The Scottish Independence Referendum and the Myth of Successful Small States

lhs (print) issn 1742–2906 lhs (online) issn 1743–1662 Article

The Scottish independence referendum and the myth of successful small states

Robin Mathias Engström

Abstract In 2013 the Scottish government launched its flagship publication, Scotland’s Future, intended to mobilize the electorate to vote for independence. A particularly salient feature of this document is the large number of references to small northern European countries. Combining theories of cognitive linguistics with a discursive approach to political myth, this article argues that Scotland’s Future employs the political myth of national rebirth in tandem with the construction of small European countries as democratic role models. This results in a mythical conception of small states, here referred to as the myth of successful small states. This myth is then used to legitimate the Scottish government’s policies that are conveyed to the Scottish electorate.

Keywords: National identity; nationalism; political myth; Scottish National Party

1. Introduction In 2013 the Scottish Government announced its intention to hold a referendum on independence from the United Kingdom. The referendum was preceded by lengthy public deliberation and the outcome was thus to be the result of the power of words rather than violence, which has tainted the strug- gle for independence in many other European states. An independent Scot- land would have been, quite literally, discursively constructed. The referendum was propelled by the Scottish National Party (SNP), which took the reins of government in 2007. There are nationalist parties in virtually

Affiliation

Department of Languages, Linnaeus University. email: [email protected] lhs vol 12.1 2016 47–66 https://doi.org/10.1558/lhs.31460 ©2019, equinox publishing 48 The myth of successful small states all European democracies, many of which have a secessionist agenda reflecting a broader isolationist ideology. Against this conception of nationalism, the SNP stands out as atypical with its positive view of immigration and the EU (Ichijo, 2004; see also Lynch, 2002 and Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns, 2012 for an introduction to SNP ideology and membership). The SNP’s ideology is mirrored in the party’s construction of national identities, and a study of its discourse could help us understand how national identity is constructed in Scotland. In November 2013, the SNP government released its flagship publication Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland (Scottish Govern- ment 2013; the document was usually referred to as the White Paper). The document outlines the government’s vision of an independent Scotland and backs it up by a large number of external references, as expected from a government publication. However, in order to sell the idea of independence to the Scottish electorate, the message of independence had to be motivational and mobilizing. Typically, nationalist parties mobilize support by appealing to a belief in ethnic or civic unity as the organizing principle of society (Keat- ing, 1996). In contrast, the organizing principle of society for the SNP is territory, as exemplified by the often reiterated argument that no one is better suited to rule Scotland than the people living within the borders of Scotland, regardless of their origin or adherence to specific cultural values. On constitutional and economic matters, the Scottish government is known to have looked to small European nations for inspiration, and comparisons have been made with the Nordic countries, Ireland and the Baltic states (Arter, 2004; Cairney and Widfeldt, 2013; Keating and Harvey, 2014). However, leading up to the referendum, the media and academia alike scruti- nized the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom while largely neglecting other national contexts. This is remarkable, given the salience of references to European nations in pro-independence campaign material in general, and Scotland’s Future in particular. A future independent Scotland would not have been shaped solely by its relationship to the rest of the UK, but would have had to search for its place in a politically increasingly dynamic Europe. This article examines the role played by references in Scotland’s Future to countries other than the UK, and how discursive constructions of nations contribute to the development of a motivational pro-independence narrative. Because national construction is an ongoing process, such narratives have to be studied using a process-oriented approach. Using the notion of political myth, Bottici (2007) has developed a set of criteria which allow us to identify and demarcate such motivational narratives. By applying theories of cognitive linguistics (Croft and Cruse, 2004; Hart, 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Langacker, 1987, 2008) to a large text, large numbers of rhetorical structures can be linked Robin Mathias Engström 49 to cognitive structures and construals of meaning. This not only enables us to see how a political myth develops but also helps us to answer questions about the relationship between political ideas and political language that cannot be answered simply by looking at single speeches or shorter texts.

2. Political myth and national construction This section introduces the notion of political myth, an idea which is helpful in understanding the White Paper. It focuses on two specific myths in particular: the myth of national rebirth and the myth of successful small states. An important element of discursive constructions of national identity is the creation of a common past and a common future, and a key role in this construction of past and future is played by myth in various forms (Wodak et al., 2009). Building on Bottici (2007), this article makes use of the notion of political myth, understood here as a discursive component with a motivational and mobilizing function. This framework is useful not only in identifying and demarcating political myths within a bigger discourse, but it also enables studies of the construction of myths. By identifying and analysing core motivational components in Scotland’s Future, we will arrive at a deeper understanding not only of how the Scottish electorate was expected to be motivated and mobilized but also of how these motivational components were communicated to the electorate. The starting point for a myth is a narrative, i.e. an account of events, people, places, etc. A narrative becomes a myth when it is significant in the community in which it is used, and it becomes significant because of its ability to address the particular condition of that community and to galvanize people into action (Bottici, 2007: 183ff.). At an abstract level, it is clear that independence is the source of inspiration that will motivate and mobilize people. As seen in this excerpt from Scotland’s Future, independence tran- scends the mere constitutional implications of the concept and becomes a source of inspiration in addition to its function as a goal.

