27th December and on the same day est height; they were now under deep snow was made the announcement of General and even in summer are quite impracticable Montgomery's transfer to command of for the movement of large forces. The west Twenty- Group. General Mont- coast rises steeply into the trackless Aurunci gomery was succeeded, on ist January, 1944, and Lepini Mountains and the coastal road runs by General Leese,f who had commanded 30 close to the seashore, except for a short stretch Corps in the desert and in Sicily. In the new in the plain of Fondi, until it debouches into organisation in the Mediterranean, Allied Force the Pontine Marshes which the Germans had Headquarters now had a wider authority, in- flooded. The Aurunci and Lepini Mountains cluding those areas which had previously come are separated from the main Apennine range, under General Headquarters Middle East. To however, by the valley of the Liri and, further a large extent, therefore, its preoccupations to the north-west, by the valley of its tributary, were political and logistical; I was accordingly the Sacco. The gap thereby formed, through instructed that for the conduct of the campaign which runs 'Route 6, the Via Casilina, varies in Italy I was given a free hand. For this in width from four to seven miles. When it reason the title of my headquarters was changed reaches the eastern end of the Aurunci chain from Fifteenth Army Group to Headquarters the Liri meets the Rapido (known also as the Allied. Armies in ItalyJ and my administrative for the stretch between Cassino and the staff was reorganised and put. on a proper level confluence) flowing from due north at right with the operations staff. At the same time I angles to its course and the joint stream, now was relieved of the duties of Deputy Allied called the Garigliano, flows due south to reach Commander-in-Chief, being succeeded in the the east of Mmturno. From the appointment by Lieutenant-General J. L. confluence with the Rapido to Ceprano, where Devers of the United States Army. the Sacco joins the Liri, the valley is about I had had the pleasure of serving under twenty miles in length with the river on the General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Com- south side and the road on the north. Undu- mander for about a year. I have already ex- lating and well-wooded towards the north-west pressed, in my Despatch on the Conquest of the valley gradually loses these characteristics, Sicily, my appreciation of his gifts as a com- and open cornfields in the vicinity of Aquino mander and I need not repeat it here; but I give way to flat pasture land nearer the Rapido. will say that, apart from our professional rela- Numerous transverse gullies break up the sur- tionship, the footing on which we stood per- face, the most important being the Forme ' sonally was of close friendship and under- d'Aquino. standing. General Wilson, of course, was a The mouth of the valley was closed by for- member of the old Middle East team, having midable defences. . To enter it it is first neces- commanded in Syria and' subse- sary to cross the Rapido river which, as its quently the Persia and Command. He name shows, is very swift-flowing; the banks had succeeded me in command at General are generally low.but marshy, in fact most of Headquarters, Middle East when I took over the land here is reclaimed land. The Rapido command of Eighteenth Army Group on I9th might be compared to the moat before a castle February, 1943. His diplomatic gifts and his gate and on either hand are two great bastions. * General Sir : now Field- To the south Monte Majo, rising to just under Marshal The Lord Wilson of , G.C.B., G.B.E., three thousand feet, sends down spurs to the D.S.O. river running along its eastern side. The key t Lieutenant-General Sir , Bt., K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. of the position, however, lies on the north. J For a short time it was known as " Allied Central Here Monte Cairo, over five thousand feet, Mediterranean Forces ". rears its head as the southernmost peak of a 2908 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 great spur of the Apennines. From its summit on the Alban Hills. The choice of this objec- a ridge thrusts out, terminating abruptly in tive was 'made for obvious geographical . This is a bare, rocky pro- reasons. Rising just south of Rome this large montory, seventeen hundred feet high, whose massif of volcanic origin dominates both routes sides drop sharply into the plain beneath. It from Rome to the enemy's line on the Gari- had been selected for its natural strength and gliano, Routes 6 and 7, the Via Casilina and inaccessibility by Saint Benedict as the site the Via Appia. The latter can be cut with of his first monastery and by the Italian General ease by landing almost anywhere on the west Staff as an example of an impregnable position. coast, but the Alban Hills mark the first point Before we could advance on Rome by this where the inland route is not protected, by route, and there was no other way except by the almost trackless Aurunci and Lepini Moun- sea, we should have to storm this bastion de- tains. If we could seize them the enemy's fending the gate, for from it the Germans could communications would be cut and JRome almost command the whole floor of the valley. within our grasp. It would, admittedly, foe rather in the nature of a bluff, for a really Plans for an Amphibious Landing. strong-nerved commander might still hang on to his positions—although, of course, we in- The desirability of employing our control of tended to attack them frontally in force simul- the sea in amphibious outflanking movements taneously with our landing—and try to raise had been well in the forefront of all our plan- a force from somewhere else to fight his com- ning ever since we first set foot in Italy. For munications free. Such a course would cer- lack of resources in men and craft only one tainly mean reinforcements from outside Italy, operation had so far been attempted, Eighth which would be an assistance to the other Army's small-scale ibut successful landing at fronts, and I felt myself that, provided we got Termoli, but I had also been constantly ex- firmly on to the Alban Hills and across Route 6, amining the possibilities of a " seaiborne hook " Kesselring would not dare to take the risk of on the west coast where it seemed to promise retaining his positions at Cassino. still greater advantages. General Clark had endeavoured to fit in such an operation as a With the objective thus designated, detailed feature of almost all his attacks so far but, in planning became a Fifth Army responsibility, spite of his great keenness, -had been unable in conjunction with Rear-Admiral Lowry,* to find a suitable target for the resources avail- United States Navy, who was appointed as able. Now that iwe were approaching the naval commander for the force. The code- narrowest part of the peninsula the advant- name SHINGLE was given to the operation. ages of an amphibious strategy became even On I2th November, Fifth Army set up a plan- more obvious. With the shortening of their ning staff; they were instructed foy my Head- line and the strengthening of their defences, quarters to work on the assumption tjaat the with only one really vulnerable point in their force would number about twenty-three front, the Liri valley, the Germans could thousand men and that the target date would economise in troops while we, however well be 20-th December. The planning staff quickly our build-up might progress, would have diffi- . decided on the area around Anzio as the site culty in bringing our full strength to bear. of the landing. This would give immediate The advantages of an outflanking move were access into relatively open terrain, though not, of course, limited to assisting the advance broken iby water obstacles, over which good on Rome and extending the area on which the roads lead directly to the Alban Hills only Germans would have to fight us; they included twenty miles away. The beaches were definitely also the possibility of the destruction of part poor, with very shallow under-water gradients of the force opposing us. It was on these and off-lying sandbars, but they were the best grounds that I had urged this strategy at the to be had south of the Tiber; there were three Carthage conferences on 25th October and 3rd possible landing sites, one east and one west November and it had been agreed that an of Anzio and one in the port itself. The beach amphibious landing should 'be made south of to the west was particularly shallow and had, the Tiber when Fifth Army had advanced to in fact, to.ibe abandoned after the initial assault. within reasonable supporting distance. I had The weather was likely to ibe toad for beach proposed to use for this I British Infantry working and forecasts promised only an average Division, which had been originally intended of two good days out of seven. Conditions for Eighth Army. The landing craft situation would be much improved, however, if the port was quite uncertain. I pointed out on 8th of Anzio, which the Germans had been using November that, on the present programme, my for coastwise maintenance, could ibe captured Armies would still be ten thousand vehicles undemolished. As.to opposition to the landing, short by ist January and that it would be it was not expected that the enemy would have impossible to mount'an amphibious operation any large force in the area. Our estimate of before 25th December. If the craft were then the prepared defences likely to be met was withdrawn it would be impossible to lift as made difficult (by the fact that the first photo- much as a division with what would remain. graphic coverage showed an enormous number However, we decided to go on planning on of defences of all kinds in the immediate the -assumption that sufficient might be avail- vicinity of Anzio. It was learned, however, able. The SEXTANT conference was due to that the area had been a much-used training open in Cairo on 22nd November and General ground for Italian troops before and during Eisenhower agreed to press there for the re- the war, and nearly all the defences were tention of the landing craft which I thought marked as.unoccupied; in the event the 'masses necessary. of trenches and strongpoints which dotted the My operation instruction of 8th November coast on the defence overprints issued to the had directed that in the third phase of the troops played no r61e in resistance to the operations then envisaged an amphibious land- assault. ing would Ibe made south of Rome directed * Rear-Admiral F. J. Lowry, United States Navy. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2909 The first plan for SHINGLE was approved agreement with General Clark, to use the VI on 25th November. The operation was to be United States Corps Headquarters, General timed to coincide with the arrival of the main Lucas commanding, which was then out of the body of Fifth Army on the general line Capi- line, with I British Division, plus some Com- strello-Ferentino-Priverrio and was to be in the mandos and armour, and 3 United States Divi- strength of one infantry division,* reinforced by sion, also supported by American armour, para- some armour and anti-aircraft artillery. It was chutists and Rangers, i Division had just intended to make contact with the main body arrived in Italy and was not yet committed* within seven days. We were to retain the 3 Division had already been engaged on necessary landing craft until i5th January but planning SHINGLE and was the obvious we now thought it unlikely that we should be choice. I should like to mention, in this con- within supporting distance until at least loth nection, a typically understanding signal I re- January. By i8th December it was clear that ceived from General Eisenhower, almost the even this date could not be met and General last he sent me before leaving the Mediterra- Clark signalled to me " reluctantly " recom- nean. " The disadvantages of employing a mending the cancellation of the operation on mixed Corps," he said, " are of course as ob- the grounds that the arbitrary date set for the vious to you as to me. I have wondered surrender of landing craft made it impossible to whether or not you may have been influenced mount the attack under the conditions necessary by either of the following factors: that you for success. I signalled this decision to General felt it undesirable, because of the risks in- Eisenhower on the 2ist but informed him that volved, to hazard a Corps of two American I was still studying the problem in the hope divisions when you as a British officer have of 'being able to prepare a modification of the the deciding responsibility or that you may have original plan for a later date. thought it undesirable from a political view- I fully shared General Clark's reluctance to point for a Corps of two British divisions to see ourselves forced back on a strategy of be given the opportunity for the direct capture frontal assault in the present unfavourable con- of Rome. In my opinion neither of these fac- ditions. There was now no hope that Fifth tors should be allowed to outweigh the military Army could arrive within supporting distance advantages of launching your assault by any of a landing at Anzio within the proposed time; troops you believe best fitted and most avail- no advantage would be gained by a landing able. In giving these views I merely wish to nearer to the present front under the abrupt remove any political difficulties that may occur southern slopes of the Aurunci; I therefore to you in order that you can launch the best began to consider the possibility of making the military operation that can be laid on in the SHINGLE force much stronger, strong enough time available." I replied that the composition to hold its ground by itself, for a longer time of the Corps was based solely on the best for- than we had previously considered. I put up mations available in the time: " the political this proposal, which virtually amounted to a aspect is of no consequence but I do think new plan, at a Commanders-in-Chief confer- the sharing of risks and hazards together is of ence in Tunis on 25th December. The Cairo importance." conference had just broken up and it had there been decided that General Eisenhower should Orders for the operation were issued on 2nd take over the command of the invasion of January. The objective was defined as to cut North-west Europe, to be succeeded in the the enemy communications and threaten the Mediterranean by General Wilson. Both were rear of the German XIV Corps. In the last present at the conference, as was also the Prime paragraph Fifth Army was ordered to make Minister who was passing through on his way " as strong a thrust as possible towards Cas- back from Cairo to London. I proposed we sino and Frosinone shortly before the assault should assault with two divisions reinforced by landing to draw in enemy reserves which might some armour. The conference decided that, by be employed against the landing forces and then a readjustment of the programme for the re- •to create a breach in his front through which pair and refitting of landing craft in England, it every opportunity will be taken to link up would .be possible for sufficient to remain in rapidly with the seaborne operation." For this the Mediterranean long enough to carry out 10 Corps was being reinforced by 5 British the assault without diminishing the numbers Infantry Division. This was the second division available for the invasion of North-west I had taken from Eighth Army, for i Division Europe, f We also had a lucky windfall in the had been originally intended for it, and I was arrival of fifteen Landing Ships, Tank on their shortly afterwards to take three more. The way home from the Indian Ocean where a Adriatic sector was now of secondary impqrt- proposed operation for which they were ear- ance to the western sector. The intention was marked had been cancelled. It was decided, to launch successive attacks by the three Corps therefore, that all preparations should be made on the main front: the French Expeditionary for carrying out SHINGLE with two assault Corps on i2th January against the high ground divisions on or about 20th January. The ob- north of Cassino, II Corps on the I5th to jective, as before, was to be the Alban Hills. capture Monte Porchia and Monte Trocchio and reach the Rapido river and 10 Corps on It was now necessary to press on rapidly the 17th to cross the lower Garigliano in the with the planning of the new assault. • The Minturno area and attack northwards up the composition of the force caused some discus- Ausente river valley towards San Giorgio a sion as it would be difficult to compose a homo- Liri. Finally, II Corps, with its left and right geneous Corps quickly enough. I decided, in thus protected, would on 20th January force * 3 United States Division was nominated .on 13 the Rapido in the area of Sant' Angelo and December. exploit rapidly, supported iby armour, west- t At that time the target date for the invasion was in May and it was agreed that this readjustment would wards and north-westwards. Two days later not affect that date. VI Corps was to land at Anzio and threaten 2910 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 the rear of the enemy who, it was hoped, would on the Maiella. These parachutists were un- by then -be already hard pressed on his main doubtedly the best German troops in Italy— front. in the German army, some said—and Ortona I was still a little anxious about the time gave magnificent opportunities for street fight- limit for the return of landing craft because of ing. For over a week, from 20th to 28th the needs of maintenance and my Chief Ad- December, the Canadians were engaged in the ministrative Officer, General «Robertson,* gave most violent hand-to-hand struggle. Street me his opinion on 5th January that the plan fighting, especially in a town of masonry was not sound administratively. I managed houses, calls for the greatest skill and courage eventually a slight readjustment of -the pro- as Stalingrad had shown and the Canadians gramme, as a result of a conference on 8th came triumphantly out of a test as severe as January, which gave us a reasonable guarantee any in the war. On the 28th the parachutists that we should -be able to supply the force were finally driven from the town. All our landed. I also planned -to land in the first attacks on Orsogna in the meanwhile had failed follow-up convoy a mobile, hard-hitting force •and the enemy remained in (possession foil from i United States Armoured Division and another five months. For the rest of the period 45 Infantry Division. Later the remainder no advance was made east of the Apennines; of these divisions was to follow. This meant the Germans took the opportunity of the pause that in two months SHINGLE had grown from in operations .to complete the relief of 65 a first tentative figure of twenty-three thousand Division by the newly arrived 334 Division. men to an expected eventual strength of one On the Fifth Army front advances by II hundred and ten thousand. It was hoped that Corps) and the French Expeditionary Corps the Germans would not be able, with the between 3rd and isth January drove the Ger- resources available to them in Italy, both to mans back through the depth of their winter block off this force and to hold the " Gustav " positions on to the final " Gustav " line. It line. < was a strongly contested advance; the Germans had reinforced their front here in December Having made the outflanking force as strong with 44 Infantry and 5 Mountain Divisions and as possible it was now essential to give the 71 Infantry Division was on the way. San maximum strength to the frontal attack, which Vittore was captured on 6th January and Monte must have sufficient momentum to carry it well Porchia on the same day; Monte Trocchio, the up the Liri valley. I therefore decided to with- last hill before the Rapido, was abandoned draw the New Zealand Division from Eighth by the enemy on the isth. Meanwhile the Army, to be concentrated in the Naples area French Expeditionary Corps, of 2 Moroccan and by 26th January, D plus 4 for SHINGLE. This 3 Algerian Divisions, had also made contact division, of good fighting quality, well motorised with the " Gustav " line further north where and with an armoured component, was the they had captured Monte Santa Croce; across most suitable readily available for such ex- the upper Rapido, and Monte Pile, west of Viti- ploitation. It gave me an Army Group reserve cuso. This represented an advance of about under my hand, for the first time, with which ten miles by the northern arm of my pincers to influence the battle; as the events of the fol- aiming at Cassino and caused considerable lowing May were to show, operations in the Liri alarm to the Germans; the newly arrived 5 valley and from Anzio must be treated as an Mountain Division made a poor showing in its Army Group battle. It was the third division first battle in Italy and had to be reinforced taken from Eighth Army to increase our con- with detachments from the 3 Panzer Grenadier centration at the vital point; I intended to put Division which had been intended for the it at the disposal of Fifth Army when a suitable Adriatic. opportunity for its employment in an exploit- ing rdle could be foreseen. Opening of the Battle for Rome. On 2oth January I moved my headquarters Operations Preliminary to the Anzio Landing. over to the west of the Apennines and opened On the Adriatic sector General Montgomery in the Royal Palace at . General still continued with his attempt to break Richardson had been succeeded as my Chief of through the enemy's defensive system and Staff shortly before by General Harding* who, reach Pescara but with even less success as after commanding 7 Armoured Division in the the weather worsened and the enemy's desert, had had command of a Corps in strength increased. The immediate objective England. was now Ortona, a small port surmounted by a medieval Old Town with a dilapidated castle It will be useful at this point to pause and and an outlying New Town of modern solidly describe the order of battle of the opposing built houses. It was hoped that we should -be armies as they stood on 22nd January, the able to use the harbour for maintenance. On day of the Anzio landing, f On our side there 6th December I Canadian Division and on 7th were at that time eighteen divisions^ and six December 8 Indian Division crossed the Moro brigades, equivalent to rather over twenty and drove on Ortona. Every advance was most divisions; however 3 Carpathian Division and 5 bitterly contested by 90 Panzer Grenadier Canadian Armoured Division were not yet Division), which had now arrived complete; available, for employment. Eighth Army had instead of the passive defence of 65 Division the two Corps in the line, 5 and 13, with four Panzer Grenadiers spent lives recklessly in divisions and two brigades, and two divisions savage counter-attacks. But the acme of stub- arriving in the Army area. Fifth Army had bornness was reached in the defence of Ortona three Corps in line, French Expeditionary, itself by i Parachute Division which had been * Lieutenant-General (now Sir John) Harding, brought across from its hitherto inactive front K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. t Appendices " C " and " D ". * Major-General (now General) Sir Brian Robertson, j Ten British, five American, two French and one St., K.C.M.G.. K.C.V.O., C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. Polish. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2911 II United States and 10 British, with six divi- French ships. The assault force consisted of sions in line and one in reserve; VI Corps, some fifty thousand American and British troops landing at Anzio, had two reinforced divisions, and over five thousand vehicles. The voyage to be followed shortly by elements of two more. was uneventful and the force was neither There was one division in Army Group reserve. observed nor intercepted by the enemy. The Total enemy strength was between twenty first assault troops touched down on the beaches and twenty-one divisions. On the main front at 0200 hours on the 22nd; opposition was negli- Tenth Army had thirteen divisions (facing ten gible and it was clear that complete surprise to twelve on our side) under LXXVI Panzer had been obtained. The enemy defences, except Corps in the east and XIV Panzer Corps in for a few coastal artillery positions, were un- the west. The remainder were in North Italy manned and it was soon discovered that the under Fourteenth Army; some of the eight only German unit in the area was a battalion there were still in process of forming. In view of 29 Panzer Grenadier Division- which had been of the weak state of some of these the German so severely reduced in the recent fighting that High Command considered it necessary to re- it had been sent there the day before to rest inforce Italy with the equivalent of three good and refit and to acquire some training in demoli- divisions, and allow the retention of a fourth, tion by blowing up, at its leisure, the small in order to meet the threat presented by Anzio. harbour of Anzio*. Fortunately it had made The operations to which the Anzio landing no progress with the task before its training was to be the climax began with the attack was interrupted. The failure of enemy recon- of 10 Corps across the Garigliano on iTth Jan- naissance is undoubtedly to be ascribed at least uary. This was delivered by three divisions, in part to a heavy air raid we had laid on for the 5th, 56th and 46th but the last played only the purpose against the enemy's long-range a minor role in the opening phases; the object air reconnaissance base at Perugia on I9th Jan- was to crush the enemy's extreme right behind uary. This was so successful that no recon- the lower Garigliano, and then turn northwards naissance was flown between ro,th and 22nd and, breaking through the hills between Min- January. A local diversion was made by the turno and Castelforte up the valley of the Navy who bombarded Civitavecchia and Ausente river, to appear in the Liri valley at simulated landings there on the night of the 2ist; San Giorgio. The attack began well. The the feint was taken seriously at first by the German 94 Infantry Division, a relatively in- enemy who flew a reconnaissance over the area experienced formation, had not been expecting —the pilot asked where the landing was. Army an attack and was surprised by the weight of Group " C " informed the German High Com- its delivery, for the arrival of 5 Division had mand at 0600 hours that a landing had taken been well concealed. The Germans reacted place directed at Rome and requested the rapidly to what they imagined to be our main reinforcements which had been agreed for that effort, finding confirmation of this appreciation case; but the first real news that the landing when II Corps attacked across the Rapido on was taking place at Anzio was given by a 20th January. 90 Panzer Grenadier Division Messerschmidt at 0820 hours, six hours after was brought down from the Eighth Army front the assault troops landed. and 29 Panzer Grenadier Division from the Rome area; the latter move was rather gratify- Consolidation of the Bridgehead. ing and unexpected, for it was the division The first phase of the operation had thus which had been expected to oppose the Anzio gone better than we had reason to hope; we landing; in addition the Hermann Goering had gained both strategical and tactical surprise Division was also put in on the lower Garigliano and had got our forces ashore with scarcely any in spite of orders which had been received to fighting. The exploitation inland, however, was transfer it to France on 20th January to prepare slower than I had planned and failed to reach for the invasion battles of the coming summer. our objective, the Alban Hills. This is in part The 10 Corps attack looked the more danger- to be ascribed to what is always a potent factor ous to the enemy; by the igth 5 Division had in all military operations, the delayed effect of captured Minturno and the 56th was in the out- preconceived ideas on a situation to which they skirts of Castelforte. General von Vietinghoff no longer apply. At the time when the orders decided to rely on the strong defences of the for the operation were issued Fifth Army's In- Rapido to hold off the frontal attack of II Corps. telligence Staff estimated that enemy resistance In this he was justified although the attack by would be in the strength of one division (viz. 36 Division was pressed with great gallantry. 29 Panzer Grenadiers), four parachute batta- A small bridgehead was seized on the 2ist but lions from Rome, a tank and an anti-tank it was eliminated on the 22nd. Meanwhile the battalion and other miscellaneous units, to a Germans were preparing a powerful force to total of fourteen thousand three hundred men. counter-attack 10 Corps. On the morning of VI Corps was therefore expecting to have to the 22nd all the three newly-arrived mobile fight an assault landing and have some trouble divisions, 29, 90 and Hermann Goering, were in consolidating its beach-head. Although the thrown into the attack; every division of the enemy dispositions assumed in this apprecia- Tenth Army was thus actively committed at tion had been radically altered, and VI Corps the moment when VI Corps was landing at had, of course, been apprised of this fact before Anzio. the landing, the effects of the original concep- tion of the task undoubtedly remained. The fact The assault force had sailed from Naples at that the whole nature of the operation had fairly 0500 hours on 2ist January in perfect weather recently been changed from a relatively small conditions and with the prospect that the weather flanking assault designed to join up quickly with would continue fine. The convoy was made the advance of the main body of Fifth Army up of two hundred and forty-three warships, transports, landing craft and various other * In addition there were dispersed on the seventy* three miles of coast from the Tiber to Terracina three vessels of the United States and Royal Navies, engineer companies and part of the 29 Reconnaissance supplemented by Dutch, Greek, Polish and Battalion. C 2912 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 to one employing five times the force, intended and abandoned after the landing of the first to be self-supporting for an indefinite period, assault troops; but the port of Anzio had been combined with the fact that the enemy with- opened, practically undamaged. Ninety per drawals which had left the coast clear at Anzio cent, of the personnel and equipment of the had reduced the chances of rapid progress by assault convoy had been landed (by midnight the main body, undoubtedly contributed to the on D-day and the return and follow-up convoy decision to secure first, and consolidate, a sound programme was running to schedule. defensive perimeter before proceeding to the '.Enemy, reactions to the landing were rapid. main objective, the capture of the Alban Hills. Kesselring's (first decision was to build up as The increase in the size of the force no doubt hastily as possible, and with every available persuaded the Corps Commander that it was means, some form of (blocking force to con- now practicable to proceed, if not cautiously tain the beach-head. There were already in at least deliberately, rather than hazard a dash the Cisterna area some elements of the Hermann inland at the very beginning of the operations. Goering Division, notably part of the divisional There was a mechanical factor making in the tank regiment with some artillery; a regiment same direction; the beaches were so bad .that the of 3 Panzer Grenadier Division, which was on landing of the guns, tanks and heavy equipment its way to Eighth Army front, was 'halted and was delayed beyond our expectations and it was brought back to the Alban Hills where it was some time before the troops could be wedded joined on the evening of the 23rd by a regi- to their supporting weapons. mental group from 15 Panzer Grenadier Divi- sion, the successful defenders of the Rapido. At the time, therefore, I considered that The latter two forces were put under command our progress in the first days of the landing of a regimental commander of 4 Parachute had been rather too slow. On the other hand, Division, Colonel Gehricke, and were rapidly now that we have the inestimable advantage joined by the remainder of this division which of .wisdom after the event and know what steps came down by battalions at a time from the enemy was prepared to take, I find it Perugia, where it was in process of forming. interesting to speculate whether a deep and The rest of the Hermann Goering Division rapid thrust inland, ignoring what the Germans came iip from the lower Garigliano, where the could bring against us, would have been suc- offensive it had joined in on the 22nd was cessful or not. Certainly my experience of called off by the end of the day. It was clear German reactions on such occasions has been that the enemy intended both to hold the that, though they are easy to deceive, they " Gustav " line, where he had now blunted are not easily (panicked. Every time we our first attacks, and to seal off the bridge- attacked Kesselring in Italy we took him com- head in his ^rear with a view to destroying pletely by surprise, but he showed very great it later if possible. This intention was soon skill in extricating himself from the desperate reinforced iby an order from the Fuehrer's situations into which his faulty Intelligence had Headquarters which was directed to be read out led him. I feel now that he would not, in to all ranks: " The ' Gustav ' line must be these circumstances, have altered his disposi- held at all costs for the sake of the political tions on the main, front to any great extent consequences which would follow a completely until he had tried every means to eliminate successful defence. The Fuehrer expects the the threat in his rear. The risk in such a bitterest struggle for every yard ". This verbal course is obvious; on the other hand, VI Corps, intervention iby Hitler was followed by more with the resources available to it, would have . fruitful actions than was to be usual later; the found it very difficult both to be secure on Italian theatre was to be reinforced. Kesselring the Alban 'Hills and at the same time retain was informed that he would receive two semi- the absolutely necessary communications with motorized infantry divisions, three independent the sea at Anzio. There are too many hypo- reinforced and two heavy tank bat- theses involved to make further speculation talions, together with an extra allotment of valuable; but such conclusions as can be drawn G.H.Q. medium and heavy artillery. Further, are at any rate satisfactory: that the actual he was told he could retain in Italy for the course of events was probably the most advan- present the Hermann Goering Division. With tageous in the end. these reinforcements he was expected not merely The area of the (bridgehead, as decided on to contain but to eliminate the Anzio bridge- previously, was about seven miles deep by head. Not only was this essential militarily fifteen miles wide with a perimeter of twenty- in order to continue holding in Italy with the six miles. On the left 4he flank rested on minimum forces but also psychologically and the Moletta river and was covered toy a system politically it would be a most valuable gain of wadis. In the open central sector the line to defeat ignominiously the first seaborne land- ran across fields to meet the western branch of ing made by the Allies in 2944, a year which the Mussolini canal south of Padiglione, and was fated to see other and still more dangerous then along its course eastwards to Sessano and landings. southwards to the sea. The canal between By 3Oth January there were already elements Sessano and the sea is a considerable obstacle, . of no less than eight divisions assembled south with steeply sloping sides like an anti-tank of Rome. Admittedly these forces were extre- ditch, and a shallow stream in the middle . mely mixed and hastily organised, but they sixteen feet wide. The right flank was were in the main experienced troops and therefore very strong and could be held accustomed by now to working independently with minimum forces. This original beach- of their parent formations. The first four head line was reached all along its extent divisions represented were, as already stated, by the evening of the 23rd after some 3 and 15 Panzer Grenadier, 4 Parachute and small actions on the night of the 22nd on the Hermann Goering. They were joined by 26 Mussolini canal with elements of the Hermann Panzer Division which was rushed across at Goering Division. The British beaches on the top speed from the Adriatic sector, bringing western flank had been found wholly unsuitable with it three battalions of i Parachute Division. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2913 Meanwhile 65 Infantry Division, which was re- counter-attack on the salient which i Division organising at Genoa after its losses on the San- had established, stretching north from Carro- gro, was hurried down to the west of the bridge- ceto to Campoleone. The position, held by head to assist Gehricke, and advanced elements 3 Infantry Brigade, was untenable against a of 715 (Motorized) Infantry Division had al- heavy attack and it was only by committing ready arrived. Command was exercised by 168 Brigade of 56 Division, which had landed Fourteenth Army, General von Mackensen, as a reinforcement on 3rd February, that it with two Corps Headquarters, I Parachute and was possible to extricate our troops from the LXXVI Panzer Corps. The tank strength salient by the night of the 4th/5th to a line available amounted to above one hundred and 'covering Carroceto and the " Factory ". VI eighty and the artillery deployment was Corps then went over to the defensive in pre- already formidable. paration for the enemy counter-attack in force, The first attempt to enlarge the bridgehead of whose imminence there was strong evidence. position was on 25th January when 3 Division Two positions were to be prepared in rear of advanced towards Cisterna. This attack the present front lines; the last, corresponding was -halted by the Hermann Goering Divi- with the initial bridgehead, was to be the final sion after gains of up to two miles. The line, i and 3 Divisions, both reinforced, plus advance was resumed on the 27th but was again the newly arrived i Special Service Force and halted well short of its objective; 3 Division a regimental combat team of 45 Division, were was still three miles from the town and in the line; the remainder of the 45th and i it was evident that a more concentrated and Armoured Division, less one Combat Command, better prepared attack would be necessary, were in reserve. As the dimensions of the enemy i Division in the meanwhile was endeavouring threat became more, apparent I decided that to push up the main road from Anzio to Albano more reinforcement was necessary and sent in with Campoleone as its first objective. An the remainder of 56 British Division; this attack on the so-called " Factory Buildings " arrived between I3th and i8th February and (actually the first buildings of Mussolini's new relieved i Division on the i3th. On 25th town of Aprilia) was successful on the 25th, February 18 Infantry Brigade, from the British though it met strong resistance from 3 Panzer i Armoured Division in North Africa, began to Grenadier Division; but we could only advance disembark at Anzio. a mile and a half beyond the " Factory " and it was clear that Campoleone, like Cisterna, Renewed Attack on the " Gustav " Line. could only be taken by a strong and consoli- Although the attempt by 10 Corps to en- dated attack. I had returned to the bridge- velop the southern flank of the " Gustav " line head on the 25th, after being there on D-day, had 'been halted after an initial success by the and as a result of my observations ordered enemy's counter-attacks, and the frontal General Clark on the 27th to press the advance attack by II Corps across the Rapido had with the utmost energy,before the enemy rein- failed, it was still vitally necessary to break forcements could arrive; they were then through as soon as possible in order to gain suffering considerable delay from our ak the maximum advantage from the Anzio land- attacks on communications. I told him I con- ings. There was little chance of a further ad- sidered that, with the prospect of the balance vance through the Aurunci Mountains for the of 45 Division" arriving in the bridgehead enemy were strongly posted and prepared and shortly, risks must be taken and I suggested we had had to weaken 10 Corps by withdraw- that all efforts should now be concentrated on ing 56 Division for Anzio. I therefore decided full-scale co-ordinated attacks to capture to strengthen the northern arm of my pincers Cisterna and Campoleone, followed by a rapid and ordered II Corps to shift its weight to its advance on . right flank and, in conjunction with the French Expeditionary Corps, to seize the high ground General Clark, who had set up an Advanced above Cassino and envelop the position from Command Post at Anzio, replied that the main the north. If we could seize Cassino, the nor- attack could not be launched, for various thern 'bastion, we should be able to advance reasons, before 3oth January. The results of up the valley without worrying about the the attack were disappointing. 3 Division southern flank. failed to capture Cisterna and suffered heavy It was difficult for Eighth Army to provide losses, particularly among the Ranger much distraction to tie -down the enemy on battalions which were under command, i their front. When General Leese took over Division reached the railway embankment at he found that the heavy battles from the Sangro Campoleone, a difficult obstacle, but was un- to Ortona had left the enemy, though no longer able to advance beyond it, leaving itself in a in his planned winter positions, still strongly dangerous salient protruding into the enemy posted on an easily defensible line and our own lines. On 3ist January I again visited Anzio troops severely depleted in strength. There by destroyer, returning on 2nd February. It was no vital objective within our grasp on this was clear to me that until we had captured front; the enemy could easily afford to give Cisterna and Campoleone it would be im- ground if really necessary and had already pre- possible to undertake any important offensive pared strong defensive positions in rear. On operations. I therefore ordered a renewed 22nd January General Leese told me that he attack on Cisterna in full strength with a hoped to be able to mount a major operation, properly prepared Corps plan and all possible using 4 Indian, i Canadian and 78 Divisions, concentration of artillery and air attacks. Next by mid-February. I replied that this would! my plan was to gain ground on the left of probably be too late and that what we needed i Division, clear up our centre and organise was to prevent the enemy withdrawing troops, our communications so as to be able to mount from opposite Eighth Army, which he was, a solid offensive to cut Route 6. doing at that very time. On further considera- Before these instructions could be carried tion, however, I saw clearly that that was out the Germans on 3rd February launched a impossible and I therefore decided, on 30th C 2 2914 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

