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Home , English nationalism, Ethnosymbolism, Internal colonialism, Lombard nationalism, Nationalism studies, Scottish independence

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Date:______

I, ______, hereby submit this work as part of the requirements for the degree of: in:

It is entitled:

This work and its defense approved by:

Chair: ______

Nationalism and Modernization A Comparative Case Study of Scots and Kurds

A Dissertation Submitted to The Division of Research and Advanced Studies of the University of Cincinnati

In partial fulfillment for the requirements of the degree of

Doctor of (Ph. D.)

in the Department of Political Science in the McMicken College of Arts and Sciences

2008

By

Ahmet Tolga Turker

B.A. Bilkent University 1998 M.A. Eastern Illinois University 2000 M.A. University of Cincinnati 2003

Committee Chair: Dr. Joel D. Wolfe

Abstract

This dissertation explores the links between modernization and , and the question of why economic, political and socio-cultural processes of modernization have not led to the elimination of separatist nationalist movements. It tests hypotheses concerning modernization and nationalism on two prominent cases: the Scottish and

Kurdish separatist movements in the and Turkey. Analyzing the relationship between economic modernization and nationalism, the economic modernization account is supported in both the Scottish and Kurdish cases for the period until the 1960s. However, it is discredited and found reductionist in the latter part of the twentieth century. Analyzing arguments that political modernization reduces separatist nationalism, this study found support for the political modernist account in both cases until the 1960s. However, the political modernist accounts failed to give a satisfactory picture of why Scottish and Kurdish took a separatist turn since the 1960s.

Finally, analyzing the socio-cultural links between modernization and nationalism, this project finds that these socio-cultural arguments are supported in the period prior to the

1960s in both cases. Although a significant causality between socio-cultural factors and nationalism could not established for the period after 1960, this study concludes that socio-cultural modernization tends to create conflict rather than reconcile differences in the period since the 1960s. In light of these findings, this study criticizes modernist accounts. It suggests that, along the lines of ethno-symbolist perspective, while nationalism is modern, it is constructed around a particular ethnic tradition that modern have to be explained and “contextualized” with reference to their ethnic forbearers . Accordingly, the following suggestions are made: first, nationalism should be

iii examined in a larger time span, which will cover pre- modern attachments. Second, notions such as re-discovery and re-construction of the ethnic past should replace invention and imagination. Third, nationalism is not a history-specific and transitory force. Finally, modernity’s accelerated dynamism generates new nationalisms.

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Copyright @ 2008 A. Tolga Turker

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Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the sources of intellectual, financial and moral support for my doctoral studies, which made this project possible. Professor Joel Wolfe supervised my doctoral thesis with enthusiasm and congeniality. His enduring support in pursuing this project and his considerable scholarship on British has made me look forward for our discussion sessions. Professor Dinshaw Mistry was a constant source of encouragement and motivated me to prioritize this project over other responsibilities when I was in need most. He never gave up reminding me the fact that this doctoral thesis had to be finished and provided me with organizational tools to do so.

Professor Laura Jenkins provided enthusiastic support for my work, giving much needed suggestions for improving the dissertation. I hope other doctoral students will be as fortunate as I was in terms of a coherent and supportive dissertation committee.

I acknowledge the financial support from the Department of Political Science and

Charles Phelps Taft Research Center at the University of Cincinnati during my graduate studies.

I would like to thank my parents who remained a great source of inspiration and support of my adventures. Finally I would like to thank my wife, Lisa, for her love and encouragement. Without her, I would not have relish life so much in the process of writing this dissertation.

I was an undergraduate when my first nephew; Canberk was born. Naïvely, at the time, I planned to be part of his life. Then I came to the US to pursue my graduate studies and I not only ended up failing to see him grow up but also missed the birth of two more nephews; Burc and Tunc, and a beautiful niece; Elif. I completed this project at the

expense of not being part of their lives. For that reason I dedicate this dissertation to them and ask for their understanding.

Needless to say, I, alone, am responsible for any shortcomings or errors in this work.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables ...... 5 Chapter 1. Introduction ...... 7 The Argument ...... 9 Chapter 2: Theory, Case Selection, and Methodology ...... 24 The Study of Nationalism ...... 24 Debates on Nationalism ...... 25 What is Nationalism?...... 27 Perspectives on how to study nationalism ...... 33 Nationalism and Modernization...... 40 The Hypotheses...... 43 Modernization subverts separatist nationalism...... 45 Observable implications...... 48 Modernization reinforces separatist nationalism ...... 49 Economic Modernization reduces separatist nationalism (H1) ...... 52 Observable Implications: ...... 53 Economic modernization fosters separatist nationalism (H1’)...... 54 Political modernization reduces separatist nationalism (H2)...... 56 Observable Implications: ...... 58 Political modernization fosters separatist nationalism (H2’)...... 59 Modernizing socio-cultural conditions reduces separatist nationalism (H3)...... 61 Observable Implications: ...... 63 Modernizing social and cultural conditions promotes separatist nationalism (H3’) 63 A Note on the Effects of Modernization...... 65 Measurement...... 66 Nationalism...... 67 Elements of Modernization:...... 68 Chapter 3: and modernization ...... 72 A Note on European Nationalism and ...... 74 Review of Scottish Nationalism...... 75 I. Scottish Nationalism from the until post- World War II ...... 75 II. Political Nationalism in Scotland Since 1960s ...... 80 III. Scottish Since 1960s...... 90 Modernization and Scottish Nationalism...... 94 I- Economic modernization: ...... 95 II. Political Modernization:...... 106 III- Socio-cultural Modernization:...... 123 Chapter 4: Modernization and ...... 138 Review of Kurdish Identity and Nationalism ...... 139 I- The Kurds and the evolution of Kurdish Identity ...... 139 II- The Kurds in the Ottoman (16 th – late 19 th century) ...... 141 III- 1900-1923 emergence of Kurdish intelligentsia and Young Turks...... 149 IV- Post WW II: The Multiparty Era and the development of Kurdish nationalism ...... 157 V- 1983- present: PKK and the Rise Kurdish Nationalism ...... 164

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Modernization and Kurdish Nationalism...... 169 I- Economic Modernization and Kurdish Nationalism (H1) ...... 172 II- Political Modernization and Kurdish Nationalism (H2)...... 188 III- Socio-cultural modernization and Kurdish Nationalism (H3)...... 208 Chapter 5- CONCLUSION...... 224 Summing up the Debate...... 224 Economic Modernization and Nationalism ...... 225 Political modernization and Nationalism...... 229 Cultural Modernization and Nationalism...... 236 Theoretical implications...... 241 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 248

4 List of Tables

Table Page

2-1 Perspectives on how to study nations and nationalism 39

2-2 Summary of Hypotheses 66

3-1 National identity in Scotland 91

3-2 Forced-choice national identity in Scotland 1979- 2000 92

3-3 National identity in Scotland by vote in 1997 general elections 93

3-4 Perceptions of Britain’s economy 103

3-5 Personal economic experience over the last ten years on the vote 104

4-1 Average participation rates and distribution of votes by 158 Political parties in national elections (Turkey)

4-2 Comparison of rural and west Turkey with south and east 179 Turkey 1968- 1973

4-3 Percentages of illiterate in 1985 and number of 181 Medical doctors in 1990 by

4-4 Relative per capita GNP in 1979 and 1986 (by ) 182

4-5 The proportion of expenditures over revenues in 183 budget between 1986 and 1990, and per capita public investment expenditure for 1983- 1992

5-1 Table of findings (H1) 225

5-2 Table of findings (H2) 228

5-3 Table of findings (H3) 236

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KARA CIZGILER

Dogadaki ilk kirlenmedir Ulkelere Bolunmesi Yeryuzunun

F. H. Daglarca

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Chapter 1. Introduction

The modernist interpretation of nationalism, which predicts that ethnic identities will come to be less salient after modern industrial society has been achieved, is a widely accepted generalization. 1 Eric Hobsbawn suggests that nationalism has come to be a force of declining significance and doubts whether nationalism can continue to be a program of politics in the twenty-first century. 2 Also, Francis Fukuyama observes that nationalism has been domesticated and made compatible with the universal recognition of rights, much like three or four centuries ago. 3 On the policy front, contemporary Europe’s quest for unity and for the creation of a supranational structure is presumably an attempt in curbing the malignant potentialities of . However, neither the predictions of scholars nor the attempts by policy-makers should be seen as proof of the decay of nationalism or the - as such.

The nation-state and nationalism die hard, making the arguments about the demise of nationalism seem somewhat premature. As Marshall and Gurr remark, ethno-national wars for independence are commonly considered to be the main threat to international peace and regional security in the post-Cold War period. 4 Illustratively, a number of violent ethnic conflicts broke out in the former Soviet Union, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia and Africa. Many of these conflicts centered on the status of minorities and their demands for political autonomy and/or . The violence associated with the ethnic

1 Gellner, E. 1983 Nations and Nationalism, NY: Cornell University Press; Hobsbawn, E. 1992 Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality , NY: Cambridge University Press; McNeill, W. 1986 and National Unity in World History , Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 2 Hobsbawn, E. Nations and Nationalism , p. 182. 3 Fukuyama, F. 1989 “The End of History?” The National Interest , 16, pp. 3-18; 1992 The End of History and the Last Man , NY: Free Press. 4 Peace and Conflict 2003 . (2003) Biennial Report for the Center for International Development and Conflict Management Project, p. 30.

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conflicts that took place in Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, former Yugoslavia, Somalia,

Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, India, and Afghanistan was of an intensity and magnitude that has seldom been seen in ethnic conflicts in the past. Finally, in Europe, we have seen the shattering of old post-war coalitions of mass parties into smaller groupings of parties with an intense quest for cultural-ethnic distinctiveness, like the

(SNP) in Scotland, Democratic Society Party (DTP) 5 in Turkey, the Lombard League in

Italy or Henri Batasuna in . How can we explain the outbreak of these conflicts?

This project argues that, in contrast to expectations, the modernization process has not

led to the elimination of ethnic and separatist nationalism . Instead, modernization has led to

the resurgence of separatist movements. I argue that, due to modernization processes,

separatist nationalist movements of ethnic minorities within larger nation-states have

become prominent sources of conflict. In short, minority nationalism is rivaling the

nationalism of nation-states themselves.

Theorists of modernization have failed to predict the resurgence of nationalism in the

twenty-first century. While this failure has been frequently emphasized, we do not yet have

a clear diagnosis of why and where modernization theory went wrong. Noting this gap in

the literature, this project theoretically explores why modernization has not led to the

elimination of separatist nationalist movements and tests these theoretical arguments

countering the modernist account with two prominent cases: the Scottish and Kurdish

separatist movements in the United Kingdom and Turkey.

5 As we will see in 4 th chapter, political parties representing Kurdish population has been banned frequently by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, the names of those parties vary from time to time. DTP can be considered as the latest variation of this group.

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The Argument Classical modernist theory suggests that because of particular political, economic, and social-cultural processes, ethnic nationalism among minorities in a state will decline as states modernize.

Economic -based arguments are twofold. First, uneven and uneven industrialization leads to economic differences between the core and periphery of a country. 6 These differences cause ethnic/ separatist nationalism in the peripheral regions that are relatively less developed when compared to the rich core. Second, it is argued that the greater economic inequalities between collectivities, the greater chance that the less advantaged collectivities will resist political integration. 7 According to the conventional modernist vision, economic modernization will lessen the differences between the core and periphery, and economic inequalities between collectivities. 8

Therefore, modernization will reduce ethic nationalism in the periphery and among economically disadvantaged groups resulting in national integration.

The findings of this project analyzing British and Turkish economic modernization and Scottish and Kurdish nationalism until the first half of the twentieth century support the modernist hypothesis. Yet the inquiry of the link between economic modernization and nationalism since 1960s found that economic modernization does not reduce nationalism among ethnic minorities in two respects: the appeal of economic self-

6 Nairn, T. 1981 The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism, London: NLB. 7 Hechter, M. 1975 Internal : The Celtic fringe and British National Development, 1536- 1966 , London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 8 Note that both arguments were made by neo-Marxist scholars. ’s The Break-up of Britain (1981) was probably the most important statement of The New Left’s position vis-à-vis nationalism in which a new generation of Marxist scholars attached a greater importance to the role of culture, ideology and language in their analysis. Michael Hechter’s Internal Colonialism (1975) was another influential contribution to the literature from the neo-Marxist camp. Hechter’s book is particularly important because, first; it introduced Lenin’s concept of ‘internal colonialism’ to the study of nationalism, second; unlike many of his predecessors- a notable exception would be Deustch (1966)- Hechter used quantitative data and multivariate statistical analysis to support his thesis.

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sufficiency and the reductionism of economy-based arguments. First, as the periphery is modernizing, the idea of its becoming economically viable as a separate political entity can be appealing, which can lead to separatist nationalism in the peripheral region. For instance, attempts by the central in Turkey to increase economic development in the Kurdish region did not eliminate Kurdish nationalism. Rather it resulted in a newly reinforced Kurdish identity. Second, the modernist argument based on economic factors is reductionist because it diminishes nationalism to a discontent caused by regional economic inequalities and exploitation. Explaining nationalism by prioritizing a single factor as in Hechter’s ‘internal colonialism’ limits the utility of the model. Rather, it is more useful to regard economic inequality as exacerbating a pre- existing sense of . 9

Another variant of modernism has been propounded by scholars who focus on the

transformation in the nature of politics , for example the rise of the modern bureaucratic

state 10 , the emergence of a willing and capable political elite 11 or the “invention of tradition” as part of social engineering 12 to explain the demise of separatist tendencies of nationalist movements. First, modern bureaucratic institutions are thought to be essential in terms of reconciling the public interest of citizens and private demands of minority groups. In this manner, rights would be inseparable from the rights of citizenry. Second, the emergence of the willing elite from the dominant to share power with aspirant ethnic group leaders will be successful in achieving pluralist

9 Smith, A. D. 1983 State and Nation in the Third World: the Western state and , NY: St. Martin’s Press, p. xvi; Orridge, A. W. 1982 “Separatist and Autonomous Nationalism” in Colin H. Williams (eds) National , Cardiff: University of Press, pp. 188-189. 10 Brueilly, J. 1982 Nationalism and the State , NY: St. Martin’s Press. 11 Brass, P. 1991 Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison , CA: Sage Publications. 12 Hobsbawn, E. and Ranger, T. 1983 The invention of Tradition , NY: Cambridge University Press.

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solutions rather than secessionism. 13 Third, a modern state can and will ‘deliberately

invent new traditions’ to create certain values and norms of behavior. 14 Therefore the idea of a national community in which sub-national identities peacefully co-exist will secure cohesion in the face of separatist movements caused by rapid industrialization and modernization. 15

Analyzing the arguments that modern political institutions are capable of reducing separatist nationalism, this study credited modernist account both in Scottish and Kurdish cases for the period until the 1960s. However, for the period since the 1960s, this project found that these models based on political modernization exaggerate the role of the modern state in the genesis of nationalism due to the models’ instrumental (elitist) orientation and their tendency to equate state-building with nation-building. First, the

‘top-down’ method and reliance on elite manipulation employed by modernist theorists fails to pay attention to the needs, interests and hopes of ordinary people. They ignore

‘the view from below’ and do not provide an analysis of the effects of modernization on the lower classes, which is the real source of separatist mass mobilization. 16 Second,

such models confuse state-building with the forging of a national identity among

culturally diverse . Attempts by state authorities to create a homogenous

national identity, for instance, through ‘invention of tradition’ is no guarantee that the

population will identify with new bureaucratic institutions and the . On the

13 In addition to the role of elite, Brass (1991) mentions the possibilities for alignment of political and social forces and organizations, and the potential availability of alternative political arena. 14 Hobsbawn, E. and Ranger, T. (1983), p. 1. 15 Hobsbawn, E. and Ranger, T. (1983), chapter 7. 16 Koeble criticized particularly Hobsbawn’s instrumentalism. Koeble, T. A. 1995 “Towards a Theory of Nationalism: Culture, Structure and Choice Analyses Revisited”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics , 1(4), 73- 89.

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contrary, such attempts may be perceived as repression. 17 This holds true in both of the examined cases. National identity, such as and Turkishness, neither referred to ethnicity when initiated but an umbrella identity has been rejected and attempts to accommodate minorities have reinforced separatist inspirations.

Finally, the last group of modernist theorists stresses the importance of social/cultural transformations in understanding the separatist nationalist phenomena.

First, modernization will lead to the dominance of citizenship, which will take precedence over other sources of identity such as ethnicity and religion. Second, the industrialization processes’ imposition of high culture, for instance through uniform centralized education, will lead to a homogeneous society. Therefore, the impact of modernization on society is predicted as “diminution (not disappearance) of the virulence of nationalism”. 18

The survey of socio-cultural modernization of the period prior to 1960s in

Scotland and Kurdish populated regions of Turkey supports the modernist accounts. 19

17 Smith, A. D. 1995 The Formation of National Identity , NY: , p. 38. 18 Gellner, E. 1983, p. 49. See also Gellner, E. 1964 Thought and Change , London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. 19 Here it would be useful to note the contributions of two founding fathers of , Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Max Weber (1864- 1920), to the study of nationalism and its relationship to modernity. Smith argues that two aspects of Durkheim’s work have been influential on contemporary theories of nationalism, more specifically, the modernist paradigm. The first was ‘his analysis of religion as the core of moral community and his consequent belief that “there is something eternal in religion”…because all societies feel the need to reaffirm and renew themselves periodically through collective rites and ceremonies’[ Smith, A. D. 1998 Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism , London: Routledge, p. 15.] The second aspect was ‘his analysis of the transition from “mechanical” to “organic” ’. Basically, Durkheim argued that traditions and the influence of the conscience collective decline, along with impulsive forces, such as affinity of blood, attachment to the same soil, ancestral worship and community of habits. Their place is taken by the division of labor and its complementarity of roles (Smith 1998, p. 15). This aspect of his work particularly influenced modernist theories of nationalism, notably of . The aspects of Weber’s work that influenced subsequent theories includes “the importance of political memories, the role of intellectuals in preserving the “irreplaceable culture values” of a nation, and the importance of nation-states in the rise of the special character of the modern West (Smith 1998, p. 13). As these aspects of Weber’s work make it clear, the nation, for him, is essentially a political concept. He defined it as ‘a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own’ (1948, cited in Smith 1998, p. 14). In other words what

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Although a significant causal relationship could not be established for the period since

1960s, the assertiveness of Scottish and Kurdish identities during this period allows me to criticize the link between socio-cultural modernization and separatist nationalism on two grounds: theoretical and factual. First, theoretically, modernization and socio-cultural transformations do not guarantee that the population will identify with citizenship as the main source of identity. On the contrary, such attempts may be perceived as an imminent threat to the social and cultural existence of ethnic groups. Second, factually, many nationalist movements such as Scottish nationalism precede even early industrialism by

150-200 years. Therefore, arguments contending that industrialization precedes nationalism can be factually falsified. 20

This project aims to take issue with the dominant modernist that views nations and nationalisms as attachments to ethnic myths and symbols as a form of false consciousness 21 . According to this line of thought, separatist nationalism is condemned to diminish as a mobilizing force as modernization processes mature.

Although the modernist models deserve appreciation, they are limited because they tend to view national identities and nationalism either in functional or instrumental terms.

From their perspective modernization, as exemplified in the rise of the modern bureaucratic state, industrialized economy, and socio-cultural homogeneity, will lead to

distinguished nations from other communities was the quest for statehood. This particular conception of statehood, Smith argues “has inspired a number of latter-day theorists of nation-states to emphasize the role of modern Western state” (Smith, 1998, p 14). 20 Kitching, 1985 Development and Underdevelopment in historical perspective: populism, nationalism and industrialization , NY: Routledge, p. 106. Also, for more discussion and examples on the relationship between industrialization and nationalism see, Kedourie, E. 1994 Nationalism , MA: Blackwell, p. 143 and Minogue, K. R. 1996 Nationalism , Baltimore: Penguin, p. 121. 21 Hutchinson, J. 2005 Nations as Zones of Conflict , CA: Sage, p. 2.

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the decline of the divisive tendencies of nationalism. 22 This present project will argue that, when assessed against the cases of Scottish nationalism in Britain and Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, such models are limited and fail to account for the growing saliency of separatist nationalist movements as well as mass political campaigns to restructure the modern state either in the form of devolution or secession.

For these reasons, this project considers an alternative model of national- formation: namely ‘ethno-symbolism’. Ethno-symbolists portray themselves as a middle way between primordialists; those who think that nations are perennial entities and modernists; those who believe in the modernity of nations and nationalism. They emphasize the durability of pre-modern ethnic ties and display how ethnic cultures set limits to elite attempts to forge the nation. The revival of nationalism in Scottish and

Kurdish cases during the last decades of twentieth century presents us with two examples of how ethnic ties can negate the supposedly positive, that is diminishing, effects of processes of modernization. This suggests that, in contrast to modernist equation, ethnicity must be treated as an independent variable, rather than dependent variable, as much as economic or political modernization.

22 Examples of this perspective can be found in the works of many philosophers including Marshall T.H. 1965 Class, citizenship, and social development : essays by T.H. Marshall , NY: Doubleday and Dahrendorf, R. 1973 The New Liberty: Survival and justice in a changing world , CA: Stanford University Press. Marshall’s argument was simple: implementation of eighteenth century civil rights in required the extension of political rights in the nineteenth century and then the social rights in the twentieth century. He simply saw the progress of citizenship over class conflict—all sources of social conflict as a matter of fact- as a process with its own internal dynamics. In addition, building on Marshall, Ralph Dahrendorf explored Marshall's central theme of the relevance of class in a period where citizenship has conferred one universal equality status on all citizens. Dahrendorf (1973) using Marshall's story of the progression of national citizenship to join the normative debate on the uses of nationalism, argued that: 'Historically at least, the nation-state was as much a necessary condition of progress as it unfortunately turned out to be a source of regression and inhumanity. The alliance of nationalism and was a force for emancipation' (p. 29). and citizenship for Dahrendorf are intertwined, since 'not the least advantage of the nation- state was that it generalized the ancient idea of citizenship' (p. 30). In a way Dahrendorf see how democracy and nationalism can be reconciled.

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Implications for the literature on Nationalism

Modernist scholars offer powerful insights on nationalism, but their stress on nationalism’s diminishing character as a result of modern organizational development of state, economy and socio-culture has several weaknesses. This suggests a systemic failure in the modernist explanation. Therefore, this project is important, first and foremost because it will diverge from conventional modernist accounts, which take nationalism for granted or as a declining force as countries modernize. Rather, by examining the divisive tendencies of nationalism in Britain and Turkey, I will show that nationalism does not decline with modernization and is hardly a latent force that manifests itself in extraordinary circumstances.

Second, related to the previous point, I will diagnose the deficiencies of the classical modernist debate, specify the theoretical problems we are still facing, and challenge the predictions of modernist literature on the demise of nationalism in the last analysis of modernity. Modernist scholars stress different factors in their accounts of nationalism and none of them rely on a single factor. Nevertheless, regardless of their degree of sophistication, they emphasize one set of factors at the expense of others. This project, on the other hand, suggests a more comprehensive view. It will integrate the political, economic, and socio-cultural explanations into an overarching theoretical critique of the classical modernist account.

Third, modernists, in focusing on a variety of aspects of modernization, neglect

the profound cultural struggles engendered by nationalism. For modernists , nation and

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nationalism is a transitional unit between ‘traditional localism’ 23 and modern civilization.

Ethnic identity, in modernist view, is a characteristic of ‘simpler’ pre-modern groups.

Modernization liberates people from fixed social roles and traditional identities and encourages individuals to prefer choice and mobility over traditional ascribed identities.

Modernization theorists argued that this autonomous individuality conflicts with one’s attachment to a cultural group as in the case of minorities. However, the cases will show that modern desire for freedom and autonomy, far from weakening people’s commitment to their own , has strengthened it. 24

Fourth, I will show that the modernists’ focus on the role of the state in supporting and perpetuating ethno-cultural identities limits the explanatory value of their models.

Modernists argue that just as the modernization process has led to the de-politicization of religious identities, similar processes will lead to the de-politicization of ethno-cultural identities. From this point of view, first, nations are culturally homogeneous and follow a linear progress toward integration. 25 Second, just as liberal democracies have achieved separation of state and church, so separation of state and ethno-cultural groups will follow. 26 Modernist theorists fail to account for the fact that most nations are driven by

embedded cultural differences that generate rival political projects. The British and the

Turkish cases will suggest that attempts at homogenizing the population are destined to

be met with the endurance of Scottish and Kurdish identities. Furthermore, the analogy

between religion and culture is flawed. The modern state is inevitably involved in

23 Hutchinson, J. 2005, p. 2. 24 Kymlicka, W. 2000 “Modernity and National Identity” in Sholo Ben-Ami, Yoav Peled and Alberto Spektorowski (eds.) Ethnic Challenges to the Modern Nation-State : St. Martin’s Press, p. 11. 25 For critique of “linear progress”, see Hutchinson, J. 2005, p. 2 and Hearn, J. 2006 Rethinking Nationalism NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 104-108. 26 See Kymlicka, W. 2000, for an elaborate discussion of state and culture.

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recognizing and reproducing particular ethnic groups and so the politicization of ethnic identities is, to some extent, unavoidable.

The failure of modernization theorists to predict the resurgence of nationalism has

often been noted. On the theoretical ground, this study will go one step further and

provide the reader with a clear diagnosis of why and where the modernization theorists

went wrong.

Policy implications:

Because of the weaknesses proposed above, modernist interpretations cannot satisfactorily explain the current nationalist revival sweeping much of our world. This fact, in turn, allows this study to claim not only a theoretical significance but also policy relevance. The policy implications of this project can be summed up in four distinct but complementary points:

First, the first years of twenty-first century have demonstrated that nationalism, ethnicity, and religion are still among the most powerful forces influencing our world. As of September 2004, at least 35 countries were in some stage of major armed conflict, from tenuous cease-fire to all out war. 27 , the most deadly of which are in Darfur and

Indonesia’s Aceh province. In addition, global terrorism has become the dominant security concern of twenty-first century due its transnational character and anti-western and anti-democratic doctrine.

Second, related with the proliferation of nationalism, the presence or absence of ethnic and separatist movements often determines whether entire regions of the world are

27 Minorities at Risk Project (2005) College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/ on: [9/22/06].

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at peace or at war. Indeed, some scholars, such as Samuel Huntington, have speculated that wars between regions and even entire civilizations may occur because of cultural differences rooted in ethnicity and religion. 28

Third, in addition to regions, the presence or absence of ethnic and separatist movements determines whether or not a country will enjoy domestic stability. We can readily observe that these ethnic separatist nationalisms are currently affecting the territorial integrity of countries. For the most part, such movements involve the wish to form independent nation-states, on behalf of areas that were formerly part of larger units, such as the Scots in Britain and . 29

In addition to the threat ethnic separatist nationalism cause for the territorial

integrity of nation-states, it has contributed much of the violence and instability around

the world. From the separatist movements in constitutional democracies such as Canada

and to ethnic wars in the developing world such as the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict

in Sri Lanka, to secessionism and state collapse in Africa, to ethno-religious conflicts in

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia the variety and magnitude of such conflicts confirms

no part of the world is immune to malignant affects of nationalism.

Fourth, the revival of interest in nationalism is prompted by the nature of ethnic

conflicts that cause violence in many parts of the world. According to Turnbull, the year

2002 witnessed 491 incidents that spanned over 43 countries covering 5 continents. 30

These challengers to the states in which they live in are often brutally suppressed, yet

28 Huntington, S. 1996 The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of world order , NY: Simon and Schuster. 29 To this group we can also add Basques in Spain, Muslim Black Africans in the Darfur region of Western Sudan, Malay-Muslim in , Acehnese in Indonesia, Kashmiri Muslims and Scheduled in India, the Karens and Shan in Myanmar, the Chechens in Russia, Albanians in Serbia and Montenegro. 30 Turnbull, W. 2003 "2002 Conventional Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National Actors Resulting in Death or Injury", Center for Non-Proliferation Studies , on line [http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/conv2k2.pdf].

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mobilization often continues in the face of this repression. Therefore, questions, such as why despite the high risks involved and the often remote chance of success, have such movements continued to emerge, carries importance for policymakers both at the national and international levels.

In short, it has never been more important to study nationalism and ethnic conflict than it is today. I hope that policymakers and analysts will benefit from this project in two ways. First, is the recognition that nationalism remains an important source of identity, thus we cannot reject the separatist tendencies of nationalist movements.

Second, the modernist theory of nationalism is an inadequate guide to understand the persistence of nationalism and its contribution to a world of greater divisions and conflicts. The analysis of the Scottish and Kurdish cases helps to clarify controversies in social science mirroring the ongoing power of nationalism and national identity as forces that retain the capacity to crucially affect the stability and security of the world today.

Cases: Great Britain and Turkey

This project includes two full cases of separatist challenge: the continuing

Kurdish struggle to secede from Turkey, and the Scottish sovereignty movement’s efforts

to separate from Great Britain. While it is not reasonable to generalize about separatism

on the basis of such a small number of cases, they do allow us to theorize about the

relationship between modernization and ethnic conflicts.

The persistence of the Scottish and the Kurdish nationalist movements provides

us with two cases of nation-states, Great Britain and Turkey, in which the processes of

modernization did not result in the decline of separatist nationalism. As the twentieth

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century closed and a new one started with high expectations of peace and stability, the issue of national identities became more salient in countries like Great Britain and

Turkey. In many respects this is a remarkable occurrence because, for most of the century

(until 1960s in Britain, and 1970s in Turkey, with the exception of brief period 1926-

1928), indeed for most of the period we now call modern, it seemed as if the problem of national identity had been solved once and for all. British and Turkish narratives for nationalism have one aspect in common with modernist theories of nationalism: they assumed that Scottish and Welsh nationalisms in Britain and the Kurdish and other sub- national aspirations in Turkey were just romantic distractions from the real business of modern government. As these countries march toward modernity, it has been predicted by those theories that ethnic nationalism has no right (reason) to exist and thus will eventually become a diminishing force. However, today the Scots and Kurds are among the most obvious groupings who, to a greater or lesser extent, dispute the political identities conferred on them by the states to which they belong.

In the British case, the principles of political life seemed to be flourishing once again in Scotland, Wales and . This flourishing appeared to make the old British state weaker and paved the way to debates on separatist nationalism in England.

According to the March 2007 poll results taken by YouGov, a professional market research agency, 46% of the Scots are now in favor of independence vis-à-vis 39% who oppose it. Moreover, series of surveys first started by Luis Moreno in 1986 and then carried by in 1991, Scottish election Survey in 1992 and in 1997 to tap the relationship of Scottish to British national identity verifies similar results. Between six and nine times more people stress their Scottishness than their Britishness. This is a

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remarkable and consistent finding. Moreover, the third Scottish parliamentary election held in May 2007 resulted with the victory of SNP and today ’s government is ruling Scotland. It is clear that people living in Scotland give priority to being Scottish.

In the Turkish case, representing the Kurdish vote in Southeast Turkey the

Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) won 6.2 % of the popular vote in 2002 general elections becoming the 6 th most popular party. (However DEHAP did not get any seats

due to the 10% general threshold). Also, politicians representing the Kurdish population

consistently got 65 per cent of the votes in the Kurdish population in the local elections. 31

In addition, minority issues such as language, education, communication brought to the political stage as a result of attempts to become a full member of the

(EU), seem to foster debates around the survival of the .

It is quite remarkable that, after centuries of living in a large and centralized administrative system with no separate , Scottish and Kurdish identities are so strongly held across a wide spectrum of people.

What makes these two cases suitable for the scope of this project? The Scots and

Kurds lack clear demarcation lines. What, then, binds them together? Where does this shared sense of being Scottish and Kurdish come from? There are three elements. First is territory. It is plausible to argue in both cases that Scottish and Kurdish borders have remained largely unchanged over time. The second element involves a common history.

The common history, which is the basis of the sense of togetherness, has cultivated

31 DEHAP was banned by the Constitutional Court in 2003. As mentioned earlier DTP is the latest (see footnote 5) political party claim to represent Kurdish vote. Fearing that the party will not pass the 10 per cent threshold in 2007 election, they will run independent candidates and plan to form the party group in the Turkish parliament after the elections.

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certain characteristics, or even values within the Scottish and Kurdish population. With the majority of these respective populations believing that they share certain values which are different from others, these values shape the way they see themselves. Finally, both

Scottish and Kurdish groups are bound together because they have a clear ‘other’, namely the English and the Turkish. In addition to the common elements that allow us to consider these two cases together, I have used several criteria to select cases: their contemporary importance, the different lessons that can be learned from them, and their geographical mix.

Among the important cases not included in this project are the Quebec

sovereignty movement’s separatist tendency in Canada, the Basque separatism in Spain,

the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka, and the case of democratization as a source of

ethnic conflict among Russia’s new minorities. I hope that after exploring this project

readers will ask questions similar to the ones posed here about the relationship between

modernization and nationalism, and other contemporary cases of ethnic conflict.

Structure:

This study will first provide a systematic overview of some of the key theories of nationalism and consider the main criticism raised against them in a comparative perspective. Second, I will diagnose the deficiencies of the classical modernist debate and specify the theoretical problems we are still facing. Particularly, I will challenge the predictions of modern social theory on the demise of nationalism as an ideology in the last analysis of modernity. This argument will then be used for the analysis of nationalism in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Turkey. Finally, in light of these

22

considerations and criticisms, I will explore and assess some of the alternatives proposed by the main critics of classical modernism.

In this context, chapter 2 will offer a critical and comparative review of the main theories of nationalism, focusing mostly on the post-1960s literature. I will analyze the development of nationalism by dividing modernist literature into three categories in terms of key factors: economic, political, and socio-cultural transformations. This may seem overly simplistic since none of the modernist theories rely on one factor in their account of nationalism. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, most theories emphasize one set of factors at the expense of others. In fact this is what lies behind the major charge brought against modernist interpretations, namely the charge of ‘reductionism’ 32 . Chapters 3 and

4 will be devoted to the discussion and examination of two cases Scottish and Kurdish

nationalisms. For both cases, the chapters will start with a historical overview of the

evolution of Scottish and Kurdish identities. The former case will cover the institutional

changes since the 1970s- more specifically I will look into constitutional changes, and

reasons and outcomes of devolution. Specific attention will also be given to political

parties such as the Scottish National Party (SNP). The bulk of the comparison will be

made between the pre-post 1960 period. The Kurdish case will cover the republican era

since its establishment in 1923 until present with useful references to earlier periods

during the Ottoman Empire. The bulk of the comparison will be made between the pre-

and post-1970 period. Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, will first embark on a critical

evaluation of the main theoretical propositions. Then, in the light of these considerations,

the rest of the chapter will be devoted to broader implications that can be derived from

this dissertation project.

32 Smith, A. D. 1983, Calhoun, J. 1997 Nationalism , Buckingham: Open University Press.

23 Chapter 2: Theory, Case Selection, and Methodology

The Study of Nationalism This project examines the relationship between modernization and the rise of nationalism among ethnic minority groups. As noted in the previous chapter, the modernist school argues nationalism is to be understood as intrinsic to modernity and that modernization is a process that reduces ethnic nationalism. Separatist nationalism of ethnic minorities is thus predicted to decline as societies march through the modernization process. However, modernist approaches, while rightly drawing attention to the historical specificity of nationalism, have a misleading tendency to represent modernity as a relatively stable state. Modernists fail to appreciate the accelerating dynamism of modernization, which continues to generate new nationalisms such as in the case of Scots and Kurds. This study suggests that separatist nationalism among these ethnic groups has increased during the modernization process.

This chapter provides a working theory of nationalism and modernization. After a brief chronological summary of major debates on nationalism since the late nineteenth century, the first part of this chapter explains the concept of nationalism. I argue that ethnic nationalism should be understood as a mass sentiment for or against state power.

