National Secession
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NATIONAL SECESSION National Secession Persuasion and Violence in Independence Campaigns Philip G. Roeder CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON Copyright © 2018 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress.cornell.edu. First published 2018 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Roeder, Philip G., author. Title: National secession : persuasion and violence in independence campaigns / Philip G. Roeder. Description: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018015839 (print) | LCCN 2018017755 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501725999 (pdf) | ISBN 9781501726002 (epub/mobi) | ISBN 9781501725982 | ISBN 9781501725982 (cloth ; alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Secession. | Separatist movements. | Autonomy and independence movements. | Political violence. | Self-determination, National. Classification: LCC JC327 (ebook) | LCC JC327 .R64 2018 (print) | DDC 320.1/5—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018015839 Cover photograph: United Ukrainians fighting Polish and Russian forces. Postcard (1920) published by the Ukrainian Brigade. Contents List of Figures and Tables vii Acknowledgments ix 1. Three Questions about National Secession 1 2. Strategic Constraints: Goals and Means 20 3. Organization and Mobilization in Campaign Development 46 4. Programmatic Coordination in Campaigns 67 5. Significant Campaigns: Getting on the Global Agenda 92 6. Intractable Disputes: Consequences of Successful Campaigning 117 7. Protracted Intense Struggles: Reinforcing Intractability 149 8. Complementary Explanations: Motivations and Opportunities 171 9. Looking Forward: Implications of Programmatic Analysis 189 Appendix to Chapter 2 199 Appendix to Chapter 5 207 Appendix to Chapter 7 217 Appendix to Chapter 9 229 Notes 239 Glossary 263 References 267 Index 287 Figures and Tables Figures 2.1. Significant national-secession campaigns, 1945–2010 21 2.2. Types of peoplehood and statehood campaigns 24 5.1. Moldova, Novorossiia, and Ukraine 93 5.2. Platform size and campaign significance 112 6.1. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagornyi Karabakh 125 6.2. Abkhazia, Georgia, and South Ossetia 128 6.3. Moldova and Transdniestria 133 6.4. Chechnya and Ingushetia 136 7.1. Protracted intensity in national-secession campaigns, 1970–2006 162 7.2. Platform size and protracted intensity 167 Tables 2.1. National-secession campaigns by region, 1945–2010 27 2.2. Common-states facing one or more national-secession campaigns, 1945–2010 28 2.3. Successful secessions, 1945–2016 29 2.4. Most intense and protracted campaigns, 1970–2006 40 2.5. Maximum intensity of lethal violence per campaign, 1970–2006 41 3.1. Constituent parts of a national-secession campaign 54 3.2. Developmental stages and activation phases 55 4.1. Incentives and types 73 5.1. Changes in probabilities of campaign significance 103 7.1. Twenty most-protracted intense struggles, 1970–2006 163 vii viii FIGURES AND TABLES 7.2. Change in index of protracted intensity, 1970–2006 164 7.3. Changes in probabilities of new civil war, 1945–2010 164 9.1. Projects with greatest unrealized potential to achieve significance, 1945–2010 193 9.2. Campaigns with greatest unrealized potential for more protracted intense violence, 1970–2006 194 2A.1. Significant national-secession campaigns, 1945–2010 200 2A.2. Logit results for impact of war on independence, 1945–2010 205 5A.1. Summary statistics for variables included in tests of campaign significance 209 5A.2. Logit results for ethnic groups that become platforms for significant national-secession campaigns 213 5A.3. Reestimation of model 1 215 7A.1. Summary statistics for variables included in estimations of protracted intensity 218 7A.2. Regression results for alternative analytic approaches, 1970–2006 225 7A.3. Regression results for alternative specifications of programmatic model, 1970–2006 226 7A.4. Logit results for initiation of intense violence, 1970–2006 226 7A.5. Logit results for initiation of civil wars, 1945–2010 227 9A.1. Projects that were more significant than predicted, 1945–2010 231 9A.2. Campaigns that were more violent than predicted, 1970–2006 235 Acknowledgments This book would not have been possible without the opportunity to build on the accomplishments of so many distinguished scholars who have gone before and tackled so many of the really difficult issues addressed here. I can only hope that I have done justice to these fine scholars by at least citing their works, even if I have misused some of their contributions. On