The Case for Scottish Independence FERGUS EWING AND JENNIFER ERICKSON PRAGMATIC NATIONALISM Critics of Scottish independence argue that nationalists are excitable myopics whose patriotism was stirred watching an Australian actor wear a kilt in an American movie set in the Irish countryside. Nationalism is a misguided feel- ing, they argue, and one that will pass. But this article will explore the pragma- tism of one of the world's most noteworthy independence movements-a movement that is taking place not with weapons, but with laws. It will begin with a brief history of union and devolution before arguing the case for and against Scottish independence and the role of the Scottish Parliament in achieving an independent Scottish state. Throughout this piece we will explain the positions of the Scottish National Party (SNP), Scodand's political voice for independence, and in so doing will explain a movement committed to both independence and law, outcome and process. Nationalists need not resort to poor argumentation or brutal violence. The SNP has always unequivocally condemned the use of violence as a means of pur- suing political objectives. In Scotland, roughly a third of all citizens identify them- selves as political nationalists, and they are sending increasing numbers of nationalists to various public bodies to represent them-to the European Union, to the British Parliament (Westminster), and now to the newly reconvened Scottish Parliament (Holyrood). It is no small irony to be part of a group paid by a government whose dissolution we seek. But such is the nature of this move- ment-passionate but peaceful, urgent but orderly. Nationalists are often charac- terized as impulsive and exclusionary people who are unable to rationally evaluate FERGUS EWING IS MEMBER OF SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT (MSP) FOR THE HIGHLAND CONSTITUENCY OF INVERNESS EAST, NAIRN, AND LOCHABER. HE IS THE SHADOW MINISTER FOR RURAL AFFAIRS AND SERVES ON THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY. JENNIFER ERICKSON WAS POLICYADVISOR To FERGUS EWING FOR THE FIRSTTER OF THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, FROM 1999-2000. AN AMERICAN, SHE BECAMEINTERESTED IN THE SCOTTISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT WHILE RECEIVING HER MASTERS IN PUBLIC POLICY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH. SHE IS NOW A CONSULTANT WITH THE BRIDGESPAN GROUP, IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR. VOL.25:z SUMMER 2001 90 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS their interests. Let us dispense with such characterizations and focus on the reality of the case for Scottish independence. POWER CONSOLIDATES IN LONDON: A TALE OF TWO PARLIAMENTS Union has been a relatively recent phenomenon in the life of the British Isles. For hundreds of years before joining the British state, Scotland had its own kings and nobles, and despite periodically intense disputes with England, it remained a separate and independent country until it signed the Treaty of Union in 1707. In the words of one historian, "Scotland was a society which by 1707 had been a state for far too long-about half a millennium-to cease being one."' But what happened three hundred years ago was not conquest, but compromise. Union was more a business calculation than an issue of national identity. When the English crown offered to pay off Scottish nobles' debts, which had resulted from bad colonial investing, in return for political union and an alliance against the French, a deeply divided Scottish Parliament voted to dissolve itself and rein- corporate with the English Parliament at Westminster, thus forming Great Britain. As a result, the Scottish and English people both became British sub- jects. 2 Union was a cool calculation of interest. Scotland and England were trad- ing partners and occasional adversaries. Their fates had already been entwined under a single crown for a century due to the ascendance of the Scottish King James VI after the death of Queen Elizabeth. And in 1707, there was money on the table. Scottish nobles got out of debt, Scottish politicians got a change of address, and Scottish citizens got a new flag-the cross of St. George (red on white, England's banner) joining the cross of St. Andrew (white on blue, Scotland's standard). The arrangement was met with disdain by many Scots, prompting Robert Burns, Scotland's national poet to write, "We were bought and sold for English gold, such a parcel of rogues in the nation. " 3 The conception and terms of this political arrangement are important. First, Union was always an agreement between two countries; Scotland and England kept separate school systems, legal systems, and churches.4 These dis- tinctions remain today and are undoubtedly in large measure responsible for the fact that the majority of citizens in Scotland identify their nationality as "Scottish" before "British," despite what their passports say. Second, understand- ing the initial calculation of Scottish interests sets the stage for the current recal- culation of Scottish interests in light