This argument is followed by an explanation of the civic- ethnic typology of modern nationalism. In the second part, I outline some major perspectives in social science literature on how to study nationalism, such as historical accounts, , ethno- symbolism, modernism and psychological studies. In the third part, narrowing the focus of the study to modernist accounts, I illustrate the connection between modernization and

nationalism. I suggest that rather than leading to integration, modernization, in the

Scottish and Kurdish cases, causes separatist nationalist movements to develop and challenge the territorial integrity of a nation-state. Fourth, focusing on the modernist perspective, I set out the hypotheses. The hypotheses spell out the different ways that economic, political and socio-cultural modernization can cause integration or fragmentation, civic or ethnic nationalism. The fifth part deals with measurement issues in which I define and measure the concepts of nationalism and modernization.

Debates on Nationalism The study of nationalism is generally divided into three stages: The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the idea of nationalism was born up until the beginning of

World War I, the interwar years when nationalism became a subject of academic inquiry, and 1945 to the present when the debate became more diversified with the participation of sociologists and political scientists. More recently attempts have been made to transcend the ‘classical debate’. 1 This survey will conform to this classification.

Nationalism as an ideology and a social movement has been around since the end of the eighteenth century. Baycroft even suggests that “the history of Europe from 1879 to 1945 is synonymous with the history of the growth and development of modern nations.” 2

However, interest in nationalism did not become a subject on its own in academic circles up until the second half of the twentieth century. The scholars of the first period, mostly historians and social philosophers, were more concerned with the merits and defects of

1 Synder, T. 1997 “Kazimierz Keller-Krauz (1872-1905): A Pioneering Scholar of Modern Nationalism” Nations and Nationalism , 3(2), pp. 231- 250. 2 Baycroft, T. 1998 Nationalism in Europe 1789-1945 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3.

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the doctrine than with the origins and spread of the phenomena. 3 Their interest in nationalism was largely ethical and philosophical. Nationalism was seen as a progressive stage in the evolution process which provided an alternative to the “idiocy of rural life” 4.

This evolutionist view, shared both by the liberals and the Marxists, was that nationalism would gradually wither away with the establishment of a peaceful world order. 5 By the

same token, Sir Isaiah Berlin wrote of nationalism, as one of the movements dominating

the nineteenth century that it was one “for which no significant future was

predicted…Indeed up to the First World War, it was thought to be waning.” 6 The power of nationalism of this era came not from specific political content but from the capacity to provide emotional sustenance as a response to the decline of religion and the dehumanization of industrialism. Nationalism survived because it gave individual lives meaning in an increasingly meaningless universe through the potent emotions of history and locality.

Not surprisingly, the scholars of the second period were mostly guided by political concerns. During the interwar period the social and political realities of the world did not leave room for alternative viewpoints. Nationalism was the compelling norm and no one could remain indifferent to its emotional appeal. Smith notes that there

3 Smith, A. 1983, pp. 257. 4 MacLaughlin, J. 1987 “Nationalism as an Autonomous Social Force: A Critique of Recent Scholarship on Ethnonationalism”, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism , xiv (1), quoted in Ozkirimli 2000 Theories of Nationalism: a Critical Introduction , NY: St. Martin’s Press, p. 1. 5 For instance, J.S. Mill wrote about the possibility of a large and progressive nation that should possess the capacity to absorb nations that were not sufficiently enlightened or modern; Mill, J.S. 1861/ 1975 “Considerations on Representative Government” pp. 144- 423 in R. Wollheim (ed) Three Essays , NY: Oxford University Press, p. 385. His argument seems in some ways similar to Engels’ famous rejection of the claims of those he called historyless peoples. Engels thought that minorities (or remnants of nations) would either be exterminated or de-nationalized by the course of history (Marx 1973, p. 221). 6 Berlin, I. 1999 “ The Roots of ”, London: Chatto & Windus, p. 99, quoted in Anthony D. Smith 2004 The Antiquity of Nations , MA: Polity, p. 238.

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was “no attempt to fashion a general theory applicable to all cases, or to resolve the antinomies of each issue in a coherent and systematic manner”. 7

The third stage of the study of nationalism, which can be broadly dated from the end of the Second World War, was heavily influenced by the process of and the establishment of new states in the Third World. 8 From the 1960s onward, the debate was no longer confined to historians. Rather, the debate became much more diversified with the contributions by sociologists and political scientists.

The 1970s witnessed a new wave of interest in nationalism. The input of neo-

Marxist scholars who emphasized the role of economic factors in their accounts was particularly important. 9 The debate experienced a new twist in the 1980s. The works of

John Armstrong (1982) Nations Before Nationalism and Anthony D. Smith (1986) The

Ethnic Origins of Nations , laid the groundwork for an ‘ethno-symbolist’ critique of

modernist theories. The great classics of the modernist approach were also published in

this period. Ernest Gellner’s (1983) Nations and Nationalism , ’s

(1983) Imagined Communities , and Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger’s (1983) The

Invention of Tradition , all published in 1983, set the scene for fruitful discussions during

the last two decades of the twentieth century. As Ozkirimli has noted, with these studies,

the debate on nationalism reached its most mature stage. 10

What is Nationalism? A brief survey of competing definitions of nation and nationality illustrates how the

academic debate on nationalism is diverse. One established approach begins with the

7 Smith, A. D. 1998, Nationalism and Modernism , p. 10. 8 Snyder, T. 1997, p. 233. 9 Hechter’s 1999 Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 , and Nairn’s (1981) The Break-Up of Britain are two pioneering examples of this era. 10 Ozkirimli, U. 2000 Theories of Nationalism , London: Macmillan, p. 55

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assumption that ‘nationalism’ is what ‘nations’ do. defined the nation broadly as a combination of social solidarity built up out of historical contingencies, with a voluntary collective will to continue on that solidarity. 11 In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch emphasized the frequency and density of social communication, a theme that is still central to many conceptions of nationalism today. 12 Yet another key theme, introduced by

Walker Connor, stresses notions of ancestry, and descent. The nation, according

to this formulation, is an imagined extension of the bonds of blood relationship. 13 Also in the line of thought running from Emile Durkheim (1965 [1915]), up to Benedict

Anderson (1991 [1983], pp. 5-6), the parallels between nationalism and religion have always been noted with many seeing the national community as a modern replacement for religious community supplying a focus for social solidarity. Finally, some have tried to formulate philosophical justifications as a response to highly negative conceptions of nations and nationalism as malign forces inevitably leading to , social conflict and violence, as portrayed best by Hobsbawn (1996). For instance, Miller defined nations as teams in that “they see themselves as co-operating to achieve some end, that they regard one another as having obligations to the team.” 14

11 “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which strictly speaking are just one, constituted this principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is in the common possession of rich legacy of memories; the other is actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage that has been received in common.” Renan, E. 1882/ 1996 “What is a nation?” in S. Woolf (ed.) Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the Present , London: Routledge, pp. 57-58. 12 “[functional definition of nationality]…membership in a people essentially consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over wide range of subjects, with members of one large group, than outsiders.” Deutsch, K 1953 Nationalism and Social Communication , 2 nd ed., MA: MIT Press, p. 97. 13 “[nation] is a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related. It is t he largest group that can command a person’s loyalty because of felt kinship ties….The sense of unique descent, of course, need not, in nearly all cases will not, accord with factual history.” (emphasis in original) Connor, W. 1994 Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding , NJ: Princeton University, p. 202. 14 Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 17-18.

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So, which is it? Is the nation a historically formed community, an artifact of communicative interaction, an imagined family, a pseudo- religion or a team? While not necessarily incompatible, these various definitions point us in different directions and each seems to work better in particular circumstances than others.

Hence, defining nationalism is a particularly problematic task. Nevertheless, this project should offer some sort of working definition, a general guide that draws the parameters of this study as well as a context in which readers can relate to their day-to- day experience. I offer the following definition, which is followed by some qualification and more elaboration on concepts of ethnic nationalism:

“Nationalism is the making of combined claims on behalf of a population provoked by periodic incapacities of states that asserts the existence of an alternative – ethnic- loyalty that stands in distinction, though not always in opposition, to the state- defined nation.”

This definition stresses that at its core nationalism involves the assertion of social and political claims, and that these claims are normally articulated and advanced by smaller social and political groups in the name of a larger population. The emergence of states and of nations is linked. Nationalism is the potential basis for popular legitimacy or expression of support for state power, and as such the two are tied together by definition.

When nationalism coincides with an existing state it provides legitimacy, spreading acceptance and support for the state’s claim to a monopoly of coercion. When it does not coincide with a state, it de-legitimates, potentially threatening that state’s coercive power.

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But whether as a sentiment inspiring state-building or justifying existing states, nationalism implies the ideal of a “nation-state” in which mass allegiance and institutional power coincide.

So defining nationalism as a mass sentiment for or against state power specifies the subject. In the former case, that is nationalism as a mass sentiment for the state power, models of the state assume a strong centralized administration integrates and promotes socio-economic development so that ethnicity will wither away eventually. Yet, since this is not happening, the latter case, in which nationalism understood as a mass sentiment and forms an alternative to the state power, deserves further attention of this project.

Ethnic Group, Nation and Nationalism :

Ethnic group or ethnic community can be defined as a group of people who are united by

a common inherited culture, racial similarity, common religion, and belief in a common

history and ancestry and who exhibit a strong psychological sentiment of belonging to the

group. 15 There are two types of ethnic groups: indigenous 16 and diaspora communities. In

the former type long time residents of a given territory claim exclusive legal and moral

rights and ownership over that land, which is backed up by factual and mythical

evidence. The latter type refers to communities that can be found in foreign countries that

are created by population migration, oppression in their home state, or the attraction of

15 Taras, R. C., Ganguly, R. 2006 Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The international dimension , NYC: Pearson Longman, p. 1. Also see Esman, M. J. 1994 Ethnic Politics , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press for comprehensive discussion of these concepts. 16 Taras and Ganguly (2006) also uses the term “ communities”

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better opportunities. These groups’ demands usually revolve around nondiscriminatory political practices. 17

An ethnic group’s links with nationalism occur when political and statist ideas

develop within the group. As Ernest Barker has argued, “a nation is a body of men,

inhabiting a definite territory, who normally are drawn from different races…[and

who]…cherish a common will, and accordingly form, or tend to form, a separate state for

the expression and realization of that will”. 18 In this formulation, a nation–state exists

when an ethnic nation is congruent/ coterminous to the state. 19 However, ninety percent

of the states in the world today incorporate more than two ethnic groups, and thus, are

defined as multi-ethnic. 20 According to Barker’s definition, the state is the natural outgrowth of a nation’s desire to self-govern. Therefore, it assumes that the formation of nations precedes the formation of states. This is true for most of Western Europe and

North America where the formation of nations provided the incentive to form states. In contrast, in the developing world, at least in the majority that was colonized, this process worked the other way around. The creation of multi-ethnic administrations in the , which were converted to sovereign states during decolonization without first achieving political aspirations, created artificial multi-ethnic states. Therefore, state- building had to be followed by the very difficult task of national identity building. 21

Although nationalism has been a contested phenomenon since it first made its appearance after the , many scholars agree that nationalism

17 Taras and Ganguly, Understanding ethnic conflict , p. 1 and Milton, M.J. Ethnic Politics , p. 9. 18 Ernest Barker 1927 “National Character and Factors in its Formation”, London, p. 17 quoted in Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins 1985 International Relations: The World Community in Transition , New Delhi: CBS Publishers, p. 19. 19 Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism , p. 11 20 Taras and Ganguly, Understanding ethnic conflict , p. 2. 21 See Taras and Ganguly, Understanding ethnic conflict , pp.2-3, for detailed account of this nation and state debate.

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incorporates two important features. First, nationalism is an emotion or a sentiment. Hans

Kohn, for instance, stressed the emotional nature of nationalism when he wrote that nationalism “is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness” 22 Second, it is

a political doctrine. Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith, in contrast, emphasized the

political nature of nationalism. According to Gellner, nationalism is a political doctrine

that requires congruence of political and national units. 23 Smith, rejecting the arguments of critics of nationalism, such as Elie Kedourie’s claim that the nationalist doctrine has exceedingly harmful consequences, argued that “[nationalist doctrine] is distinguished by the fact that the objective of their [nations] social action can only be the ‘autonomous polity’, a of their own; and they derive their sense of community from historically specific political actions”.24

Two major are possible when an ethnic group transforms into a nation: civic and ethnic. 25 suggests one’s membership in and loyalty

to the nation-state in terms of citizenship, common laws, and political participation

regardless of ethnicity. 26 Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, suggests one’s membership in and loyalty to the nation-state in terms of ethnicity and vernacular culture. 27 Therefore, minority ethnic groups, even if they are citizens of the state, “cannot

become part of the dominant national group”. 28

22 Kohn, H. 1944 The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background , NY: McMillan, p. 8. See also Kohn, H. 1955 Nationalism: Its meaning and History, Princeton , NJ: Van Nostrand. Boyd Shafer, also view nationalism as a sentiment that binds group of people to live as a separate and distinct unit. See Shafer, B. 1955 Nationalism: Myth and Reality , New York: Harcourt, Brace, p. 10. 23 Gellner, E. (1983), p. 11. 24 Smith, A.D. 1971/ 1983 Theories of Nationalism , (2 nd ed) NY: Holmes and Meyer, pp 19-20. 25 Taras and Ganguly (2006) p. 3. 26 Kupchan C. A. 1995 Introduction: Nationalism Resurgent, in Kupchan (ed.) Nationalism and in the New Europe , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 4. 27 Smith, A.D. 1993 “The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism” Survival , Vol. 35, No 1 Spring p. 55. 28 Kupchan, C. A. Nationalism and Nationalities , p. 4.

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According to Esman, the transformation of an ethnic group into an ethnic occurs when an ethnic community is converted “into a political competitor that seeks to combat antagonists or to ethnically define interests on the agenda of the state”. 29 Such ethnic political movements attempt to represent “the collective consciousness and aspirations of the entire community”. 30 But why does such

transformation occur? Why do processes of modernization fail to prevent such

fragmentary trends and lead the way to the fusion of ethnic groups? Answers to such

questions are complex. However, the following section attempts to shed light on the

nationalism debate by surveying and categorizing the political science literature.

Perspectives on how to study nationalism In attempting to understand the development of nationalism, it is impossible to avoid the wider debates surrounding the origins and nature of nations and nationalism. Therefore, it is first necessary to locate the perspectives on how to study nationalism in the broader context of the ‘nationalism debate’. Once it would have been fashionable to approach the question through the primordialist/modernist dichotomy. Today, a relatively new view, ethno-symbolism, challenges this traditional dichotomy.

Nationalism Debate

The common denominator of the modernists is their conviction in the modernity of nations and nationalism; that of the ethno-symbolists is the stress they place in their

29 Esman, M. J. Ethnic Politics, p. 27. 30 Ibid. p. 27. Here we can also refer to the nature of PKK as being the representative of Kurds, (or even HADEP, and/or political parties in Turkey) and of course SNP in Scotland.

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explanations on ethnic pasts and cultures; finally, that of the primordialists is their belief in the antiquity and naturalness of nations.

Primordialism is the idea that nations were natural and ‘given’ historical units.

While a nation may lay dormant, go through Golden Ages, and decline, it is an ever present actor on the stage of history. This might be described as the nationalists’ view of the nation, the starting point of traditional ‘patriotic histories’. More recently, the socio- biologist Pierre van den Berghe has argued that there is a biological necessity behind nationalism 31 , while Clifford Geertz has stressed the importance of “assumed ‘givens’ – of social existence.” 32 Thus, in the words of Ozkirimli, “[f]or the primordialist, the past determines the present: nations have existed since time immemorial and they are a natural part of human existence, as sight of speech. 33

Although it would seem pertinent to note that this outlook remains an important

way of viewing nations and nationalism in the real world, primordialism has been

systemically displaced inside academia. In its place ‘modernism’ has become the

dominant paradigm. Ernest Gellner (1964) and Elie Kedourie (1971) pioneered this angle

and the modernist theme was taken up by writers, such as Eric Hobsbawn (1983), Tom

Nairn (1981) [1977], John Breuilly (1993) [1982] and Benedict Anderson (1991) [1983].

This perspective asserts that nations and nationalism have only existed for, more or less,

the last 200 years, and are products of specific modern processes, such as capitalism,

industrialism, the bureaucratic state, urbanization and secularism. Thus, while individual

writers stressed particular dynamics, such as ‘industrial culture’ for Gellner, uneven

31 Van den Berghe, P. 1978 “Race and Ethnicity: A Socio-biological Perspective”, Ethnic and Racial Studies , 1(4), pp. 401-411. 32 Geertz, C. 1973/ 1993 The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, London: Fontana, (2 nd ed), p. 259. 33 Ozkirimli, U. Theories of Nationalism pp. 64-65.

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economic development for Nairn, the modern state for Breuilly and, in the case of

Anderson, a combination of factors including ‘print capitalism’ and a revolution in the conception of time, the common denominator between modernists is their assumption of the historical novelty of ‘nations and nationalism’.

Therefore, the nationalist political argument as characterized by Breuilly signifies

following assumptions first; there exists is a unique nation, second; its interests and

values take priority over all other interests and third; it must be independent as possible,

is qualitatively different and discontinues from pre-modern ethnic communities. 34

Yet, in recent years, the modernist view has been criticized by the ‘ethno-

symbolist’ view. While, this paradigm recognizes the modernity of both nations and

nationalism, it seeks to find, what A.D Smith termed, ‘the ethnic origins of nations’. 35

That is to say, they have endeavored to locate what Gellner described as a nation’s

‘navel’, in a pre-modern ethnic community. 36 The primary partisans of ‘ethno- symbolism’, A.D Smith (1986), John Armstrong (1982) and John Hutchinson (1994), argue that earlier symbols, myths and values have been overlooked by the modernists and instead focus on the ‘la longue dureé’ 37 character of modern nations. 38 Specifically, why particular modern nations have developed has to be explained and “contextualized” with reference to their ethnic forbearers. As Smith claimed, pre modern ethnic communities were transformed under conditions of modernity but not obliterated. In this argument, it

34 Breuilly, J. Nationalism and the State . 35 Smith, A.D. 1986 The Ethnic Origins of Nations , Oxford: Blackwell. 36 See Gellner, E., Smith, A. D. “The Nation: Real or Imagined?: The Warwick Debates on Nationalism”, Nations and Nationalism 2, no. 3, 1996, pp. 367-368. 37 Armstrong, J. 1982 Nations Before Nationalism , Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, p. 4 This French term is used to prioritize long term historical structures over events. In American English more common usage is ‘longer duree’. 38 Smith (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations , Armstrong, J. (1982) Nations Before Nationalism , Hutchinson, J. 1994 Modern Nationalism London: Fontana.

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is implied that “a greater measure of continuity existed between ‘traditional’ and

‘modern’… eras.” 39 Furthermore, as nationalism often focuses on ‘symbolic’ goals, such as education in a particular language, protection of ancient rites or having ones own TV station, ethno-symbolism illuminates these issues, while many of the materialist modernist explanations struggle to understand the emotive power of ‘collective memory’.

In short, the differences between the pre modern ethnic communities and modern nations and nationalism are envisaged as a shift rather than a radical break.

The modernist/ ethno-symbolist division not only highlights the importance of the novelty/ la longer dureé [time dimension of many centuries] dichotomy in understanding nations and nationalism. It illustrates a second dispute which revolves around an

‘invented’/‘constructed’ versus ‘essentialist’ nature of nations. In this debate the battle lines cut across the Modernist/ Ethno-symbolist divide. Arch modernist Eric Hobsbawn’s influential ‘invention of tradition’ argument and Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ thesis both stress the invented/constructed natures of nations. Hobsbawn’s (and

Ranger’s) 40 argument postulates that many so called ‘national’ traditions are not

contiguous with traditions of the past. Rather, they are “responses to novel situations

which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by

quasi-obligatory repetition.” 41 These new traditions serve to symbolize social cohesion

(national unity), legitimize institutions (arms of the state and institutions of civil society) and socialize people into particular ‘world views’ (national values). Hobsbawn further asserts that ‘nations’ are essentially constructed from above, but can only be understood by looking at them from below, thus, differentiating his view from the more elite-

39 Smith The Ethnic Origins of Nations , p. 13 40 Hobsbawn, E. J., Ranger, T.H. (eds) The Invention of Tradition. 41 Ibid., p. 131

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centered instrumentalist views of Gellner and Paul Brass. Anderson rejected the

‘invention’ idea because of its insinuation of ‘falsity’. 42 This would imply there was a real alterative to Hobsbawnian view. In place of ‘fabrication’ and ‘invention’ Anderson uses ‘creation’ and ‘imagining’. While accepting a constructivist view, he relates the

‘imagined political’ to ‘print capitalism’ and, often ignored, the decline of traditional religious worldviews to the development of the doctrine of . John

Armstrong, a pioneer of ‘ethno-symbolism’, accepts the ‘invented’ nature of human communities and continues only to debate their antiquity. 43 Equally, ‘modernists’ such as

neo-Marxist Tom Nairn, treats the existence of Scottishness, Welshness, Irishness and

Englishness as unproblematic. He accepts Fredrick Engel’s conception of the ‘historic

nations’ and explicitly recognized this in stating that “nationalism, unlike nationality or

ethnicity variety cannot be considered a natural phenomenon.” 44 This concurs with

Smith’s, an ethno-symbolist, stress on the ethnic community’s ‘exceptional durability’ under the normal historical ‘vicissitudes’ of history. Thus, while nationalism may be modern, it “is not ‘contingent’, it is constructed around a ‘particular’ ethnic tradition.” 45

It is in this context, this study will analyze Scottish and Kurdish nationalisms.

To what extent does the past matter for present day nations?

The answer to this question gets to the heart of the theoretical debate on nationalism that

took off in the 1960s with the pioneering works of Karl Deutsch (1963, 1966, 1969), Elie

Kedourie (1961) and Ernest Gellner (1965) together with the work of an earlier

42 Anderson, B. 1983/ 1991 Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism , (2 nd ed) London: Verso. 43 Armstrong Nations Before Nationalism 44 Nairn, T. The Break-up of Britain , p. 331. 45 Smith, A.D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations , p. 13

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generation of historians such as Hans Kohn (1951, 1955), and Carleton Hayes (1926,

1955 [1931]). The debate gained momentum from the 1980s onward with the publication of seminal works by Benedict Anderson (1983, 1998), Eric Hobsbawn (1983, 1996),

Anthony D. Smith (1983), and again, Ernest Gellner (1995, 1999).

As mentioned in the previous section, the major contenders in this debate are

primordialists, ethno-symbolists and modernists, depending on the answer they give to

the above question and their views on the nature of nations and nationalism. For the

primordialist, the past determines the present: nations have existed since the immemorial

and they are a natural part of human beings, as natural as sight or speech: “that nations

are historical givens, have been a continuous presence in human history and exert some

inherent power over both past and present generations.” 46 For the ethno-symbolists, the

past constrains the present: modern nations are, in most cases, an outgrowth of the pre-

existing ethnic communities and the resilient feature of social and political landscapes as

they respond to real human needs. According to the modernist account, the past is

exploited by the present: nations that have emerged as a direct consequence of various

processes associated with modernization appeal to the past to validate their existence in

the presence and project themselves into the future. From the modernist perspective,

nations are outgrowths of modernization or rationalization as exemplified in the rise of

46 Hutchinson, J. Nations ad Zones of Conflict , p. 10.

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the bureaucratic state, industrial economy and secular concepts of human autonomy. 47

The basic claims of each category and its representatives are summarized in Table 2.1. 48

Table 2.1 Perspectives on how to study nations and nationalisms Perspective Definition Example Historical History of the development and Kohn, Greenfeld, migration of nationalism Hobsbawn Primordial Past determines present Geertz

Ethno-symbolist Past constraint present Armstrong, Hutchinson, Smith Modernist The past is exploited in the present

-Instrumentalist Nationalism is a tool at the hands of Breuilly, Brass elite to generate mass support (political modernization)

-Structuralist Nationalism is a result of industrial Deutsch, Gellner, society Hobsbawn Communications, technology, new skills…etc (economic and socio-cultural modernization)

- Constructivist Ethnicity and nationalism are Anderson artificial constructs (constructivism) (political and socio-cultural modernization) Psychological Nationalism as a primary articulator Tajfel & Turner of group identity

47 The other two approaches toward nationalism and national identity as marked first and last in Table 2.1 that have gained academic currency are known broadly as historical perspective and social identity theory. While historical studies analyze the development and migration of nationalism, the focus of social identity theorists is on the centrality of social identity as a factor in an individual’s sense of self-identity. 48 I must note that this categorization is not conditioned by a belief in the validity of them. Rather they reflect a general tendency. I admit that classifications cannot be empirically right or wrong. See Breuilly, J. 1996 “Approaches to Nationalism”, in Balakrishnan, G (ed.) Mapping the Nation , London: Verson, p. 9.

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Nationalism and Modernization

In nationalism studies modernism forms a coherent paradigm, reinforced by notions of social evolution that underpin much modern social theory. 49 As the survey of literature

has shown so far, there are varying emphases among modernists. All stress economic

forces shaping ideological structures, but Gellner (1983), and to a certain extent

Hobsbawn (1983), take particularly materialist positions. 50 Breuilly (1991) focuses more

on the dynamics of political change, while Anderson (1996) highlights the fundamental

changes in the worldview. There are many disagreements, but they are nonetheless

unified by a general paradigm of profound social and historical transformation over the

last centuries.

Moreover, various sub-themes also claim a role in the broader modernization

paradigm. The notion of uneven development highlights a conflict between

interdependent societies at different stages in the process of modernization. The

civic/ethnic dichotomy similarly exemplifies a contrast between the ‘modern’ and the

‘backward’. The thesis of secularization suggests that religion in modern life would fade,

where nationalism would provide a substitute for religion as the gatherer of social values.

Finally, civil society, as a set of values and institutions conducive to the liberal

individualistic, market-based way of life, is usually displayed as an essential element in

the process of modernization.

49 In contrast, the idea of primordialism “tends to develop through critiques of the limitations of this dominant paradigm, but also lacks, so far, a firm grounding in a broader explanatory paradigm.” See Hearn, J. Rethinking Nationalism , p. 92. 50 Gellner came to be labeled as a non-Marxist materialist whereas Hobsbawn is a Marxist historian.

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In the following sections, I criticize the modernist approaches to the study of nationalism. I suggest that modernization and its end result, modernity, is a dynamic process rather than a stable state. Hence, we need to reconsider concepts such as ‘uneven development’, as an intensifying condition of the modern world that generates more nationalisms rather than providing just a rocky step in the path to modernity.

Separatist nationalist movements and integration in modernization theory:

To treat nations as modern is often to presume that they did not exist (indeed were not

even conceived) prior to a recent and historically discrete period. 51 Modernists hold that

with the achievement of modernization, ethnic cleavages will be ironed out and an

integrative homogenization process established. Political, economic and social cleavages

are regarded as signs of underdevelopment. They are aberrations to be eradicated by

industrialization and urbanization. Modernist scholars on ethno-nationalism espouse ‘a

melting pot’ hypothesis concluding that ‘modernization is not only homogenizing, it is

also an irreversible process’ 52 . Over time and as a consequence of processes of modernization, becomes more French, Nigeria becomes more Nigerian, and so forth. Modernist interpretations, according to Hutchinson, emphasize five major aspects of these formations: 53

1. Secular political units infused with ideas of popular sovereignty, which

seek realization in the achievement of an independent state, united

through universalistic citizenship rights.

51 Manzo, K.A. 1996 Creating Boundaries: The Politics of Race and Nation , Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 8. 52 Lijphart, A. 1977 Political Theories and the Explanation of Ethnic Conflict in the , Ithaca, NY: Cornell university press, p. 48. 53 Hutchinson, J. Modern Nationalism , pp. 4-6.

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2. Consolidated territories, that exemplify the new scales of organization

brought about by the bureaucratic state and market economy that have

eroded regional and local loyalties and engendered more intensive

networks of communication.

3. Ethnically homogeneous compared with earlier polyethnic societies, by

virtue of state policies, including the promotion of official languages,

the inculcation of a pat riotic ethos in education and expulsion of

minorities.

4. High cultural units based on a standard vernacular language, literacy

and print capitalism, whose new genres of newspaper and novel provide

the necessary basis of an extensive industrial society of strangers.

5. Industrial urban societies with a high degree of territorial integration,

whose large-scale career pathways create a new mobile middle class

that dominates national life.

As mentioned before, this project suggests that the disappearance of nationalist movements and integration through modernization is a discredited proposition. The presence of proliferating separatist movements seeking autonomous existence has become commonplace, and is provoked in many instances by processes of modernization.

In effect, I argue that the opposite of the modernization hypothesis is true; namely, that modernization in multi-ethnic states tends to activate assertions for self-determination.

Modernization brings disparate peoples closer together. The impact of change varies from ethnic group to ethnic group, conferring advantages on some and severely

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disadvantaging others. The differential impact of modernization stimulates sentiments of relative depravation which are amplified by another dimension of modernization: better communication. Disparities in development breed jealousy and spawn fears of ethnic domination. 54 Claims of discrimination and exploitation then become rife. Democratic

mass politics feeds on these raw materials of the modernization process, fuelling the fires

of ethnic militancy. Overall, ethnic group formation and emergent separatist movements

stem in the main from the modernization experience of both the developed and

underdeveloped world.

Until recently it was the common faith among political scientists that nationalism was on the decline. Economic growth, technological advances and simply modernity it was argued, were pushing peoples of the world to recognize their commonalities rather than differences. Nationalism was considered to be a matter of the nineteenth century and its sporadic outbursts in the twentieth century seemed temporary. This study, as mentioned earlier, resists this consensus.

The Hypotheses

To learn about the phenomena of modernization and modernity and their effects in a range of contexts, I study Scottish nationalism in the UK and Kurdish nationalism in

Turkey. Since the signing of the Act of Union 1707 that merged Scotland, England and

Wales, 300 years have passed and Scottish nationalist demands of independence have accelerated for the last 40 years. The Kurdish campaign for recognition of their distinctiveness, which can be traced back to the era of the Ottoman Empire, erupted for a

54 For more detailed discussion, see Hechter, M. (1975) Internal Colonialism .

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brief period in the 1920s during the first years of the Republic and then accelerated in the

1980s.

I study these cases for two reasons. First, these cases are historically significant and policy relevant. Second, the historical timeline, organizations, incidents and activities within the cases provide multiple observations of, and variations in, the variables I study: economic, political and socio-cultural modernization. To examine the variables, I first review the Scottish and Kurdish nationalism in the cases. Using a comparative method, I observe that the Scottish and Kurdish nationalisms increased since the 1960s when compared to first half of the twentieth century and nineteenth century. I then develop a number of hypotheses on modernization and its possible effects on separatist nationalism.

I test these hypotheses by process tracing events within each case to see whether the modernization processes reinforced integration or increased separatist nationalism.

Overall comparison of two periods within the cases, before and after 1960 in Britain and before and after 1970 in Turkey, gives us a testable framework for the hypotheses. 55

To test my hypotheses, I infer predictions (observable implications) about what behavior one should expect in the cases if the hypothesis were true. I then examine the cases to see if they contain evidence of the predicted behavior(s). Predictions tell us what to look for when examining the evidence and they answer the question “how do we know effects of modernization when we see them?” Within a case study, determining how well the predictions fare is the best way to measure variables. Therefore, the comparative case

55 Some of the classic works on comparative case study are: Eckstein, H. (1975) “Case Study and Theory in Political Science” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.) Handbook of Political Science, vol. 1, Political Science: Scope and Theory , MA: Addison- Wesley, Lijphart, A. (1971) “Comparative Politics and Comparative Method”, American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (September), pp. 682-698, Mackie, T. and David M., 1995 “The Comparative Method”, in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. Theory and Methods in Political Science , London: Macmillan, pp. 173- 189.

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study can yield valid causal inferences. 56 To assure universally applicable standards,

Alexander George suggests a method of “structured, focused comparison”. 57 George

emphasizes the need for a systematic collection of the same information, the same

variables, across carefully selected units. In order to accomplish a systematic description

and thus to make causality possible, I employ a theoretical guidance throughout the case

studies.

The main questions this project answers are: Do the processes of modernization

diminish the presence of separatist nationalist movements and does modernization

promote social integration? If so, how and when? This means that the causal chain I am

investigating is: Modernization -> Civic Nationalism-> Unified and Sovereign Society.

Modernization subverts separatist nationalism

The independent variable is modernization, a linear process through which regions and social groups are steadily incorporated. The ultimate dependent variable is a unified and sovereign society established by state and market. To examine this causal relationship systematically and explore the possible effects of modernization on national integration and, thus, the elimination of ethnic separatism, I lay out and test the principal ways that modernization may reduce or increase the possibility of the emergence of separatist nationalism.

56 King, G., Keohane, R. O., and Verba, S. 1994 Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 45 57 George, A.L., McKeown, T. J. 1985 “Case Studies and Theories of Organization Decision Making”, Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, 2, pp. 21-58, in King G. et al (1994) p. 45.

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Modernization may affect the attitudes of ethnic minorities towards the nation in

three ways. First, economic modernization narrows down inequalities between

collectivities. Second, political modernization enhances bureaucratic capabilities of the

state integrating regions and ethnic groups. Finally, social and cultural modernization

replaces traditional loyalties with national ones. These hypotheses are largely derived

from the literature on the nation and nationalism. 58

Today, ‘modernism’ is the dominant orthodoxy in the study of nationalism. Its hypotheses emerged out of classical sociological theory, which claims that concepts of nation and nationalism are products of modern historical developments. For the modernists, nation is an innovation, a creation of the modern epoch, a response and a product of historical processes of modernization such as capitalism and industrialization, rapid urbanization, the development of the bureaucratic state, mass democracy, and public education. Many would agree that ‘modern society is industrial society; to modernize is to industrialize and to embrace all of its consequences’ 59 . The sharp dichotomy between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ (or industrial) societies has been adopted widely by social theorists. For instance, according to Gellner, nations and nationalisms are the products of long-term structural transformation: from traditional to modern. In time the functional requirements of industrial society became fully articulated as a theory of political legitimacy, held by modern nation-states and those aspiring to that condition, one “which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state- a contingency already formally

58 Examples include Gellner (1983, 1996), Hobsbawn (1990), Anderson (1991), Breuilly (1982), Hechter (1975), Kohn (1967) Nairn (1979). 59 Kumar, K. 1988 The rise of modern society: aspects of the social and political development of the West , Oxford: Blackwell.

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excluded by the principle in its general formulation- should not separate the power- holders from the rest”. 60

Gellner spoke in terms of ‘industrial’ rather than ‘capitalist’ society. Anthony

Giddens has pointed to the significance of this choice in terms of social theory in general, observing that the former is associated with a notion of modern society as functionally integrated, and of history as converging on that model. Capitalism, on the other hand, is associated with a model of underlying social conflict between the economic classes generated by modern industrial capitalism. 61

The idea of nationalism as a progressive, integrative force, able to tear down barriers of traditionalism and help people along the road towards modernity preoccupied modernization theorists with notions such as greater levels of individual participation, autonomy, citizenship and democratization. Kerr et al. argued, “the industrial society is an open community encouraging occupational and social mobility. In this sense industrialism must be flexible and competitive, it is against tradition and status based on family, class, religion, or race” 62 This line of reasoning also predicts that national states

will conform to the idea of a dominating nationality assimilating smaller, peripheral

ethnic groups and their languages and cultures through the agents of the modern state.

While these assumptions sum up the conventional relationship between

modernization and nationalism, this project suggests that the opposites of such

assumptions are true in the Scottish and Kurdish cases. Modernization does not

necessarily pave the way to national homogenization or reduce separatist demands.

60 Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism , p. 1. 61 Giddens, A. 1987 Sociology: a Brief but Critical Introduction, (2 nd ed.), FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, chapter 2. 62 Kerr C., Dunlop, J., Harbison, F. and Myers, C. 1964 Industrialism and Industrial Man: The problems of labour and management in economic growth , NY: Oxford University Press.

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Instead the Scottish and Kurdish cases show that in some instances modernization should be the process to blame for raising ethnic consciousness and thus, demands for separation.

Observable implications

We can point out three aspects of modernization as observable: economic, political and social elements.

