Armed Groups in Libya: JUNE 2012 • Typology and Roles NUMBER 18 ight months after the death of Col. The emergence of armed groups Muammar Qaddafi, security in Libya is in Libya Econtested by an increasingly complex set of state and non-state armed actors. Nevertheless, The ‘17 February Revolution’ began in mid- available analysis on the situation in Libya February 2011 with mass protests in Benghazi tends to oversimplify what is an intricate and (see Map 1). Demonstrations quickly devolved fluid security environment. Some reports refer to into armed conflict in Benghazi, Misrata, and all non-state armed groups simply as ‘militias’ the Nafusa Mountains as Qaddafi’s forces (AI, 2012). Use of such terms risks obscuring cracked down on demonstrators (Al Jazeera, ARMED ARMED ACTORS critical differences among groups’ goals and 2011). The escalation of violence and the threat tactics (Small Arms Survey, 2006, p. 248). It can of heavy civilian casualties led the UN Security also misrepresent the multifaceted roles armed Council to pass resolution 1973 on 17 March groups play in post-conflict security environ- 2011, mandating member states and regional ments. Understanding and distinguishing organizations to ‘take all necessary measures’ to among the heterogeneous armed groups oper- protect civilians (UNSC, 2011, para. 4). France, ating in the country is thus critical for effective the UK, and the United States immediately international policy, especially as revolutionary enforced a no-fly zone and began military forces continue to view state security institu- strikes against Qaddafi ground forces that tions with suspicion. were threatening Benghazi (McGreal, 2011). This Research Note, based on a forthcoming NATO assumed responsibility for operations Small Arms Survey publication and extensive on 31 March 2011 (NATO, 2011). field research, investigates the evolving nature of Usually portrayed as chaotic and disorgan- armed groups in Libya with a focus on Misrata, ized, the Libyan revolution was fragmented and Libya’s third-largest city.1 The report proposes decentralized, as exemplified by the emergence Notes a typology designed to refine the analysis of of revolutionary brigades (kata’ib)2 in Misrata. armed groups; it also reviews the controls revo- The brigades began as uncoordinated street- lutionary forces exercise over their weapons. fighting cells but evolved into organizations Map 1 Libya Tunis Sicily GREECE TUNISIA M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a ZuZuwarawara Tripoli ReghdaReghdalinlin Nafus al-Jumail Misrata a Benghazi Zintan Mts Bani Sirte ALGERIA Walid LIBYA 0 km 250 Sabha EGYPT International boundary National capital Kufra Other town NIGER CHAD Research Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 18 • June 2012 1 capable of operating tank divisions Unregulated brigades are revolution- between amorphous groups on behalf and coordination using Global Posi- ary brigades that broke away from the of their city or ethnic group. If tensions tioning System and Google Earth authority of local military councils in continue to flare up, more cohesive technologies. The forces in Benghazi, the later stages of the war. Senior mil- fighting units will probably emerge. Misrata, and Zintan began with a itary leaders claim that, as of March Militias refer to a distinct collection handful of guns but now control much 2012, there were six to nine unregulated of armed groups, including criminal of Qaddafi’s vast arsenal of conven- brigades in Misrata—less than four networks (such as smuggling networks), tional weapons and munitions. Post- per cent of the total number of opera- and violent extremists. Militias repre- revolutionary armed groups began tional groups in the city.6 They under- sent a very small fraction of the groups emerging in the later stages of the went formation processes similar to operating in Libya. In general, the war, further complicating the secu- those of revolutionary brigades and, resilience of these groups is untested rity environment. as a result, developed a cohesive organ- as they have not yet been subjected izational structure and significant to sustained attacks from either state military capacity. authorities or other armed groups. A typology Yet the leaders of the unregulated Violent extremists operating in Four distinct types of non-state armed brigades chose not to integrate into Libya have received particular atten- groups are currently operating in Libya: local military councils, thereby chang- tion by counter-terrorist specialists revolutionary brigades, unregulated ing important aspects of their structure and the international media (Isa, 2011, brigades, post-revolutionary brigades, and legitimacy. While these groups pp. 155–65; Robertson, Cruickshank, and militias. operate in