Case for Scottish Independence

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The Case for Scottish Independence

FERGUS EWING AND JENNIFER ERICKSON

Critics of Scottish independence argue that nationalists are excitable myopics whose patriotism was stirred watching an Australian actor wear a kilt in an American movie set in the Irish countryside. Nationalism is a misguided feel- ing, they argue, and one that will pass. But this article will explore the pragma- tism of one of the world's most noteworthy independence movements-a movement that is taking place not with weapons, but with laws. It will begin with a brief history of union and devolution before arguing the case for and against Scottish independence and the role of the Scottish Parliament in achieving an independent Scottish state. Throughout this piece we will explain the positions of the Scottish National Party (SNP), Scodand's political voice for independence, and in so doing will explain a movement committed to both independence and law, outcome and process. Nationalists need not resort to poor argumentation or brutal violence. The SNP has always unequivocally condemned the use of violence as a means of pur- suing political objectives. In Scotland, roughly a third of all citizens identify themselves as political nationalists, and they are sending increasing numbers of nationalists to various public bodies to represent them-to the European Union, to the British Parliament (Westminster), and now to the newly reconvened Scottish Parliament (Holyrood). It is no small irony to be part of a group paid by a government whose dissolution we seek. But such is the nature of this movement-passionate but peaceful, urgent but orderly. Nationalists are often charac- terized as impulsive and exclusionary people who are unable to rationally evaluate

FERGUS EWING IS MEMBER OF SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT (MSP) FOR THE HIGHLAND CONSTITUENCY OF INVERNESS EAST, NAIRN, AND LOCHABER. HE IS THE SHADOW MINISTER FOR RURAL AFFAIRS AND SERVES ON THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY. JENNIFER ERICKSON WAS POLICYADVISOR To FERGUS EWING FOR THE FIRSTTER OF THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, FROM 1999-2000. AN AMERICAN, SHE BECAMEINTERESTED IN THE SCOTTISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT WHILE RECEIVING HER MASTERS IN PUBLIC POLICY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH. SHE IS NOW A CONSULTANT WITH THE BRIDGESPAN GROUP, IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR.

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their interests. Let us dispense with such characterizations and focus on the reality of the case for Scottish independence.

POWER CONSOLIDATES IN LONDON: A TALE OF TWO PARLIAMENTS

Union has been a relatively recent phenomenon in the life of the British Isles. For hundreds of years before joining the British state, Scotland had its own kings and nobles, and despite periodically intense disputes with England, it remained a separate and independent country until it signed the Treaty of Union in 1707. In the words of one historian, "Scotland was a society which by 1707 had been a state for far too long-about half a millennium-to cease being one."' But what happened three hundred years ago was not conquest, but compromise. Union was more a business calculation than an issue of national identity. When the English crown offered to pay off Scottish nobles' debts, which had resulted from bad colonial investing, in return for political union and an alliance against the French, a deeply divided Scottish Parliament voted to dissolve itself and rein- corporate with the English Parliament at Westminster, thus forming Great Britain. As a result, the Scottish and English people both became British sub- jects. 2 Union was a cool calculation of interest. Scotland and England were trad- ing partners and occasional adversaries. Their fates had already been entwined under a single crown for a century due to the ascendance of the Scottish King James VI after the death of Queen Elizabeth. And in 1707, there was money on the table. Scottish nobles got out of debt, Scottish politicians got a change of address, and Scottish citizens got a new flag-the cross of St. George (red on white, England's banner) joining the cross of St. Andrew (white on blue, Scotland's standard). The arrangement was met with disdain by many Scots, prompting Robert Burns, Scotland's national poet to write, "We were bought and sold for English gold, such a parcel of rogues in the nation. " 3 The conception and terms of this political arrangement are important. First, Union was always an agreement between two countries; Scotland and England kept separate school systems, legal systems, and churches.4 These distinctions remain today and are undoubtedly in large measure responsible for the fact that the majority of citizens in Scotland identify their nationality as "Scottish" before "British," despite what their passports say. Second, understanding the initial calculation of Scottish interests sets the stage for the current recal- culation of Scottish interests in light of recent history and present circumstances. While in 1707 less than one percent of the population had a role in determining which flag would fly over Scotland, now the decision will be made by millions. Again, it is time for Scotland to evaluate its interests. And this time it will be a popular exercise.