Economic variables include division of labor, GNP per capita, level of industrialization and levels of individual welfare. In a modern society, these variables tend to be higher. For instance, complex division of labor, increased GNP per capita, diversified economy and high levels of individual welfare such as high life expectancy and the supply of hospitals and doctors. The higher these figures the better the chances are for national integration. Economic prosperity diminishes demands for ethnic autonomy.

Political elements of modernization are determined by the rationalization of authority. For instance, the modern polity requires replacement of traditional, religious, familial and ethnic authorities by a single, national, secular political authority. In addition to that, we can count the differentiation of new political functions, the development of specialized structures to perform these functions and increased participation in politics by social groups throughout the society.

In terms of socio-cultural modernization, in modern societies we expect vertical social mobilization to be the norm. This includes literacy, education, increased communication, mass media exposure and urbanization. For instance, increased

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communication and high literacy are likely to bring people together and thus, decrease conflict between different groups.

These hypotheses will be credited if modernization processes increased the above- mentioned elements of the modern polity and paved the way to the elimination of differences and the establishment of a united society. Finding otherwise, that is that modernization processes had little or no effect in the elimination of differences, and thus, contributing to separatist national revival will discredit these hypotheses. In what follows, after detailing the reversed relationship between modernization and nationalism, that modernization reinforces separatist nationalism, I set out the hypotheses.

The reader has to keep in mind that this is not a horse race between winning and loosing hypotheses. It is an endeavor to tell the truth about modernization and nationalism in order to advance scholarship and help policy makers. Also, as we shall see, whether modernization has a positive or negative effect can not be determined on a blanket basis because modernization’s effects are often highly dependent upon prior conditions.

Modernization reinforces separatist nationalism

This project links the modernization process with the emergence and diffusion of ethno- nationalist sentiments in the modern world. We can account for political fragmentation63 ,

instability, and anti-democratic developments around the world by pointing to the

negative effects of modernization.

63 See Schwarzmantel, J. 2001 “Nationalism and Fragmentation Since 1989”, in Kate Nash and Alan Scott (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology , Blackwell Publishers: MA, pp. 386-395.

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First, on a general note, theorists such as Clifford Geertz accounted for the rise of nationalism by referring to the disorienting process of modernization and failure of the state to draw different ethnic groups into the national mainstream. 64 This increased the economic, cultural, and political divergence of these groups from the rest of the state.

Scholars following this line of reasoning, however, also added the qualification that the rise of ethnic nationalism and politicization of ethnicity are temporary phenomena and would gradually disappear. 65

Second, advocates of the ‘developmental approach’, originating in the studies of political modernization, saw the affects of the modernization process on the rise of ethnic nationalism. They dealt directly with ethnic political mobilization. The central argument of this approach is that ‘ethnic identity’ forms “the essential independent variable that leads to political assertiveness and militant separatism, regardless of the existence of inequality or dominance”. 66 Thus, the developmental approach assigned primacy to

cultural identity and argued that ethnic communities prefer to be governed poorly by their

ethnic fellows than wisely by aliens. , for instance, contends that the

modernization process helped to sharpen ethnic identity and spark ethno-nationalist

sentiments. 67 For example, the spread of communication and mobilization extended the

-administrative reach of into peripheral ‘ethnic ’ where

the ethnic group had enjoyed substantial autonomy. This helped to increase the ethnic

64 Geertz, C. (1963) “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiment and Civil Politics in the New States”, in C Geertz (ed.) Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia , NY: Free Press. 65 See Newman, G. “Does Modernization breed ethnic-political conflict?” World Politics , April 1991, v. 43: 3, pp. 454-455. For detailed discussion of the impact of modernization in developing world, see Huntington, S. P. 1968 Political Order in Changing Societies , New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, Lerner, D. 1967 “Communications and Prospects of Innovative Development”, in Lerner, D., Schramm W. (eds.) Communication and Change in developing Countries , HI: East-West Center Press, pp. 305-317. 66 Heraclides, A. 1991 The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics , London: Frank Cass, p. 8. 67 Connor, W. 1972 “Nation-Building or Nation- Destroying?” World Politics , Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 328-331.

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group’s awareness of its own distinct culture, its contempt for ‘alien rule’, and its desire to preserve its autonomous lifestyle. 68

Third, Smith uses Halpern, Berger, and Binder’s analysis of ethnic, religious, and

political extremism in the Middle East 69 in order to discredit the significance of social and cultural modernization for the integration of minorities. According to this, extremism is related to the destruction of the traditional elite, elite culture, and peoples’ sense of security that was caused by the disruption of the traditional way of life that accompanied modernization.

Because of these weaknesses, modernist interpretations cannot satisfactorily explain

the current separatist nationalist revival sweeping much of the globe. Although we must

be grateful for the insights of modernist scholars, their understanding fails to grasp the

realities of today’s world. In this study, along the ethno-symbolist line, I suggest that,

rather than seeing minority nationalisms as by-products of the ‘modernization’ process,

we must take them as products of powerful experiences, occurring well before the

modern period, that are centrally important in directing the evolution of modern societies.

In the following sections, I match hypotheses about the positive, separatist

nationalism-reducing effects of modernization (economic, political and socio-cultural

respectively) with primed or counter-hypotheses about the negative effects of

modernization. After setting out the hypotheses favored by modernist thought I infer

observable implications about what to expect in the cases if the hypotheses are true. After

68 Ibid., p.330. Also Stein Rokkan further highlighted three factors which could prevent states from integrating groups in to the national life: territorial concentration and remoteness of ethnic groups, their social isolation, and their economic isolation. See Rokkan, S. 1970 Citizens, Elections, Parties , NY: McKay, p. 121. This is also one of the reasons, for example, why Scottish and Kurdish nationalism became salient and more assertive (will be addressed in more detailed in related chapters). See also Connor, W. 1973 “The Politics of Ethnonationalism”, Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 27, pp. 1-21, and Connor, W. 1967 “Self-Determination: The New Phase”, World Politics Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 30-53. 69 Smith, A. Theories of Nationalism , pp. 57-58.

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setting out the counter-hypotheses, I examine the cases in separate chapters to see if they contain evidence of the predicted behavior.

Economic Modernization reduces separatist nationalism (H1)

The first hypothesis is that economic development and industrialization weaken separatist tendencies of ethnic minorities and strengthens those groups’ attachment to national identity. Many scholars have explained ethnic conflicts as a consequence of backwardness, economic crises, uneven development or relative deprivation. 70 Following

this line of reasoning, economic modernization is expected to serve to reduce those

conflicts. Elaboration of this hypothesis is twofold. First, economic modernization

integrates core and periphery. Second, economic modernization promotes welfare and

reduces regional differences.

First, states enter into economic modernization in order to take advantage of its

benefits, and one proposed benefit is the assimilation of ethnic groups into society. The

anticipation of increased economic equality between groups helps to form a legitimate

view of the central government, and thus, acceptance of the role of national identity.

Therefore, remedy for the conflicts focuses on addressing the economic grievances.

Second, economic inequalities between collectivities, and between the core and

periphery, diminish minority ethnic groups’ willingness to enter into society as part of the

national cultural mosaic or accept the national identity. On the other hand, economic

equality, led and reinforced by economic modernization, reduces the dominant feeling of

70 See Nairn, T., The break-up of Britain and Hechter, M., Internal Colonialism .

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discontent experienced by underprivileged minority groups and increases incentive to assimilate by the increasing the sense of fairness.

As industrialization promotes the general welfare and reduces the regional differences, the core and the peripheral regions will be unified under the same economic structure. Measures, such as abolishing internal custom duties and instituting common systems of weights and measures and a common currency, will break down the barriers to trade and establish an integrated market. In this picture, Keating even suggests that nationalism itself has been used to promote development as peripheral interests may be attacked in the name of the greater good: for national advancement. 71 The creation of economic prosperity has been a convenient tool for governments to legitimate themselves and to ease the economic, political and cultural basis of ethnic differentiations.

Observable Implications: High levels in the following economic indicators relative to previous years will lead to the fusion of ethnic groups. 72

- GNP per capita

- Level of employments

- Level of individual welfare

- Human development index (UNDP)

To assess hypothesis (H1), I look for evidence in the cases that increased economic modernization accompanied by higher GNP per capita, better employment opportunities

71 Keating, M. 2001 Nations Against the States, New York: Palgrave, p. 36 72 Comparative method will be used to measure observable implications in both the Scottish north in the UK and the Kurdish south-east in Turkey. In each case I will set out periods of development, such as 18 th , 19 th and 20 th centuries and then compare these periods with the last four decades of 20 th century until present which we observe rising nationalist sentiments.

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and overall better living standards reduced levels of regional differences. Regional comparisons will be made between Scotland and rest of the UK and the Kurdish south east and rest of Turkey during different time periods such as the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century. Highlighting the periods between pre and post 1960 gives us better sources of comparison in terms of understanding the rise of nationalism among Kurds and Scots. For instance, finding that the Scottish economy fared well or moderately, when compared to rest of the UK in the post 1960 era will alert us to the fact that rising Scottish nationalism cannot be explained by the economic modernization hypothesis. The same is also true for the Kurdish case.

Economic modernization fosters separatist nationalism (H1’) Arguments revolving around economic development are limited in terms of explaining separatist nationalism because they do not fit the facts and are reductionist in nature.

First, if H1 is true, we expect that the economically advanced periphery would assimilate with the core with no difficulty. However, economic model(s) cannot explain why there are political aspirations on the part of economically privileged and prosperous ethnic groups. The most obvious example is Scotland, which is a case of overdevelopment. The Scots have long been innovators in the British context- in education, finance, technology, and the physical and social sciences. 73 Therefore,

Scotland constitutes an anomaly since it has been as industrialized as Britain from the

73 Hechter, M. 1985 “Internal Colonialism Revisited”, in Tiryakian, E. A., Rogowski, R. (eds) New Nationalism of the Developed West , Boston: Allen & Unwin, 17- 26.

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eighteenth century onward 74 while at the same time, the Scottish separatist movement has

maintained its popularity, especially from the 1960s to the present.

Also, the economic model fails to explain the assertiveness of the political

mobilization of the Kurdish minority, for example, in southeast Turkey. If H1 is true, we

can expect a decline in Kurdish separatism since the region has received large portions of

GNP for regional projects and has constituted a priority for regional development since

the 1970s. For example, large sums of government funds for projects such as the

Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) 75 were diverted to the region providing no remedy for rising ethnic and separatist sentiments.

Second, although economism still represents an element within the literature on nationalism, notably among instrumentalists, it tends to reduce nationalism to a discontent caused by regional economic inequalities. This project and my cases substantiate that the separatist claim of ethno-nationalism appears to operate independently of economic variables, and that perceived economic discrimination can only work as a reinforcing variable. In other words, the economic approach is only useful to explain political and nationalist mobilization in many parts of the developing world that followed from their economic exploitation and infiltration by core or dominant ethnic groups. As Connor has argued, to put economic issues at the centre of analysis means to

74 Kellas, J. 1991 The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity , London: Macmillan, p. 40. 75 The Southeastern Anatolia Project referred to as GAP from the Turkish acronym for Güneydo ğu Anadolu Projesi. The GAP had originally been planned in the 70s consisting of projects for irrigation and hydraulic energy production on the Euphrates and Tigris, but transformed into a multi-sector social and economic development program for the region in the 1980s. The development program encompasses such sectors as irrigation, hydraulic energy, agriculture, rural and urban infrastructure, forestry, education and health. The water resources development component of the program envisages the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydraulic power plants and irrigation of 1.7 million hectares of land. The total cost of the project is estimated as 32 billion US $. GAP’s projected completion date is scheduled for 2010, provided current financial difficulties and inflation do not further delay the project. For more information visit http://www.gap.gov.tr/index_en.php

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miss the primary point, namely, that separatist ethnic movements are indeed ethnic and not economic. 76

One piece of evidence must be found in the cases to support H1’. The economies of the Scottish north and Kurdish southeast must be similar to other regions in their respective nation-states while the separatist nationalist sentiment is rising.

Political modernization reduces separatist nationalism (H2)

The modernity of states is based primarily on their enhanced administrative capacity. The enhanced administrative capacity of the modern state reduces ethnic separatist nationalism due to:

1. The unification of territories under a single administrative centre and the

replacement of indirect rule with an increasingly direct control of territories and

populations.

2. Its reliance on popular political participation.

3. Its capacity to mobilize and coordinate citizens by invoking nationalist ideas. 77

First, structural changes made it possible to conceive of the nation as unitary. Tax

collection, for example, was no longer left to quasi-autonomous feudal elites or ‘tax

farmers’, but systemized in the hands of the national government and its bureaucratic

agents. 78 Not only could taxes be collected, but roads could be built, schools run, and mass communications systems created. Eventually, state power could be exercised at the

76 Connor, W. 1984 The National Question in Marxist- Leninist Theory and Strategy , Princeton: Princeton University Press. 77 Recent accounts of the relationship of nationalism and state formation are in Mann (1986, 1993), and Breuilly (1993). See also the influential earlier works of Deutsch (1966, 1969), and Kohn (1968). 78 Calhoun, C. Nationalism , Chapter 4.

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farthest point of a realm as effectively as in the capital, which legitimizes the central government and its institutions in the eyes of ethnic minorities.

Second, the society of individuals defined as a polity of citizens will diminish demands to be recognized as a minority group deserving separate rights. Citizens’ commitment to the state could only be generated by participating in democratic and liberal institutions. In contrast to the 18 th -19 th century nation, the modern nation-state is more than a body of citizens with political rights. For instance, applying the ideas of Max

Weber, Reinhard Bendix focused particularly on the transformation of political authority, from the patrimonial rule of kings to the bureaucratic rule of states. 79 According to this line of thought, the modern state regulates and administers society through a bureaucratically defined system of offices, staffed by professionals, who obtain their offices on merit and are subject to legal authority. Therefore the modern state is a case of the people actively governing themselves according to agreed terms, rather than being governed by monarchs of nobles. In this manner, what matters most in a modern state is the recognition of the cultural identity of minorities, while stressing the collective character of society. Subsequently, in a modern state, this formulation is standardized and becomes the major way of providing a common identity for members of different social groups.

Third, the modern state, by invoking nationalist rhetoric through coordination and mobilization, will replace the entrenched interests of separatist nationalist groups by motivating people to work for a greater good in the form of national advancement.

Specifically, by coordination, I refer to the promotion of the idea of common interest

79 Bendix, R. 1964 Nation-Building and Citizenship , London: John Wiley and Sons, p. 106. See also, Bendix, R. 1978 Kings or People: Power and mandate to rule Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

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among different groups, which would otherwise have rather distinct interests in opposing the existing state. By mobilization, I refer to the use of nationalist ideas to generate support for the political movement from broad groups. In this formulation, a state’s increased capacity to coordinate and mobilize will reduce separatist tendencies of minority groups and enhance the groups’ tendencies to identify themselves with the nation-state.

In short, it has been argued that integration of regions and different ethnic groups

is due to bureaucracy and related information management by political elite as well as

improvements in transportation and communications infrastructure. These developments

not only knit together dispersed ethnic groups they also help to define national unity.

Observable Implications: The use of state mechanisms to foster modernization is the main observable implication

of this hypothesis. I look for their use in the cases. States can use a variety of

mechanisms, alone or in combination, to foster modernization. They include:

- Citizenship and political rights of citizens with an aim to dominate ethnic/ cultural

identities

- Pluralism: open system for political bargaining, in order to satisfy different groups

(power sharing)

- Legal and cultural equality, such as media and education rights, in order to

establish bonds of affinity among citizens and increase cooperation.

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- Invention of tradition (Hobsbawn)—primary education, public ceremonies, public

monuments-- as the main strategy for the elite to foster national unity among

different ethnic groups will provide integration/ assimilation

Overall, politically induced change such as the dismissal of traditional privileges and interest and its subordination to the state can soften the cultural forms, values and practices of different ethnic groups.

The hypothesis (H2) would be supported if the modern state successfully embraced the mechanisms to increase cooperation between groups and regions and this reduced separatist demands. Finding that the use of state mechanisms had little or no effect on diminishing separatist demands would serve to discredit the hypothesis H2. As mentioned earlier, comparisons will be made between regions in each case as well as between different periods.

Political modernization fosters separatist nationalism (H2’) Contrary to H2, the enhanced administrative capacity of modern bureaucratic states does not reduce ethnic nationalism because such an elitist approach, first, underestimates the impact of local networks and, second, confuses state-building with nation-building.

To start with the former, political modernists depict the last two centuries as shaped by a single decisive transition. Political revolutions, industrial take-off, and the decline of religious authority were the main features of this transition. Hutchinson calls this the ‘revolutionary’ model of modernization. 80 This approach underestimates the

significance of local cultural and social contexts. As Smith has argued, what determines

80 Hutchinson, J., Modern Nationalism , p. 23.

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the intensity, character, and scope of nationalism is the interaction between the tidal wave of modernization and these local variations. 81 Therefore, in some cases political modernization and the attempts by the state authorities to create a homogeneous national identity through the rise of the modern bureaucratic state may be perceived as repression and lead to separatist nationalism.

Second, the political modernist approach confuses state-building with the forging of a national identity among culturally homogeneous populations. The establishment of incorporating state institutions is no guarantee that the population will identify with these institutions and the national myth 82 they promote. In some cases, such myths alienate those groups who refuse to identify with them. For instance, today we do not observe the fusion of ethnicities through national identity (e.g. Scottish with British and Kurdish with

Turkish), but the persistence of deep cleavages and deep ethnic antagonisms that threaten the very existence of the state. 83

In short, one should not exaggerate the role of the modern state as a factor diminishing the significance of separatist nationalism. My cases will prove that separatist nationalism continues to flourish while states modernize. In addition to my cases, it does so even in the most advanced industrial and politically modern societies such as France,

Canada, Spain, and the . 84 As Smith has concluded, ‘it would be folly to

predict an early super session of nationalism and an imminent transcendence of the

nation”. 85

81 Smith A.D. 1995 Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era , Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 42. 82 Such as in Hobsbawn’s “deliberately invention of traditions”. 83 Smith, A. D. Nations and Nationalism , p. 39. Smith also illustrates this point by referring to the experiences of the new states of Asia and Africa. 84 Ibid. pp 42-43. 85 Ibid. p 160.

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Modernizing socio-cultural conditions reduces separatist nationalism (H3)

According to hypothesis (H3), the modernization of society reduces separatist nationalism because, first, it replaces traditional loyalties with national ones for the population at large, and, second, leads to cultural convergence, which erases ethnic cleavages.

It is worth noting at length Gellner’s argument that nationalism involves the generalization of a ‘high culture’. He does not mean that nationalism bestows culture on those who did not have it before, but rather that the culture of elite groups, and especially their language and literacy, spreads and replaces, or at least supplements, other ‘folk’ cultures sufficiently to create a certain ideological unity around the idea of nation. For

Gellner, ‘nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.’ It is also a fundamental feature of the modern world since in most of human history political units were not organized along nationalist principles. Nationalism became a sociological necessity only in the modern world.

Gellner and other proponents of this line of reasoning argue that the late industrial society is going to be one in which nationalism persists, but in a muted, less virulent form. 86

(1983). This argument was an inevitable consequence of the industrialism/nationalism link Gellner postulated in his theory. 87

86 Ibid., p. 122. 87 Here I must note Michael Mann’s challenge to Gellner’s industrialization thesis. According to Mann industrialization was not the principal cause of modern nationalism since it arrived too late and too uneven. Rather Mann emphasizes the role of the emergence of commercial capitalism and its universal social classes, and the emergence of the modern state and its professional armed forces and administrators. Taken together, these fiscal-military pressures produced the politics of popular representation and formed several varieties of modern nationalism. See Mann, M. 1992 “The Emergence of Modern European Nationalism”, in Hall, J. A. and Jarvie, I. C. (eds.) Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 162.

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First, regarding the previous point, I distinguish two types of loyalty, traditional and modern. Traditional loyalties adapt the old loyalties based on family, region, religion and ethnicity to new situations, producing and reproducing themselves spontaneously. By contrast, loyalties that characterize the modern era are cultivated in national cultures, which are usually sustained by literacy and experience, with conscious design and supervision. The former can be found in all societies. The latter develops when the need to create order and unity becomes paramount. Therefore, modern loyalties reinforce the idea of national community, which secures cohesion in the face of fragmentation and disintegration.

Second, industrial society creates nations by promoting homogenization of national culture. In a traditional society culture merely underlies structure and reinforces existing loyalties. In contrast, culture plays a more active role in industrial societies, which are characterized by high levels of social mobility, impersonal, context-free communication and a high level of cultural standardization. For the first time in history culture becomes important in its own right in industrial society. Gellner argues that the cultural homogeneity of modern societies is an ‘essential concomitant’ of industrial production with its reliance on science, technology, and mass education. “A homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism” (1983: 39) 88 . In other words, the nationalist drive for conformity reflects an underlying pressure from modern industry, which needs uniformity to function well.

88 Gellner, E., Nations and Nationalism , p. 39

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Observable Implications: The necessary link between individual and community, between past and future, may be provided by institutions, notably the state, but a crucial role is played by culture. Culture can be defined as the customs, habits, traditions, values, ways of life, manner of thinking, behavior in a community and a feeling of belonging to a society which shares the same history. Particularly, I will look for the following aspects of culture

- Spread of literacy and universal education

- Cultural and linguistic uniformity

- Effects of communication systems

To confirm this hypothesis, the aspects of socio-cultural modernization (for ex: spread of literacy, universal education…etc) in the cases should clearly serve as a mechanism for social integration and promoting social equality. Finding a gap between the official world-view in the UK and Turkey and daily reality and whether or not Scots and Kurds benefited from socio-cultural modernization in practice, will tell us that this aspect of modernization undermines the legitimacy of the system, and thus, assessment of this hypothesis will be negative.

Modernizing social and cultural conditions promotes separatist nationalism (H3’) The theoretical sweep of the socio-cultural model and the assertive tone which was presented by Gellner, the most important and influential scholar of his generation 89 , have made it a matter of debate in academic circles. Here, I will confine myself to only two points that conflict with the modernist view. Contrary to the prior section, modernizing socio-cultural conditions do not reduce separatist nationalism because first, they misread

89 Nairn, T., The break-up of Britain , p. 96.

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the relationship between industrialization and nationalism, and second, they fails to explain the resurgence of ethnic and nationalist sentiments in the modern world.

We can cast doubt on the relationship between industrialization and nationalism on two grounds by pointing to a series of counter-examples. First, many nationalist movements flourished in societies, which had not yet undergone industrialization.

Kedourie asserts that nationalism as a doctrine was articulated in German speaking lands in which there was hardly any industrialization. 90 91 Also, we can make a similar point for the British Isles, and thus, substantiate the claim that the emergence of nationalism precedes even early industrialism by 150-200 years.92 Moreover areas like Greece, the

Balkans, and parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as the North African territories like

Egypt, fell prey to nationalist ideology when they were innocent of industrialization.

Second, we observe that contemporary nationalist movements, with separatist and violent overtones, have erupted in long-industrialized countries such as Britain, Spain and

Belgium. Similarly, Hutchinson points to the revival of ‘the ferocious terrorist nationalisms’ in the European heartland among the prosperous Basques and Catalans. 93

90 Kedourie, E., Nationalism , p. 143. 91 , rich in problems and potentialities, presents an unusual case. With no political definition or unity or roots in social reality, lacked self-assurance; its inferiority complex was often compensated by overconfidence, and the German nationalism appeared something infinitely deeper than the nationalism of the West. In an influential essay, John Plamenatz, has treated the unifying nationalisms of Germany [and ] in the later nineteenth century as evolved into a Western nationalism. See Plamenatz, J. 1976 “Two types of Nationalism”, in Kamenka (ed.) Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea , London: Edward Arnold. In either case, before or after the unification, German nationalism is different than . Viewing this distinction Rogers Brubaker contrasted German case as follows: “The German understanding has been Volk-centered and differentialist. Since the national feeling developed before the nation-state, the German idea of nation was not originally political, nor was it linked to the abstract idea of citizenship. This prepolitical German nation, this nation in search of a state, was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic, cultural, linguistic or racial community- an irreducibly particular Volkgemeinschaft”. See Brubaker, R. 1992 Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 1. 92 Kitching, G. (1989) Nationalism: The Instrumental Passion, Capital and Class, 25, 98-116, in Ozkirimli (2000) Theories of Nationalism, p.139 . 93 Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism , p. 22

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Finally, we can make the same point by invoking the popular reaction to the Maastricht

Treaty in France, Britain and Denmark. 94

Culture and its components, such as language and religion are significant for nationalism because they supply symbolic resources for articulating nationalist claims. In contrast to modernists, who dismiss continuities with ethnic groups, ethno-symbolists consider culture and its components in the pre-modern era as essentially political, and at best provide raw materials on which nation-builders can draw.

A Note on the Effects of Modernization It is clear by now that modernization and its aspects can have a variety of different effects on separatist nationalist movements. This is the logic behind the laying out of both positive and negative hypotheses about modernization. The following table summarizes major ways modernization can affect, decrease or increase the popularity of separatist nationalism.

94 For detailed discussion of this argument see, Kellas, J. G. (1991) The Politics of Nationalism, Smith, A.D. 1996 History and Modernity: Reflections on the Theory of Nationalism, in Hall, J. A. and Jarvie. I. (eds.) The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner , Atlanta and Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 129-146.

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TABLE 2.2 Summary of Hypotheses, Modernization and Nationalism

Hypothesis 1: Economic modernization reduces separatist nationalism 1.1 Economic modernization integrates core and periphery. 1.2 Economic modernization promotes welfare and reduces regional differences. Hypothesis 1’: Economic modernization fosters separatist nationalism 1’.1 H1 cannot explain Scottish separatism, an economically privileged minority ethnic group. 1’.2 H1 cannot explain Kurdish separatism, which received large portions of GNP for regional development. 1’.3 Economic models are reductionist.

Hypothesis 2: Political modernization reduces separatist nationalism 2.1 Centralized administration integrates regions and groups. 2.2 Modern state defined as a polity of individuals diminishes demands for separate rights. 2.3 Modern state is capable of invoking national rhetoric, and thus, can generate broad support. Hypothesis 2’: Political modernization fosters separatist nationalism 2’.1 Elitist approaches underestimate local networks 2’.2 H1 confuses state-building with nation-building

Hypothesis 3: Modernizing socio-cultural conditions reduce separatist nationalism 3.1 Modernization replaces traditional loyalty with national identity 3.2 Modernization promotes homogenization of national culture Hypothesis 3’: Modernizing socio-cultural conditions foster separatist nationalism 3’.1 Nationalism precedes industrialization 3’.2 Separatist nationalisms do exist in long-industrialized countries

Measurement This section defines how I measure nationalism and modernization. Nationalism is examined by focusing on national identity issues and the role it plays in voting behavior in each of our cases. Modernization is analyzed by focusing on the following elements: urbanism, literacy, media and political participation. I set out indicators then compare their magnitude as high and low between two periods. In the Scottish case, periods will

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cover the years prior to and after the 1960s. In the Kurdish case, the comparison will be between before and after the 1970s.

Nationalism Lord Kelvin, 19 th century British physicist, wrote “If you cannot measure, your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory”. 95 The issues of measurement are among the

most critical in social research because the analysis and interpretation of behavior

patterns depends on the ability to measure attitudes. How do we measure nationalism

among Scots and Kurds? This can be done in two ways. First, one can employ the

opinion polls and longitudinal surveys held in each country, and second one can analyze

the support for regional political parties in both national and local elections.

Surveys assess attitudes by posing questions about topics of public concern on

which most people have opinions. The responses to the questions are presumed to reflect

those attitudes. The assessment of such attitudes in surveys of the general population

permits the tracking of social change and the analysis of its sources. This is important

both because of the practical importance of trends in public opinion and because of the

great potential it affords to understand processes of individual and social change. In

addition, the general climate of public opinion provides a standard against which to

measure social change because shifts in public attitudes follow changes in social norms. 96

Attitude change is, thus, one barometer for assessing social change. 97

95 Quoted in Alwin, D., Scott, J. 1996. “Attitude Change: Its Measurement and Interpretation using longitudinal Surveys”, p. 77, in Taylor, B., Thompson, K. (eds.) “Understanding Change in Social Attitudes, Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publications. 96 Ibid., p. 75 97 Variety of polls conducted in both cases available. Some of which will be utilized are, International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), Scottish Social Attitudes (SSA), Eurobarometer, The Nations and Regions Research Programme, Turkiye Kamuoyu Arastirmalari Dernegi (Turkish Public Research

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There are many repeated surveys taken at single points in time using different samples. Political opinion polls make an almost continuous series, however with data on a limited range of questions. They are critical in terms of in terms of equipping us with knowledge of changes in public opinion or social values, yet, not necessarily in terms of electoral change. Therefore, I will also analyze the electoral support for regional parties, namely Scottish National Party (SNP) and Democratic Society Party ( Demokratik

Toplum Partisi , DTP). 98

The importance of the Scottish agenda, represented largely by SNP, has clearly grown in the demand for and the creation of a in 1999. The same point can be made for the escalating violent PKK terror, and growing Kurdish nationalism represented by DTP in southeast Turkey in the 1990s. In short, measurement of growing separatist nationalist tendencies will be first done by examining the extent to which the electorate now feels more exclusively Scottish and Kurdish than previously by analyzing the public opinion surveys. Second, the analysis of support for the regional nationalist parties, namely SNP and DTP, will tell us how this perceived change in identity is reflected in electoral politics.

Elements of Modernization: Briefly, modernization can be defined as a movement from the traditional to the modern polity. In this section I examine the elements of modernization by dividing it into three types: economic, political and cultural. However, we should keep in mind that

Association [ATT’s translation]. In addition to these national and International organizations, privately funded polls held by scholars will also be used. 98 DTP is currently the largest party representing the Kurdish population in Southeastern Turkey. However, the name of the party has changed often due to constitutional court decisions to ban the party. Details of these changes will be provided in relevant chapter.

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modernization may not occur simultaneously in all these three areas. For example, the fact that social modernization is taking place does not imply that political modernization is also taking place.

Modernization as Economic Transformation:

The initial measurement refers to overall economic output. I show per capita output for the core and periphery using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates and price levels from the 1960s to date. Where available, I compare the country as a whole (For ex:

UK or core) and the region (Scotland or periphery) using data from national agencies as well as international ones such as the World Bank.

However, per capita output levels and rates of growth are not by themselves

adequate indicators of economic modernization and human welfare. Simply, GDP figures

provide no information on distribution of incomes or non-economic elements of well-

being. Therefore, I will employ an alternative index that incorporates a wider array of

factors, namely the human development index of the Development

Programme (UNDP). 99 The closer the gap between center and periphery, majority and

minority, in these numbers will mean that the economic transformation is well on its way

or even consolidated in a given country.

Modernization as Political Transformation:

The indicators of political modernization are three-fold: rationalization of authority,

development of modern bureaucracy, and extended political participation. First, the

99 UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) combines data on GNP with that on literacy and life expectancy.

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rationalization of authority refers to the replacement of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities with a single secular national political authority. If the central governments in London and in Ankara are capable of penetrating and ruling the periphery efficiently, then the cases will confirm the presence of this aspect of political modernization. Second, the development of modern bureaucracy refers to the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform these functions. Here, I evaluate the capability of bureaucratic institutions to absorb and operate demands from the periphery. Finally, political participation refers to increased participation in politics by all social, ethnic and religious groups throughout society. To what extent the local groups organized to form political pressure groups and whether their demands are heard and processed in the central decision making organ will be determinant in the quest to evaluate the level of political modernization.

Modernization as Cultural Transformation :

The main indicator of cultural modernization is related to the idea of collective cultural rights. This idea emerged as a means of stabilizing ethnically, religiously or nationally fragmented societies. 100 Particularly, I refer to the idea of citizenship, which includes acknowledging and granting collective cultural rights as a general strategy in the modern polity such as empowerment of and increased political participation among minorities.

The rationale is that stability can be achieved only through the recognition of the identity of the minorities. To explain the impact of collective rights I will employ an analysis of the right to language of Scottish and Kurdish minorities. The right to language is

100 Kukathas, C., “Are there any cultural rights?” Political Theory , 20/1, pp. 105-139.

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understood as the right of the community to communicate using their own language and more importantly, to educate their children in their own language.

In conclusion, this chapter discussed the theories of modernization and nationalism and provided measurement of these concepts. It is clear by now that modernization and its economic, political and socio-cultural aspects can have variety of different effects on nationalism depending on whether these aspects causes diminishing or strengthening of the ethnic identities, in this case Scottish and Kurdish ethnic identities. This is the logic behind the laying out of both positive- diminishing and negative- strengthening hypotheses about modernization processes. The next two chapters test these hypotheses on the relationship between modernization processes and nationalism in the case of Scots and Kurds by using ‘structured, focused comparison’. I begin by sketching the origins and development of nationalism in each case. This will help determine the extent to which the promise of modernization is motivated the diminishing or increasing significance ethnic identity among Scots and Kurds. To the extent the modernization diminished significance of ethnic identity, it supports modernist accounts which contend that modernization subverts separatist nationalism.

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Chapter 3: Scottish nationalism and modernization

The previous chapter aimed at establishing a theoretical model that explains the relationship between the modernization processes and the decline/ rise of separatist nationalism. Shortly, the modernist theory suggests that due to particular political, economic, and social-cultural modernization processes, ethnic separatist nationalism among minorities in a state will decline as states modernize. The present chapter will examine this relationship in the Scottish context. The main question I will address is to what extent we can hold the processes of modernization responsible for the rise of separatist Scottish nationalism since the 1960s.

To this end, this chapter will review the nationalist trend in Scotland in two periods: first from the beginning of the Union until the end of nineteenth century, and second, during the twentieth century. First , I will argue that, Britain was constructed in

1707 as a political convenience between England, the senior partner, and Scotland, the

junior. Wales and Ireland were under the jurisdiction of England, although the latter was

not formally incorporated into the British state until 1801, thus creating the ‘United

Kingdom’ (of Great Britain and ). During these centuries ‘Britishness’

was superimposed or forged in the long period of war with France over an array of

internal differences “in response to contact with the Other, and above all, in response to

conflict with the Other”. 1 In short, Britishness at this period worked well with the grain of older national identities such as Scottish national identity. In other words, the entente between emotional Scottish nationalism and effective British unionism prevented outbreak any separatist political movement. Second , we observe that, during the twentieth

1 Colley, L. 1992 Britons: Forging the Nation , 1707-1837 , New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 6.

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century, the forged British identity started to crumble, and outlasted by the older national identity, especially in the Scottish case. This allows us to suggest that modernist accounts, which predict a decline in Scottish nationalism as the British state modernized, are seemingly invalid especially during the latter part of the twentieth century. To support this argument, I will review the rising electoral support for the Scottish National Party

(SNP) and public surveys, which will be followed by a discussion of Scottish identity. I will argue that, especially in the post World War II period, SNP’s electoral success was accompanied by a change in attitudes towards the Union. At this time, surveys show us that Scottish identity was becoming ever more significant than the British one.

The survey of Scottish nationalism in the history of the Union establishes two separate periods in which the Scottish nationalism has shifted from a subculture that had been contained under the British identity to a one that has separatist overtones. This allows us to employ a comparative method to test the effects of modernization in the nature of nationalist movements. The hypotheses, examined in the previous chapter, assume that modernization is a force that can reduce the calls for separatism in the nationalist rhetoric. For instance, economic modernization reduces regional differences, political modernization integrates subcultures, and socio-cultural modernization replaces local loyalties with a national one. Apart from this logic if we establish an argument that supports modernization in Scotland in either of these periods we can also expect to find that separatist nationalism is absent or minimal. However, if we find a credible separatist nationalist movement in Scotland in a period in which Scotland is as modern as the rest of the Britain, this will mean that the modernist hypotheses are not supported.

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The rest of the chapter will test first the effects of economic, political and socio-

cultural modernization comparatively in the 18 th and 19 th centuries, followed by an

assessment, and then 20 th century followed by an assessment.

A Note on European Nationalism and Scotland Nationalism, along with ethnicity and religion, is one of the most powerful political forces shaping the modern world. The creation of new nation states was accepted as one of the war aims by the victorious allies during the First World War. The League of

Nations declared as the appropriate form of government to replace the of the past. The legitimacy of the national quest for independence was again recognized by the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations.