Our ambition is to build an independent nation where our cultural and historic life can continue to flourish. With independence we will have new powers over the economy to encourage our culture and creative sectors. And the process of becom- ing independent will, itself, stimulate new creativity and energy in Scotland. (p. 19)1

Political myths are never fully stabilized since they have a narrative core that is continually reworked by the community in which the myth operates. This entails a moving away from a study of mythic reifications to a process- oriented approach. Bottici refers to this as work on myth. The process-oriented nature of Bottici’s framework makes it compatible with cognitive linguistics, 50 The myth of successful small states which is used here to identify the cognitive processes involved in work on myth. These two approaches complement each other in the sense that they allow us to study the development of the conceptual content of a myth, but also to identify the cognitive processes involved in its decoding, which deter- mines how we understand the myth. Trevor-Roper (2008) notes that myth has a very special place in Scotland. Myth, he argues, seemed to have permeated every aspect of Scottish society and remains immune to reason; only the introduction of another myth could change it. A particularly salient myth in nationalist discourse is the myth of national rebirth. National rebirth, or palingenesis (Greek, lit. ‘born again’), is the idea that a land needs to be reconstructed in order to remove current power structures, which are typically seen as evil or decadent. The palingenetic myth is in fact a hybrid of two myths: (a) the image of the nation as a dying, decadent or martyred organism; and (b) the belief in cyclical transfor- mation and rebirth (Griffin, 2006: 498f). Today, Scottish politics might not come across as mythopoeic, but as Bot- tici (2007) points out, myths operate even if they are not regularly acknowl- edged. For example, the palingenetic myth underpins an image found during the independence campaign on the SNP website of a young child waving a Saltire (the Scottish flag, based on the St Andrew’s cross). The flag clearly indexes the Scottish land while the use of a child signals a new beginning. The parliament building is another example of the use of the palingenetic myth. The salient use of Saltires in the design and the absence of union flags suggest that Scotland has been established as a new political entity, independent of the UK. Moreover, a patriotic quotation (associated with Scottish writer Alasdair Gray) on the Canongate wall encourages the parliamentarians to ‘[w]ork as if you live in the early days of a better nation’. The palingenetic myth also features in Scotland’s Future, where a call for rebirth is made in the opening statement by then party leader and First Minister Alex Salmond.

At its heart independence is not about this Government or any political party. It is about a fundamental democratic choice for the people of Scotland. It is about the power to choose who we should be governed by and the power to build a country that reflects our priorities as a society and our values as a people. (p. viii)

The call for a ‘fundamental reform’ is actually a call for the reconstitution of the entire political system and the concomitant birth of a new state. The notion of a cyclical opportunity is found at the end of Alex Salmond’s statement: ‘Our generation has the opportunity to stop imagining and start building the better Scotland we all know is possible’. It is thus not simply a case of continuing improving an existent and well-functioning political framework, but a desire for a reinvented Scotland drawing on core Scottish ideals. Robin Mathias Engström 51

The employment of this myth is not particularly surprising given that the SNP, even before it took the reins of power, was fighting for an independent Scotland. What is noteworthy is that the myth has gone from being people-oriented to territory-oriented. This process reflects the SNP’s ideology and perhaps even a broader, European development (Keating, 2013). Keat- ing (1996: 53) argues that Scottish nationalism, along with nationalism in Catalonia and Quebec, constitutes a new form of nationalism which aims to create post-nation-states and ‘reconstitute politics on a territorial basis which is legitimated historically but which can be used to confront contemporary political and economic realities’. Nowhere is this clearer than in Alex Sal- mond’s opening statement in Scotland’s Future, in which the then First Min- ister starts off by saying that Scotland is an ancient nation, only to move on to the problems facing Scotland today. A political myth has to address the particular condition of the community in which it is used. In Scotland, the myth of national rebirth has been confronted with Scotland’s real-life condition. The end result is a mythic hybrid which retains the belief that Scotland requires a constitutional make- over, which is only possible at a particular time in history, but which adds the argument that many other small societies have been successful because of independence. This take on the myth of national rebirth, which underpins much of the argumentation in Scotland’s Future can be labelled the myth of the successful small state.