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DEVOLVED POWERS RETURN TO EDINBURGH

While the debate over an independent Scotland has intensified in recent years, it is in no sense new. In 1712, only five years after Union, George Lockhart, a Scottish Member of Parliament (MP), was already trying to dissolve the Union to revert to a constitutional state before the second reading of the Treaty, a day, which he wrote, "was the last day Scotland was Scotland." But widespread calls for Home Rule, mean- ing the official devolution of parliamentary responsibilities over certain matters to Scotland, began in the nineteenth century. Home Rule became a cross-party issue for Scotland's left of center parties. Then 1934 saw the formation of the SNP, which cam- paigned for Home Rule entailing the reversion of all powers to Scotland. The historic by-election of Dr. Winnie Ewing in 1967 gave the SNP the credibility it needed, and then the economic troubles of the 1970s gave the SNP a case for independence that appealed to many working class Scots. National identity is not static, and the troubled economy in the face of the North Sea oil discovery as well as the election of Margaret Thatcher, an "ineluctably English prime minister"5 in 1979 both con- tributed to a reinforcement of Scottish identity and Scottish interest politics. Nevertheless, in 1979 a first attempt at devolution, promoted by the SNP, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats, failed. The majority of Scots voted for devolution, but after Westminster amended the devolution proposal to include a turnout clause which said that 40 percent of the entire potential electorate had to cast pro-devolution ballots, the vote was not a sufficient proportion to pass the legislative proposal. In 1997, however, there was no such repeat; 74.3 percent of Scots voted for devolved powers to be entrusted to a Scottish Parliament.6 And in May 1999 Dr. Ewing opened the Parliament saying: "The Scots Parliament, last adjourned on May 25th, 1707, is hereby reconvened." The Scottish Parliament has control over Scottish matters such as health- care, schooling, agriculture, certain aspects of economic development, local government, and the courts. Powers related to international treaties and trade, European Union relations, defense, and social security are reserved to Westminster. Such an arrangement represents, in the words of legendary former Labour leader John Smith, "the settled will of the Scottish people." These seven words have become a mantra recited-somewhat hopefully-by politicians from the Labour party, the Liberal Democrats, and the Conservatives. Devolution may now be the status quo, but many believe it is not the settled will of the Scottish people. The Scottish National Party is committed to real- izing an independent future for Scotland, a future no more or less grand than could be imagined by any other European country-to take its place as an independent nation within Europe and the international community. Before consid- ering how devolution fits on the path to independence, it is first worth laying out the arguments for and against an independent Scotland.

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NATIONALISM, SCOTTISH STYLE

As with most political distinctions, lines are easier to draw on paper than they are in public debate or even in individual motivation. Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of Scottish nationalism: cultural, economic, and social. Considered in turn these forms of nationalism will highlight common themes underlying arguments for Scottish independence. Cultural nationalists assert that Scots have an independent national identity and should govern themselves. Simply put, they believe that independence is the logical state for any country. Economic nationalists believe that Scotland would be more prosperous if left to govern its own affairs and negotiate its own way, rather than exist as a small part (roughly 10 percent) of the United Kingdom. They believe that independence provides the freedom to make rational economic decisions for depressed areas like Glasgow, where approximately a third of working age men are unemployed; and likewise for rural towns in the Highlands where life is becoming increasingly expensive, often in the face of decreased financial opportunities following difficulties in mainstay industries such as farming and fishing. Social nationalists base their beliefs on the knowl- edge that Scots lean farther to the left than their English counterparts, and believe that an independent Scotland would thus form a more compassionate, welfare- oriented society than present day Great Britain.7 For these nationalists, independence is a powerful means to an end. To be fair, critics of Scottish nationalism have offered their own views to counter calls for independence. First and foremost, the critics argue that culture is an irrational reason to draw national lines. Additionally, they warn that identity politics is a slippery business. Unionists contend that Scots can celebrate and acknowledge their identity within a larger British state; they see "kilt in the heather" nationalists as immaturely assuming a Brigadoon-like future ruled from Edinburgh, when more rational reasons should be used to draw national bound- aries, like the faulty economics of independence. This point leads to the second form of criticism: bad math. Both Labour and the Tories argue that Scotland is a net beneficiary of Westminster's purse. Simple accounting, they say, dictates that Union is therefore in Scotland's interests. In the words of the Labour party's last election advertisements, "Divorce is an expensive business." On the social front, some more conservative Unionists argue that the thought of a more liberal, more socialist Scotland is surely no argument for independence, and is rather an argument to stay with the more moderate neighbors to the south. These arguments against independence are stated (though often less clearly) in rhetoric from both parties on the left (Labour and the Liberal Democrats) and