Since 1945 a host of new nation states have come into being.

The variety of national self-expression has become a dominant theme in the historic development of the uniformly organized modern state. There are nations like the

Irish and Magyars which have retained a national identity based in ethnic distinctions during centuries of imperial rule. There are nations like the United States and Liberia which have been artificially constructed. In Europe the basis for nationalism is the historic nation, which enjoyed some degree of autonomy during the .

Therefore European nationalism is, in a sense, always backward- looking, always more conscious of the past than the present. It is the Scottish, or the French, or the Italian inheritance of which men are proud: a glorious past, a distinctive culture, a .

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Scotland has possessed all the characteristics of a distinct nation since the twelfth century. 2 Today the Scots have their own national church, their own national education system, their own national legal system, their own national banking system, their own system of national and local government and their own way of speaking English. As a result, Scotland can be considered as a self-sufficient administrative unit or even, according to some, a state within the wider state of the United and Northern Ireland, a state with its own characteristic pattern of life, which in many ways quite different from that of England. 3

Review of Scottish Nationalism

I. Scottish Nationalism from the Treaty of Union until post- World War II The Union between Scotland and England began with a when

James VI of Scotland became James I of England in 1603. During the reign of the

Stuarts, the pressures on Scotland to unite with England grew stronger. But it was not until the reign of Queen Anne that the Treaty on Union between Scotland and England was passed and the Scottish Parliament voted itself out of existence in 1707. 4

The Union was one of the artificial creations that arose from time to time in

Europe as a result of dynastic alliances. It was not popular at the time either in England or in Scotland. Like other dynastic creations, the union of Holland and , the union of Sweden and Norway, and the Great Habsburg empires, it required a dual system of

2 Hanham, H.J. 1969. Scottish Nationalism , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 15. 3 Ibid., p. 15. 4 For detailed historical survey of this era see DeLisle, Leanda 2005 After Elizabeth: The Rise of James of Scotland and the Struggle for the Throne of England New York: Ballantine Books, and Smyth, J. 2001 The Making of United Kingdom, 1660-1800: State Religion and Identity in Britain and Ireland , New York: Longman.

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government to make it work. Theoretically speaking, both Scottish and English

Parliaments were abolished and a new British Parliament was born. In reality, the

Scottish Parliament was absorbed by the British one. According to Hanham, had the

Scottish institutions and estates remained distinct from those of England it is possible to imagine Scots doing what the Norwegian estates did in 1905 when they formally declared the independence of Norway from Sweden. 5

The unpopularity of the Union of Scotland and opposition to it reached its peak in

the form of the Jacobite Rebellion in 1745. The Jacobite Rebellion split Scotland,

between the Protestant Lowlands who were in favor of the Union, and Catholic

Highlands who were against it and left a scar which profoundly affected Scottish society. 6

After the rebellion was crushed, the highland society was penalized by the British government in the form of a ban on playing bagpipes and wearing the kilt. More importantly, highland society was affected by the which forced many highlanders to emigrate to make space for sheep. 7

In the second part of the eighteenth century economic advantages of the Union seemed so great that it was scarcely worthwhile to break the link with England. Indeed, by the nineteenth century, Scotland enjoyed a prosperity so great by comparison with that of the past that unionist sentiments seemed likely to destroy Scottish national self- consciousness altogether. 8 However, with rapid urbanization cities grew and new set of

5 Hanham, H.J. Scottish Nationalism , p. 10. 6 Lynch, M. (1992), Scotland: A New History , London: Pimlico, pp. 88. 7 “Sheep ate men” a common saying of the time. More on this issue will be discussed together with the nineteenth century economic modernization on page 94. For an excellent discussion on how this practice at the time paved the way to emergence of middle class and eventually a democracy in Britain, see, Moore, B. 1966 Social Roots of Dictatorship and Democracy, Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern World , Boston: Beacon Press. 8 MacIver, D. N. 1982 “The Paradox of Nationalism in Scotland” in Colin H. Williams (ed.) National Separatism , Cardiff: University of Wales Press, p. 114-115.

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problems such as housing emerged. Especially during nineteenth century, the long term effects of the change in the industrial structure were beginning to be noticed. 9 This was

by no means a problem unique to Scotland; in the rest of Britain similar developments

had taken place.

What held back the creation of a national movement in Scotland during the period

of the decline of prosperity was the promise of a substantial measure of devolution within

the United Kingdom. After 1885 there was a separate Secretary for Scotland, 10 and after

1888 the Scottish Liberals were committed to the creation of a Scottish parliament and a

Scottish administration. Scottish devolution and the Welsh devolution that was to accompany it, along with Home Rule for Ireland was known as Home Rule All Round.

However, it was not before 1913 that the legislation to provide the creation of Scottish system of government could be brought on the floor. The First World War broke out before anything had been done. The best that could be done for Scotland during the inter- war and post-Second World War years was to permit a wide measure of just administrative devolution rather than a regional autonomy.

As modernist accounts would suggest, Scottish nationalism during this period was contained comfortably within the greater British state. Modernizing economic, political and socio-cultural conditions prevented the outbreak of credible questioning of the

British state by the Scottish nationalists.

9 Ibid., p. 116 10 Mitchell argues “Secretary for Scotland Act’s (1885) main responsibility was education…However within two years an enactment Act was passed to include law and justice under the auspices of the Secretary for Scotland. The creation of the office no more defined a lasting and precise delimitation of the powers and responsibilities of the Secretary for Scotland any more that it was to appease Scottish national sentiment or satisfy Scottish grievances.” Mitchell, J. 2003 Governing Scotland: the Invention of Administrative Devolution , New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 28.

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Twentieth Century: Beginnings

The nationalist movement of the interwar years was the creation of two distinct groups:

those who were political nationalist in the traditional sense and those whose hopes of

Home Rule had been disappointed. Scottish nationalism has, therefore, always tended to

speak with different voices. But the support of the for some measure of

Home Rule has never been any doubt. Rudimentary opinion polls, conducted in the 1920s

and 1930s, Hanham argues “showed almost exactly the same findings as have opinion

polls since 1945. Rather more than 60 per cent of the people in Scotland favor a large

measure of Home Rule, and a substantial body is in favor of independence.” 11 Certainly,

by the standards of national movements in other countries, there is ample basis on which

to build an independent Scotland.

Yet the fortunes for nationalist revival in Scotland have been uncertain. For one

thing in the first half of the century, nationalists chose to contest parliamentary elections

rather than build up a power house outside the ordinary political system. In a first-past-

the-post electoral system, Scottish nationalists, like any other small political party

experienced frustrating outcomes. One can see that there was a burst of nationalist fervor

at the end of 1920s and early 1930s; there was another one during 1940s and early 1950s,

and there has been one since 1960s. 12 The first one was very small by the standards of modern democracy. The second revival took the form of a covenant movement which secured some popular backing for Home Rule (not independence). But the third revival,

11 Hanham, H.J. Scottish Nationalism , p. 12 12 Poll percentage of Scottish nationalist vote at general elections are 1929; %.46, 1931; %.96, 1935; %1.26, 1945; %1.27, 1950; %.49, 1951; %.26, 1955; %.48, 1959; %.81, 1964, % 2.43, and 1966; %5.03. From Hanham, Scottish Nationalism , p. 231.

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which continues today, has taken the form of a massive campaign at parliamentary and municipal elections. The following section will deal extensively with this last burst of

Scottish nationalism.

Assessment

So far, I have argued that over the last hundred years increasing demands for internal reform in Scotland have resulted in increased responsibilities assigned to the Scottish

Office. The increased responsibilities reached to the extent that a fairly high degree of self-government or limited sovereignty existed. Scotland was a partner in the Union and it could best realize itself as a nation if it remained within the Union, which is what the modernist account would predict. United Kingdom is a modern state where minorities such as Scots would enjoy their minority status without harming the Union. Particularly,

Scottish Office was in many respects a pressure group representing Scottish interest within the British central government. Therefore, Scottish nationalism was not perceived as a threat to the unity of the country. Although there was an ‘oppositional’ mood when the politicians and civil servants of the used Scottish nationalism to put pressure on London for more resources, nationalism of this moderate sort became the taken-for-granted framework for all Scottish political debate. Therefore the survey of

Scottish nationalism since the Treaty of Union until the 1960s was more or less in line with the assumptions of modernist perspective.

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However, as John Mackintosh noted, the existence of Scottish Office had no effect in reducing or preventing the rise of nationalist feeling. 13 By the time, SNP started to make gains at the polls in the 1960s, it was accepted that “public affairs in Scotland should be conducted in special way”. 14 As Jack Brand argues, this is not sufficient factor

to explain the rise of the SNP, but it certainly was an important aspect of it, 15 which make

the Scottish Office, a crucial institution signifying the modernizing British State, is of

importance not only to students of public administration but also to those of

nationalism. 16

II. Political Nationalism in Scotland Since 1960s The previous section provided a background on Scottish nationalism since the Treaty of

Union (1707). As noted, attitudes towards the Union has started to be challenged by the end of the nineteenth century but thanks to establishment of Scottish Office, serious calls for confronting Britishness remained minimal. Although there have been periods of nationalist burst during the interwar years and after World War II, there was little interest in the Scottish public for the nationalist message.

This section will chart the development of nationalism from the surge of political nationalism in Scotland in the 1960s to the present. First , since the principal objective of political nationalism is to gain autonomy/ independence, support for a nationalist party provides a good indication of its presence. Therefore, I will review the rise of the Scottish

National Party’s (SNP) electoral support. Second , I will evaluate the relationship between

13 Mackintosh, J. 1968 The Devolution of Power , London: Chatto & Windus, p.163. 14 Brand, J. 1978 The National Movement in Scotland , London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 29 15 Ibid., p. 29 16 Mitchell, J. Governing Scotland , p. 2.

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Scottish national identity and British identity. By analyzing the survey results held during the last two decades of twentieth century, I will show that Scottishness outlasted

Britishness.

Rise of the SNP

The 1960s clearly marks a new stage in Scottish nationalism when the Scottish National

Party (SNP) increased its electoral support. This came as a surprise to many scholars

since the negative image of nationalism had been firmly established with its connotations

of irrationality and violence. In addition, nationalism had come to be regarded as a

characteristic of the developing world, not the advanced world of the west. 17 Since then multiple attempts have been made to explain the surge of political nationalism in

Scotland. 18 The point to make here is that those explanations share a common perspective. According to this, Scottish nationalism was not an irrational phenomenon of a society reverting back to its atavistic tendencies, but rather a response to social change which mainly took place in the post- WW II era.

The SNP was established as the only nationalist party in Scotland in 1934 as a result of the merger of the National Party for Scotland [NPS] (founded in 1928) and the

Scottish Party [SP] (founded in 1931). Tension between the two groups had existed since

17 For the academic reaction to the surge of nationalism in the West see, Connor, W. 1977 “Ethnonationalism in the First World: The Present in Historical Perspective” in Milton Esman (ed.) Ethnic Conflict in the Western World Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 19-45 18 Some of the best examples that attempted to explain the rise of Scottish nationalism in 1960s and 1970s are: Hechter, M. 1975 Internal Colonialism , McCrone, D. 2001 “Scotland and the Union : Changing Identities in the British State” in Morley, D., Robins, K. (eds) British Cultural Studies: Geography, Nationality and Identity, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 97-108 [disputed major arguments of Hechter], Esman, M. 1994 Ethnic Politics , [stressed the importance of the discovery of ], Brand, J. 1978 The National Movement in Scotland [Scottish alienation from the central government], Harvie, C. 1998 Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707 to Present, NY: Routledge [historical account of the surge of nationalism].

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the beginning. NPS was on the left of the political spectrum and inclined towards independence, whereas SP was on the right and wanted a Home Rule.

The new party had a negligible electoral impact between 1930s and 1950s. The great achievement of the SNP was simply to have survived. The survival of the SNP has been based entirely on a very limited conception of nationalism. One document that stands out from this period was the 1946 policy statement, which is still official SNP policy. 19 It is an unusual document because it sets out to offer something quite different from the offerings of other parties: emphasis on grassroots and small-town democracy.

By downplaying the importance of intellectuals and concentrating on the small man, the party has deliberately set out to win over the rank and file of older political parties. The

SNP is a grassroots political movement or it is nothing. 20 The nearest parallels are with

the social credit movements 21 in Canada and , and the populism of the

United States. There is much the same emphasis on the little man and on building up small-town democracy. Similar mixtures of influences were at work, as in these parallel movements outside Scotland.

From the early 1960s, however, there were signs that the SNP was gradually

establishing itself as a credible political power in Scotland. The first sign of Scottish

voting distinctiveness was immediately apparent: the rise in popular support for the SNP

in the late 1960s, culminating in their winning the Hamilton by-election (from Labour) in

19 Statement of Aim and Policy of the Scottish National Party, adopted 7 th -8th December 1946. 20 The aim of the SNP was summarized in the party program in 1946 as “Self-Government for Scotland. The restoration of Scottish national sovereignty by the establishment of a democratic whose authority will be limited only by such agreements as will be freely entered into with other nations in order to further international cooperation and world peace”. 21 Social credit (Socred) is an economic ideology and social movement which started in 1920s. It was originally an economic theory developed by C.H. Douglas from Scotland. The movement has played a role in Canada and, to a lesser extend in New Zealand in the post WW II period.

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1967 22 , and in their widespread electoral success in local elections shortly after. Although the party did not sustain this success into the 1970 general election, they started growing under the Conservative government of 1970-74. During this period, the party, managed to transform its modest success into a seemingly unstoppable surge by tying its campaign for independence to the discovery of oil in the North Sea. The high point of the SNP was in the general election of October 1974, when they attracted over 30 per cent of the vote and won 11 of the 71 Scottish Parliamentary seats.

The Labour government of 1974-79 managed to get legislation through

Westminster recommending that a directly elected Scottish Assembly be established with legislative powers. One price for passing this bill was that a should be held in

Scotland in which at least 40 per cent of the total electorate would have to vote in favor before an assembly would be set up. The referendum took place in 1979, and the proportion in favor was only 33 per cent (although this was a majority- 52 per cent of votes cast) 23 . The subsequent Conservative government repealed the legislation. In the

next election (1979), the SNP lost all but two of its seats and its vote fell to 17 per cent.

How can we explain this apparent decline in the SNP’s popularity? The answer

lies in the SNP’s political orientation. The SNP was and is essentially a social democratic

party, very much like the Labour and the Liberals. The vote for the SNP was as much for

the social democratic projects as they were a preference for a particular form of Scottish

Parliament. When it looked as if the Labour could continue to deliver the project, the

22 Mrs. Winifred Ewing (Lanark, Hamilton) November 1967 won the election as the SNP candidate. She famously said at her time of election “Stop the world, Scotland wants to get on”. Her presence at Westminster led to significant rise in SNP membership. Quotation retrieved from www.blackwellsynergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.146723X.1968.tb00271 .x on 2.1.2007 . 23 The electorate were asked to vote yes or no: “Do you want the provisions of Scotland Act to be put into effects?” Yes: 1, 203, 937-- % 51.6, No: 153, 500-- % 48.4, Turnout: % 63.8.

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SNP waned. In addition, the Labour Government had put in place several new agencies, such as the Scottish Development Agency that eased the demands for autonomy. This shows that the Scottish electorate was expressing a continuing preference for a welfare state, delivered through distinctive Scottish agencies.

During the first years of the Thatcher government, the SNP was experiencing a painful split between the fundamentalist and the gradualists over its strategy to achieve

Scottish independence. SNP’s share of votes dropped to 11.7 per cent in the 1983 general election and the party managed to hold on to two seats.

Assessment (1960s-1970s)

The SNP finally in the 1960s and during the first half of 1970s managed to persuade many who saw themselves as Scottish to perceive independence as the best means of preserving and promoting Scottish identity. There is no obvious explanation, at least from a modernist perspective, for a heightening of Scottish identity in the middle

1960s and after. Culturally, for instance, there was no major literary, artistic or linguistic nationalist tide to stimulate these feelings in the 1960s and 1970s. After all, the cultural

‘Scottish Renaissance’, which will be elaborated later, of the 1920s, had not galvanized the Scots to support nationalism. Politically, perhaps, a more weighty ingredient for rising support for the SNP was the loss of faith in the ability of the two Westminster focused parties to deliver economic and social policy benefits. The SNP was able to galvanize support, when neither party, Labour or Conservative, had succeeded in bringing demonstrable gains. Economically, modernist accounts, which give priority to relative economic depravation as a source of rise of separatist Scottish nationalism, fail to

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provide a satisfactory explanation to the abrupt rise of support for the SNP too. From this perspective, modernists would expect the positive forces flowing the SNP in the 1960s and 1970s to continue given the economic condition of Britain, which had been acute in

1974, seemed more troubled by 1979. However the opposite happened, as mentioned earlier the support for the SNP waned by the end of 1970s when British economy went from bad to worse. Thus, this survey of rising Scottish political nationalism between

1960s until mid 1980s contends that modernist accounts fail to explain the rising popularity of the SNP. Rather, as suggested by ethno-symbolist accounts, it seems that a strong feeling of Scottishness had long existed among people from every political complexion, that ethnic identity should be considered as an independent factor as much as economic development.

“Independence in Europe” (1980s)

Things began to change by the latter half of 1980s. At the 1987 election the

number of Conservative MPs was reduced to 10 from 21 and the SNP’s share of the vote

increased to 14 per cent of the total vote cast in Scotland, which secured them 3 seats. At

the 1992 election, in terms of the percentage of the vote, the SNP increased its share the

most with a 21.5 per cent share of the vote. At this point it was clear that the level of

support for the SNP had recovered to its pre-referendum level. In addition to the revival

of Scottish nationalism, there was a new theme in Scottish politics: Independence in

Europe.

The SNP, much like the Labour Party, was traditionally suspicious of the EU on

the basis that it was simply an organization dedicated to big business, and it further

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eroded Scottish autonomy. But by the mid 1980s this attitude had undergone a remarkable transformation with the addition of a new member to SNP ranks: .

Mr. Sillars, a one-time Labour member, was the brainchild of the “Independence in

Europe” theme and one of the leading advocates of the SNP’s campaign for in Europe. His argument was, while Scotland could not be wholly independent if it joined the EU, it would enable Scotland to secede from the Union with

England. Even though it would be a part of larger union in Europe, Scottish national identity would be preserved. Scotland would enjoy considerably more autonomy if it were a sovereign state in its own right in the EU, as opposed to simply being a region of the UK. 24

The adoption of the “Independence in Europe” policy was a major change for the

SNP. However, it did not bring an immediate increase in electoral support. Also the

“Independence in Europe” policy proved to be more popular than the SNP itself. For instance, in 1994, when the level of support for the party was around 30 per cent, a poll reported that 48 per cent of the respondents thought that an independent Scotland within

Europe would be better off. 25 On the other hand, the policy simply set the context for the

debate on the constitutional arrangement for Scotland. By adopting the “Independence in

Europe” policy, the SNP fundamentally changed the framework from which Scottish

nationalism evolved after the 1979 referendum. 26 Ichijo argues that the policy set the context where the debate on the constitutional arrangement for Scotland was taking place.

In this manner, Labour and Liberal Democrats incorporated the European dimension in

24 Sillars, J. 1986 The case for optimism, : Polygon, pp. 185. 25 Lynch, P. 1996 Minority Nationalism and European Integration , Cardiff: University of Wales Press, pp. 43-44. 26 Ichijo, A. 2004 Scottish Nationalism and the Idea of Europe, New York: Routledge, pp. 46-50.

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their respective Scottish policies and the recognized the role of Scottish Office in negotiations with the EU. 27

It is fair to say that ‘Europe’ would never have gained such prominence in the

development of Scottish nationalism had the SNP not launched its policy of

‘Independence of Europe” in 1988. It is also fair to add that if there had not been

something in the Scottish society that was receptive to this idea, ‘Europe’ would have had

little impact.

Overall, underlying these Scottish preferences in the 1980s is a cultural shift that

is unprecedented since the beginning of the Union. England is no longer admired as the

source of progressive ideas. This role has been taken over by Europe. Therefore to call

yourself “European” in the late 1980s and 1990s Scotland has something of the same

modernizing connotation as calling yourself “British” did in the period between late

eighteenth and the middle of twentieth century. In short, to Scottish nationalists,

‘Europe’ has become a means of bypassing the British state so as to usher in a new

political system more sympathetic to smaller nations.

The Road to the Scottish Parliament, (1990s) and the 21 st century

As the Conservative government returned to power after the 1992 general election, the pressure for devolution in Scotland grew stronger. Following the publication of the

Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right by the Constitutional Convention in 1995, there emerged a consensus among the major political parties in Scotland that any future

27 Ibid., p. 49.

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referendum on the establishment of a Scottish Parliament should include a question about its tax-varying power. 28 The 1997 general election was significant from the of the development of Scottish nationalism. First, Labour Party won the majority, thus devolution became an achievable goal. According to Labour, devolution was good for

Scotland and Wales as well as Britain as a whole since it would enhance the quality of democracy throughout the UK. 29 Second, no MP’s were returned from Scotland demonstrated the distinctiveness of Scottish politics. The concern over the ‘break-up of

Britain’ surfaced yet again.

The Labour government introduced the Referendum Bill on May 1997. 30 Two questions were asked: one on whether a Scottish parliament should be established, and the other one whether the Parliament should have tax-varying power. Pro-parliament parties, the Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and SNP joined forces for the ‘Yes-Yes’ vote, while the Conservative led the ‘Think Twice’ campaign urging the voters to reject the devolution plans. The referendum took place on September 11, and the ‘Yes’ vote for the

28 Scottish Constitutional Convention (1995) “Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right”, Edinburgh: Scottish Constitutional Convention 29 For the critique of this approach, see Nairn, T. 1997 Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited, NY: Verso, pp. 3-5.. 30 The Labour manifesto in 1997 tells us that the internal party dynamics are in line that there was not significant dissent to devolution. Labour Party Manifesto, for general election 1997 clearly states commitment to “Devolved power in Scotland and Wales”. According to the manifesto “The United Kingdom is a partnership enriched by distinct national identities and traditions. Scotland has its own systems of education, law and local government. Wales has its language and cultural traditions. We will meet the demand for decentralization of power to Scotland and Wales, once established in .” For Scotland, in particular, manifesto proposed “the creation of a parliament with law-making powers, firmly based on the agreement reached in the Scottish Constitutional Convention, including defined and limited financial powers to vary revenue and elected by an . In the Scottish referendum we will seek separate endorsement of the proposal to create a parliament, and of the proposal to give it defined and limited financial powers to vary revenue. The Scottish parliament will extend democratic control over the responsibilities currently exercised administratively by the Scottish Office. The responsibilities of the UK Parliament will remain unchanged over UK policy, for example economic, defense and foreign policy.”

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first question constituted 74.3 per cent of the total vote cast, and for the second, 63.5 per cent. Following this unambiguous endorsement, the Scottish Parliament was established.

The first election was held on May 1999. 31 Labour won the largest number of the seats (56), followed by SNP (35), the Conservatives (18) and the Liberal Democrats (17).

The MSP, who announced that the Scottish Parliament was reconvened on 12 May 1999, was none other than Mrs. Winifred Ewing, who proved to be a sound choice for the victorious SNP campaign in 1967.

Although, Scotland has yet to take the ‘separatist road’ since 1999, the first years of devolution 32 has ups and downs. For instance there were three First Ministers 33 in quick succession. 34 However the Labour and Liberal Democrat coalition managed to ensure that there was a degree of coherence despite the ministerial changes. In contrast to the 1980s and 1990s when there had been a growing perception that Scotland had been misgoverned by politicians in London, there were high hopes that the parliament would transform Scotland for the better. Now once again Scots would govern themselves, and it was expected the country would be administrated better.

31 The election to the Scottish Parliament was historic not only in being the first election to a Scottish legislature in 300 years; it was also the first election in Britain to be held fully under a system of proportional representation (PR). More specifically the system adopted is a variant of PR known as the Additional Member System. Voters cast two votes, one for a constituency member, of whom are elected using the familiar first-past-the-post system, and second for a party-list. The members taken from the party lists are used as a ‘top-up’ to ensure that the total distribution of seats in the Parliament reflects, as closely as possible, the distribution of votes in the second ballot. For example, in the constituency vote Labour gained 53 of constituency seats with 39 per cent of the constituency votes. The SNP on the other hand, gained just 7 of constituency seats from 29 per cent of the constituency votes. The ‘top-up’ seats aim to rectify this disproportionality. As a result Labour is allocated only 3 seats from the regional list while the SNP have 28 seats, correcting some but not all of the over-representation of Labour. The impact of the proportional system in terms of results is threefold: First, the SNP gained seats in proportion to their total vote allowing them to form the opposition to Labour in the Parliament. Second, due to PR it became very difficult for any one party to win an absolute majority. Third, proportionality gave representation to two smaller parties: the Scottish Socialist and the Greens. 32 Proper term here should be ‘legislative devolution’ but for the sake of simplicity just devolution will be used herein. 33 First Minister is the Prime Minister of Scotland’s devolved government. 34 (1999-2000) Labour, Henry McLeish (2000-2001) Labour, and Jack McConnell (2001- ) Labour. As of 16 May 2007, Alex Salmond of the SNP was elected as the Parliament’s First Minister.

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Towards the 2007 general election to the Scottish Parliament, the SNP positioned itself to win the majority of the seats with a promise of a referendum. Alex Salmond, the leader of the SNP, aimed at making his party the largest in Scotland. The support for the

SNP was boosted by some recent opinion polls 35 that placed SNP ahead of their main rivals, the Party. Salmond promised that within 100 days of taking office, he will issue a bill scheduling a referendum with regard to separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom. Although SNP fell short of winning the majority of the seats in the

Parliament in 2007 elections, it emerged as the largest party with 47 seats followed by the incumbent Scottish Labour Party with 46 seats. 36 The SNP, for the first time, formed a minority government as a result of the third general election of the devolved Scottish parliament with support from the Greens on certain issues.

III. Scottish National Identity Since 1960s

35 According to ICM opinion poll for , 52 per cent of Scots approve independence. Also ICM research published in The Scotsman found out that 33 per cent of respondents will give their local vote to SNP. The Scottish Labour Party is second with 31 per cent followed by the Scottish Liberal Democrats with 17 per cent and with 13 per cent.

Data retrieved on 2/1/2007 and 2/10/07 respectively from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=//2006/11/26/nunion26.xml http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewItem/itemID/14677

36 The composition of Scottish parliament as a result of 2007 elections: Scottish National Party 47 seats, Scottish Labour Party 46 seats, Scottish Conservative Party 17 seats, Scottish Liberal Democrats 16 seats, Scottish Green Party 2 seats, Independent 1 seat. For a comprehensive candidates and constituency assessments visit http://www.alba.org.uk/scot07constit/index.html

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In this section I will examine the relationship of Scottish to British identity. This will allow us to understand the extent to which people living in Scotland think of themselves as Scots rather than British.

One of the issues that attracted much scholarly attention is the fate of British identity among the Scots. Opinion polls and surveys suggest that Scottish identity has become stronger in relation to British identity. Table 3.1 shows data over last three decades. These surveys began in 1986 when Luis Moreno devised a question to tap the relationship of Scottish to British national identity and the survey was carried by the

Glasgow Herald . The table used ‘Moreno’ as a measure of Scottishness, that is, those

who say they are Scottish not British and more Scottish than British. Whichever way we

look at it, there appears to be a strengthening of Scottish identity. By 1999 and 2000 we

see that two-thirds of respondents prioritize being Scottish over being British.

Table. 3.1 National Identity in Scotland (per cent)

Respondent feels 1986 1991 1992 1997 1999 2000

Scottish not British 39 40 19 23 32 37 More Scottish than British 30 29 40 38 35 31 Equally Scottish & British 19 21 33 27 22 21 More British than Scottish 4 3 3 4 3 2 British not Scottish 6 4 3 4 4 4 None of these 2 3 1 2 3 4

Sample size 1021 1042 957 882 1,482 1,663 Sources : Scottish Election Survey (SES), 1992, 1997, 1999, 2000 .

Table 3.2 is based on forced-choice best identity. The question that asked the

respondents to choose which one identity best described the way they felt about

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themselves has been included in Scottish Electoral Survey (SES) since 1979 when the first referendum failed to establish a Scottish Parliament. We can see the change most dramatically in the ‘forced-choice’ categories. Whereas over one-third of the respondents opted for “British” in 1979, and over half ‘Scottish’, the 1990s saw what appears to be a long term shift towards ‘Scottish’. By 1997, less than quarter of the respondents considered themselves ‘British’, and more than three quarters Scottish. A further step shift occurred in the Scotland-only event of the referendum in 1997. Those who prioritized being British were reduced to around one in six, whereas more than eight out of ten said they were Scottish.

Table 3.2 suggests that the referendum provoked an intensification of

Scottishness, and that this was maintained in the 1999 Scottish parliamentary election.

This is the first piece of evidence to suggest that constitutional change has broadly amplified rather than diminished Scottish national identity. While slightly fewer people than during the referendum say they are Scottish, the number remains above the figures for the earlier 1990s. It seems that the Scottish parliamentary election, like the referendum of 1997, saw a strong assertion of Scottishness, possibly because both were uniquely Scottish events, compared with the UK general election of 1997.

Table 3.2 : Forced- choice National Identity in Scotland, 1979-2000 (per cent) 1979 1992 1997 1999 2000

Scottish 57 72 72 77 80 British 39 25 20 17 13 Base 661 957 882 1,482 1,663

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Source : Curtice and Seyd ‘Is devolution strengthening or weakening the UK?’ p.237 .37

How does national identity relate to certain political behavior? Conservatives were more likely than members of other parties to stress their Britishness, but even among them far more emphasized their Scottish identity as the Table 3.3 shows. The modal position for all the supporters of all parties, including SNP, was to claim to be

Scottish more than British, with the exception of the Conservatives. Nevertheless more than twice as many Conservatives gave priority to being Scottish (36 per cent) as to being

British (14 per cent). SNP voters were more likely than those of other parties to highlight their Scottish national identity (76 per cent), while two-thirds of Labor voters (64 per cent) and over half of Liberal Democrats (55 per cent) did likewise.

Table 3.3 : National Identity by Vote in 1997 general election (per cent) Respondent feels Cons. Labour Lib.Dem. SNP All

Scottish not British 10 25 13 32 23 More Scottish than British 26 39 42 44 38 Equally Scottish & British 45 26 28 18 27 British more than Scottish 7 4 6 2 4 British not Scottish 7 3 5 2 4 None of these 4 3 5 1 4

Sample size 96 363 96 132 882 Source: Scottish Election Survey (1997).

We cannot tell from these survey data how the respondents themselves interpret this term; Scottish national identity, but it is plain that the Scottish dimension is deemed more significant than the British one for most of the people. We can also see that this preference, while it varies from survey to survey, is consistently strong, and that it holds

37 Curtice, J. and Seyd, B. 2001 ‘Is devolution strengthening or weakening the UK”, in Alison Park et al. (eds.) British Social Attitudes, the 18 th Report: Public Policy, Social Ties , London: Sage, pp. 227-244.

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across political party, constitutional preference, social class, gender, religion and region of the country. 38 For instance, those preferring independence, rather than home-rule are most likely to claim Scottish national identity and Conservatives or those preferring the constitutional status quo are least likely to claim Scottish identity over British. Catholics who are more likely to vote Labour than Protestants are somewhat more likely to claim

Scottish national identity. Also there is no major gender difference, with men stressing

Scottish national identity compared with women. This review clearly indicates that most people living in Scotland consider themselves to be Scottish in terms of their nationality.

Modernization and Scottish Nationalism

This section investigates how much modernization in different areas helped reduce or induce political nationalism in Scotland. I employ a comparative method to examine the economic, political and socio-cultural processes of modernization in two different periods: from the Treaty of Union through the nineteenth century and twentieth century.

As noted earlier, the second period covers the 1960s until present in more detail since the nationalist bursts of the early twentieth century are politically negligible. After the analysis of each period an assessment section will follow to discuss the validity of hypotheses.

I assume that, in accordance with the modernist perspective, modernization fared better in the latter period and thus separatist political nationalism lost momentum.

Finding that Scotland’s modernization fared better, but that separatist nationalist

38 For results on the variables other than the political party, see Brown, A. McCrone D., and Patterson, L. 1998 Politics and Society in Scotland, Houndmills: Macmillan , pp. 200- 223.

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momentum has not diminished will prove that there is a positive correlation between modernization and escalation of political nationalism.

I- Economic modernization:

17 th and 18 th centuries: The Union and its effects on Scottish economy

When we ask why the Union took place, the most plausible answer is not the immediate

political context. Rather, the economy seemed a sensible compromise to many reasonable

and patriotic Scots of that time. 39 Scotland was a poor country, suffering from

intermittent war and famine throughout most of the seventeenth century. In pursuit of

commerce with England, Scottish distinctiveness was felt to be less important than

securing markets. The economic motives for union can best be described as instrumental.

It can be argued that Scottish business elite were willing to use whatever means necessary

for developing their economy. Moreover, as will be discussed below, there are good

reasons that the proponents of union were ultimately correct that exposing the Scottish

economy to free competition would be to its benefit.

The Scottish economy suffered from the effects of free trade in the years

immediately after 1707. For instance, at the end of the seventeenth century much of the

manufacturing sector collapsed due to sharp competition from England and the

Netherlands. 40 Campbell argues that the Union pushed Scotland in the direction of

complementary development. 41 In this context of more or less free competition,

39 Paterson, L. 1994 The Autonomy of Modern Scotland , Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 28. 40 Ibid. p. 28. 41 Campbell, R. H. 1985 Scotland since 1707: the Rise of an Industrial Society , Edinburgh: John Donald.

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perspective was created for the exercise of native Scottish industry and invention. That is why the economic growth that occurred from the 1740s onwards can be said to be due to the broadly free-trade framework of the Union and to indigenous resources that dated back to the seventeenth century.

Scotland was much less of a satellite economy by 1780 than it had been a century earlier when it was nominally independent. It was no longer dependent on imported capital. It now exported a wide range of manufactured goods. This stimulated indigenous technology, which was inspired also by the flourishing scientific culture of the

Enlightenment. 42

19 th Century Scottish Economy:

Industrialization in Scotland took-off around the mid-eighteenth century, which

led to unprecedented economic and population growth. 43 There were continual waves of

improvement in the agricultural sector while the Scottish economy was becoming less

and less dependent on agriculture. The distribution of the population also changed. The

Highland Clearances 44 were most intensively carried out in the early nineteenth century to implement a new form of sheep farming. It left the Highland deserted and many residents immigrated to cities. Scotland was transforming itself into an urban society. The

42 The Irish economy during this period provides a contrast. It had been more developed than the Scottish one at the end of the seventeenth century, but fell behind in the eighteenth. Whatley has suggested that this was because Ireland did not have the self-confidently independent civil society that Scotland has enjoyed. Whatley, C.A. 1989 “Economic Causes and Consequences of the Union of 1707: A Survey”, Scottish Historical Review , 68, pp. 150- 181. 43 Lynch,. M. Scotland: A New History , p. 406 44 Highland tenants were thrown off their traditional lands by chiefs who sought to improve their land by raising sheep. For a brief discussion of how Highland Clearances provided a case material for Karl Marx’s so-called “primitive accumulation” in Vol. 1 of Capital , see Hearn, J. 2000 Claiming Scotland, The National Identity and Liberal Culture , Edinburgh: Polygon, pp. 69- 72.

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proportion of the population living in towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants rose from 17 per cent in 1800 to 32 per cent in 1850 and to 50 per cent in 1890. 45

Urbanization in Scotland, accompanied with the widening of the franchise in

1832-33, gave real power to the middle class and prompted significant state involvement

in social policy. 46 For the middle class, the main drive for economic development was the

pursuit of business, which also calls for subservient government. The Scottish economy

did indeed grow massively in the nineteenth century, aided by free trade policies and the

expansion of the Empire. It was a self- financing economy run tightly by networks of

local entrepreneurs whose education and culture were Scottish. Moreover, Lindsay argues

that the Scottish legal framework had been particularly favorable to business expansion

“ever since the reforms introduced by Henry Dundas in 1772”. 47 England did not catch up with the Scottish economy until the 1850s. Scotland was far from being a of

England; it actually had a full fledged national economy of its own.

