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Home , 2011 in Libya, Benghazi, Misrata, Zuwarah

ARMED Research Notes ACTORS NUMBER 18 • JUNE 2012 tactics (Small Arms Survey, Arms 2006 (Small tactics and groups’ among goals differences critical 2012 (AI, simply groups ‘militias’ as non-state armed all refer to Somereports environment. fluidsecurity and intricate what an is to oversimplify tends in situation the on available analysis actors. Nevertheless, of non-state armed state and lutionary over forces weapons. exercise their revo controls the reviews it groups; also armed of analysis the to refine designed a typology Typology andRoles Armed GroupsinLibya: Map 1Libya Map E Libya’s third-largest city. Libya’s third-largest , on afocus Libya with in groups armed of investigatesthe evolvingnature fieldresearch, publication extensive Survey and Arms Small tions with suspicion. suspicion. with tions institu state to view security continue forces policy, revolutionary as international especially for effective critical thus is country the in ating oper groups armed heterogeneous the among distinguishing and Understanding ments. environ security playgroups post-conflict in roles armed multifaceted the misrepresent also Research Note Research This 0 ALGERIA contested by an increasingly complex set increasingly bycontested an Libyais in Qaddafi,security Muammar death of Col. the after ight months c National boundar Int Other town ). Use of such terms risks obscuring obscuring risks Use terms of). such apit km ernational al 250 y , based on a forthcoming aforthcoming on , based 1 The report proposes proposes report The

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kata’ib a , para. 4 on 17 on ) 2 in Misrata. Misrata. in June2012 1 March March ). ,). - capable of operating tank divisions Unregulated brigades are revolution- between amorphous groups on behalf and coordination using Global Posi- ary brigades that broke away from the of their city or ethnic group. If tensions tioning System and Google Earth authority of local military councils in continue to flare up, more cohesive technologies. The forces in Benghazi, the later stages of the war. Senior mil- fighting units will probably emerge. Misrata, and began with a itary leaders claim that, as of March Militias refer to a distinct collection handful of guns but now control much 2012, there were six to nine unregulated of armed groups, including criminal of Qaddafi’s vast arsenal of conven- brigades in Misrata—less than four networks (such as smuggling networks), tional weapons and munitions. Post- per cent of the total number of opera- and violent extremists. Militias repre- revolutionary armed groups began tional groups in the city.6 They under- sent a very small fraction of the groups emerging in the later stages of the went formation processes similar to operating in Libya. In general, the war, further complicating the secu- those of revolutionary brigades and, resilience of these groups is untested rity environment. as a result, developed a cohesive organ- as they have not yet been subjected izational structure and significant to sustained attacks from either state military capacity. authorities or other armed groups. A typology Yet the leaders of the unregulated Violent extremists operating in Four distinct types of non-state armed brigades chose not to integrate into Libya have received particular atten- groups are currently operating in Libya: local military councils, thereby chang- tion by counter-terrorist specialists revolutionary brigades, unregulated ing important aspects of their structure and the international media (Isa, 2011, brigades, post-revolutionary brigades, and legitimacy. While these groups pp. 155–65; Robertson, Cruickshank, and militias. operate in a lawless environment, they and Karadsheh, 2012). Unlike in Syria, conform to social expectations of their