3. Linking political language to political ideas The concept of political myth is useful in delimiting motivational components in discourse. However, in order to understand how and why these motivational components come into being, a different tool is needed. Cogni- tive linguistics offers the tools of mapping textual surface layers to underpin- ning concepts and shows how the meaning of text is dependent on cognitive processes. As noted, there are many national references in the White Paper, but they do not all perform the same task. To say that national references are employed in order to contrast the UK with Europe is true, but reduction- ist. Conceptualizations of nations are complex, and by studying lexical and grammatical choices from a cognitive linguistic point of view we gain insight not only into how other nations are conceptualized but also about what these conceptualizations can tell us about the Scottish self-image. The fundamental ability of cognitive linguistics to show how language and thought inter- act in order to produce meaning is therefore helpful in explaining the role of national representation in Scottish nationalist myth making. Cognitive linguistics is a school of linguistics focusing on the dynamics of meaning making. It encompasses several different approaches united 52 The myth of successful small states by a number of core assumptions, notably that language is used to express actors’ world views and that meaning is grounded in general cognitive systems (Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007). Along the lines of Langacker (1987, 2008) and Croft and Cruse (2004), whose theories have been particularly influential, Hart (2011a, 2011b, 2013, 2014) has widened the empirical application of cognitive linguistics by incor- porating theories of critical discourse studies (Meyer and Wodak, 2009). In so doing, Hart has specified that the objective of cognitive linguistics in discourse analysis is to study the relationship between constructions in language and the (re)production of ideology. This approach is thus well suited for a study of the role of political language in the construction of political myths. When language is produced, certain interpretations are encoded by the writer. The addressee’s decoding of language consists of the application of so-called construal mechanisms, which are sense-making strategies based in general cognitive systems. For example, the concept of independence could be understood in one way if we only look at its related content, in another way if we believe there is some notion of causality involved, and it could be understood in yet another way if we believe independence is a metaphor. Success- ful communication thus requires the addressee to employ the same construal as intended by the writer, although this does not by any means equal effective persuasion. Table 1, from Hart (2013) provides an overview of the most central construal mechanisms postulated by Langacker (1987, 2008) and Croft and Cruise (2004).

Table 1: Construal mechanisms and discursive strategies. Taken from Hart (2013)

System Gestalt Comparison Attention Perspective Strategy Structural Schematization configuration Framing Categorization Metaphor Identification Focus Profiling Scanning Positioning Deixis Modality

The four systems in Table 1 contain a number of construal mechanisms. Gestalt refers to an understanding of phenomena as schematic representa- tions. Comparison encompasses processes involving juxtaposition of phenomena in different forms. Attention is concerned with salience of content, Robin Mathias Engström 53 such as foregrounding and backgrounding. Perspective refers to a writer’s linguistic involvement in a text. Pilot coding of national references in Scotland’s Future showed, however, that the most relevant processes for this study belong to the gestalt and comparison systems.2 Motivated by the pilot corpus, it is these aspects that will be investigated in the present paper.

3.1. Gestalt: Force-dynamic and static schemas Schematizations represent conceptual content and conceptual structures. Force-dynamic schemas, unlike static schemas, incorporate the notion of causality. Examples (a) and (b) exemplify a static conceptualization and a force-dynamic conceptualization respectively.

(a) Within the UK, Scotland is part of an increasingly unequal society. (p. 44) (b) We plan to continue in the current Common Travel Area with the rest of the UK and Ireland so there will be no need for border checks between an independent Scotland and England. (p. 269)

A schematization of a static conceptualization such as in (a) takes into con- sideration the concepts involved, in this case ‘Scotland’, ‘the UK’ and ‘an increasingly unequal society’. In terms of structures, Scotland is conceptualized as a part of the UK and of ‘an increasingly unequal society’. Example (b) shows a force-dynamic conceptualization. Force-dynamic schemas (Talmy, 1988) are abstractions of the entities involved, but also of the forces acted upon them. Typically, force-dynamic relations include explicit causers and undergoers. Example (a) is seen as force-dynamically neutral (or static) because it is not clear who the causer and the undergoer are, while (b) is regarded as an instance of force because it contains a causer (we, a met- onym for the Scottish government) and an action possibly influencing or changing the other entities.