Assessment:

From the Union of 1707 until the end of the nineteenth century, the level of

economic modernization in Scotland is comparable to rest of the Union and in some

cases, such as Ireland, it fared much better. Therefore, in terms of closing the gap

between center and periphery and reducing the regional differences, modernization

clearly accomplished its goal for the Scots. Also in the twentieth century, although

economic conditions showed signs of decline as in most parts of the world due to World

45 Lynch, M. Scotland: A New History , p. 411 46 Paterson, L. The Autonomy of Modern Scotland , p. 47. 47 Ibid. p. 50. Henry Dundas was the Solicitor General for Scotland between 1766-1775.

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Wars and the Great Depression, the problems of the Scottish economy can be said to be similar in nature to those of other regions in the Union.

The economic situation in Scotland supports the modernist hypothesis, that is, economic modernization reduced differences between Scotland and the rest of the UK

(H1). Despite the economic modernization, political nationalism, that is, a movement for gaining lost independence never took off in Scotland. The desire for autonomy created a handful of associations towards the end of the nineteenth century, but none of these sought independence.

Why did political nationalism not take a hold in the Scotland of the nineteenth century? According to Nairn’s 48 uneven development scheme and Hechter’s 49 internal , the uneven development would produce a dissatisfied intelligentsia who would initiate nationalism. This sense of dissatisfaction would be gradually diffused among the middle class who suffer from the disadvantages of underdevelopment.

Together, the intelligentsia and bourgeoisie would form an organic community to defend their culture and would seek an independent statehood. This process would eventually involve the masses, which is the main characteristic of nationalism. Nairn holds that since

Scotland was overdeveloped, the Scottish intelligentsia did not hold grievances against the British state nor did the middle class, hence the absence of political nationalism 50 .

Briefly, the survey of the eighteenth, nineteenth and first half of twentieth century

of the Scottish economy clearly provides support for the modernist school which

proposed that economic modernization reduces separatist nationalism.

48 Nairn, T. The Break-Up of Britain: Crises and Neo-Nationalism. 49 Hechter, M. Internal colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national development . 50 Nairn, T. The Break-Up of Britain, p. 27.

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20 th century

As one of the first countries to experience , Scotland developed its economy around heavy industries, including shipbuilding, steel, engineering, and coal. For example, in the nineteenth century 80 per cent of the world’s ships were built in Scotland. The textile and woolen industries also formed part of the basis of the Scottish economy. After , the market for Scotland’s goods was open to increasing competition, and the interwar depression years had serious consequences on Scottish industry. As in other parts of Britain, unemployment soared. 51

Similar to other countries, the economy was lifted out of depression in the late 1930s, mainly because of production required for the war effort of 1939-1945.

In the post- WWII period, although Scotland was part of the economic consensus associated with the Keynesian welfare state, it was also successful in constructing its own national economic interest. 52 The existence of distinct policy networks and institutions in

Scotland and the role of the Scottish Office in promoting Scottish interest helped to ensure the articulation of this separate Scottish national economic interest.

During the interwar and post-war periods, we can talk about some developments,

such as the establishment of the SNP, which would give slight support for the modernist

argument. Deteriorating economic conditions and the growing gap between center and

periphery caused the forming of a political party with nationalist tones. However, as the

51 Aitken, K. 1992 “The Economy”, in Linklater, M. and Dennison, R. (eds), The Anatomy of Scotland , Edinburgh: W. & R. Chambers, p. 52 See Paterson, L. The Autonomy of Modern Scotland, p. 44- 48.

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election data suggested earlier, SNP did not become a significant actor in this era with a mass appeal.

Scottish Economy during the Collectivist Years (Post-WWII- 1970s)

The Scottish economy during the pre and post WWII years experienced a decline in the manufacturing industries which had dominated the employment sector since the

1860s. Control of what remained was shifting to London or overseas. At the same time the Scottish Office had lost most of its control of economic policy after 1945. The new conventional wisdom for economic management throughout Europe was based on

Keynesianism, which called for state intervention at the macroeconomic level through control of prices and labor supply. In this framework nationalization was the main tool and seemed to entail centralization at the cost of stripping the Scottish Office from its upper hand in economic management. These new assumptions about economics arose from the collectivist consensus shared by Conservatives and Labour.

Whatever the nationalist sentiments, Scotland was bound to be judged ultimately on what it did for the economy. Conventionally, one may claim that nationalist sentiments arose as a reaction to the centralization of economic policy. Was the Scottish situation really so dependent on this context? The short answer is no. At both the British and Scottish level, the system provided a mechanism by which interest groups could be coordinated in the pursuit of Keynesian aims. These groups involve leaders and bureaucracies at the British level and the ideology of the resulting consensus at that level was British nationalist. Scotland was part of this, but also constructed its own separate national economic interest. For instance regional policy was supported by the

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establishment of the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDP) in 1965, aimed at providing economic assistance and encouragement to the area. 53 Ten years later, in 1975, the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) was set up with responsibility for economic development in other areas of Scotland. 54 The result was diversification of Scotland’s industrial base.

Beyond Collectivism and Public Perception of Scottish Economy

The performance of the Scottish economy beyond the collectivist era has been

subject to academic debate and political controversy. The most relevant debate, as well as

the dominant one, to my argument on modernization and nationalism surrounds the issue

of underdevelopment/ internal colonialism. These theories were used to explain the

perceived disadvantaged position of the Scottish economy. For instance working within

the framework of analyzing capitalism as a world system and dividing countries between

‘core’ and ‘periphery’, Wallerstein argued that Scotland could be categorized as a

country on the periphery. 55 Within this analysis countries on the periphery such as

Scotland are disadvantaged in their trading relationships with core countries, which in turn reinforce the inequality between core (England) and periphery. We can also extend this argument to the modernist interpretation of nationalism: the perceived disadvantaged position and dependency of Scottish economy paved the way to the rise of Scottish nationalism.

However we can challenge the view that dependency is necessarily a barrier to economic development. In Scotland’s case, according to Smout, trade was not an engine

53 For a broader discussion of Highland and Islands see, Mitchell, J. Governing Scotland , pp. 81-83. 54 Hutchison, I. G.C. 2001 Scottish Politics in the Twentieth Century , NYC: Palgrave, p. 131. 55 Wallerstein, I. 1980 “One Man’s Meat: The Scottish Great Leap Forward”, Review , 3 (4), pp. 631-640.

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of exploitation, but on the contrary was a cause of growth. 56 He contended that Scotland had been able to move from periphery to semi-periphery and then to core status precisely because of its early dependency. Without a doubt the concepts of colonial status or disadvantaged position have played an important role in the development of a specifically

Scottish political consciousness, especially at times of economic decline when the SNP has gained electoral support. But this argument is valid only if we can lay out empirical support from the public point of view.

How did Scots perceive their economy? If we find that the Scottish public is dissatisfied with their economic well being when compared to rest of the Union we can say that (H1) is supported. In other words, the economic gap between center and periphery can be said to cause separatist sentiments in Scotland. To find that Scottish perception of their own economy is indifferent or better than rest of the Union will mean that (H1) is not supported since this is a period of rising Scottish nationalism as documented in earlier sections.

Measuring perceptions of the state of the economy is a difficult task since the economy has many different elements. For this reason survey (SES) respondents were offered a wide range of questions relating to the economy. To begin with, respondents were asked to give their opinion on the state of Britain’s economy in the ‘last year’ and in the ‘last ten years’. Table 3.4 57 shows us there were very few differences between English and Scottish respondents on the performance of the economy. Only one in five of all respondents felt the British economy had weakened in the previous ten years. The

56 Smout, T.C. 1980 “Scotland and England: Is Dependency a Symptom or a Cause of Underdevelopment?” Review , 3 (4), pp. 601- 630. 57 Bennie, L. Brand, J. and Mitchell, J. 1997 How Scotland Votes? Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 123.

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Scottish respondents were a little less likely to have perceived a strengthening of

Britain’s economy over the longer period. However we should not overemphasize this difference. Scottish and English opinion on economic performance over the ten year period is definitely more similar than dissimilar. This finding allows us to argue that regional economic differences were perceived as minimal.

Table 3.4 Perceptions of Britain’s economy (%)

Economy in last year Economy in last 10 years Scots English Scots English

Got stronger 10 12 27 32 Got weaker 53 53 19 19 Stayed same 33 30 47 41

Source : Scottish Election Studies (1992)

When we look at the relationship between personal economic experience and the political party preference, we expect to find that voters for the SNP would be the ones who had a negative economic experience over the last ten years. In other words, the modernist account would suggest that a nationalist party, the SNP, would benefit from those in periphery (Scotland) who perceived their economic situation as worse when compared to the core (England).

As Table 3.5 58 shows, in England economic risers are predominantly

Conservative, and in Scotland being a riser certainly increases one’s chances of voting

Conservative but overall the votes of better off are really quite evenly distributed across the parties. However, economic fallers are clearly pro Labour in both countries; almost

58 Ibid. p. 127.

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exactly the same percentage of fallers vote Labour in both samples. Interestingly, the

SNP receive a similar level of support from all types of voters, whether they have experienced a change in economic prosperity or not. Therefore, one can conclude that there is no strong link between economic prosperity and voting for the SNP in Scotland.

In contrast to modernist arguments (H1), I conclude that experiencing economic hardship does not greatly increase the chances of voting SNP. 59

Table 3.5 : Personal economic experience over the last ten years and the vote (%)

Conservative Labour Lib. Dem. SNP Scotland England Scotland England Scotland England Scotland

Risen 27 54 23 17 11 16 19 Same 27 46 28 25 9 14 22 Fallen 13 26 43 42 9 17 18 Source : Scottish Election Studies (1992)

To sum up these findings so far, Scots do not feel worse off at the individual level when compared to rest of the UK. Therefore, our survey of debates on the Scottish economy and the perception of the Scottish public of their economy do not substantiate a significant relationship between economic decline and rising popularity for SNP.

59 Further support for this argument has been made earlier for the period between 1974- the peak of the SNP’s popularity and 1979- when the SNP’s popularity waned significantly. As mentioned, the subsequent decline of the party in this period is perplexing especially since the economic condition of Britain, which had been acute in 1974, seemed nearly terminal in 1979. One would expect a rise in SNP popularity given the declining British economy.

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Assessment

Since the 1960s Scotland has had a hard time economically. In addition to the apparent decline and eventual disappearance of the Empire status, the British state ceased to pursue its non-interventionist nature in economic affairs through regional planning agencies. From the modernist perspective, economic conditions in this period support

(H1). In other words, deteriorating living standards due to economic hardships are to blame for the rise of political nationalism. Since the Union of 1707, the primary way to advance Scottish interest was to participate in the project of the . The

British Empire was a means of leaving the footprints of this small nation in the wider world. Scotland was maintaining its place as a respectable nation amongst its fellow nations by staying in the Union with England. According to the modernist perspective, when this condition was gone Scottish nationalism came to be expressed in a more separatist way.

Although we can confirm the absence of the Empire status and the changing nature of economy, the above arguments do not make sense as long as we fail to make a strong link between economy and the rise of Scottish nationalism in the form of voting for the SNP. First, opinion polls show us that, over 80 per cent of Scottish people perceive that the economic situation either got stronger or stayed the same in the long run. Second, as noted earlier, there is no significant relationship between economic situation and vote for the SNP. Third, the Scottish economy, although it deteriorated, followed the British pattern, meaning that Scots were not comparatively disadvantaged.

During the first two centuries of the Union, economic modernization reduced

Scottish nationalism, as hypothesized by (H1), both because it helped Scots to integrate

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with England, as proposed by (H 1.1) and it promoted general welfare, thus reduced regional differences, as proposed by (H1.2).

Did deterioration of economic indicators, loosing the Empire status, and interventionist regional planning help to reinforce the rise of political nationalism in

Scotland since the 1960s? To a certain extent, yes, the declining economic situation supports the modernist argument. However, we cannot argue that the Scottish economy was comparatively worse off than the rest of the Union which brings a support to (H1’.1).

The politicization of Scottish identity was more than merely an expression of material self-interest. The firm affiliation to an overarching British identity had been sorely tested by London’s perceived neglect, a sentiment that markedly increased during the Thatcher years. Therefore (H1) fails to provide a significant causal relationship between economic modernization and separatist nationalism in Scotland. Overall I conclude that economic models/factors cannot explain the rise of nationalist sentiments and thus they are reductionist (H1’.3). In other words, modernist variables such as economic modernization, uneven industrial development and the economic discrepancies between center and periphery do not necessarily have a significant effect on Scottish nationalism.

II. Political Modernization: The purpose of this section is to trace the development of Scottish politics. For that reason, I will divide this overview into four parts, eighteenth century, nineteenth century, twentieth century and development of the welfare state, and the campaigning for a Scottish Parliament and devolution since the 1960s. Although the main part of the study

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deals with the last period, the roots of the recent developments lie far back in the early nineteenth century or earlier.

I also provide two assessments, one that covers the period between 1707 until

World War II and another one covering the 1960s until present. These assessments will serve to evaluate the relationship between political modernization and political nationalism.

Scotland in the eighteenth century

Three events marked Scottish politics in the eighteenth century: the Union, the

defeat of the Jacobite rising of 1745 and the British war against France. 60 Christopher

Harvie argues that in theory the Acts of Union passed by the parliaments of England and

Scotland in 1707 put an end to the existence of both the kingdoms of England and

Scotland. 61 Therefore, only the new kingdom of Great Britain was to exist in law. But because England was so much bigger and wealthier than Scotland, and because the capital of the new state was the English capital, both parties to the union recognized that in most everyday affairs English traditions would prevail over Scottish ones. That is why the Union settlement included safeguards for Scottish institutions such as the church, the legal system, and the local government system with which the British parliament might be tempted to interfere. 62 In addition to these institutions, the Union also left Scottish

civil society intact. In Scotland, civil societal organizations were autonomous and had

roots stretching back to before the Union. Parliament in London left them alone unless

there was a threat to the peace and security of Britain.

60 Brown, A., McCrone, D. and Paterson, L. Politics and Society in Scotland, p. 4 61 Harvie, C. Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707- 1977 , p. 20 62 For more detailed discussion on Scottish institutions see, Harvie C. (1977) pp. 20-22.

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It was such a threat that led to the second key event, the Jacobite rebellion.

According to Brown et al “[Jacobite rebellion] were not merely a colorful and romantic episode, or a simple rebellion on the northern border; it was the British instance of a

Europe wide civil war between Catholicism and Protestantism.” 63 The Glorious

Revolution of 1688 had secured the British monarchy for the Protestant cause. But there have been recurrent events in the first half of the eighteenth century to restore a Catholic

King (James VIII), most of them supported by the and continental Catholic powers, such as Spain and France. So when the 1745 rising was crushed in 1746, a half century of potential instability was at an end. 64 The defeat of ensured that the British state would continue along the path on which it had been embarking since the Union: the free market in trade, Protestantism in religion and rationalism in social thought.

The final key event of this period was the series of wars directly against France.

What mattered in Scotland at the end of the century was the unprecedented popularity which these wars gave to being British. A new patriotism, one that fitted very well with the rivaling national identity of Scotland because Britishness was so firmly grounded in

Protestantism, was invented. 65 To secure their Scottishness, the Scots had to be British, because otherwise the central element of that Scottishness, their religion, would be endangered. 66 Overall, Scottish national identity safely developed in areas that are non political, such as the family, language or folk songs.

63 Brown et al Politics and Society in Scotland , p. 6. 64 Gardiner argues that the question of whether [Jacobite rebellion] really meant national rebellion is now rarely regarded as a sensible one. What is worth noting is how enlightenment Britain reworked its marginal nations in terms of image and ethnicity within the whole, meaning that each nation could be granted any amount of apparent autonomy without danger to the constitution. Also Highland dress banished after the Rebellion was re-legalized as early as 1782 to denote fierceness in British Army. See Gardier, M. 2004 The Cultural Roots of British Devolution, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 65 For a classic discussion of this era see Colley, L. Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837. 66 Gardier, M (2004) ibid., p. 44.

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We can summarize the legacy of eighteenth century politics of Scotland to the politics of nineteenth and twentieth centuries as follows: a belief that problems can be solved rationally, a tendency to regard England as the core of rational thought, and the resultant view that the Union was the best way of defending Scottish political freedom, especially from enemies beyond Britain, many of whom were hostile to the Protestant religion.

The nineteenth century: Development of liberal politics

Nineteenth century Scottish politics was shaped by the conflict between Tories

and Whigs that occurred in the opening decades of the century. The Whigs were

representatives of the emerging middle classes in the industrializing towns and cities and

believed that they were the vanguard of rationalist and liberal thought for the whole of

the civilized world.

Two long-lasting political outcomes of the conflict between the Whigs and the

Tories are the extension of the franchise in 1832-33 and then in 1868 and in 1885, and the

split of the in 1843. Although the first wave of extension still left an

electorate made up of only 8 percent of adult males, it nevertheless represented a vast

democratization compared to the eighteenth century.67 The result was that the Whigs re-

formed as the Liberal Party and dominated Scottish politics for almost the whole of the

rest of nineteenth century.

The second major event, the Disruption of the Scottish Church (1843), was

against the influence which landlords could exercise over the appointment of ministers,

67 Brown et. al. Politics and Society in Scotland, states that this extension expanded the electorate by more than twelve-fold to 65.000.

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something which offended the democratic base of the Presbyterian Church government. 68

Some 40 percent of the members left to form a new Free Church, which was again led by the liberal middle class. The effect of the Disruption was to restrict the influence which either church could have on politics. For the rest of the century, Brown et. al. argues, although the dominant tone of church remained Protestant, the governing structures became mainly secular. Since the Disruption encouraged this secularization, it is vital to the development of Scottish politics.

Although, these political activities were led by elites and benefited them directly, there were also signs of popular pressure. Popular politics could be found in the agitations for parliamentary reform, in riots against bread shortages, or against conscription into the militia. According to Brown et al, a working class person might not be able to look forward to being enfranchised, but would want the vote to be given to those elite social groups which would be most likely to look after working class interest and respond to working class political agitation. 69

The political system that emerged from the reforms and political conflict of this

century was liberalism. Scottish liberalism shared key tenets with the liberal programs of

politicians throughout Europe and North America. Central to it was a belief in free trade,

free market, and the minimal role of government in the operation of the industrial

economy. In addition, as the century progressed the Scottish middle class came to view

themselves as natural rulers with strong paternalistic overtones similar to doctrine of

“noblesse oblige” of aristocracy helping to free the rest of the Scottish society from

68 For more information on the Disruption of 1843, see Harvie, C. (2004 [1977]) (4 th ed.) pp. 53-56. 69 Brown et al Politics and Society in Scotland, p. 10.

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political oppression and material want. 70 The developing Scottish middle class eventually

extended this vision beyond Britain to the Empire and thus the British Empire began to

be seen as an arena in which the Union had its greatest achievement. Moreover, the mass

of the Scottish population shared this enthusiasm for the Empire. The Union was almost

never seriously questioned at any time before the 1880s, and even then the questioning

was about reform, not separation.

The political identity that then flourished in Scotland has been described as

“unionist nationalism”. On the one hand, for Scotland to realize its true potential as a nation it had to be in the Union, therefore to be a true Scottish nationalist one must also be a unionist. On the other hand, in the absence of Scottish nationalist assertion, the

Union would degenerate into an English take-over; therefore Scotland had to remind

England and itself repeatedly that it was a partner in the Union and that it retained the right to secede.

In summary, nineteenth century political modernization in Scotland left a legacy of, first, the rhetoric of liberalism, second, an enthusiasm for the British Empire (thus unionist nationalism) and third, a growing belief that the state had a duty to intervene to regulate morality and mitigate the bad effects of the free market.

Twentieth century and the growth of the central state :

By the twentieth century, Scotland developed its own version of a central state in

the Scottish Office. The origin of this institution is in the creation of the post of Scottish

Secretary in 1885 in response to the nationalist campaign for Scottish matters to be given

70 Noblesse oblige also influenced by the Protestant belief that those who had risen to the top had a duty to help those who were less well-off.

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more attention by Westminster. 71 The Scottish concerns arose because central government was taking a growing role in social policy.

The main period of expansion of the Scottish Office was between 1920- 1940, when the Office took over the activities of boards that had been inherited from the nineteenth century and assumed the defense of Scotland’s main interest. The Scottish

Secretary became the Secretary of State with Cabinet rank in 1926 and lobbied for greater public spending and special legislation. The lobbying efforts usually occurred behind closed doors. It was not the politics of a formally federal state such as Canada, where the premiers are expected to discuss their efforts in front of their electorates. Rather Scottish politics depended so much on informal contacts.

By the 1940s, the system of government that emerged to deal with the new state role in welfare was commanding the support of Scottish politicians. It was broadly agreed that the Scottish Office should be the direct provider of health, education, and financial support to people living in poverty. Moreover, the Scottish politicians and civil servants had to assume an active role in planning the economy so that unemployment would be reduced. The same consensus existed in England, but it was more extensive in Scotland.

Two aspects of this era are related to this project. First, as a legacy of the nineteenth century, in the twentieth century, state intervention in Scotland is justified to alleviate the harmful effects of the free market. Second, it became clear that the Scottish

Office became the defender of Scotland’s national interest.

71 For a detailed account on the development Scottish Office, see Hanham, H.J. (1969) “The Development of Scottish Office” in Wolfe, J.N. (ed), Government and Nationalism in Scotland, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 51-70.

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Assessment :

The historic institutionalist school offers an explanatory framework for understanding the

modernization, in this case rationalization of authority and modern bureaucracy, of the

Scottish polity. The idea of historical institutionalization is that ‘policy choices made

when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is initiated, will have a continuing

and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future’. 72 In this context, establishment of the Scottish Office (1885, 1939) ensured that separate administrative arrangements would not only persist but would apply to new or expanding areas of public policy. The Scottish Office proved in time to have a great significance in establishing a modern Scottish polity. It was clear even before the establishment of the Office, a pattern of distinct central administrative apparatus had been established which provided the basis for continued distinct treatment of Scotland at the heart of British government. The U.K. was a union state, not a unitary state. 73 While administrative standardization prevailed over most of the territory some pre-union rights and institutional structures preserved some degree of regional autonomy.

Throughout the history of Scottish central administration, a key figure in the union state, have been the ideas of allowing, encouraging, and celebrating Scottish distinctiveness alongside centralized authority with a bureaucratic apparatus capable of altering the policies at the stage of implementation.

As I elaborate in the following section, Jim Bulpitt maintained that a dual a polity operated for much of the twentieth century as well: the centre allowed the local

72 Peters, G.B. (1999). “Institutional Theory in Political Science, London: Pinter, p. 63. This draws on the seminal works of Skocpol, T. 1994 Social Revolutions in the modern world, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, David King (1995) and Krasner, S. 1985 Structural Conflict: the Third World against global liberalism , Berkeley: University of California Press. 73 Mitchell, J. Governing Scotland , p. 164.

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authorities in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, along with England, a fair degree of autonomy enabling the centre focus on ‘high politics. 74 The devolution of ‘low politics’ gave rise to interaction between the centre and the periphery creating what Bulpitt called territorial politics, “that arena of political activity concerned with the relations between central political institutions in the capital city and those interests, communities, political organizations and governmental bodies outside the central institutional complex, but within the boundaries of the state, which possess or are commonly perceived to possess a significant geographical or local/regional character”. 75

Apart from this line of reasoning, I argue that the autonomous nature of the

Scottish polity was complemented by the orthodox view that Britain was a relatively homogenous political community. It is this perception of the United Kingdom, a modern centralized state with diverse regions, that provides support to (H2) (H2.1) and (H2.2).

The Empire and the UK was something of which the Scots were immensely proud. It was theirs as much as England’s. Division of labor between center and periphery can be summarized as follows: a significant degree of autonomy given to Scotland in their own affairs enabling London to concentrate on national matters as well as promoting a national rhetoric which integrated diverse regions.

The rise of Scottish nationalism: 1960s-present:

Until the 1960s most people and especially most politicians were happy with the

compromise that had been reached between the 1920s and the 1940s, which created a

distinctively Scottish branch of administrative state. Scotland established material welfare

74 Bulpitt, J. 1983 Territory and Power in the United Kingdom, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 134- 163. 75 Ibid. p. 1.

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for the majority of the population, distributed according to Scottish traditions. For example, the education system was established with a separate structure of Scottish examinations, Scottish curriculum and Scottish teaching practices. 76 Likewise, the health

service maintained separate patterns of training, a greater integration than in England

between hospitals and general practice, and a stronger concern with the social origins of

disease. 77 What is more important is that these were not the results of the broad sweep of legislation. Rather, these changes can be attributed to the details in implementation. Thus, it was the modern Scottish political apparatus that contributed to the local and particular

Scottish national identity.

By the 1960s, the credibility of the old system started to decay, however, as the state became less able to deliver the material welfare. The dissatisfaction with the material welfare and the framework through which material welfare was administrated led to questioning of the credibility of the UK state as never before. With respect to material problems, British social democracy was following a European trend, where the welfare consensus of the previous 40 years was crumbling. What made Scotland peculiar was not the perception that the post-1945 welfare state was failing to live up to its expectations but that the UK link—the Union itself that was blamed.

Poggi argues that the main trend in state development in the twentieth century was to solve political problems by technical means.78 According to this, the most efficient

way to ensure that welfare could be delivered to the whole of society is through rational

76 See McPherson, A 1983 “ An Angle on the Geist: Persistence and Change in the Scottish Educational Tradition” in W.M. Humes and H.M Paterson (eds.) Scottish Culture and Scottish Education 1800-1980 Edinburgh: John Donald, pp. 216- 243 and McPherson, A. & Raab, C.D. 1988 Governing Education , Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 77 See McIntosh, M. 1984 “The family, regulation, and the public sphere”, in McLennan, G., Held, H. and Hall, S. (eds.) The Idea of Modern State , Open University Press, pp. 204-240. 78 Poggi, G. 1990 The Nature of State , Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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planning. In the Scottish case the new welfare society could become an instrument of distribution only by removing decisions about how to allocate resources from the hands of politicians. It is believed that non-political experts, namely bureaucrats, would be fairer and more efficient. Bureaucrats would not only control the implementation of policies but would also be involved in helping to draft the legislation, and even lobbying in the first place. Thus politics that really mattered were administrative politics. In the case of Britain, this dominance was helped by the political consensus over the aims of the welfare state.

In this context, by the middle of the twentieth century Scotland had as much autonomy as could reasonably be hoped for. Scotland had its own indigenous bureaucracy in the Scottish Office and the other Scottish branches of the bureaucratic state. In Scotland, centralized control mostly meant control by the Scottish Office, rather than by the ministries in London. In education, for example, reforms came from non- partisan committees, not from the political parties. These committees did not impose their ideas on Scottish education or Scottish society. They negotiated compromises that would be acceptable to the key interest groups, the teachers, local authorities and so on. Out of this consensus, it was clear that the civil servants would implement the policy, either by administrative agencies or by special Scottish legislation that, until the 1970s, mostly passed through Parliament with no serious challenge. 79

As the century progressed the Scottish Office acquired growing powers beyond traditionally Scottish areas. For instance, on economic affairs, it mattered a great deal to

79 Similar points can be made about a whole range of social policy which was governed by boards and councils in the nineteenth century, such as housing, health, roads, agriculture.

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the legitimacy of the Office to be able to influence the Scottish economy. 80 At this stage,

the political response to development of a Scottish nationalist movement was simple:

transfer more economic powers to the Scottish Office. For example, in the 1970s the

Labour Government gave the Scottish Secretary responsibilities for significant aspects of

economic development, such as oversight of regional policy, which became especially

important in the 1980s and 1990s as grants from the EU grew in size.

The growth of the Scottish Office in the latter half of the twentieth century was

accompanied by demands for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament by those who

were dissatisfied with an unaccountable Scottish Office. 81 They simply wanted a

legislature which will be controlled by popular will. These demands follow a long

campaign in Scotland stretching over many years- some would say since the Treaty of

Union in 1707 when its predecessor was dissolved. In more recent history, constitutional

change occurred very rapidly in the period following the Labour Party’s return to office

at the general election in May 1997. The new government moved swiftly in publishing a

White Paper on devolution in July 1997 before holding a two-question referendum in

September 1997. When the majority of people voting in Scotland responded positively to

both the referendum questions, the Scotland Bill was published at the end of 1997, which

was then followed by the Scotland Act one year later. Soon after the first election of May

1999, the new politicians (MSPs) took their seats, a coalition government was formed

with Labour and Liberal Democrats (minor partner) while SNP came second. The

80 As Brown et al (1998) notes the Secretary of State for Scotland was being pressed to speak for the Scottish economy as early as the 1930s and during 1950s the convention developed that the Secretary of State was Scotland’s minister.

81 Details and brief timeline towards the establishment of Scottish Parliament can be found on pages 12-14.

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opening of the Parliament was described by Sir David Steel, the Presiding Officer, as ‘the most significant political achievement in Scotland for nearly 300 years’. 82

Furthermore, there were external sources that made establishment of Scottish

Parliament possible, namely the EU. By the end of 1980s and 1990s, a good number of

Scottish actors had developed direct links with the EU and its institutions. This is particularly true for governmental bodies, since they were most likely be affected by the

EU. The decisions that affected their work were taken increasingly not in London but in

Brussels. Although we cannot argue that Westminster had been by-passed by Scottish governmental bodies, it was clear that the existing constitutional arrangements were no longer sustainable.

Assessment

The first question we have to answer is whether or not it is the result of political

modernization that a separate Scottish political system exists. The debate initially started

in the 1970s and has flourished since then. 83 James Kellas argues that although the boundary between British and Scottish political systems was not clear, a Scottish political system existed with distinct institutions and organizations. 84 An alternative view argued

Scotland was governed through distinct British based ‘policy networks’ and that the main political institutions operating in Scotland were British because power was ‘retained and concentrated at Westminster and Whitehall’. 85 Others contended that if the term system

82 The Scotsman 2 July 1999. 83 We can date 1973, the publication of James Kellas’s “The Scottish Political System” 1 st eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, as the first scholarly work to provoke this debate. 84 Kellas, J. (1984) “the Scottish Political System”, 3 rd eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 18. 85 Keating, M. and Midwinter, A. 1981 “The Scottish Office in the United Kingdom Policy Network”, Studies in Public Policy, No. 96, Glasgow, University of Strathclyde, Center for the Study of Public Policy, pp. 1-2, quoted in Mitchell, J.2003 “Politics in Scotland” in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Richard

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‘is to have any meaning in political science it must relate to a distinct sovereign and autonomous set of political institutions governing within defined territorial boundaries, which clearly Scotland does not have’. 86 Despite these disagreements, all scholars clearly acknowledged that a distinct Scottish dimension to politics existed especially since the

1970s.

In late twentieth century, the domestic and economic spheres, which were considered private spheres in the nineteenth century, are no longer separated from the state in any meaningful way. In modern times the state can no longer stand outside social, political and cultural relations and institutions which make up society. In other words, as

Stuart Hall points out, the ‘empty’ state- without a social content- does not exist. 87

Therefore, the modern British state comes to constitute British society as well as being constituted by it.

Where does this understanding of state and society relation leave us with regard to understand the politics of Scotland? Simply, in addition to British state, Scottish Office came to be represented in British state and society equation as a separate entity for

Scottish society. The survey of development of British state in relation to Scottish Office has showed that over the last hundred years increasing demands for internal reform in

Scotland have resulted in increased responsibilities to the Scottish Office to the extent that a fairly high degree of de facto self-government has existed. The demand for democratic accountability over the Scottish semi-state in the late twentieth century

Heffernan and Gillian Peele (eds.) Development in British politics, 7 New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 163. 86 Moore, C. and Booth, S. 1989 Managing Competition: Meso-Corporatism, Pluralism and the Negotiated Order in Scotland , Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 15. 87 Hall, S. 1992 “The Question of Cultural Identity” in Hall, S. (ed), Modernity and Its Futures , Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 273-316.

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represents recognition that Scottish Office constitutes Scottish society more than the

British state does. The same is also valid for the argument that Scottish society constitutes Scottish semi-state more than the British society. The irony is in the fact that the Scottish Office has given political meaning to Scotland as a result of the modern development of the British state. If it had not existed then it would have been much harder to address Scotland as a meaningful political unit. As a result the more British state modernized, the more Scottish polity became a distinct entity when compared to the

UK, assuming authority over its region and providing a distinct locus of loyalty to her citizens. Therefore I conclude that, this survey of development of British state discredits modernist hypothesis, which suggested that creation of central administration as a result of political modernization integrates regions and groups and thus diminishes calls for separation or separate rights (H2). Rather, the result of political modernization in late twentieth century was the development of Scottish polity with a high degree of civil and political autonomy despite nearly 300 years of belonging to a unitary UK.

Apart from this argument on how modernization can be responsible for a development of a Scottish polity, which can be defined as a semi-state, I infer three trends. The first one is very much related with the operation of the Scottish political system and its technocratic nature, which was elaborated in the previous section. The question is whether loss of popular participation is a price worth paying for technocratic efficiency. Suspicion of technocracy took the form of student rebellions in the 1960s and the emergence of movements such as feminism, sexual politics and environmentalism.

All of these have in common the assertion of the rights of human beings to shape their own lives. The worrying trend for the leftists was that welfare state grew too much that

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the bureaucrats had gained too much control of individual people. On the political right, the most famous and influential representatives were and Ronald

Reagan, who believed that the only way to reduce the power of bureaucracy was to convert all social relations into relations of free market.

Had it not been for a highly autonomous Scottish polity, which was developed as a result of British political modernization, reactions of Scottish society could very well be analyzed under the British society, namely between the Labour and the Conservatives.

However, Scotland had produced its own version of a critique of technocracy as a result of the Scottish Office’s bureaucratic governing style. It has been claimed that only a

Parliament could bring the system under popular scrutiny. It is not a surprise that the leftist critique of the technocratic state found more supporters rather than right given the reduced role of the Conservative Party in Scotland. According to this, arguments of the

Scottish Parliament have found followers whose political philosophy has decentralization at its core, such as feminists and environmentalists. Although, followers of this trend were not necessarily separatist nationalists, they clearly saw the Scottish Parliament as a first step towards a thorough devolution of power to Scottish people.

The second trend is very much associated with the political divergence between

Scotland and England. As mentioned earlier, since the 1970s Scotland has retained an essentially social democratic majority while large parts of England have moved to the right. This is controversial because the English majority has provided the government that controls Scottish Office. On the one hand Scottish Conservative vote declined to under one fifth; on the other hand Scottish Office became increasingly Conservative. In a way this suggests a rightist revolution from above. This is also in line with H2’.1 which

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suggested that elitist approaches underestimates local networks and thus modernization can foster separatist nationalism. Overall, political divergence within UK has helped the

SNP in its battle with the Labour Party. The disagreements between the Scottish and

English majorities pushed Scotland towards outright independence.

The third trend is the reorientation of Scotland towards the EU, which also means away from Britain. Some of the arguments for a Union with England since 1980s have become arguments against it. If the economy made sense for unification once, then the

EU offers better opportunities than the UK today. If as a small country Scotland wants to share in cultural developments or leave a mark beyond its borders, then the EU provides more security and respect for the diversity of its members than within a UK dominated by

England. The European dimension urged all political parties to take a stand on the issue; however, it was the SNP with its ‘Independence in Europe’ campaign that managed to steer public opinion towards themselves.

In brief, I argued that, British political modernization created its own nemesis, namely the Scottish Office. Although initially intended to represent the power of London in Scottish region and facilitate the policy implementation for the central authority,

Scottish Office came to be recognized as the Scottish institution that is responsible for solving Scottish problems. This understanding and development of Scottish polity found a distinct locus of loyalty and earned accountability from Scottish society. Rather than functioning as a policy filter for Westminster, Scottish Office has given a distinct political meaning to Scotland. It’s pure existence have made political demands for more self-determination so much easier to make. Along with this, a distinct Scottish political culture when compared to rest of the UK has flourished and gained more support among

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Scots, which has been exemplified by three trends above. Overall, British political modernization, rather than reducing separatist demands (H2), provided nationalist Scots with necessary political means to claim distinct political culture, political institutions such as the Scottish Parliament and eventually separate a Scottish state (H2’).