Revolutionary brigades account for which has seen regular and coordinated constituencies—principally the commu- an estimated 75 to 85 per cent of all suicide and car bombs, the operational nities from which brigade members experienced fighters and weapons not capacity of extremist groups in Libya originate. These brigades are respon- controlled by the state.3 They formed has, thus far, been limited (Sly and sible for a disproportionately high in the early stages of the war and are Warrick, 2012). That said, the frequency, number of human rights abuses (HRW, intensely cohesive, with strong alle- severity, and sophistication of attacks 2011; 2012).7 giance to their leaders. A distinct have been increasing since the end of feature of the revolutionary brigades Post-revolutionary brigades emerged the war (Al-Tommy, 2012). is their consensus-oriented decision to fill security vacuums left behind by making. This feature was evidenced defeated Qaddafi forces. These groups within brigades and among brigade are most common in pro-government The National Army vs. 8 commanders. or pro-Qaddafi neighbourhoods such the National Shield Several types of local coordinating as or Sirte, but they also structures formed during and after exist in other cities and towns that A power struggle is underway over the war, including military councils were less affected by the conflict. Post- the rebuilding of the National Army. and unions of revolutionaries, which revolutionary brigades are increasing The revolutionary brigades see them- have gained importance since the end in number because of the extent and selves as ‘guardians of the revolution’ of fighting. prominence of loyalist communities (Kirkpatrick, 2011). They distrust the Critically, revolutionary brigades in Libya (ICG, forthcoming). Yet while Ministry of Defence and the National possess significant combat experience— their hasty emergence prevented these Army because much of its wartime as individuals and, more importantly, groups from becoming as cohesive and leadership remains intact. To safeguard as fighting units. This distinguishes militarily effective as the revolutionary the ‘ideals of the revolution’, revolution- them from post-revolutionary groups or unregulated brigades, they are gain- ary brigades created a national network that emerged later in the war. ing experience by taking part in ongo- of revolutionary unions and established Revolutionary brigades are typified ing post-revolution communal conflicts. the National Shield, a national army- by the fighting groups that emerged Recent fighting in Zuwara illustrates in-waiting. The National Shield’s four in Misrata and Zintan. In Misrata, as the complexity of post-revolutionary divisions—east, west, centre, and of November 2011, 236 revolutionary groups and their relationship to the south—reflect the regional power bases brigades were registered with the social networks in which they are of the revolutionary brigades (ICG, Misratan Union of Revolutionaries, embedded. Like many recent clashes in forthcoming). In the Misrata region, accounting for approximately 40,000 Libya, the recurring violence between 7,000 revolutionary fighters are incor- members.4 Estimates suggest the force the Berber city of Zuwara and its Arab porated into the central division of is comprised of students (41 per cent), neighbours al-Jumail and Reghdalin this force.9 private sector workers (38 per cent), is driven by long-standing ethnic Revolutionary brigades assigned public sector employees (11 per cent), divisions and Qaddafi-era grievances control of the National Shield to the professionals such as doctors (8 per (Gumuchian, 2012; ICG, forthcoming). chief of the National Army, Maj. cent ), and unemployed individuals Once sparked, the violence has quickly Gen. Yousef al-Mangoush, thereby (2 per cent).5 degenerated into communal strife circumventing the National Army