January, to follow the enemy's example and Division to oppose the French he decided to reinforce the vital points at the cost of weaken- strengthen the mixed group of 44 and 71 Divi- ing the Adriatic sector. sions which was defending Cassino itself and The first attack north of Cassino, between the Monastery with 90 Panzer Grenadiers, 24th and 3ist January, had had limited success. brought down from the Anzio front. Against 34 United States Division, in hard fighting, these excellent troops II Corps.was unable to secured a bridgehead over the Rapido about two make progress. It had got into the outskirts of miles north of the town and, pressing up into the town and was within striking distance of the hills beyond the river, captured two out- the Monastery hill; indeed it was only a mile lying spurs and the village of Cairo. To their from Route 6 down below, but it was a mile .north the French, supported .by an American packed with defences held by fanatical troops Regimental Combat Team, captured Colle and broken up by mountain ridges and gullies. .Belvedere and pushed further into the moun- The! first battle of Cassino was a German tains towards Terelle. II Corps was now in a success; its retention now was a matter of position to swing the direction of its attack German prestige. from west to south. 36 Division, still weak from I had refused to commit the New Zealand its losses in the Rapido crossing, was brought Corps, my Corps de Chasse, until it was certain in to guard the western flank by holding Monte that II Corps could not take the position. The CasteUone, captured by 34 Division on ist New Zealanders had relieved the Americans February, and the 34th began attacking oil the south of Route 6 on 6th February to allow 2nd along the ridge from Colle Majola on to the the latter to concentrate for the attack; but rear of Monastery Hill. Hopes were high and it was now clear that they would be obliged, General Clark signalled me on that day: not merely to debouch through a gateway " Present indications are that the Cassino flung open for them, but to capture the gate heights will be captured very soon ". He asked themselves. II Corps went over to the defen- ior a directive on the employment of the New sive on I2th February. My plan now was Zealand Division. for 4 Indian Division to capture Monastery Hill I had already decided that the development while the New Zealanders would seize a bridge- of the situation at Anzio and the stubborn head over the Rapido. The Corps would then •enemy resistance on the main front made neces- exploit up the Liri valley, but this was not to sary a reinforcement of General Freyberg's* start until weather conditions were favourable forces if they were to be able to carry out the enough to allow the movement of armoured task assigned. I had therefore ordered General forces off the roads. At the same time I Leese on 3Qth January to despatch 4 Indian ordered Fifth Army to make plans for resuming Division, which had newly arrived in ;the the offensive with VI Corps. country, to come under command of General Time was urgently pressing, for it was known Freyberg in an ad hoc New Zealand Corps. 4 that a great enemy counter-attack against the Indian Division had had the longest experience Anzio bridgehead was being prepared. In the in actual operations of any Allied formation event the two attacks went in on the same day, and had recently been doing some training in i6th February. A preliminary to the New mountain operations.! I told General Leese: Zealand Corps attack was the destruction of "' I fully realise that this will put out of court the Monastery of Monte Cassino by air bom- any possibility of offensive operations by you ". bardment and artillery fire. This famous On 3rd February I put the New Zealand Corps building had hitherto been deliberately spared, under command of Fifth Army, from Army to our great disadvantage, but it was an in- Group reserve. I still felt the need for a forma- tegral part of the German defensive system, tion under my hand to influence the battle and mainly from the superb observation it afforded. therefore signalled Eighth Army on the 4th It is doubtful, however, whether the ruins to be prepared to release 78 Division within after the destruction were not more valuable seven to ten days. General Leese was naturally to the enemy than the intact buildings; as we very perturbed at this proposal to take away were to find in the town of Cassino below, a fifth division; not only would it render any heavy bombardment often produced better offensive action quite impracticable and upset defensive positions than it destroyed. The the system for reliefs of tired formations but he feared that it might even lead to a loss of attack which went in on the i6th made no pro- security on his front. This, however, was a gress. 4 Indian Division ruefully decided that risk which I was prepared to take; the Adriatic the Cassino position was almost as strong as sector was now unimportant to either side; both Keren, still their invariable standard of com- were gathering their maximum strength for the parison. The only gain below the mountain decisive battle under the snows of Monte Cairo was a small bridgehead over the Rapido oppo- and among the canals of the Pontine Marshes. site the railway station. 78 Division, which had been put under command of New Zealand The attack by 34 United States Division con- Corps on the 8th, arrived in the area on the tinued to make progress but the enemy was iTth, having been held up by deep snow on now steadily reinforcing. Leaving 5 Mountain the way from Eighth Army front. On the 24th * His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard it took over from the New Zealanders south Preyberg, V.C., aC.M.G., K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O. of the railway, the latter relieved 34 United •f One of our most serious handicaps in Italy was the lack of formations trained and organized for States Division in the north end of Cassino mountain fighting. I had 4 Moroccan Mountain and the remaining elements of II Corps, on Division for just over three months and eventually Monte Castellone, were relieved by the French got the American 10 Mountain Division, in February Expeditionary Corps on the 26th. 1945, for the last three months. I had frequently asked for the only British Mountain Division, the 52nd. Fourteenth Army's Counter-attack at Anzio. This division was held in reserve in the United King- The preliminary moves in the enemy's dom, presumably for projected operations elsewhere. In fact it was never employed in mountain warfare planned counter-offensive against the bridge- but was retrained and eventually deployed in Holland head took the form of an attack to clear the in the autumn of 1944. " Factory " area to secure a firm base for SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2915 the assault. This began on 7th February and and supported by tanks. By the end of the the intention was to capture the whole area in day a salient of some two thousand yards had a night attack. In actual fact the stubborn been driven down the road in the sector of resistance of i Division and counter-attacks 45 Division. The airstrip at Nettuno had by 45 United States Division meant that five been rendered unserviceable by long-range days of heavy fighting were necessary before artillery fire, which also destroyed four aircraft the objective was secured on the i2th. VI as they were about to take off; fighter cover, Corps was now back on its " intermediate " line as a result, now had to be flown wholly from astride the Anzio-Albano road and it was clear the Naples area. Before (midnight the attack that this road would be the axis of the enemy's was resumed. Fighting on the I7th was even main attack. To meet it VI Corps relieved heavier; the enemy made fewer diversionary i Division and handed over the sector to 56 attacks and concentrated on his drive down the and 45 United States Divisions. On. iyth Anzio road. By now there was a wedge two. February General Truscott, Commander of 3 and a half miles wide and over a mile deep in, United States Division* was appointed Deputy the centre of 45 Division's front. Against this, Commander of the Corps. He directed, with wedge the whole of VI Corps' artillery was great success, the defence against the great directed, supported by all the air resources, German counter-offensive and on the 23rd available, some seven hundred bomber sorties. succeeded General Lucas as Corps Commander. The enemy was now getting very near the It was a new >r61e, for General Truscott had " Final Beach-head Line" and General made his reputation, and continued to increase Truscott moved two brigades of i Division into it, as a dashing commander of hard-hitting that line hi rear of 45 Division. offensives; indeed the defence was a new r61e The i8th was the most critical day. After altogether for our armies in Italy. The troops infiltration during the night into the shoulders showed, however, that fhey were fully equal to of the salient the enemy moved forward under the demands made on them, encouraged by the a lowering and overcast sky which prevented massive support of our concentrated artillery a repetition of the previous day's tremendous fire, which was augmented by the big guns of programme of air support. Once more waves the Allied Navies and the bombs and machine- of infantry attacked in the morning and in the gun fire of the Air Forces. afternoon Mackensen threw in his Corps de By the time the German attack began two Chasse, not now to exploit a breakthrough in flSbre divisions had been brought in to re- the Allied lines but to make one. For four inforce Fourteenth Army: 114 Jaeger from hours the battle raged east of the road on the Jugoslavia and 362 Infantry from North Italy, final beach-head line. The honours of the and the three independent regiments and two day go mainly to the United States 179 In- heavy tank battalions already mentioned had fantry Regiment and i Battalion of also arrived. This gave the Germans the the Loyals, and to the Corps artillery equivalent of about ten divisions against an which did deadly execution in the attacking Allied strength of rather less than five. German masses. The enemy was- held, and that night it morale was particularly high; a special order was clear that he was pulling back to re- from Hitler was read out to all troops before organise. The time had come for the planned the attack in which he demanded that this counter-attack. On the igth an armoured " abscess " must and would be eliminated in force from i United States Armoured Division three days. They were told that they would together with elements of 3 United States In- get massive air support from the Luftwaffe, fantry Division attacked the eastern flank of the combined with numbers of heavy tanks, em- German salient and gained some fifteen hundred ployed for the first time in Italy, and would yards causing disorganisation and panic. In have the privilege of operating for the first the afternoon 2 Brigade of i Division cleared time on any front the new secret weapon, the up some enemy penetrations and re-established " Goliath " remote-controlled explosive tank. the final line. A last, badly mismanaged enemy, The plan was to attack on a very narrow front attack on i Loyals on the morning of the 2Oth, of some four thousand yards straight down the repulsed with heavy losses, was the end of the Albano-Anzio road on to Anzio itself, only German offensive. It was clear that they would eight miles away. The loss of Anzio would attack again, for Hitler was insistent, but their mean that the bridgehead would be split in losses would render essential a pause to half and deprived of its port; this would have reorganise.* made further defence hopeless and even evacua- Fresh Plans of Campaign. tion would have been almost impossible for the beaches were already known to be entirely The failure of the main offensive attempts inadequate. The assault was to be made by by both sides, by the Allies in the second battle four divisions, reinforced by eleven battalions, of Cassino and by the Germans at Anzio, left led by the crack Lehr Regiment, the Infantry us with the same problem as before and the Demonstration Regiment from Doberitz, pride, necessity of thinking out some new solution for of the German Army. Four hundred and fifty- it. I felt confident now that the bridgehead two guns supported the attack. Two mobile could be held, for, unless they could find fresh. divisions, 26 Panzer and 29 Panzer Grenadier, formations, a renewed German attack would reinforced by two battalions, one of Tiger and have to be made in much reduced strength. one of Panther tanks, were echeloned behind I could concentrate, therefore, on Cassino and them to exploit the success of which no one try to find some new method of taking this doubted. fortress which had twice defied our best efforts. I still had one division uncommitted, the 78th, The attack began at 0630 hours on i6th but the weather was very bad and the Liri February after half an hour's artillery prepara- valley a sea of mud; it was no good putting my tion, with massed infantry covered with smoke last fresh troops into a repetition of our former * Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Lucien K. Truscott Jr., United States Army—subsequently * German sources give their casualties from 16 .to Commanding General, Fifth Army. 20 February as 5,389 in killed, wounded and missing. 2916 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 attacks unless I could produce some new tac- and advance up the Liri valley. Fifth Army iics to give us a better chance of success. In would attack on a parallel axis to the south this frame of mind I decided to try the effect through the Aurunci Mountains and from Anzio of a really heavy air bombardment. General on to to cut Route 6 in the enemy's Cannon,* Commanding General of the Tactical rear. This was the plan with which we were Air Force, was anxious to make the experiment successful in May, unaltered except for the too; he hazarded the opinion that, given good minor point of timing that the VI Corps attack weather and all the air resources in Italy, we was held back until the main attack had made could " whip, out Cassino like an old tooth." good progress. It was not certain that our Of course both of us regarded the plan wholly big attack would be made from Ithe same as an experiment, without any certainty as to positions as those held in February but I was how it would work out, for we had never tried already prepared for that. This had certain anything on that scale before; but I was very advantages. A major offensive from these posi- tions gave the 'best chance of achieving our willing to try it on for I felt that if successful object, for between the main front and the we should have found a way of capturing posi- bridgehead we were certain to trap and maul tions like this without the loss of life which so many German divisions that reinforcements more normal methods must involve, f Accord- would have to foe sent at the expense of the ingly, on 20th February, after discussing the resistance to OVERLORD. If, on the other plan with General Clark and General Freyberg, hand, our spring offensive found the Germans I decided we would next attempt to capture holding a connected front south of Rome, or the town of Cassino, after a heavy bombard- withdrawing up the peninsula to the " Gothic " ment, with the New Zealand Division which line, they would be unlikely to need reinforce- would then push past ithe southern face of ments so urgently and, indeed, in the latter Monte Cassino along Route 6, make contact case, might be able to release formations for with the Indians north-west of the Monastery the west. However, our regrouping would take and thus encircle the enemy positions. This a long time and I estimated mid-April as the would give us a big -bridgehead over the earliest possible date which could be expected Rapido and an entry into the Liri valley. for the resumption of the offensive. At the same time I decided to carry out a thorough regrouping of forces and reorganisa- General Wilson, in replying to my proposals, tion of command, the main lines of which were showed anxiety about the possible effects of reported iby General Harding, my Chief of a pause in operations. He began by stating General Staff, to Allied Force Headquarters in that as far as operations in Italy were con- an appreciation dated 22nd February. In this cerned, these must be conditioned mainly by the object of operations in Italy is defined as the air factor. His general plan for Italy was " to force the enemy to commit the maximum to use the air to deprive the enemy of the ability number of divisions in Italy at the time OVER- either to maintain his existing positions or to LORD is launched."$. To attain that object withdraw his divisions out of Italy in time the most effective way was not merely to push for OVERLORD. There was indeed, con- back the enemy's line but to destroy enemy .siderable optimism at Allied Force Head- formations in Italy to such an extent that they quarters about the ability of 'the air forces so must be replaced from elsewhere to avoid a to damage the enemy's communications as to rout. (But, as Nelson said, " Only numbers force him to accept the alternatives of starva- can annihilate "; my own calculations were tion, and reduction of ammunition reserves that " to have a reasonable chance of effective below the danger level, or withdrawal. This penetration against organized defences hi was based largely on an over-estimate of the Italian terrain, it is necessary for the side that disorganisation caused by bombing attacks on takes the offensive to have a local superiority marshalling yards; but even the more effective of at least three to one in infantry ". It is policy of creating -blocks at defiles, especially important to note that I said local, not overall by the destruction of bridges, which was sub- superiority. At the time the Germans lhad sequently adopted with the support, and, in between eighteen and nineteen divisions south part, on the advice of my staff, never in fact of Rome and some five divisions, including achieved this desirable result Jthougb, it did three still forming, in. the rest of Italy; as seriously reduce the enemy's margin of main- against this we had about twenty-one divisions. tenance.* General Wilson estimated, in the To remedy this it was proposed to initiate signal referred to, that the Mediterranean Allied immediately a scheme of reinforcement to bring Ah* Forces' bombing plan would make itself the Allied Annies by midiApril up to the total felt by the end of April and the effect would be of twenty-eight and a half divisions, four of to compel the enemy to withdraw " at least which, however, would be armoured divisions, to the Pisa-JRimini line ". The land forces of less value than infantry for fighting in Italy. would be required to keep up a continuous pressure during this time, otherwise the enemy The details of the regrouping carried out might withdraw and the spring offensive would can be better described in connection with the be a blow in the air. I could not consider actual opening of the spring offensive. Briefly, it likely, on the basis of past experience, that the effect was to bring Eighth Army Head- * As far as Italy was concerned, the fallacy of the quarters over west of the Apennines to take policy of attacks on marshalling yards, lay in the fact command of all -British troops, except for a that these are usually on level ground and always Corps on the Adriatic and the two divisions contain a large number of parallel tracks so that any at Anzio, and with these to capture Cassino damage can be rapidly repaired and a through line established in a very brief time. A reduction in rolling * Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) John K. stock and facilities was of little importance as for their Cannon, United States Army Air Force. military purposes the Germans, only needed about six- •f The technical experience we gained from this teen per cent, of the total available. A broken bridge, experiment was subsequently of great use on the on the other hand, meant a long delay and stores had to Western front. be ferried round the break by road, thus wasting as 11 was not then, aware of the proposed date for much fuel as would be lost from the destruction of OVERLORD. a good-sized dump. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2917 the enemy would withdraw, and I was con- defensive. In March three German mobile vinced that our spring offensive would find divisions, 26 Panzer, 29 Panzer Grenadier and him still offering a most determined resistance. Hermann Goering Panzer, were withdrawn from It was for this reason that I considered a the line, followed by 114 Jaeger. On the Allied regrouping absolutely vital to bring our full side 5 Division relieved the 56th -between 5th strength to ibear at the critical point, while a and nth March and on the 28th 34 Division continued attack in our present circumstances relieved 3 United States Division, which had would merely weaken us to no good purpose. been sixty-seven days continuously in the line. First, however, I would try once more to 56 Division went to the Middle East but the 3rd eliminate Cassino and seize some kind of a remained at Anzio in Corps reserve. bridgehead; this would mean that there would I reported on the situation after the repulse be no serious lull in the fighting. Comment- of these attacks in a signal on 5th March, when ing on the air plan I limited myself to hoping: I had returned from another visit to Anzio. " that the weather will improve in time to It was now much improved and, I added, " a give our air forces a chance to carry out their more healthy feeling of confidence prevails part of your plan. At present it is atrocious throughout". I took the opportunity of and shows no sign of change ". summing up the balance of the six weeks I explained my plan, on the lines of the fighting with reference to the rather mislead- appreciation of 22nd February, to the Army ing accounts which had been given publicity: Commanders at a conference at Caserta on the " From various reports I have read from 28th. We decided to relieve 5 (British Division home it appears that public opinion imagines in 10 Corps by 88 United States Division at that after the initial landing no effort was once and the former should then move to Anzio made to advance further. This is most to relieve 56 Division. 56 (Division 'had been distressing to me and the troops. Reference severely reduced in fighting value during its should be made to the many casualties short period in the bridgehead; General Truscott sustained by the British in taking Campoleone on the 26th reported it as inadequate to hold where they were finally held at the foot of its .present front.* We decided further that, the Colli Laziali, and also the losses suffered at a later date, 34United States Division should by.the Americans in trying to take Cisterria, also move to Anzio. Steps were also taken where all attacks failed. After this, superior to prepare the major reorganisation of the front German forces attacked us in strength and for the coming offensive. threw us on to the defensive and we had a bitter struggle to maintain the bridgehead Fourteenth Army's Second Offensive at Anzio. intact after being driven back from Campo- While the weather held up our renewed leone. A man may enter the backdoor of a attack at Cassino it was already clear that the house unperceived save by the kitchenmaid enemy was preparing another offensive at who raises the alarm. But unless the in- Anzio. He no doubt calculated that he had habitants hide upstairs there will be a fight time enough before our threat to the " Gustav " in the passage for the possession of the house. line became serious and experience had given We are now fighting in the passage ". him a justified confidence in the strength of Third Battle of Cassino. his defences there. His renewed attack could All this time the New Zealand Corps, now not be made in the same force as the strengthened by the addition of 78 Division, first; there were large gaps in his divisions and was waiting for suitable conditions for the next morale had suffered the inevitable depression attack on Cassino, which was intended to be that follows the failure of an offensive of which our last attack before the spring offensive. In much had been hoped. Mackensen therefore order to give our experiment in the use of heavy planned an attack on a smaller scale, using air attack its best chance we had laid down two LXXVI Corps only; it was designed to narrow conditions: there should be three fine days down the bridgehead by driving a wedge into before the attack to ensure that the ground was the eastern flank to cut off the troops defend- dry enough for the use of tanks, especially in ing the Mussolini canal. If this were success- the exploitation into the Liri valley, and there ful a further process of attrition might reduce should be good visibility on the day of the the bridgehead to dimensions too small for attack for the benefit of the bombers. For safety. Four divisions, including two panzer a fortnight after the repulse of the second Ger- divisions, were to make the assault, with a man offensive at Anzio General Freyberg waited mobile division in reserve: it was to be com- at twenty-four hours notice until, on the I4th, bined with diversionary attacks on both flanks. these conditions appeared likely to be fulfilled VI Corps was prepared for the attack on 29th and the attack was ordered for the next day. February and it was a complete failure: The total weight of high explosive showered artillery fire and the firm defence of 3 on Cassino amounted to over eleven hundred Division broke up most of the attacks, a small tons of bombs and nearly two thousand rounds penetration was made but was soon ironed out of artillery fire, but when the New Zealanders and by the afternoon of ist March the enemy advanced into the town they found 1he enemy had acknowledged defeat, f He never again still resisting. This was an extraordinary feat resumed the offensive and I now could consider and much to the credit of I Parachute the Anzio bridgehead secure, especially after Division.* After personally witnessing the we had captured Fourteenth Army's order of bombardment it seemed to me inconceivable 4th March directing the assumption of the that any troops should be alive after eight * As I have already explained, it was well below hours of such terrific hammering, let alone strength when it went to the bridgehead, and had been should be able to man their defences. 1 doubt fighting continuously since 9 September. if any other division in the German Army t Kesselring ordered at 1840 hours i March all concentrated attacks to be halted; Mackensen had * The first elements of the Parachutists had arrived already called off the offensive. German losses in the for the second battle, in February, when they held two days amounted to 2,215 (excluding 362 Division's the heights, including Monastery Hill. For the March losses for 29 February). assault they were responsible for the town as well. 2918 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

could have done it. With the defenders show- influenced by our ability to regroup the neces- ing such spirit the heaps of rubble .raised by sary formations for battle, marshal our forces the bombardment were actually an assistance and prepare the stage for an all-out, sustained to them, not least in preventing the use of offensive which will best assist OVERLORD in tanks. However, we succeeded hi clearing the drawing in and destroying the maximum num- greater part of the town and capturing Castle ber of German divisions which would otherwise Hill. That night, contrary to the forecast the be employed against.the Western invasion". weather broke; torrential rain turned the valley, It could indeed be said, reviewing the results of with its mass of craters, into a bog and de- the winter campaign, that the Allied Armies in prived the night attack of the advantage of Italy were already making the greatest possible the moon. The same spirited defence was made contribution consistent with their strength to on the mountain as in the town beneath. the plan of diverting German attention to what " Hangman's Hill ", a small knoll protruding was now a secondary theatre. Twenty-three from the glacis of Monte Cassino a short way German divisions, including many of the best below the Monastery, was captured by 4 Indian in the German Army, were held down in Italy; Division on the i6th; this marked the limit Anzio alone had meant the equivalent of four of our gains in the heights above the town. divisions being lost to other fronts. Tli3 size Fighting continued in the town and by the of the German garrison in the Balkans was also i8th most of it was in our hands; but on the influenced by the potential threat from Italy igth an enemy counter-attack re-took a point and by aid to the Partisan movements which between " Hangman's Hill " and the Castle could be provided from Italian bases. All this hill. Our garrison of the former, which had was achieved without our once having that been reduced by casualties, was cut off and numerical superiority usually considered neces- progress in the town was halted. sary for offensive operations, with a mixed force On 2oth March I informed both Army of many nationalities and with little opportu- Commanders: nity of flexibility in their employment. And it was already likely that the enemy, now "The slow progress made so far in forced on to the defensive in so awkward a two-« attacking the town of Cassino with the fronted position, would be unable to meet our consequent delay in launching the attack next offensive without drawing once more on on the Monastery, combined with the his dwindling central reserve to prevent a great necessity of preparing the maximum forces disaster. for a full-scale offensive in the second half of April, makes it essential to decide in the course of the next twenty-four or thirty-six PART III. hours whether (a) to continue with the THE CAPTURE OF ROME AND THE Cassino operations in the hope of capturing ADVANCE TO THE ARNO. the Monastery during the next three or four days or, (b) to call the operations off and to Regrouping for the Spring Offensive. consolidate such gains of ground as are In planning the strategy to be used when the important for the renewal of the offensive Allied Armies in Italy should be able to resume later ". large-scale operations I had laid down at the Renewed attacks on the 2ist and 22nd again start that " to have a reasonable chance of made no progress and on the 23rd the attack effective penetration against organised defences was called off. The decision was taken to con- in Italian terrain, it is necessary for the side solidate Castle Hill and the eastern part of the that takes the offensive to have a local town; as a result the isolated troops on " Hang- superiority of at least three to ©ne hi infantry ". man's Hill " were withdrawn on the night of It was to the attainment of this prior condition the 24th, and 4 Indian Division was relieved that I devoted my attention during the month by the 78th. On 26th March 13 Corps took of April. My general superiority in divisions command of the sector and the New Zealand in May would be of the nature of just under Corps was dissolved. one-and-a-quarter to one; these were, however, the best odds I ever enjoyed in Italy. But to The three attacks on Cassino had failed to convert this slight overall superiority into a achieve what we had hoped from them but local superiority of three to one at the critical they left us with solid advantages. We had point would not be easy. Neither side enjoyed the greater part of the town, which gave us any particular advantage in ease of lateral a bridgehead over the Rapido to use when communications and, if Kesselring correctly ap- we could concentrate the proper force for a preciated our intentions, he could concentrate renewed offensive. We could look forward to his strength opposite the threatened point as the next phase with confidence. Not only had fast as we could. And it must surely be easy we the Cassino bridgehead but we also held a for him to form a correct appreciation; we could large salient into the enemy's southern flank, not be going to attack up the Adriatic, which won by 10 Corps' attack in January, which led nowhere; our main effort must come some- was of the very greatest value to Fifth Army where west of the Apennines and almost in May; above all we had established, far in certainly on the axis of the Liri valley. So the enemy's rear, a strong Corps of good troops much was obvious from the configuration of well supplied, hi a position to cut all the the ground and would be confirmed by the enemy's communications when they should move across to the west, which we could not break out, or to threaten directly the possession hope to conceal, of Eighth Army Headquarters of Rome on which the Germans set such value. and the majority of the British troops under its command.* It was natural, perhaps, that some disap- pointment should be felt at home in view of * Captured enemy documents show that they were the length of the pause which we now proposed aware of the move of Eighth Army Headquarters though they placed it some twelve miles from its before renewing the offensive. I felt it neces- true location, presumably by an error in Direction sary to explain, on 2nd April: " The date is Finding. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2919

The directive on which Kesselring was act- else could have done its strength and its weak- ing, dating from the previous October but still nesses, and during the April lull these lessons in force, was to hold the Allies as far south of had been applied in the form of much work Rome as possible. He had been successful, on- the improvement of the defences. How- at great strain and risk, in achieving this object ever even before this, in December 1943, work during the winter months, but this very success had been started on a second line in rear had made his task more difficult. For the very which was given the name of " " reason that he had kept the Allies out of Rome until its fall seemed imminent, when it was for seven months the retention of Rome had changed to the colourless " Dora "; we usually acquired a still greater value for prestige, a called it the " Piedimonte—Pontecorvo consideration which might overrule the require- line ". Its function was to bar the ments of sound strategy; indeed for the same advance up the Liri valley to a force which reason, though acting here with slightly lesser had succeeded in forcing the Rapido, and for force, the Cassino position had acquired a this its left rested on Monte Cairo, descending semi-sacred character which would dictate a to the valley through Piedimonte, and its right special effort to hold it. However, there was no on the Liri at Pontecorvo; south of the Liri reason for Kesselring to suppose that the task there were few permanent defences on this line laid on him would be beyond his powers. He for the country was very difficult. In the plain 'had twenty-three divisions to our twenty-eight, the defences were by May very strong; they two of them Panzer and four Panzer Grenadier included extensive belts of wire, anti-tank divisions. He had been receiving very strong ditches, minefields and steel pillboxes, many of drafts all through the winter, amounting on the the latter formed by " Panther " tank turrets average to fifteen thousand men a month, and sunk in the ground. Against a frontal assault, his formations were therefore well up to therefore, the line was most formidable but it strength.* New equipment, particularly an had one serious weakness: the presence of a increased divisional allotment of assault guns, strong Allied Corps many miles behind it at had arrived and the April lull had been used Anzio. A break-out from there, cutting to good advantage in training. Morale was Route 6, would make the " Adolf Hitler " line high and the troops could be relied on to useless. The Germans therefore began to con- give a good account of themselves. struct," in March, a third line of defences known Of the twenty-three German divisions in the as the " Caesar " line. This was a position country eighteen were in the two armies to which Tenth and Fourteenth Armies would actively engaged ;f as the battle developed all withdraw when, and if, the Allies forced a but one were drawn in, together with five more junction with the Anzio bridgehead; it might from other theatres. One of the two Panzer be called the last-ditch defence of Rome divisions, the Hermann Goering Division, was though, if it could -be held, it gave reasonable earmarked for France and was already half- depth forward of the city. Its main purpose way there, as it was re-forming around Leg- was to block the gap between the Alban Hills horn, but in the event it too was drawn into and the Prenestini mountains through which run the battle in Italy. 162 Infantry Division, a both Route 6 and the Alatri—— formation of Soviet subjects, mainly Turko- Tivoli road. To the west of this gap the line mans, had been brought in from Slovenia to continued across the Alban Hills to the left take over responsibility for the Tuscan coast. flank of the bridgehead, and to the east of it During the lull in April the mobile divisions it ran via Avezzano and Celano to positions in Tenth and Fourteenth Armies were pulled on the Saline river west of Pescara. Only the out of the line into reserve. The infantry right flank of the line, where it actually covered divisions in the line also thinned out wherever Rome, had had much work done on it but the possible; in the Adriatic sector Russian troops positions here were naturally strong. were employed in the line to relieve Germans This was, in brief outline, Uhe problem which and even west of the Apennines battalions were faced me in planning the battle for Rome. occupying sectors formerly held by regiments. The solution eventually adopted was first given The enemy, therefore, was theoretically in a expression in an appreciation of 22nd February good position to meet our offensive owing to the and the plan there proposed was agreed on at presence of strong mobile reserves. It was an Army Commanders' conference at Caserta our prime object to see that these reserves on 28th February. In essence it involved should be directed to the wrong sectors. making Fifth Army responsible for the sea flank, including Anzio and the Aurunci Moun- One thing was clear to the enemy: the Allies tains south of the Liri, and bringing the weight would have to make an attack up the Liri of Eighth Army into an attack up the Liri valley whatever else they did, and here the valley. It would mean a great effort of German plan of defence rested on three forti- regrouping and would take a considerable time. fied positions known as the " Gustav ", " Adolf This would in any case be inevitable, for all Hitler " and " Caesar " lines. Thefirs to f troops in iboth Fifth and Eighth Aumies were these was the present main line of resistance exhausted and time was necessary, not only for which represented the rear line of the old them to 'be rested, (but also for the arrival of " winter position '", dented and endangered in reinforcements. some parts by the Allied offensives from Two main problems faced the administrative January to March, but in principle the same staff: the maximum number of divisions which as planned. It had stood the test of many could be maintained in Italy by the existing furious attacks, which had revealed as nothing port facilities and the practicability of main- * A good example is 15 Panzer Grenadier Division. taining the bulk of these on an axis west of This was one of the hardest worked formations in the Apennines. The agreed figure for the first Tenth Army and only came out of the line at the was twenty-eight divisions, which coincided well beginning of May but its strength on 6May was"i3,984 enough with the maximum number we actually plus 9x5 Italians employed mainly in the divisional services. had available. The second problem was made t Appendix " F ". • easier by the fact that the original plan for a 2920 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

rigid division 'between the lines of communica- battle. Eighth Army's task I defined as "to tion of the two Annies had not been adhered break through the enemy's main front into the to and there were already bases and depots Liri valley and advance on Valmontone "; both in Apulia and the Naples area which Fifth Army's " to secure the Ausonia denle and allowed us the requisite flexibility at the cost, advance via Esperia to the south of the Liri well worthwhile as it turned out, of a certain valley" and " to break out 'of the Anzio duplication. The administrative plan for the bridgehead and advance on Valmontone." spring offensive was that Fifth Army should Timing was also discussed. The programme be (maintained on its existing west coast axis; of reliefs, in particular the move of 10 Indian Eighth Army should have two axes, one for Division from the Middle East, was taking a the Army, less the Polish Corps, on the west little longer than was expected and we now and one for the Poles on the east, and 5 Corps, estimated that it should be possible to complete which was to be under direct command of my all preparations by 3rd to 5th May. I had Headquarters, should have an independent axis originally calculated that, in order to give the • of its own on the east coast. best support to the western invasion, our attack Orders for the regrouping were issued by should precede it by fifteen to twenty-one days; my Headquarters on 5th March; the change I was unaware at the time of the date chosen of Army 'boundaries took effect from 26th for OVERLORD but I was given to understand March. I need not describe the actual steps that a date for our attack in early May would by which we carried out the .various reliefs suit General Eisenhower. It would also suit but 'in order to understand their effect it will well with the phases of the moon. For the be useful to anticipate by giving our disposi- sake of troop movements at night it is always tions on the main front as they were on nth most useful to have a good moon and it would May, when the operation began.* be full on 8th May. I eventually decided on a tentative D-day of loth May. In the sector from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the confluence of the Liri and the Gari Fifth There as a good deal of discussion as to the Army had two Corps in line: on the left II relative timing of the assault on the enemy's Corps with 85 and 88 Divisions, and main line and the break-out from Anzio. There on the right the French Expeditionary was much to be said for making all attacks Corps with four divisions, i Motorised, simultaneous but the main disadvantage of this 2 Moroccan, 3 Algerian and 4 Moroccan Moun- was that it would mean splitting our air effort tain Divisions and three Groups of Tabors of between the bridgehead and the main front. Goums.f In Army reserve on this part of the My original idea was to lead with the Anzio front was 36 Infantry Division. Eighth attack so as to threaten or, if possible, sever Army's sector extended from Fifth Army's the enemy communications between Rome right boundary to a line running from the and Cassino and thereby make easier the task highest peak of the Maiella, through the summit of the assault up the valley. I decided against of the Gran Sasso and so generally north-west. it, however, because the enemy's mobile re- The striking force was on the left. From the serves around the bridgehead, for reasons Liri to Cassino town was 13 Corps with four which will appear later, were strong and there divisions, 6 Armoured, 4, 78 and 8 Indian was a possibility that a-n attack there might get Infantry, and behind it, ready to pass through held up short of its objectives and, secondly, or come into line on its left as the situation because th@> enemy seemed to expect us to should demand, was I Canadian Corps with make our major attack there and I wanted to i Infantry and 5 Armoured Divisions and 25 surprise him; as long as he remained in that Tank Brigade; on its right, poised and concen- frame of mind he would tend to regard our trated for the attack on Cassino, was the Polish attack on the main front as subsidiary only. Corps with two infantry divisions, 3rd and 5th, It was decided, therefore, to lead with and an armoured brigade 4 10 Corps held the Eighth Army's assault on the valley and Fifth right of the Army's front, the mountainous Army's into the Aurunci. The force at Anzio centre of the peninsula, with a miscellaneous was to >be ready to open an attack on or after group of forces based mainly on 2 New D plus 4 at twenty-four hours notice. I modi- Zealand Division; it included a parachute bri- fied the original proposal to put another infan- gade, two armoured car regiments and an try division into the bridgehead; instead the Italian brigade group. In Army reserve was remainder of i United States Armoured Divi- 6 South African Armoured Division which was sion would be moved in (as late as possible not yet complete in the country; its motor to avoid 'Unnecessary losses from shelling in brigade was under command of 10 Corps at the the rear assembly areas) and 36 United States time the battle opened. On the Adriatic coast Division would initially be held in Army was 5 Corps, under direct command of my reserve, ready either to support the main drive Headquarters; it consisted of 4 and 10 Indian or to move to the bridgehead at short notice. Infantry Divisions and was intended to play a The prospects of an operation against Elba containing role only. were also discussed at the conference. This opera- tion (codename BRASSARD) had been for Plans for the Offensive some time under consideration at Allied Force A conference of the two Army Commanders Headquarters. If it could be carried out with- was Iheld at my Headquarters hi Caserta on out subtracting from the resources for the main 2nd April and I explained my plan for the attack the capture of the island would have important results in the disruption of the * Appendix " E ". f A Goum equals roughly a company and a Tabor enemy's seaborne traffic and would also greatly a battalion, both on the large side. The total of assist our cover plan. General Wilson was pre- goumiers was about 12,000. They are native Moroccan pared to use Q Colonial Infantry Division troops under French officers and N.C.O.s and are (French) from Corsica. His Chief of Staff particularly skilled in mountain warfare. J The Polish divisions were only two brigades attended the conference and promised to strong, however, so that the Corps amounted to one examine the possibilities of the attack urgently. armoured and four infantry brigades. On 7th April, however, I was informed that, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2921 for various reasons, it would be impossible to Commander divided the former task into two launch the attack before May and 25th May was phases . In the first phase 2 Polish Corps chosed as the target date. This considerably would isolate the area Monastery Hill— reduced the value of the operation as there Cassino from the north and north-west and was reason to hope that by that date enemy dominate Route 6 until a junction should be coastal traffic south of Elba would be effected with 13 Corps, subsequently capturing diminished by reason of our overland advance Monastery Hill. 13 Corps would secure a and he would not be likely to pay much atten- bridgehead over the Rapido between Cassino tion to a threat to his right flank when he and the Liri, isolate Cassino from the west knew that all our strength was committed on by cutting Route 6 and effecting a junction the southern front. with 2 Polish Corps, and then clear the town A final conference was held on ist May, also and Monastery Hill and open up Route 6. In in the War Room at Caserta, at which the second phase the Poles were to gain contact decisions were taken on the remaining out- with the " Hitler " line north of {Route 6 and standing points. D-day was fixed at nth May develop operations against it with a view to a and H-hour at 2300 hours; postponement break-through. 10 Corps, covering a wide would only be on account of bad weather and front, was to secure the right flank and demon- would be for periods of twenty-four hours, the strate in force in the direction of Atina with decision to postpone being taken not later the object of leading the enemy to believe that than 1600 hours on D-day. The breakout from an attack was being made in that direction, a Anzio, which it had already been agreed should plan which had at one time been considered be prepared for D plus 4, would take place but rejected. 10 Corps was also to be pre- when a penetration of the enemy's second line pared to relieve formations as the battle pro- of defence on the main front (i.e. the " Hitler " gressed, i Canadian Corps, in Army reserve, line) had been achieved. It was hoped that was to be held in readiness either to assist there would be sufficient air resources to meet or to pass through 13 Corps, as the situation all the demands of both Armies but, if not, required. 6 South African Armoured Division priority would go in the first phase of the was also in reserve; it -was not yet quite com- attack to Eighth Army and in the second, the plete and it was intended to use it for ex- breakout from Anzio, to VI Corps. Until the ploitation. The total strength in the attack attack was about to open the air forces would was about six to seven infantry divisions and continue with their existing plan of attacks on three armoured divisions. enemy lines of communication. The effects The task of Fifth Army on the main front of this were most valuable but, since this was was described as to " capture the Ausonia the first time we had tried anything of this defile and advance on an axis generally parallel nature, there was a certain tendency to over- to that of Eighth Army t>ut south of the Liri estimate them. I felt it necessary to emphasize and Sacco vafleys." In his Field Order No. 6 that our intelligence staff credited the Germans of 20th April General Clark further defined with at least four weeks supplies at full opera- this as " to advance with both Corps abreast, tional rates and ventured the prophecy that we secure the Ausonia defile and advance south should have at least twenty-one days actual of the Liri River to cut the Pico—Itri road." fighting, quite apart from days spent in move- Subsequent advances would be made on Army ment, before the enemy could be defeated. It orders. The advance to the first objective was was actually twenty-four days from the open- divided into four phases. In the (first the inter- ing of the offensive to the entry into Rome. mediate objective was the Ausonia—Formia The definitive order for the attack, Operation road; the French Expeditionary Corps, on the Order No. I, was issued on 5th May.* This right, was to take Monte Majo and secure the added little new information to the decisions defile at Ausonia while II Corps, on the left, already taken at the preceding conference. was to seize the high ground west of Castel- Reference was made for the first time to 91 forte and Santa Maria Infante, thus threatening United States Division which was now beginning the southern end of the Ausonia road. These to arrive in (North Africa and was due to move attacks were to be simultaneous with each to Italy during the latter part of May and the other and with the Eighth Army attack. In beginning of June, to join Fifth Army. It the second phase the French were to advance had arrived in North Africa at the end of across the 'River Ausente and drive through April from the United States and was originally the central part of the mountains to capture assigned to Allied Force Headquarters but one Monte Revole from where they could threaten Regimental Combat Team was ordered to the Pico—Itri road. II Corps were to cross Italy, arriving at Anzio on ist June; the re- the Formia—Ausonia road and capture Monte mainder of the division joined Fifth Army after La Civita and Castellonorato. In the third the fall of Rome. I British Armoured Division, phase the "French were to cut the Itri—Pico which was expected to arrive in June, could road near Itri and direct their main strength not in fact be brought over from North Africa on the capture of Monte d'Oro, overlooking until July. Pontecorvo on their right. II Corps was to General Leese worked out his plan for advance % on the left to Monte Campese and Eighth Army at a series of conferences for Monte Scauri and on the right towards Itri. Corps Commanders and did not issue any Tthe fourth phase would put Fifth Army all written operation orders. The Army's task was along the Itri—Pico road, ready for a further to break through the enemy's front in the Liri advance. This division into phases was only valley and advance on Rome. This involved to be regarded as an indication and it was breaking through, or turning, both the expected that, after the " Gustav " line had " Gustav " and " Hitler " lines, and the Army been broken, the progress of operations would be fairly fluid. The total strength in the attack * The name of my headquarters had been changed on 9 March from " Allied Central Mediterranean was six infantry divisions, plus twelve thousand Forces " to " Allied Armies in Italy " and this was '! goumiers," with one infantry division in the first operation order issued since the change of title. reserve,* 2922 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

Enemy Dispositions. Cassino and Liri valley sectors. This obser- On the main front, held by Tenth Army, vation covered not only the forward areas and Kesselring adapted his dispositions to a fairly approaches but also many of the gun areas and close copy of our own. On the Adriatic sector ammunition dumps and even, in the case of he organised a holding force which defended a the Poles, Corps Headquarters. In this parti- long stretch of front from the sea to Alfadena, in cular sector it was necessary to erect a vertical the centre of the mountains, with three infantry screen over a mile long to conceal vehicles divisions; this was put under General Hauck passing along the road to the Headquarters of 305 Division and called the " Hauck of 3 Carpathian Division, which was in full view Group"; in function it corresponded to from Monastery Hill. Many new tracks had 5 Corps on our side. From Alfadena to in- to be constructed in 13 Corps' sector leading clusive Cassino was LI (Mountain Corps with down to the chosen crossing sites over the river, three divisions, including i Parachute in and these had to be carefully concealed with Cassino. XIV Panzer Corps commanded the brushwood. All moves forward were made by Liri valley sector, the Aurunci mountains and night and dummy tanks and vehicles were left the west coast as far as Terracina. In the in the areas vacated by armoured formations. valley was a " Blocking Group " in regimental The new artillery positions were so well camou- strength from 305 Division (Hauck) plus a flaged that hardly a shell fell on them before regiment of 15 Panzer Grenadier Division; in the battle opened, although some of the guns the Aurunci mountains were two infantry divi- had carried out registration from their new sions strengthened by three 'battalions from a positions. The French concentration was third in LI Corps and the remainder of 15 particularly well concealed. Into their Panzer Grenadier Division guarded the west Garigliano bridgehead, with a radius of only coast. Fourteenth Army, at Anzio, had five some four thousand yards, they packed twenty divisions, one a Panzer Grenadier division, in battalions, five batteries and two divisional line and a Panzer division in reserve. headquarters; the enemy only credited them These dispositions, especially when con- with one division forward on the whole Corps sidered together with the location of the sector. An even greater feat was the conceal- German mobile reserves, which I shall come ment of the entire Canadian Corps. This was to shortly, were gratifying evidence of the vital to the success of the whole scheme for success both of our security measures and of if the enemy had discovered their true location our cover plan. As I have already explained, our bluff would have been exposed. in order to achieve a secret concentration The plan succeeded perfectly; that it had against the vital point hi sufficient strength to done so was clear to us at the time from give us the necessary superiority it was essential Kesselring's dispositions and was confirmed by not merely to conceal our troop movements but documents subsequently captured. All the also to induce the enemy to believe that the available German mobile formations were dis- troops whose whereabouts were concealed from posed up the west coast. Between the him were intended to be employed in' a totally " Gustav " line and the bridgehead was 15 different direction. I therefore early decided Panzer Grenadier Division (less a regimental that we would take steps to simulate the inten- group); between the bridgehead and the Tiber tion of launching another amphibious landing was 90 Panzer Grenadier Division (less on the west coast, this time directed against elements in Tenth Army reserve); north of the Civitavecchia. The fact that, as was well Tiber in the Civitavecchia area was 29 Panzer known to us, the enemy constantly over- Grenadier Division. In the last area there estimated our total strength in the theatre and, was also 92 Infantry Division, which had not from his own lack of experience of amphibious yet finished training but was fairly complete. operations, was (bad at assessing the probability The other two mobile divisions were .on the of such a threat, would help us in our design; Anzio front, one, 3 Panzer Grenadier, partly moreover I considered that the surprise which in the line and the other, 26 Panzer, in reserve; had (been sprung on him at Anzio would make these two also were regarded as available for him more than ever willing to believe such use against a seaborne landing.* A natural a landing possible and more cautious in guard- corollary of this misappreciation was that ing against a repetition of his surprise. Such a Kesselring badly underestimated the forces cover plan had the further advantage that which we could bring against his main front. Kesselring would be bound to expect that, as in As late as I2th May, the day after our attack, January, we should begin with a strong attack he calculated that between Cassino and „ the oh the Garigliano so that the actual opening of west coast we had six divisions in line, against the offensive would not cause him to revise his which his four should be quite adequate, con- appreciation. Orders to put this plan into sidering the strength of his defences; in actual effect were issued on :i8th April. The forces fact we had the equivalent of over thirteen. which were notionally to 'be employed in the By this means we ensured that we had our amphibious operations were to be I Canadian three to one superiority at the vital point, that Corps with its two divisions and 36 United the German reserves were far away and that States Division. They were directed to simu- they were eventually committed, when Kessel- late wireless traffic and take other measures to ring had at last realised the trap into which create the impression that they were training he had fallen, reluctantly, piecemeal and too in the Naples—Salerno area for the proposed late.j operations. * The Hermann Goering Division was at Leghorn, Besides the positive measures of deception and responsible for guarding the coast in that area it was necessary to carry out negative but for this we cannot claim the credit; the division measure of concealment and camouflage on a was still earmarked for France. very large scale. This presented great diffi- f The date of the attack was also well concealed. Captured documents show that General von Vietinghofl, culties, since almost the whole of the front of commanding Tenth Army, proposed to return to attack was overlooked by the enemy and he Germany on leave on u May. One of his Corps had particularly good observation m the Commanders picked on 24 May as our D-day. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2923