III- Socio-cultural Modernization: This section will concentrate on socio-cultural modernization in Scotland. Briefly, I will discuss whether modernization of socio-cultural conditions reduces separatist nationalism as suggested by (H3). As in the previous sections, I will survey the modernization process from socio- cultural perspective in different periods and provide assessment of different periods in relation to how the processes of socio-cultural modernization bear on modernist hypothesis. The bulk of the comparison will be between the pre and post 1960 periods.

Eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

From the Union of 1707 until the end of the nineteenth century, the level of

intellectual and cultural activities in Scotland was one of the highest in the world. 88 There

was the in the late eighteenth century, which produced such

eminent scholars as David Hume (1723-90), Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), Thomas Reid

(1710-1819), and William Robertson (1721-1793). There were also successive waves of

inventions: James Watt (1736-1819) revolutionized the steam engine by separating the

condenser; the world’s first steamboat, the Charlotte Dundas , was equipped with the

88 For more on Scottish intellectuals (1707- 1945) see Harvie, C. Scotland and Nationalism , chapter 3, pp. 80-110.

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engine which William Symington (1763- 1831) built; and many more followed. 89

Scotland also commanded respect from the world for its literary achievement. Robert

Burns (1759- 96), son of a small farmer, enjoyed an international reputation as the national poet of Scotland. He composed in Scots, and his works were translated into many languages. Burns’ major work, Ossian , which was regarded as the long-lost epic of

ancient Gaelic heroes of Scotland, was published in 1760. This was, as it turned out, in

part a forgery by James Macpherson (1738-96). Nevertheless, it was eagerly read by both

Scottish and European readers. Ossian opened a ‘long line of nationalist epic literary

fakes’ and inspired many nationalist movements on the continent. 90 In Scotland, it

certainly triggered development of historical societies but did not produce a nationalist

movement for independence.

Walter Scott (1771-1832) published a series of novels which highlighted

Highlands as the essence of the Scottish past not only in Scottish but also in British

minds. According to Paterson, Scott produced a prototype of explicit nationalism which

was in practice very similar to the nationalisms of small countries all over Europe. 91

Scott’s novels, according to Paterson, “…had the effects of creating the community of

Scotland by imagining it. In certain respects, he gave birth to a new definition of that community: now that Jacobitism was no longer a serious political threat to the state, he and his followers could build a newly unified national culture around symbols of the

Highlands and Gaelic”. 92 If the tone of the culture derived from Walter Scott was

melancholic, that too was common among the moderate nationalist anywhere. Tom Nairn

89 The pamphlet published by the Scottish Office, Scotland in Profile , lists 17 names as Scottish genius who contributed to industry and science by inventing and discovering something. 90 Raymond, P. 1994 European Nationalism 1789-1920 , London: Longman, p. 209. 91 Paterson, L. The Autonomy of Modern Scotland , pp. 59-60. 92 Ibid. p. 59

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characterized this Janus-faced modernizing nationalism reculer pour mieux sauter : invoke the past to address the present. 93 Paterson justifies this elegantly by stating that

“the Scots looked partly to an imaginary past…because they knew that they would

discover in the new received version of their own history great national deeds which

would demonstrate the strength that they were sure they had for the future”. 94 As a Scot,

Scott cared for Scotland and worried about the erosion of Scottish culture but he did not

attempt to regain Scottish independence. Next to his Scottish identity, he was British and

imperialist at the same time. In a way, we can argue that, Scott is a personification of the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: Scottish but, British too.

From this emerged a phenomenon of unionist nationalism, something that is not

wholly dead even in the late twentieth century. 95 Unionism and nationalism were

mutually dependent. To be a true unionist, it was necessary to be a nationalist, because

otherwise Scotland would not be a partner in a Union but become dependent on England.

On the other hand to be a true nationalist it was necessary to be a unionist. Pragmatically,

the best way of defending the interest of Scottish society was to maintain the alliance

with England in foreign affairs; only in that way that Scotland would be able to develop

its own society and culture free from interference.

Education

93 Nairn, T. The Break-up of Britain.. 94 Paterson,. L The Autonomy of Modern Scotland, p. 60 95 Morton, G. (1994), “Unionist Nationalism: The Historical Construction of Scottish National Identity, Edinburgh 1830- 1860”, Ph.D. thesis, Edinburgh University, cited in Paterson (1994).

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The story of education system is also worth mentioning in some detail since it is a very clear example of the delicate Scottish balance between nationalism and assimilation.

Moreover education has always been a Scottish icon, whose autonomy has been preserved by the Union Treaty in 1707 and has been seen as a main requirement for

Scottish independence. The general conclusion can be summed up by Sydney and Olive

Checkland: “the debate on education was recognized by many [in the nineteenth century] to be not a question lying between England and Scotland, but between two views of how

Scotland should respond in educational terms to a rapidly changing world”. 96

Scotland did not get a national system of elementary schools until 1872 two years

after a corresponding English Act, despite there have been Scottish agitation since the

1830s. Why was there a delay from the 1830s to 1872s? Although, we can find

arguments that take this delay to show that Scottish wishes could be frustrated until the

English wanted the same, Paterson tells us a another story. 97 For her, the ultimate reason for the delay in legislation can be seen to have been Scottish disagreements rather than the deliberate obstruction instigated in England. 98 These disputes can be best characterized as showing one Scottish faction using the power of state to impose on other

Scottish factions. Therefore, the imposition of Scottish education system was indigenous: the oppressors, if there were any, were Scots, not the English. This also explains why universities never generated intense nationalist campaign in Scotland when compared to elsewhere in Europe such as Ireland, Wales or central Europe. The Scottish middle class

96 Checkland, S., and Checkland, O. 1984 Industry and Ethos: Scotland, 1832- 1914 London: Edward Arnold, p. 8. 97 Although not known as a nationalist, a historian Smout, T.C. (1986) argues this former point in “A Century of the Scottish People, 1830-1950”, London: Collins. 98 The Scottish disagreements over the education system were mainly between the established church, who feared that the loss of schools would be the end of its formal established position and supporters of the Free or United Presbyterian Churches, who favored only non- statutory religious intervention in any schools system. For more detailed account, see Paterson, L. The Autonomy of Modern Scotland, pp. 67-69.

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had already had what the middle class were agitating for in these other places: they had an indisputably national system which was controlled through local governing bodies and

Commissions.

Assessment:

Why did political nationalism not take hold in the Scotland in the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries? Can we accept that (H3) holds true for this period? Short answer is

yes. As (H3) assumed, modernizing socio-cultural conditions reduced separatist

tendencies of Scottish nationalism. During eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a strong

Scottish identity was not matched by a strong political movement in Scotland.

In the nineteenth century, Scottish nationalism was successful, practical and

official, engaged in building a state to rival its modernity the most advanced in Europe. It

believed itself to be at the forefront of social development, and the economic success

which Scotland enjoyed, seemed to confirm this self-confidence. It was nationalism

which did not demand a parliament for the simple reason that it could get what it wanted

without a parliament – economic growth, free trade, liberty and of course, cultural

autonomy.

As H.J. Hanham put it, the cultural revivals and reinventions could not contribute

to national politics, just as they did elsewhere in continental Europe. 99 Hanham dates the founding of modern Scottish nationalism to the 1850s, in the sense that this was the time when Scots started to articulate their nationalist demands in a modern form. In Scotland, these demands worked. For instance, the National Association for the Vindication of

99 Hanham, H.J. Scottish Nationalism , pp. 64-66.

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Scottish Rights (1853) wanted an institutional reform to enable the pursuit of social reform. This demand has been satisfied by expanding the boards of Scottish social administration which also acquired more directive powers over local practices. 100 Later in the century, the same kind of nationalist discontent produced another peaceful settlement: the founding of the modern Scottish Office. In 1884, the political consensus was wide enough to demand a separate Scottish Secretary. Eventually, in the same year, the Convention of Royal Burghs organized a large and representative meeting in

Edinburgh, which convinced the government that change was indeed wanted in Scotland.

The outcome in 1885 was the inauguration of the Scottish Office, which in the next decade took over the central government role in all the main areas of Scottish administration – local government, education, social policy and law. 101

Repeatedly, therefore, nationalism of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in

Scotland was not about imposed policies or oppression. As Hanham argues “Most Scots found a substitute for political nationalism in nostalgia about the Scottish past and pride in those specifically Scottish institutions that had survived the Union.” 102 It was a

nationalism that is satisfied if it gets the instruments which it thinks it needs. In sporadic

protests, the Union might be questioned, but it was never really a political threat to the

Union. In other words, although modernization did not eliminate the local Scottish

identity or paved the way to the development of homogeneous British culture as (H3)

suggests, it surely contributed to a healthy balance between Scottish and British cultures.

100 Paterson, L. The Autonomy of Modern Scotland, pp. 51- 55 101 For more detailed narrative of the timeline for the foundation of the Scottish Office, see Hanham, H.J Scottish Nationalism , pp. 82-90. 102 Hanham, H.J. Scottish Nationalism , p. 33.

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The Union and the unity of Parliament remain unchallenged to a great extend until the next century.

20 th Century: The first Scottish Renaissance and beyond

So far we have seen how the Empire of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries managed to redefine the body of people as part of the culturally diverse British entity. 103 According

to Gardiner, the ‘Greater Britain’ had allowed for a framework in which the British

Empire was based more on the franchising of ‘English’ culture in each locality, ‘a

replicable cultural standard which was placeless and morally universal. 104 Under

conditions of the Greater Britain language had come to signify the cultural competence of

people and become a primary term for the empire’s cultural nationalisms. Therefore, our

survey in the previous section concluded that the Greater Britain was good enough to

keep separatist nationalism out of the picture.

This section concerns with one of the first instances of post-British culture outside

of Ireland, one that emerged at the time of Irish separation, which was initiated in 1921.

Scottish nationalism, partly as an anti-imperial movement, directly linked by the key

colony of Ireland came to acquire separatist tendencies from 1910s to present. This trend

coincided with the following issues throughout the twentieth century: first; the Scottish

Renaissance and literary revival in 1920s and 1930s, second; the reflux of immigrants in

103 Gardier argues that “The emerging ‘national’ diversity can be generically described as ‘Greater Britain’. See Gardier, M. The Cultural Roots of British Devolution , pp. 10-18. 104 Gardier, M. The Cultural Roots of British Devolution , pp. 29-30.

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the latter part of the century, and third; the decline of the Empire status and thus weakening of positive Unionism.

Founding a language was to be the central nationalist project of the First Scottish

Renaissance. This foundation has left a legacy which in some ways hampers the

devolution, conceived in its 1990s form. The champion of this trend was Hugh

MacDiarmid, a figure comparable to Ireland’s James Joyce and William Yeats,

proclaimed himself the center of Scottish renaissance. As an artist and literary figure he

stated the predicament of the national intelligentsia. His aim was vast: to pull red and

black, aristocrat and democrat, nationalist and cosmopolitan Scotland, into

confrontation. 105 In 1926, at the peak of the nationalist Renaissance, MacDiarmid’s Albyn called for Scotland’s continued centrality to empire:

Scotland has contributed far too much to the upbringing of the Empire to want to withdraw from it. It is, indeed, the very opposite motive that is at work. It is the recognition of how grossly anomalous it is that Scotland, which has contributed so preponderantly to Imperial development, which should be relegated to so inferior and ineffective place in it, and have no voice in determining and disposing its future. 106

MacDiarmid in his prime in 1920s and 1930s shifted the intelligentsia some way along his road. Although “[MacDiarmid] his devotion to a mix of communism and nationalism took him in and out of the nationalist movement of the next forty years”107 ,

he continued to influence coming generations. For instance, Harvie argues that younger

poets writing in Lallans 108 or in English inherited MacDiarmid’s rigor, his internationalism, and his conviction, and believed that real creativity was possible in

105 Harvie (2004), p. 101. 106 MacDiarmid, H. 1995 [1926] “Albyn: or Scotland and the Future”, in Alan Riach “Introduction to Hugh MacDiarmid”, in Alan Riach (ed.), Contemporary Scottish Studies , Manchester: Carcanet, p. ix. 107 Hanham, H. J. Scottish Nationalism p. 144. 108 The Lowlands Scots tongue. In 1920s, it has been thought that Lallans could be made into a suitable vehicle for the expression of Scottish ideas that could not be suitably expressed in English. See Hanham, H. J. Scottish Nationalism , p. 46. and Harvie, C. Scotland and Nationalism , p. 106.

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Scotland. Harvie argues that next generations felt that the renaissance could no longer be dismissed as a parochial outburst that whatever their differences, they were speaking with their accents. Therefore, the renaissance in 1920s, a period central to a sub-British national culture paved the way to more precise calls for devolution in the second half of the century.

A second issue that coincides with separatist tendencies was the post-colonial reflux of British immigrants. Where during mid- 1950 the number of immigrants was between 12,000 and 15,000 a year, it had risen to 50,000 in 1960, 66,000 in 1961, and

32,000 in the first half of the 1962 before the rules were changed. 109 Thus 1960s opened a

new era of anxiety over immigration, expressed in popular fears of being surrounded.

These fears found a voice in the Conservative MP Enoch Powell 110 who exerted a

decisive influence on the 1970s elections which would eventually inspire Margaret

Thatcher. Zig Layton-Henry argued that Thatcher played the Powellite race card as a

general strengthening of power. 111 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown also notes that

Thatcher’s anti-immigration stance had become popular in many sectors before her

election, given her ability to use an ethno-centric form of ‘patriotism’. 112 Gilroy explains

that Powell’s conception of nationality tended to freeze citizenship, since even when

immigrants became British, for Powell they somehow remained West Indian, African or

109 Layton-Henry, Z. 1992 The Politics of Immigration: Immigration, ‘Race’ and ‘Race’ Relations in Post- War Britain , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 71-71. Immigration rules were tightened by Commonwealth Immigration Act (1962). 110 Enoch Powell held his seat for Westhampton South-West from 1950- 1974. In his infamous ‘rivers of blood’ speech, delivered in 1968, links concerns over national danger of immigration to the rank-and-file Englishman imagined to be walking the streets of Wolverhampton. In another speech the same year, Powell claimed that Britain was being “hollowed out from within by implantation of unassimilated and unassimilable populations” Quoted in Gilroy, P. 1987 There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack London: Routledge, p. 43. 111 Layton-Hentry (1992) pp. 195-198. 112 Alibhai-Brown, Y. 2001 Who Do We Think We Are?: Imagining the New Britain London: Penguin, p. 86

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Asian. 113 This is where Britishness and ethno-cultural ideas of Britain falls apart:

citizenship is no longer sufficient to gain access, and the possibility of being a proper

nation-state, as defined by Gellner as congruency of nation and state, is lost.

This is not to claim that Powell’s electoral success in his own seat has ever

translated into a nationwide public appeal. But while immigrants were increasingly

required to take on the ‘citizenship’ meaning of Britishness, the consecutive Conservative

governments continued to single out ethnicity into the 1990s. Anthony Barnett has noted

Powell’s front-bench days to 1997 a continuity of metaphors deployed by the

Conservative leadership, which figured each coming general election potentially the last

British election ever. 114 Where these panic calls had been aimed at the immigrant threat,

in Scotland and Wales they were being directed at Yes votes in the devolution

referendums. 115 Shortly, those warnings became real: increasingly those experiencing devolution have turned away from British polity, which they regard as not being properly representative.

Finally, the crucial change is once again (as discussed during the political modernization section) one in which is contingent on the decline of the Empire, the shift away from the title ‘Unionist’ in the 1960s. 116 In those days, ‘Britain and Empire’

patriotism was international and inclusive: Scottishness was one of many ‘local’

nationalities within the Pax Britannica . However, since then the traditional Unionism had

lost nearly all the grounds of its historic appeal.117 There is clear evidence that inclusive

113 Gilroy, P. There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack p. 46. 114 Barnett, A. 1997 This Time: Our Constitutional Revolution , London: Vintage, pp. 43-46. 115 Another well-known misfit of Anglo-British ethnicity with the state is Norman Tebbitt’s, a Conservative MP, ‘cricket test’ for immigrants, which equates the England team with the United Kingdom. 116 In addition, we can also argue that since the 1970s, the much more broadly challenge of EU government and institutions has been encroaching on Britishness. 117 For more on this see Devine, T. M. 1999 The Scottish Nation: a history, 1700-2000 , New York: Viking.

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positive Unionism is declining and being undermined. As Norman Davies suggests, there is an ‘inability of prominent political authorities to present the history of our Isles in accurate and unambiguous terms’ and added that ‘the old Anglocentric straitjacket is bursting at the seams’. 118 Insisting that it fits only provokes anger and division.

To take only one example is the revival of great interest in Scotland’s culture and

history within Scotland. A report commissioned by the government appointed Scottish

Consultative Committee on the Curriculum (SCCC) from the Scottish Culture Review

Group concluded in June 1998 that “Scottish culture has not yet been given adequate

place”. Their report, Scottish Culture and Curriculum , showed that government and its

agencies were out of touch with the strength of appetite for Scottish culture on the

ground. A poll of institutions by the group revealed that some 90 per cent of respondents

thought there should be a curriculum in schools with a Scottish emphasis, and 97 per cent

wanted emphasis on Scottish history, 93 per cent on , 91 per cent on

Scottish music and 80 per cent on , while even in Modern Languages and

Sciences, around 45 per cent wanted Scottish content or examples promoted. 119 The

SCCC report was demand for self-respect. Although the incoming administration in

Holyrood in 1999 promoted a consultation on the formation of a National Cultural

Strategy, it was clear that the specifics of the Scottish culture regarded by major British political parties as politically dangerous. The best example of this fear is the Tory reaction to the loss of Empire, which has been drift, not towards other forms of internationalism, but to an increasingly narrow . Pittock argues, even

Michael Forsyth’s last efforts to present himself in tartan as Secretary of State failed to

118 Davies, N. 1999 The Isles: a history , New York: Oxford University Press, p. 2. 119 SCCC report, Scottish Culture and the Curriculum , 1998. The poll covered 1125 institutions including 250 schools.

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overcome many years of perception that Conservative Party considered sectional English interests as their priority. 120

Arguably, the last upsurges of explicit Britishness occurred during the Falkland

War of 1982. 121 Foreign policy seem to be one of the last strongholds of positive

Unionism: but even here, the SNP were able to speak out against the war in Kosovo

(when Britishness once again showed signs of being important) in 1999 in a way which had not been possible in 1982. Although this intervention possibly damaged their electoral prospects, it did not destroy them as it might once have done.

Assessment:

In the twentieth century, the term “British” culture is used although people increasingly

describe themselves as English, Scottish, or Welsh. According to 2000 figures, Britain

(strictly speaking, Great Britain) is comprised of England (49, 495 million), Scotland (5,

120 million), and Welsh (2,933 million). 122 The United Kingdom (of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland) is comprised of 59, 237 million and includes Ulster (1,689 million).

The umbrella terms ‘British” and “Britishness” at one time probably related to a geographical entity, but have become equated with “English”. Historian Professor,

Norman Davies claims largely on constitutional/ institutional grounds that “the United

Kingdom is not, and never has been, a nation-state…It is essentially a dynastic conglomerate, which could never equalize the functions of its four constituent parts and

120 Michael Forsyth, Conservative and Unionist Party politician, served as the Secretary of State for Scotland between 1995- 1997, during which he led a high profile but ultimately unsuccessful campaign against the opposition parties’ plans to establish a devolved Scottish Parliament. 121 One famously titled by American press ‘the Empire strikes back’. 122 Social Trends, 2000, p. 22

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which, as a result, could never fully harmonize the identities of national communities within its borders.” 123

Our survey of socio-cultural modernization in Britain in the twentieth century can be summarized as: There has been a strengthening of Scottishness, especially in the last four decades and a declining willingness to identify with Britishness as a result of modernization. Therefore we can conclude that modernization socio-cultural conditions strengthened Scottish identity. However, our analysis falls short of confirming strong relationship between cultural identity and political question in Scotland. Despite the rhetoric of nationalism, it is not possible to infer massive support for independence from the fact that most people in Scotland feel intensely Scottish. By the same token, the continuing attachment to cultural Britishness does not tell us anything about the long term prospects for the Union. For instance, although Scottishness has gather strength, it also proved to be fluid. Scottishness peaked during the 1997 referendum, and fell back by

1999, although not back to the levels it was at before (which were already very high).

At the same time, saying that this changing sense of nationality has no political implications would be an exaggeration. After all, there is a growing sense that Scotland and England are in conflict with each other and a growing willingness to identify with people of the same nationality. In this manner, I conclude that socio-cultural modernization has more to do with strengthening differences between Scots and English than reconciling those differences, though this analysis falls short of proving stronger national identity is directly linked with rising separatist nationalism in Scotland.

123 Davies, N. The Isles- A History , p. 1039.

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Scottish nationality and nationalism have a long and complex history. This chapter has sought to tell this story fully from the perspective of modernization, if briefly, in order to promote an understanding of that complexity and to diminish the prevalence of exaggerated self worth and an ignorant desire to dismiss. If it can inform enough to allow settled discussion of the nature of Scottish nationalism and how it has been affected by modernization processes, and Scottish dialogue with Great Britain, it will have done its work. Theoretical synthesis of Scottish case will be provided in the last chapter after the analysis of Kurdish nationalism and the Turkish modernization.

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Chapter 4: Modernization and Kurdish Nationalism

Introduction

The use of past to legitimize present conflicts is notoriously a constitutive element in nationalist discourse and struggle. Contemporary historical arguments about the origins of Kurdish nationalism follow a similar theoretical pattern. They are primarily political discourses, tracing the origins and development of the Kurdish nation and national identity in order to substantiate specific political positions. They contain different conceptions of the Kurdish nation and national identity and hence different notions of political authority, legitimacy and the conditions of their existence and realization.

These conceptions, be they modern, primordial, or ethno-symbolist, are associated with specific political processes and practices in contemporary Kurdish history. They merit attention and evaluation despite the historical inadequacies and theoretical confusions. Although historical commentary on the origins of Kurdish nationalism is indispensable to most contemporary writing on Kurdish politics and culture, serious scholarship on the subject is scarce. Studies of Kurdish nationalism have so far been untouched by theoretical concern about origins. This chapter is an attempt to address this need.

To test a variety of perspectives is beyond the reach of this project; however, we

can focus on one: the modernist conception. By focusing on three perspectives of

modernist theory, namely economic, political, and socio-cultural, we shall see if

modernization diminished or promoted Kurdish nationalism. Finding that the

modernization process in the Turkish Republic has diminished calls for Kurdish

separatism will support modernist theory.

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To this end, this chapter will start with a survey of Kurdish nationalism and its development starting with the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century throughout the modern history of the Turkish Republic. After this review of Kurdish nationalism, I will analyze the effects of the modernization project in Turkey from three different perspectives, economic, political, and socio-cultural.

Review of Kurdish Identity and Nationalism

I- The Kurds and the evolution of Kurdish Identity This section examines the formation of the idea and consciousness of Kurdishness in the relatively limited historical works from the late sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. First, I will summarize particular remarks on the Kurdish identity. Then discussion of the status of Kurds in the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth until late nineteenth century will follow. This section will then engage in further inquiry of Kurdishness in more detail in the twentieth century.

Identity

It is not the intent of this chapter to overload the reader with much early history of

Kurds, but some observations are worth making since they indicate many of the characteristics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Kurdish society is generally presented as a conglomeration of tribal, nomadic, pastoral, and non-urban formations. By the sixteenth century, the Kurds were living in diverse social formations that may be identified as tribal and nomadic, settled agrarian and urban. Until the mid nineteenth

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century the Kurdish region in eastern Anatolia looked like a mosaic of principalities, tribes, towns and cities. The pre-industrial modes of transportation together with a predominantly mountainous geography constrained the movement of population. Even more limiting was the socio-economic system which tied the peasants to the land although agriculture practiced by tribes allowed for regular movement between summer and winter pastures. Trade within the region and outside was practiced on a limited scale.

Hassanpour regards the diversity of dialects, costumes, architecture, and other cultural practices as remarkable. 1 Therefore we must also note that the formation Kurdish identity occurred under conditions of extensive social, economic, cultural and geographical dispersion.

By Kurdish identity, I mean simply the feeling and idea of belonging to a collective entity called ‘Kurd’. This identification transcends affiliation with one’s family, , village, region, religion or dialect. For instance, Kurds do not have a single common language. The most widely spoken Kurdish dialects are Kurmanci and Soranci. 2

Kurmanci is spoken predominantly in Turkey, Syria, and the Caucasus, as well as by some Iranian Kurds. Soranci is spoken mostly by Iraqi and Iranian Kurds. 3 The Kurdish language(s) belong to the Indo-European language family. They have been influenced by contact with modern languages and at times evolved accordingly, for example Kurdish in

Turkey contains some Turkish words. 4 Similarly the Kurds do not share a common

1 Hassanpour, A. 2003 “The Making of Kurdish Identity: Pre-20 th Century Historical and Literary Sources” in Abbas Vali (ed.) Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism . CA: Mazda Publishers, pp. 106-162. 2 Some scholars regard the different forms of Kurdish as separate languages rather than dialects; thus they are not mutually intelligible. See Bullock, J. and Morris, H. 1992 No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds , Oxford: Oxford University Press. In contrast, this claim objected by Yildiz, K. 2005 The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights , Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, p. 4. 3 Yildiz, K. 2004 The Kurds in Iraq: Past, Present and Future , London: Pluto Press, p. 8. 4 Information retrieved on Cultureorientation.net, ‘Language Issues, Iraqi Kurds: Their History and Culture, Refugee Fact Sheet No. 13’ < www.cultureorientation.net/kurds/ktoc.html >.

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religion. Most are Sunni Muslims who converted between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries and are part of the Shafi’i school of Islam. 5 Many of Iran’s Kurds are Shi’ite. 6

Other Kurds follow Alevism 7, an unorthodox form of Shi’ite Islam, as well as the

indigenous Kurdish faith of Yezidism. 8 There are minor communities of Kurdish ,

Christians, and Baha’is. Therefore, Kurdishness today is made up of a cluster of

identities; linguistic, political, cultural, religious, territorial and for some Kurds in the

twentieth century, racial.

II- The Kurds in the Ottoman Empire (16 th – late 19 th century) By the mid-sixteenth century the Kurds were governing, effectively over much of their

territory. The Ottoman state was not in a position to extend its direct rule over Kurdish

regions, and had to accept the presence of Kurdish emirates or principalities, which were

semi-independent or autonomous entities. 9

The Ottoman Empire, despite its nomadic tribal origins managed to create a highly centralized form of government with a civic and formal culture. It developed a standing army, very large and relatively effective bureaucracy 10 , and incorporated Sunni

5 For more info on Shafi’i Islam and the Kurds, see van Bruinessen, M. 1999 The Kurds and Islam . Working Paper no. 13, Islamic Area Studies Project, Tokyo, Japan. 6 A word delivered from the expression Shi’at Ali, which “the partisans of Ali” 7 For more info see Mehrdad R. Izady “Alevism” (Harvard University), 8 For more info on the origins and beliefs of Yezidism see 9 Similarly Safavid state had failed to establish a direct presence over Kurds. 10 For more detailed discussion of bureaucratic organization in Ottoman Empire see, Howard, D.A. 1993 “Central and Provincial Administrative Interaction in Timar Bestowals in the Early Seventeenth Century”, in Caesar E. Farah (ed.) Decision making and change in the Ottoman Empire , MO: Thomas Jefferson University Press at Northeast Missouri State University, pp. 81-89.

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institutions within the establishment. 11 Having initially established its dominance in western Anatolia and Thrace, it began to turn its attention eastwards, where unruly tribes gave increasing cause for concern. These tribes resented and resisted attempts to settle, control and tax them. To the further east, another regional power was emerging in the 16 th century: Safavid Dynasty. The disputes between the Ottoman Anatolia and Safavid Persia had a vital impact on Kurds, who now became the border march between two empires.

McDowall argues, Kurdish chiefs had the “unenviable task of choosing between which empire it was wisest to recognize, balancing a desire for maximal freedom from government interference against the local benefit of formal state endorsement of their authority”. 12 The majority of the Kurdish leaders willingly accepted an arrangement that

gave them the benefit of Ottoman recognition and confirmation of their relatively

independent status under Yavuz Sultan Selim. In return they established an armed and

mounted men to serve the Ottoman Empire when called upon to do so.

By this action the Ottomans created a formalized quasi-feudal system. The

Kurdish emirates enjoyed their semi-autonomous status until the early nineteenth century.

In practice such autonomy amounted to hereditary, large scale land tenure and exemption

from centralized taxation. 13 In that sense, the economic and political order in the Kurdish

region, unlike in imperial territories closer to Istanbul, displayed feudal characteristics. 14

11 For detailed account of state formation in Ottoman Empire see Abou-El-Haj, R. A. 2005 Formation of the Modern State, the Ottoman Empire, sixteenth to eighteenth centuries , New York: Syracuse University Press. 12 McDowall, D. 2000 A Modern History of the Kurds , NY: I.B. Tauris Publishers, p. 26. 13 See Nazan, K. 1993 “The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire”, in Gerard Chaliand (ed.), A People without a country , New York: Olive Branch Press, pp. 14- 15. 14 Istanbul traditionally favored state-owned small-scale land tenure with an independent peasantry. Hereditary land tenure with landlords escaping central taxation was unusual because the formation of a feudal class subjecting the peasantry was regarded as the most serious threat to central authority. For a summary of land and public administration in the Ottoman Empire see Inalcik, H. 1977 “Centralization and

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But the relationship between Istanbul and its Kurdish periphery was far from perfect.

Since the system lasted well into the nineteenth century, it is tempting to consider it a successful political arrangement. In practice neither side was satisfied. Both Istanbul and

Kurds pushed for greater control whenever they thought they had the power to achieve it.

Declining Imperial Power

The second half of the eighteenth century is the period when the first serious inroads

formed into the Ottoman Empire: the empire was beginning to crumble on the fringes.

Europe’s technological superiority, particularly in the military could no longer be denied.

It was also clear that the Europeans, notably the Dutch, British and French were building

successful merchant enterprises in the eastern Mediterranean. The major impact of the

century old decline of imperial power was that all over the empire central government

was increasingly forced to recognize the power of tribal chiefs and provincial notables

and to confirm their status.

The decline came to a halt during the reign of Mahmud II (1809-1839). Mahmud

II believed the total collapse of the empire could only be avoided with re-centralization of

the tax system and reorganization of the army. Under his rule, the unruly Janissary corps

was finally eradicated. Soon the newly formed Ottoman army managed to suppress the

powerful tribes of Anatolia and Balkans. However, despite such military and

administrative re-centralization, the son of the powerful governor of Egypt Muhammet

Ali humiliated the new Ottoman army, which revealed the weakness of the empire in

Decentralization in Ottoman Administration” in Naff, T. and Owens, R. (eds.) Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History , Chicago: Southern Illinois Press.

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1832. 15 This unprecedented challenge, coming from a distant Muslim land alarmed the

center about the necessity of bringing the fringes of the empire under its direct

authority. 16

Faced with occasional Kurdish insurrections inspired by the Egyptian victory, the suppression of the Kurdish emirates became a political priority for the central administration. Starting in the 1830s, the Kurdish emirs who were increasingly perceived as subversive rulers were targeted for elimination.17 By the 1850s the Ottoman forces had

managed to eradicate most of the Kurdish emirates. 18

Eradication of the emirates also destroyed the dominant political-administrative organization in Kurdish territories. Emirs occupied a critical link which loosely united

Kurdish tribes into confederations through their ability to mediate between tribes. In their absence, appointed regional governors proved unable to restore law and order. In this new framework, religious leaders; sheiks , assumed greater political influence in the region. The Kurdish sheiks, Bruinessen argues, were “the only figures whose influence exceeded the limits of tribes”. 19 Consequently, the second half of the nineteenth century,

the Kurdish territories of the Ottoman Empire witnessed the political rise of the Kurdish

sheiks, who expanded their religious orders such as the Nakshibendi and the Kadiri

networks. They became capable of mobilizing and leading the Kurdish resistance against

15 Mohammed Ali Seized Syria and proceeded to cross Anatolia, sweeping Ottoman resistance aside. He was only persuaded to withdraw to Syria by the European powers. Ortayli, I. 1983 Imparatorlugun en Uzun Yuzyili [The Empire’s longest century] Istanbul: Hil Yayinlari, pp. 44-45. 16 Ibid., p. 45. 17 McDowall, D. A modern history of the Kurds , pp. 42-44 18 Some powerful Kurdish emirs, such as Bedir Khan brought to Istanbul for negotiations. Due to increasing power struggle in the region some Kurdish warlords also managed to play the Ottomans, Persians, and British consuls against each other, though with limited success. See Olson, R. 1989 The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, and the Sheik Said Rebellion , Austin: University of Texas Press, pp. 2- 3. 19 Van Bruinessen, M. 1992 K urtler arasinda bir siyasi protesto araci olarak Naksibendi tarikati [Nakshibendi order as a tool for political protest among Kurds], Istanbul: Iletisim, p. 108.

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the Ottoman authority. Among those, one worth a further note: the scale and strength of the uprising masterminded by Sheik Ubeydullah in 1880 illustrated the newfound political power of the Kurdish sheiks. Olson argues that the Sheik Ubeydullah’s revolt displayed the first symptoms of ethnic nationalism disguised in a religiously motivated

Nakshibendi rhetoric. 20

The political ascendance of sheiks among Kurds coincided with the pan-Islamist

reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1908). Abdulhamid intended to maintain Ottoman

territorial integrity by creating a new Islamic-Imperial orientation. His pan-Islamism

played a crucial role in the reconciliation of Ottoman and Kurdish interests. It also

enabled their relationship to focus not only on their common religion but also on their

common enemy: Armenian nationalists.

As part of his pan-Islamist project Abdulhamid opened the gates of the palace to

certain Kurdish political and religious leaders. 21 Sultan Abdulhamid also created the

Hamidiye regiments: a Kurdish cavalry force, armed and trained by the Ottoman government. 22 Hamidiye units played a significant role in terrorizing the Armenian population of eastern Anatolia and tightened the Sultan’s control over disobedient Alevi

Kurdish tribes. 23

The closing years of the nineteenth century were characterized by the suppression of political opposition and censorship of the press. Abdulhamid, abrogated the constitution and his authoritarian style forced the opposition to go underground and

20 Olson, R. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, and the Sheik Said Rebellion , p. 4-9. 21 For example, Bahri Bey, Bedhir Khan’s son became an aid to the Sultan, and Sheik Abdulkadir, Ubeydullah’s son became the president of the Ottoman Senate in 1908. See Nazan, K. “The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire”, p. 25. 22 This also resembles the use of Scottish kilt and pipe and Scottish regiments by British Army during late seventeenth century. 23 McDowall, D. A modern history of the Kurds , pp. 59-60.

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organize in the form of secret societies. Despite the repressive regime, Istanbul, at the turn of the century, was a city prone to nationalist and revolutionary agitation, which will be elaborated further in the section following an assessment of Kurdish nationalism from the sixteenth until the twentieth century.