a lawless environment, they and Karadsheh, 2012). Unlike in Syria, conform to social expectations of their Revolutionary brigades account for which has seen regular and coordinated constituencies—principally the commu- an estimated 75 to 85 per cent of all suicide and car bombs, the operational nities from which brigade members experienced fighters and weapons not capacity of extremist groups in Libya originate. These brigades are respon- controlled by the state.3 They formed has, thus far, been limited (Sly and sible for a disproportionately high in the early stages of the war and are Warrick, 2012). That said, the frequency, number of human rights abuses (HRW, intensely cohesive, with strong alle- severity, and sophistication of attacks 2011; 2012).7 giance to their leaders. A distinct have been increasing since the end of feature of the revolutionary brigades Post-revolutionary brigades emerged the war (Al-Tommy, 2012). is their consensus-oriented decision to fill security vacuums left behind by making. This feature was evidenced defeated Qaddafi forces. These groups within brigades and among brigade are most common in pro-government The National Army vs. 8 commanders. or pro-Qaddafi neighbourhoods such the National Shield Several types of local coordinating as Bani Walid or Sirte, but they also structures formed during and after exist in other cities and towns that A power struggle is underway over the war, including military councils were less affected by the conflict. Post- the rebuilding of the National Army. and unions of revolutionaries, which revolutionary brigades are increasing The revolutionary brigades see them- have gained importance since the end in number because of the extent and selves as ‘guardians of the revolution’ of fighting. prominence of loyalist communities (Kirkpatrick, 2011). They distrust the Critically, revolutionary brigades in Libya (ICG, forthcoming). Yet while Ministry of Defence and the National possess significant combat experience— their hasty emergence prevented these Army because much of its wartime as individuals and, more importantly, groups from becoming as cohesive and leadership remains intact. To safeguard as fighting units. This distinguishes militarily effective as the revolutionary the ‘ideals of the revolution’, revolution- them from post-revolutionary groups or unregulated brigades, they are gain- ary brigades created a national network that emerged later in the war. ing experience by taking part in ongo- of revolutionary unions and established Revolutionary brigades are typified ing post-revolution communal conflicts. the National Shield, a national army- by the fighting groups that emerged Recent fighting in Zuwara illustrates in-waiting. The National Shield’s four in Misrata and Zintan. In Misrata, as the complexity of post-revolutionary divisions—east, west, centre, and of November 2011, 236 revolutionary groups and their relationship to the south—reflect the regional power bases brigades were registered with the social networks in which they are of the revolutionary brigades (ICG, Misratan Union of Revolutionaries, embedded. Like many recent clashes in forthcoming). In the Misrata region, accounting for approximately 40,000 Libya, the recurring violence between 7,000 revolutionary fighters are incor- members.4 Estimates suggest the force the Berber city of Zuwara and its Arab porated into the central division of is comprised of students (41 per cent), neighbours al-Jumail and Reghdalin this force.9 private sector workers (38 per cent), is driven by long-standing ethnic Revolutionary brigades assigned public sector employees (11 per cent), divisions and Qaddafi-era grievances control of the National Shield to the professionals such as doctors (8 per (Gumuchian, 2012; ICG, forthcoming). chief of the National Army, Maj. cent ), and unemployed individuals Once sparked, the violence has quickly Gen. Yousef al-Mangoush, thereby (2 per cent).5 degenerated into communal strife circumventing the National Army 2 Small Arms Survey Research Notes • Number 18 • June 2012 bureaucracy. Thus far, revolutionary persistent rumours of future govern- brigade commanders have trusted ment weapon buy-back programmes, Maj. Gen. al-Mangouch. The practical which encourage fighters and civilians result, however, is that he controls to retain their weapons. two national armies. The National In January 2012, prominent scholars Shield has already been deployed in and clerics in Libya forbade the sale coordination with other state and of small arms. While the overall effect non-state armed groups to subdue of the ban is unknown, it has forced the violence in Kufra, Sabha, and Zuwara trade underground, increasing the price (ICG, forthcoming). of assault rifles on the black market.13 Weapons control Conclusion