Opening of the Offensive. 13 Corps sector 4 British and 8 Indian Divi- In the Order of the Day issued before the sions each assaulted the crossings of the Rapido attack I stressed the connection between the with two brigades up. The stream was flowing blow about to be delivered to the enemy in fast, both sides were putting down smoke to Italy and the assault from the west for which add to the thick mist provided toy nature and, the world was waiting. The Combined Chiefs though the enemy artillery had been very of Staff had directed that, for the sake of largely silenced, the infantry in their deep dug- security, the connection could not be directly outs were much less affected. Once across the asserted and, after careful consultation with river the leading troops soon plunged into a Washington and London, the most I was thick and continuous network of , wire, allowed to say was " From the East and the minefields and concrete emplacements. 8 Indian West, from the North and the South, blows Division managed to make good its footing on are about to fall which wild result in the final the west bank and two bridges were completed destruction of the Nazis and bring freedom •by next morning in the divisional sector; once again to Europe, and hasten peace for 4 Division was unable either to enlarge its us all". But, however concealed, no-one narrow bridgehead or, for the whole of the could miss the significance of the event and no next day, to replace its precarious ferries with sentence was more gratifying to those who had bridges.* The (Eighth Anmy position, there- long years of Mediterranean campaigning be- fore, toy the evening of I2th May was not quite hind them than the words which followed: as favourable as I had hoped; the right hand "To us in Italy has been given the honour Corps was back where it had started, the left to strike the first blow ". hand Corps had gained only about half of the In the late afternoon of nth May the guns objectives which it was intended to capture in at Cassino and in the Liri valley ceased fire. the first two hours. Fifth Army, too, had By an odd coincidence the German artillery made no significant progress and were still also ceased fire and a strange, impressive heavily involved with the strong enemy defences silence fell on the front. This caused much facing them without having achieved a break- conjecture; the reason, we subsequently dis- through. Nevertheless I felt justified in report- covered, was that the Germans were intending ing that evening that both Army Commanders to carry out reliefs at Cassino that night and were reasonably satisfied with the opening were anxious to avoid hostile reaction. After stages of the battle. (Provided we could bring an hour or two of this suspicious silence we our full strength to bear before the enemy could opened up again with moderate harassing fire. reinforce all would go well but, I added, Chi Fifth Army front also the day wore on " there is no doubt that the Germans intend quietly, with desultory artillery fire. The to fight for every yard and that the next few weather was cloudy with a little rain but the days will see some extremely bitter and severe night was fine, except for ground mist in the fighting." The forecast was fully justified. Liri valley, and the forecast for the next seven ' The firm resistance offered to Fifth. Army days was good. At 2300 hours the whole of on- the first day of the attack began to weaken the artillery of Fifth and Eighth Armies, some on the I3th. The two German divisions facing two thousand guns, opened with a violent our six had been ordered to resist to the last counter-battery programme. The Fifth Army in their prepared positions; this meant that infantry attack followed immediately, 13 Corps when their resistance was overcome there would three quarters of an hour later and the Polish be few survivors to oppose our further advance. Corps two hours later, at oioo hours on the The French enjoyed a particularly heavy I2th. It was soon clear that, having already numerical superiority—and exploited it with achieved strategic surprise, we had now added great 6lan—and the advantage of good training tactical surprise. Besides the reliefs already in mountain) warfare. On this day they suc- mentioned which were going on at Cassino ceeded in capturing IMonte Majo, the key to Tenth Army was carrying out a reorganisation the whole " Gustav" line in their sector, of command in the Liri valley. The headquar- and pushed I iMotorised Division up the ters of 44 Division, from north of Cassino, was Garigliano, capturing Sant' Andrea, Sant' being brought down to take command of the Ambrogio and Sant' Apollinare and thereby five German battalions then opposing 13 Corps. clearing the whole west bank of the river. As a result of the attack it never took over II Corps made small advances in the coastal and went back to its old sector again; the area, {but were still meeting very stubborn confusion caused can be imagined and must resistance. It was clear, as I reported that have both assisted our attack and prevented night, that the Germans still intended " to the German higher command from forming a fight it out where they stand." This was true picture of the situation. particularly noticeable on 13 Corps' front also. The first definite success was the capture It had seemed likely to me that, once the of Monte Faito by the French, four hours after " Gustav" line was breached toy a success- the attack -began. II Corps made some pro- ful crossing of the Rapido, the Germans gress into the enemy's line of defences but met would offer only delaying resistance in front most violent opposition, as did the French after of the " Hitler" line in order to preserve their first local gains. North of Cassino the sufficient strength for a successful defence of Poles attacked with great dash across the that line. They could scarcely hope to eliminate 'broken rocks and scrub, seamed and pitted by our bridgehead by counter-attack for they had four months of bitter battles and, at the cost practically no mobile reserve for such a pur- of heavy casualties, seized " Phantom Ridge," pose. However they showed no signs of north-west of the Monastery. It was an weakening but fought with the utmost vigour exposed position and, as soon as damaged com- to resist any advance up the valley, pulling in munications were restored, German artillery * As an example of the losses in ferries, in 10 Brigade and mortars made it untenable. The Corps sector on the right of 4 Division, all but five boats out Commander therefore ordered a withdrawal to of forty had been lost by 0800 hours on 12 May and by the start line at 1400 hours on the I2th. In 1600 hours there were none left. 2924 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

every spare battalion, and even company, 13 Corps was now, however, almost through which they could detach from formations not the " Gustav'.' defences and ready for the heavily engaged, particularly from the central final assault, with the Poles, on the Qassino sector. Nevertheless we continued to make bastion. General Leese decided that the progress here also. By great efforts a bridge Canadian Corps would have to be employed on was completed in 4 Division sector on the morn- its left for the attack on the " Hitler " line ing of the I3th, the reserve brigade was imme- and it began to cross the river on the evening diately passed over and gains of up to two of the I5th, relieving 8 Indian Division. Next thousand yards made. By the evening both day 78 Division opened their attack northwest- divisions in 13 Corps were only a little short wards through the last remaining defences of of their second objectives, and the bridgehead the " Gustav " line and made such progress was secure. that the same evening Eighth -Army ordered This completed the first phase of the opera- the Poles to launch their attack on the morning tion. 13 Corps was now directed to employ of the I7th. The Poles had been obliged to its reserve infantry division, the 78th, to accom- carry out extensive reorganisation to fill the plish the second phase: to cut Route 6 and . gaps caused by the losses of the earlier attack isolate Cassino in conjunction with the Poles but, though their strength was reduced, they who, having regrouped and reorganised, were had gained experience. Once' more they warned to be ready to renew their attack on attacked the strong enemy positions on the the morning of the I5th. The move forward ridges west of the Monastery and by 1800 of 78 Division was delayed by difficulties hi the hours had secured both " Phantom Ridge " river crossing and congestion and bad going on and the commanding height of Colle Sant' the west bank. It was clear that 13 Corps Angelo. By the same time 13 Corps had cut would not be in a position to cut Route 6 by Route 6. There was a narrow gap between, the morning of the I5th and the Polish attack over the bare mountain side, which the was accordingly postponed. 4 British and Germans succeeded in keeping open that night 8 Indian Divisions continued to make good long enough to pass through a large proportion progress and with 78 Division moving in of the garrison. In the morning of the i8th between them we should be able to develop the town of Cassino was finally cleared and a good degree of strength; but it was now at 1030 hours the Poles raised the red and certain that the latter would have to make white standard with the white.eagle over the a deliberate attack against stiffening resistance, ruins of the Monastery. rather than the rapid exploitation which had been hoped. The fall of Gassino immediately brought a In the meantime Fifth Army was now find- radical change in the shape of the battle in ing the going rather easier. In the hard struggle the Liri valley. The enemy now had no reason which had marked the breaching of the for attempting to stand forward of the " Gustav " line the two German divisions had, " Hitler " line; indeed he had already spoiled suffered crippling losses; once forced out of his chances of a successful defence by his their strong prepared positions their weakness obstinacy in holding Cassino, mainly for was even more evident and their collapse was propaganda purposes. Another incentive to rapid. On the I4th the French captured withdrawal was the discovery of the original Ausonia and cleared all the country to the misappreciation; up to the I5th the German north between it and the Liri, thus exposing radio had still referred to our attack as the right flank of the Germans opposing 13 " diversionary " but the identification of the Corps as far west as San Giorgio a Liri. Canadian Corps on the i6th showed Kesselring II Corps captured Santa Maria Infante, for the trap into which he had fallen and the over- which they had been fighting since the attack whelming strength of the assault which was began, on the I4th; next day they were able about to be launched against the diminished to advance three miles beyond it and capture garrison of the " Hitler " line. So weak, in Spigno and Castellonorato. The whole of the fact, and so disorganised were they that German right flank had collapsed and its Aquino, the northern bulwark of the line in casualties had been such that it was never to the valley, was almost carried by a coup de form a coherent line again. The most main, on the evening of the i8th, by a small significant point was the great hole which had armoured force oif the Derbyshire Yeomanry. been blasted in the centre of the line where 71 and 94 Divisions, or what remained of It was impossible to provide reinforcement them, had left a gap as they fell back in from elsewhere. On the right 71 Division had different directions, one towards the Liri and suffered a blow from which it did not recover the other towards the coast. Into this gap for nearly two months. To save the southern General Juin* launched his Goums, with the end of the line 90 Panzer Grenadier Division, order to advance west across the trackless which was'intended for the valley, had, to be mountains north of the great ridge of Monte diverted south of the river to block the Esperia Petrella and cut the Itri—Pico road, far in the defile. It came up in detail and was defeated enemy's rear. Almost unopposed they pressed in detail; this was to be the fate of all Kessel- on through country regarded by the enemy as ring's mobile divisions. 15 Panzer Grenadier impassable; by the i6th they had captured Division, the next to be engaged, was split Monte Revole and their mountain guns were already; part was in the Liri vajley; part, shelling the road. On their right 3 Algerian recalled from its coast-watcHing r61e, was now Division was that day attacking Esperia. put in west of Formia to buttress 94 Division which was ibeing hard pressed by II Corps, Fall of Cassino. and part moved back to Sant' Oliva, at the In the Liri valley the Germans continued to mouth of the Esperia defile. Here they came resist unaffected by the disaster to their right. under command of 26 Panzer Division. The * General de Corps d'Annee (now General d'Armee) latter had been originally, intended as the A. P. Juin, K.C.B., Commander of the French Expedi- armoured reserve for Fourteenth Army against tionary Corps. a breakout from the bridgehead but it had been SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2925

grudgingly committed, again in small detach- line and up the Lin and Sacco valleys and by ments,, on i8th May. Its initial losses were VI Corps from Anzio on to Valmontone. The extremely heavy. French and II Corps were to clear up the mountainous triangle between the two drives. On the i8th, while the attempt was being made to rush1 the " Hitler " line at Aquino, Breach of the "Hitler" Line. the Canadian Corps on 13 Corps' left was ad- In spite of their losses since the attack began vancing to contact with the line. South of and the defeat of their right whig, Tenth Army the Liri the French had captured Esperia and were still determined to defend the " Hitler " Sant' Oliva and the two mountains overlooking line in the valley between Piedimonte and Pontecorvo, Monte d'Oro and Monte della Pontecorvo. The defences were even stronger Commune. II Corps had captured Formia and than in the " Gustav " line which had already was about to enter Itri and Gaeta, both occupied given Eighth Army so much trouble; they next day. The battle had become fluid, and I varied' between five hundred and a thousand took steps to increase the pressure. It was yards in depth ands the main system, of re- almost near the time for the breakout from inforced concrete emplacements, was linked by Anzio and I therefore ordered 36 United States tunnels and communication trenches into a Division to the bridgehead; its arrival was mutually supporting whole. The main weak- spaced out over four days and we hoped it ness was the lack of troops to man the defences would pass unnoticed. It was extremely diffi- but Kesselring had all the same ordered the cult to decide on the exact date for the VI strongest resistance. Eighth Army between Corps attack. General Truscott,. the Com- 20th and 22nd iMay was preparing for the manding General, had asked for three days' assault. Following the failure of the surprise notice, rather than the twenty-four hours in attack on Aquino on the evening of the iStJi the original orders, so as to give him two nights heavier, but still hasty, attacks had been to get his assault troops into position; it would mounted on the igth by 78 Division on the have to be done by night, for 'by day the right and i Canadian Division on the left; enemy had too good observation. This faced these ran into heavy fire which showed the me with rather a difficult problem in prophecy, defences ito be as formidable as had been for the breakout would have to be tuned care- expected. An attack in full strength would fully to fit in with Eighth Army's advance and be necessary. The main blow was to be it would not be easy to forecast where they delivered by the Canadian Corps north of would be in three days' time. On the main Pontecorvo while 13 Corps would maintain front Eighth Army were ordered " to use the pressure at Aquino and concentrate forward utmost energy to break through the ' Adolf ready to advance abreast of the Canadians. The Hitler' line in the Liri valley before he Poles, who had captured Villa Santa Lucia on Germans have tune to settle down in it ". The the iQth, were to continue the attack against Poles were directed to press on to Piedimonte the strongly defended hill town of 'Piedimonte to turn the line from the north and the French, which they had started on the 20th. 8 Indian after reaching Pico, were to turn northwards, Division, after its relief by the Canadians, had if at all possible, and envelop the southern end. been sent back east of the Rapido; General If they could strike into the rear of the enemy Leese now decided to bring it forward again facing Eighth Army, directed on Ceprano, to reinforce 13 Corps, together with 6 British we should be able to surround a good Armoured Division. These moves led to con- proportion of their force. siderable congestion, a foretaste of the serious The operation for the capture of Pico proved traffic jams which were to be a feature of the to be a major one. Fearing just such a Liri valley operations. manoeuvre 'as I had planned Kesselring The Canadian attack began at 0600 hours had strongly reinforced the area with his best on the 23rd and met very stiff resistance. Our troops from reserve, 26 Panzer and 90 Panzer casualties were heavy, particularly in Grenadier Divisions (both less large detach- i Division, and the equally severe enemy ments) and was bringing over to their assistance losses showed the effort which had been the greater part of the two divisions from the made to hold the line. By noon on the 24th, Adriatic sector.* As a result the French made however, we had cleared the whole position, little progress on the igth but on the 20th cap- except for Aquino, and 5 Canadian Armoured tured Monte Leucio, a high and dominating Division was. exploiting rapidly towards the mountain between Pico and Pontecorvo. They River Melfa which crosses the valley at right were driven off it by a German counter-attack angles to the course of our advance and on the, 2ist 'but recaptured it on the 22nd; on offered the next delaying position for the the latter date, after two days of violent and enemy's rearguards. It was certain, how- fluctuating fighting, they finally captured Pico. ever, that it could only be a delaying posi- This delay meant that their thrust northwards tion; the Germans must now withdraw in as would now have less chance of cutting off good order as possible to the "Caesar" line any important German forces, for Eighth Army south of Rome where Tenth and Fourteenth c, was about to assault the "Hitler" line and Armies could join hands to form a connected expected, once that was broken, to make fairly front barring any further advance north. It rapid progress, especially on the left. II Corps, was a faint hope now. Tenth Army was a to the south, were pushing on, entering Fondi beaten force and, on the day the " Hitler " on the 20th and reaching Terracina on the line was breached, Fifth Army

time: " I cannot in all honesty say that I actions practically eliminated as effective units, should welcome any more German divisions just particularly the former. On the same day as at the moment but from the broader point of Cisterna fell II Corps advanced from Terracina view no doubt it is for the common good." and made contact with the 'bridgehead. Our forces were reunited at last; more important Break-out from Anzio. still was the advance of i Armoured Division With the arrival of 36 Division there were which had broken out northwards from the now seven divisions at Anzio plus the Special salient driven into the German defences and Service Force and a Combat Engineer Regi- was advancing towards Velletri and Artena. ment. The perimeter was held by four divisions and the Engineer Regiment and in reserve were Fall of Rome. i Armoured, 3 and 36 Infantry Divisions and I had now got my Armies into the position the Special Service Force. I and 5 British Divi- I wanted. Now that VI Corps had made con- sions, holding the left flank, were put directly tact with the rest of Fifth Army it was no under command of Fifth Army; they were to longer an isolated bridgehead, a threat in the revert to command of my headquarters after the enemy's rear, but the spearhead of the extended capture of Rome. I issued the orders for the left flank of my group of Armies. To use operation on 2ist 'May; this was not three days' old-fashioned military parlance, 1 was now warning but it did give General Truscott the employing the " oblique order " beloved by two nights he had asked for and proved quite Frederick the Great, with my left advanced adequate. The plan of attack by VI Corps en potence and my right, 5 Corps, refused. envisaged two phases: first a penetration of the In my centre I had a very strong and con- enemy defences to seize a ifirm base on an arc centrated force, i Canadian and 13 Corps under of about a mile radius round Cisterna, and Eighth Army, with which, while my left held secondly an advance through Artena on Val- the enemy by forcing him to fight for Rome, montone. The first phase was the task of on whose retention he set much value, I in- i Armoured and 3 Infantry Divisions and the tended to drive forward on ani axis parallel Special Service Force; when it was completed to the extension df my left, break through 36 Division, the freshest formation in the bridge- the enemy's centre thus weakened and pursue head, was to pass through and advance to a up the centre of the peninsula, east of Rome. line running across the valley below Velletri, This would enable me to cany out the classical supported by i Armoured Division. Then, re- manoeuvre of parallel pursuit, for at the same inforced by 3 Division, it was to advance time Fifth Army would continue to press hard on Valmontone. The enemy force opposing against the extreme right of the enemy, con- numbered five divisions. Almost all the tinually forcing back his seaward flank. There armour in« Fourteenth Army had been were, therefore, topographically considered, sent to the main front* leaving only two objectives; to capture Rome and to pass the assault guns of 3 Panzer Grenadier a force east of Rome up the axis of the Tiber Division and a handful of Tigers and Panthers. where it flows southwards from the mountains The Hermann Goering Division was on its way of . These two objectives I allotted but its leading elements had got no further to the two Armies, the former to General Clark than Viterbo the day the attack began. The and the latter to General Leese. This allot- last hope would have been 29 Panzer Grenadier ment of tasks had, in fact, been made before Division but that, released at last from its the battle -began and the operation had pro- fruitless guard over Civitavecchia, had been ceeded so closely in accordance with my original rushed down to Terracina where it went into plan that there was no need to vary it. action against II Corps on the 22nd. Once General Leese issued orders to implement again Kesselring's mobile reserves had been his part of the plan before the attack on the misdirected. " Hitler " line went in. After the breach of VI Corps' attack began at 0630 hours on the "Hitler" and "Caesar" lines his in- 23rd May, half an hour later than the attack tention was to exploit to and Terni. This on the " Hitler " line. For the last ten days would mean that he would have to pass very the Corps artillery had fired heavy concentra- close to Rome on the east, between the city tions on the German lines and gun positions and Tivoli, in order to get on to the two best at widely differing times; this was to accustom routes to his objective, Routes 3 and 4, the the enemy to being fired on heavily without ancient and Via Salaria; if Fifth an infantry attack following, and to encourage Army were already in or approaching the city him to reveal his defensive fire plans; it also it might be difficult to avoid traffic conges- showed us, as might have been expected, that tion, for the days when all roads from all parts he was particularly alert at dawn. General of the civilised world converged on the "Forum Truscott decided therefore to attack an hour have left their mark still on the road-net of after dawn,, when vigilance had relaxed. The modern Italy. Fortunately the same reasons result was complete local surprise. The enemy had provided plenty of bridges over the Tiber, defences, though they had been under develop- but I foresaw that we should have to take ment since early March, proved less formidable forceful measures about road priorities. than those of the " Hitler " and " Gustav " The main advance up the valleys of the Liri ° lines; the minefields, however, were numerous and the Sacco was entrusted to 13 Corps, right, and well laid and caused unusually high losses and i Canadian Corps, left. The Polish Corps, in tanks. The attack continued to gain ground weakened by its high casualties and the short- on the 24th and by evening Cisterna was com- age of replacements, was to be withdrawn as pletely surrounded; it fell on the 25th. . The soon as it had completed the task of clearing German 715 and 362 Divisions were by these Piedimonte and the slopes of Monte Cairo. I intended to use it later on the Adriatic sector, * The last detachment of 26 Panzer Division had left for the main front just before VI Corps attacked ; taking the place of 5 Corps, after it had had it was consequently of no use to either sector at the a little time for rest and reorganisation. 10 moment it was most needed. Corps, reduced by the withdrawal of two SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2927 brigades for 6 South African Armoured hundred feet above the general level of the Division, was to secure the right flank of the valley. Monte Piccolo had been occupied by a advance by blocking off the roads leading small advanced detachment of i Guards south from Sulmona, Opi and Atina. The New Brigade late on the 26th but during the night Zealand Division was on the southern flank of i Parachute Division infiltrated back onto both the Corps, and advanced through San Biagio hills and prepared for a stubborn defence. An to Atina and Sora, on the road from Arce to attempt to force the defile on the 27th ran Avezzano. For the advance in the valley the into heavy enfilade fire and we were obliged stages were to be, first the line Arce-Ceprano; ,to desist from this attempt and withdraw the secondly Ceccano and thirdly Vahnontone, or small force from Monte Piccolo. For the next near it, to link up with VI Corps. The two two days attack and counter-attack continued Corps would advance abreast, a great concen- and it was not until late on the 28th that the tration of strength in so narrow a space. Germans evacuated Arce and fell back behind The Germans were as well aware as we were the upper Liri, which here cuts across Route 6 of their position and of the danger of the at right angles. Meanwhile the Canadians had centre of their line being rushed while their made an assault boat crossing of the Liri south right was locked in a furious battle for Rome. of Ceprano on 27th May. It was a difficult At all events they must block the valley long operation in face of heavy enemy artillery and enough to allow the withdrawal of their forces small arms opposition but the town was cap- from the area to the south of it and ensure an tured by midday. Our bridgehead was still orderly withdrawal into the " Caesar " line only supported by ferries and it was not until before Eighth Army joined hands with VI the afternoon of the 28th that a hundred and Corps. They also had to block the Sora and twenty foot bridge was completed over which Subiaco roads to prevent a further envelop- the armoured brigade was to pass to advance to ment by these routes, but this was a much Frosinone. It had to be used instead, however, simpler task for both roads run through narrow by 78 Division which 13 Corps had sent' round denies on either side of the Simbruini moun- to the south to outflank the enemy defenders tains and can be held without much difficulty of the Arce defile. This delayed the pursuit against any- force which can advance up them. by the Canadian armour. From a captured operation order it appears that they intended to hold the line of the The first few days of the break-out by VI MeLEa river with 90 Panzer Grenadier and i Corps had gone so well that the first object of Parachute Divisions but the order was issued the operations could be deemed to be secured; too late; by the evening of the 24th the we were already threatening Route 6 and had Canadians succeeded in forcing a crossing. Thii destroyed or driven off all,the enemy on the was a notable feat by 5 Canadian Armoured right flank of the original bridgehead. How- Division, which had advanced rapidly from ever the Hermann Goering Division had now the breach in the " Hitler " line with the right begun to arrive in the Vaknontone area where flank of its advance open since the enemy were it had been joined by part of 92 Infantry still resisting 13 Corps in Aquino. The small Division from north of the Tiber and by units bridgehead, only one company strong, resisted of 4 Parachute and 65 Infantry Divisions with- violent enemy counter-attacks all that night. drawn from the left flank of the bridgehead. Next morning, the enemy having withdrawn It had suffered heavy losses from air attacks, from Aquino and Piedimonte, 13 Corps was for its move from Leghorn had been so precipi- able to advance to - the river line with 6 tate that it had mainly been made by day; but Armoured, 78 and 8 Indian Divisions, and the we knew its quality and that it was likely to remainder of i Canadian Corps, which had been put up a very stout defence. It was therefore delayed by bad going and the inadequacy of decided to change the direction of VI Corps' routes forward, came up to the support of its attack and throw the main weight against the advanced guard. There were now five divisions weakened left shoulder of the bridgehead in a moving forward in the same general direction drive to secure a line from Lanuvio to on1 a front of rather less .than five miles and Campoleone station. Early on the 26th General skilfully laid minefields and German delaying Clark issued orders for the change, which he tactics added to the difficulty of bringing so described as " a new attack along the most large a force to bear in so restricted a space. direct route to Rome ". The intention was to 13. Corps' plan provided for an advance up continue the drive towards Valmontone with the northern side of the valley. The Corps 3 Division, reinforced, and to employ for the axis was to run through Arce, exclusive of new drive the 34th, 45th and i Armoured, Ceprano, to Frosinone where it would swing supported by 36 Division, which had not been right 'handed to run more or less parallel with used for its original mission owing to the speedy Route 6 through Alatri to Genazzano. It was success of the -first attack. Within the very impossible to get started, however, until the short space of twelve hours from the decision enemy had been cleared* from Aquino and an being taken the new attack was under way. • attempt to pass 6 Armoured Division south of Troops of 3 Division with their supporting tanks Aquino involved it in confusion with 5 Canadian advanced with great dash to Artena, which they Armoured Division which was using the same surrounded and captured next day. They were axis; an undetected minefield caused further •unable, however, in face of stiffening enemy delay. They got across the

were issued on 3ist May. VI Corps was to Belisarius captured it fourteen centuries ago attack on ist June to secure the Alban Hills .that the Eternal City had been taken by an in its. sector and advance to cut the enemy's invading army from the south. withdrawal routes through Rome. 5 British Division, under Army command, was to Influence of Operations in France on the Italian advance on the left of VI Corps to drive against Campaign. the Tiber and destroy any forces which were The fail of Rome preceded the invasion of turned southwards by this thrust. II Corps France by two days. It was very gratifying to was to secure the .high ground north of have provided a heartening piece of news so Valmontone, seize the northern part of the appositely, but before long the progress of opera- Alban Hills and pursue any enemy attempting tions in France began to exercise an influence to withdraw northwards across its front. -The which was most prejudicial to our exploitation Germans were still resisting desperately and of the victory in Italy. I must recapitulate a still apparently with the same orders, to keep little to explain the connection. At the Quebec us out of Rome at all costs. Even now, with conference in August, 1943, it was decided that Fifth Army on the Alban Hills and their centre the forces in the Mediterranean were to con- disintegrating under Eighth Army's blows, tribute to the invasion of France by effecting they continued to hope that the situation might a lodgement in Southern France, in the area yet be stabilized; captured enemy documents of Toulon and Marseilles, as a diversion to show that as late as 2nd June von Mackensen the invasion of Normandy. This was con- was still ordering resistance to the last and firmed after the Cairo conference in December making plans for the redisposition of his forces of that year. The assault, given the code- with apparent confidence in the possibility of name ANVIL, was to be in the strength of success. It is a striking example of German at least two divisions, the date in May; it reluctance to yield ground even in the most was an assumed prerequisite that our forces serious circumstances, carried this time to a in Italy should have reached the Pisa-Rimini disastrous extreme. line. It will be remembered that OVERLORD II Corps, once more with its old divisions, was at that time planned for May. It was 85th and 88th, reinforced by the y-d, made decided, however, at a conference held in the greatest advance on ist June. On that day Algiers in February, 1944, that there was no they finally crossed Route 6 and on the and they hope of getting enough craft to mount ANVIL captured Valmontone and advanced almost up in May and, at the beginning of March, the to Palestrina. VI Corps met very heavy resist- date was advanced to early June, thus making ance on the ist but succeeded in capturing it once more simultaneous with OVERLORD Velletri which had defied us so long. On the whose date had also been postponed. Three 2nd there was still no sign of weakening in the divisions were now to be released from Italy for enemy determination to resist. That night, the assault. But the serious shortage of craft however, the Hermann Goering Division, still continued and on loth April the Combined though reinforced at last by 334 and part of Chiefs of Staff laid down that ANVIL would 26 Panzer Divisions, had reached the limit of probably not take place 'before mid-July; it its endurance and turned to full retreat.' It was intended to use craft released from OVER- withdrew with all speed to the Aniene river, LORD. east of Rome, which it held with a light screen; I was not directly concerned in these plans, 334 Division, whose losses had been particu- which were discussed between the Combined larly heavy, was taken out of the line entirely Chiefs of Staff and Allied Force Headquarters, and sent north to re-form. It was now time except in so far as the troops for the Southern for the Germans fighting south of the Alban France operation would have to come from my Hills to pull out as well or risk destruction command. It was, of course, distracting to have against the Tiber. By the afternoon of the this uncertainty weighing over us but it was 3rd both II and VI Corps were pressing for- at least satisfactory, after April, to know that ward on Rome by all the roads that lead to I should be able to plan my operations for the city. 4 Parachute Division, from the the capture of Rome without having to lose extreme right, was left as a rearguard behind three divisions at short notice. However I still which the remainder slipped away through the had to look ahead and, since March, I had city, over the Tiber bridges and precipitately been pressing for guidance on what the long- north.* The parachutists were able to delay term plan for Italy should be. I got this on II Corps long enough, in an action at 22nd May in the form of the following direc- Centocelle, to frustrate the attempt to drive tive from General Wilson: southwards towards the Tiber and link up with " Your task will continue to be the destruc- VI Corps. At 1915 hours on 4th June the tion of German forces in Italy. first elements of 88 United States Division (a) In carrying out this task you should entered the Piazza. Venezia below the Capitol. bear in mind the importance of the capture So Rome fell to the Allied Armies in Italy of the Ancona area since its ports and two days before the Anglo-American invasion airfields may be of considerable import- was launched against the shores of Normandy. ance in any operations which may be taken It was but the latest of many captures of Rome across the Adriatic. in history but it was the first time since (b) It is also my intention, subject to * The German offer to declare Rome an open .^ity conditions at the time, and further subject belongs rather to a history of propaganda than to a military history. The offer was broadcast at a time to the provisions that your operations will when Allied troops were already in the outskirts of the continue "to have overriding priority in the city following hard on the heels of the enemy retreating allocation of resources until you have cap- through it. In the circumstances the enemy under- tured Rome, to prepare and mount an taking " to carry out no troop movements in Rome " amphibious operation at the earliest oppor- was both belated and insincere. The most significant point abj>ut this announcement is 'that it showed the '- tunity, in any case not later than mid- Germans had not expected Rome to fall so soon, . ,...,_. September. This operation might take the D 2 2930 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

form of an amphibious assault in close sup- operations in North-western Europe its effect on port of your ground advance or, alterna- the Italian campaign was disastrous. The Allied tively, in areas outside your responsibility. Armies in full pursuit of a beaten enemy were For one operation in the latter category called off from the chase, Kesselring was given now being planned it is anticipated that a breathing space to reorganise his scattered three United States infantry divisions and forces and I was left with insufficient strength all the French divisions at present in Allied to break through the barrier of the Apennines. Armies in Italy will be required. To make My Armies, which had just been built up into this possible it may be desirable for you to a strong, flexible and co-ordinated instrument, relieve formations to be concentrated under inspired by victory and conscious of their own control of Allied Force Headquarters as superiority, were reduced once more to the early as follows: one United States division shifts and improvisations which had marked by lyth June; one French division by 24th the previous winter and faced again with the June; one United States division by 27th problems of overcoming not only the difficulties June; thereafter the remaining formations of the Italian terrain and the stubbornness of at longer intervals. The dates given are the the enemy's resistance, but also the lack of man- earliest you may have to meet, and then power on their own side.* I express no opinion only if you have captured Rome. You on the correctness of the decision, but I was, should 'take this requirement into account to say the least, disappointed that our victory in planning both immediate and subse- was not to be exploited as it deserved. quent operations. The Pursuit North'of Rome. In addition to the above an experienced The German flight north from Rome was, in United States Corps Headquarters should be the first few days, rapid and rather dis- relieved by ist June, if you can do so with- organised. The roads along which their flight out interfering with your present mission. had gone presented an amazing sight; mile after You will be notified from time to time re- mile they were littered with the wrecks of garding the assault lift and shipping which armoured and. other vehicles, destroyed either can be made available to you but it is un- by our air forces or by our armoured pursuit likely that there will be sufficient resources or abandoned and wrecked by their drivers (shore to shore) available this year to enable when fuel ran out. It was still Kesselring's you to undertake an amphibious operation on intention, however, to delay us as far south as a scale in excess of one division plus ". possible and retain as much territory as he It will be noted that no decision had been could. He was, in fact, now back again in the taken, at the time this directive was issued, same position as in September 1943, or rather whether ANVIL should be mounted or not; on in the position he then expected to find himself the other hand the forces to be provided for it in, that is he was withdrawing up the leg of from Italy had now risen to seven divisions. Italy pursued by a superior force. Now also, This uncertainty was a very great handicap to as then, his task was to fight a delaying action our planning, and its psychological effect on the in front of a prepared position but this time his troops expecting to be withdrawn, especially " winter position " was further back. The on the French, was undoubtedly serious. It is " Gothic " line, as it was called, f ran along hard to expect troops to give of their 'best when the summit of the Northern Apennines; it was they are continuously " looking over their intended to be held to the last to preserve the shoulder " to a new objective, particularly rich lands of Northern Italy. When Rome fell when it is so attractive an objective as the it was far from completion and though for the liberation of their own country. This situation immediate future the Germans would have to lasted throughout June. On the i4th I was fall back quickly to avoid a complete rout, instructed that VI Corps Headquarters was to especially in the relatively open west coast be withdrawn at once, 3 Division on lyth sector, it would soon be necessary to bring this June and the 36th on 27th June. On the withdrawal to a halt and gain time for more 24th a French division was to be withdrawn work to be done. It was necessary, therefore, to the Naples area, followed by a second in the for Kesselring to weigh carefully the dangers first week of July. On the same day 'the Com- involved in making a stand too soon, and there- bined Chiefs of Staff signalled " the destruction by risking another defeat before he had had of the German armed forces in Italy, south of time to reorganise his forces, and, on the other the Pisa-Rimini line, must be completed. There hand, in delaying that stand too long and allow- should be no withdrawal from the battle of any ing the Allies to make contact too soon with the Allied forces that are necessary for this " Gothic " line. It was certainly essential to purpose ". Nevertheless I was informed on the carry out as soon as possible some measure of i6th that, in order to preserve the possibility * The loss of the French was particularly severely of mounting ANVIL, it was necessary to pro- felt as they were expected to repeat in the Apennines ceed with the programme of withdrawal of their feats in the Aurunci mountains. 4 Moroccan forces already laid down. We could still hope Mountain Division was, as I have explained, my only mountain division. that we might get these troops back again later | We took this name from a map captured in but this became more unlikely after it was Kesselring's Headquarters at and it known that General Eisenhower had strongly was the name we always used for the line. This name recommended the operation in a signal of 23rd " Gotenstellung " appears to have been given to the whole Apennine position in the planning stage but on June. The final decision in its favour was 16 June it was changed to the " Green " Line (Grime communicated to me on 5th July. ANVIL* was Lime), which was what the Germans called the actual eventually launched on I5th August. line on the ground. There is no special connection between the Northern Apennines and the Goths but Whatever value the invasion of Southern the Germans often showed themselves conscious, not France may have had as a contribution to only by their behaviour, that in Italy they were treading in the footsteps of their barbarous forefathers; for * Shortly before the operation the codename was instance -two minor 'defensive positions in Campania changed to 1>RAGOON; were called after Totila and Alboin. • • SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2931

reorganisation for at the moment divisions were as we knew to have arrived, was not strong not only severely weakened by casualties but enough to hold the " Gothic " line against a also in most cases split up into small groups, really powerful attack. Of our own troops often under various different commands. It I wrote " I have now two highly organised shows the efficiency of the German leadership and skilful Armies, capable of carrying out and staff work that they were successful in large scale attacks and mobile operations in bringing order out of this chaos and rallying so the closest co-operation. Morale is irresistibly quickly a defeated and, in part, dispersed army. high as a result of recent successes and the whole forms one closely articulated machine, Since our offensive began on nth May all capable of carrying out assaults and rapid the German divisions which were at that date exploitation in the most difficult terrain. in Tenth and Fourteenth Armies, including Neither the Apennines nor even the Alps should the two originally on the Adriatic coast, had prove a serious obstacle to their enthusiasm been drawn into the battle south of Rome and and skill ". I proposed, therefore, to give the west of the Apennines. Of the seventeen in- enemy no breathing space but to continue to volved at that time three, the 7ist, 94th and press the pursuit up the centre of the peninsula 7i5th, had temporarily ceased to exist as effec- to the line Bibbiena-Florence-Pistoia-Pisa and tive formations and the remainder had all been then over the Apennines; if they were held in heavily mauled. Of the reinforcements brought force I would mount a full-scale attack on in before the fall of Rome the Hermann Goering Bologna not later than 15th August. I would Division had suffered extremely heavy losses then establish a firm base in the area of Bologna and 92 Infantry Division had been so battered and for the development of further that it was disbanded and never re-formed. operations either westwards into France or However, in spite of the fact that the in- north-eastwards into Austria according to the vasion of France had now begun, and the Rus- requirements of Allied stategy at that time. sians were threatening East Prussia, Kesselring At the same time I would secure and protect had been promised considerable reinforcements any airfield areas in the considered of new formations, quite apart from the normal necessary for the operation of the Allied Air replacement drafts. It is strikingly significant Forces. As I explained, this plan was only of the different value attached by the opposing possible on the assumption that I retained the sides to the Italian campaign that at the very forces I then had in Italy; I had to work on same time as the Allies were withdrawing seven this assumption as long as I could while the divisions from Italy to France the Germans fate of ANVIL was being decided. were despatching to Italy the equivalent of eight divisions, some of them actually from the My tactical plans for the pursuit north of threatened West. 19 and 20 Luftwaffe Field Rome envisaged two main lines of advance: Divisions came from Denmark and Holland along the west coast for Fifth Army and up the respectively, 16 S.S. Panzer Grenadier and axis of the Tiber, both east and west of the 42 Jaeger Divisions from the Balkans and 34 river, for Eighth Army. Fifth Army's first Infantry Division from Russia. Three other objective was the port of Civitavecchia, which infantry* divisions which were forming in Ger- was now vital for our maintenance; Eighth many, one of which had already been equipped Army was directed on the area of Terni and for the Russian front, were sent to Italy where Rieti, the capture of which would disrupt any they were given the numbers of divisions which German plans for forming a continuous front had been destroyed in the battle for Rome and across the peninsula and would threaten with incorporated their survivors. In addition a envelopment the left wing of Tenth Army. battalion of Tiger tanks, 504 Heavy Tank From the point of view of terrain the former Battalion, was taken from the G.H.Q. reserve task was rather the easier, for the country is in the great tank centre of Mailly-le-Camp in of an open, rolling nature while the route up France. In view of the general German short- the Tiber, though not difficult by comparison age of armour and the desperate need for heavy with the country between Naples and Rome, tanks to employ against General Eisenhower's offered many opportunities for delaying actions, gradually widening bridgehead, this transfer especially on the east bank of the river. Enemy seems to me to be particularly significant.* opposition was also much weaker on our left, for most of Kesselring's divisions had with- I reviewed the situation in a signal to General. drawn northward east of the Tiber and, having Wilson on 7th June. My object I defined as rashly destroyed all the bridges from Rome " to complete the destruction of the German as far as Todi, sixty miles to the north, were armed forces in Italy and, in the process, to having great difficulty in getting across to the force the enemy to draw to the maximum on west to come to the support of the weaker his reserves, whereby I shall be rendering the forces retreating up the west coast. VI Corps greatest assistance to the western invasion of therefore set the pace, with 34 Division on which my Armies are capable ". I calculated the coast and the 36th inland, both supported that the enemy, in spite of such reinforcements by armour from I Armoured Division. At * Other reinforcements were of less value. Two 1030 hours on Ttth June elements of 34 Division German equipped Italian divisions arrived towards the entered Civitavecchia. The speedy capture of end of July and were employed at first on coastal defence this port, the most important between Naples and internal security. The Czech Army had arrived and Leghorn, was a considerable gain and, in Northern Italy about the time of the fall of Rome. It was twelve battalions strong and was used mainly although the Germans 'had carried out exten- for guarding railways and dumps in Northern Italy sive demolitions, particularly fine efforts iby the and keeping order among the Italian population, port reconstruction companies made it usable i Slovak Infantry Division, reorganised as a " Technical earlier than had been expected. The first Land- Brigade " for work on fortifications, had been in Italy since . There were also various Russian ing Ship, Tank berthed on I2th June and formations and units but, except for 162 Division and Liberty ships (began unloading in the roads on certain battalions, these were also normally employed the I4th. only in rear areas. The indirect contribution of all these non-German formations in releasing German The boundary between the German armies troops for active service was, of course, considerable. was now the Tiber, with Fourteenth west and 2932 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