Assessment (16 th - 19 th centuries)

So far I have sketched the formation of the idea, consciousness, or identity of

Kurdishness in the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries and attempts to establish the distinctness of Kurds as a people with a claim to sovereign rule. 24 By the late seventeenth century, the Kurds were clearly distinguished from the two ruling peoples, the Turks and the Persians, and the religiously and linguistically dominant Arabs. This Kurdish awareness, very much similar to the Scottish case, included a cluster of distinctions. First, the Kurds had a history of self rule, which distinguish them from tribes. Second, a region and space with its own name, , recognized as such by the Kurds and their adversaries, i.e. Ottoman and Iranian rulers. 25 Third, Kurds had a language that could act

24 Sovereignty is a contested concept. According to Falk, “there is little neutral ground when it comes to sovereignty”. Moreover “in origins and evolution, sovereignty or a Western concept and was not shared by other regions until twentieth century” Richard Falk, 1993 “Sovereignty”, in Joel Krieger (ed.) The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World , New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 852-854. In the context of the feudal order of Kurdish territory, I use it in the sense of a state to remain independent. 25 The territory, or at least major part of it had been called by non-Kurds, Kurdistan . The first cartographic appearance of Kurdistan was in Ali Kashghari’s map of 1076. Also known in Turkish as Kasgarli Mahmut- (or Mahmut from Kasgar), was known as the first Turkish cartographer, as well as a philologist and ethnographer. He had identified the territory as the “Land of the Kurds”. Reproduction of his map can be found in Chaliand, G. and J. P. Rageau 1983 A Strategic Atlas: Comparative Geopolitics of the World’s Powers , translated by T. Berrett, London: Harper Collins, p. 62. The term Kurdistan refers to more than a mere geographical area, though, and also denotes the culture of the people who inhabit the lands. Regimes in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have been extremely reticent about acknowledging the presence of Kurds within their borders. However, there is no doubt that there exist an area pre-dominantly Kurdish inhabited.

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as ‘pen’ and ‘sword’ of sovereign rule. 26 Fourth, Kurds had a demand for independence

from Ottoman and Iranian rule and the formation of a Kurdish monarchical state.

These claims continued in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, though during

this time the ideas on Kurdish identity, according to Hassanpour can best be regarded as

‘feudal nationalism’. 27 He uses the term ‘feudal nationalism’ to describe pre-modern

Kurdish identity when the national movement was led primarily by the feudal elements.

The Kurdish princes revolted against the Turkish and Persian powers with an aim to protect their autonomous hereditary rule. To that end they fought each other and sided with one of the powers against the other. Therefore the resistance to foreign domination was led by princes who defended their own territory, rather than the whole or the major parts of Kurdish population. This sort of nationalism is labeled as ‘feudal’ and should be distinguished from the modern middle class nationalism of the twentieth century. 28

Related with ‘feudal nationalism’ one must also note that during the decline of the

Ottoman Empire Kurdish nationalism and separatism did not represent a major threat. As

mentioned earlier, although Kurds were aware of their distinctiveness, a sense of Kurdish

unity and national identity developed much later compared to Turkish, Persian and Arab

nationalism. 29 In explaining the absence of Kurdish statehood and the late emergence of

26 The metaphor of ‘pen’ and ‘sword’ signifies a dividing line between tribes and sovereign peoples and emphasizes the interconnection between written language and state power. According to Hassanpour, this connection is prominent in pre-modern intellectual and political thought, especially in Kurdish literary discourse in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, “The Making of Kurdish Identity: Pre-20 th Century Historical and Literary Sources”, p. 118. 27 Hassanpour, A., “The Making of Kurdish Identity: Pre-20 th Century Historical and Literary Sources”, p. 138. 28 Hassanpour argues that the ideas of Haji Qadir Koyi (1817-1897) represents a rupture in ‘feudal nationalism’ since Koyi’s writings strongly reacted against the traditional aristocratic leaders and clergy, and called for the formation of a Kurdish state, advocated the use of one unified Kurdish language and literature and encouraged the adoption of modern secular education, “The Making of Kurdish Identity: Pre- 20 th Century Historical and Literary Sources”, pp. 131-137. 29 The awareness of Kurdish ethnicity, which is older than Kurdish nationalism encompassed only the courts and the tribes and excluded subjected peasantry and lower urban strata, see Martin Van Bruinessen

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Kurdish nationalism, most of the academic literature primarily refers to deeply- rooted tribal rivalries in Kurdish societies and the mountainous geography of the region. 30 To this list, one can also add the partition of Kurdish provinces between Safavid and

Ottoman empires. Both powers practiced “divide and rule” policies on their Kurdish territories successfully.

Beyond tribal rivalries and imperial manipulation Kurds remain divided along linguistic and religious (sectarian) lines. As Taspinar notes, the historical absence of a centralized Kurdish state contributed to the persistence of diverse Kurdish dialects. 31 In

addition to linguistic fragmentation, the Sunni- Shiite cleavage has always played a

divisive role on the sectarian front. As mentioned earlier about 75-80 per cent of Kurds

are Sunni Muslims, there is a sizeable Alevi and Shiite minority as well as smaller

percentages of Yezidi, Christian and Jewish Kurds. 32 Given these factors dividing

Kurdish society, the Kurdish province remained fragmented and presented no major

military challenge to Ottoman sovereignty until the end of the nineteenth century.

The turning point for the Kurdish political identity took place at the turn of the

twentieth century.

(1992) “Kurdish Society, Ethnicity and Nationalism”, in Philip G. Keyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (eds.) The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview , London and New York: Routledge, pp. 45-47. 30 See McDowall, D. A modern history of the Kurds , pp. 5-17, van Bruinessen, M., “Kurdish Society, Ethnicity and Nationalism”, pp. 10-22, Olson, R., The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, and the Sheik Said Rebellion, pp. 7-12. 31 Taspinar, O. 2005 Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey, Kemalist Identity in Transition , New York and London: Routledge, p. 68. 32 Van Bruinessen, M. “Kurdish Society, Ethnicity and Nationalism”, pp. 92- 93.

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III- 1900-1923 emergence of Kurdish intelligentsia and Young Turks It was essentially under the authoritarian regime of Abdulhamid that a Kurdish intelligentsia emerged as a politically active group. Young Kurdish patriots were involved in journalism and politics and launched cultural associations and nationalist journals. For instance, Mithat Bedir Khan of the famous Badir Khan dynasty began publishing the first Kurdish language journal Kurdistan . The journal, which became a vocal platform of Kurdish nationalism was banned in 1902 only to reappear in Geneva, and then in London. In many ways, Kurdish patriots followed the same patterns of

Turkish nationalists opposing Abdulhamid’s absolutism.

There were also a substantial number of Kurdish students who refused to adopt ethnic Kurdish nationalism as a political ideology. They joined constitutionalist opposition movements in Istanbul and some even became the founding members of the

Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The Committee, whose members came to be known as the “Young Turks” during their exile in Europe, was the most effective and widely based opposition movement against the Abdulhamid regime. Those who were more inclined toward Kurdish nationalism but were still involved with the Young Turk movement but had a sympathy for the “decentralist and liberal” wing of the CPU rather than the “Turkish nationalist” nucleus. 33 What these patriotic Kurds envisioned was a decentralized Ottoman confederacy with an autonomous Kurdistan. 34

The centralist-nationalist wing of the CUP firmly established its political power

after their 1908 military coup and liberal and decentralist faction was sidelined. As the

33 This division within the Young Turk movement became more apparent in the aftermath of the Paris Congress in 1902. See Kutlay, Naci 1992 “Ittihad Terakki ve Kurtler” (The CUP and the Kurds), Ankara: Baybun Yayinlari, p. 45. 34 Kutlay, N. (1992), pp. 110-115.

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imperial grip on the fringes continued to loose its strength, 35 the Unionist government

banned all association based on ethnicity. As a result, most ethnically based associations,

including one formed by Kurdish students called Hevi (Hope), were forced underground. 36 This also pushed the Kurdish movement to become increasingly

nationalistic. Kurdish activists began setting up nationalist associations in the urban

centers of eastern provinces.

Other CUP policies aimed at asserting the state power such as centralized taxation

and conscription encountered more difficulty in the Kurdish populated regions. Such

measures triggered insurrection with an increasingly nationalistic tone. Between 1912-

1914, a number of Kurdish revolts occurred in eastern Anatolia, which also contributed to

the worsening of military conditions and Ottoman disintegration during World War I.

By the end of WW I, Britain was victorious and given the presence of its troops in

the region, the British government was in a position to determine the future of Kurds. In

order to avoid involvement in Kurdish tribal politics, the British Foreign Office wanted to

let Kurds establish a state of their own which would also serve as a buffer zone between

the British mandate in Iraq and the Turkish territories. 37 This was also in line with the

Wilsonian principle of self determination. Thus, the Sevres Treaty signed between the

Allies and the last Ottoman government in 1920 granted independence to Armenia and

autonomy to Kurdistan. 38

35 Bulgaria declared her independence, Albanian revolt in Kosovo started and annexed Bosnia- Herzegovina in 1910. 36 Kutlay, N. Ittihad Terakki ve Kurtler, p. 123. 37 McDowall, D. A modern History of the Kurds, pp. 120-121. 38 Articles 62 and 64 of the Sevres Treaty envisioned the formation of Kurdish entity which will vote for complete independence after one year. See Paul C. Helmreich 1974 From Paris to Sevres: The Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919- 1920, Columbus: Ohio University Press, pp. 24- 25.

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Yet, a united Kurdish leadership, as a reliable counterpart in negotiations remained elusive. In Istanbul, Olson summarizes three strands of Kurdish nationalists: those who favored a British mandate in Kurdistan, those who supported a confederacy with the Ottomans and a small group insisting on complete independence. 39 However

these preferences remained irrelevant to factors dividing Kurdish territories. In addition

to the divisive issues outlined above, tribal rivalries and territorial conflicts had only

worsened throughout the war.

At the time what united and mobilized Kurds and other minorities in Anatolia was

Mustafa Kemal’s pragmatic appeal to religious solidarity during the War of

Independence (1919-1922). At the first regional congress of the Independence War, in

Erzurum, 56 delegates, 22 of whom were Kurdish, gathered under the leadership of

Mustafa Kemal and decided to fight against the formation of Armenian and Greek states

in Anatolia. 40 Also, a total number of 74 deputies represented the Kurdish regions of southeast Anatolia in the Grand National Assembly, the parliamentary body of the

Ankara government. 41

By mid- 1922, the Kemalist resistance had won a decisive victory against the

Greek army forcing it out of western Anatolia. Therefore, the Ankara government earned

a position to negotiate a new peace treaty at Lausanne. After Mustafa Kemal abolished

39 Olson, R. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, and the Sheik Said Rebellion pp. 125- 128. This situation also summarized by British High Commissioner in Istanbul “The Kurds are like a rainbow of every shade and color. There exist much doubt whether independence or autonomy of Kurdistan is a proposition at all and in any case no such as ‘Kurdish opinion’ in the sense of coherent public opinion can be said to exist…few [Kurds] are looking higher than tribal aghast or religious Sheiks amongst whom there is little common ground…[The] few educated Kurds outside Kurdistan holding separatist ideas are very apt to exaggerate their own influence and importance”. FO 371/ ro68, de Robeck to Lord Curzon (Secretary of Foreign Office), Istanbul, 19 March 1920. Cited in McDowall, D. A modern history of the Kurds , p. 132. 40 One can access detailed information on participants and outcomes of the Erzurum Kongresi on Turkish Grand National Assembly’s website http://www.tbmm.gov.tr. 41 The first Grand National Assembly had 473 deputies. With 74 deputies, the highest proportion of deputies came from the Southeast. See Ahmet Demirel (1993) “[Government and Opposition the first Grand National Assembly]”, Istanbul: Iletisim, p. 82.

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the Sultanate and declared the new Turkish Republic, the Ankara delegation sent to

Lausanne became the only legitimate representative of the country. Throughout the negotiations in Lausanne, the Kurdish issue was discussed in relation to the future of the oil rich Mosul province. 42 On the contrary to the British argument, Ankara based its

territorial claim over the province on the unity of Turks and Kurds as one nation. Lord

Curzon, head of the British delegation argued that the Kurds, with their own history,

customs and manners, ought to be an autonomous “race”. On the other hand, the Ankara

delegation, acknowledging that Turks and Kurds spoke different languages, held that they

were not significantly different and formed a single bloc from the standpoint of race, faith

and customs. Ismet Inonu, head of the Turkish delegation, also underlined the fact that

Kurdish representatives sat alongside Turks in the Grand National Assembly and stressed

the necessity of recognizing the Ankara government as the government of both the Turks

and Kurds.

The Treaty of Lausanne dropped all provisions of the Sevres Treaty regarding the

formation of autonomous Kurdistan. The status and rights of Turkey’s minorities came to

be based on religion rather than ethnicity. Therefore, the new Turkish republic did not

recognize any of the Muslim ethnic groups constituting the Republic as a minority. Only

the Jews, Armenian, and Greek communities came to be considered as official minorities.

The newly born Turkish state refused the multicultural character of the Ottoman era and

embarked on a nationalist drive for homogeneity.

The Turkish Nation-State and the Kurds

42 Othman, A. 1997 “The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923”, Middle Eastern Studies , Vol. 33, No3, 521- 534.

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The major Kemalist mission of the Turkish state can be summarized as homogenization and secularization of an ethnically mixed and Muslim Anatolian society.

This political project aiming to replace Islamic identity of the Ottoman Empire with

Turkish nationalism and radical secularism caused a fierce opposition in the Kurdish provinces. Kurds were simply different than other Muslim minorities in the Anatolian heartland who came from the Balkans and Caucasus escaping from Bulgarian, Serbian, and . Taspinar points to this difference, “while the integration and assimilation of Balkan and Caucasian Muslims within the Turkish nation-state was voluntary, the Kurdish story of assimilation was one of resistance, war and repression”. 43

Moreover, as noted in previous sections, the Kurds had never really experienced

centralized authority. Under the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds managed to resist imposition

of the economic and political supremacy of Istanbul, which relied traditionally on the

Caliphate 44 or the Armenian common enemy to maintain imperial loyalty. In the absence

of both the Caliphate and the Armenian threat the republican regime in Ankara was

unwilling to tolerate regional liberties granted to Kurds earlier. Under the new

circumstances, in a region with no affinity with centralized state functions, such as

taxation, land registration, police force, standardized education, the military conflict

between the new government and the Kurdish tribes was inevitable. For the Kurdish

society, Van Bruinessen argues, “more foreign even than the concept of the nation was

that of nation-state” 45 . Therefore, the main motive for the Kurdish rebellions against the

Ankara government during the interwar years was twofold. First, as mentioned earlier,

43 Taspinar, O. Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey, p. 78 44 The Sultan accepted as the successor of the Muhammed and the leader of the community of Islam. The last caliphate was the Ottoman dynasty and abolished by Mustafa Kemal in 1924. 45 Van Bruinessen, M. 1992 Agha, Shaikh and State London: Zed Books, p. 269

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they were ethno-religious reactions to the secular nationalism of the Turkish Republic.

Second, they were also resisting to the efforts of state-building.

Turkish nationalism generated its mirror image as Kurdish dissidents started joining nationalist movements such as Azadi (Freedom) in eastern Anatolia. Even some of the assimilated Kurdish members of the Ottoman political and military establishment had a hard time remaining loyal to the new Turkish Republic. 46 It is very telling and significant that out of the 18 anti-Ankara resurrections between 1924 and 1938, 17 were of Kurdish origin. 47

The most significant of the Kurdish rebellions was the one led by Sheik Said. The

origins may be traced back to anti-secular and anti-Turkish agitation by the Azadi

movement. Yet despite the widespread Kurdish discontent and religious mobilization due

to the abolition of the Caliphate, the majority of Kurdish tribes once again remained

divided. This fragmentation among Kurdish tribes was also true for all other ethno-

religious Kurdish rebellions of the next 15 years.

The Kemalist leadership perceived the Sheik Said rebellion as a counter-

revolution which threatened the unity of the Republic. In response, the Republican

People’s Party [Cumhuriyetci Halk Partisi (CHP)] founded by Mustafa Kemal resorted to

dictatorial measures. The opposition Progressive Republican Party [Terakkiperver

Cumhuriyet Firkasi (TCF)] was closed on the grounds that it instigated anti-government

46 The Azadi movement established by Kurdish nationalists, ex-officers of the Ottoman army and estranged Kurdish head of tribes. The movement also included members of the Grand National Assembly who failed to be elected in the 1923 elections since they were denied the right to return to their constituencies, McDowall, D. A modern history of the Kurds , p. 191. 47 Tuncay, Mete 1981 Turkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek-Parti yonetiminin kurulmasi [ The formation of the single-party regime in Turkey], Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, p. 136.

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activities in Anatolian provinces with the ultimate objective of bringing back the

Caliphate. 48

The religious dimension of Kurdish discontent only strengthened Ankara’s determination to crush all kinds of Islamist opposition. Shortly after the Sheik Said uprising, the government banned all Sufi brotherhood, shrines, lodges and schools. The government issued the ‘Law for the Maintenance of Order’ and declared a martial law enforced by ‘Independence Tribunals’. 49 Equipped with such powers, Ankara’s

secularization drive from the latinization of the alphabet to the ban of traditional

headdress reached an even more radical stage. By 1928, the reference to Islam as the

official religion of the Turkish Republic was removed from the Constitution.

Assessment 1900- 1938

It is important to note that in the eyes of Turkey’s Kemalist political establishment, the

Kurdish rebellions of the 1920s and 1930s, and especially the Sheik Said rebellion, came

to be remembered as products of British agitation. The fact that the Turkish government

had continuing territorial claims over the Mosul province, gives some undocumented

credibility to the view that British forces instigated the Kurdish rebellions. Even the

United States, Turkey’s closest NATO ally is not immune from Turkey’s suspicions. This

was clearly illustrated in March 2003 when Turkey refused American soldiers on

Anatolian soil for the invasion of Iraq. Before this episode, similar concerns about

American intention to create a Kurdish state had been voiced. What motivated such

concerns about Iraq is the fact that a Kurdish federation in this country might entice

48 Tuncay, M. Turkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek-Parti yonetiminin kurulmasi , p. 95. 49 Ibid., 105-107

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Turkey’s own Kurds. With the nineteenth century Ottoman disintegration in mind, such problems have aggravated Turkey’s own fear of disintegration and turned issues such as

Kurdish political and cultural rights into a zero-sum game of national survival.

Any effort to understand the survivalist logic of the Turkish government should take into consideration the traumatic effect that the Kurdish uprising had on the nation- state between 1924 and 1938. The heavy handed suppression of the Kurdish rebellions made it clear that the Turkish Republic would tolerate no ethnic identity other than a

Turkish one for its citizens. Accordingly the nation-state denied officially the existence of

Kurds as a separate ethnic group. The use of Kurdish language and any reference to

Kurdish ethnic identity was prohibited.

The Kemalist formulation of Turkish nationalism lacked an elaborate ethnic definition of ‘Turkishness’. Instead, Mustafa Kemal wanted to define the fundamental elements of the Turkish nation in terms of a “territorial, linguistic and political unity strengthened by a sense of common roots, morals, and history. 50 Although the reference to common lineage and roots can be interpreted as having ethnic-racial implications,

Mustafa Kemal’s popular saying “Happy is whoever says ‘I am Turkish’” seems to prioritize a personal identification with ‘Turkishness’. In that sense, ‘becoming Turkish’ always remained an option for the Kurds, or any other non-Turkish Muslim ethnic group.

The authoritarian nature of the regime gained an ethnic character whenever the

Turkish nation-state encountered active armed resistance. Especially the Settlement Law of 1934 was the high point of the republican assimilation program. The Settlement Law ordered the deportation of dissident tribes and sheiks to Western Anatolia as part of the

50 Tezcan, Nurhan 1989 Ataturk’ un yazdigi yurttaslik bilgileri [Ataturk’s writings on Citizenship], Istanbul: Yurt Yayinlari, p. 20

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assimilation program, which created only more turmoil in the Kurdish provinces. The law threatened previously loyal Kurdish tribes and contributed to a growing Kurdish ethnic awareness. 51 The policy of created a vicious cycle of repression, which finally came to an end with the transition to multiparty politics after 1945. By that time, most of the Kurdish tribes had also realized that armed resistance against Ankara led them nowhere.

Consequently, it was the very repression Turkish state used against Kurds ended up kindling the politicization of Kurdish ethnicity. Milton Esman’s view on this issue comes to mind here: “Where the state has been created or captured by a particular ethnic community and operates as an agent of that community, that state becomes a party to ethnic conflicts.” 52 Therefore, the modernization process in Turkey defined the changing

relationship of Kurdish identity to its “others”. That Kurdish culture and language has a

centuries old history and continues to prove itself resilient to state repression, leaving

Kurdish nationalist movements an important base from which to build up.

IV- Post WW II: The Multiparty Era and the development of Kurdish nationalism The transition from a single to a multi-party system with competitive elections increased

popular participation in Turkey. The participation rates in the elections during 1950s in

the provinces where more than 15 per cent of the population declared their mother tongue

to be Kurdish, was high (Table 4. 1). Ozbudun attributed this to the role of feudal and

51 Besikci, Ismail 1976 Zorunlu Gocler Uzerine [On forced deportations], Istanbul: Dicle Yayinlari, pp. 5- 9. 52 Esman, M. J. Ethnic Politics , p. 217.

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tribal leaders in Kurdish populated areas who made people vote. 53 According to

Ozbudun, throughout the 1930s and 40s the governing elite had been able to work with many rural notables. Local interests were recognized and in return reforms promoted by the centre were supported by these notables. 54 In the Kurdish populated areas this alliance between the CHP and the local elite continued in the 1950 election. In the province of

Hakkari the CHP received 100 per cent of the votes. The Democrat Party [Demokrat Parti

(DP)] was less successful in Kurdish populated provinces. According to Van Bruinessen, the DP was more successful in the following election in 1954 because of the relaxation of forced assimilation policies by the government. 55

Table 4.1 Average participation rates and distribution of votes by political parties in National elections in percentages (%)

Election Year Participation CHP DP Others rate 1950 country average 89.3 39.9 53.3 6.8 Ave. for 15 provinces 87.7 53.4 43.7 2.9

1954 country average 88.6 34.8 56.6 8.6 Ave. for 15 provinces 89.5 36.4 52.8 10.6

1957 country average 76.6 40.6 47.3 12.1 Ave. for 15 provinces 77.9 45.3 45.5 6.3

Source: Milletvekili: Genel ve Cumhuriyet Senatosu Uyeleri Secimi Sonuclari , 5 Haziran 1977 (Ankara Basbakanlik, Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu [DIE], 1977, and 1965 Genel Nufus Sayimi (Ankara: DIE, 1969) Note : the 15 provinces are those more than 15 per cent of the population declared during the 1965 national census that their mother tongue was Kurdish.

53 Ozbudun, E. 1970 “Established Revolution versus Unfinished Revolution: Contrasting Patterns of Democratization in and Turkey” in S.P. Huntington and C.H. Moore (eds.) Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society , New York: Basic Books, pp. 380- 405. 54 Ibid. 55 Van Bruinessen M., Agha, Shaikh and State , p. 340

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Serious economic problems and political instability in Turkey resulted in the military intervention of 1960. The military had been disturbed by the liberalization that had taken place under the DP, especially in the eastern parts of the country. As a result,

55 Kurdish notables ( aghas ) of whom 54 were members of the DP were arrested and deported to western Turkey. Ironically, the 1961 constitution adopted after the military coup has been considered as the most liberal constitution Turkey has ever produced. Van

Bruinessen argues that the liberal nature of the 1961 constitution prevented the military from introducing the assimilation and resettlement policies of the single-party era. 56 The

constitution gave people more civil rights, the universities greater autonomy, and

permitted students to organize their own associations. 57 In this environment some Kurds began to be increasingly aware of their ethnicity.

The political participation patterns of the 1950s to a large extent persisted during the 1960s. However, there were indications of an increasing awareness of Kurdish ethnicity in voting behavior. The New Turkey Party [Yeni Turkiye Partisi (YTP)], composed mostly of members of the local elite in the eastern parts of the country, received more than 30 per cent of the votes in 1961 in the east. With six ministers the

YTP was a member of the CHP-led coalition government between July 1962 and

November 1963. Under the YTP’s influence the government allowed the 55 notables to return to eastern Turkey.

The Turkish Worker’s Party [Turkiye Isci Partisi (TIP)] and the Reliance Party

[Guven Partisi (GP)] were two other small political parties that received votes in

56 Van Bruinessen, M., Agha, Shaikh and State , p. 341 57 Turkish Constitution of 1961 declares public freedom of expression (article 20), press freedom (article 23), the right to organize public meetings and demonstrations (article 24), and the right to form trade unions and associations (article 25). Also, by 1963 progressive interpretations of some articles had led to the granting of the right to strike and to make collective agreements.

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Kurdish- speaking areas. At its fourth party congress in 1970 the TIP discussed the

Kurdish problem and became the first legal party to recognize openly that “there is

Kurdish people living in eastern Turkey”. 58 The Marxist credential of TIP prevented it

from making inroads into rural areas, but during the 1965 and the 1969 elections the

highest percentage of its votes came from Diyarbakir and Tunceli, two provinces much

associated with Kurdish ethnicity. The TIP forced to close down shortly after March 1971

military ultimatum. 59

The growing awareness of the Kurdish identity has also manifested itself in

increased votes for the independent candidates. This trend was already evident in the

1950s as can be seen from the “Others” column in Table 4.1, which included independent

candidates. Unlike 1961, in the 1965 and the 1969 elections these candidates received a

substantial vote, especially in the Kurdish speaking areas. For instance, in south-eastern

Turkey in the 1969 elections independent candidates received 22.8 per cent of the votes

while on average for the country independent candidates picked up 5.6 per cent. In south-

eastern Turkey the independents constituted the second largest group in terms of

percentage of votes after the Justice Party [Adalet Partisi (AP)] (which took the place of

the DP after 1960), while CHP trailed fourth after the YTP. 60

In March 1971, Turkey has witnessed a military intervention for the second time.

Due to the rapid growth of legal and illegal pro-Marxist organizations, the army believed that civilians once again meddling dangerously with the democratization opportunities they have been presented with. Turkish Armed Forces overthrew the government, which

58 Balli Rafet (1992) “Kurt Dosyasi [Kurdish File]”, Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, p. 182. 59 Ahmad, F. 1981 The Turkish Experiment at Democracy, 1950-1975 , London: Hurst, p. 311. 60 Ozbudun, E. 1975 Turkiye de Sosyal Degisme ve Siyasal Katilma [Social change and Political Participation in Turkey] Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Hukuk Fakultesi Yayinlari, No. 363, p. 93.

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was considered to be a mainstream one. A state of emergency imposed, associations of all sorts were dissolved, the TIP was banned, the right to strike suspended, ongoing strikes ended and widespread arrests of politicians and activists took place. The Turkish army handed over power to the government formed following elections held in October 1973, as they had done on the earlier occasion.

CHP won the elections in 1973 under its charismatic and mildly leftist leader

Bulent Ecevit. Ecevit attracted much of the politicized Kurdish vote, particularly since his rival, Demirel , had made his position on Kurdish issue clear, “Anybody who does not

feel Turkish, or who feels unhappy in Turkey, is free to go elsewhere”. 61 Kurdish

populated areas divided between town, predominantly CHP, and country, where the

aghas and sheiks instructed their constituencies to support the Justice Party (AP) or the

National Salvation Party [Milli Selamet Partisi (MCP)], which was openly Islamic

revivalist. Ecevit failed to achieve a majority and formed a coalition with the MCP. It

was the first of ten administrations, only five of which enjoyed coalitional majorities in

the Assembly, before the army intervened again in September 1980.

Assessment (1946- 1980)

By the mid-1960s Kurdish politicians seemed content to operate within the Turkish leftwing and rightwing political parties. In other words, the newly emerging ideological cleavages appeared to have successfully co-opted Kurdish constituencies. 62 The second

61 Taspinar, O. Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey, p. 94. 62 The only exception was a clandestine and marginal party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, established by a small group of Kurdish nationalist who wanted to copy Mustafa Barzani’s nationalist movement in Iraq. Mustafa Barzani was the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).See Poulton, H. 1997 Top hat, grey wolf, and crescent New York: New York University Press, p. 210. [His son Massoud Barzani is the current leader of the KDP, and was elected as the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan region by the parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan in 2005.]

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part of the 1960s witnessed unprecedented ideological polarization mainly due to the

1961 constitution, which allowed greater political diversity. 1960s and 1970s were ideologically polarized decades in which Kemalism seemed to have lost its primary relevance in shaping the political climate of the country. In this new political environment, Kurdish-Turkish, Sunni-Alevi, and Islamist-Secular cleavages found relevant platforms of expressions within the rightist and the leftist political movements.

As a result, the Kurdish nationalist groups were able to avoid a confrontation with the

Kemalist regime guarded by the military establishment.

Moreover, the bipolar stability of the Cold War contributed to the development of

Turkey’s cleavages along the ideological rather than the ethnic lines. Throughout the

1960s and 1970s, the Turkish political spectrum, with growing bourgeoisie, proletariat and student population, evolved along patterns similar to the Western democracies.

However, the political modernization of this era did not translate into a relaxation of the

Kurdish taboo. Journals in the Kurdish language advocating cultural rights and the leftist

Kurdish movements remained illegal and severely punished. 63 Such restrictions, as

mentioned earlier were part of the Kemalist tradition denying the ethnic existence of a

Kurdish minority. Yet, these measures did not radicalize majority of the Kurds who

preferred operating within the national political establishment. 64

63 In January 1967, many bilingual Kurdish-Turkish left-wing journals were prohibited by decree and their editors arrested. See McDowall, D. A modern history of the Kurds , p. 405. 64 Those ethnically conscious Kurdish intellectuals, workers and students of the urban centers, who are left out of the national politics joined underground political movements defending the ideals of self- determination. For instance, the Federation of the Turkish Revolutionary Youth (Dev-Genc) supported the ‘struggle against and ’, for ideological independence and the liberation of peoples, including that of Kurds and Turks. But they were essentially Marxist activist who believed in the class struggle and socialist revolution. Therefore Kurdish nationalism was not on their revolutionary agenda. See Landau, J. 1974 Radical Politics in Modern Turkey , Leiden: Brill, p. 86.

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It was not until the end of 1970s an increasing number of Kurds became dissatisfied with the way their cause handled at the national level. For instance, the majority of the Turkish socialists still had a tendency to analyze the problem along

Marxist lines, and thus they considered the Kurdish nationalism as damaging and untimely. The Kurdish activists, on the other hand, increasingly wanted to be recognized as a separate ethnic group and a region capable of leading a proletarian revolution of their own. 65 The result was the multiplication of the radical Kurdish leftist groups. According

the Ismet Imset, there were 12 Marxist-Leninist Kurdish separatist groups active during

1970s, among which the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) would eventually become the

most radical and the most influential. 66

Van Bruinessen has pointed out that by the end of the 1970s the activities of the

Kurdish nationalists were ‘changing the self-perception of a considerable section of the

Kurds.’ 67 This development, together with the economic chaos, political instability and

street violence paved the way for the military intervention in September 1980. The

military coup was a major setback against the growth of Kurdish ethnicity and the

Kurdish nationalist ideas. In one case, a former CHP deputy and a cabinet minister,

Serafettin Elci was sentenced to a year of imprisonment by a military court for having

said that “There are Kurds in Turkey. I am a Kurd.”68

65 According to Gunter regional dynamics also convinced Turkish Kurds of the foolhardiness of relying on other powers in their own struggle for socialist liberation. See Gunter, M. 1990 The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma , Boulder CO: Westview, p. 17. 66 Imset, I. 1992 The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey , Ankara: Turkish Daily News Publications, pp. 17-20. 67 Van Bruinessen M. “The Ethnicity of Kurds” in Andrews P. (ed.), p. 621 68 Taspinar, O. Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam , p. 95.

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The constitution of 1982 also reflects the reactions against manifestation of

Kurdishness. 69 The new Constitution defines one of the fundamental tasks of the state as the safeguarding of ‘the independence and integrity of the Turkish nation, the indivisibility of the country, the republic’ (Article 5). 70 This also made it illegal to

express any idea that could be interpreted by the authorities as amounting to recognition

of a separate, Kurdish, ethnic identity. Article 26 notes “No language prohibited by the

state shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought.” Article 68 banned

political parties which supported activities ‘in conflict with the indivisible integrity of the

state’. 71

It was after the re-installment of the parliamentary democracy in Turkey in 1983, we observe a significant increase in the proportion of the population in Turkey who considered themselves, to be Kurds.

V- 1983- present: PKK and the Rise Kurdish Nationalism The banning of all the political parties by the military created a political vacuum, which led to a period of political uncertainty and a realignment among and within the political parties that continues to this day. 72 As the brief discussion earlier on some of the articles

of the new constitution of 1982 suggest, the mood of the military coup presented a total

reversal of the liberal constitution of 1961. The common point of these provisions was

that they were formulated without a single reference to the word “Kurdish”. The basic

69 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (official English translation) Ankara: 1990. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 For more elaborate discussion of the realignment argument see, Barkey, H. J. and Fuller, G. 1998 Turkey’s Kurdish question , MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 97-116.

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understanding was that the Kurds had equal rights in all aspects as the Turkish citizens.

As long as they do not demand a separate set of cultural and ethnic rights there would be no complications. As Abdulmelik Firat, Sheik Said’s grandson and a parliamentary deputy argued, such political and military repression, coupled with the cultural policies reminiscent of the 1930s had the counterproductive effect of boosting the Kurdish nationalism. 73 Therefore, two major consequences of the 1980 military intervention and the fierce military repression in the southeastern Anatolia are the rise in the popularity of the PKK and the strengthening of the Kurdish ethnic consciousness.

By 1984, a successful transition to the democratic politics was accomplished.

However in the late summer of the same year, the PKK launched a series of attacks on the Turkish forces and reemerged as a revolutionary organization in quest of the Kurdish independence. As mentioned earlier, the PKK was founded on 1977 when number of radical left-wing Kurdish groups decided to pursue their own revolutionary and separatist agenda. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK fled to Syria before the 1980 intervention and regrouped his forces in northern Iraq. Northern Iraq was the stronghold of Mesud Barzani, the leader of the KDP, who was busy with his own war against

Baghdad. With Barzani’s approval, border marches between Iraq and Turkey became a major field of activity for the PKK whose guerilla forces received formal training in the

Syrian controlled Bekaa valley in Lebanon. 74

Meanwhile on the political front, a questioning of the state policies started to find voice. While all the political parties included Kurdish members, it is only in the latter part of the 1980s that any of these members started to raise the question of Kurdish minority.

73 Interview with Abdulmelik Firat in the weekly Turkish magazine Aktuel , 11 December 1991, p. 28. 74 Ozdag, Umit 1999 Turkiye, Kuzey Irak ve PKK [Turkey, Northern Iraq and the PKK], Ankara: ASAM Yayinlari, p. 72.

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Social Democratic Populist Party [Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti (SHP)] was the main vehicle of activism. Openly critical of the Turkish state’s policy, some members of the

SHP expressed criticism in various forums. In one such incident, seven Kurdish SHP parliamentarians were expelled from the party for attending an international conference on the Kurdish question in Paris in 1989. In 1990 these seven parliamentarians established their own pro-Kurdish People’s Labor Party [Halkin Emek Partisi (HEP)].

The October 1991 parliamentary elections took place in a political environment which offered substantial reformist leverage for the new coalition government formed by

Suleyman Demirel’s True Path Party [Dogru Yol Partisi (DYP)] and the SHP. The SHP even concluded an electoral pact with the pro-Kurdish HEP in an attempt to strengthen its eastern constituency and democratic image. The HEP had been prohibited from presenting its slate on candidates for the elections due to a technicality. The SHP-HEP pact enabled 22 HEP candidates to be elected to the Parliament, constituting almost a quarter of the SHP representation. Most importantly, this was the first time an openly pro-Kurdish political party was operating in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. It was also in this context, a conservative politician with firm nationalistic credentials such as Demirel declared to a crowd in Diyarbakir that “Turkey recognized the Kurdish reality”. 75

On the political front, the optimism was rapidly replaced by the nationalist polarization as some of the newly elected pro-Kurdish parliamentarians antagonized the parliament by reading their prepared text both in Kurdish and Turkish during their swearing ceremony. As a result 14 out of the 22 HEP members resigned from SHP and

HEP eventually closed by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1993 on grounds of

75 “Kurdish reality recognized” Anatolian News Agency, December 9, 1991.