of recent history and present circumstances. While in 1707 less than one percent of the population had a role in determining which flag would fly over Scotland, now the decision will be made by millions. Again, it is time for Scotland to evaluate its interests. And this time it will be a popular exercise. VOL.25:2 SUMMER 2001 THE CASE FOR SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE DEVOLVED POWERS RETURN TO EDINBURGH While the debate over an independent Scotland has intensified in recent years, it is in no sense new. In 1712, only five years after Union, George Lockhart, a Scottish Member of Parliament (MP), was already trying to dissolve the Union to revert to a constitutional state before the second reading of the Treaty, a day, which he wrote, "was the last day Scotland was Scotland." But widespread calls for Home Rule, mean- ing the official devolution of parliamentary responsibilities over certain matters to Scotland, began in the nineteenth century. Home Rule became a cross-party issue for Scotland's left of center parties. Then 1934 saw the formation of the SNP, which cam- paigned for Home Rule entailing the reversion of all powers to Scotland. The historic by-election of Dr. Winnie Ewing in 1967 gave the SNP the credibility it needed, and then the economic troubles of the 1970s gave the SNP a case for independence that appealed to many working class Scots. National identity is not static, and the trou- bled economy in the face of the North Sea oil discovery as well as the election of Margaret Thatcher, an "ineluctably English prime minister"5 in 1979 both con- tributed to a reinforcement of Scottish identity and Scottish interest politics. Nevertheless, in 1979 a first attempt at devolution, promoted by the SNP, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats, failed. The majority of Scots voted for devo- lution, but after Westminster amended the devolution proposal to include a turnout clause which said that 40 percent of the entire potential electorate had to cast pro-devolution ballots, the vote was not a sufficient proportion to pass the legislative proposal. In 1997, however, there was no such repeat; 74.3 percent of Scots voted for devolved powers to be entrusted to a Scottish Parliament.6 And in May 1999 Dr. Ewing opened the Parliament saying: "The Scots Parliament, last adjourned on May 25th, 1707, is hereby reconvened." The Scottish Parliament has control over Scottish matters such as health- care, schooling, agriculture, certain aspects of economic development, local gov- ernment, and the courts. Powers related to international treaties and trade, European Union relations, defense, and social security are reserved to Westminster. Such an arrangement represents, in the words of legendary former Labour leader John Smith, "the settled will of the Scottish people." These seven words have become a mantra recited-somewhat hopefully-by politicians from the Labour party, the Liberal Democrats, and the Conservatives. Devolution may now be the status quo, but many believe it is not the set- tled will of the Scottish people. The Scottish National Party is committed to real- izing an independent future for Scotland, a future no more or less grand than could be imagined by any other European country-to take its place as an inde- pendent nation within Europe and the international community. Before consid- ering how devolution fits on the path to independence, it is first worth laying out the arguments for and against an independent Scotland. VOL.25:2 SUMMER 2001 92 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS NATIONALISM, SCOTTISH STYLE As with most political distinctions, lines are easier to draw on paper than they are in public debate or even in individual motivation. Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of Scottish nationalism: cultural, economic, and social. Considered in turn these forms of nationalism will highlight common themes underlying arguments for Scottish independence. Cultural nationalists assert that Scots have an independent national iden- tity and should govern themselves. Simply put, they believe that independence is the logical state for any country. Economic nationalists believe that Scotland would be more prosperous if left to govern its own affairs and negotiate its own way, rather than exist as a small part (roughly 10 percent) of the United Kingdom. They believe that independence provides the freedom to make ratio- nal economic decisions for depressed areas like Glasgow, where approximately a third of working age men are unemployed; and likewise for rural towns in the Highlands where life is becoming increasingly expensive, often in the face of decreased financial opportunities following difficulties in mainstay industries such as farming and fishing. Social nationalists base their beliefs on the knowl- edge that Scots lean farther to the left than their English counterparts, and believe that an independent Scotland would thus form a more compassionate, welfare- oriented society than present day Great Britain.7 For these nationalists, indepen- dence is a powerful means to an end.