Tenth east. General von Mackensen, the for- the enemy on their front. If the advance mer commander of Fourteenth Army, had of Eighth Army fails to force the enemy to been relieved from his command after the fall abandon Ancona, Polish Corps will ,be moved of Rome and replaced on 6th June by General forward later on Eighth Army's eastern axis Lemelsen. To his assistance Kesselring directed to take Ancona from the west. all the newly arrived reinforcements, 356 Infan- 4. The Commander-in-Chief authorizes try Division from Genoa, 20 Luftwaffe Commanders to take extreme risks to Division from Holland, and the i62nd from secure the vital areas mentioned in para- Leghorn. The last named heralded its arrival graph 2 above before the enemy can re- with a charge of Cossack ; this was the organise or be reinforced." first we had seen of an arm of which we had On these orders the pursuit was pressed heard such interesting reports but it proved in- rapidly. The main difference was that 13 effective against Fifth Army and the experi- Corps was no longer directed on the Terni- ment was not repeated in Italy. In Tenth Rieti area but farther afield; this meant that Army XIV Corps, retreating up the Rieti axis, the South Africans were no longer to turn east- had in the area of Carsoli and Orvinio a mixed wards to cross the Tiber to seize as group of 305 and 94 Infantry Divisions and, originally planned, but to press on to . lined up north of the Aniene river from east Here again a difficult question of routeing was of Tivoli to the Tiber, I Parachute, 15 Panzer involved since both they and II Corps were in Grenadier and Hermann Goering Divisions. danger of arriving simultaneously at Viterbo. 13 Corps was the pursuit Corps for Eighth I decided to give precedence to the armour and Army and the plan was to employ two II Corps was halted in place until the South armoured divisions in the lead, 6 South African Africans were through. Meanwhile VI Corps up Route 3, the Via Flaminia, west of the made rapid progress up the coast in spite of Tiber, and 6 British up Route 4, the Via the arrival of two fresh German divisions. On Salaria, east of the Tiber; 4 British Infantry the Qth it captured and a task force Division with 25 Tank Brigade followed up the from i Armoured Division, operating on latter on the minor road leading due north from the inland flank, cut into II Corps' territory Tivoli through Palombara.* The French were to capture the Viterbo airfield. On the nth, already across the Aniene, east of Rome, which however, VI Corps was relieved by IV Corps gave an initial advantage to the pursuit on the and moved to Naples, coming under command right but on the left the South Africans were of Seventh Army for operation ANVIL. II hampered by having to pass through II Corps Corps had pushed forward with 85 and to use the Rome bridges across the Tiber. They 88 Divisions up the axis of Route 2 and were clear through, however, by the morning consolidated the position between VI and 13 of the 6th and by that evening a dashing ad- Corps. It was relieved by the French on loth vance of thirty-three miles brought them to June. On the gth Eighth Army had also . East of the Tiber our ad- carried out a regrouping; the Tiber was now vance was more strongly opposed, in particular to be the boundary between 13 and 10 Corps, by the Hermann Goering Division which gave with the latter commanding all the troops for- 6 British Armoured Division a stiff fight for merly in 13 Corps east of the river. The final Monterotondo; 4 Division also met resistance result was to give 13 Corps 78 and 6 South on the Palombara road from 15 Panzer Grena- African Divisions, with 4 Division in reserve, dier Division and i Parachute Division. and 10 Corps 6 British Armoured and 8 Indian The situation was developing so favourably Infantry Divisions, with 10 Indian as reserve. west of the Tiber that on the morning of 7th The Canadians were grounded south of Rome. June I sent fresh orders to both Annies and The Polish Corps, which had passed to Army to 5 Corps: Group reserve on 26th May after the capture " i. The enemy has been greatly weakened of Piedimonte, assumed command of the Ad- by the fighting since nth May and is now riatic sector from 5 Corps on I7th June, re- thoroughly disorganised. He is certainly in maining under direct command of my head- no position at present to launch a serious quarters until 29th June when it passed to counter-attack. He will continue to suffer Eighth Army. The enemy had begun to fall seriously during his retreat from attacks by .. back in the Adriatic sector on 8th June and on our Air Forces and advancing columns. the loth we occupied Pescara and Chieti. 2. To take full advantage of this situation For ten days after the regrouping the pur- Eighth Army will advance with all possible suit continued, though the enemy was now speed direct on the general area Florence- offering stronger resistance. Kesselring had at Bibbiena-Arezzo and Fifth Army on the last managed to shift sufficient strength west- general area Pisa-Lucca-Pistoia. Armies will wards to feel secure against a serious outflank- maintain general contact on their inner flanks ing by Fifth Army up the west coast and he but will not wait on each other's advance. was beginning to feel the benefit of the fresh Enemy resistance will be by-passed wherever reinforcements he had received from elsewhere. possible in order to reach the above vital He could now put twenty to twenty-one of his areas quickly. Eighth Army will be respon- twenty-six divisions into the line. The revival sible for any protection that may be neces- of his strength was shown 'by the stiff action at sary on its right flank. Bagnoregio which delayed the fall of Orvieto to 78 Division until I4th June. IV Corps on 3. To save transportation resources and the extreme left also had to fight hard for bridging material 5 Corps will not follow up Orbetello and Grosseto; the latter fell on the * I intended to employ only the minimum force I5th but little advance had been made beyond necessary in the pursuit; among other reasons it by the 20th, for the Ombrone river was a maintenance ruled out a large force, as railhead was still back in the Cassino area. The remaining divisions difficult obstacle. During the same period of were grounded in areas where they could be easily ioth-2oth June the French, under a provisional maintained. - " Pursuit Corps " Headquarters commanded SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2933 by General de Larminat,* advanced up Route 2 The Battle of the Trasimene Line. on the right of Fifth Army with two divisions, It was clear that Kesselring had now decided i 'Motorised and 3 Algerian. On the nth they not merely to stiffen his delaying resistance seized and on the i8th stormed' but to make a stand, although he was the strong position of Radicofani, the highest approaching the broadest part of the Italian point on the road from Rome to Florence. By peninsula. He calculated that the momentum the 2oth advanced elements were on the Orcia of our pursuit, after the exhilaration of the river, a tributary of the Ombrone. Our main chase north from Rome, now left a hundred forces had now reached the line on which the and thirty miles behind, must be starting to enemy had decided to stand 'but on the Adriatic flag and that he had his own troops well they were not yet up with that line which in this enough under control again to rally them for sector was the River Chienti. On i6th June I a defensive action on a coherent front; by thus had instructed the Poles to press on with all- imposing a pause on us he would gain time possible speed to secure the capture of Ancona. and space to prepare the " Gothic " line. His The Polish advance was indeed rapid and by decision began to make itself felt about 2Oth the 20th they had crossed the River Aso and 'June. The chosen line was based on the east captured Fermo and Pedaso. On the 2ist they coast on the River Chienti; west of the even managed to secure a small bridgehead over Apennines the key points were' the 'high the Chienti -but next day this was destroyed ground north of Perugia, Lake Trasimene and by a heavy enemy counter-attack. It was clear Chiusi* from where the line continued east- that to force the Chienti would require a full wards along the River Astrone to the Orcia Corps attack. General Andersf decided that in and the upper Ombrone. By now the Germans view of the time needed for concentration and were to a certain extent reorganised and re- for bringing up the necessary supplies and grouped and both armies were on the same ammunition the probable date would be 4th line and fairly well balanced in strength. They July. I agreed to this plan and proposed to had nineteen divisions, admittedly nearly all stage the attack in such a way as to be able to under strength, in the line and six in reserve; press directly on from the Chienti to Ancona, as against this we were maintaining the pur- some twenty-two miles beyond the river. suit with nine only. The Army boundary ran On I4th June I divided my headquarters, through Montepulciano with Tenth Army east and, leaving the bulk of .the administrative and Fourteenth west. On the Adriatic Tenth branches and services in Caserta", to follow to Army had LI Mountain Corps of four divisions, Rome when space was available, I created a rather under strength. From the Tiber to the small Advanced Headquarters, consisting of Army 'boundary was LXXVI Panzer Corps my operational staff only. This was the system with seven divisions, including the good 15 Panzer Grenadier, i Parachute and Hermann on which I had worked in Tunisia and Sicily Goering Divisions; it was this Corps which was and, now that the comparatively static period of given the task of delaying our 10 and 13 Corps the winter was over, I was anxious to be as either side of Lake Trasimene. In Fourteenth close behind the Armies as possible. On i4th Army i Parachute Corps, between Monte- June I opened this advanced headquarters at pulciano and Montalcino, had four divisions in Frascati, using for offices a small building which the line, including 26 Panzer and 29 Panzer had previously been used for the same purpose Grenadier. XIV Panzer Corps, on the west by Field-Marshal Kesselring. This was soon coast, was weaker; it had five divisions but left too far behind by the speed of our advance, only two, the 3rd and 90 Panzer Grenadiers, and on 25th June I moved to a camp site on were of good quality and the other three were the eastern shores of Lake . definitely poor. As the situation here deteriorated The capture' of Elba, early plans for which this Corps .had to be reinforced with battle I have already mentioned, took place about groups from two other divisions, 16 S.S. and this time. I originally wanted this operation 42 Jaeger. The general situation, however, to be launched if possible 'before the spring was hopeful for the Germans; their best offensive opened but it had been postponed to divisions were equally spaced at the vital points a date between 20th and 25th May. On i6th and had received heavy drafts of reinforce- May I was informed that it had been further ments and 34 Division was in process of arriv- postponed till mid-June. This removed almost ing from the Russian front. all the value of the operation as by that time The line selected for a stand had been well our troops, advancing overland, would be chosen, in spite of its length.* There were .no almost level with the island and on I2th June very obvious natural obstacles to our advance, I asked whether the forces earmarked for Elba except the river lines on the two coasts, and could not rather be used for a landing on the no prepared defences; but the country is hilly mainland in support of Fifth Army. However, and in general thickly cultivated, especially this was considered unacceptable as the French in the vine-growing areas in the centre of the would not consent to the -use in Italy of '9 line. Our own lines of communication were Colonial Infantry Division, which they wanted severely stretched and these difficulties would to keep for the landings in France. The opera- not be eased before the capture of Leghorn and tion therefore went in as planned in the early Ancona. The reconstruction of the railways morning of I7th June; the occupation of the was being pushed ahead with good speed but island was complete by the afternoon of the at the moment Eighth Army railhead was back T9th. Steps were taken to emplace medium at Roccasecca, two hundred miles from the ,guns in the north-eastern corner of the island battle front. The time had also been well to command Piombino but the town fell on chosen for two reasons, one of which was a 25th June without the necessity for their use. most unusual spell of bad weather between I7th * The position was apparently reconnoitred in * General de Corps d'Armee E. R. M. de Larminat. August 1943 when the Germans considered holding f General Wladyslaw Anders, C.B.E., D.S.O. a line Grosseto—Monte—Amiata—Perugia—Ancona. 2934 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

and 20th June. The more important reason offered a wealth of alternative positions to the was unknown to Kesselring: the uncertainty of defenders and imposed a severe delay on 13 and the future on the Allied side which had reached 10 Corps. Eighth Army's task was to secure its climax just at this time. I explained the the general area of Florence, Bibbiena and situation on 28th June: Arezzo as quickly as possible as a base for " The ghost of ANVIL hangs heavily over operations against the Northern Apennines. For the battle front. For example the Americans the attainment of this purpose the routes for- have been ordered to send .back 517 Regi- ward were limited: in the Army sector only one mental Combat Team and 117 Cavalry Re- road appeared capable of carrying the weight connaissance Squadron which are actually of a highly mechanized Corps, Route 71 which engaged in contact with the enemy. They skirts the western shore of Lake Trasiment are also required to release now an engineer and runs up the Chiana valley to Arezzo. There regiment and other service units required is a secondary road running up the west side for the conduct of the battle. The French of the valley through Sinalunga to Arezzo but do not appear to be putting their hearts east of the lake there is no route forward until into the present operations and the reason the Tiber valley is reached and the road here, is undoubtedly because they have their eyes through Perugia and Umbertide to San- turned in another direction. The air efforb sepolcro, is narrowly confined in the river will shortly be curtailed owing to moves valley and unsuitable for a rapid pursuit. of fighting units to Corsica. Eighth Army Looking further ahead Arezzo was likely to are not directly concerned with ANVIL but prove a bottleneck in the advance on both as long as there is doubt and uncertainty Bibbiena and Florence. The original Eighth about the future so long will there be a Army plan was to send 10 Corps up Route 71 moral weakening. Armies have a very and 13 Corps by the Sinalunga road; but it delicate sense and they are beginning to look was soon seen that the latter road would be over their shoulders. You will no doubt re- quite inadequate for the task and the inter- member the Biblical quotation: ' If the Corps boundary was therefore altered to run trumpet give an uncertain sound who shall through the centre of the lake. This meant prepare himself for battle?'. If the momen- that the two Corps could not give mutual sup- tum of my offensive is to be kept up to the port and, after the north end of the lake had maximum I must receive confirmation that been reached, their axes would again diverge.* the Italian campaign is to be backed. If 13 Corps had the more important task, the on the other hand it is decided to go all out easier and more direct route, and met the for ANVIL then I must know so that I can stronger opposition. It had three divisions, recast my present plan. In the event of the 6 South African Armoured, 4 and 78 Infantry latter decision I have proposed that I should and two armoured brigades, 9 and i Canadian. fly home and take certain proposals aimed 78 Division was due to ibe relieved at the end at producing the best results my emasculated of June and leave the theatre for a short rest forces will be able to achieve in support of and reorganisation in the Middle East. It the war effort." would be difficult to reinforce, should that be The battles for the Trasimene line may be necessary, for all Army reserves had been left considered as "having lasted from 20tih to 30th behind near railhead, for ease of administration; June. They were most severe in the centre it was intended, however, to bring up gradually where the Germans opposed 10 and 13 Corps; 10 Indian Division from 5 Corps. Facing 13 on the west coast, although the (American Corps were three German divisions, i Para- advance was considerably slowed down, as chute, 334 Infantry (four regiments strong) compared with the first two weeks after the and Hermann Goering, and part of a fourth to fall of Rome, the Germans were unable to pre- the west, 356 Infantry. Their chosen position vent a steady gain of ground. IV Corps on was anchored on the east on the lake and on the left, with 36 and I Armoured Divisions the west on a ridge of high ground extending leading, captured Follonica on 24th June and north-west from Chiusi; the latter town, an Piombino on the 25th. Then stiffer resist- ancient hilltop city of the Etruscans, was held ance was met, particularly inland where as a strongpoint by the Hermann Goering i Armoured Division, opposed by a skilful Division. West of Chiusi the hills are steep and enemy and difficult country, lost seventy-one badly roaded and there was no chance of the tanks in the course of these ten days. The French hi Radicofani exercising any pressure stiffest resistance was at Cecdna, at the mouth to then* right. Our attack would have to come of the river of the same name; the battle for between Lake Trasimene and Lake Chiusi and the town lasted from agth June to ist July here the Germans had prepared a series of de- and cost 34 Division, which had relieved fences in depth based on small woods and farms the 36th, fairly heavy casualties. 16 S.S. on the north bank of the small River Pescia Division had been brought in here to strengthen which proved a useful anti-tank obstacle. In the German defence and fought with skill and front of the Pescia they held a line of outposts, fanaticism. The French, directed on Siena, the southernmost of which were the villages of were held uip from the 22nd to the 26th June on Sanfatucchio and Vaiano. the River Orcia and were able only to make We made contact with the forward positions an advance of some two miles. On the night on 20th June, when 78 Division attacked San- of the 27th, however, the Germans -began to fatucchio and Vaiano at the south-western withdraw and only delaying actions were corner of the lake and the South Africans began fought south of Siena, which was entered on to work their way up the lower slopes of the bill 3rd July. By the 7th, with the capture of crowned by Chiusi. By next day the nature of Colle di Val d'Elsa, the whole of Route 68, the enemy resistance became clear, and 13 from its junction with Route 2 to the sea, had been secured. * I warned General Leese not to fall into the same trap as the Romans on this spot; he assured me that The rolling hill country either side of Lake he had carefully studied the records of the earlier Trasimene, vine-clad and thickly cultivated, battle and would avoid the errors of Flaminius. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2935

Corps' Commander decided to commit his as a result of their failure to hold 13 Corps. reserve division, 4 British. 78 Division suc- 10 Corps followed up, advancing as rapidly as ceeded, in very fierce hand-to-hand fighting, in their means permitted into the mountains either clearing Sanfatucchio on the 2ist but they had side of the Tiber. On their right the Poles, made no progress against Vaiano and the South who came under command of Eighth Army on Africans met most violent resistance in their 2gth June, continued to make preparations for attack on Chiusi. Only the Armoured Brigade the assault on the German position behind the was forward; they managed, after three days Chienti but discovered that the general with- of heavy fighting, to get a company into the drawal on the night of the 29th. applied to their centre of the town early on the 23rd but the front also; they therefore proceeded, although Germans counter-attacked and by the end of their concentration was by no means complete, the day were again firmly in control. 78 to pursue across the river. Division now decided to put in a full-scale attack on the lower ground on their right, to New Plans of Campaign. carry the defences of the Pescia and exploit to So far I had been conducting operations on Castiglione, in the centre of the west shore of the assumption that the forces which had been the lake. The attack went in on the morning withdrawn provisionally for ANVIL, or which of the 24th and by the evening had secured a were still to be withdrawn, might yet be re- small bridgehead over the Pescia; but heavy turned to my command for the exploitation of rain delayed the armour which was to have the Italian campaign if the decision went supported the leading troops. As a result pro- against ANVIL. As the time lengthened during gress was slow on the 25th and by the 26th it which that decision hung in the balance it be- was necessary to call a halt until 4 Division came urgent to plan- what could be done with could close up on the left flank. They had had the forces available on either hypothesis. I a hard struggle for Vaiano, which was not therefore called a conference of my Army Com- cleared until the 25th, and did not draw level manders on 23th June and explained what my until the 26th. In the meantime, however, the plans would be if I were assured the same divisional reconnaissance regiment had pushed forces as at present. The object of operations round the north shore of Lake Chiusi and in in Italy must be to invade southern Germany face of this threat the Germans withdrew from by an overland advance through north-eastern the town; the South Africans entered on- the Italy and the Ljubljana gap. By this means morning of the 26th but were held up by very we should strike directly at territory which it •extensive demolitions on all the exit roads. was vital for the Germans to defend, even at The direct route up the west shore of the lake the cost of diverting strength from other fronts, was still blocked by the strong defences of the and have the possibility of joining hands with line running west-south-west from Castiglione the southern wing of the and with and 73 Division- was unable to make any pro- Marshal Tito's partisan forces. The alternative,, gress here. This meant that 4 Division would an advance into Southern France across the have to force the pace. It took a consolidated Maritime Alps, would be less profitable and attack by four battalions to carry Frattavecchia more difficult. I appreciated that the enemy in the centre of the line. By the end of 28th intended to hold the Northern Apennines until June the major part of the ridge north of the driven from that position in oveiwhelming Pescia had been cleared and the Germans had force but, with the troops then available to been driven off the Trasimene Line. They had him, he would be unable to do so and would won a'welcome respite, though at heavy cost in be risking certain disaster, provided we could casualties which had severely depleted the bring our whole strength against him. Coming i Parachute and 334 Divisions. They now had down to tactical details, I considered that the to fall back fairly rapidly on their next delay- " Gothic " line should be attacked in the centre ing position, covering Arezzo, but the flooded both for topographical reasons, which I shall condition of the Val di Chiana would give them discuss later, and because that would lead most reasonable time for this and allow them to directly to the important objectives in Northern make firm dispositions. They could remain a Italy. The conference agreed to the plan as little longer in the more broken ground im- outlined but took note that if ANVIL were mediately west of the lake and gave 4 Division launched it would not be practical. In particu- a hard fight for Petrignano on the 3otih. On lar the administrative organisation of the Allied 2nd July 78 Division cleared the northern shore Armies in Italy would be " hamstrung ", hi of Lake Trasimene. General Robertson's expression. General Clark also made the point about the bad effect East of the lake 10 Corps could do little more of the present state of indecision on the morale than maintain pressure and keep level with 13 and efficiency of the troops now engaged. Corps' advance. The strong mountain positions north of Perugia, extending almost to the east It is interesting to speculate what would have shore of the lake, were unsuitable for operations happened if I had been allowed to carry out by 6 British Armoured Division; the Germans this plan and had appeared with two strong rapidly appreciated 'this and were able to with- armies on the southern frontier of Germany and draw 15 Panzer Grenadier Division to the west at the gates of the Danube basin in the autumn side of the lake to oppose 13 Corps. They also of 1944. The effects would probably have been pulled out 94 Infantry Division and sent it back considerable, not only militarily but also to North Italy to re-form completely with fresh politically. My plan was, however, fated to be drafts. On 26th June 10 Corps regrouped; 10 stillborn though the final decision was not taken Indian Division- arrived and 6 Armoured was until the beginning of July and the discouraging sent across to reinforce 13 Corps. The same feeling of uncertainty continued to hang over day 8 Indian Division scored a gratifying suc- the battlefield. The demands of ANVIL had cess -by the capture of Monte Pilonica, east of grown: the troops to be withdrawn included the Tiber. Between the river and the lake the not only the whole French Corps and three Germans now began, on 27th June, to fall back United States divisions but also a considerable 2936 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 number of American Corps and Army troops.* three American divisions plus their appro- I was informed that our air strength would also priate Army, Corps and Service troops be reduced, probably by about seventy per were to be taken from my command for cent. I expounded my views on what could this purpose. I was to be allottejd 92 be done with what was left in a letter to General (Coloured) United States Infantry Division Wilson on 231 d June. My forces would be and also a Brazilian Infantry Division much reduced, and unbalanced in infantry, but organised and equipped on the American I came to the conclusion that an advance into basis. Firm dates would be notified later but north-eastern Italy would still be possible, for planning purposes approximate dates though at a reduced tempo, and must be would be I5th September for 92 Division and attempted. 30th October for the Brazilians. Enemy strength was reckoned at the equiva- 3. The destruction of the German forces in lent of about fourteen full-strength divisions; Italy continued to be my -task. I was reinforcement from elsewhere .might bring it therefore— up to the equivalent of between eighteen and (a) To advance over the Apennines and twenty-one divisions. His intentions were close to the 'line of the River Po secur- correctly appreciated as to continue to with- ing the area -Bologna-Modena to draw fighting to the Apennines and to defend the coast north of Leghorn. If possible I the ," Gothic " line. Our troops, assuming was to seize , an important road there were no further withdrawals than centre. those already ordered, would amount to just (b) Subsequently to cross the Po to the over fourteen infantry and four armoured line --Verona-. It was divisions, with seven independent armoured thought 1ihat with the advance of our brigades. For a successful assault on the forces in Southern France up the Rhone " Gothic " line, carried to the Po, a total of Valley and my advances as outlined above eighteen divisions would be required, of which all German formations would withdraw not more than two or three should be armoured; from north-west Italy thus making an to follow this up as far as the Piave would again offensive in that direction unnecessary. require eighteen divisions and to force the Piave and exploit to the Ljubljana gap also eighteen 4. I should receive further instructions divisions. It would obviously be impossible, after reaching the line defined in para- however, although the Allied strength available graph 3 (b) above. just equalled eighteen divisions, to use the same 5. All available resources in the Mediter- divisions for all these assaults, even if the rdles ranean less those required for operation of offence and defence were rotated; a reserve ANVIL and for internal security would be of at least a third, or six additional divisions, made available to me for these operations. would be required. Various suggestions were 6. Subject to the priority given to ANVIL made as to the source from which this additional the Air Commander-in-Chief was requested to strength could be derived. In the event all the give me maximum air support. major formations I asked for proved unobtain- In order to be in a position to carry out able though some of the minor ones were made this rather optimistic directive it was necessary available; but a more fruitful suggestion was the to make contact, as quickly as possible, with recommendation that we should raise, arm and the " Gothic " line. Now that we knew finally equip some Italian formations. For each phase where we stood and what our resources would of the attack a certain number of divisions be we were at least free from the doubts and had a purely defensive role, and for this the indecisions of the past month and could Italian " Gruppi di Combattimento " which we develop our strategy to suit our strength. The later raised proved most useful. enemy was in no mood to accelerate his with- The decision to proceed with operation drawal, now that he was back " on balance " ANVIL was communicated by the Combined again; after being driven off the Trasimene Chiefs of Staff to Allied Force Headquarters line on 29th June he \vent back fairly steadily on 2nd July. As a result of the decision a new until 5th July but on that day he began directive was issued by General Wilson on 5th once more to call a halt. The line selected ran July in the following terms: from the west coast in the area of Rosignano, some six miles north of Cecina, to Volterra," 1. My previous directive was cancelled thence across the Val di Chiana to the heights and, from receipt of the telegram, operation surrounding Arezzo; on the east coast ANVIL was to have priority of • all Medi- Filottrano and Osimo were key points. The terranean resources. This priority was to hold west coast was strongly defended by 16 S.S. good until the build-up of forces in the Panzer Grenadier Division with 26 jPanzer South of France reached ten divisions. Division on its left. 19 Luftwaffe Field Divi- 2. I was to be informed from time to time sion had been withdrawn from the line in this what resources were allotted to operation sector; it had suffered very heavy casualties ANVIL and I was to take all necessary steps and shortly afterwards it was disbanded and to have them available at the required place the survivors incorporated in its sister division, and time. the 20th. Further east 90 Panzer Grenadier Division, with 20 Luftwaffe Field Division I was told, as a guide, that as the plan under command, defended the high ground now stood not more than four French and around Volterra. From Poggibonsi to Arezzo, * These included : a mechanized Cavalry Recon- in the centre of the front, dispositions were naissance Squadron, three tank battalions, three tank much the same as they had been in the destroyer battalions, eleven batteries of artillery, two Trasimene line with, from west to east, 15 engineer combat regiments and a combat battalion, and a large number of anti-aircraft units. Between Panzer Grenadier, 334 Infantry, i Parachute, i June and i August the strength of Fifth Army ,fell Hermann Goering and 4 Parachute Divisions. by almost forty per cent., from 249,000 to 153,000. This was a formidable deployment,.an,4-it was SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2937

clear that we should have stiff fighting before mene line were now stretched over a front of we could drive these excellent troops from their twenty-five miles and had no reserves.* In positions. Their artillery support was better 10 Corps 8 Indian Division had been fighting co-ordinated now, and a particular feature of with only four days break since the crossing the fighting here was the German use of their of the Rapido; 10 Indian Division had arrived heavy artillery, especially the 17 centimetre to reinforce and had taken over almost the gun, and of a reinforced strength in multi- whole Corps sector to allow the 8th a partial barrelled rocket projectors. 305 and 44 Infantry rest. 4 Indian Division, which had had three Divisions, withdrawing from Perugia, had weeks mountain training, was coming forward fallen back unhurriedly, the former closing in and the first brigade reached the Umbertide east of Arezzo. 114 Jaeger Division, moving area by 7th July. 'However, even when thus up the centre of the peninsula, put in several reinforced, 10 Corps could have little effect counter-attacks to ease the pressure on its on the battle for Arezzo as the country east neighbours. On the Adriatic coast 278 Divi- of the town is very broken and badly roaded sion, in its first major engagement, was fighting and the Corps' main task was to press up the hard for Osimo and Filottrano and losing Tiber valley to Sansepolcro. It was necessary, heavily. therefore, to reinforce 13 Corps and strike at IV Corps on the left had a very bitter Arezzo by the natural route, from the south- struggle for Rosignano, which the S.S. Panzer west. The nearest reserves were in i Canadian Grenadiers defended against 34 United States Corps which had 2 New Zealand Division under Division with the same stubbornness as they command; they had not been needed for the had shown at Cecina. The town is situated on pursuit so far and had been left in the Liri a hill top, very compactly built of large valley for ease of administration and in order masonry houses with an ancient castle in the to give them time to rest, reorganise and pre- centre. In these circumstances street fighting pare for the attacks on the " Gothic " line. was bound to be a long job; it lasted in fact The most readily available formation was the from 3rd July until g\h July. Naturally only New Zealand Division at Frosinone and I part of our force was directed into the town decided to bring this up; to give it time to itself and the remainder endeavoured to out- arrive the attack would have to be postponed flank it to the east, (but here too resistance from until the I5th. 26 Panzer Division was strong. Further east This decision was -reached on gth July and i United States Armoured Division was relieved for the next four days the enemy attempted, by 88 United States Infantry Division which by a series of counter-attacks on different on the 8th captured the " far-famed hold " of points of 13 Corps' front, to gain the initiative Volterra. and re-establish his positions where they had been endangered. These were all repulsed Arezzo presented a more complicated prob- with heavy losses and on our side an attempt lem. The town itself lies in a flat plain but to increase our hold on Monte Lignano, the it is surrounded by mountains on three sides. main bulwark of the defence south of Arezzo, The broad and fertile Val di Chiana leads was also unsuccessful. In the meantime 10 up to it from the west side of Lake Trasimene ' Corps was able to make a gratifying and un- but some three miles short of it the plain expected advance. 4 Indian Division was em- ceases and the road turns north-eastwards to ployed west of the Tiber, where a large moun- enter the town through a comparative defile. tain mass, culminating in the three thousand The advance on Arezzo from the Trasimene five hundred foot peak of Monte Favalto, line was relatively rapid both by 13 Corps and blocks all access from the Tiber valley to 10 Corps, though the latter was employing only Arezzo; there were no roads across this massif one infantry division and an armoured brigade. in either direction and shortage of bridging 13 Corps first met stiff resistance lafe on 5th material meant that the divisional routes of July. The full strength of the German position access were severely restricted. Trusting in was not immediately appreciated, for the ex- this inaccessibility the enemy held the ground posed approaches and heavy shelling made here relatively lightly. But 4 Indian Division reconnaissance difficult, and for the next three had already a fine reputation in mountains days the leading brigades continued to probe and recent training had polished up its know- forward in the expectation that the Germans ledge; with 1/9 Gurkhas in the lead it pushed would turn once more to withdrawal under resolutely into the tangled mass of ridges continued pressure without our having to mount and peaks and by the I3th Monte Favalto a full-scale attack. 6 Armoured Division in the was in our hands. The Army Commander, * valley, having relieved 78 Division, attempted taking advantage of this, ordered the division to press on by the direct route to Arezzo and to press on north across the Arezzo-San- succeeded hi gaining a tenuous foothold on sepolcro road, capture the Alpe di Poti and Monte Lignano, due south of the town on the threaten Arezzo from the east. It was a right hand side of the-defile. On the. Corps' difficult task, as the Indians had completely left 4 British Infantry and 6 South African outstripped then* road communications, and be- Armoured Divisions tried to break through the fore this threat could be fully developed the enemy defences on the hills running parallel Germans had been forced out of Arezzo; but the to the Arezzo-Siena road and thus break into capture of Monte Favalto was undoubtedly a the Arno valley west of Arezzo but though strong contributing factor in that success. 4 Division succeeded in seizing one of the hills, 13 Corps' attack on Arezzo was launched at Poggio aH'Olmo, the main line held firm. oioo hours on i5th July. The New Zeaknd It was clear that further reinforcement would Division attacked in the hills south of the be needed before we could break through this line of defence. Our main weight must be * 78' Division, which had been engaged almost continuously since Sicily, was due to leave for the developed in 13 Corps' sector, where the ap- Middle East in the normal programme of rotation; proach was easiest, but the three divisions 46'and 56 Divisions were returning from the Middle which had fought their way through the Trasi- East to replace it. 2938 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 town, Monte Lignano and Monte Gavino, and them fame. A marble tablet in the ancient city 6 Armoured Division on their left along the of San Gimignano, captured iby 4 Mountain lower western slopes of Monte Lignano. Maxi- Division on I3th July, recalls their great ad- mum artillery support was given from half an vance from the GarigUano. hour -before midnight and at dawn the fighter- The Germans, having now made us-deploy bombers joined in the battle. The enemy and fight hard for the two ports and Arezzo, guns were for the most part silenced by the initiated a programme' of gradual withdrawal weight of this attack but the infantry in their to the Arno based on a series of phase lines strong positions still resisted firmly. The New known by girls names in alphabetical order.* Zealanders on the high ground made little Their forces were now well balanced and there progress hi daylight and I Guards Brigade, was little chance of seriously disrupting this lower down, were checked after an early ad- programme. On i6th July Arezzo fell, on the vance. Nevertheless the balance of the day i8th IV Corps reached the Arno east of Pisa, was in our favour; the New Zealanders were on the same day the Poles captured Ancona firm on Monte Lignano, which they captured and on the igth the Americans entered Leghorn. before dawn, and 6 Armoured Division had The Poles had had heavy fighting at Loretto driven a threatening wedge into the centre of and Filottrano; it took six days of fluctuating the enemy's positions. That night the Ger- attack and counter-attack to clear the latter and mans broke contact everywhere. In the plain the main attack was delayed thereby till the our armour went through and 16/5 Lancers morning of the i7th. IV Coups had to beat off entered Arezzo at 0945 hours on the i6th. On a final counter-attack on Rosignano on loth their left 2 Lothians, after a dashing advance July, and for the next two days progress to the at full speed, were rewarded by the capture of east of the town was still slow. From the I3th an intact bridge over the Arno. to the I5th the advance was more rapid as the Last light on the i6th saw the end of the Germans fell back to their next delaying posi- battle for Arezzo; Florence was our next ob- tions. 91 Division was the first unit in IV jective. The former was to be the administra- Corps to reach the Arno, capturing Pontedera tive base and the latter the operational base on i8th July, but on the left 34 Division was for the attack on the " Gothic " line. I ought held further south in the hills behind Leg- to mention here that we had been considerably hampered administratively by the stubborn horn and first entered the city at 0200 hours German defence of Arezzo; it had been nomin- on the igth. The Germans had devoted greater ated as Eighth Army's main roadhead and efforts than ever to render the port unusable. eventual railhead and, in anticipation of its The dock area was heavily mined and booby- capture, the roadheads at Terni and Narni had trapped, all the quays had been cratered and oeen only lightly stocked. Railheads had been the harbour entrance was almost wholly blocked opened north of Rome in the general area of by sunken ships. By 23rd July 34 Divi- Orte and Civita Castellana at the end of the sion had captured the southern part of Pisa. first week in July and we were pressing on All bridges over the Arno had been destroyed with the construction of the line to Arezzo. We and the enemy was firmly posted on the north calculated that when that area was opened bank all along the Corps front. Leghorn har- and developed we should be able to maintain bour remained under fire from long-range a total of thirteen and a half divisions from artillery. Florence forwards. In the meanwhile the Fifth Army's sector was now reduced to a Germans, by delaying us for ten days in front front of four divisions with IV Corps left and of Arezzo, had gained that much more time II Corps right; by the 23rd it ran along the for the completion of their " Gothic" line Arno from the mouth to Empoli. The two defences. Corps in, the centre of Eighth Army's front While Eighth Army was thus having to put meanwhile continued to press on up the moun- forward its best efforts in the centre of the tainous centre of the peninsula to seize the bases peninsula we were pressing attacks on both for the attack on the " Gothic " line. 13 Corps flanks to win the vital ports of Ancona and was now directed on Florence and 10 Corps Leghorn. The Poles on the Adriatic captured therefore took over the area due north of Osimo on 6th July, inflicting severe losses on Arezzo and advanced on Bfibbiena by the 278 Division; so severely was this division parallel axes of the upper Arno and the upper weakened that Kesselring began to move over Tiber. Between these two rivers is a great i Parachute Division to its support.* General- roadless massif known as the Alpe di Catenaia Anders then began preparations for the final and west of the road from Arezzo to Bibbiena attack on Ancona. IV Corps on the left was is the equally roadless, longer and slightly driving on Leghorn, which it planned to take higher massif of the Pratomagno. iq Corps by an enveloping movement from the east. The now had two Indian infantry divisions, 4th French, on Fifth Army's right, had celebrated and loth, and an armoured brigade and on its I4th July by capfturing Poggibonsi, on the extreme right two armoured car regiments, 12 direct route from Siena to Florence. The time Lancers and the Household Cavalry, operating for their relief was now, however, rapidly ap- in the tangled country between Gubbio and proaching; on 22nd July their sector was taken Fabriano. On I7th July 4 Indian Division over iby 8 Indian Division and in part by the captured the Alpe di Poti, north of the Arezzo- New Zealanders, coming under command of 13 Sansepolcro road and on i8th July 4/10 Corps. It was with very real regret that I Baluchis of 10 Indian Division cleared Monte saw the departure of the French Corps. They Cedrone, west of Citta di Castello in the Tiber had most worthily upheld and reinforced the valley, a strong position which had delayed our reputation of French arms in the country where advance here since the I3th. Citta di Castello Bayard and Gaston de Foix had first brought fell on the 22nd. 4 Indian Division now took * He may also have been influenced in this by our * The ones with which we were most concerned deception plan which indicated the Adriatic sector as were, from south to north, " Irmgard ", " Karin ", the area of our intended attack on the " Gothic " line. " Lydia ", " Maedchen -', " Olga " and " Paula ". SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2939 up the running on the heights of the Alpe di is a centre of communications and the best Catenaia and the weight of 10 Corps shifted operational base for the attack on the to its left. On 5th August, after a swift ad- " Gothic " line. We planned, if possible, to vance across the trackless mountains, with the capture the city by an outflanking movement divisional engineers building a jeep track be- on both sides of it, with our main strength limcf them at full speed, 3/5 Mahrattas cap- on the west. The Germans were making tured the summit of Monte II Castello. This promises to treat it as an open city but by this was 10 Corps' high-water-mark. The plan for they appeared to mean that, while using its the attack on the " Gothic " line had now communication facilities themselves, they ex- been changed and on 7th August, reduced in pected us to refrain from doing so when we strength to 10 Indian Division only, the Corps should capture it; at any rate they had con- went onto the defensive. centrated large forces immediately south of the city. From Figline on the upper Arno to 13 Corps in the meanwhile was operating iMontelupo west of the city four and a half north-westwards against Florence. It had five divisions, strong in artillery and heavy tanks, divisions under command, two of them now confronted 13 Corps, with three and a armoured, but with the imminent disappear- half divisions forward. The German formations ance of the French Corps it was about to take included 4 Parachute, 29 Panzer Grenadier and over a front of some forty miles. The original part of 3 Panzer Grenadier Divisions. 13 Corps plan was to make the main effort on the right, decided to concentrate the New Zealanders on up both sides of the valley of the Arno with a narrow front west of Route 2 and break 6 British Armoured Division, and along the through the " Paula " line by capturing the west side of the Monti di Chianti, through ridge of Pian' dei Cerri, which runs roughly Radda and Greve, with 4 British Infantry and east and west from the main road three miles 6 South African Armoured Divisions, the latter south of Florence to the Arno opposite Signa, in the lead. 6 British Armoured Division had exploiting to the river west of Florence. East the advantage of the bridge over the Arno of the road the South Africans would make which they had captured intact the day Arezzo diversionary attacks and 4 Division would pro- fell and were able to make some progress be- tect the Corps' right flank. The attack went tween the river and the heights of the - in on 30th July and fierce fighting continued magno. 4 Division paralleled this to the west until the late evening of 2nd August, when of the river but by the igth the Germans, now the New Zealanders captured the crest of La on .their " Irmgard " delaying line, were able Poggiona, at the eastern end of the enemy's to impose a halt. The South Africans in the ridge position. This was the turning point of thickly cultivated Chianti hills had captured the battle; the roads now led downhill into Radda in Chianti on the i8th. By the 20th, Florence and the enemy began to withdraw however, it became clear that -the enemy in- back across the Arno. They fought a stiff tended to resist particularly strongly on our rearguard action on the River Ema which original line of advance, the Arno axis, with crosses Route 2 some two -miles south of the two and a half divisions east of the river and Arno and on the night of 3rd August disengaged one, 715 Infantry, re-formed and brought up to again over the Arno. strength after its disaster at Anzio, between The local German commander had apparently the rrver and the crest of the Chianti moun- been allowed discretion about demolishing the tains. The Corps Commander therefore de- Arno bridges and exercised it by blowing up cided to make his main effort on the left of his all but the Ponte Vecchio. The Ponte della sector and employ both 8 Indian and 2 New Trindta, by many considered the most beautiful Zealand Divisions to relieve the French Corps in the world, was a particularly severe loss; the and press up the axis of Route 2. Ponte Vecchio, though it has a certain charm By 22nd July the relief of the French was of antiquity, is not so fine a work of art and completed and the South Africans and New in any case is too weak for all but the lightest Zealanders were able to make good progress traffic. It has been suggested that it was to the west of the Chianti chain. By the end spared because it reminded the nostalgic para- of the 25th both were facing squarely up to the chutists of Nuremberg; but to .ensure that " Olga " line which, ran roughly east and west military requirements were not unduly sacri- through San Casciano, ten miles south ol ficed to sentiment the ancient buildings at both Florence. This advance loosened up the de- ends were blown up in order to block the fence in the Arno valley and on the same day approaches. We were not, in fact, hampered the right of the South Africans, and 4 British militarily by all this destruction for we never Division, were in contact with the enemy posi- intended to fight in Florence and, once the tions on Monte Scalari and Monte Moggio, the city was cleared, could build as many bridges south-eastern bulwarks of the defence of as we wanted without loss of time or efficiency. Florence. This was the " Lydia" line; With the entry into the southern part of " Olga ", on Route 2, was held by 4 Parachute Florence on 4th August the campaign in central Division. Leaving " Lydia " to 4 Division, 13 Italy came to an end,* and it was on the same Corps grouped the South Africans and New day that the new plan for the attack on the Zealanders for the attack on " Olga ". There " Gothic " line was decided on, a plan which was stiff fighting on the 26th but the next day involved a radical regrouping by Eighth Army. the New Zealanders captured San Casciano and From the Garigliano to 'the Arno is two the parachutists 'withdrew to " Paula ", the hundred and forty miles as the crow flies; by last line covering Florence. 4 Division had the shortest road it is two hundred and seventy very heavy fighting, lasting three days, for miles. We had covered this distance in sixty- Monte Scalari, which was. finally cleared on the four days, breaking through three lines of 29th. On the left of the Corps front 8 Indian prepared defences south of Rome and fighting Division had reached the Arno east of EmpolL 'two major battles, the .Trasimene line and We wanted Florence as quickly as possible, * The clearing of the Pontassieve .loop of the Arno, not for the sake of the name but because it east of'Florence, lasted until 9 August. 2940 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