2 Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 18 • June 2012 bureaucracy. Thus far, revolutionary persistent rumours of future govern- brigade commanders have trusted ment weapon buy-back programmes, Maj. Gen. al-Mangouch. The practical which encourage fighters and civilians result, however, is that he controls to retain their weapons. two national armies. The National In January 2012, prominent scholars Shield has already been deployed in and clerics in Libya forbade the sale coordination with other state and of small arms. While the overall effect non-state armed groups to subdue of the ban is unknown, it has forced the violence in , Sabha, and Zuwara trade underground, increasing the price (ICG, forthcoming). of assault rifles on the black market.13

Weapons control Conclusion As the largest non-state force in the Security concerns dominate the politi- country, Libya’s revolutionary brigades cal landscape in Libya. Understanding probably account for 75 to 85 per cent the different histories, objectives, and of the seasoned fighters and weapon capabilities of existing non-state stockpiles outside of government con- armed groups has important ramifica- trol. In Misrata, where brigades con- tions for policy-makers. While some trol more than 820 tanks, dozens of groups continue to present a threat to heavy artillery pieces, and more stability, others are playing an active than 2,300 vehicles equipped with role in securing the country’s future. machine guns and anti-aircraft weap- Effective international policy needs

ons, this percentage is thought to be to recognize these distinctions. much higher.10 Visits to six weapons storage facili- ties undertaken in March 2012 in Notes Misrata indicate that both revolution- 1 This Research Note draws on the author’s ary and unregulated brigades exercise doctoral research, carried out between substantial control over light weapons July 2011 and March 2012 and supported and other conventional weapons.11 The by the Berghof Foundation and the British Economic and Social Research Council, as brigades have permanent guard duty at well as additional field and desk research storage sites and control procedures, conducted for the Small Arms Survey in including through weapon registra- March and April 2012. tion and sign-in and sign-out sheets. 2 In Libya, kata’ib (singular, katiba) was the Yet interviews with local military designation for the military units in the commanders and civilian leaders sug- Qaddafi army headed by a colonel. During gest that inadequate storage facilities the fighting, the anti-Qaddafi forces appro- priated the term to describe any group of for weapons and ammunition present insurgents, irrespective of group size. In a safety risk. These sources also high- English-language reporting of the war, it lighted the need for additional techni- is most commonly translated as ‘brigade(s)’. cal expertise for the construction of 3 Estimates of strength and holdings in this such storage sites. Research Note relate to the situation as of In contrast to controls over light March 2012 and are calculated based on and heavy weapons, the regulation author interviews with military command- of the estimated 30,000 small arms ers across the country. They include brigade members serving under the National held by brigade members in Misrata Shield (see below) but exclude National remains almost exclusively in the hands Army soldiers and their weapons as of their individual holders, who usu- these are, by definition, state-controlled. ally store their rifles at home.12 Military 4 Unpublished registration records of and civilian leaders identify the pro- the Misratan Union of Revolutionaries liferation of small arms as a significant as of 15 November 2011 list a total of 236 developmental challenge. They argue, brigades. Of these, 61 did not register Arms and ammunition storage in Misrata, 2012: the number of brigade members. The however, that revolutionaries will have 1. buried arms and ammunition container; total number of fighters was estimated 2. open air storage; to trust the national army before any - by multiplying incomplete brigade 3. rocket-propelled grenade launcher with homemade registra- disarmament can take place. Efforts tion tag; and registrations by the average number 4. good conduct pledge for use of signed-out weapons. to reduce the amount of small arms of brigade members in the remaining © Brian McQuinn in circulation are also hindered by 175 brigades.

Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 18 • June 2012 3 5 Unpublished records of brigade registra- Fight.’ Reuters. 4 April. 6 The range is based on author interviews HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2011. ‘Libya: About the with senior commanders conducted during Militias Terrorizing Residents of “Loyalist” Small Arms Survey March 2012. Town.’ 30 October. pendent research project located at 8 The facile dichotomy between pro- and —. 2012. ‘Misrata Military Council Response the Graduate Institute of Interna- anti-Qaddafi supporters employed by to Human Rights Watch.’ 3 May. small arms and armed violence and ernment; see ICG (forthcoming). ICG (International Crisis Group). Forthcoming. as a resource for governments, poli- 9 Author interviews with two senior mili- ‘Divided We Stand: Communal Conflict cy-makers, researchers, and activ- tary leaders responsible for the establish- in a Fragmented State.’ Middle East/North ists. ment of the Central Shield contingency, Report. Brussels: ICG. Misrata, 18 and 19 March 2012. Isa, Muhammad Kabir. 2011. ‘Militant Islamist The Security Assessment in North Africa is a multi-year project of the 10 Author interviews with senior Misratan Movements in Libya: The Libyan Islamic Small Arms Survey that supports military officials suggest that there are six Fighting Group (LIFG).’ In Muna Abdalla, those engaged in building a more to nine unregulated brigades operating in ed. Interregional Challenges of Islamic Extrem- secure environment in North Africa Misrata. These figures were compared to ist Movements in North Africa. Pretoria: and the Sahel-Sahararegion. It pro- 155 77 the unpublished registration records of Institute for Security Studies, pp. – . duces timely, evidence-based re- registered brigades with the Misratan Kirkpatrick, David. 2011. ‘In Libya, Fighting search and analysis on the avail- Union of Revolutionaries as of 15 November May Outlast the Revolution.’ The New ability and circulation of small 2011. It should be noted that unregulated York Times. 1 November. arms, the dynamics of emerging brigades were registered with the Misratan McGreal, Chris. 2011. ‘Coalition Attacks Wreak armed groups, and related insecu- Military Council during the war and are Havoc on Ground Troops.’ Guardian. rity. included in the 236 total. 20 March. For more information see www. 11 The terms ‘small arms’ and ‘light weap- NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). smallarmssurvey.org/sana ons’ in this report refer to the definitions 2011. ‘NATO Takes Command in Libya This Research Note has been made and list of materiel outlined in the Report Air Operations.’ 31 March.

4 Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 18 • June 2012