3.2. Comparison Comparison involves, as the term suggests, the juxtaposition of at least two entities. However, as pointed out by Croft and Cruse (2004), comparison is intimately associated with the faculty of judgement, and because a comparison is a judgement, the degree of similarity between entities can be more or less full. Comparisons, as Langacker (1987) notes, are often creative or non- conventional, as is often the case with metaphors. The process whereby an experience of a concept is assigned similar linguistic forms as it has previously been assigned is known as categorization. Reit- erated comparison may result in prototype effects, meaning that if a concept, 54 The myth of successful small states e.g. state, co-occurs frequently with evaluations such as small and successful, then future references to small states may evoke the concept of successful small state. Another characteristic of comparisons is that they are gradable. In cognitive linguistics, degree is not limited to the use of lexemes such as more or less, but can be invoked by any degree modifier operating on conceptual structures. This occurs through contextually motivated zone activation, i.e. the choice to make an analogy between different zones of meaning (Paradis, 2008). In traditional grammar literature (e.g. Huddleston and Pullum, 2002), this corresponds partly to a distinction between comparisons involving relative position (scalar) and comparisons based on likeness or identity (non- scalar). The function of a comparison based on likeness is arguably different from the function of a comparison based on relative position, and there may very well be ideological reasons behind the choice. Examples (c) and (d) illustrate a scalar and non-scalar comparison respectively.

(c) Even without independent status, Scotland’s international brand value already ranks 15th out of 50 nations according to international comparisons published in 2012. (p. 210) (d) Ireland currently operates a different immigration system to the UK and this has not affected the Common Travel Area agreement. (p. 490)

Example (c) is clearly scalar as it juxtaposes a position (‘15th’) on a scale (consisting of 50 nations). In contrast, example (d) focuses on difference as such, rather than concentrating on how these different conceptualizations relate to each other.

4. Methodology and material 4.1. Scotland’s Future The project of constructing a national identity is largely a discursive one, and the SNP, whether acting solely as a political party or in its government capac- ity as well, is a prolific producer of political discourse across platforms. How- ever, its flagship publication in the independence campaign was Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland. Because of its key status in the campaign, Scotland’s Future is richly illuminative of the ideas underlying the SNP-led government’s independence policies and the rhetorical means by which they are realized. In addition, Scotland’s Future is well suited for an investigation of the construction of national identity in Scottish politics for a number of reasons. It is an authoritative document outlining a detailed picture of an independent Scotland. In terms of content, it is a very thorough roadmap intended to cover all political areas. As a consequence, it is a rather lengthy document: Robin Mathias Engström 55

670 pages and 175,000 words. The length of the document enables large-scale investigations to be performed, which yields a deeper understanding that cannot be gained by focusing on single speeches or shorter texts.

4.2. Coding of national references In order to get an understanding of the roles played by national references in Scotland’s Future, the references were linked to construal mechanisms using software for computer-aided manual annotation. The coding process consisted of two main stages. First, a list of national references was compiled. National references are defined as linguistic features (either national place names or demonyms) referring to member states of the United Nations. By using the multi-query function of the concordance software Antconc, a list of occurrences of national references in their respective mini-contexts was gen- erated.3 Second, in order to assist the manual coding of connections between these instances and construal mechanisms, the author found it useful to employ the annotation and text statistics software UAM.4 The national references were annotated manually by reading through the text. As pointed out by Hart (2013: 409), conceptualizations are not based on single sentences but on the analyst’s impression of the text. A conceptualization of a nation can span several sentences and contain several construals. By employing the UAM corpus tool it is possible to map the dynamics of construal mechanisms operating on conceptual structures manually, e.g. by identifying how construals co-occur and how they relate to one another. For this study, an HTML version of Scotland’s Future available on the website of the Scottish government was used. Only national references embed- ded in the running text were considered. References in tables or figures were not annotated. Similarly, national references occurring in the notes section were not annotated as they were judged not to be part of the main body of text. Only non-UK references were annotated since the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK, and England in particular, is rather well- researched and well-understood, in contrast to Scotland’s relationship with the rest of the world.

5. Construal mechanisms in Scotland’s Future Scotland’s Future contains a total of 270 references to countries other than the UK. This is striking, given that the White Paper might be expected to be an inherently inward-looking document. In section 2 it was suggested that the non-UK references could be understood as part of work on myth, and more precisely as domestication of the myth of national rebirth. In order to illustrate how this work on myth is performed, this paper has made use 56 The myth of successful small states of the cognitive linguistic understanding of meaning as concepts and construals and with the aid of corpus linguistics software applied these theories to Scotland’s Future. Forty-two nations have a discursive function in Scot- land’s Future (a handful of others occur in tables only and are therefore not included in this investigation), as seen in Table 2.