Arezzo, between Rome and Florence. I con- ever, it retains the characteristics which have sider this a very satisfactory speed in Italian made it inferior hitherto, as a route for an terrain, and the more so when it is remem- army, to the western coastal route. It would bered that, after the fall of Rome, I was being be truer to say that the coast road, Route 16, forced to make detachments to other fronts offers the only passage on the level, for the while Kesselring was being strenuously rein- spurs descending from the central chain run forced. I had admittedly the advantage of right down to the coast in the form of a con- operating hi a country whose inhabitants were tinuous series of ridges, not high, at least near well disposed. This was especially noticeable the sea, but not easy for the passage of troops. in Tuscany, where the local population The soil, too, is heavy and movement is diffi- frequently gave valuable information to our cult after rain. The few roads which run troops on matters of tactical importance, such parallel to Route 16, all of them narrow and as the location of enemy minefields. When badly surfaced, switchback up and down these we entered Florence some of the population ridges through small villages. More important engaged in skirmishes with supporters of still, the whole foothill region is intersected, the Fascist Republican Government and at right angles to the direction of advance, assisted our troops with, information on German by numerous water obstacles, some quite krge dispositions north of the river. I should also rivers and some mere torrents but all liable to like to pay tribute to the courage and constancy sudden flooding from the proximity of their of many hundreds of brave Italians, of all mountain sources. They give a foretaste of the classes, who at the risk and sometimes forfeit still more serious obstacles which face the of their lives, sheltered and protected Allied attacker round the elbow of the mountains prisoners of war, crashed airmen and liaison where broad embanked rivers flow north- officers operating behind the enemy lines. But eastwards across his path through the muddy it was a hard-fought struggle all the way, plains of the . except for the first two weeks in June, and one which is infinitely to the credit of the troops of Between the two narrow coastal belts the all nationalities under my command, for the mountains present an unbroken front about a German is a master in retreat and can seldom hundred and forty miles long and fifty to sixty be hustled or panicked. I was determined to miles deep. There are no natural routes across employ the minimum troops in the pursuit, to them but the historical importance of the cities have the maximum strength for the attack on of the Arno valley on the one hand and the the Apennines. The result was that they were Po valley on the other has been such that no hard driven, and only the greatest enthusiasm less than eleven roads, of all classes, have 'been and skill could have made the plan a success. constructed to link the two districts. Not all I should like to mention particularly my three of these can be considered for military use. armoured divisions i United States, 6 British The two routes which lead from Viareggio and 6 South African. Central Italy is not through Aulla to and Reggio, Routes 62 really cavalry country; it offers, on the con- and 63, run through the wildest and deepest trary, innumerable opportunities for the anti- part of the Apennines; this disadvantage is not tank gun embuscade; but these three divisions so serious as the fact that access to their starting gave a superb demonstration of that dash in point at Aulla is almost impossible, for the two- the attack and tenacity in retention of captured mile coastal belt is commanded by a towering objectives which have in this war distinguished mountain wall on its right.. Two roads lead the armoured descendants of the old mounted from Lucca to Modena, one up the Serchio and arm. down the Secchia and the other, Route 12, over the ASbetone 'Pass, four thousand three hundred PART IV. feet high; the former is particularly bad but THE GOTHIC LINE BATTLES. both are tortuous and difficult and the latter runs for eighty-five miles through the mountains The " Gothic " Line. which are here still very broad. From Pistoia In the region of the upper Tiber the Route 64 leads to Bologna, with a branch on Apennines, which have hitherto formed the the north side of the mountains to Modena. backbone of Italy, turn north-west and run This is a reasonably good road, just over sixty across the peninsula to join the Maritime Alps miles long. Florence is the most important road on the French border, thus cutting off Central centre with two roads leading to Bologna, one Italy from the basin of the Po. This sudden via Prato and the other over the — bend has always interposed a sharp line of the latter with a branch to. via division, political and economic, between the —a road to Faenza vid Marradi and thickly populated plains of , inten- one to Forli vid Dicomano. The mosf import- sively cultivated and at the same time highly ant is Route 65, the direct route to Bologna. industrialized, and the mountainous peninsula The distance between the two cities is sixty- whose urban centres and industry are more seven miles but the main chain of the widely dispersed on historically important river Apennines begins at the Sieve river so that the sites. From the military point of view the actual distance through the mountains is only barrier is a first-class strategic obstacle. An fifty miles. The highest point on the road is the army advancing from the south finds that what Futa Pass, two thousand nine hmndred feet, has hitherto been its best and broadest avenue and the Pass of II Giogo, on the lateral road to of approach, the western coastal plain, comes Firenzuola to the east, is a little lower. -From suddenly to a dead end when it reaches the the upper Arno valley, at Bibbiena Route 71 Magra river, just east of La Spezia. : The leads to ; it is difficult of access and of eastern coastal belt, hitherto by far the less inferior quality but is only fifty-five miles long. useful, now comes into its own for it continues Its disadvantage is that, like Route 67 from round the angle of the bend and offers the only Florence to Forli, it leads into a corner of the passage on the level into the plains of the Po Romagha, well- away from any important valley. In spite of this great advantage, how- objective. ....,- SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2941

All these roads are artificial, cut into the through the Apuan Mountains to a strongpoint sides of valleys to lift them over passes which at , astride the two routes in winter are snowbound and for a large part north from Lucca to Modena. This was the of the* year are subjected to heavy rains. They first of a series of strongpoints blocking all the are magnificent feats of engineering, recalling routes north; they were connected with each the fact that a genius for road building is one other by a continuous line of positions running of the few undoubted inheritances of the through the mountains, with subsidiary strong- Italians from the Romans, but for that very points at places of particular importance. The reason are peculiarly susceptible to demolition. main blocking positions were at Porretta, north The latter is a craft at which the Germans, after of Pistoia, the Vernio Pass north of Prato, and their experience in this war, can probably claim the Futa and II Giogo Passes north of Florence. to be world masters; Kesselring himself had From here the line ran south-east, following the ordered his troops to cany out demolitions crest of the Alpe di San Benedetto, with strong- " with sadistic imaginativeness " and they had points at the Casaglia and San Godenzo Passes always proved themselves equal to this de- on the Faenza and Forli roads, until it reached mand. The greater number of roads are in the the Alpe di Serra where strongpoints at Serra- western half of the area, between Florence, valle and Valsavignone blocked the two roads and the Tyrrhenian Sea, and the shortest routes to Cesena from the upper Arno and upper lead due north from Florence. In the eastern Tiber valleys. From here it turned roughly half there are only the two roads which lead east again, following the course of the River to Forli and Cesena and both these run -north- Foglia, until it reached the sea at Pesaro. For east instead of due north. Lateral communica- the last thirteen miles, where the foothills are tion is infinitely better on the northern side of lower, the line was particularly strong, and the the mountains than on the southern. On the defences included anti-tank ditches, extensive latter movement from east to west is limited to minefields, bunkers and various types of built-in a few poor roads across the mountains but on tank turrets. Attention had also been paid to the the Germans' side the Via Emilia, Route 9, runs seaward flanks of the line to guard against an along the whole length of the position. It is a amphibious outflanking. This was scarcely a broad, straight road on the flat, with numerous danger at the western end, but the defences of short roads leading off it into the mountains, La Spezia were strengthened. On the Adriatic a for the crest line is nearer the southern than line of cliffs runs from Pesaro to Cattolica and thei northern edge and the secondary road this was supplemented by defences extending system on the latter is therefore much more as far north as Ravenna. developed. This is an enormous advantage to Early Plans for the Attack on the " Gothic " the defender, for in the defence of a line it is Line. vital to be able to move forces rapidly from After the great victories of the spring one sector to another where the threat is offensive, with Rome in our hands and the greatest. Germans withdrawing rapidly through Latium The original German plan for Italy, as Hitler and Tuscany, pursued with the utmost vigour told Mussolini at the Feltre conference in July, by my two Armies, it seemed likely that the 1943, was to hold nothing south of the line of Northern Apennines would prove merely an in- the Northern Apennines so that the preliminary cident in our pursuit, which would carry on reconnaissances for the " Gothic " line were almost unchecked across them into the plains probably carried out about that time. of the Po valley. Even if this proved too Work appears to have (begun in Serptemlber, optimistic a hope it was reasonable to expecv 1943. The first work was done at the that we should quickly be able to bring such two ends, in the coastal plain south of forces to bear in a frontal attack as would La Spezia and behind the Foglia river on the ensure the piercing of the mountain barrier; the Adriatic, and in the centre, where elaborate success of the French Corps in the Aurunci defences were constructed on the Futa Pass. mountains had shown the way and proved that Italian forced labour and a Slovak Technical the Germans could no longer place such con- Brigade were used; but as the winter of 1943 fidence for their defence as previously in the progressed most of the labour force was diverted difficulties of the Italian terrain. But before to work on the " Gustav ", " Hitler " and the end of June these hopes were dashed by the " Caesar " lines, and it was not until the fall withdrawal of seven divisions from our side and of Rome that priority was restored to the the .arrival of eight reinforcing divisions for " Gothic " line and the work was pushed ahead Kesselring. Encouraged iby this the German at the .highest pressure. It was principally to troops, who in the early days of June were gain more time to allow for the " Gothic " line speaking gloomily of the Brenner as their next to be' completed that Kesselring fought the stop, were able to rally and convert our pursuit battles of Lake Trasimene and Arezzo. At one into a hard-fought advance. The withdrawal time it was expected that it would be ready by of forces for the operations in Southern France 30th June but in fact our attack on the Adriatic represented not merely a quantitative loss to on 25th August found many of the defences on my Armies of over twenty-five per cent, but the Foglia still unfinished while in some of the also a qualitative loss, for the French Corps more inaccessible mountain sectors they were had the greatest experience and training in only in the early stages of development. mountain warfare of all the troops under my The total length of the line of defences was command and included my only regular about two hundred miles. In the west the mountain division. approaches to La Spezia and the valley of the This considerable reduction in my strength Magra were barred by a system of anti-tank did not at first alter my plans for dealing with defences in depth with two artificial obstacles the " Gothic " line, which were to attack it hi seven miles apart; this was the only example the centre on a front from Dicomano to Pistoia of defence in depth in the system. From the and debouch into the Po plains at or near region of Carrara the line swung south-east Bologna.* From the topographical point of xiew 2942 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

the choice was narrowed down to two sectors, potentiality by creating new defensive forma- the centre and the extreme right, and there was tions from the exiguous forces left by ANVIL. little to choose between them. On the axis of The most striking was the creation of " Task Route 65 the mountains are higher but Bologna, Force 45 ". This force, of roughly divisional the most important objective south of the Po, is strength, was made up from five American nearer. On the east coast the ground is much Light Anti-Aircraft battalions, a British Light lower hut the ridges are at right angles to the Anti-Aircraft regiment, an American- Tank direction of the advance and there are a number battalion, part of two Tank Destroyer of serious water obstacles. It was, however, battalions, part of a divisional reconnaissance largely on considerations of timing that I re-- battalion and some miscellaneous service units; jected the idea of an attack up the east coast. it was divided into three regiment-sized groups. It was vital not to allow the enemy a day more Up to 24th July these units were still.being than was unavoidable to strengthen his de- employed in their original rdles, and had only fences and reorganise his formations. The bulk a very short period of intensive training before of my forces was advancing up the centre of taking over part of the line on the Arno from the peninsula and the west coast by routes 34 Division. The success of this remarkable which would bring them to the Arno in the area effort at conversion was very encouraging of Florence and Pisa so that it would be both and " Task Force 45 " remained for many easier and quicker to concentrate for the attack months a valuable part of Fifth Army's order of round Florence than anywhere else. In the battle, used for holding defensive fronts. days when I still had my full forces I expected On 26th July I sent an appreciation on future to be able to rush the Apennines almost without operations to both Army Commanders. My stopping; in my present situation some slight general plan was divided into four phases and pause would ibe necessary but I was determined described as follows : " To penetrate the centre to reduce it to the minimum. of the ' Gothic ' line roughly between- Dico- The plan involved a simultaneous attack by mano and Pistoia; to thrust forward over the Fifth and Eighth Armies on parallel axes, each Apennines to secure the general line Imola- with their main strength on their contiguous BolognanModena; to complete the destruction wings. Eighth Army would be able to bring of the enemy forces south of the Po by rapid forward for the attack two fresh Corps, 5 and i exploitation across the Po valley; to secure a Canadian, with five divisions between them, to • bridgehead over the Po north of and be reinforced by i British Armoured Division if possible at Ostiglia as well ". Plans for which was arriving in the country. For the Eighth Army's attack were unchanged and» the moment, until arrangements for forward main- main subject for decision was the task of Fifth tenance could be perfected, these forces were to Army, for the weakening of that Army was the concentrate in the general area of Assisi with chief new factor which had been introduced. some elements to the west near Siena. On General Clark would be unable to produce more 17th July Eighth Army Headquarters produced than a Corps of two divisions plus for the a detailed appreciation. The conclusions were attack. If Eighth Army was to attack up the • that the attack should be made by two Corps, main routes north from Florence on Bologna each with two divisions forward, operating up Fifth Army must clearly attack towards the axes Florence-Firenzuola and Florence- Modena, from either Lucca or Pistoia. On full Bologna. The Poles were to hold on the consideration of topographical factors, which I Adriatic coast and would be connected with the need not detail here, the latter axis was clearly central front by a Corps with a defensive r61e. preferable. I calculated that Fifth Army would A cover-plan had already been put into force probably be strong enough to seize and secure by my headquarters on 3rd July to suggest to Modena but that it could not be called on for the enemy that the main attack would come on any more than to exploit to a radius of some the Adriatic coast. ten or fifteen miles from that objective. Eighth It was more difficult to decide on the rdle Army would therefore have to be responsible and capabilities of Fifth Army which had now for the advance up to and across the Po. After been reduced to one armoured and four infan- bearing the brunt of the attack in the mountains try divisions, all of which had seen heavy and it would probably only be able to exploit to the continuous fighting recently. On igth July, in Po on one axis, to Ferrara, though it would be a letter to General Clark, I outlined the posi- most desirable, if at all practicable, for it to tion as I saw it and my proposals for his actions seize a bridgehead also in the Ostiglia area. preliminary to the main attack on the line. I From this appreciation it seemed clear that, suggested that it would almost certainly prove after fighting our way through the mountains too costly to attempt to force a crossing of the we should arrive in the plains too weak to Arno west of Pontedera, where the great Monte exploit rapidly northwards. This conclusion I Pisano feature gave the enemy commanding had reached some time before and -I therefore observation, and proposed that he should hold decided to implement the plan which the Air the line from Pontedera to the sea with light Forces had already made for the destruction of forces and cross between there and Empoli, the bridges over the Po. This operation, given exploiting to capture Lucca and Pistoia. This ,the code-name MALLORY MAJOR, was first would give us the desired start line for an studied after the fall of Rome and an opera- attack from Pistoia arid the front from Pistoia tional directive for it was issued on- iTth June. to the sea could be held as a defensive flank The object given was " to disrupt the enemy's with reduced forces. General Clark fully con- flow of supplies into northern Italy by the curred with these plans and issued orders to destruction of six rail bridges over the Po river that effect on 2ist July; he estimated that and one across the Trebbia river, supplemented D-day for the operation would be between 5th by the destruction of the Recco or Zbagli via- and loth August and ordered measures to be duct " (this was a long and vulnerable viaduct taken in the meantime to ensure a thorough on the coastal line east of Genoa). The date rest for all troops. At the same time Fifth of the operation was to be decided by me, to Army took energetic steps to increase their fit in with the situation on the ground. As SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2943

originally conceived this was a part, but an Fifth Army once more regained its character especially important part, of the general plan of an Allied Army, which had distinguished it then in force for disrupting the enemy's lines of from the start. communication; as I have already explained, The new plan, which was given the code- it had been found by experience that the name OLIVE was decided on at a short and destruction of bridges caused very much more informal conference on Orvieto airfield. There embarrassment to the enemy than the previous were only three of us present, General Leese, policy of attacking marshalling yards. This General Harding, my Chief of Staff, and myself was, however, just that period in the first week and we sheltered from the sun under the wing of June when it seemed likely that we should of a Dakota while General Leese explained the be able to force our way rapidly through the reasons which led him to urge a reconsideration Apennines and still have suf&cient force to ex- of our previous intentions. The proposal for ploit into northern Italy on a large scale, and a redirection of our attack was largely his idea for this we wanted to have the chance of seiz- and arose from his judgment of his Army's ing a bridge over the Po. I was in fact plan- capabilities and the manner in which it could ning an airborne operation for this very purpose be best employed. I was already concerned using 2 Parachute Brigade which was shortly at the prospect of extensive operations in moun- aftepwards, unfortunately, withdrawn from me tains without my best mountain troops, the for use in the South of France. I therefore French. General Leese shared this concern decided to cancel MALLORY MAJOR; but the and represented frankly that, although he was decision to mount ANVIL put a very different prepared to exert his utmost endeavours to complexion on the situation. The Po would carry out whatever strategy should seem best, now probably be the limit of our possible ex- he had not that confidence he would like to ploitation after we had broken- through the have in his ability to break through the centre mountains. The Air Force plan offered an of the Apennine position. With very small opportunity of making a virtue of this neces- exceptions Eighth Army had no troops trained sity; I decided to pin my hopes on being able in mountain warfare and, of course, no to bring the Germans to a decisive battle be- organized mountain divisions; provision of pack tween the Apennines and the Po and drive transport trams and other vital necessities for them against the obstacle of a bridgeless river. this kind of operation was only improvised at In the meantime the enemy's maintenance present and the Army as a whole had had com- would suffer from the interposition of this. paratively little experience of large-scale opera- dramatic line of interdiction. tions in mountains. On this line of attack, Orders for the operation went out on nth moreover, it would be unable to develop to July; its scope was extended and all bridges, the full extent its superiority in armour and both road and rail, were to be destroyed. artillery, the use of wjiich in combination had During the first four days of the operation, been the mainstay of its successful African i2th to I5th July, medium bombers concen- operations and which had recently given proof trated on the nineteen bridges from Piacenza of its effectiveness in the Liri valley. The east to the sea. Favourable weather contributed to coast route, on the other hand, appeared to the success of the attacks. In the first two days provide much more the kind of battlefield to eleven bridges were rendered impassable and which,1 Eighth Army was accustomed. It by the isth the line of interdiction was com- would have fewer mountains to contend with plete. In some cases, however, the damage and the chance of employing its artillery in was not considered extensive enough and re- controlled and concentrated " set-piece" peated attacks were made until, by the 27th attacks, and the hope of fiat country ahead all bridges over the Po east of and inclusive beckoned to its desert-trained armour. of the one at Torreberetti, north of Alessandria, were cut. Eighth Army's preference for the east coast route of attack was based, it will be seen, on Change of Plan. reasons both strictly military and also psycho- On 4th August I recast the plan for the logical. The latter reasons; as a well-known attack on the ". Gothic " line. The principal dictum of Napoleon's lays down, are as much difference was in the rdle of Eighth Army; military factors as the former and in a case instead of exerting its main strength on its where the courses available were fairly equally left and driving at the centre of the line side balanced it was obviously preferable to choose by side with Fifth Army it would now carry that course which inspired the greater confi- out a swift but secret transfer of strength to dence in those who were to carry it out. It its right and strike at the extreme eastern end of was anything but certain that our heavy blow in the line in order to. roll up the enemy's left at the mountains of the centre would take us the point where he was least protected by the through to our objective and if the first attack terrain. When this attack was well under there fell short of expectations the advantage way, and depending on the extent to which the would be all with the defenders. He had by enemy had weakened his centre to meet it, far the easier lateral communications so that, Fifth Army would launch a subsidiary, attack once it was clear that all our strength up the axis Florence-Bologna. In order to was concentrated at one point, he could strengthen this 'blow and make Fifth Army very rapidly build up a counter more nearly equivalent in strength to Eighth concentration. On the new plan we should Army, and to what it had been before the be able to employ what I call the strategy recent withdrawals, I proposed to place undei; of the " two - handed punch" or, more General Clark the British 13 Corps, of one orthodoxly expressed, the strategy of attacking armoured and two infantry divisions.* Thus two points equally vital to the enemy (i.e., * 6 South African Armoured, I British and 8 Indian Ravenna and Bologna) either simultaneously Infantry Divisions. The South Africans were later or alternately in order to split the reserves put under command of IV Corps and replaced by 6 British Armoured Division. 78 Division was added in available for the defence. October. Plans to implement this decision were made E 2944 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 in the greatest secrecy and only the minfamffii in the process." Eighth Army was to nave was committed to paper. In the order I the predominant role in the opening phases issued to both Armies on 6th August, giving the and to have priority in all requirements needed prelimiQary operations to be carried out, I to obtain its object. Its task was to break laid down " The scope and object of operation through into the valley of the Po and exploit OLIVE have been settled in discussions be- to seize Ferrara and'Bologna. Fifth Army was tween the Commander-m-Chief and Army Com- to assist the first phases of the offensive by manders and will not be referred to in writing carrying out ostentatious preparations to simu- at present." The greater part of the planning late an imminent attack by both Armies on the was left to Eighth Army who were faced with front between Pontassieve and Pontedera, a tremendous task in transferring their strength which was the sector originally chosen for the to their right wing. The mounting of the opera- main attack. While these manoeuvres were tion involved complicated and difficult moves in progress Fifth Army was to prepare ah over an inadequate road-net, carried out in attack to break through the enemy's centre conditions of great secrecy, a large-scale cover on .the axis Florence-Bologna, using II and plan (and the cancellation of the cover plan 13 Corps. This attack would be ordered by previously in force) and considerable pre- me as soon as it appeared that the enemy had liminary engineer work. The plan of the weakened his centre sufficiently to meet Eighth attack, as given in orders issued on i3th Army's attack. It was naturally impossible August, provided for a simultaneous assault by to forecast when this would be, but General three Corps in line. 2 Polish Corps, on the Clark was to be prepared to attack at twenty- right, was to attack and seize the high ground four hours' notice, if possible, from D plus 5 north-west of Pesaro; this was all the Poles of the Eighth Army attack, i.e., 3oth August. could do in their present weak state and after The cover plan for the attack had to be radi- completion of this task they would revert to cally altered and was now designed to per- Army reserve. I Canadian Corps, in the suade the enemy that our main blow was com- centre, was to attack on the left of the Poles ing in the centre and that the Adriatic coast to capture the high ground west of Pesaro operations were a preliminary feint by our and from there, squeezing out the Poles, to surplus armour. reach the main road at Cattolica and drive up The objectives for exploitation were given the road along the coast directed on Rimini. 5 in summary form in this operation order. Corps, on the left, was to advance on an axis Eighth Army, on reaching the Ferrara area, to tiie west of Rimini, directed on Bologna and was to secure a bridgehead over the Po in the Ferrara. The movement across to the east general area north of Ferrara. Fifth Army was coast began on i5th August on a heavy scale to secure Modena and exploit north and north- and was completed, by,a triumph of organiza- west of it as far as practicable with the re- tion, by 22nd August, 25th August was sources available after returning 13 Corps to decided on as D-day. It was not expected that command of Eighth Army. It will be remem- we should be in contact with the " Gothic " bered that these were the eventual objectives line on that date but this was no disadvantage foreseen in the original plan and the change as we intended to press up to and through in Eighth Army's plan made no difference to the line in one motion. This would be of them. I dealt with further possibilities for assistance in the matter of surprise. 13 Corps exploitation more fully in a paper on future came under command of Fifth Army on i8th operations on 27th August* after the attack August. Between its right and the left of 5 had begun. The new factor in the situation Corps the mountainous central sector was the was the rapid advance of the invading armies responsibility of 10 Corps, commanding only in the South of France. The German resistance 10 Indian Division and a scratch brigade group, there had been so weak and had turned so mainly of dismounted armoured car regiments. quickly to a full withdrawal that by that date There was little of interest in the preliminary Toulon, Marseilles and Grenoble 'had all been operations before the offensive opened. On the captured and the Allies were pursuing at full left the Fifth Army front was quiet. II Corps speed up the Rhone valley. In these circum- had now taken over the right of the Army sec- stances it seemed clear that if the Apennine line tor, with 91 Division; the 85th and 88th were were pierced the enemy would be obliged to in rear areas resting and training. West of withdraw his forces from north-west Italy back Empoli there was no change along the line to a line based on the Alps to Lake Garda, the of the Arno. In Florence the Germans with- Mincio and the Po, in order to avoid the risk drew on the night of loth August back from of encirclement. This would mean that Fifth the north bank of the river to the line of the Mugnone canal, running through the northern Army would be relieved of any threat to its outskirts of the city. Further to the right, left flank and could concentrate its weight on however, on the Adriatic coast, there were the right in a thrusj across the Po at Ostiglia considerable advances made as the Polish directed on Mantua and Verona. Eighth Corps pressed on to clear -the high ground be- Army's main task on arriving in the plain must tween the Cesano and Metauro rivers. By the be to capture Venice, for until we could obtain 23rd the Poles were established on the right the use of its port our lines of communication bank of the latter river from the sea to Fossoin- would be stretched to the limit and mainten- .ance of any large force made most difficult. brone, some fifteen miles inland, and with that This would mean an advance on the axis Fer- the stage was set for the assault on Pesaro. • rara-Padua-Treviso, forcing in succession the Orders for the Offensive. Po, Adige and Brenta, and would certainly The orders for the offensive were issued on require the-employment of all available forma- i6th August. I defined my intention as "to tions, including 13 Corps. It is interesting to drive the enemy out of the Apennine positions note that the axes of exploitation here given and to exploit to the general line of the lower were those on which the Armies advanced after Pb, inflicting the maximum losses on the enemy the great victory of Spring 1945. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2945

Disposition of Opposing Forces* Panzer Grenadier and one infantry division. When the attack opened the forces under Army reserve consisted of 29 Panzer Grena- Kesselrmg's command totalled twenty-six Ger- diers, north of Florence, and 20 Luftwaffe Field man divisions and two Italian; they were Division, which had now finally absorbed the fairly well up to strength, for drafts in June, remains of 19 Division, on -the coast between July and August amounted to some sixty the western end of the " Gothic " line and thousand. There had been certain changes in Viareggio. the order of battle. At the end of July the It is more difficult to adduce these disposi- Hermann Goering Panzer Division, which had tions as a definite proof of the success of our been active in the Mediterranean theatre ever cover plan than in the case of the spring since it was formed, and first saw service in offensive but they do show a tendency to Tunisia, had been withdrawn to the East Prus- concentrate on the defence of the central sector sian front. To replace it Kesselring received, rather than the east coast. Particularly signi- in August, 98 Infantry Division which had been ficant is the fact that, of the three divisions re-forming in the Zagreb area after its severe in Army reserve, one was near Bologna and losses in the Crimea. In August two more a second, the only mobile reserve, was between mobile divisions, 3 and 15 Panzer Grenadier, Florence and Bologna.* The enemy's order were withdrawn for the western front; the two of battle on the east coast was not impressive infantry divisions to replace them did not arrive except for the parachutists and the event soon until September. The Allied invasion of showed that it would need heavy reinforce- Southern France added two more German divi- ments if this sector of the front was to be sions to the order of battle in Italy, 148 In- held. It also showed, unfortunately, the in- fantry and the 157 Mountain f Divisions. These evitable limitations of any cover plan: the two were originally in Nineteenth Army but the sectors which alone it was logical to threaten rapid advance up the Rhone cut them off from were, on the German side though not on our their parent formation and they fell- back on ownj so closely connected by good lateral com- the Maritime Alps, coming under Kesselring's munications that reserves intended for the one command. This invasion had, in its early could very rapidly be diverted to the other. stages, had the effect of weakening the forces In northern Italy the Italians were now com- opposing us. On getting wind of the prepara- ing a little more into the picture. Marshal tions for the assault, which it was impossible to Graziani, Commander-in-Chief of the Fascist conceal, Kesselring decided that the blow was Republican Forces, was given command of a about to fall on the Ligurian coast. He there- mixed Italo-Gennany " Army of Liguria " of fore hastily moved 90 Panzer Grenadier two Italian and two and a half German divisions. Division to Genoa. It arrived there on isth With these he was responsible for the coast August, but when the real invasion came, two from the French frontier to Spezia; the more days later, it was re-directed to the Franco- important sectors, on the French .border and Italian frontier. covering Genoa and Spezia, were held by In the two armies opposing us on the main German troops. After the Allied invasion of battle front there were nineteen divisions. France this command was increased by the Tenth Army held the eastern half of the line, addition of the two divisions from Nineteenth from the Adriatic to the inter-army boundary Army and 90 Panzer Grenadier Division, rais- just west of Pontassieve, with LXXVI Panzer ing the Army of Liguria to a total of seven Corps left and LI Mountain Corps right; these divisions. It played, however, a purely defen- Corps Headquarters had recently exchanged sive role throughout. In the north-east, under sectors. LXXVI Corps, from the sea to the Army Group command, the Germans had a area of Sansepolcro, had three divisions for- reserve mountain division and one infantry ward and two in reserve, all infantry and one, division, the 94th, which was re-forming after the 7ist, at only half strength. 278 Infantry its serious losses. Division, on 'the seaward flank, after fighting Against these forces we had twenty divisions a continuous withdrawal all the way up the and eight brigades. Eighth Army accounted for Adriatic coast since June, had been badly eleven divisions, all but two of which were hi shaken by the Poles in the heavy fighting from the three attacking Corps. On the right was Ancona to the Metauro. Of the two divisions in the Polish Corps with 3 and 5 Divisions and reserve 162 (Turkoman) Infantry Division was an armoured brigade along the Metauro from not of high quality but (the other was the the Adriatic on a front of about seven miles. famous i Parachute Division. This was resting Next, on a narrow front of just over two miles, in the rear of 278 Division on the coast and it covered by a screen of Polish units, was the was intended that the latter should withdraw Canadian Corps with i Infantry and 5 through it for a badly needed rest in a quieter Armoured Divisions, supported by a British sector of the line. The mountainous sector of tank brigade. To the west, covering about LI Corps, from Sansepolcro to Pontassieve, twenty miles of front, was 5 Corps, the was held by five infantry divisions, mainly strongest of the -attacking Corps, with two infantry divisions, 46 and 4 Indian, in the those which had suffered most in the retreat line and i Armoured and 4 and 56 Infantry from Rome, such as the 44th, ii4th and 334th. Divisions, plus two armoured brigades, in re- There was one infantry division, the recently serve. 10 Corps covered lightly, with 10 arrived 98th, in Army reserve near Bologna. Indian Division and a mixed brigade group, the Fourteenth Army, from Pontassieve to the area stretching from the upper Tiber valley to coast, had eight divisions, also divided between the Army boundary on the Pratomagno. In two Corps, I Parachute left and XIV Panzer Army reserve was 2 New Zealand Division, to right with the inter-Corps boundary at Em- poli. The former had 4 Parachute and two * 20 Luftwaffe Field Division was not a very- important reserve and its location is irrelevant to th» infantry divisions, the latter 26 Panzer, 16 S.S. problem. 90 Panzer Grenadier -Division, before its * Appendices " G " and " H ". move to the north-west, had been resting west of t Later renumbered 8 Mountain Division. Bologna. E 2 2946 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

