jRtttnb, 38937 2879 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF TUESDAY, 6th JUNE, 1950 Registered as a newspaper MONDAY, 12 JUNE, 1950 The War Office, June, 1950. THE ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY FROM SRD SEPTEMBER, 1943, TO DECEMBER; 1944. PREFACE BY THE WAR OFFICE. PART I. This Despatch was written by Field-Marshal PRELIMINARY PLANNING AND THE Lord Alexander in his capacity as former ASSAULT. Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Italy. It therefore concentrates primarily upon Strategic Basis of the Campaign. the development of the land campaign and the The invasion of Italy followed closely in time conduct of the land battles. The wider aspects on the conquest of Sicily and may be therefore of the Italian Campaign are dealt with in treated, both historically and strategically, as reports by the Supreme Allied Commander a sequel to it; but when regarded from the (Field-Marshal Lord Wilson) which have point of view of the Grand Strategy of the already been published. It was during this- war there is a great cleavage between the two period that the very close integration of the operations. The conquest of Sicily marks the Naval, Military and Air Forces of the Allied closing stage of that period of strategy which Nations, which had been built up during the began with the invasion of North Africa in North African Campaigns, was firmly con- November, 1942, or which might, on a longer solidated, so that the Italian Campaign was view, be considered as beginning when the first British armoured cars crossed the frontier wire essentially a combined operation. The very into Cyrenaica on nth June, 1940, the morrow intimate relationship between the three Services of Mussolini's declaration of war. The invasion was undoubtedly one of the governing factors of Italy was part of the next period in in securing victory. European strategy which was destined to cul- The following Despatch was submitted to the minate in the invasion of the West and the Secretary of State for War on iQth April, destruction of the German armies. When the 1947, by HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD- last German fled across the Straits of Messina MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT the first aim of Allied strategy had been ALEXANDER OF TUNIS, K.G., achieved: to clear the enemy from Africa and G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.S.J., D.S.O., M.C., to open the Mediterranean to the shipping of former General Officer Commanding-in-Chiej, the United Nations without fear of interruption; Fifteenth Army Group. in the next phase the Mediterranean theatre I have the honour to submit my Despatch on would no longer receive the first priority of re- the Allied Annies in Italy during the period sources and its operations would become prepa- from 3rd September, 1943, to I2th December, ratory and subsidiary to the great invasion 1944. based on the United Kingdom. It was now The Despatch is divided into the following called on to break up the victorious team of four parts: armies trained in its hard school and to sur- Part I — Preliminary Planning and the render to the West the picked divisions which Assault. were to form the spearhead of the assault on Part II— The Winter Campaign. the beaches of Normandy. Part III— The Capture of Rome and the The nature of the break between the Sicilian Advance to the Arno. and Italian operations is clear from the con- Part IV— The Gothic Line Battles. trast between the directives for them issued by 2880 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 JUNE, 1950 the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Casablanca of a German attack through Spain, though conference treated the invasion of Sicily as a already remote by now compared with 1942, continuation of the clearance of iNorth Africa could not be entirely disregarded. Our air and looked no further ahead; its orders were strength, though slightly reduced, particularly clear-cut and definite. The " Trident " con- in heavy bombers, would remain adequate for ference which met in- Washington, in May 1943* the support of operations*. On the sea we were took a wider view. On 26th May, the Combined now not likely to meet the Italian fleet and Chiefs of Staff informed the Supreme Allied fully confident of our ability to defeat it if Commander* in the Mediterranean of their de- met. More serious was the intention to with- cision that the major attack on Europe would draw almost all the landing craft from the be made from the United. Kingdom, probably theatre for use in the west; this programme in the early summer of 1944. He was therefore did not take effect until later but it represented a instructed to plan such operations in exploita- severe curtailment of our amphibious mobility. tion of the conquest of Sicily as would be best A further contrast between the campaigns in calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and Sicily and in Italy is provided by the nature to contain the maximum number of German of the planning which proceeded them. For divisions; which of the operations should be Sicily we had had a period of almost six adopted and thereafter mounted would be de- months to study in detail a problem which was cided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Here not, in its essentials, a complicated one. For were no geographical objectives pointed out but the operations in exploitation of success in two desiderata, one political and the other, the" Sicily we were in the first place not given any containing of the maximum number of German definite geographical objectives and the prob- divisions, from its very nature indefinable. It lem of deciding between the available alterna- is essential that this directive -be constantly tives was complicated by a number of unknown borne in mind, for it continued to rule all factors which would only be resolved by the strategy in Italy up to the final surrender of outcome of the preceding campaign. It was the German armies in the field, and the cam- realised from the first that the decision between paign can only be rightly understood if this is the various courses of action which would then firmly grasped. The campaign in Italy was a be open to us would have to be deferred to a great holding attack. The two parts of the later date and might have to be taken rapidly. directive aim at the same purpose: the diversion Our aim in planning was therefore extreme of German strength to a theatre as far removed flexibility and I think it is fair to say that as possible from the vital point, the Channel few operations of war of this magnitude have coast. To eliminate Italy would mean the been so distinguished by the speed with which loss to the Axis of fifty-nine divisions amount- they were mounted and the shortness of the ing to -some two million menf ; they were time between the decision to undertake the in- admittedly not good troops but they were useful vasion and its launching. This speed was as garrisons in occupied territory. To replace made possible by the flexibility of strategy these, and at the same time to provide the permitted by the nature of amphibious opera- troops which would have to be sent to hold the tions and the geographical configuration of the line in Italy, would represent a formidable com- theatre, and it was encouraged by the challenge mitment for Germany at a time when she was of a constantly changing military and political faced once more with war on two fronts. The situation. A certain amount of preliminary comparison with the contribution of the Penin- planning began as soon as the plan for Sicily sular War to -the downfall of (Napoleon is was firmly established. This was done in the hackneyed but fully justified. first place at Allied Force Headquarters, since In order to carry out the tasks assigned by my own staff were fully engaged on the this directive the Supreme Allied Commander Sicilian operation. I shall therefore pass over was allotted all the ground forces available in this preliminary period as briefly as possible, the Mediterranean theatre except for four but in order to understand the background to American and three British divisions, which the operations carried out under my command were to foe held available for return to the it is necessary to give some account of the way United Kingdom by ist November, f and two in which the problem of an invasion of the British divisions held in readiness to fulfil our Italian mainland was first approached and the commitments to Turkey. These forces were basic reasons for the strategy which was eventu- estimated at the equivalent of nineteen British ally adopted. and British-equipped divisions, four American and four French, but of these many were under General Considerations Governing Operations strength in men and material and others were against Italy. not fully trained. Other divisions, again, had To carry out the terms of the directive from to be retained for internal security duties in the Combined Chiefs of Staff one course of the Middle East and for garrisons of the princi- action had obviously pre-eminent advantages. pal ports of North Africa, while the threat Italian troops could be found and fought at * General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. (The any point of the deeply indented northern coast- title of his appointment was " Commander-in-Chief, line of the Mediterranean from Thrace to the Allied Force." Another title frequently used was Pyrenees, or in the many off-lying islands, but " Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theatre ".