Table 2: Number of non-UK national references in Scotland’s Future and corresponding construal mechanisms

Nation Static Force Comparison Total Scalar Non-sc. Afghanistan - 1 - - 1 Australia 2 - - - 2 Austria - 1 1 - 2 Belgium 1 2 2 1 6 Brazil - - 1 - 1 Canada 6 - - 3 9 China 3 - 1 - 4 Croatia 1 1 - - 2 Czech Republic - 3 - - 3 Denmark 3 6 8 3 20 Finland 2 2 6 4 14 France 4 2 - - 6 Germany 5 2 - - 7 Iceland 4 2 - - 6 India 2 1 1 - 4 Iraq - 1 - - 1 Ireland (Rep.) 37 8 8 15 68 Italy - 1 - - 1 Jamaica 1 - - - 1 Japan - - 1 3 4 Korea 1 1 - - 2 Luxembourg 3 1 2 - 6 Malawi 1 1 - - 2 Malaysia - 1 - 1 2 Malta - - - 1 1 Montenegro 2 - - - 2 Robin Mathias Engström 57

Nation Static Force Comparison Total Netherlands 7 1 2 - 10 New Zealand 1 2 2 2 7 Norway 8 5 13 2 28 Pakistan - 1 - - 1 Russia - 1 1 - 2 Rwanda - 1 - - 1 Slovakia - 3 - 1 4 Slovenia 1 1 - - 2 South Africa - - 1 - 1 Spain 1 - - - 1 Sri Lanka - 1 - - 1 Sweden 7 2 8 3 20 Switzerland 2 1 1 - 4 Tanzania - 1 - - 1 United States 4 3 - 1 8 Zambia - 1 - - 1 Total:42 109 61 59 4 269

Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a clear overrepresentation of Western European countries. North American references only include the US and Canada while Asian references are limited to a few countries which are inter- esting to Scotland from an economic point of view. African references are not only few but also clustered together. Most nations are only referred to once or a handful of times while a few other nations, such as Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland stand out. Because it is unlikely for a pattern to emerge from few, individual references, this paper will focus on the most frequently conceptualized nations.

5.1. Force-dynamic and static conceptualizations Force-dynamic conceptualizations contain notions of action and causality. They are different from static conceptualizations in that they invite an understanding of a relationship not as something that simply is but as something which is being caused, has been caused or will be caused by actors or entities involved. Force-dynamic conceptualizations that include references to small Euro- pean states are frequent and they play a fundamental role in evoking a positive understanding of these nations. In order to argue that the rebirth of 58 The myth of successful small states

Scotland will result in yet another successful small state, the first step is of course to argue that there is such a thing as a successful small state and that independence is the enabling factor. The first step is to construct small Euro- pean nations as autonomous players, but with a modern touch and capable of working together if so needed.

(1) While they are both strong advocates for nuclear disarmament, both Norway and Denmark allow NATO vessels to visit their ports without confirming or denying whether they carry nuclear weapons. We intend that Scotland will adopt a similar approach as Denmark and Norway in this respect. (p. 465)

Example (1) conceptualizes two small Scandinavian states, Denmark and Norway as having a great degree of military autonomy despite being part of a military alliance, NATO. The description of these nations as ‘strong advocates for nuclear disarmament’ conceptualizes Denmark and Norway as moral players. Although Denmark and Norway are part of NATO, the decision to allow possibly nuclear-carrying vessels to make use of Danish and Norwegian ports is said to be made by the two countries’ respective governments. What a force- dynamic conceptualization helps us see here is that the use of the verb allow conceptualizes Denmark and Norway not as entities being acted upon, but as a force, capable of allowing or resisting outside forces. In so doing, the Scottish government is safeguarding itself against criticism that decisions concerning Scottish defence and safety will be made elsewhere. The claim for independence is a balancing act. While force-relations are used to exemplify the agency that comes with independence, force-relations are also deployed to illustrate the necessity, or perhaps desire, to put some autonomy aside and work together.

(2) Sweden, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Finland have all made significant global contributions to security, peace and reconciliation initia- tives: New Zealand, for example, played a key role in the Oslo Process that banned cluster bombs and similar weapons. These nations cap- italize on their soft power and build coalitions – normally infor- mal and related to specific issues – to advance their objectives. The effectiveness of a coalition lies less in the sheer numbers involved and more in their ability to develop strong and sound arguments for negotiations. There are inherent advantages in being a smaller, wellgoverned, independent state in a rapidly-changing world, with the ability to respond to developments and with the scale to bring national institutions and civic society together quickly if need be. (225–226, author’s emphasis) Robin Mathias Engström 59

Example (2) appraises a number of small states by referring to their contributions to global security. These nations are active: they make contributions, they play a key role, they build bridges. These small states are seen as role models in establishing new and better forms of international coopera- tion; a direct result of their constitutional status and small size. It also puts forward the argument that these small states are powerful. In constructing these nations as powerful, the Scottish government also redefines power as the ability to partake in coalitions rather than creating hierarchies. At the same time there is an element of horse-trading involved as these small successful states, which co-operate on many issues, are said to advance their own objectives. The moral superiority of small states is not limited to peace initia- tives, but they are also capable of taking on commercial interests, as seen in example (3).