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the right (the Tories). The SNP believes the critics are putting up strawmen, and so we will consider these arguments in turn. For multifarious reasons, most people in Scotland identify their nationality as Scottish. Consider recent results of the oft-repeated Moreno style study that asks Scots to identify their nationality.8

TABLE I: Reflection of National Identity

Scottish, not British 32% More Scottish than British 28% Equally Scottish and British 27% More British than Scottish 3% British, not Scottish 9%

Contrary to the Unionist claim, national culture, understood as a commu- nitys shared self-perception, is not an irrational reason to draw national lines-it is one of the most powerful reasons we draw national lines. Benedict Anderson wrote about "imagined communities," arguing that societies consider themselves tied to certain people and histories and not others, thus forging a perceived com- mitment in time and space to a notion of collective national identity.9 In a modern context, an unemployed steel worker in Buffalo considers himself tied by nation to a wealthy businessman in Los Angeles and not to a day laborer across the border in Canada. It is a shared cultural conception common in much of the world. Scots collectively remember a unique history and have fashioned a civil society distinct from the English, just as the English collectively remember a unique history and have fashioned a unique civil society distinct from the French or the Dutch.10 In the words of one young Scot, "I don't dislike the English. I don't dislike the Norwegians either. But I'd rather not be governed by either of them." The Unionist lament against identity-politics is both distorted and hypo- critical. Unionists argue that nationalists ignite passions better left alone, inciting an us-them mentality that has no place in the modern world. But the SNP is a decidedly inclusive nationalist party. Organizations like New Scots for Independence (which includes many people of English birth) and Scots Asians for Independence prove that a belief in an independent Scotland has less to do with tartans and ancient heroes than with the calm but confident realization that only when a nation takes responsibility for itself can it realize the true potential of its people. Secondly, it is more than a tad perverse to be lectured about the place of identity in political discourse by a party that ran one of the most shame- fully incendiary political advertisements in British history, depicting vandals smashing apart a family photograph-style image of the United Kingdom. As this

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advertisement shows, both sides rely on some measure of identity politics-the SNP focuses on the Scottish identity, the Unionists parties focus on the British identity. It is a different spotlight, but not an entirely different exercise. Unfortunately, the economic case for independence cannot be definitively won or lost. That is to say that the "simple math" of nationalist critics is anything but simple. While Unionists tout numbers showing Scotland as a tax beneficiary; these numbers have not been reconciled with the enormous oil revenues that the Scottish North Sea has brought to the British purse. As unfathomable as it may seem, Britain has no freedom of information laws, so we can only speculate as to how much revenue Scotland has actually delivered to Westminster over the decades. But we do know this: when asked in a parliamentary question, the government admitted that taking North Sea oil revenues into account, Scotland's revenues exceeded government expenditure in Scotland by 28 billion pounds from 1978-1979 to 1994-1995.1" According to analysis of the Financial Statement and Budget Report of March 2000, the Pre-Budget Report of November 2000, and other key documents, Scotland is shown as a net contribu- tor to the Union kitty, as shown in Tables 2 and 3. By these projections, the current fiscal year will see a net drain from Scotland of 2.8 billion pounds, or over 500 pounds per Scottish citizen.

TABLE 2: Government Revenues from Scotland (Figuresin billions ofpounds)

2000/01 2001/02 Income Tax Receipts (net of credits) £8.2 £8.5 Corporation Tax (excluding oil) £2.6 £3.2 Excise Duties £3.4 £3.5 Value Added Tax £5.1 £5.3 Social Security Contributions £5.4 £5.6 North Sea Revenues £4.1 £6.2 Other Revenues (each individually totaling less than 1 billion)12 £9.0 £9.2 Total Revenues £37.7 £41.5

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TABLE 3: Projection of General Government Expenditure in Scotland (Figuresin billions ofpounds)