a more personal note, once again I learned how much I rely on truly good friends to take a look at an unpolished manuscript. I want to extend special thanks for the many hours and careful comments they provided. Gershon Shafir offered strong encouragement after reading a very early draft of the manuscript, and this kept me going. Valerie Bunce, Caroline Hartzell, and Matthew Hoddie read a slightly improved version and offered extensive and thoughtful sugges- tions for still more work. Roger Haydon and the two anonymous reviewers at Cornell University Press offered strong encouragement and advice that moved the manuscript to its final draft. I thank each of these wonderful colleagues. A delight that comes with working at a research university is the presence of outstanding students and research assistants. The University of California at San Diego has been a very special place in this regard. This book began as ill-focused questions that my students and I explored. I think Karthik Vaidyanathan had serious doubts that I knew where I was going in my research (he was right), and his questions challenged me to find focus. In my seminars the students who explored case studies with me introduced me to a wider world. Dotan Haim, Sean Morgan, and Deborah Seligsohn closely read and carefully annotated the first half of the manuscript and thus helped me clarify the theory in this book. Konstantin Ash and Luke Sanford generated GIS-based data and presentations; I would still be puzzling over the diabolically opaque software if I had continued with my original plan to do it all myself. And Brian Engelsma read every last word of the manuscript; his insightful comments helped me clarify the logic and pol- ish my presentation. To all of these students I owe a very special thank-you for their hard work and for making the process of writing this book more enjoyable. ix NATIONAL SECESSION 1 THREE QUESTIONS ABOUT NATIONAL SECESSION In recent decades the challenge confronting many countries around the world has not been communist revolution or Islamic transformation but national secession. Among the political agendas that have convulsed the world, campaigns to achieve independence through secession have been among the most momen- tous. These national-secession campaigns promise a transformation every bit as profound and deep as class revolution or religious transformation—not only in the lives of those they claim to liberate but often in the lives of those whom they claim to be their oppressors and even their neighbors. This book asks why some programs for national secession give rise to such significant campaigns and lead to intractable disputes, and even to protracted intense conflicts. National-secession campaigns are akin to revolutionary activity. In the name of “popular sovereignty,” they promise to liberate their people by creating new, independent, sovereign states such as Georgia, Quebec, Scotland, or South Sudan. They promise that these new states will empower their citizens and turn old power relationships on their head: levers of government will be controlled by Eritreans rather than Ethiopians, Latvians rather than Russians, East Timorese rather than Indonesians. Independence will purportedly transform not only the institutions of government but also wealth and property rights, social and cul- tural patterns: the privileges of oppressors will be stripped away. “Foreigners” and their fellow travelers who enriched themselves under the unjust old regime will be divested. The natural wealth of the homeland, including its land, forests, and resources, will be returned to its rightful owner: the nation. Campaigns for independence promise that the speakers of a national language and the faithful 1 2 CHAPTER 1 of a national church will be freed from humiliation and oppression. The symbols of the nation will be elevated to a revered place on the national flag, its heroes recognized in monuments, and its history taught in public schools.1 The consequences of these changes do not stop at the borders of the new imagined state. For the common-state government—the jurisdiction that is currently recognized as the sovereign authority over the secessionists’ nation and homeland—the campaign’s promises are threats.2 Secession of Crimea, the Donetsk Republic, and Novorossiia (New Russia) threatened to divide Ukraine almost in half and leave it as a landlocked rump. Secession by East Pakistan threatened to shrink Pakistan’s territory by more than an eighth, its economy by almost two-fifths, and its population by more than half.3 Secession by Slovenia and Croatia threatened to upset a delicate balance among republics within