(3) Whilst the Westminster Government requires firms to report the number of men and women on their boards, and has a target to increase the number of women on FTSE 100 boards to 25 per cent by 2015, a number of European countries have adopted a more pro- gressive attitude to gender balance on company boards. Belgium, Italy, France, Iceland and Norway have already introduced legislation requiring a gender quota on boards. (p. 106)

The use of the past tense have( adopted, have introduced) suggest that these nations have come further than the UK. Together with the adjective progres- sive, which evokes movement, example (3) conceptualizes these nations as actively tackling the issue of inequality. This is in contrast to Westminster, whose requirements are seen as toothless. In example (3) Westminster is also seen as more static in comparison; while the other states ‘introduce legislation’, Westminster ‘has a target’. Static conceptualizations are frequent in Scotland’s Future and they are typically used to normalize existing relations between different nations. For example, references to Commonwealth countries are used to argue in favour of retaining the monarchical form of government while references to France, Ger- many, and the Netherlands are used in order to argue in favour of retaining the pound. References describing relations with Ireland serve mainly to argue that independence for Scotland will not affect the relationship negatively. Static conceptualizations typically occur in relation to active conceptualizations, in which case they have a normalizing function, as seen in examples (4) and (5).

(4) This Government intends that Scotland will also seek a closer relationship with the Nordic Council of Ministers. Scotland has key 60 The myth of successful small states

shared interests with our geographical neighbours in the North Atlantic, such as Iceland and Norway, and a common interest in the Arctic and High North. (p. 227)

(5) Scotland will be willing to co-locate diplomatic missions with other nations, including, and in particular, with the rest of the UK in current premises. This is common practice internationally. The UK has arrangements with Canada under a Memorandum of Understanding and with other nations. Ireland and Denmark also use this approach successfully to provide support to their citizens overseas. (p. 230)

While the Scottish government is opposed to join the Schengen area, there are other forms of co-operation seen as less problematic. In example (4), the Scottish government is seen as an active player which will work closer together with the Nordic Council, an obscure inter-governmental organiza- tion which is given little attention in public debate even in the Nordic countries. It does seem to matter to the Scottish Parliament, however. As noted by Arter (2004), the Scottish Parliament was the only national assembly outside of the Nordic countries to congratulate the Nordic council on its 50th anni- versary in 2002. The relationship between Scotland and the Nordic countries is normalized using a static construction: Scotland has shared interests with these countries. The same pattern seen in example (4) can also be seen in example (5), where Scotland is conceptualized as an active and a potential international player. The first sentence establishes that in the future, Scotland will co-operate in diplomatic missions with other countries, and the two following sentences are normalizing this scenario. Two small states, Denmark and Ireland, are conceptualized as active co-participants in diplomatic missions. The UK, however, is part of a normalizing static conceptualization, implicitly comparing the relationship between the UK and Canada with that which the Scot- tish government envisions it will have post-independence with other nations. Scotland is also involved in explicit comparisons, which will be the focus of the next section.

5.2. Comparative conceptualizations Comparison is the process whereby entities are evaluated in terms of similarity and difference, which thus allows us to see how nations are evaluated against one another. Not all comparisons perform the same function, however. By considering comparisons not merely as rhetorical devices but as construals operating on different bounded structures, differences between comparisons become visible. Non-scalar comparisons are used to evaluate entities, in this case nations, in terms of identity and likeness. In Scotland’s Robin Mathias Engström 61

Future, non-scalar comparisons can be thought of as the first gear in the process of comparing Scotland to its role models. Most comparisons are made with small European states. These small states, notably Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland are repeatedly described either as countries similar in size to Scotland or simply as countries similar to Scotland with no direct specification. A clear difference can be seen between non-scalar comparisons with Ireland.

(6) Though it would ultimately be a decision for the rest of the UK, we also expect that Scottish citizens will continue to serve in UK forces if they wish to, as citizens of Ireland and the Commonwealth do. (p. 244)

(7) Ireland currently operates a different immigration system to the UK and this has not affected the Common Travel Area agreement. For example, Ireland grants ‘green cards’, which the UK does not, and the UK has a points based system which Ireland does not. Far from hindering the Common Travel Area, the UK and Ireland issued a joint statement earlier this year committing to the development of a Common Travel Area visa. (p. 490)

References to Ireland imply that an independent Scotland, just like Ireland, can choose in which areas the reborn state wants to emulate the UK. As seen in (6) and (7), this view is seen as unproblematic as the Scottish government presupposes that Scottish citizens, just like Irish, may continue to serve in the British army and travel between the two countries without a visa. In a sense, comparisons to Ireland are used to guarantee that things will stay the same, unlike references to other small European states which are more used as motivational examples. Scotland is compared to the Nordic countries in several ways. Besides referring to similarity in size, comparisons also focus on constitutional matters, as seen in example (8).