2000/01 2001/02 Scottish Executive Budget £16.5 £17.8 LA Self Financed Expenditure £1.6 £1.6 Defense £1.8 £1.9 Social Security (adjusted for tax credits) £9.8 £10.3 Additional Expenditure £2.5 £2.5 EU Contribution Factor and Debt Interest £2.7 £2.5 Total General Government Expenditure £34.9 £36.6

As for the current difficulties of certain sectors of the Scottish economy, they are largely the result of poor planning on the part of Britain for Scottish interests in particular. Consider the Scottish beef industry. The Mad Cow (BSE) scare prompted Europe to boycott all British beef exports. But when it came to light that Scottish farmers had never engaged in the practices that led to BSE, European countries offered to accept Scottish exports. The British government, however, rejected the offer without consulting the Scottish beef industry much less the Scottish Parliament. Now many Scottish meat farmers are facing bank- ruptcy, as they were never allowed to bring their safe product to market. The lack of support for industry in Scotland, but not in England, and the loss of Objective 1 and Assisted Area Status (both of which are EU-governed statuses which allow for regional investment to struggling areas) to much of the Highlands are two more examples of Westminster acting like a faraway government which remains arrogantly sure of its policies despite the words from the provinces. Each of these cases shows the benefits Scotland would have as a small but independent country in Europe;protecting its interests like other small but independent countries like the Netherlands, Ireland, and the Scandinavian countries. With regard to the criticism against social nationalism, the argument against Scots having the kind of government that suits them best is an argument against self-determination and democracy itself. Whether or not Scottish social services should be more expansive or less so, whether Scottish laws should be more classically liberal or less so are matters for Scots to decide. 3 The stifling of Scottish democratic expression under the Conservative government from 1979 to 1997 showed the civic fatigue that comes with thwarted political will. The 1997 general election showed the Scottish electorate's disgust with the Conservative party when it did not give the Tories a single one of its 72 parliamentary seats. It was in large measure the reaction against being overridden at the polls for eighteen years that the devolution referendum of 1997 enjoyed such widespread support. Scots were

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tired of being governed by politicians they did not vote for and subsequently living with policies with which they disagreed. Indeed, devolution has already permitted Scottish politicians to diverge in some measure from English policies, such as the vote to end Section 2As gag order on the discussion of homosexuality in schools and the decision to dismiss certain Scottish student tuition charges. But why Scots should be allowed to decide the nature and scope of some government functions and not others defies easy explanation. The prudence of independence is something each Scot must decide for him or herself. But the anemic arguments of the opposition are often little more than scare tactics that would leave Scots thinking that a life without England would be bare and desolate. "Could Scotland make it on its own?" is a question often asked, and many in the opposition rush to argue in the negative. To these political grim reapers let us ask the obvious: would the roads and train tracks disappear in an independent Scotland? Would the academic capital of the four ancient universities and the formidable intellectual curiosity of some of the world's most advanced scientists disappear in an independent Scotland? Would centuries-old traditions of civil society and responsible government disappear in an independent Scotland? Would the trained and capable work force that has produced leaders of industry disappear in an independent Scotland? Surely the answers to these questions are "no." So with that in mind, let the debate for independence continue on a more sound footing than fear.

DEVOLUTION: THE PATH TO INDEPENDENCE

With an understanding of the key arguments for and against Scottish independence, we have the background necessary to understand how the new Scottish Parliament fits on the path to independence and what the potential futures for Scotland are. The SNP's job is to argue the case for an independent parliament and to demand greater power for the parliament we have. The success of the Scottish Parliament is an integral part of that plan. The example of good limited government in Scotland will prove the case for good sovereign government in Scotland. Halfvay through the second year of Scottish Parliament we have seen some early successes (such as the committee system and reform of outdated legislation con- cerning school standards and elderly care) and some early stumbles (notable public relations gaffes by the troubled alliance of Labour and the Liberal Democrats, and the failure to reform the civil service). In the midst of this second year of a devolved Scotland, the future of Scottish government is still uncertain, but three scenarios are possible: reversion of power to Westminster, the perpetuation of the status quo, or accumulation of power to Scotland.