be reinforced by 3 Greek Mountain Brigade the battle for Ancona, where his own losses 'when the latter arrived from the Middle East. had been heavy, he had in any case been At the time the attack went in the New expecting the Poles to be relieved. Moreover, Zealanders were moving from the Siena area to there was still some twelve miles to go before concentrate between Falconara and lesi. the " Gothic " line was reached and the Germans Fifth Army had three Corps in line, account- probably expected us to delay our formal attack ing for the remaining nine divisions, four of until we had actually reached it. them British. 13 Corps, on the right of the The effects of this German misappreciation Army front, held the area from the Prato- lasted for some time and it was not until the magno range to about two miles west of 29th that the German Corps Commander issued ITiorence. In the line were i infantry, 6 a strong Order of the Day which showed that Armoured and 8 Indian Divisions, supported he had at last realized that a serious attempt by i Canadian Armoured Brigade. II Corps at a break-through was intended. In spite of held a narrow sector of about four miles imme- this on the 30th elements of both 5 Corps and diately on the left of 13 Corps; it had three the Canadians crossed the River Foglia and infantry divisions under command, the 34th, captured the advanced positions of the " Gothic *' •88th and gist. All these were in reserve and line before the enemy had time to man them. the front was held by an independent Japanese- On 3ist August and ist September a further American Regimental Combat Team. On its left was IV Corps, responsible for the line of the advance gave us a stretch of the main defences Arno from due south of Prato to the sea; under some twenty miles long, from the coast to Monte command were the i Armoured and 85 Infantry Calvo. The works were not manned, many of Divisions, a Regimental Combat Team of 92 the minefields were still carefully marked and {Negro) Infantry Division, which was in pro- set at safe and in one case some recently arrived cess of arriving, and " Task Force 45 ", the troops were actually captured while sweeping improvised formation I have already referred out the bunkers which they were to occupy. to. 6 South African Armoured Division was The parachutists, all of whom had acknow- moving to come under command of IV Corps ledged, by initialling, an order from to relieve 85 Infantry Division, which was Kesselring stating that the " Gothic " line was to pass to II Corps. Like Eighth Army, the last hope hi Italy before the Brenner and therefore, Fifth Army had its greatest strength that they were to hold then* positions for three on its right; IV Corps duplicated the rdle of weeks, pulled out of Pesaro on the night 10 Corps in holding a long defensive sector of ist September and raced back behind with minimum forces. the Conca. In the fighting so far they had As will be seen, we had all our goods in the suffered very heavily, up to half the strength shop window and it was impossible for me to with which they went into action; it was only create a central reserve with which to influence their hasty retreat which prevented them from the battle. This was less important than it being encircled by an outflanking move of the might seem, however, hi view of the nature of Polish Corps. the plan. The two Annies were fighting, in As always the Germans were quick to recover the opening stages, essentially separate battles from their surprise. By 29th August a regiment and each of them had a strong striking Corps, from 26 Panzer Division, brought across from 5 and II Corps, with plenty of reserves. In west of Empoli, had arrived and gone into a sense, 'Fifth Army might be regarded as the action on the River Foglia; it was soon followed Army Group reserve, for in the two-handed by the rest of the division. This was a standard strategy which I planned its blow would be manoeuvre; we had seen before, for instance held back until the moment seemed right. hi the Anzio crisis, the rapid transference of Opening of the Offensive. this division, now Kesselring's only armoured division, from one flank of the Army Group Eighth Army's attack went in as planned to the other, but this time it was committed an hour before midnight on 25th August. The opening stages were silent but a was so hastily and so unprepared that it suffered fired at midnight to cover the advance from unduly heavy losses. At the same time 98 the bridgeheads over the Metauro river. By Division was committed from Army reserve. dawn on the 26th all the five assaulting It fought with great vigour in this its first action divisions were deep across the river, more or in Italy and its casualties too were heavy. A less without opposition. It soon became regiment from 162 Turkoman Division was a obvious that we had caught the Germans in less useful reinforcement. Finally, with that the middle of a fairly complicated withdrawal readiness to accept risks which had marked and regrouping movement; their intention was Kesselring's strategy throughout the campaign, to pass 278 Division back through I Parachute and had gone far to retrieve the initial disasters Division and bring it across to the western to German arms which his invariable misreading flank of LXXVI Corps where it would relieve of our intentions always incurred, the enemy 5 Mountain Division which was to move to the Commander-in-Chief now removed .his last re- French frontier to relieve 90 Panzer Grenadier serve from the centre and left, 29 Panzer Division. The enemy was, therefore, prepared Grenadier Division, and despatched it in haste to yield ground and the fact that he was fall- eastwards. The first elements of the division ing back voluntarily as we advanced made it were in action by 4th September, but the bulk difficult for him to detect the greater weight did not arrive until the 6th. On the latter day of our attacks on this occasion compared with also a regiment of 5 Mountain Division, which 'the following-up attacks by which the Poles had been taken out of the line on its way to ihad up to now been pressing him back up the French frontier, was halted and brought the Adriatic coast. Eighth Army's secret con- back into the line. centration had completely escaped his notice; It had been a great success for Eighth Army. Ihe presence of some new troops in the former By a combination o| surprise in preparation Polish sector had indeed been established but, and dash in the attack they had swept through having overestimated the Polish casualties in a fortified line which had been twelve months in SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2947 preparation almost as though it were not there. ever expect them to be and he was obligingly Only two assets now remained to Kesselring to withdrawing from the high ground north of retrieve the situation: the excellence of his Florence without serious resistance, which lateral communications and the fact that the saved us time and trouble. As soon as Fifth " Gothic'" line had been built on the forward Army had forced the enemy back to the slopes of the range. The importance of the " Gothic " line they would launch a full-scale former factor in allowing a rapid reinforcement attack to break through and by that time I I have already emphasized; the latter meant hoped Eighth Army would be just about ready that there was still one more ridge between the for their attack on the Rimini positions and Allies and the plains, known from the village that we should be able to prevent Kesselring on its summit as the Coriano ridge. The from shifting reserves from one Army front to Canadians were already over the Conca, on another by keeping up a series of heavy blows 2nd September, and 5 Corps were about to pass by our two Armies in turn. The weather had i Armoured Division • through in a dash for improved and I hoped for a fine spell—another the flat country beyond. Just in time reason for launching Fifth Army then. Kesselring succeeded in manning the Coriano All preparations for Fifth Army's attack had ridge with- i Parachute, 26 Panzer and 29 been made by 8th September. The main blow- Panzer Grenadier Divisions; these three ex- was to be delivered by II Corps but, in order cellent divisions, aided by very heavy rain from to gain surprise, its concentration was to be 5th to 7th September, resisted all attacks secret and it was to be launched into the attack between the 4th and the I2th both on the ridge through 13 Corps. The plan was that 13 itself and on its southern flank at Gemmano. Corps should attack first with 8 Indian Divi- As Eighth Army's offensive developed its sion to capture the line of hills from Monte full extent the enemy was forced to economize Morello to Monte Giovi, already mentioned, strength on the remainder of Ms front by then, hi the second phase, II Corps would withdrawing into the " Gothic " line. This pass through the left of 13 Corps with its four was essential if he were to be able to divisions (34th, 85th, 88th and gist) and ad- make further reinforcements available for vance up the axis Florence-Firenzuola. 13 his left; it was also a natural measure Corps would shift its main thrust to the right of. precaution in case a real break- and continue to advance up the two roads through was achieved for, apart from LXXVI Dicomano to Forli and Borgo San Lorenzo Corps, now engaged with Eighth Army, the to Faenza. IV Corps was to exert the maxi- rest of the German troops were still well south mum pressure in its area with 6 South African of the watershed of the Apennines. The with- Armoured Division, a Negro Regimental Com- drawal began on 30th August. LI Mountain bat Team and " Task Force 45 " and release Corps, between Urbino and Pontassieve, moved i Armoured Division for Army reserve to be straight back into the line on a timed pro- used if a chance of exploitation arose. gramme, releasing one division for the central This plan could not be carried out in its sector, and 10 Corps, following up, made con- original form, for on 8th September the enemy tact with the line on 3rd September. At the withdrew voluntarily from the line of thills same time the enemy opposite Fifth Army which was to have been 13 Corps' objective in began to pull back. On the extreme right they the first phase. This was gratifying in itself went back almost directly into the " Gothic " and represented a further gain in that it gave line. Opposite 13 Corps, however, the enemy us -the chance of launching an attack on an stabilized on 3rd September on the line of hills enemy already engaged hi withdrawing which, north of Florence: Monte Morello, Monte as Eighth Army's experience had shown, was Senario, Monte Calvana and Monte Giovi. IV one of the surest means of obtaining surprise. Corps followed up across the Arno on 3ist On loth September, therefore, 91 and 34 August and II Corps on ist September. Little Divisions of II Corps passed through i British resistance was met and we were able to occupy Infantry Division on the left of 13 Corps, the northern part of Pisa on the 2nd, Lucca on astride Route 65, and began an advance the 6th and Pistoia on the I2th. ' directed on the " Gothic " line north of the River Sieve. Considerable gains were made on This enemy withdrawal made it easier to the loth and nth as both Corps pressed on concentrate forward the Fifth Army troops across the Sieve in face of little resistance, which were to launch the second punch of my capturing Dicomano, Borgo San Lorenzo and two-handed attack on the " Gothic" line. Scarperia. The Germans offered only delay- Moreover, in the course of the withdrawal ing resistance as they drew back into the Kesselring still further weakened his centre, ." Gothic " line but the weight of the Allied from which he had already removed 29 Panzer attack surprised and disconcerted them and Grenadier Division, by relieving 356 Infantry pushed them back quicker than they had ex- Division and sending it over to the Adriatic. I pected or were prepared for. It was not until decided, therefore, that the time was almost the strong position of Monte Calvi was cap- come for the Fifth Army attack to go in. I tured on the I2th that it became clear that visited Eighth Army front on 8th September this was not merely an attack to gain contact and it was clear to me from what I saw there with the line but to break through it. that we could not continue our advance on to Rimini until we had driven the enemy off the Simultaneous Attacks by Fifth and Eighth Coriano ridge. This would need full prepara- Armies. tion and would probably take two or three On the night of I2th September Eighth days more. I explained the situation in a Army reopened its attack on the Coriano ridge signal next day, gth September, and concluded and in the early morning of the I3th Fifth by saying that for these reasons I had decided Army began the assault of the main " Gothic '* to unleash Fifth Army who would now go line positions in the centre. This marked the ahead with their offensive in the centre. The beginning of a week of perhaps the heaviest enemy's forces there were as weak as we could fighting on both fronts that either Army had 2948 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 yet experienced. The Canadians on the right attack through. I .British Infantry Division. and 5 Corps on the left of Eighth Army The strongest enemy defences were at the Futa succeeded in getting onto the Coriano ridge pass on the watershed crossed by the main In their first attack, capturing over a thousand road from Florence to "Bologna, Route 65; prisoners on the first day. The second phase General Clark had therefore decided to make was to exploit across the River Marano. The his principal thrust to the east of this road Germans, though shaken, were clearly deter- up the Fifenzuola road, using the Giogo pass. mined to expend every effort to deny us 13 Corps was to apply its main weight simul- Rimini and concentrated strong forces on a taneously to assist II Corps and to open the line running from the mountain on which is Marradi road. As I have already explained, the perched the small republic of to the Germans had seriously weakened -their forces sea in front of Rimini; on the coast the front was in this sector but the fanaticism and skill of protected by the River Ausa and in the centre 4 Parachute Division made up for this and of the position by a strongpoint on the hill initially little progress was made. On the crowned by the village of San Fortunate, the centre of 13 Corps front, however, 8 Indian last piece of high ground before the plains. Division advanced across the trackless moun- Reinforcements continued to arrive. Before tains, operating by night, and by the isth had the battle for Coriano, Kesselring had brought broken through the line in their sector and over three divisions to the Adriatic sector from reached the watershed on the Alpe di Vitigliano, his centre and right; he now took another looking down on the Marradi road. This was the first breach of the " Gothic " line in the infantry division from the centre, the 356th, centre. On the I7th combined attacks by i and another from the right, 20 Luftwaffe Field British and 85 United States Divisions, directed Division, and on the igth added a regimental against the junction of the enemy's Tenth and group from go Panzer Grenadier Division, Fourteenth Armies, captured Monte Pratone, brought from the French frontier. Kesselring and on the same day the enemy resistance at had thus doubled the strength of his forces last broke under the weight of our attack. originally facing Eighth Army by the transfer Poggio Signorini, -Monte Altuzzo, Monte of the equivalent of five divisions, but shortly Verruca and Monticelli were all occupied, and after the attack on Rimini began he had to with these heights went possession of the Giogo withdraw entirely two divisions to re-form. Pass. Now it was time.for Kesselring to scrape The importance which he attached to the up 'reinforcements for yet another part of his Adriatic sector was based largely on the fact front. He drew them from the right of the that, if he were driven off the Apennines, he line and from the sector between the two Allied would have to withdraw in a north-easterly thrusts; from the former caime 362 Division, direction to avoid being penned up. against the which arrived on the igth to cover Firenz-uola, Swiss and French frontiers, and this sector and from the latter 44 Division on the 2ist to would be the vital hinge on which to swing take over the sector of the Firenzuola-Imola back his exposed right. The transfer of 20 road. Luftwaffe Field Division* was particularly sig- Fifth Army had now, by i8th September, got nificant for, as it passed behind the centre of both its attacking Corps firmly on to the water- the front, the first strongpoints of the shed. The terrain which there faced them pre- " Gothic " line on the direct road to Bologna sented a totally different picture from that in were already falling. which they had been operating hitherto. So far In spite of these reinforcements Eighth Army they had been climbing up a steep ascent where continued to make steady progress. They won the mountains offer a nearly continuous wall a -bridgehead over the Marano and by the i5th running east and west at right angles to the h,ad advanced nearly three thousand yards line of advance; once the line of the passes north of it. The New Zealanders were now is reached the whole grain of the country is brought into the battle and a full-scale attack reversed and the mountains begin to trend was launched on the i8th. After a desperate north-eastwards in gradually descending spurs three day struggle San Fortunato was cleared separated from each other by the valleys of on the 20th and the same night the Greeks, swift rivers which drain into the plains of under command of I Canadian Division, Lomibardy. • For the greater part of their course entered Rimini. I was glad that this success in the mountains these rivers run through deep had so early brightened the fortunes of that gorges which offer no scope for deployment or heroic country which had been the only ally manoeuvre but in a few .places, as at Firen- to fight by our side in our darkest days and zuola on the upper Santerno, the valleys open that a new victory in Italy should be added to out and it is possible for artillery and trans- the fame won in the mountains of Albania. port to deploy. The mountain spurs, as I More disheartening was a sudden fall of torren- said,, descend gradually, and for nearly half tial rain, also on the night of the 20th, under their total length their height is very little cover of which the enemy withdrew across the less than that of the watershed, with isolated broad and swollen Marecchia river. Only one higher peaks offering good command of the bridge survived, the bridge built by Tiberius, surrounding terrain. There was little advant- nineteen hundred years ago, which had out- age, therefore, in the fact that we were now lived the drums and tramplings of many con- going, according to the map, " downhill "; the quests, and now carried troops from the Anti- immense difficulties of supply to the forward podes across the river onto the Via Emilia. troops and deployment of our strength in As our patrols pushed forward on the 2ist into artillery still remained. So bad and so scanty the plains so long hoped for and so fiercely were the forward routes that our lines of com- fought for the deluge foreboded a future of munication, the more we advanced, became clogging mud and brimming watercourses. more of a drag on our progress while the II Corps' main offensive on the " Gothic " enemy, as his lines shortened, reaped propor- line began on the morning of I3th September tionate advantages. when 85 Division moved forward to the In spite of the enemy reinforcement Fifth * Relieved by 42 Jaeger Division from Genoa. Army still retained sufficient momentum from SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2949 its capture of the Giogo pass to press down 2ist September, General Leese said he con- into the valley of the Santerno. On 2ist sidered the fighting to have been as bitter as September, 85 Infantry Division captured at Alamein and Cassino. The German artillery Firenzuola, and, pressing on north, stormed fire was very heavy and well-directed and the the strong position of Monte la Fine, west of many counter-attacks were made in considerable the Imola road. On its right II Corps had strength; one 'village changed hands ten times. put in, on the 2ist, its last fresh division, 88 Eighth Army claimed to have " severely Infantry, with the task of clearing the east mauled " eleven German 'divisions and taken side' of the Imola road. The 88th pressed over eight thousand prisoners. The cost was over on over desperately difficult country and on fourteen thousand casualties, of which over the 27th seized Monte La Battaglia, a great seven thousand in British infantry units, and mountain mass dominating the and San- two hundred and ten tanks lost. The tanks were terno valleys on either hand and only ten miles easily replaceable, but the men were not and from Imotla and the Emilian plain. The enemy I was forced to take very unwelcome measures now reacted with great vigour and began a to keep up the strength of formations. I British series of most violent counter-attacks with ele- Armoured Division, which had played a distin- ments of four divisions; these and the increas- guished part in so many ibattles in Africa, was ing difficulties of our communications brought to be disbanded in less than three months after a halt to our advance on Imola. 13 Corps its arrival in Italy. A brigade of 56 Division was during this time had had the task of protecting be reduced to a cadre basis. Finally, all United II Corps' right; it had still the same three Kingdom infantry battalions were to be re- divisions forward with which it had fought its organised at once on the basis of three rifle way up from the Arno valley. Its sector of companies.* Yet, although the price had been operations was dictated by the road-net and heavy, no one in Eighth Army doubted that a its main efforts must be down the roads to real victory had been gained, for it was con- Faenza and Forii. On 24th September it fidently expected that, after breaking into the captured Marradi on the former and San flat country of the Romagna, we should be able Benedetto on the latter. Meanwhile the left to exploit rapidly to the Po. It was not long, of II Corps had also been making good pro- however, before, as the Eighth Army historian gress where 91 and 34 Divisions were puts it, " the tactical implications of the local advancing up the direct routes from Florence to Bologna. On the 2ist the fate of the strong agricultural methods were realized " and the Futa'Pass -positions was sealed 'by the capture continuous water lines were found to be more of Monte Gazzarro (or Guzzaso) on its eastern serious obstacles than the mountains. flank and by the 28th Route 65 was clear as Not only the Eighth Army replacement situa- far as the northern end of the Radicosa Pass, tion but the general manpower situation of the the second main pass on the Florence-Bologna Allied Armies in Italy was such as to give rise road. On. the PratcnBologna road 34 Division to anxiety. I explained the main features to had kept level until, on a change of corps the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on 2ist boundaries at midnight 28th-29th September, September. After the loss of seven divisions they were relieved by the South Africans when to the invasion of Southern France the just short of Castiglione dei Pepoli. Between promised reinforcements to Italy, after deduct- them and the coast the task of IV Corps was ing other subsequent decreases, had only to follow up the enemy; this had brought us amounted to one and a half divisions, including by the 28th to a line some five miles north of 78 Division, which would not be available until Pistoia and running from there over the moun- the first week in October. On that date, there- tains north of Lucca to the coastal plain about fore, the net loss would be five and a half three miles short of Massa where the western end divisions. The enemy, on the other hand, had of'the " Gothic " line was secured by strong continued to reinforce Italy. Since May Kessel- defences anchored on the sea. Viareggio was ring had lost to other fronts three of his entered on i6th September by a British con- original twenty-three German divisions and verted anti-aircraft battery of " Task Force had disbanded one other. In return he had 45 ". 6 Regimental Combat Team of the received from elsewhere ten divisions and three Brazilian Expeditionary Force took over a divisions' worth of extra replacements; one of sector of the line on i6th September. This was the new arrivals had now been likewise dis- the first contingent of an Allied South American banded which left him with twenty-eight Ger- state to see action in this war. While it was man divisions all told.f To this should be adSled gaining battle experience it played a valuable two Italian divisions which were .at least useful r61e in holding an important part of the for internal security duties. Even without defensive front. counting the Italians the net German gains were The " Gothic " line was now completely five divisions, or eight if the three " shadow " turned at its eastern end and pierced over a * I had received 13,000 infantry replacements from wide front in the centre. By the end of Sept- the United Kingdom in April 1944 and was told that I should have no more. Realizing that this quota ember the enemy had decided to abandon such would not last beyond the end of July I set on foot a of the prepared positions as still remained in plan for creating more reinforcements from theatre his hands except for a small sector in the ex- resources. By disbanding Light Anti-Aircraft and some units I got together 17,000 treme west. In thus depriving the enemy of the reinforcements, 9,000 of which went to infantry units. permanent defences on which he had worked In August I converted a further 5,000 gunners into so long the Allied Armies in Italy had scored infantry but even this was insufficient to make up for our losses in the " Gothic " line battles. a great success, won at a great price, but it f 232 and 237 Infantry Divisions had now arrived was difficult to exploit. The furthest advance to replace 3 and 15 Panzer Grenadier Divisions; had been made, as was intended, by the Eighth the former went, in the first place, to Liguria and Army, which had advanced some thirty miles the latter to Istria. It will be remembered that August and September, the period when this reinforce- in twenty-six days. In a letter to me summing ment of Italy was set in train, were months of very up the results of the action to date, written on severe crisis on the Western Front. 2950 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 divisions, incorporated as replacements in three rivers flowing down from the Apennines in their of the original divisions, are counted. Summing new north-easterly direction. The principal up I said: rivers are, in order from east to west, the Uso, " To put it briefly, we shall have to con- the Savio, the Ronco, the Montone (these last tinue the battle of Italy with about twenty two after their confluence take the name of divisions, almost all of which have had long Fiumi Uniti), the Lamone, the Senio, the periods of heavy fighting this year, and some Santerno, the Sillaro and the Idice; these are for several years, against the twenty German only the principal rivers and there are hundreds divisions committed to the battle front, with of smaller streams, canals and irrigation ditches the prospect of four more German divisions, in between them. By these, and by canalization and probably two Italian divisions, joining of the main rivers, the primitive swamp had in the battle at a later stage. We are inflicting been drained after centuries of patient effort very heavy losses on the enemy and are and, as the water flowed off, so the level of making slow but steady progress, but our the ground sank; the river beds were thereby losses are also heavy and we are fighting in left higher than the surrounding ground and country where, it is generally agreed, a as soon as they descend into the plain all these superiority of at least three to one is required rivers need high banks on either side to keep for successful offensive operations. It will be them in their course and to guard against the small wonder, therefore, if we fail to score sudden rise of level which heavy rainfall in a really decisive success when the opposing the mountains invariably causes. Even hi the forces are so equally matched ". best drained areas the soil remembers its I was naturally fully conscious that by thus marshy origin and when rained on forms the battling on against odds we were fulfilling our richest mud known to the Italian theatre. It function in the grand strategy of the war, what- will be seen, therefore, that under autumn con- ever the cost and even though we were to make ditions we should have difficulty in making no progress on the ground at all. I was repeat- full use of our armoured superiority. Tanks edly reminded that this was the crisis of the were hampered also iby the intensive cultiva- war and that now more than ever it was vital tion, and in particular by the vineyards. The to hold down the maximum forces in Italy, Germans had prepared fieldworks and well- away from the vital theatres in east and west.* studied plans for defence on all the main water From this point of view the balance of strength lines and were determined to offer the most in Italy was definitely in our favour and I was stubborn resistance in this vital sector. To determined to keep it so; but I could not help Kesselring his eastern flank was the pivot considering the question of how long I could which-, if a withdrawal was forced on him, he keep up the pressure. With the present rela- would have to hold firmly in order to swing tionship between the opposing forces, even back his right into a position blocking the ap- though enemy casualties exceeded ours, it proaches to Austria through north-eastern Italy, would be impossible to continue hammering whether that position was based on the line away at full stretch indefinitely, and to sus- of the Po and Ticino or the Adige. The pivot pend operations, if the suspension were long was hot, however, in serious danger until he extended, would be to renounce the whole ob- was forced back to a line between the Valli di ject of the campaign. The first relief I could [Comacchio, a large lagoon on the Adriatic expect would be from the newly formed Italian shore, south of the Po, and Bologna in the Combat Groups; they were still an unknown south-west. Before that position was reached quantity but would at least be useful in a he had reason to hope that the cumulative effect defensive role. The first was expected to be of so many opposed river crossings and the ready by the end of October, the second by the deterioration of the weather would bring Eighth middle of November; two more by the middle Army's offensive to a standstill. of December and two by January. In the , The Canadians crossed the Marecchia by event only five were formed; Cremona, Man- Rimini on 2ist Septem'ber and the next day tova, Folgore, Legnano and Friuli. Cremona the New Zealanders passed through i Canadian was the first to see active service, in January Division to exploit up the coast. 5 Corps also 1945. The Brazilians were also an unknown reached the river on the 22nd, having mopped quantity, though they were well equipped and up the Coriano area, and on the 23rd exploited in good strength. They gave a good account forward to make contact with the ridge be- of themselves in the final offensive of the fol- tween the Marecchia and the Uso. By the 25th lowing spring. The coloured troops of the the enemy was generally iback behind the Uso United States 92 Infantry Division proved un- but not in very good order and advances were suited for modern combat conditions; the divi- made all along the Army front. In the plains sion was eventually reorganized, and made into we had cleared the whole eastern 'bank of the an effective formation by incorporating one Fiumicino by 29th September but the enemy Japanese-American and one white American was still holding out in the foothills south of Regimental Combat Team, the latter formed Route 9 when the rain descended with great from converted anti-aircraft gunners. violence for four successive days. All the fords Eighth Army enters the Romagna. over the Marecchia and Uso became impass- I have already alluded to the difficulties of able and the approaches to the (bridges, neces- operations in the Romagna and the fact that sarily more congested, were in very bad con- water was now the main obstacle to Eighth dition; the Fiumicino, normally a shallow Army's advance rather than high ground. The trickle, swelled to a width of thirty feet and its whole area is nothing but a great reclaimed speed and depth made it impossible for in- swamp—and not wholly reclaimed in some fantry patrols to cross. Going off the roads parts—formed by the lower courses of numerous became quite impossible. The enemy took * General Eisenhower's forces first crossed the heart from this to maintain a steadfast resist- German frontier on n September. ance and it was not until 5th October that the SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2951

Fiumicino was reached all along the 5 Corps through ". General Clark's plan was to con- front.* tinue «o press forward with the troops already During the period while Fifth and Eighth in the line, resting one regiment from 85, 88 Annies were developing their main attacks 10 and 91 Divisions and then to bring hi these Corps, acting as the connecting link between rested troops on loth October in a concentrated the two forces (but under command of Eighth attack. 13 Corps was to conform by attacking Army), had ibeen following up and hastening on the right of II Corps with its existing forces the enemy's withdrawal on the axis of Route and then, relieving 88 Division with the 71; the Arezzo-Cesena road. Its frontage was 78th, to attack in concert with the Americans very extensive for its small strength but the down the Santemo valley onto Route 9 north- enemy also was weak in this sector. On 24th west of Imola. September the watershed was gained after a II Corps' new drive had started on ist Octo- stiff fight for the Mandrioli Pass, for which the ber with 85 Division advancing east of enemy put up a strong defence. After this Route 65 and the pist on the road itself, sup- heavy rains prevented further operations until ported by diversionary attacks by 88 and 30th September; the division and the armoured 34 Divisions on the right and left flanks brigade under command were transferred to the respectively. On 2nd October the relief of 88 Adriatic sector and replaced 'by i Guards Bri- Division on Monte La Battaglia began, in gade Group and 2 Anti-Aircraft Brigade from the -first place by I Guards Brigade. The bad- Fifth Army for use as infantry. With these ness of the roads and tracks in rear of the posi- forces, reinforced by three dismounted tion severely hampered the relief; the rain also armoured car regiments and three independent continued remorselessly. On the left of II infantry battalions, it was impossible to force Corps good progress was made. On 2nd Octo- the pace. The enemy, however, continued to ber 91 Division captured the village of withdraw and by 6th October 10 Corps had , twenty-five miles by road from gained a position astride Route 71 on the upper Bologna, and on the 3rd 34 Division cap- reaches of the Savio, not much more than fifteen tured Monte Venere, a commanding height miles from Cesena. to the west of the large village of Loiano. On the right 85 Division had reached the head Fifth Army resumes the Attack on Bologna. waters of the River Idice. By the 4th II Corps The furthest point in Fifth Army's advance had made good an advance of some four miles down the Imola road had been reached with in two days against strong resistance and in the capture of Monte La Battaglia on 27th abominable weather. Loiano, twenty-two miles September. While the enemy was expending from Bologna, fell to 91 Division on the his strength in vain counter-attacks to recapture 5th. On the same day 6 South African this vital position, attempts which continued Armoured Division came, under direct^ Fifth until they died down from exhaustion on 6th Army command with the task of operating on October,f General Clark decided to take ad- the left of II Corps up the Prato-Castiglione vantage of the progress made by the left wing road; it had under it 24 Guards Brigade, an of II Corps to concentrate the main weight of an independent Indian battalion (6/13 Frontier the Corps on the axis of Route 65, the direct Force Rifles) and Combat Command " B " of road to Bologna. The factors which had I U.S. Armoured Division. militated against the choke of this axis for the Slowly the advance on Bologna continued, original attack no longer applied, since we had with gains of the nature of two thousand yards now left well behind the strong defences and in a day; for although we had now left the difficult terrain of the Futa Pass and were over " Gothic " line defences far behind and were the Radicosa Pass as well. Accordingly 13 attacking, in a sense, downhill, the complexities Corps were to take over responsibility for the of the mountain structure, the rain and the Imola axis and were to relieve 88 Divi- fanaticism of the defenders made every ad- sion on Monte La Battaglia. I felt that this vance a hard fought struggle. The attack in- new drive would be the climax of our opera- creased in intensity on loth October when 88 tions in the mountains; the season was already Division, now completely relieved by 13 Corps, far advanced. and the break in the weather attacked simultaneously with 85 Division to had come earlier than*usual;J unless we could the east of Route 65 and with 91 Division on get through now we were likely to be stuck the axis of the road itself. The enemy was in the mountains for the winter. In order, now reinforcing fast.* 65 Division had therefore, to give the maximum weight possible already been brought round from the to the attack, and since all three divisions in western sector and put in in a narrow sec- £3 (Corps were very tired after continuous tor on the Bologna road and, on the I3th, 44 fighting, I decided on 2nd October to reinforce Division, which had been taken out for a rest, it with 78 Division, my only fresh formation, was re-committed. The troops were encouraged just back from a restful tour of duty in the by a personal order from Hitler, read out to Middle East. Even with this addition, as I all ranks on 6th October, that the Apennine reported on the same date, I feared that " we position was to be held at all costs. On the may not be quite strong enough to carry it I4th Vietinghoff decided to run risks in his vital left sector and began to bring across 29 * I am unable to say definitely when I crossed the Panzer Grenadier Division from the front oppo- Rubicon until historians decide which river it is ; the Uso, Fiumicino and Pisciatello are the candidates in site Eighth Army. In spite of this our advance that order of preference. continued. On the I2th 85 Division captured f There was a further unsuccessful counter-attack Monte delle Formiche, a two thousand foot on Monte La Battaglia on the night of 10/11 October. peak to the, east of the main road and level J Although the Italian weather is regular only in its extreme variability and although heavy rainfall is * At the beginning of October Field-Marshal •a feature of every month in the calendar the rain in Kesselring was seriously injured in a car accident on September and was^both heavier and Route 9 and did not return until the end of December. earlier in its incidence than the general average of past He was succeeded in the interim by General von years seemed to prognosticate. Vietinghoff of Tenth Army! 2952 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 wi-th Livergnano, a village only twelve miles replacements for Seventh Army, i.e. France, by road from Bologna. Fighting continued were then sailing from Naples and it for Livergnano itself from the loth to theai5th. would have been quicker to have diverted them On the same day 34 Division, which had northwards than to fetch fresh ones from been relieved on the left of the Corps by i France. General Eisenhower at once under- Armoured Division, took over a new sector took to examine the matter urgently and re- between 91 and 85 Divisions, to strengthen the plied on the 2ist that he was proceeding to attack east of Route 65. despatch our three thousand men immediately The climax of the assault was reached be- by air. It was a fine example of General tween 20th and 24th October. On the 2Oth Eisenhower's ready grasp of the big strategic 88 Division attacked and seized the great picture and his willingness to cut through red massif of Monte Grande and Monte Cerere. On tape to assist a friend in need. It also illus- the 22nd the same division captured La Costa, trates the advantage the Allies drew from our only four miles from Route 9 and on the 23rd command of the facilities of air transport. 34 Division captured Monte Belmonte, about ten miles east of Route 65 and nine miles Eighth Army's Advance from the Fiumicino from the centre of Bologna. That same night to the Ronco. 78 Division stormed Monte Spaduro for which On ist October General McCreery assumed the Irish Brigade had been struggling since command of Eighth Army in succession to the 20th. This was Fifth Army's finest effort General Leese, who had been appointed to of the winter campaign. For the Germans it command Allied Land Forces in South-eastern was a real crisis, for a relatively small advance Asia. It was a well-deserved promotion for one would put the Allies on Route 9, behind Tenth who had worthily carried on the traditions Army; the front would be split and even an established by General Montgomery and who immediate withdrawal might lead to disaster. had made his mark on the campaign in Italy by The only course was to hope that we might be his handling of large forces in the Liri valley so exhausted by the struggle in the.mountains battles. General McCreery had commanded 10 as to be incapable of that supreme effort. As Corps since the first landings at Salerno. That he had done at Cassino, Vietinghoff decided to operation might be said to typify the kind of hold on in that hope and to make the parallel task in which he had ever since been engaged, still closer and strengthen the hope he brought the achievement of vital results with limited across from opposite Eighth Army the two resources, by hard fighting in difficult terrain divisions famous for the defence of Cassino, where a scientific adjustment of means to ends 90 Panzer Grenadier and I Parachute called for constant changes of tactics and all the Division. With the arrival of the remainder craft of generalship. The first crossing of the of 29 Panzer Grenadier Division the three best Garigliano, and the operations east of Arezzo, divisions in Italy barred the way to the plain. are further examples of his successful use of Assisted by torrential rains and winds of gale the strategy of deception. I was well force, and by Fifth Army's exhaustion, the acquainted with General McCreery's qualities as German line held firm. On 27th October I a scientific soldier with a gift for the offensive agreed to General Clark's assumption of the from the time when he had been my Chief of defensive. Staff for the Alamein campaign and onward To be robbed of a decisive success after to final victory in Tunisia, and was therefore so long and sanguinary a struggle was the more particularly pleased to have him as one of my bitter in that the price already paid would have Army Commanders. been heavy even if paid for victory. I cannot The plan for the continuance of the advance sufficiently express my admiration for the way on the Adriatic sector called for a full-scale in which the troops of Fifth Army, in spite of offensive by 5 Corps and I Canadian Corps on the most arduous and exhausting conditions, an axis parallel to and north of the Rimini- in mud and snow, returned again and again Bologna road; weather permitting this was to be to the attack on one mountain position after launched on the night of 6th/7th October. The another, regardless of the heavy and continuous weather did not permit; rain was continuous losses which thinned their ranks. Casualties and of extraordinary violence, paralysing any had been mounting steadily during the long- movement in the plains. In the higher ground drawn-out offensive, more particularly in II on the left the effect was not so serious and 10 Corps, and, as with Eighth Army, a serious Indian Division was able to exploit its bridge- replacement crisis had arisen. On gth October head over the Fiumicino and to capture on 7th General Clark informed me that by-ist Novem- October Monte Farneto. This started a series ber, at the present rate of wastage, he would of manoeuvres which were to characterize the be eight thousand infantry short for his United next period: ground was gained on the left States divisions which would mean a shortage flank in order to turn from there the series of of seventy-five men per rifle company. He had river lines. It was natural that this policy already asked General Devers,* Deputy should commend itself to General McCreery, for Supreme Commander, if he could foe allotted he had recently been operating with very small replacements from the pool scheduled for forces in these mountains,-while commanding Seventh Army, which was in .the theatre. General 10 Corps, and had found them less of an Devers did not feel able to comply with this obstacle to an advance than the continuous request and on I5th October, as a last resort, water lines of the deceptively attractive plains. I signalled personally to General Eisenhower The Germans were also surprised by our to ask him if he could allot Fifth Army successes here and moved across 29 Panzer three thousand replacements from the resources Grenadier Division to this sector from north of of the European Theatre of Operations. Route 9. It was not left there long, however, This was rather a roundabout method, as for on I4th October it began to transfer to the * Lieutenant-General (now General) Jacob L. Devers, central front to meet Fifth Army's attack on United States Army. Bologna. The result was that by the i6th both SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2953