(8) The current Scottish Government proposes that, from the date of independence, the Scottish Parliament will keep its current single chamber structure. This is similar to other comparable states which also have single chamber parliaments, such as New Zealand, Den- mark, Norway and Sweden. (p. 572)

The ‘Scandinavianness’ of the Scottish Parliament has been noted by schol- ars (Arter, 2004; Cairney and Widfeldt, 2013). By focusing on the role played by committees in the Swedish and Scottish Parliaments and on the notion of consensus-driven politics, Arter (2004) has dubbed Scotland a 62 The myth of successful small states

Scandinavian-style democracy. The structure of the Scottish Parliament is an important question for the SNP government, which makes a distinction between parliaments which they see as ‘adversarial and confrontational’ (Westminster) and those that are ‘more democratic’ (e.g. Sweden).5 This distinction is, however, used in literature on parliamentary structure, most notably in Lijphart’s (1999) distinction between the Westminster model and the ‘consensus model’). But the comparison between the Scottish and Scan- dinavian parliaments is about more than structure. On the opening day of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, Winnie Ewing, the first woman to represent the SNP in Westminster, stated that ‘[o]ur dream is for Scotland to be as sov- ereign as Denmark, Finland or Austria – no more, no less’ (Arter, 2004: 3). Several comparisons between Scotland and small states emphasize all the things that small states do better than a Scotland locked to the Westminster system. This is mainly done using scalar comparisons. First it should be noted that non-European states play a small and insignificant role in this construction process; countries such as Brazil, China, India, Japan, Russia, and South Africa serve only to emphasize the importance of trade between Scotland and the rest of the UK. Instead, the object of comparison are the successful small states found in Northern Europe, as seen in example (9).

(9) With independence, Scotland will be able to negotiate fairer allo- cations for rural development – similar to those achieved by many other member states. For example, despite having an area of agri- cultural land equal to around 25 per cent of that of the UK, Ireland negotiated an allocation of almost €2 billion for rural development – almost 85 per cent of the total allocation for the UK. Finland negotiated a €600 million uplift. This demonstrates what independent countries similar in size to Scotland can achieve within EU negotiations when they are able to reflect their own needs and priorities. (p. 280)

While force-dynamic conceptualizations served to establish small states as active players on the world stage, scalar comparisons contribute with evidence that they are performing better than a Scotland in the UK. In example (9), the presupposition is that Scotland within the UK is not receiving enough funding for rural development. Two small states, Ireland and Finland, are presented as evidence that even a small state would be more successful in negotiating with the EU than a larger state like the UK, thus reducing the complexity inherent in EU development policy to a question of size. So far, the various construal mechanisms have mostly been treated sep- arately, but typically these mechanisms co-occur. Example (10) shows how these operations perform their work on myth. Robin Mathias Engström 63

(10) Nations that are similar to Scotland – such as Norway, Finland, Den- mark and Sweden – sit at the top of world wealth and well-being league tables. Unlike Scotland, they are independent and are able to take decisions in the best interests of their own economies. They do not leave the important decisions about their economy to parliaments whose interests necessarily lie elsewhere. That is their independence advantage and they have used it to build societies that deliver a higher quality of life for their citizens. (p. 43)

Before the credit crunch, Ireland was given as an example of a successful small state, and was part of what the SNP had labelled ‘the arc of prosperity’, stretching from Ireland to the Nordic countries (Keating and Harvey, 2014). In the 2014 referendum, however, this sort of comparison was no longer viable so focus shifted ‒ to the Nordic countries. Example (10) epitomizes the rhetorical work resulting in the myth of the successful small state. A non-scalar construal is first invoked by conceptualizing Scotland and the Scandinavian countries and Finland as belonging to the same category. A scalar construal is subsequently invoked by referring to these countries’ ranking on international lists. Simultaneously, these countries’ agency is also emphasized and explained as a result of independence. In this example, the Westminster system is lurking in the background, as it often is in relation to non-UK references. Manifestations of anti-Westminster sentiment abound in Scotland’s Future, but nowhere else are the Scandinavian countries so clearly put in direct opposition to Westminster. The central government is not merely conceptualized as inept; it is described as working against the Scottish people.