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Reversion of power from the Scottish Parliament back to the British Parliament is the plea of some in the Conservative party. But reversion seems unlikely. Despite the failings of the Coalition government to assert an active and empowering agenda for Scotland, the Scottish Parliament has delivered limited successes. It is difficult to imagine that as growing pains subside, these successes will not grow as Scottish issues receive the direct governmental attention that has often been denied them, particularly over the last twenty years. Reversion would require Scottish citizens to say that they have tried governing themselves and have found themselves unfit for the job. The second scenario would be static-Holyrood neatly operates within its current purview and Westminster does likewise. It is of no small importance, however, that these purviews are anything but neat. The Scottish Parliament is finding its way within the guidelines of the 1998 Scotland Act, but already time has shown the inherent friction in the arrangement, manifested in such incidents as the BSE crisis, pension concerns, and the petrol tax. It is unlikely that devolution is, in fact, "the settled will of the Scottish people" because devolution itself is an uneasy and unstable tension. The third path of more power accumulating to Scotland is the prediction of the SNP, the hope of many Scottish people, and the way to evolutionary independence. It is also a prediction that is supported by nationwide polls. Near the close of last session's Parliament, a BBC System Three Poll of 999 people revealed that 62 percent of respondents wanted more powers for the Scottish Parliament, 22 percent wanted no change, and 8 percent wanted less powers for the Parliament. 4 Consider also, the following predictions from Scots on the future relative influence of various parliaments: 5

TABLE 4: Predictions of Relative Influence of Parliaments

Currently (%) In 20 Years (%) Net Change (%) Scottish Parliament 21 37 +16 Westminster Parliament 54 17 -37 European Parliament 14 33 +19 None/Don't Know 11 13 +2

The public not only predicts the increased importance of Holyrood and Brussels, it also foresees a legally independent future.' 6

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TABLE 5" Predictions of Likelihood of Scottish Independence

At any time in the next twenty years, do you think it is likely or unlikely thatScotland will become completely independentfrom the United Kingdom? Very Likely 19% 59% (Likely) Quite Likely 40% Quite Unlikely 25% 41% (Unlikely) Very Unlikely 16%

The optimism and acceptance of an independent future for Scotland has grown since the Devolution Debacle of 1979. The previously cited polls show that an independent future within a European supranational context may well be the next chapter in Scottish history. This history, as defined in hindsight includes epochs of clans and kings, of union with England and imperial power, and now of post-war economic challenges and opportunities as well as transnational con- nections. This next chapter of a once-again independent Scotland need not be frightening or reactionary. In the words of Tom Nairn:

Far from it being terribly risky, irresponsible, and juvenile to move towards getting out of the Union bed, it may well be dangerous, and indeed posi- tively childish, to hang around in it for the sake of a misunderstood 'auld lang syne'-a wish not to offend and upset our neighbors, after such a pro- 7 longed period of connubial interaction.1

To those still skeptical of an England-less fate for Scotland, let us consider the fate of other countries that have left the British fold. Over 50 countries have declared their independence from the United Kingdom and it is worth mention- ing that none have asked to come back. From the West to post-colonial Africa, statehood has been adopted by many peoples who wish to assert their national sovereignty on the international stage. Canada and Australia have done well for themselves away from Westminster (to say nothing of the United States), and Ireland, once over-looked by a distracted (or uninterested) government, has expe- rienced substantial economic success as a small independent European country. Rich in human capital, civic tradition, and natural resources, there is every reason to expect that an independent Scotland could comfortably and energeti- cally take its place within the European community.

CONCLUSION

The Scottish independence debate is a different kind of struggle. It is not a struggle against an oppressive sovereign. It is a struggle for the Scottish people

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to discern and fight for Scottish interests. It is one that is being fought with words and ideas in the political halls, living rooms, and public houses of Scotland, not with weapons on any battlefield. Scots will decide their future, peacefully and democratically. Even so, there are those academics who have recently argued that nationalism is dead, that the Age of Nations, which began in the eighteenth century, has come to a close at the end of the twentieth century. Why then, if nations are becoming less important, bother with the fight to establish another? Our answer is simple: nationhood is still recognized as the most commonly held and professed badge of identity. It is the context within which we identify actors on the international stage. There is a United Nations, not a United Regions. The SNP is committed to helping Scotland assume its position as a sovereign nation on this stage. Our belief in Scottish independence is bolstered by statistics and case stud- ies, but it also rests on a far simpler notion. We believe in Scottish independence because we believe Scotland is a nation in its own right and should be like all the other democratic nations of the world-free to make its own decisions. We believe that the voice of an independent nation looking after its own affairs in the European Union and on the international stage would breed confidence and responsibility which would open up the energies that lead to greater prosperity. Let us be clear. The SNP wants nothing less than the return of complete power over Scotland's future to the people of Scotland. But independence is not something to be bequeathed from an overweening parent in London; it is something that Scotland must claim for itself u