Corps had reached the line of the river head in face of opposition desperately difficult Eisciatello. but was liable also to interrupt at any moment On 17th October 2 Polish Corps, which had maintenance and the movement of reinforce- taken over the sector on the left of 5 Corps ments. Some miles of waterlogged ground were previously under 10 Corps (and commanded gained but despite our best efforts it was im- in the interim by the Headquarters of the dis- possible to prevent the enemy, making full use banded i Armoured Division) opened an of these natural advantages, from withdrawing attack to improve our communications in the sufficient troops to block Fifth Army's advance. mountains. The principal object was to clear The capture of Cesena and Forlimpopoli, and the minor road which leaves Route 71 at San even of Mussolini's birthplace at Predappio, Piero in Bagno and joins Route 67 at Rocca were not sufficient recompense for the failure San Casciano, crossing the valleys of the to capture Bologna. Eighth Army's strength Bidente and . Possession of Route 67 was now also, declining, for early in October it would be of the greatest importance for improv- had to release 4 Indian Division and the Greek ing communications between the two Annies. Mountain Brigade Group to go to Greece. This The Poles made good progress in the mountains. was the beginning of a process which was to Galeata, commanding the upper Bidente cost British troops in Italy eventually two more valley, fell on igth October and Strada, in the divisions.* valley of the Rabbi, on the 2ist; here the enemy showed signs of an intention to resist more Plans for the Winter Campaign. strongly. Meanwhile in the plains Cesena had Operations in Italy in the winter of 1944 been entered on igth October and on the 2Oth to 1945, the bitter and continuous fighting in 4 Division seized a precarious but tenaciously the Apennines and in the waterlogged plains defended bridgehead over the Savio in the of the Romagna, can only be properly under- neighbourhood of Route 9. Further to the south stood against the background of the general 10 Indian Division established two more bridge- strategic picture of the war against Germany heads and in the southernmost built up rapidly on all fronts. The main factor determining the for an assault on Monte Cavallo, on the water- situation was the decision by General shed between the Savio and the Ronco. By the Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander in 2ist there were no enemy forward of the Savio the West, that it would be necessary to fight a except in the coastal sector, where they still winter campaign on that front the effect of held Cervia. which would be either to bring about directly Intentions now were for the Poles to press a German collapse or at least, by the attrition down the valley of. the Rabbi towards Forli while caused, to ensure that result next spring. The 5 Corps advanced on the same objective on Italian campaign from its very inception had the axis of Route 9. The Polish attack began on been designed to second and supplement the 22nd October but made little, progress until the invasion of the west, even before that invasion 25th. 5 Corps also met heavy resistance to was launched, and the Allied Annies, in Italy attempts to break out from its Cesena bridge- were therefore now called on once more to head over the Savio. 10 Indian Division cap- make a direct contribution to the winter cam- tured Monte Cavallo and began to thrust north- paign on thfe Western front. I considered four wards. Resistance ceased on the 24th, however, possible courses to make that contribution: to when the enemy carried out.his sole voluntary transfer troops from Italy to the west, to withdrawal on this front. The tactical situation, employ troops "from Italy in Jugoslavia, to in particular the threat from Monte Cavallo, continue the offensive on the Italian front at . would indeed have forced a withdrawal in the full stretch to the limits set by exhaustion and near future but an even more pressing reason material shortage or to halt the offensive now was the situation on the Fifth Army front where and build up for a renewal in greater strength the crisis of the defence of Bologna had now at a later date. All these courses were judged been reached. Three first class divisions, 29 and solely by the criterion of which would have 90 Panzer Grenadiers and I Parachute the greatest effect on operations in the west. Division, had been withdrawn in succession to The first was rejected because there was, on the central sector and it was vitally necessary the current programme, no need for extra to reduce the front of LXXVI Corps to allow troops in France and the current maintenance for this reduction in strength. The line chosen situation would not allow any from Italy to was the river Ronco. . By the 25th both the be accepted as yet. To transfer troops to Canadians and 5 Corps had made contact with Jugoslavia was a project which I was then . this line but the rain, which was at that very actively considering; it would have certain time foiling Fifth Army's attack on Bologna, advantages, as I shall show, if we could first now reached a new high pitch of intensity. drive the enemy in Italy back to the Adige On the 26th all bridges over the Savio, in our line, but it would have no effect on the Western immediate rear, were swept away and our small front and would only begin to have one on bridgeheads over the Ronco were eliminated the Eastern front next spring. Of the two and destroyed. The'Poles continued to advance courses which involved continuing to use our and on the 27th captured Predappio Nuova. full resources in Italy the one which General The situation remained more or less unchanged, Eisenhower- considered more advantageous to like the weather, until the 3ist when the enemy him was the continuance of the offensive. I was forced back opposite 5 Corps to a switch thoroughly appreciated this reading of the situ- line from the Ronco at Forli airfield to the ation. It -was for this reason that operations Rabbi at Grisignano. were pressed on in Italy despite all the diffi- This was a most discouraging period for culties of climate and terrain, of deficient man- Eighth Army. The weather was abominable power and material. and the country difficult. Every river and * One brigade of 46 Division in November ; 4 British canal was subject to sudden rises and floods Infantry Division during December; remainder of 46 which not merely made the seizing of a bridge- Division during Janriary and February. 2954 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 The consequences of this policy were ex- capture Bologna was accordingly postponed pounded in a letter to both Army Commanders until about 30th November. Eighth Army was dated loth October. For the reasons given to continue to attempt the capture of Ravenna the offensive must be continued, but it was and should be in a position to launch an attack already necessary to plan ahead and consider with that object also by 30th November. I the question of when to call a halt; that it laid down, however, that the offensives were would be necessary to call a halt was deduced only to be launched if the weather was favour- from the fact that there was no certainty' of able and there appeared to be a good chance the war against Germany ending in 1944 and of success. that a major offensive in 1945 would therefore A critical shortage of artillery ammunition be necessary. In order to meet that require- was among the other difficulties of this period. ment it was vital, in view of the close approxi- To a force which relied so much on artillery, mation of the opposing strengths, to make a the only effective superiority we possessed for pause at some time to rest, reorganize and a campaign in an Italian winter, this was a train our own troops. During this pause most serious matter, the more so as it was Eighth Army was to plan, and prepare to carry not an isolated phenomenon but a world-wide out, operations across the Adriatic. If north- shortage both on the British and United States west Italy were cleared it would be occupied side. It had naturally been aggravated by our .by a British District Headquarters with one heavy expenditure during the " Gothic " division under command (6 South African line -battles. The root cause, however, as I Armoured Division was tentatively nominated). was informed by a signal from, the War Office The conclusions drawn were: that active on I7th August, was a reduction in ammunition operations with all available forces should con- production all over the Allied-controlled world. tinue as long as the state of our own troops and This was a condition of affairs which could the weather permitted in the hope that by then not hastily be unproved and, although I was we should have at least succeeded in driving on 20th October authorized to draw on the the enemy back to the general line of the Supreme Allied Commander's reserve up to Adige and the Alps and in clearing up north- the foil extent which the operational situation western Italy. Secondly, when full-scale might; necessitate, there was a serious danger • operations ceased, there should be a period that not only would current operations be of active defence during which the minimum severely limited but there might not be suffic- forces would be committed against the enemy ient stocks on hand for the spring offensive. and the maximum attention paid to the rest, I drew this conclusion in a letter to General reorganisation and training of all formations in Wilson on I3th November: preparation for a renewal of the offensive as " As far as I am. able to forecast I have soon as the weather should permit. just enough British ammunition for the This appreciation was brought up to date current operations of Eighth Army and for on 23rd October in a further letter to Fifth an all-out offensive in December lasting about and Eighth Armies. In this, operations in fifteen, days. American ammunition is, how- Jugoslavia were brought more into the fore- ever, only sufficient for about ten days in- ground for the major r61e in the proposed tensive fighting between now and the end of spring offensive and the question of when to the year. Deliveries hi the first quarter of halt the offensive in Italy was more closely 1945 in the case of both British and American studied. Between loth and 23rd October the types are so limited that it will be necessary fiercest fighting on Fifth Army front had left to exercise the strictest economy for several us still short of Bologna, the exhaustion of our months to build up large enough stocks to troops had increased and the lack of replace- sustain a full-scale offensive in 1945 ". ments, both British and American, had made I have referred to plans for operations in itself felt. In this second paper, therefore, it Jugoslavia as part of our proposed spring offen- was assumed that we were unlikely to have sive and although the necessity for such opera- driven the enemy back to the line of the Adige tions did not arise the plans themselves are by the time that it became necessary to halt of interest in illustrating the strategic problems the offensive; instead our immediate objectives which faced us in the autumn of 1944. If were limited to the capture of Bologna and we were wholly successful in our attack on the Ravenna. The plan proposed was that Eighth Apennine positions we should be faced with Army should continue their offensive with all a situation- resembling that of September, 1943, available forces at least until i5th November before the German decision to stand south of in order to capture Ravenna and, to draw off Rome: that is the enemy would be withdraw- the enemy from Fifth Army. The latter was ing at his leisure to a prepared position in rear to go on- to the defensive forthwith (this was and we should be unable to make him stand ordered on 27th October), withdraw forces in Italy. Just as in the preceding September, from the line to rest and prepare them for therefore, I turned my eyes to the other side one more offensive effort and then launch them of the Adriatic, where we could be certain of as secretly as possible in a final attack on bringing the Germans to battle on ground of Bologna. If this plan was unsuccessful, then our choosing rather than theirs. From the point we should have to accept the best winter of view of containing the maximum number of position that could be managed; Eighth Army German divisions, the line of the Apennines on must endeavour, however, to capture Forli and which the Germans found themselves in October open Route 67 to improve lateral communica- was the best suited to my purpose. Once driven tions between the two Armies. I held a con- off that, any other line they could stand on, ference at my Headquarters to discuss this or at least any other line north of and in- plan on 2gth October. The principles of the cluding the line of the Po, would require less plan were agreed to but I decided to advance troops to hold. It was considered that, once the date at which the .offensive efforts of both Bologna fell, the enemy would withdraw to a Armies must cease from I5th November to line based OD the rivers Po and Ticino, aban- I5fch December; Fifth Army's final attempt to doning north-west Italy, and that he was not SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2955 likely to delay long on that river line but, deal of detailed planning was done to prepare under pressure, when and if we could apply for 'this but in the event the plan turned out it, he would withdraw to the Adige.* Once to be unneccesary and was. cancelled on 4th back on the Adige he would be able to spare February, 1945. The main reason was the divisions from Italy and instead of -our con- failure to capture Bologna, which meant that taining him, he would be containing us. we continued to keep the enemy in Italy still Looking ahead to such a possibility, at a stretched to the maximum extent. A further time when we seemed likely to break through reason was the withdrawal, in early 1945, of the Apennines, I thought it advisable to con- the whole of the Canadian Corps to join the sider other employment for the forces which Canadians on the Western front and the diver- would become surplus on our side as well as sion to the West of 5 Division which was in- on the German, for if the Germans, on our tended to return to my command from the calculations, would only need the equivalent Middle East. It is interesting to speculate on of eleven divisions to hold the Adige line so what the results might have been if «the plan on the Allied side we could probably only use had been carried into effect. The terrain of one Army against that position. The Balkans Dalmatia is rugged and unpromising for opera- once more offered an obvious and attractive tions and the maintenance of the force would field. The Russians were advancing in eastern have met. serious difficulties. On the other Hungary and approaching Jugoslavia (Belgrade hand the relatively weak and inexperienced fell on 20th October) and the "Partisans were German troops would probably have offered clearing the ports of southern and central only an ineffectual resistance to six veteran Dalmatia. Ever since the fall of Rome I had divisions of Eighth Army, assisted by strongly borne in mind the possibility of forcing an entry reinforced Partisan formations, and an entry into Austria through the Ljubljana gap, a stroke into Austria might have been possible before which might even lead us to Vienna. Before the general capitulation. But the conditions the withdrawal of troops for the invasion of which would have rendered operations in Jugo- Southern France it had seemed likely that this slavia possible and profitable failed to even- could be achieved by an ovenland advance tuate; the Germans continued to hold their through north-eastern Italy, possibly • assisted extended line in the mountains and it was by an amphibious operation against Istria or neither necessary nor practical for us to open . With our present reduced strength, a new front on which to contain them. and especially after the losses and exhaustion Final Winter Operations. incurred in the battles for the Apennines, it would be impossible, after breaking through On 3ist October Eighth Army crossed the into the Po valley, to be certain of destroying Ronco near Forli but the weather again inter- the enemy south of the river and I should have vened and the town did not fall until gth to face a succession of hard fought frontal November. We then had a week's fine weather attacks against a still powerful enemy on (he and were able to drive the enemy back to the many river lines of Venetia: the Adige, the line of the Montone and Cosina by the i6th. Brenta, the Piave, the Tagliamento and the Route 67 was now open at last but the collapse Isonzo.f Rather than accept this it would be of a vital bridge prevented our using it until 2ist better to make a two-handed attack up the November. A further offensive by 5 Corps and two opposite coasts, designed to meet at the 2 Polish Corps between 20 and 25 November head of the Adriatic. This would undoubtedly brought us to the line of the river Lamone but tie down more German forces than a frontal another break in the weather prevented ex- attack on the Adige and would give more scope ploitation into Faenza. In the meantime Fifth for a flexible strategy and a greater chance Army had been resting and regrouping its troops for a decisive success. according to plan, i Division of 13 Corps re- I first brought forward the plan on 2nd lieved 88 Division on Monte Grande and October, at a conference attended by General II Corps took advantage of this to pull out for Wilson, and it was elaborated at several sub- a rest as many troops as could be spared. Un- sequent conferences. In its final form it pro- fortunately the line we were holding was posed that, after the Germans had been driven so extended that periods spent out of the line back to their Adige line. Fifth Army should could only be very short although the discom- become wholly responsible for operations in forts of the mountainous terrain and the severe Italy, taking under command the -Polish Corps, Italian winter were very great. During this whose employment in Jugoslavia might have period, the, .remainder of 92 Division and been politicaDy embarrassing. Eighth Army a second regiment of the Brazilian Expedition- should prepare a base in the area of the ports ary Force arrived; it was not practicable, of Split, Sibenik and Zadar, occupying them however, to employ these troops in the with light forces, and then, in early spring, important. II Corps sector. bring in their main forces, in the strength of Plans for thejresumption of the offensive were at least six divisions, for a rapid advance on studied in an appreciation produced by my Ljubljana and Fiume. I would retain a Corps Headquarters on igth November, to serve as a of two Indian divisions in Army Group re- basis for an Army Commanders' conference on serve, ready to support either Army. A good 26th November. It was calculated that Eighth * Since the end of. July the Germans had been at Army had enough artillery ammunition for work on a line of permanent defences based on the about three weeks' offensive. They had one Adige and the Euganean and Berici hills, running from armoured and three infantry divisions resting the Adriatic at Chioggia to Lake Garda ; it was known and training in preparation for this; one infantry as the " Venetian " line and by October was already formidable. Defences were also prepared on the line of division at present engaged, however, (the 4th) the Po—Ticino and, south of the Po, on the Santerno, • was due to be withdrawn shortly to go to the Sillaro and Idice, the 'last-named known as the Middle East and ife -elieving division (the 5th) " Genghis Khan " position. was not due to arrive until January*. This t The Germans were known to be constructing defences on the two last, in rear of the " Venetian " * In the event 4 Division went to Greece and the 5th line. to Twenty-first Army Group in Germany. 2956 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

strength should be sufficient to reach the San- . staff to evolve the detailed orders and arrange- terno river and, possibly, secure bridgeheads ments which will carry his conception into across it. An offensive with this object in view effect. In this my staff, headed by General was to be launched on 2ist November, as Harding and his American deputy, General already provided for, and it was estimated that Lemnitzer,* thoroughly fulfilled all demands it would hardly have reached its objective made on them and ensured the smooth work- before the first week in December.* This deter- ing of a complicated and intricate machine. mined the timing for Fifth Army. By 5th This achievement was the more remarkable as December it would have completed its pro- the staff was composed in almost equal pro- gramme for the relief, rest and training of the portions of representatives of two different four American infantry divisions in II Corps; nationalities. This is an extraordinary fact to 13 Corps had only been able to rotate then- which, in my opinion, too little attention has forces so that only a limited offensive effort been paid. It might have been expected, on a could be called for from them. American " realistic " view of human nature, that a artillery ammunition was sufficient for not mixed headquarters of this nature command- more than about fifteen days' full-scale ing a mixed group of Armies would tend to split offensive operations. In view of that -fact in its approach to day to day operational prob- and the other considerations which made lems on national lines, a British staff officer it inevitable that this should be the last favouring, even- if only subconsciously, the major offensive before the spring of 1945 it was Eighth Army' and an American staff officer, essential that every chance should be calculated similarly, the Fifth Army. Nothing of this to ensure its success and I directed that the kind occurred. All branches and all indivi- actual timing of the offensive, which would be duals worked as parts of one integrated some date after 7th December, must be de- machine, loyal to the common cause and, I pendent on the weather and, if necessary, it take justified pride in claiming, to their must be postponed until the weather was Commander-in^Qiief. propitious. •My administrative staff was headed by The outline plan was as follows. Eighth General Robertson - whose experience in Army was to develop its present operations so this vitally important branch of the military art as to reach the line of the Santerno, and, if reached back to "the .early days of Abyssinia possible, secure bridgeheads across it, as early and the Western Desert. I have referred from as enemy resistance and the weather permitted. time to time in the earlier parts of my Des- Fifth Army was to prepare to carry out an offen- patch to various particular difficulties which sive with all available resources up Route 65 faced us in the supply of our troops in and to co-operate with Eighth Army by an Italy and if I have not referred to these prob- attack from the Monte Grande position against lems since then it is because so firm a founda- Castel San Pietro, on Route 9 south-east of tion had been laidi down that subsequent prob- Bologna. The plan and proposed timings were ' lems were solved almost automatically by the agreed at an Army Commanders' conference hi existing organisation. The proverb calls that Florence on 26th November. Orders for the land happy which has no history and certainly operation were issued on 28th November. The an administrative machine can be known to be second paragraph showed the reasons for the working at its best when nothing is heard of offensive as I have already described them; my it either for good or evil. It must not be intention was " To afford the greatest possible imagined that the basic and permanent difficul- support to the Allied winter offensive on the ties of the Italian scene were abolished; the Western and Eastern fronts by bringing the blocked and mined ports, the demolished' roads enemy to battle, thereby compelling him to em- and 'bridges, the railway lines torn up by ploy in Italy manpower and resources which special machines, all these remained and pre- might otherwise be available for use on the sented a yet more difficult appearance as the other fronts." Germans grew more experienced at the work of destruction. The merit of the administrative Before these plans could be carried into opera- staff is that they took them in their stride and tion I was appointed, on i2th December, the proof is that, instead' of recounting a series Supreme Allied Commander in tie Mediter- of achievements, it is only necessary to record ranean Theatre. General Mark Clark took over that operations were never hamstrung and from me the tactical direction of the two operational 'plans never radically altered Armies with a small operational staff under the because of any administrative considerations. name, revived for the purpose, of Fifteenth For the faultless working of the operational Army Group. Headquarters, Allied Armies in and administrative machinery the achieve- Italy, was disbanded; part came with me to ments already recorded will provide sufficient Allied Force Headquarters and part, in particu- evidence. The successes of lar the operations and intelligence staff, went have appeared less frequently and! from their to General Clark's headquarters. I should like very nature they are much more difficult to to express here my appreciation of the work of record; there is also the difficulty that that my staff throughout the campaign. This narra- nature is very widely misunderstood by a public tive will have made it clear that our successes whose mind, especially in wartime, is occupied were never won by force of numbers, never by stories true or false of spies and secret by a simple marshalling of overwhelming agents. In actual fact espionage can never resources, but always by stratagems, secret play anything but the most minor rdle in mili- concentrations and surprise moves. It is the tary intelligence and certainly in Italy it pro- task of the. Commander-in-Chief to think out duced no information of any importance. the broad lines of such a strategy but it is for his Military Intelligence is a more prosaic affair, dependent on an efficient machine for the * General McCreery considered that by 7 December he would probably only be on the Senio ; a fresh break collection and' evaluation of every sort of item in the weather was the main factor which helped to * Major-General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, United prove him right. States Astny. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2957

of information, a machine which extends from since the landing in the Gulf of Salerno in the front line troops right up to the Army September, 1943. Although his operational ex- Group staff in which hundreds of individuals perience up to that time had been slight I had all play a vital part. But if its methods of the greatest confidence in his capacity and as working are humdrum its achievements have the campaign developed was glad to see that been dramatic. For me in Italy the result was judgment fully confirmed. He was quick to that the " fog of war " was dispersed and the learn the difficult art of warfare in a mountain- enemy's strength and dispositions were always ous region, keen to profit by every experience clear and obvious. It will be apparent how of his own or of other commanders and re- useful this knowledge was in enabling me to sourceful in the conduct of complex battle economize forces and) achieve important results situations both in good and evil days. To all with the minimum effort and avoiding casual- the mental resources of a trained soldier he united ties and losses. great gifts of leadership. Just as he had had My relations with the Naval and Air Forces under his command both American and British grew closer and more ultimate as the campaign troops, and other nationalities also, to whom progressed. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, he stood in a mutual and reciprocal relation- whose name had been associated with the ship of confidence and loyalty so I found him hardest and most glorious days of naval war- a most loyal subordinate, unquestioning in fare in the Mediterranean, was succeeded on obedience and eager to give the utmost co- 23rd October, 1943, by Admiral Sir John operation to the common design. It is strange Cunningham.* The latter's period of command, for me to think, and gratifying to recollect with in the absence of any enemy fleet to contest hopes for the future of co-operation between our supremacy on the open sea, was devoted our two nations, that just as I had myself taken almost exclusively to the support and assistance orders from an American commander so I could of land operations. In this task I always re- give orders to an American subordinate, in- ceived from him the fullest and most under- volving the lives of thousands of American standing co-operation. If I should single out soldiers, in the certainty that they would be any one incident it would be to recall the Anzio implicitly executed. It was something new in operation where the Allied Navies uncomplain- the history of war and the fact that custom ingly accepted a burden both greater in degree soon made it matter of course should not be and of longer duration than had been expected allowed to obscure its value. and maintained a force which 'by May had It proved impossible to launch thet offensive * grown to over seven divisions through a harbour in December. The requisite precondition on no bigger than a fishing port and under con- which I insisted, an. adequate spell of good tinuous fire.f I moist mention also the role of the weather, was never fulfilled. Had we under- Allied Air Forces in support of the Army. Air taken an offensive in the weather that prevailed Marshal Coningham,J to whom I owe so much it would almost certainly have fallen short of and to whom I have referred in my Despatch success and the resulting expenditure of on the Conquest of Sicily, returned to the ammunition would have meant the postpone- United Kingdom as part of the OVERLORD ment of the. offensive of next spring. Eighth team and was succeeded, as Commander of the Army took advantage of some fitful spells of Tactical Air Force, toy General Cannon§ of the clear weather to improve its positions; Ravenna United States Army Air Force. General fell on 4th December and Faenza on the i6th Cannon showed from the start a thorough and by 6th January our line was on the river acquaintance with the problems of co-operation Senio and touching the southern shore of the between ground and air. Our headquarters were Valli di Comacchio. Here the advance was always together and relations between us were halted and both sides settled down to an uneasy so close and constant that I could be certain lull. It is surprising to note that, up to this that the operations of our respective forces time, the Germans had shown clearly their in- would blend into a perfect three-dimensional tention to maintain their strength in Italy. Two whole. I cannot speak too highly of General infantry divisions were hastily despatched in Cannon's gifts as a leader or of the encourage- November to meet a crisis in Hungary but were ment which his assistance and support always immediately replaced; one of the new forma- gave me. The measure of his achievement can tions was a division from Norway which had be seen in the complete immunity we enjoyed travelled all the way through western Germany from enemy air attacks, the close and effective at the time when Rundstedt's Ardennes offen- support enjoyed by the ground forces, and the sive was raging without being drawn into it. long lines of destroyed enemy vehicles, the At the end of the year, therefore, Kesselring .smashed bridges and useless railways found by still had twenty-seven* German divisions, four my Armies wherever they advanced into enemy Italian divisions and a Cossack cavalry divi- territory. sion. Though we had failed to break through General Clark was the obvious choice to the Apennines we had succeeded in our mis- succeed me at Army Group Headquarters; he sion. The Germans found themselves obliged was the senior of "my two Army. Commanders by the very measure of their success in the and General McCreery, now commanding winter fighting to await our attack in the Eighth Army, had previously served under him following spring on an extended and un- when he commanded 10 Corps. This is a good economical line and I was able to accomplish opportunity to record, my gratitude and appre- what I had feared impossible the previous ciation of General Clark's achievements in Italy autumn, the effective destruction of the * Now Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Cunningham, enemy armies south of the Po. G.C.B., M.V.O. f Besides providing gun support, the Allied Navies, up to the breakout from the beachhead on 23rd May, The Final Victory. landed no less than 478,407 tons of ammunition and The full story of the battles which brought supplies, in the face of air attack. us complete victory in the spring of 1945 is 1 The late Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham. § Lieutenant-General John K. Cannon, United States * 20 Luftwaffe Field Division had by then been Army Air Force: absorbed into 26 Panzer Division. 2958 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

given in my Despatch' as Supreme Allied Com- could be contemplated. To carry it out the mander, forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of forces fighting in Italy were absolutely essential; Staff. Before proceeding, however, to my con- they represented the only large coherent body cluding evaluation of the Italian campaign it of men left in the spring of 1945. They were hi will be as well to complete the picture of the a position to withdraw straight into the over-running of Italy from Cape Passero to southern face of the redoubt; they might, more- the Brenner by giving in broad outline the over, retain for at least a time the food-pro- events which led up to the final capitulation. ducing and industrial areas of Northern Italy. It is unnecessary to be detailed, for the stage Undoubtedly if they had been able to with- nad been set by the events of the winter and draw across the Po in good order they would the action proceeded according to the plans have given a very good account of themselves laid down then. The problem was to disrupt hi the defence of the Alps; it was more than the enemy's defences in the valley of the Po ever necessary, therefore, to ensure their by attacks at two separate points, to surround destruction south of the river. as much as possible of the forces disposed between the two points of rupture and to ex- The armies facing us were still strong* well- ploit with the utmost speed to the Po both equipped and in good heart. Four divisions, in order to forestall any attempt to reorganize by no means the best, had been transferred to the defences of the river line and to cut off the Eastern' front between January and March and destroy the maximum number of enemy to balance the transference of the Canadian south of the river. There were two axes on Corps and 5 British Division from my command which to operate, each of them capable of but General von Vietinghoff, who succeeded serving for the advance of an army: Route 12 Field-Marshal Kesselring on 2$rd March, on (Modena-Ostiglia-Verona) for Fifth Army and the latter's transfer to the Western front, com- Route 16 (Ferrara-Rovigo-Padua) for Eighth manded on that date a force of twenty-three Army. On the former route the problem for German and four Italian (German-equipped) Fifth Army was to break out of the mountains divisions, f Furthermore, by contrast with other where they had been locked up since the pre- fronts, the divisions which faced us in Italy vious winter; once in the plains their advance were real divisions and not the scratch battle- would go with the grain of the country. The groups which usurped the name elsewhere. Re- obstacles facing Eighth Army were, as hi the inforcements had continued to arrive and a previous, winter, a series of water barriers, vigorous comb-out of rear areas and a con- especially the fortified lines of the rivers Senio, siderable reduction in all -but essential services- Santerno, Sillaro and Idice. Above all the had maintained fighting strength. The para- road to Ferrara was narrowed to a heavily chutists, for example, were particularly strong defended defile by extensive artificial flooding —i and 4 Parachute Divisions went into action hi the area of the town of Argenta. This with sixteen thousand and nearly fourteen defile, known to us as the Argenta Gap, loomed thousand men respectively—and so were the large in all our appreciations; in order to mo-bile divisions; in fact the average strength advance rapidly to the necessary crossing sites for German divisions was eleven thousand five on the Po we must either force it or outflank hundred, slightly over the standard war estab- it and the latter looked the more difficult, and lishment strength for infantry divisions at that certainly the more time-wasting, of the two period of the war.J The troops were well possible courses. North of the Po the enemy rested and had spent the period of the lull in had constructed defence lines based on the intensive training. Morale was astonishingly rivers Adige, Tagliamento and Isonzo, and good. In spite of the desperate situation of behind them was the final line of the Alps. I German arms in the homeland itself the Ger- was less concerned with these, as if we were mans in Italy continued to show the same successful in our battle south of the Po the resolute spirit of resistance and dash in coun- enemy would have no troops left to man them. ter-attack which had distinguished them It will be seen that the Germans had made hitherto. It was not until they had been driven most elaborate preparations for a protracted against the Po, and had lost all their heavy defence hi Italy and it may well be asked why, weapons in the vain attempt to cross it, that when the Thousand Year Reich was clearly any large-scale surrenders were recorded. § To crumbling to ruin nine hundred and eighty- * The German Order of Battle on gth April, iQ45» eight years short of its proposed span, great is given at Appendix " J ". masses of slave labourers should still be toiling t On loth April XCVII Corps in north-eastern Italy, to throw up defences hi the plains of Venetia. with two divisions, was transferred to the Commander- The answer must probably be connected with in-Chief South-east. There were also in Italy various foreign levies, a Cossack division, 29 S.S. Grenadier tiie Nazi plan for a " National Redoubt". Division (It alian troops with German officers) and other For the sake of the example for the future, and Italian formations to a strength of 126,000. because the armies were still firm in the hand J These figures are from an official German document of a man who was determined never to from Headquarters Army Group " C ". § This was a disheartening result for the large surrender, it was still necessary to plan as if organization engaged in propaganda and " Psycholo- there were some hope left. The only prospect gical Warfare" to the German troops. In general which appeared to offer any chance for pro- the verdict must be that this had no military effect tracting resistance was to abandon the defence whatsoever ; the enemy continued to resist beyond of the open country of North Germany and the limits of what could have been thought possible. Such deserters as gave themselves up during the concentrate on holding for as long as possible campaign were naturally claimed as successes of our the mountains of the south in the area of Tyrol, • psychological warfare but it would be difficult to prove Salzburg and Western Carinthia. It was that they would'not have deserted in any case, espe- questionable how long, if at all, this fortress cially as the great majority of them were persons of non-German origin, forcibly conscripted. There will could be held and there must have been many always be deserters in a war fought in such unpleasant commanders who doubted but, such as it was, conditions ; the surprising thing is that their numbers this represented the only future plan which were so entirely insignificant. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2959 oppose this force I had in Italy seventeen divi- and annihilated him there. The capitulation sions, four Italian Combat Groups and six of 2nd May only sealed a fate which had already armoured and four infantry brigades.* been decided. An army of half a million men The spring offensive began with Eighth had been destroyed and all forces remaining Army's attack on gth April on the enemy's in Italy and Austria kid down their arms in left. Jt was a resumption of the battle of unconditional surrender . the previous winter, for the enemy were still For just under two years, since the invasion on the same defence line and had been for- of Sicily in 1943, Allied troops had been fight- bidden, by Hitler, to make even the smallest ing on Italian soil. In this period of twenty- withdrawal. But the weather was now dry two months the troops under my command had and favourable and our troops, though dimi- four times carried out an assault landing, the nished in numbers, were thoroughly rested; most difficult operation in war. Three great the speed and weight of their blows were such offensives with the full force of an Army that the enemy was unable to occupy any of Group had been launched, in May and August, his prepared alternative positions. The Senio 1944, and in April, 1945. ' From Cape Passero and Santerno lines were'breached and by the to the Brenner is eleven hundred and forty I7th Argenta had been captured and we were miles by road; except for the plains of Lom- about to debouch through the Gap on to Fer- bardy, reached only at the end of the long rara. Meanwhile on the I4th Fifth Army had struggle, that road led almost everywhere begun its drive on Bologna, after a two day through mountains. In the course of the postponement due to weather. By contrast fighting we inflicted on the enemy casualties in with Eighth Army, which in the plain had been killed, wounded and missing which have been able to maintain a steady rate of progress, estimated, largely from German figures, at five Fifth Army had first to burst out of the moun- hundred and thirty-six thousand;* Allied tains. For a week the German defenders con- casualties were three hundred and twelve tested every height with the greatest stubborn- thousand. But statistics, however striking*, ness until the battered survivors were pushed are barren materials for an evaluation of the off the last ridge of the Apennines down into results of a campaign which must rather the plain. Then the cost of this stubborn resist- •be considered against the background of ance was seen; unable to form any coherent • the -whole strategy of the war. In an line of defence the troops of Fourteenth Army attempt to set the campaign against that were swept back to the Po in full flight and background I feel it would be least invidious Fifth Army, after its slow and painful struggle to change the point of view and to consider the in the mountains, was able to race ahead in importance of the struggle in Italy from the wide sweeping thrusts. Bologna fell on the German side. 2ist, entered simultaneously by the Poles of From the beginning both Germans and Allies Eighth Army and II Corps of Fifth Army. On regarded Italy as a secondary theatre and the evening of the 22nd 10 United States Moun- looked for the main decision to be given on tain Division reached the Po at San Benedetto either the Eastern or the Western front. Both and next day 5 Corps reached the river in sides were therefore bound above all to con- strength either side of Ferrara. Between them sider whether this admitted " side-show " was these two thrusts had trapped and immobilized making a positive contribution to the main thousands of German troops and the number object of strategy and whether it was making of prisoners was mounting to embarrassing pro- it at the cheapest possible cost. The Allies' portions. From the Po northwards it was a avowed intention, laid down in May, 1943, pursuit, pressed with the utmost vigour against and never varied, was not to occupy any par- an enemy who had received a mortal blow and ticular territory but to bring to battle the maxi- lost almost all his heavy weapons, but who still mum number of German troops; it was also resisted, where he could, with the same1 deter- the main German object (but not their only mination and skill. object) to contain as many Allied troops as possible and weaken by that amount the Indeed the last -battle in Italy was as hard strength which could be brought to the assault fought as the first. I was not faced with a of the 'West Wall and the . At every broken and disintegrating army, nor was the minute of the campaign, therefore, I had to outcome influenced in any degree by demorali- pose to myself the question, who was contain- zation or lack of supplies on the German side.f ing whom in Italy? This was the vital ques- It was a straightforward military operation tion for the Germans also, and to them the which, by first enveloping the enemy's left answer can never have been satisfactory.:]: In wing in a classical outflanking manoeuvre and all forty-five German divisions were employed then breaking through with a sudden blow his in Italy, together with four Italian regular divi- weakened centre, drove him against the Po sions, one Cossack division and miscellaneous formations of Czechs, Slovaks and Russians. * The Allied Order of Battle at gth April, 1945, is given at Appendix " I ". * This does not include casualcies indicted on the f We did, however, achieve our usual success in Italians, when they were still at war with us, or the deceiving the enemy as to our plans. By simulating Germans who surrendered after the capitulation. The an intention to make an amphibious landing on the German figures referred to cover the period from 3 Venetian coast (which my naval advisers assured me September 1943 to 20 April 1945. was in fact quite impossible) we persuaded him to f Another interesting figure is the total of national- divert 29 Panzer Grenadier Division, his principal ities under my command—twenty-six. A full list is mobile reserve, north of the Po. Not only did this given in Appendix "A." reduce his ability to resist Eighth Army's attack but J That is to say, the real answer had they known it, also it was a great strain on enemy resources to carry Since their faulty Intelligence continually overrated out this lengthy move, eating into the meagre fuel our strength they undoubtedly believed themselves to stocks available, and then to bring the division, when be containing forces superior to their own almost all the deception was discovered, back again over the the time. The chief advantage of our own Intelligence Po crossings under the hammering of our air attack was that it enabled us to achieve our object with the to be thrown too late into a losing battle. greatest economy of force. 2960 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE. 12 JUNE, 1950

The Allies employed in Italy a total of forty United States was launched against the beaches divisions of which eight were transferred to of Normandy, the presence of our forces in the Western front in 1943 and ten in 1944 and Italy tied down fifty-five divisions in the 1945, followed by three diverted to the Balkans. Mediterranean area.* Like us the Germans never employed this whole Ti „ „ . force at once but the details opposing strength l\ wa* the Germans therefore, who were at each stage of the campaign £iow the same «>fained * .Italy and not the Allies; the advantage on the Allied side. In October, ***** campaign drained their strength more urs 1 6 ea ons h e 1943, there were nineteen German to fifteen ***.ded °to - J ? in * f * y * Germans de- Allied divisions, and in December twenty-one " A1 ^ Italy rather than withdraw to to fifteen and a half. Next May the numerical me Alps I have already discussed; they were balance shifted slightly in our favour with n£* or at least the more important were not, twenty-seven to twenty-three but with this military reasons but political. Perhaps the minor superiority we were able to inflict such ^ure German historian, if he is as eager as losses on the enemy that by August they had his predecessors have always been to extol the been obliged to reinforce to a total of twenty- virtues of Prussian military science, will admit five (and two Italian) against our twenty. £e *<% of protracted resistance in Italy and, When the final attack begin in April, 1945, £r°wing the blame on a megalomaniac we had seventeen divisions to their twenty- ^TeT' -wl11 sj** consolation by pointing to three German and four Italian. Nor should &e bravery and stubbornness in defence of the we restrict our survey solely to the divisions German soldier He will be justified in so contained in Italy, for our forces in that country doing; but a sail finer theme wiU be that of represented such a threat to the whole of the ^ historian whc.describes how that stubborn southern coastline of Europe that strong garri- defence and the barrier of so many mountains sons had to be maintained in Southern F?ance and "vers were triumphantly overcome by. the and the Balkans; in the summer of 1944, for Ames. example, the most critical moment of the war * Twenty-five in Italy, nineteen in the Balkans and when the main effort of Great Britain and the eleven in the South of France.

APPENDIX "A" NATIONALITIES IN ITALY Troops representing the following nationalities served in the Allied Armies in Italy: Allied American1, French2, Polish, Nepalese, Belgian, Greek, Brazilian, Syro-Lebanese, Jewish, Jugoslav. Imperial British, Canadian, New Zealand, South African, Newfoundland, Indian, Ceylonese, Basuto, Swazi, Bechuana, Seychellois, Mauritian, Rodriguez Islanders, Caribbean, Cypriot. Co-Belligerent Italian. APPENDIX "B" ORDER OF BATTLE OF GERMAN FORCES IN ITALY AND SLOVENIA As at yd September, 1943 1. MAIN BATTLE FRONT (Kesselring's Command) C.-in-C. South •(Field-Marshal Kesselring) Tenth Army (Colonel-General Vietinghoff) XIV Panzer Corps (General Hube) 16 Panzer Division Hermann Goering Panzer Division 15 Panzer Grenadier Division LXXVI Panzer Corps (General Herr) 29 Panzer Grenadier Division 26 Panzer Division 1 Parachute Division XI Flieger Corps (General Student) 3 Panzer Grenadier Division 2 Parachute Division 2. SARDINIA AND CORSICA 90 Panzer Grenadier Division SS Assault Brigade " Reichfuehrer SS " 3. NORTHERN ITALY (Rommel's Command) Army Group " B " (Field-Marshal Rommel) LXXXVII Corps (General Lemelsen) 76 Infantry Division 94 Infantry Division 305 Infantry Division 24 Panzer Division 1 Including a Negro division and a Japanese-American Regimental Combat Team. 8 Including Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Senegalese. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2961

LI Mountain Corps (General Feuerstein) SS Panzer Division " Adolf Hitler " 65 Infantry Division 44 " Hoch und Deutschmeister" Infantry Division Mountain Brigade Doehla " Corps Witthoeft" L. of C. Units Adriatic Coast Command 71 Infantry Division

APPENDIX "C" ORDER OF BATTLE OF ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY1 As at 22nd January, -1944 REMARKS FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP 2 N.Z. Div. Concentrated Termoli area. Passed from under command Eighth Army igth January.

FIFTH (U.S.) ARMY i (U.S.j Armd. Div. (less C.C.B.) Reverted to Army control i2th January. 45 (U.S.) Inf. Div. Relieved by 3 (Alg.) Inf. Div. loth January. i S.S.F. Relieved i7th January and moved to Caserta area. . • 1 Italian Mot. Gp. 2 S.S. Bde. Sorrento area. // (U,S.) Corps 34 (U.S.) Inf. Div. Diversionary attack Cassino area 20th January. 36 (U.S.) Inf. Div. Attack across R. Rapido started night 20th January. C.C.B., i (U.S.) Armd. Div. Mignano area. VI (U.S.) Corps 3 (U.S.) Inf. Div. 1 Landing in Anzio area during early hours of 1 (Br.) Inf. Div. f 22nd January. French Expeditionary Corps Took over VI Corps' sector 3rd January. 2 Moroccan Inf. Div. Attacked 0630 hours 22nd January and captured S. Croce and other points. 3 Algerian Inf. Div. Took over 45 Div. sector loth January. 3 & 4 Gp. Tabors 2 Tk. Gp. 10 (Br.) Corps Assault on R. Garigliano started 2100 hours I7th January. 5 (Br.) Inf. Div. From Eighth Army to Fifth Army 6 January, on left of line in Minturno area. 46 (Br.) Inf. Div. Attacking across R. Garigliano. 56 (Br.) Inf. Div. Castelfotte and Damiano areas. 23 Armd. Bde. On R. Garigliano. EIGHTH ARMY 3 Carpathian Inf. Div. Net in Army area. 5 (Cdn.) Armd. Div. Moving to Army area—came under command 13 Corps 25th January. i .(Cdn.) Corps Not in Army area. 5 (Br.) Corps .' i (Cdn.) Inf. Div. Approaching . 8 (Ind.) Inf. Div. East of Orsogna. 2 Para. Bde. Under command 8 Ind. Div. i6th January. i (Cdn.) Armd. Bde. 13 (Br.) Corps '4.(Ind.) Inf. Div. Relieved 2 N.Z. Div. i6th January. 78 (Br.) Inf. Div. - North of Agnone. . ii (Cdn.) Inf. Bde. Gp. Under command 4th Ind. Div. 20th January. 4 Armd. Bde. Moving to U.K. The title irj-use at this xlate was "Allied.Central Mediterranean Force " (See footnote on Page 43). G 2962 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

APPENDIX "D" ORDER OF BATTLE OF ARMY GROUP ." C As at 22nd January, 1944 TENTH ARMY REMARKS LXXVI Panzer Corps i Parachute Division Hermann Goering Armoured Reconnaissance 26 Panzer Division Battalion was acting as link between i Para- 334 Infantry Division chute and 26 Panzer Divisions. Regimental Group from 65 Infantry Division 3 Panzer Grenadier Division Moving into Corps Reserve. (less one regiment). Gruppe Hauck 305 Infantry Division A G.H.Q. High Mountain Battalion under command. XIV Panzer Corps » 5 Mountain Division Supported by a regiment of 3 Panzer Grenadier Division, two battalions of 15 Panzer Grenadier Division and a G.H.Q, High Mountain Battalion. 44 (Hoch und Deutschmeister) Infantry Two regiments of 71 Infantry Division under Division command. 15 Panzer Grenadier Division Less two battalions detached to 5 Mountaini Division. 94 Infantry Division Hermann Goering Panzer Division 29 Panzer Grenadier Division 90 Panzer Grenadier Division Less elements. -1 Parachute Corps 4 Parachute Division Still incomplete. Assault Regiment (Sturm. Regiment) still forming at Perugia. 92 Infantry Division Cadre only. Miscellaneous G.A.F. Units. Remainder 90 Panzer Grenadier Division moving in from Adriatic Sector.