6. Conclusions This article has put forward the claim that the SNP-led Scottish government has reworked the myth of national rebirth in a way which reflects its belief in territory as the organizing principle of states. The end result is referred to here as the myth of successful small states. This myth is used in independence rhetoric in order to envisage an independent Scotland that bears more resemblance to the Nordic countries and Ireland than to the United King- dom in its current form. By analysing the use of myths as consisting of cognitive operations, this paper has revealed that the mythic construction of successful states consists of a number of key components. Force-dynamic conceptualizations evoke images of small states as active and influential not despite their size but because of it. Static conceptualizations provide background for further conceptualizations and either envisage new relations or exemplify existing relations between Scotland and other states in order to claim that they will be 64 The myth of successful small states maintained. Conceptualizations involving comparisons typically involve Ire- land and the Scandinavian countries. Non-scalar comparisons are used to justify comparisons between Scotland and small states. Scalar comparisons construct these small states as success stories while simultaneously declaring the Westminster system as inept and in fact even treacherous. Scalar comparisons are also typically combined with non-scalar comparisons, resulting in conceptualizations of Scotland as ill-treated and deserving better. This research has implications for our understanding of how nations are imagined using language and how national visions are communicated and used in order to mobilize voters. Finally, this article has provided an example of how the treatment of discourses as political myths can fruitfully be combined with cognitive linguistic theories in order to reveal the underlying mechanisms of discourse around socially important phenomena.

Notes 1. Numbers in parentheses co-occurring with examples from Scotland’s Future refer to page numbers in the PDF version of the text. 2. The pilot corpus consisted of chapters 1 to 7 of the White Paper. 3. Available as a free download at http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software.html 4. Available as a free download at http://www.wagsoft.com/CorpusTool/download.html 5. For a list of parliaments: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/visitandlearn/24501.aspx

About the author Robin Engström is a Doctoral Candidate in English Linguistics at Linnaeus Uni- versity. His research interests are in political discourse studies. He is currently researching how the concept of independence was conveyed to the Scottish electorate during the 2014 Scottish independence referendum.

References Arter, D. (2004). The Scottish Parliament: A Scandinavian-style Assembly? London: Frank Cass. Bottici, C. (2007). A Philosophy of Political Myth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498626 Cairney, P. and Widfeldt, A. (2015). Is Scotland a Westminster-style majoritarian democracy or a Scandinavian-style consensus democracy? A comparison of Scotland, the UK and Sweden. Regional and Federal Studies 33: 1278–1298. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597 566.2014.958818 Croft, W. and Cruse, A. (2004). Cognitive Linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511803864 Geeraerts, D. and Cuyckens, H. (2007). Introducing cognitive linguistics. In D. Geeraerts and D. Cuyckens (Eds) The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, 53–89. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Robin Mathias Engström 65

Griffin, R. (2006). Palingenetic myth. In C. P. Blamires and P. Jackson (Eds) World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia, 498–499. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio. Hart, C. (2011a). Force-interactive patterns in immigration discourse: A cognitive linguistic approach to cda. Discourse and Society 22: 269–286. https://doi.org/10.1177/09579 26510395440 Hart, C. (2011b). Moving beyond metaphor in the cognitive linguistic approach to Cda: Construal operations in immigration discourse. In C. Hart (Ed.) Critical Discourse Stud- ies in Context and Cognition, 71–92. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Hart, C. (2013). Event-construal in press reports of violence in two recent political protests: A cognitive linguistic approach to Cda. Journal of Language and Politics 12: 400–423. https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.12.3.05har Hart, C. (2014). Discourse, Grammar and Ideology: Functional and Cognitive Perspectives. London: Bloomsbury. Huddleston, R. D. and Pullum, G. K. (2002). The Cambridge Grammar of the English Lan- guage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316423530 Ichijo, A. (2004). Scottish Nationalism and the Idea of Europe: Concepts of Europe and the Nation. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203337806 Keating, M. (1996). Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Cat- alonia and Scotland. Basingstoke: Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230374348 Keating, M. (2013). Rescaling the European State: The Making of Territory and the Rise of the Meso. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/97801 99691562.001.0001 Keating, M. and Harvey, M. (2014). Small Countries in a Big World: What Scotland Can Learn. Edinburgh: Luath Press. Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Vol. 1, Theoretical Prerequi- sites. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Langacker, R. W. (2008). Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction. Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.001.0001 Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty- six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Lynch, P. (2002). SNP: The History of the Scottish National Party. Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press. Meyer, M. and Wodak, R (Eds) (2009). Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. Los Ange- les, CA: Sage. Mitchell, J., Bennie, L., and Johns, R. (2012). The Scottish National Party: Transition to Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Paradis, C. (2008). Configurations, construals and change: Expressions of degree. English Language and Linguistics 12: 317–343. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1360674308002645 66 The myth of successful small states

Scottish Government. (2013). Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland [White Paper]. Retrieved from http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/0. Talmy, L. (1988). Force dynamics in language and cognition. Cognitive Science 12: 49–100. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog1201_2 Trevor Roper, H. R. (2008). The Invention of Scotland: Myth and History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wodak, R,, De Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., and Liebhart, K. (2009), The Discursive Construction of National Identity (trans A. Hirsch, R. Mitten, and J. W. Unger), (2nd edn), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.