NOTES 1 Tom Nairn, After Britain:New Labour and the Return of Scotland (London: Granta, 2000), 96. 2 Wales, too, was and is a part of Great Britain, although it did not enter into such a state through negotiations. It was conquered by England in the thirteenth century. Ireland officially joined Great Britain with the Act of Union of 1800. While Northern Ireland remains part of Great Britain, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 estab- lished the Irish Free State. 3 Robert Burns,"Such a Parcel of Rogues in the Nation." As Nairn writes, "There will always be something irre- sistible about this folk-tale of conspiracy and sell-out." Tom Naim, 93. While this exchange of Union for money is factual, it is also part of the story telling that is a vital part of any country. David McCrone, UnderstandingScotland- The Sociology of a Stateless Nation (London: Routledge, 1992), 20. 4 As David McCrone wrote, "It is indubitably dear that Scotland survived the Union of 1707 as a separate 'civil society' andas a nation, and that, if anything, its sense of difference and identity has grown rather than dimin- ished." David McCrone, 3. 5 David McCrone, 24. 6 Scots also voted for the reconvened Parliament to have tax varying powers. 7 For recent statistics citing the slightly left-of-British political views of most Scots, see the Political Attitude Survey Results of 1998, cited in Alice Brown, David McCrone, and Lindsay Paterson, The Scottish Electorate: The 1997 General Election and Beyond (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 96-98. 8 May 1999 Scottish Opinion Polls cited in David McCrone, 90. Such polls demonstrate widespread little 'n' nationalism in Scotland. 9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).

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10 For more on the formation of Scottish identity in response to The Other of England, see Robert McCreadies "Scottish Identity and the Constitution." For more on Scots within the Union as well as the formation of the English identity in response to The Other of France, see Linda Colley, Britons:Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (London: Pimlico, 1994). 11 House of Commons Hansard Written Answers, January 13, 1997. Question asked by Alex Salmond MP and answered by William Waldegrave, Chancellor of the Exchequer. 12 "Other Revenues" includes revenues that individually total less than one billion pounds each. Examples include air passenger duty, insurance premium tax, landfill tax, customs duties and levies, and local authori- ties revenues. Data compiled by Shadow Finance Minister Andrew Wilson MSP. Figures cited from the Financial Statement and Budget Report (March 2000); the Pre-Budget Report (November 2000); Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses, Spending Review 2000; Making a Difference for Scotland-Spending Plans fbr Scotland 2001-2002 to 2003-2004; and Rating Review 2000-2001. These numbers, like those of the opposition, are contingent on several key assumptions such as debt assumption and oil prices. Nevertheless, on the point of subsidization, it is worth citing that even the ardent unionist George Robertson MP, former Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, declared on September 6, 1995, "I don't accept for a moment that we (Scotland) are subsidized," and reiterated the point again the following year on February 5, 1996, saying bluntly "Scotland is not subsidized by England." The point was also made by Tory MP Richard Ortaway when he admitted that, "The most prosperous region of England is Scotland." BBC TV, May 30, 1995. 13 Indeed, Britain signed on to the theory of decisions being made at the lowest, most appropriate level when it ratified the Maastricht Treaty with itsPrinciple of Subsidiarity in 1992. 14 Lindsay Paterson, "Scottish Democracy and Scottish Utopias: The First Year of the Scottish Parliament," Scottish Affairs 33 (Autumn 2000): 57. 15 ICM Poll January 2000, cited in McCrone, "Scottish Opinion Polls, May 1999-June 2000," Scottish Affairs 32 (Autumn 2000): 90. 16 Scottish Referendum Survey 1997, cited in Brown, 147. According to this survey, 41 percent of Scots think independence is quite likely at any time within the next twenty years. In this table, the number was adjusted to 40 percent so that the total is 100 percent. 17Tom Nairn, 116.

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