FOURTEENTH ARMY LXXXVII Corps Liguria and N. Tuscany. 65 Infantry Division Genoa. 356 Infantry Division Spezia—Leghorn. 16 SS Division Elements Leghorn ; remainder, still forming.. Ljubljana. LI Mountain Corps Romagna and Marches. 278 Infantry Division Forming at Bologna. 362 Infantry Division Rimini area. Army Reserve 188 Reserve Mountain Division Trentino. 162 (Turkoman) Infantry Division North of Fiume. Build-up of enemy forces in the Anzio bridgehead (22nd January—i6th February) FOURTEENTH ARMY (Arrived about 29th January) / Parachute Corps . 4 Parachute Division Elements arrived 23rd/24th January. 65 Infantry Division Arrived from Genoa before 3oth January. 715 Infantry Division (mot.) Arrived from Southern France by 4th< February. 114 Jaeger Division Arrived from Jugoslavia by loth February- LXXVI Panzer Corps. (Arrived from Adriatic sector by ist February.) 3 Panzer Grenadier Division Elements arrived with a Regiment of 15 Panzer Grenadier Division by 23rd January. 26 Panzer Division Almost complete in line before 3oth January. Hermann Gcering Parachute Panzer Division Complete hi line before 3oth January, with- elements of i Parachute Division. . Battle • Group 16 S.S. Panzer Grenadier Placed under command of Hermann Goering- Division Division in early February. 362 Infantry Division In Army reserve by 3pth January, elements committed on i6th February. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2963

In addition the following Independent Regiments arrived before i6th February : Infantry Lehr Regiment (three battalions) 1027 Reinforced Panzer Grenadier Regiment (two battalions) 1028 Reinforced Panzer Grenadier Regiment (two battalions). Total German Divisions in Fourteenth Army before i6th Febmary, 1944 Armoured Divisions 2 Motorised Divisions i Parachute Divisions - " - i . Infantry Divisions 4 (of which two semi-motorised) Total nominal Divisions 8 With three Independent Regiments, an S.S. Battle Group and miscellaneous Luftwaffe ground troops, .the total of German forces in the Anzio bridgehead area by i6th February was equivalent to nine divisions.

APPENDIX "E" ORDER OF BATTLE OF ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY As at nth May, 1944 HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY REMARKS 5 (Br.) Corps Adriatic Coast sector. 4 (Ind.) Inf. Div. "D" Force (H.C.R., C.I.H., u K.R.R.C., 9 Manch.) 10 (Ind.) Inf. Div. 23 Armd. Bde. 7 Armd. Bde. Gp. Not yet in Corps area. FIFTH (U.S.) ARMY H.Q. IV (U.S.) Corps ... 36 (U.S.) Inf. Div. . - . - Army reserve, later moved to Anzio beach- head. 909 Para. Bn. // (U.S.) Corps Garigliano sector. 85 (U.S.) Div. 88 (U.S.) Div. i Armd! Gp. • . ' . VI (Z7.S.) Corps Anzio beachhead. 3 (U.S.) Inf. Div. 34 (U.S.) Inf. Div. 45 (U.S.) Inf. Div. i (U.S.) Armd. Div. i S.S.F. i (Br.) Inf. Div. 5 (Br.) Inf. Div. French Expeditionary Corps Aurunci Mountains sector. 1 Mot. Inf. Div. 2 (Mor.) Inf. Div. . . 3 (Alg.) Inf. Div. 4 (Mor.) Mtn. Div. 1 Gp. Tabor 3 Gp. Tabor 4 Gp. Tabor 2 Armd. Gp. EIGHTH ARMY 6 (S.A.) Amid. Div. (less 12 S.A. Mot. Bde.) Came under command ist May—under com- mand i Cdn. Corps 3ist May. 10 (Br.) Corps Apennine sector. 2 N.Z. Div. 12 (S.A.) Mot. Bde. Under comd. 5th—23rd May, 24 (Br.) Gds. Bde. To 6 S.A. Armd. Div. 3ist May. 2 (Br.) Para. Bde. Hermon Force (K.D.G., 12 L.) Italian Mot. Gp. 11 Cdn. Inf. Bde. Gp. Relieved by ;i2 (S.A.) Mot. Bde. and moved to under comd. 5 Cdn. Armd. Div. 5th/6th May. G2 2964 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

REMARKS 13 (Br.) Corps Cassino and R. Rapido sector. 6 (Br.) Armd. Div. 4 (Br.) Inf. Div. i (Br.) Gds. Bde. 78 (Br.) Inf. Div. 8 (Ind.) Inf. Div. i Cdn. Armd. Bde. 1 Cdn. Corps Moved to south of Mignano gth May ; assumed command of 8 Ind. Div. sector 2230 hrs. i6th May. 5 Cdn. Armd. Div. North of Capua—concentrated west of R. Garigliano 20th May—passed through 3 Cdn. Inf. Bde. 24th May. 1 Cdn. Inf. Div. Moved to S. Agata area 5th May—started to relieve 8 Ind. Div. night I5th/i6th May; under comd. 13 Corps till 2230 hrs. i6th May. 25 Tk. Bde. 2 Polish Corps Took over Monte Cassino sector 27th April. 3 Carp. Inf. Div,, 5 Kres. Inf. Div.. 2 Polish Armd. Bde.

APPENDIX "F" CINDER OF BATTLE OF ARMY GROUP "C" As at nth May, 1944 • TENTH ARMY REMARKS. " Gruppe Hauck " 305 Infantry Division 334 Infantry Division 114 Jaegei Division .! LI Mountain Corps 5 Mountain Division : Two G.H.Q. High Mountain Battalions under command. 44 (Hoch und Deutschmeister) Infantry Division . ;, i Parachute Division XIV Panzer Corps \ Bode Blocking Group Regimental Group from 305 Division. 15 Panzer Grenadier Division Elements in Liri valley, bulk in reserve. 71 Infantry Division ' Three battalions of 44 Division under com- mand. . . 94 Infantry Division • • . . Army Reserve • . • go Panzer Grenadier Division FOURTEENTH ARMY . LXXVI Panzer Corps , .. . 362 Infantry Division • 715 Infantry Division 26 Panzer Division In Corps reserve. I Parachute Corps 3 Panzer Grenadier Division 65 Infantry Division 4 Parachute Division Army Reserve 29 Panzer Grenadier Division -. . 92 Infantry Division ' . ' ..•'.-.. ARMEEGRUPPE VON ZANGEN LXXV Corps Hermann Goering Division 162 (Turkoman) Infantry Division ' . 356 Infantry Division 135 Fortress Brigade . Corps Witthoejt '. -Elements 278 Infantry Division • .'.- . ... •'••• L. of C. Units SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2965 REMARKS Adriatic Coast Command (Adriatisches Kuestenland) Bulk of 278 Infantry Division 188 Reserve Mountain Division Alpenvorland and Nordwest Alpen L. of C. Units only Total German Divisions in Army Group " C " Armoured Divisions 2 Motorised Divisions 4 Parachute Divisions . 2 Mountain, Jaeger and Infantry Divisions 14 Training Divisions I Total 23 Divisions

APPENDIX "G" ORDER OF BATTLE OF ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY As at z$th August, 1944 A.A.I. REMARKS FIFTH (U.S.) ARMY H.Q. Brazilian Expeditionary Force 6 Brazilian Inf. Regt. II (U.S.) Corps West of Florence. 34 (U.S.) Inf. Div. 88 (U.S.) Inf. Div. • In reserve. 91 (U.S.) Inf. Div. 752 (U.S.) Tk. Bn. 755 (U.S.) Tk. Bn. 760 (U.S.) Tk. Bn. 442 (U.S.) R.C.T. IV (U.S.) Corps West coast Pisa sector. i (U.S.) Armd. Div. In reserve. 6 (S.A.) Armd. Div. 85 (U.S.) Inf. Div. 370 R.C.T. (92 (U.S.) Negro Inf. Div.) In reserve. 1 Armd. Gp. 2 Armd. Gp. 13 (Br.) Corps East of Florence. i (Br.) Inf. Div. 6 (Br.) Araid. Div. 8 (Ind.) Inf. Div. 1 Cdn. Armd. Bde. EIGHTH ARMY 2 N.Z. Div. Still west of Apennines near Siena. 3 Greek Mtn. Bde. C.I.L. Italian force of about divisional strength. 1 Cdn. Corps Adriatic coastal plain. i- Cdn. Inf. Div. 5 Cdn. Armd. Div. 21 (Br.) Tk. Bde. H.C.R. 2 Polish Corps Adriatic coast. 3 Carp. Div. 5 Kres. Div. 2 Polish Armd. Bde. 7 Hussars 2 Italian Bde. (ex-C.I.L.) 5 (Br.) Corps Apennme foothills on Adriatic sector. i (Br.) Armd. Div. 4 (Br.) Inf. Div. 4 (Ind.) Inf. Div. 46 (Br.) Inf. Div. 56 (Br.) Inf. Div. 7 (Br.) Armd. Bde 25 (Br.) Tk. Bde. 2966 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE. 12 JUNE, 1950

REMARKS ib (Br.) Corps Central Apennines. 10 (Ind.) Inf. Div. 9 (Br.) Armd. Bde. K.D.G. 12 L. 27 L.

APPENDIX "H" OKDER OF BATTLE OF ARMY GROUP "C" As at 2$th August, 1944 TENTH ARMY REMARKS LXXVI Panzer Corps Adriatic to area Sansepolcro. 278 Infantry Division 71 Infantry Division 5 Mountain Division Being withdrawn to N.W. Italy. i Parachute Division 162 (Turkoman) Infantry Division >In Corps reserve on Adriatic coast. LI Mountain Corps Area Sansepolcro to Pontassieve. 114 Jaeger Division 44 Infantry Division 305 Infantry Division 334 Infantry Division 715 Infantry Division Army Reserve 98 Infantry Division Bologna area. FOURTEENTH 'ARMY / Parachute Corps Pontassieve to Empoli.- 356 Infantry Division 4 Parachute Division 362 Infantry Division XIV Panzer Corps 26 Panzer Division 65 Infantry Division 16 S.S. Panzer Grenadier Division Army Reserve 29 Panzer Grenadier Division North of Florence. 20 Luftwaffe Field Division Area Viareggio. ARMY LIGURIA Corps Lombardy Savona to La Spezia. 135 Fortress Brigade La Spezia. (Italian) Mountain Division La Spezia to Genoa (excl.). 42 Jaeger Division Genoa. San Marco (Italian) Infantry Division Savona area. 34 Infantry Division Italo-French frontier. LXXV Corps 148 Infantry Division Italo-French frontier, south. 90 Panzer Grenadier Division Italo-French frontier, centre. 157 Mountain Division Italo-French frontier, north. Directly under Army Group " C " Adriatic Coast Command * 94 Infantry Division Area . 188 Reserve Mountain Division Istria.

Total Divisions in Army Group " C" German Italian Armoured Divisions i Mountain Divisions Motorised Divisions 3 Infantry Divisions Parachute Divisions Mountain, Jaeger and Infantry Total Divisions 19 Training Divisions i Advance elements of. a further Infantry Total 26 Division arriving. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2967

APPENDIX "I" ORDER OF BATTLE OF FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP As at $th April, 1945 REMARKS FIFTH (U.S.) ARMY < 92 (U.S.) Inf. Div. West coast sector. 85 (U.S.) Inf. Div. Army Reserve, Porretta area. // (U.S.) Corps Monte Grande to Route 64. Legnano Combat Gp. 34 (U.S.) Inf. Div. 91 (U.S.) Inf. Div. 88 (U.S.) Inf. Div. 6 South.African Armd. Div. IV (US.} Corps Route 64 to east of Bagni di Lucca. 1 (U.S.) Armd. Div. 10 (U.S.) Mtn. Div. Brazilian Expeditionary Force 371 R.C.T. 365 R.C.T. >Detached from 92 (U.S.) Inf. Div. EIGHTH ARMY 5 (Br.) Corps Adriatic to south of Lugo. 56 (Br.) Inf. Div. Cremona Combat Gp. 8 (Ind.) Inf. Div. 78 (Br.) Inf. Div. 2 N.Z. Div. 2 Armd. Bde. 9 Armd. Bde. 21 Tk. Bde. 2 Commando Bde. 2 Polish Corps Astride Via Emilia. 3 Carp. Div. 5 Kres. Div. 2 Polish Armd. Bde. 7 Armd. Bde. 43 (Ind.) Lor. Inf. Bde. 10 (Br.) Corps Excl. Route 9 to south of Imola. Jewish Inf. Bde. Gp. Friuli Combat Gp. 13 (Br.) Corps South of Imola'to Monte Grande. Folgore Combat Gp. 10 (Ind.) Inf. Div. Army Reserve 6 (Br.) Armd. Div. 2 Para. Bde.

APPENDIX "J" ORDER OF BATTLE OF ARMY GROUP As at gth April, 1945 TENTH ARMY REMARKS LXXVI Panzer Corps Adriatic to north of Route 9. 162 (Turkoman) Infantry Division 42 Jaeger Division 362 Infantry Division 98 Infantry Division / Parachute Corps Route 9 to Monte Grande. 26 Panzer Division 4 Parachute Division 278 Infantry Division i Parachute Division 305 Infantry Division LXXIII Corps Venice area. Minor defensive units only XCVII Corps?) North-eastern Italy. 188 Mountain Division 237 Infantry Division Transferred to Army Group "E" on loth April, 1945- 2968 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE. 12 JUNE, 1950 TENTH ARMY (continued) REMARKS Army Reserve 29 Panzer Grenadier Division Area Venice—Treviso. 155 Infantry Division FOURTEENTH ARMY XIV Panzer Corps Monte Grande to Route 64. 65 Infantry Division 8 Mountain Division 94 Infantry Division LI Mountain Corps Route 64 to coast. 334 Infantry Division 114 Jaeger Division 232 Infantry Division Italia Infantry Division 148 Infantry Division . Army Group Reserve 90 Panzer Grenadier Division S.W. of Modena. ARMY LIGURIA Corps Lombardy Coast of the Gulf of Genoa. San Marco Infantry Division Battle Group Meinhold Genoa. LXXV Corps Franco-Italian frontier. 34 Infantry Division Littorio Infantry Division 5 Mountain Division Monte Rosa Mountain Division

Total Divisions in Army Group " C German Italian Armoured Divisions i Infantry Divisions Motorised Divisions 2 Mountain Divisions Parachute Divisions 2 .Mountain, Jaeger and Infantry Total Divisions 18 Total 23

APPENDIX "K" command, viz., North Africa west of Tripo- ADMINISTRATION IN THE ITALIAN iitania. General Headquarters, Middle East CAMPAIGN Forces, was a British headquarters located in Cairo. It was responsible for mounting all Planning formations and units which came from its Administrative planning for the invasion of command i.e., the (bulk of Eighth' Army and Italy was made unusually difficult by two 10 Corps, and assisting A.F.H.Q. with such factors; the flexibility of the operational plans resources as it could make available. Fifth- .and the remoteness of the base. The decision teenth Army Group Headquarters, though between the various plans for invasion which originally intended to assume responsibility for had been prepared was of necessity postponed administrative policy and co-ordination of until very shortly, comparatively speaking, general administration of the fighting forces, before the dates on which they were due to be ground and! air, did not in fact assume that put into action. As a result it was impossible responsibility for the campaign in Sicily and to prepare well in advance an overall plan for the early stages in Italy. This came about the administrative side of the campaign and the more by circumstance than by design. . On arrangements eventually come to had to be the American side its responsibilities would hastily made and advisedly provisional in inevitably have been small, since on the character. American system the Services of Supply, North There were three major headquarters in the African Theatre of Operations, worked direct Mediterranean theatre, concerned with to Army. On the British side there was already operations against Europe. Allied Force Head- a headquarters administering the bulk of the quarters at.Algiers, Anglo-American in com- forces, Tripoli Base under General Robertson, (*) position but working on the American staff and Eighth Army planned to -bring this over system, was in general responsible for all to Sicily as " Fortbase." This had the advant- directives and policy; for operations against age that the headquarters was already well Europe; it met all administrative demands for acquainted with the formations to be the forces operating in. Italy either from its own' administered and the existing channels of resources in the Mediterranean or by demand supply to the Middle East and had a close and pn Washington and London. It was also f1) Major-General (now General) Sir Brian Robert- responsible for mounting formations and units son, Bt., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B., C.B.E., proceeding overseas from the area under its D.S.O., M.C. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2969

confident relationship with the Commander and satisfactory system of overall working had been staff of Eighth Army. Both Annies thus had evolved by trial and error. Such an emergency their own administrative organisations, and the did occur very soon. function of Fifteenth Army Group was limited The initial Eighth Army landings went to general supervision and co-ordination and the according to plan and rapid progress was rendering of advice to the Army Group everywhere made, troops hi the Toe being main- Commander. tamed easily through the several small No base depots holding large buffer stocks undamaged ports there. In the Heel matters were established in Sicily, nor was Sicily ever were not so satisfactory, since there had been considered as a base for future operations. We insufficient time to make adequate arrange- did, however, dump fairly large stocks at ments, and troops there had to be placed on Syracuse, Catania, Messina and Milazzo which short rations for a few days, but their capture were used to provide initial maintenance of the intact of the major ports of Taranto and forces to be mounted from the island. After Brindisi was of the utmost importance and was 25th August, 1943, supply convoys, which shortly be to the means of averting the com- hitherto had come from North Africa and plete breakdown which otherwise might well Middle East, began to arrive direct from the have occurred. For, when it was apparent that United Kingdom and United States. This the Fifth Army at Salerno was meeting heavy shifting of the base back to the producer opposition, Eighth Army was ordered to move countries meant that it was necessary to submit to its aid with all speed; and its subsequent long-term forecasts of requirements sometimes advance across a country with poor communi- weeks before arrival. The effect was a loss of cations—although justified by the operational flexibility with a consequent waste of shipping results—yet inevitably caused a breakdown in and congestion of ports, due to convoys the supply system. The decision was therefore arriving with stores which were not immediately taken to switch the Army's supply line to the needed, or in excess of current requirements. Heel, where the existence of railways, better roads and far better ports offered security for Initial Maintenance the future. This decision, involving the trans- After much study the administrative plans ference of stocks from Calabria to the Taranto for the finitial major Handings were settled. area at the same time as the Army had to be Troops landing in the Reggio area would be supplied in its continual advance, placed a very supplied by coasters carrying standard loads great strain on the services involved, but its from North Africa and Sicily, petrol and stores advantages were considered to outweigh its ships sailing direct from the Middle East and drawbacks. By the end of September there the United Kingdom, and landing craft ferrying were signs of improvement. The ammunition stores from Sicily to the mainland. Up to D position was satisfactory but petrol—particu- plus 14 detailed requirement demands were larly cased petrol—remained in poor supply made by 13 Corps Headquarters, and after owing to the shipping situation, and there was a grave shortage of transport. that date responsibility rested with Eighth Fifth Army meanwhile had been experiencing Army; Army demands in turn were submitted difficulties of a different kind. The landings at by Fortbase to A.F.H.Q. thirty days before Salerno had met stiff opposition, and the they would be delivered. The arrangements for accumulation of supplies had to be made under SLAPSTICK, the landing by i Airborne enemy fire; but the administrative planning Division at Taranto, were necessarily of a more had been very thorough, and the arrangements improvised nature. It was agreed that the force made proved very satisfactory until bad should be maintained initially through Taranto weather on D plus 12 stopped all unloading for itself, but that subsequently the ports of Brindisi three days. Salerno port, though soon captured, and Bari would be opened and used. A pro- was initially rendered unusable by enemy shell- gramme was worked out based on the shipping fire, and the haiibour at Castellamare was available and an arbitrary calculation of found to have been so damaged as to be use- requirements for six weeks' maintenance and less; but the small port of Torre Annunziata fifteen days reserve. After the initial pre-loaded was captured in good repair by the end of shipments had been exhausted demands would September and this, with the use of Salerno be made via Fortbase to A.F.H.Q. The land- and of various beaches, sufl&ced thereafter until ings at Salerno were to be maintained initially the opening of the port of Naples. When this over the beaches, but it was planned to develop city was entered on ist October it was found Naples and the adjacent ports as soon as that the port 'had been most systematically possible after their capture. Fifth Army obstructed and the facilities there destroyed. retained a line of communication that went J The resuscitation of the port was immediately back through NATOUSA( ) and was exclusively put under way, with such ingenuity and to such American; while, to deal with British ad- good effect that by the second week of October ministrative matters, a British Increment was it was already discharging 5,000 tons per day. added to its headquarters. This was sufficient to keep Fifth Army supplied The system of command and supply that had with essential commodities but owing to the been thus hastily evolved showed certain accelerated arrival of new formations and the practical difficulties when applied to operations. partly unforeseen demands of the civilian popu- The absence of any large stocks close at hand lation reserve stocks were not built up according and the congestion hi the North African ports to schedule. meant that the situation was bound to be Reorganisation of Administrative Command delicate until considerable supplies had been The necessity for some new organisation of built up on the mainland; and, until this was administrative command was obvious. An so, the situation there was ripe for a serious actual breakdown seemed now to have been breakdown if an emergency arose before a averted, but the margin-of safety had been (x) North African Theatre of Operations, United a very narrow one and Eighth Army was forced States Army. to halt on the Termoli line to allow its supplies 2970 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 to be built up. The solution decided,xupon was spring of 1944 was carried out without a hitch the establishment at Naples of an 'Advanced and the pursuit from the Garigliano to the Arno Administrative Echelon of A.F.H.Q., which on proceeded without ever being embarrassed by 24th October took over the functions of ad- shortage of supplies. . ministration formerly exercised by Fortbase. Major-General Robertson, who had commanded ANNEX I Fortbase, was appointed to the command of to Appendix " K " the Echelon; he was instructed to co-ordinate all administration on the mainland of Italy, THE AMMUNITION SHORTAGE IN to make the necessary arrangements to sup- ITALY port the operations of Fifteenth Army Group On two occasions during the fighting in Italy and the North-West African Tactical Air —in the winter of 1943-44 and again a year Forces, and to act as personal administrative later—operations were prejudiced by a short- adviser to the Army Group Commander. age of gun ammunition. The first shortage The primary task of the new headquarters was, initially, an artificial one and there were was to undertake the reorganisation of our always enough rounds in the gun pits; but the lines of communication. From the disposition fact that fighting was heavier than had been of the forces at the time, it followed that Eighth expected, that the arrival of the Strategic Air Army should be supplied by the Heel ports and Force in Italy delayed the build-up of reserves, the east coast roads, while Fifth Army used and that there was a general shortage of trans- Naples and roads on the west coast, each port and harbour facilities meant that reserves Army taking over additional ports as it moved at Army level were inadequate. To meet this north. It was not, however, possible to keep local shortage, considerably aggravated by our British and'American lines of supply separate, commitment at Anzio early in 1944, it was as they had been in Sicily; for the Heel ports necessary to ship to Italy all available surplus were not capable of supporting the whole stocks from the Middle East, North Africa British force and furthermore there was—and a!hd Sicily and the result was a shortage of would be for a long time yet-—at least one ammunition throughout the Mediterranean British Corps under American command near theatre so serious that in early February I flew the west coast. Naples, with its large though home to the War Office in an attempt to obtain damaged port, was clearly capable' of being immediate shipments of ammunition and an developed to accept a great tonnage; and so it increase in the general allotment. I managed was decided to establish a full complement of to obtain a certain increase, after I had fully British depots there and in the Heel, resources explained our difficulties, but I was forced to being split equally between the two areas. At issue stringent orders that the expenditure of first sight this might appear wasteful in adminis- ammunition should be drastically rationed and, trative resources; but it did allow a flexibility except when they were repelling an attack or that was invaluable later when it came to supporting an offensive, 25 pounders would be switching large forces rapidly from one coast limited to 15 and medium guns to 10 rounds to the other. per gun per day. By the end of the year the new headquarters The ammunition crisis again came to a head had succeeded in its major reorganisation and in the late autumn of 1944, and this time it there was a great change from the uncomfort- was not only a theatre shortage but was, in able position of October. Although the build- fact, world-wide and affected American as well up had not gone as fast as had at one time as British stocks. The first notification we had been hoped—due mainly to lack of transport of it came in a message from the War Office facilities—the main commodities were, with the in August which said that a shortfall in pro- exception of ammunition(r), in good supply. duction meant that future supplies would have Port development was sound and Naples was to be cut down. This news, coming at a unloading some 15,000 tons daily; on the east time when we were engaged in the " Gothic " coast the position had weakened to some extent line battles with their heavy expenditure of as a result of the German air raid of ist Decem- ammunition, caused grave concern. The ber which had destroyed 17 ships and 40,000 immediate shortage was overcome by the use tons of cargo at Ban, but there was still a of A.F.H.Q.'s reserve but this unfortunately daily turnover of from. 10,000 to 11,000 tons could be no widow's cruse and by mid-Novem- per day. We could at last say that our base ber the position was so acute that no large- in Italy was now quite firm. scale offensive could be considered for another A further reorganisation took place when four months. Again it was necessary to.impose General Eisenhower left the Mediterranean a strict system of rationing which was to remain theatre. It was decided then that all respon- in force until the final offensive began in the sibility for Italy should devolve as much as spring of 1945. \ possible on Fifteenth Army Group. The obvious step then was to transfer the A.F.H.Q. ANNEX II Administrative Echelon entire to that Head- to Appendix " K" quarters, renamed " Headquarters Allied Armies in Italy." This transfer involved no THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE change in the administrative system, and took ANZIO BRIDGEHEAD* place on 24th February, 1944. After this My administrative staff regarded the com- reorganisation the administrative side of the mitment entailed by the Anzio bridgehead as campaign presented no problems out of the very heavy. The plan relied on the continuous ordinary. (2) So successful was the basis which maintenance of a mixed force, requiring both had been laid that the great regrouping of the British and American supplies, over open beaches for an indefinite time at a season when (*) Annex I. (2) I add a note, at Annex II, on the maintenance the weather was likely to be at its worst. It of the Anzio bridgehead, which presented certain is very much to their credit that these serious original features. difficulties were overcome. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2971

Fifth Army was in charge of the detailed bour engineers. (2) Despite the bad weather planning for the administration, which they that on two occasions caused hold-up and dis- considered to fall into four phases. Initially location in the unloading, until the end of supplies had to be built up in the area of January a daily average of 7,400 tons was Naples, and a loading programme and convoy discharged. schedules had to be organised. Then, in the When, in early February, it became appar- assault, the force would have to be maintained ent that the maintenance of a force at Anzio over the beaches and beach dumps built up. would have to continue for a much longer time In the next phase maintenance would continue than had originally been considered, new steps in the same way, but it was hoped that the had to be taken. Thereafter special Liberty, port of Anzio could be used. Finally, when ships were loaded in North Africa and sailed the bridgehead force linked up with the main to Naples; there they were top-loaded with any. front, maintenance would obviously be discon- special items needed in the bridgehead to which tinued over the beaches and would be resumed they sailed when called forward by the autho-t through the normal channels. rities there. These ships, however, were too The planning and the accumulation of large to be berthed in Anzio harbour, and supplies worked according to plan and when had instead to discharge into smaller craft; and on 22nd January fine weather and calm seas this fact, coupled with bad weather, lack of enabled the unloading to be done without diffi-i craft and the constant enemy fire entailed a culty it was found that the dumps could be very considerable drop in the rate of unloadT built up well inland and not just on the beaches ing and caused a serious backlog of Liberty J ships waiting at Naples to be called forward. as originally considered. ( ) Bad weath'er on Under these circumstances severe economy was D plus 2 prevented use of one beach, supplies exercised by the troops in the bridgehead in for which were thereafter diverted to another., order to cut down their requirements, and Anzio harbour had not been demolished at all; more stores than hitherto were carried there it was found to be usable in all weathers and on loaded cargo trucks in Landing Ships, Tank;, its capacity was rapidly increased by our har- at the same time A.F.H.Q.. was able to lay its hands on some more craft for us and these (i) One novel expedient was tried in the adminis- factors enabled us to build up supplies to so tration of the Anzio bridgehead and, contrary to the satisfactory a position that, in May, we were, Navy's expectations, fully justified itself'. Every day a number of American i\ ton cargo trucks were able to cut down on shipping requirements. loaded with 5 tons of supplies 'at Naples and were When the troops at Anzio broke out of their driven on board Landing Ships, Tank which then bridgehead there were ample reserves of sailed for Anzio. On arrival there the trucks were supplies to support them. driven direct to dumps and unloaded. Empty trucks were loaded with salvage and then taken back to (2) Its initial capacity was for four Landing Ships, Naples in the returning ships. Great flexibility was Tank, and three Landing Craft, Tank. Ten days achieved in this way, and large quantities of supplies later it could berth eight Landing Ships, Tank, needed in an emergency could be- provided within eight Landing Craft, Tank and five Landing Craft, 72 hours of the emergency arising. Infantry at the same time.

APPENDIX

NOTES ON THE AIR IMPLICATION OF AN ASSAULT ON THE ITALIAN MAINLAND- NAPLES AREA To AIR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEK i. Distance from Fighter Bases For the purpose of these notes it is assumed that the assault will be made in the Salerno area which is the nearest point that an assault can be made to our air bases. 2. Distances to Salerno Milo (Trapani) 226 miles Ge"rbini 224 „ Reggio 184 „ N.E. Sicily 178 „ Vibo Valentia 152 .,, . 3. Fighter Performance (including 10 minutes combat) P-38 with one long range tank ° 350 miles A-36 with one long range tank 200 - „ Spitfire with one long range tank (90 gal.) 180 „ P-39 and P~4oF with long range tanks (75 gal.) 150 ,, Beaufighter 300 „ 2972 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

4. Probable Location of Axis Air Forces Fighter bombers and L.R. bombers Airfields in the " Heel ". Airfields in the Foggia area. Airfields in Sardinia. Fighters Airfields in the Naples area. L.R. Bombers Airfields in Lombardy.

REMARKS 5. Available Airfield Accommodation within Range of Assault (a) Gerbini Sufficient airfield space (backed by port facilities) to accommodate such fighters as are capable of reaching Salerno. (Distance 224 miles.) (b) Reggio 4 to 6 S.E.F. Sqns. can be augmented by strip farther north if ground in our possession. (Distance 184 miles.) (c) N.E. corner of Sicily One small strip only reported. Probable that others can be constructed quickly. Estimate 4 to 6 S.E.F. Sqns. (Distance 178 miles.) (d) Milo (Trapani) 2 good airfields would take 2 gps. T.E.F. (Distance 226 miles.)

6. Availability of Aircraft Carrier Support (a) Mediterranean i carrier. N.W. Scotland i carrier. Pacific 2 carriers. (b) Auxiliary carriers are still considered unsuitable for air operations of this nature as they are still incapable of operating modern fighters of the Seafire class. *

7. Availability of Fighters 3 Groups T.E.F. (day) P-38's (augmented). 2 Groups F.B. A-36's. 18 Squadrons S.E.F. Spits. 4 Squadrons T.E.F. (night) Beaufighters. •«» & 8. Airborne Operations It will be necessary to capture the airfield at Salern® at an early moment, and it may therefore be found essential to employ airborne forces for the purpose. If airborne forces are employed by day, or require part daylight fighter cover, the commitment will compete with long range fighter resources required for the assault.

9. Bomber Operations (d) A-2o's (Bostons, range 280 miles) witjb. Doolittle tanks are the only light bombers capable of reaching enemy airfields in the " Heel", Naples and Sardinia. (b) While heavy bombers (B-i7's) can reach all airfields, including those in Northern Italy, from which the enemy are likely to operate air forces, the mediums are capable of operating against the majority of airfields in the Rome/Naples area, including the ". Heel "—also Sardinia. 10. General (d) Problem primarily one of producing long range shore based fighter cover to cover an assault in either the Naples or Salerno area. Assault in the Salerno area offers .more attractive proposition from air point of view for following reasons :— (i) Spitfires with 90 gal. L.R.T. can reach it. (ii) A good airfield capable of taking 4 S.E.F. Squadrons is within 3 miles of assault beach and might therefore be brought into very early use. (iii) Is close to a good port which should fall into our hands quickly. (b) The Salerno assault suffers however from the bottleneck of Salerno town and harbour which must be kept free for land advance to Naples. (c) Long range tanks (90 gal.) may place a limitation on number of Spitfires employed, but suitable airfield accommodation within Spitfire range is more likely to be the bottleneck. Total stocks of long range (90 gal.) tanks at present within the theatre are estimated at 840. • (d) Beaufighters would be able to provide night protection operating from airfields in Sicily (Gerbini). SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2973

ii. Conclusion (a) P-38 (Lightning) and A-36 (Mustang), and Beaufighters (night) can be used for cover of any of the projected assaults in the Naples area. (b) Spitfires with long range tanks can be used for an assault in the Salerno area only. (c) P-39 (Aircobra), P-4O- (Kittyhawk and Warhawk) are unusable except for short range convoy cover. (d) All enemy airfields, including those in Northern Italy, can be reached by our heavy bombers, while the airfields in the " Heel ", Naples area and Sardinia can be covered by the heavies and mediums, and a proportion of the light bombers. (e) Bombers would have to operate unescorted. (/) Employment of Spitfires will depend upon adequate landing strips for 18 Squadrons in N.E. corner of Sicily or the use of Reggio. About 10 days will be available in which to construct these landing strips and move up supplies. Air Plans • (Sgd.) A.C. 25/7/43 • G./Capt. .NOTE i. — DAY FIGHTER SORTIE ANALYSIS (i) P-38 (Lightning) 3 Gps. 9 X 18 = 162 A-36 (Mustang) 2 Gps. 6 x 18 =* 108 Spitfires 18 Sqns. 18 x 12 =s 210 (Sic) 480

(ii) 480 aircraft. 2 sorties per day. 960 sorties. (iii) — = 80 — 12 aircraft sorties daily. 12 " • • • ' (iv) Estimated time over patrol : P-38 I hour " ' - A-36 30 mins. Spits . 20 mins. (v) Providing airfields can be produced in the N.E. corner of Sicily in time for these operations fighter cover will probably be adequate. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE APPENDICES A.F.H.Q. = Allied Force Headquarters. Alg. = Algerian. Armd. . = Armoured. Br. =. British, Carp. = Carpathian. C.CB. = Combat Command "B" (Armoured Brigade Group of about divisional strength). Cdn. = Canadian. C.I.H. = Central India Horse. C.I.L. = Corpo Italiano della Liberazipne (Italian formation). _ F.B. = Fighter/Bomber. G.A.F. = German Air Force. Gp. • = Group. H.C.R. = Household Cavalry Regiment. Ind. = Indian. Kres. = Kresowa. K.R.R.C. = King's Royal Rifle Corps. L. of C. = Lines of Communication. L.R. = Long range. • ..... Manch. = . Mcr. = Moroccan. Mot. = Motorised. Mtn. = Mountain. • ... N.Z. = New Zealand. Para. = Parachute. . • . . . - Pol. = Polish. R.C.T. = Regimental Combat Team (Infantry Brigade Group;. S.A. = South African. S.E.F. = Single-engined fighter(s). S.S.F. = Special Service Force. T.E.F. = Twin-engined fighter(s). • ' Tk; =Tank. ... U.S. ••• = United States. ...'..... 2974 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950

INDEX PART i.—PRELIMINARY PLANNING AND THE ASSAULT. Page" Strategic Basis of the Campaign •• 2879 General Considerations Governing Operations against Italy •• • • 2880 First Stages of Planning 2882 Effect on Planning of the Progress of Operations in Sicily 2883 Fall of Mussolini 2885 Plans for Assault Landing in the Naples Area 2885 Final Decisions on Invasion Plans 2886 Italians Open Negotiations for Surrender 2888 German Dispositions in Italy 2890 Eighth Army Landings in Calabria 2893 Further Operations to Exploit Italian Surrender 2893 Situation on 8 September '. 2894 Italian Surrender Announced 2894 The Battle of Salerno 2895

PART n.—THE WINTER CAMPAIGN. Planning 2897 Capture of Naples and Foggia 2898 Administrative Problems ... 2898 Enemy Change of Plan - ... 2899 Battles of Termoli and the Volturno 2901 Plans for the Winter Operations '. ... 2902 Advance to the Winter Line 2903 Attack on the Winter Line ... ..; 2904 The Cassino Position ... 290.7 Plans for an Amphibious Landing 2908 Operations Preliminary to the Anzio Landing 2910 Opening of the Battle for Rome ... 2910 Consolidation of the Bridgehead 2911 Renewed Attack on the " Gustav " Line '-2913 Fourteenth Army's Counter-Attack at Anzio 2914 Fresh Plans of Campaign 2915 Fourteenth Army's Second Offensive at Anzio 2917 Third Battle of Cassino 2917

PART in.—THE CAPTURE OF ROME AND THE ADVANCE TO THE ARNO. Regrouping for the Spring Offensive "... 2918 Plans for the Offensive ... 2920 Enemy Dispositions 2922 Opening of the Offensive ...... 2923 Fall of Cassino '.. 2924 Breach of the " Hitler " Line 2925 Break-out from Anzio ... 2926 Fall of Rome 2926 Influence of Operations in France on the Italian Campaign 2929 The Pursuit North of Rome ... 2930 The Battle of the Trasimene Line ... 2933 New Plans of Campaign ... 2935

PART iv.—THE " GOTHIC " LINE BATTLES. The "Gothic" Line ... 2940 Early Plans for the Attack on the " Gothic " Line 2941 Change of Plan • ..; • • 2943 Orders for the Offensive ...... 2944 Disposition of Opposing Forces ... . .-.. ... 2945 Opening of the Offensive . - 2946 Simultaneous Attacks by Fifth and, Eighth Armies «•-.> ...:-.:. ..: ... ,2947 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 2975

4 Page Eighth Army enters the Romagna ° 2950 Fifth Army resumes the Attack on Bologna 2951 Eighth Army's Advance from the Fiumicino to the Ronco ... 2952 Plans for the Winter Campaign 2953 Final Winter Operations 2955 The Final Victory 2957 APPENDICES Appendix "A" Nationalities in Italy ... ..- 2960 Appendix " B " Order of Battle of German Forces in Italy and Slovenia as at 3rd September, 1943 2960 Appendix " C " Order of Battle of Allied Armies in Italy as at 22nd Jamia ry, 1944 ... 2961 Appendix "D" Order of Battle of Army Group " C " as at 22nd January, 1944 ... 2962 Appendix " E " Order of Battle of Allied Armies in Italy as at nth May, 1944 ... 2963 Appendix " F " Order of Battle of Army Group " C " as at nth May, 1944 ... 2964 Appendix " G " Order of Battle of Allied Armies in Italy as at 25th August, 1944 ... 2965 Appendix " H " Order of Battle of Army Group " C " as at 25th August, 1944 ... 2966 Appendix " I " Order of Battle of Fifteenth Army Group as at 9th April, 1945 ... 2967 Appendix " J " Order of Battle of Army Group " C " as at 9th April, 1945 2967 Appendix " K " Administration in the Italian Campaign 2968 Annex I The Ammunition Shortage in Italy ...... 2970 Annex II The Administration of the Anzio Bridgehead 2970 Appendix " L " Notes on the Air Implication of an Assault on the Italian Mainland —Naples Area 2971 Glossary of Abbreviations used in the Appendices 2973 MAPS Map I Italy. Map II Rome—Pescara—Salerno. Map III The Northern Apennines.

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