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“separatist activities”. 76 Given the reluctance of HEP members’ to condemn the PKK as a

terrorist organization, both the government and the military considered the party as ‘an

extended arm of the PKK’. This negative image did not change when the HEP

parliamentarians founded the Democracy Party [Demokrasi Partisi (DEP)]. In March

1994, the Turkish Parliament repealed the parliamentary immunity of six DEP

parliamentarians, who had been accused of being in a direct relationship with the PKK

leadership. As a result the DEP suffered the same fate is its predecessor in June 1994. 77

Although a new pro-Kurdish party, the People’s Democracy Party [Halkin

Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP)] was formed shortly before the banning of DEP, unlike its predecessors, it did not benefit from the presence of a parliamentary delegation. Taspinar argues that the closure of both the HEP and DEP “destroyed a legitimate political middle ground for moderate Kurdish nationalism and enhanced the legitimacy of the PKK in the eyes of Kurdish population of the southeastern Anatolia. 78 For instance, in one of the few

surveys conducted in the region, in response to the question of how well they knew

members of the PKK, 65 per cent of those surveyed refused to answer. Out of the 35 per

cent who answered, 42 per cent claimed to have a family member in the organization. 79

The relatively uncorrupt political image and an effective grassroots approach to the politics carried the Islamist Welfare Party [Refah Partisi (RP)] to the national victory in 1995 parliamentary elections. The RP won 21.38 per cent of the votes, as the two center right parties, the Motherland Party [Anavatan Partisi (ANAP)] and True Path

76 Barkey, Henri J. “The People’s Democracy Party (HADEP): The Travails of a Legal Kurdish Party in Turkey”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs , vol. 18, No. 1., p. 130. 77 Barkey, H. J. “The People’s Democracy Party (HADEP)”, p. 133. 78 Taspinar, O. Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam ., p. 108. 79 This controversial report, funded by the Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (TOBB) proved a useful but limited vehicle to start a national discussion on the issue. “The Southeast Problem: Diagnosis and Findings” Ankara: TOBB, 1995.

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(DYP) respectively received 19.65 per cent and 19.19 per cent. The two parties of the center left the CHP and the Democratic Left Party [Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP)] received respectively 10.71 per cent and 14.74 per cent of the votes, while the pro-Kurdish

HADEP received 4.5 per cent and failed to win any seats in the parliament due to 10 per cent threshold.

The 1999 elections clearly illustrated the growing support for the Kurdish nationalism in the southeast. HADEP was banned by the constitutional court due its alleged relations with the PKK. The Democratic People’s Party [Demokratik Halk Partisi

(DEHAP)], was founded in 1997, entered the 1999 elections as the continuation of

HADEP. The overtly Kurdish DEHAP managed to do very well and emerged as the number one party in the southeast. This strong showing occurred despite the fact that the party was facing a potential ban due allegations that it served as political face of the

PKK. Despite the police harassment and the arrest of many campaigners, the DEHAP won landslide victories with up to 65 per cent of the vote in major cities such as

Diyarbakir and Van. Here one should also note that the party received only 4.7 per cent of the national vote and failed to be represented in the parliament due to 10 per cent threshold. In the 2002 election DEHAP won 6.2 per cent of the national vote (came sixth most popular party) and, as in 1995 and 1999, the majority of the votes in the southeast.

In the following year, the Constitutional Court outlawed the DEHAP ruling that it ‘aided and abetted’ the PKK. On August 2005 DEHAP announced its merger with Democratic

Society Party [Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP)]. Currently DTP has mayors in 55 municipalities, most of them in southeastern Turkey, densely populated by Kurds. It is also the first Turkish party to have a collective leadership. In short, we can suggest that

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DTP is an attempt to reduce diversity of interest among Kurdish population in Turkey, which has been a character of Kurdish nationalist movement for more than a century.

Based on the results of the 1995, 1999 and 2002 elections, Taspinar notes, it is important to recognize that the Kurdish and Islamic cleavages in the post- Cold War

Turkey are no longer successfully absorbed by the right or left wing political formations, as they were throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 80

All these developments illustrate that the process of growing national consciousness among the Kurds and the violence in the southeast have led to the alienation of the Kurds as a population in many respects. Increasingly, Kurds and Turks are coming to live in their separate psychological worlds. It is this growing psychological gap between the Kurds and Turks that is the most important feature of the Kurdish issue in Turkey today.

Why and how this gap emerged and developed the way summarized above will be the questions that will be answered in following section. Specifically, the rest of this chapter will analyze the rise of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey with regard to processes of modernization. To what extent and how modernization paved the way to development of

Kurdish nationalism will be the focus.

Modernization and Kurdish Nationalism During 1950s and 1960s, Turkey has often been considered by social scientists as one of the most successful models of a universally defined modernization process. 81 The history

80 Taspinar, O. Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam , p. 112. 81 Two books on modernization in Turkey from this period stand out; Daniel Lerner’s (1958) The Passing of Traditional Society , New York: Free Press and Bernard Lewis’s 1961 The Emergence of Modern Turkey , New York: Oxford University Press.

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of the modernization and in Turkey extended back to the late Ottoman era and peaked by the establishment of a secular nation state under Kemalism in 1923.

Bozdogan and Kasaba described Ottoman and Turkish modernization as “an elite-driven, consensus-based institution building process that took its inspiration exclusively from the

West”. 82 For the scholars of this genre Turkey’s apparently successful adoption of the

Western norms, styles, and institutions in education, law, social life, clothing, music, architecture, and the arts, was portrayed as a testimony to the viability of the project of modernity even in an overwhelmingly Muslim country.

The celebratory tone of the modernization scholars began to disappear by the late

1960s and 1970s. This new genre of critics of Turkish modernization has shifted their focus away from the elite, emphasized conflict over consensus, and studied economic structures rather than political institutions. When studied from these alternative points,

Turkish modernization contained a little that was worth celebrating. By the end of 1970s

“modernization” became a dirty word, and authors such as Lerner and Lewis were cited only as examples of how not to study the late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic.

The Kemalist path of modernization, far from being an exemplary success story, was declared as a historical failure that undermined the order in the Ottoman Turkish society.

Today many scholars emphasize the cultural identity, difference, and diversity over the homogenization and unity of the Kemalist modernization. Moreover, at the same time with the demise of nationalist developmentalism in the world, the globalizing trends are finding their way into Turkey. As these global trends threatens nation-state’s

82 Bozdogan, S. and Kasaba, R (eds.) 1997 Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey , Seattle: University of Washington Press, pp. 3-4.

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sovereignty, the official modernization in Turkey appears inadequate both as a source of inspiration and as a mechanism of control in economics, politics and cultural production.

Acknowledging the democratic premises embodied in these late criticisms of the

Kemalist modernization, one must also note that, such criticisms are not without

shortcomings, loose ends and thus some pitfalls. 83 For example, no matter how shallow

Turkey’s shift from Islam to the West has been, manifestations of modernity have

become constituent elements of the Turkish collective consciousness since the 1920s. The

modern architecture of public buildings in Ankara and major cities, performances of the

national theatre and symphony orchestra, opera and ballet, sportsmen and women

working in European leagues, railroads, highways, factories and dams are among the

most familiar images.

Another loose-end is the way in which recent Turkish history is studied and

evaluated. Few writers have stepped up to study the real history of the modernization in

Turkey, as they try to align themselves according to whether they believe Turkey has had

too much or too little modernization. No matter how one might to qualify it, more people

live longer, fewer children succumb to childhood diseases, more people can read and

write, and more people have access to modern means of transportation and

communication than was the case in the 1920s. In other words, one would be justified in

claiming that most people in Turkey now live quantitatively and qualitatively better than

was typical in Anatolia during the early decades of twentieth century.

Mustafa Kemal and his supporters imagined a new state modeled on the basic

principles of the European style nation-state. This required a total elimination of the old

regime and an establishment of a new one. The Kemalist modernity project consisted of

83 Bozdogan, S. and Kasaba, R. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey , p. 5

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three elements: political/ institutional, economic, and cultural. The reforms in all of these areas aimed to bring modernization, defined as Westernization, to Turkey. Following sections will analyze the economic, political and socio-cultural modernization processes in Turkey with regard to its effects to the rising Kurdish nationalism especially during the last three decades of the twentieth century.

I- Economic Modernization and Kurdish Nationalism (H1) As a reminder, the first hypothesis is that economic modernization reduces separatist nationalism. Economic modernization first, integrates core and periphery and second promotes welfare and reduces regional differences. Economic modernization must use mechanisms to generate prosperity and integrate core and periphery. I will look for the availability and capacity of mechanisms to achieve these goals. These mechanisms are the main observable implication of this hypothesis. Economic modernization project could use a variety of mechanisms, alone or in combination, to integrate regions and generate prosperity. Major ones that will be used in this section are: comparison of literacy rates, relative per capita GNP, relative per capita investment expenditures, relative average household income.

Comparative method will be employed to measure how different regions affected

by the modernization. First, the main comparison will be between the Kurdish populated

regions of Turkey (east and southeast) and other regions. Second, although the elite

driven economic modernization project is uninterrupted in Turkey and thus does not

allow us to make clear cut comparisons between different periods such as pre and post

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1980, comparisons between different decades and years will be made where data is available.

Given the rise of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, this hypothesis will be discredited if the economic modernization promotes welfare in Kurdish regions comparable to the rest of Turkey while Kurdish nationalism continues to rise. In other

words, by finding that the Kurdish east and southeast regions’ living standards had

increased and the economic indicators had fared well when compared to other regions in

Turkey while the Kurdish separatism continued, I will conclude that economic

modernization has little or no affect on reducing separatist nationalism.

Preliminary Remarks

When the Ottoman ruling class clearly began to loose its grip on power, ‘the relationship of the Kurdish tribes with the state also underwent a rapid alternation’.

Berberoglu argues that the tribal chiefs became the one and only force in their regions and they functioned very much like the feudal lords. 84 Fortunately for the Ottomans,

intra-Kurdish tribal rivalries obstructed Kurdish national unity. Therefore, from the

seventeenth century until the last decades of the nineteenth century semi-autonomous

Kurdish principalities existed. It is also true to say that the Kurdish lords continued their

traditions, in which landed property was transmitted from father to son. Trapped within

the framework of the Ottoman Empire, Kurdish feudalism was unable to develop further.

As the Ottomans found themselves retreating in the face of rising Western powers,

84 Berberoglu, B. 1982 Turkey in Crisis. From State Capitalism to Neo-Colonialism London: Zed Press, pp. 70-71. Also Keyder (1976) p. 179, agrees with this. Keyder, C. 1976 “The of the Asiatic Mode of Production” Economy and Society , vol.5, no.2, May, pp. 178-196.

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Kurdish feudal aristocracy possibly thought that the road to successful insurrection was now possible: “The nineteenth century was the period of the insurrection of the Kurdish

Emirs, the revolt of Baban (1806-1808), Kir Muhammet (1833-1837), Bedir Khan Bey

(1840-1847), Yezdan Ser (1855)” 85

Each of these revolts was crushed in turn. By suppressing all different modes of life, the Ottomans eventually achieved certain stability, allowing the western Turkish cities the opportunity to trade. The opposite process occurred in feudalistic Kurdish provinces, where feudal forms hindered urbanization and the accumulation of capital.

From Feudalism to Capitalism

The eruption of World War I saw Ottoman Turkey still a predominantly pre- capitalist economy, one that co-existed uneasily with both feudal and capitalist economic forms. The defeat of the Central Powers (including the Ottomans) inevitably resulted in the overthrow of the Ottoman system, and its replacement by Kemal Ataturk’s modernizing capitalist regime in 1923.

The 1920s were a key period for the economy in Turkey as a whole. It was during this period (1923-1929) that the young Turkish Republic’s economy was integrated into the whole world economy. 86 Even so, as Aydin has noted, Turkish capitalism developed not due to the ‘internal dynamics of Turkish society’ but as a result of a process

85 Keyder, C. “The Dissolution of the Asiatic Mode of Production”, p. 189. 86 The Ottoman Empire participated in the world economy, of course, especially during nineteenth century. However as Keyder (1976) notes, it did so as “a still largely pre-capitalist economy”, p. 179.

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originating outside Turkey itself. 87 The comparative underdevelopment of the Kurdish

region was the upshot of these developments. 88

In the underdeveloped regions of the world, some of the relations of production

can appear feudal or semi-feudal. White argues that, provided the country’s economy is

dominated by capitalism, however, pre-capitalist enterprises are capitalist since they are

subordinated to capitalist laws of motion. 89 Aydin comments, in relating Turkey with the world economy: “Today capitalism has acquired a universal character; the pre-capitalist appearance of the family farm should not let us believe that this constitutes a mode of production. Capital controls the conditions of reproduction of the peasant family farm” 90

While the economy in the first years of young the Republic remained subordinate

to those of industrialized states, overall it experienced a leap forward in both agricultural

and industrial structure. 91 The same was not true for Kurdish populated areas in Turkey.

In the Kurdish east and south-east, agriculture remained at a subsistence level throughout

the 1920s.

Agriculture and Kurdish Landownership

During 1930s and 1940s, in the southeast and eastern Anatolia, agriculture was

still the main economic activity. Kurdish peasants often own the land they farm although

this has not meant prosperity for most of them. 92 Until the 1950s and 1960s, the peasants

87 Aydin, Z. 1986 Underdevelopment and Rural Structures in Southeastern Turkey: The Household Economy in Gisgis and Kalhana , Durham: University or Durham, Ithaca Press, pp. 28-29. 88 Ibid., p. 45. 89 White, P. J. 2000 Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey New York: Zed Books, p. 98. 90 Aydin, Z. Underdevelopment and Rural Structures in Southeastern Turkey , p. 11. 91 Keyder, C. 1981 The Definition of Peripheral Economy: Turkey 1923- 1929 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 92 Van Bruinessen, M. Agha, Shaikh, and State , pp. 22-23.

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who lived on the plains were frequently sharecroppers who paid landowners a fixed proportion of the crop, which could vary from 10 per cent to 80 per cent. 93 Others “were agricultural workers, who received a small fee for working under the supervision of the landlord”. 94

Figures for the distribution of land holdings have shown little variation for the period 1950- 1980. By 1973, landless families constituted 30.1 per cent of total rural households. This figure is almost double the ratio of landless families to landed families for Turkey as a whole. Some 66.4 per cent were farmers, while the remainder were laborers, probably seasonal workers or artisans. 95 Very large land holdings were a feature of the region. Some families continued to own villages. Thus: “in 1980, while 11.6 per cent of the total households owned 59.9 per cent of the total lands owned… 56 per cent of the landowning household owned only 8.7 per cent of the total”. 96

The unique geography of much of the south and the south-east Turkey is also a factor inhibiting the economic development in the region. In the mountains, where land is scarce and farming was still done by oxen drawing ploughs at the time, agricultural production is scarcely above the subsistence level. The low returns even from cash crops like tobacco provided very little incentive for an expansion of agricultural production. 97

Industrial Development

93 Van Bruinessen, M. Agha, Shaikh and State, pp. 22-23. Keyder, C. The Definition of Peripheral Economy , p. 16 adds: “In 1952, 32 per cent of the peasant families in all of Turkey could be considered as middle peasants”. Aydin, Z. Underdevelopment and Rural Structures in Southeastern Turkey , p. 6 cites, 1963 census figures that indicate that share-cropping families were then 15 per cent of all farming families in Turkey. 94 Van Bruinessen, M. Agha, Shaikh and State, p. 23. 95 Aydin, Z. Underdevelopment and Rural Structures in Southeastern Turkey , pp. 59-62 96 Aydin, Z. Underdevelopment and Rural Structures in Southeastern Turkey , p. 59. 97 Van Bruinessen, M. Agha, Shaikh and State , p. 22-23.

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Industrial development began its torturous path in Turkey during the nineteenth century. Towards the end of the same century the lack of infrastructure and the fragile industrial base which remained peripheral to other economies in the region and ill- equipped to handle the foreign competition. The industrialization in the Ottoman Empire was on its course of disappearing. This did not just happen in the Kurdish populated regions; there was a general decline in industry throughout the entire Ottoman Empire from this period onwards.

By the mid 1920s industry was beginning to be transformed due to injection of merchant capitalist investment in the new Turkish Republic. One useful index of industrial growth, as well as a motor for further development is the growth of railways system. In Turkey, the railways experienced notable growth. But, once again, such growth was not uniform: “the distribution of railways exhibited an evident inequality between the market oriented Western regions, the surplus producing interior, and the subsistence farming east, north-east, and south-west”. 98 The more numerous and

economically more advantaged western region with a better range of industrialization and

a railway network added to the disparity between west and east. Beaumont et. al. adds

that the existing higher level of economic development was an important reason for the

Western Turkey to experience a continuing higher level of industrialization than the

Kurdish areas. 99

In 1927, the western Turkish cities of Istanbul and Izmir accounted for 40 per cent

(816 establishments) out of a Turkey wide total of 2,052 industrial establishments

98 Keyder, C. The Definition of Peripheral Economy , p. 29. 99 Beaumont, P., Blake, G.H. and Wagstaff, J.M. 1976 The Middle East: a Geographical Study , New York: Wiley, pp. 440-443.

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employing more than ten persons. 100 Overall 25.7 per cent of all industrial employment was in Istanbul and Izmir. By the late 1930s, according to Keyder’s estimation there were

414 large manufacturing establishments, only 7 of which were in Kurdish populated regions. These establishments represented a mere 1.7 per cent of the total in Turkey as a whole. 101

The period from the 1950 to the first military coup saw the emphasis shifting from the statism to the development of private enterprise. The DP had won the elections in

1950 on a platform of privatization. However, their economic policies did not go unchallenged. According to Waterbury the clash between the DP and the CHP was a conflict “between a newly assertive alliance of private interest and the old military bureaucratic alliance that had found the Republic”. 102

The period up until the 1980 was marked by the re-imposition of devletcilik

(statism) administered by the modernizing republican technocracy. 103 A State Planning

Organization (Devlet Planlama Teskilati [DPT]) was constituted in the 1960s and new

Five Year Plans were drawn up.

White argues that, state owned enterprises failed to make profits which caused the

high inflation rate in the 1960and the 1970s. The wage earners and poor farmers

throughout Turkey suffered, but the east and south-east were particularly affected. As

Table 4.2 shows the average household income in the Kurdish southern provinces earning

only 74.8 per cent of the country’s average income in 1968 and the east 83.4 per cent

100 Keyder, C. The Definition of Peripheral Economy , p. 56. Ten employees being the usual benchmark defining a factory as opposed to a simple workshop. 101 Keyder, C. The Definition of Peripheral Economy , pp. 56-57. 102 Waterbury J. 1993 Exposed to Innumerable Delusions. Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico and Turkey , New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 42 103 Keyder (1987) p 224, Beaumont et al. The Middle East, pp. 439-440.

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while Istanbul earned 259.4 per cent and Ankara 162 per cent. Five years later in 1973, the south had managed for some small improvement, earning a figure of 86.7 per cent.

The figure for the east slumped dramatically however, coming in at only 67.5 per cent, while Istanbul earned 162.7 per cent and Ankara a still respectable 123.5 per cent

Table 4. 2 Comparison of rural and west Turkey with south and east Turkey 1968- 1973

Rural Region(a) Metropolitan Category Central(b) North West(c) South East Ankara Istanbul Izmir

1968 Survey Avg. household income 87.9 83.3 79.5 74.8 83.5 162.0 259.4 355.9(d) as a % of country avg.

1973 Survey

Avg. household income 103.1 108.7 89.3 86.7 67.5 123.5 162.7 159.9 as a % of country avg

% of total population 18.0 15.8 20.8 13.2 9.9 5.4 13.9 3.0

Notes : a. Includes urban areas not included in metropolitan regions b. Excludes Ankara c.Excludes Istanbul and Izmir d. This figure is probably too high

Source : Hansen (1991) p. 227 104

1980s – Present: Economic Liberalization and its effects on Kurds

The situation in Turkey exacerbated much more by the second surge in oil prices in 1978-

79 period, which “pushed Turkey to the brink of default”. 105 Waterbury argued that by the mid-1970s the situation deteriorated further, due to the oil shocks. The end result by

1978-79, was a severe economic and a political crisis, which was dealt “through a military take-over and authoritarian implementation of a structural adjustment program

104 Hansen, B. 1991 The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: Egypt and Turkey ”, published for the World Bank, Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press. 105 Waterbury J. Exposed to Innumerable Delusions , pp. 77-78.

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and a shift to export led growth.” 106 The heart of the radical new economic policy package was the decision to end devletcilik (statism). The US-trained economist Turgut

Ozal, remained in charge of its implementation. Ozal forcibly lowered wages, subsidized imports and devalued Turkish lira in a ruthless drive deliberately to shrink Turkey’s domestic market. 107 Small protest aside, Keyder estimates that bourgeoisie as a whole was quite willing to trade off the economic and political problems of this period for

‘restricted democracy, ideological hegemony and a disciplined labor force’. 108 Truly comparative hard data difficult to come by, but Table 4.2 illustrates the differences between the rural centre and west of Turkey and the largely Kurdish south and east, in

1968 and 1973.

Ozal’s economic reforms caused subsistence farming to shrink ‘to almost nothing’. 109 This is a factor immensely influenced rural Turkish Kurds. In addition, as will be elaborated in the assessment section, there was a political price for the drastic post-1980 economic re-structuring. In the previous periods, economic development had managed more or less to incorporate the various social classes and marginal ethnic groups into the economic, political and cultural projects of the Turkish state. However, the rapid economic liberalization program of Ozal in the post-1980 alienated the already underdeveloped Kurdish population. Moreover, the earlier hopes of economic liberalism lead to political liberalism (or democratization) proved to be ill-placed.

The eastern and south-eastern regions where most of the Kurds live today have the lowest scores for two socio-economic indicators (see Table 4.3). Illiteracy rates of

106 Waterbury J. Exposed to Innumerable Delusions , pp. 78-79. 107 Hansen, B. The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth, pp. 383-385. 108 Keyder (1987) p. 225. 109 Hansen , B. The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth, p. 423.

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35.5 and 44.0 per cent for these regions in 1985 were much higher than elsewhere in

Turkey. Similarly, the number of medical doctors per thousand people in 1990 was lower in the less developed in Kurdish populated regions than elsewhere.

Table 4.3 Percentages of illiterate population in 1985 and number of medical doctors in 1990 by regions.

% of illiterate Number of Population in medical doctors per 1985 1,000 in 1990

Eastern 35.5 4.0 South-eastern 44.0 4.0 Aegean 18.6 9.0 Black Sea 24.7 5.0 Central 18.3 12.0 Marmara 14.2 12.0 Mediteranean 22.1 5.0

Source: Kirisci and Winrow (1997), p. 123 .110

Gross per capita income figures for 1979 and 1986 in relation to the two most prosperous western regions, the Marmara and the Agean are shown in Table 4.4.(indexed as 100)

The combined per capita income scores for eastern and south-eastern region were the lowest for both years. This income gap appears to indicate the relative lack of prosperity in the mostly Kurdish populated areas of Turkey.

110 Figures were compiled from Il ve Bolge Istatistikleri (Ankara: Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu – State Institute of Statistics, [DIE], 1993) p. 45 and Iller Itibariyle Cesitli Gostergeler (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teskilati, State Planning Organization [DPT], 1993), p. 37.

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Table 4.4 Relative per capita GNP in 1979 and 1986 (by region)

1979 1986

Eastern + South-eastern 34.4 29.2 Aegean 100.0 100.0 Black Sea 56.2 47.4 Central 53.8 52.1 Marmara 100.0 100.0 Mediterranean 69.1 61.6

Source : Iller Itibariyle Cesitli Gostergeler , op.cit., p. 67

However it would be wrong to suggest that this was the product of a deliberate policy by the Turkish government targeting Kurdish populated areas. The Black Sea and

Mediterranean regions which are not populated by Kurds also has a low socio-economic scores compared with other regions in Turkey (Table 4.3 and Table 4.4). In addition as

Table 4.5 indicates, the government’s public spending in the eastern and south-eastern regions has been proportionally higher compared to other regions. Between 1986 and

1990 the government spent 78.2 million TL in the eastern and south-eastern regions while total revenues received from the two regions came to 26.2 million TL. During the same period, while the ratio of budget expenditures to public revenue was 1.4 on a nationwide basis, the regional ratio for east and south-east was 3.0. In other words government spent

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three times more money than the revenues it collected from these two regions. At the beginning of the rise of Kurdish nationalism in the 1980s, there has been a transfer of national budgetary funds from the developed western parts of Turkey to the less developed areas of the country.

The government’s efforts to develop the area were also supported by other indicators. As table 4.5 shows, an overwhelmingly large proportion of public investment expenditures were channeled to the east and south-east between 1983 and 1992. A significant portion of this has gone to finance the South-east Anatolia Development

Project ( Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi , GAP).

Table 4.5 The proportion of expenditures over revenues in the national budget between 1986 and 1990 and per capita public investment expenditures for 1983- 1992

Ratio of consolidated budget Per capita public expenditures to budget investment expenditure Revenues 1986- 1990 for 1983-92; Index (Turkey)= 100

East + Southeast 3.0 303.0 Aegean 0.7 145.0 Black Sea 1.2 36.0 Central 0.7 131.0 Marmara 0.3 71.0 Mediterranean 0.7 60.0 Turkey 1.4

Source : Iller Itibariyle Cesitli Gostergeler , op. cit., p. 1 and p. 16.

On the other hand, we cannot conclude that mobilization of public resources improved the socio-economic situation in the eastern and south-eastern region. Kirisci and Winrow argue that “The investment in these two regions has not been matched by

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private investment. The area is characterized by low levels of savings and credits.” 111 In addition, the sanctions imposed on Iraq as a result of Gulf War have affected the economy of the area. Turkish exports to Iraq before the war amounted more than $1.5 billion, which benefited particularly south-eastern region. The basis of this important economic activity disappeared with the sanctions.

Overall, during the last two decades of the twentieth century, the Kurdish populated east and south-east regions in Turkey, experienced the biggest economic disparity when compared to western regions. The depressed nature of the economy in the area has also led to high levels of unemployment. 112 Turkey entered the twenty-first century with a Kurdish population with little stake in the prosperity of the whole country.

Assessment

Turkey, as one of the first states in the Middle East to begin to industrialize, has done so in a highly uneven manner. Given their longstanding level of chronic underdevelopment, the Kurds were probably the least integrated group in Turkish society. However,

Beaumont et. al. argues, their position was still quite different from that which obtains in post-1980 period. 113 Keyder notes “Turkish nationalism and its claim for a single integrating principle within political borders seemed to work”. 114 In contrast, Kurds since

1980 have arguably felt more ‘left-out’, less like participants in the Turkish economy and

society than ever before.

111 Kirisci, K. and Winrow, G. 1997 The Kurdish Questions and Turkey: an example of a trans-state ethnic conflic t, OR: Frank Cass, p.125. More detailed discussion of lack of private investment with hard data, see p. 125. 112 According to a study prepared by Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the unemployment level in the provinces covered by GAP averaged 36 per cent. 113 Beaumont et.al. The Middle East ., pp. 441-443. 114 Keyder (1987), p. 228

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The economy of the Turkish state as a whole is backward by world standards. To say that the economy of Turkey’s Kurdish region is comparatively much less developed is certainly significant. The east and south-east regions are the most underdeveloped part of Turkey. Limited industrialization, low level of development of the productive forces, and dominance of rural production are some of the features of this underdevelopment.

This situation exacerbated even more in the wake of a harsher climate in the world economy in general. This in turn, alienated Kurdish citizens of the Turkish state further from the universalizing myth of Turkish nationalism.

Turkish governments periodically announced economic development initiatives for the Kurdish region. For instance in 1999, the Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit promised to encourage investment in the Kurdish region to help remove the causes of Kurdish disaffection with Ankara. The most concrete government idea however was the proposal of ‘maintaining projects that create jobs, such as carpet making and beekeeping’. There appear to be real constraints in the degree to which Turkey can realistically economically modernize itself.

The effects of industrialization on Turkey’s Kurdish regions, thus appears disarmingly simple. The industry in the east and southeast of Turkey has remained permanently stunted. This means a bitter continuing fight for survival with other more advanced industrial centers elsewhere. At this point, from the modernist perspective on the reinforcing affects of uneven development (Nairn) and internal colonialism (Hechter) on separatist nationalism seems to hold true (H1). First, given the high levels of unemployment in these regions when compared to rest of Turkey, it is reasonable to expect a frustrated people to support the uncompromising Kurdish nationalism in general

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and terrorist activities of PKK in particular. Second, weak economic indicators contribute to rise of violence in the area which in itself adversely affects the economic activity as investors shy away. Third, anti-Turkish Kurdish nationalism and the violence that accompanies it lead to a migration of people and a flight of capital out of the area, which crippled the already depressed nature of economy of the Kurdish populated areas.

Had it not been for the economic modernization and its attendant rural-urban migration of the Kurdish population, Kurdish nationalism would not take the separatist turn it did since the 1970s due to lack of urban educated Kurdish intelligentsia. By 1950s,

Kurdish large landowners (aghas) had been largely co-opted into the Turkish political system (the big men that could deliver large blocs of vote): “…the aghas ceased to be

Kurdish in two vital sense: they quietly disowned their Kurdish origin, and they exploited their relationship with the peasantry not as a mean to semi-independence from the center as in the old days, but in order to become more closely integrated members of the ruling

Turkish establishment.” 115 The aghas also successfully blocked any attempts at land reform in the Kurdish regions, and the majority of the Kurdish peasantry remained sharecroppers or holders of tiny plots of land. With the introduction of mechanized agriculture, however, increasing numbers of these peasants were pushed off the land and migrated to the cities in the Kurdish regions, in western Turkey, or abroad. 116

At the same time that increasing numbers of Kurds settled in various cities,

economic modernization produced new challenges and opportunities. Education,

particularly university education, exposed a new generation of both wealthy and talented

115 McDowall, D. A Modern History of the Kurds , p. 400. 116 In 1948 Turkey had only 1750 tractors. By 1954 there were 40.000 tractors in the country (ibid., p. 399). It was particularly the large feudal agha farmers who could afford to buy the newly imported tractors, with the consequent dislocation of their tenants.

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Kurds to ideas of nationalism, socialism and struggles of other peoples against state authority. In urban contexts, the strength of tribal affiliations often declined. Many educated young Kurds adopted a Turkish identity and advanced to the top echelons of society and government. Others, however, refused to assimilate did not achieve the level of success their ambition strived for. High unemployment levels left increasing numbers of educated Kurds, who were now aware of the wealth and possibilities around them thanks to modern media and communications. This group of the population emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as the new elite leadership of many left-wing and Kurdish nationalist movements.

As I mentioned before, the survey of economic modernization in Turkey from a modernist perspective explains the rise of Kurdish nationalism as uneven consequences of transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ economy. Modernist account explains the ability to generate widespread popular support to the emerging minority intelligentsia, urban educated Kurds, and their invitation of the masses into history. However, from an ethno-symbolist perspective more important question would be “why do the people respond?” For the sake of material benefits? Such an answer reduces nationalism to resentment caused by regional economic inequalities and exploitation. True that modernist account is useful in terms of explaining the links between industrialization, economic disparities and the rise of Kurdish nationalism, this model is limited because it downplays the importance of pre-existing ethnic grievances. We have only to consider the cases of other ethnic minorities in Turkey who did not follow a similar path as the

Kurds but embraced universalizing myth of Turkish identity. As I will elaborate more in

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the conclusion chapter, I argue that explaining nationalism by just economic indicators inevitably limits the utility of the modernist model.

The following section will survey the political modernization of the Republic of Turkey.

II- Political Modernization and Kurdish Nationalism (H2) The purpose of this section is to analyze whether the Kurdish case supports the modernist hypothesis on the diminishing effects of political modernization on separatist claims. As elaborated in the second chapter, political modernization reduces separatist calls in three ways. First, structural changes, such as tax collection, building highways and mass communication systems legitimizes the state power and its institutions in the eyes of ethnic minorities. 117 Second, in a modern nation-state society of individuals are defined as polity of citizens. 118 By participating in democratic and liberal processes, citizens’

commitment to ethnic, religious, linguistic minority group will be replaced by collective

character of society. Third, the modern state is capable of coordinating and mobilizing

the idea of common interest among different groups which otherwise have rather distinct

interests. 119 In short, the process of political modernization not only knit together dispersed ethnic groups they also help to define national unity.

Ottoman Empire: and Multi-nationalism

117 Deutsch, K Nationalism and Social Communication , Breuilly, J. Nationalism and the State , Brass, P. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison . 118 Breuilly, J. “Approaches to Nationalism”, pp. 146-174. 119 Hobsbawn, E. and Ranger, T. The invention of tradition .

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The Kurds living in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria were all once part of the Ottoman

Empire. Therefore it makes sense to outline the origins, composition and ethnic politics

of the empire before moving into effects of the political modernization in modern Turkey.

By the end of the seventeenth century the Ottomans possessed a formidable

empire, stretching from Ukraine to Yemen and from Iran to the western Mediterranean.

Central government allowed certain ‘certain Anatolian districts in control of Kurdish and

Turkish peoples’ to function as ‘quasi-independent tributary provinces’. This was the

time of the so-called Kurdish ‘golden age’, when several semi-autonomous principalities

existed in territories nominally controlled by the Ottomans. However, as mentioned

earlier, most of these principalities were compelled to pay taxes and were unable to

expand.

The birth and end of Ottoman Millet system

As the Ottoman territory became transformed into an empire, the need to incorporate non-Turkic and non-Muslim groups presented a challenge to the Ottoman rulers. The

Ottomans’ response was to expand their political framework, so that it explicitly took account of these minority groups. This was the birth of the millet system.

The word millet in contemporary Turkish means a nation . In the Ottoman times,

however it meant the way of life pursued by a group of people, guided by their religion.

A millet was established in law for three non-Muslim minorities: the Greek Orthodox

Christians, the Armenian Christians and the Jews. Each millet was headed by a community leader who exercised a great deal of control over respective communities.

Aware of their existence relied on Sultan’s permission, the millet leaders directed their

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flocks towards a political loyalty to the sultan. Therefore, the concept of ‘citizenship’ in the Ottoman Empire rested on a religious basis. This did not neutralize the ethnic self- identification, however, since this, while subjugated to religion, was simultaneously welded to religious identity, which both legitimized and elevated it. 120

Administration of the Muslim subjects was assumed directly by the central government. This should not create the false impression that the sultan exercised control over every aspect of his Muslim subjects’ lives. Instead “As a ruling group the Ottoman elites had as little to do with ordinary Muslims as with the non-Muslims.” 121 We should

also note that in all its censuses in Ottoman era, the Muslims were listed as one group and

never recognized according to their ethnic or linguistic differences.

A combination of internal and external pressures prompted the fragmentation of

the original Christian millets during the nineteenth century, with them now developing a

stronger ethnic identity. 122 These developments signaled the beginnings of serious

nationalism among these communities. The Ottoman state became radically changed

from an ‘ethno-political’ entity into a ‘territorial state that was still in Muslim character’.

The empire was supposed to be Islamic. However, it was not long before its rulers

began a drive to remove clerical political influence. Secular nationalism could not

function as a social glue in the same way as the old Ottoman ethno-religious policy had,

120 Kemal Karpat sums up the Ottoman system: “To the Ottomans, the government was the art of ruling the unruly, reconciling the irreconcilable, and creating harmony out of ethno-religious discord. The method was…that of reinforcing the religious and social differences among its subjects, with clearly defined boundaries to minimize trespass…while guaranteeing its communal rights, so that these groups would not feel oppressed either by central government or by other groups” Karpat, K. 1988 “The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East” in M.J. Esman, M. J. and Rabinovich, I (eds) Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East , Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 35-53. 121 Karpat, K. “The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East”, p. 44. 122 Karpat, K. “The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East”, pp. 46-47.

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in this diverse empire containing several nations. The result was inevitable, if not predictable: the empire was fragmented into a number of separate nation-states.

Assessment

Throughout the Ottoman period, the Kurds were overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim in religion, and thus owed unqualified loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph, who was their religious and political chief. In return, they were guaranteed the Sultan’s protection. Moreover, the

Kurds of Ottoman times were clearly not candidates for modern citizenship, which requires first and foremost a certain economic dynamism permitting the emergence of true cities. Only such cities could provide a basis for intra-community links to flourish.

Specifically, as Weber argued, commerce and industry must develop to the point where the city was the centre for these activities and had required a certain amount of economic autonomy, instead of depending upon princes, lords or other aristocrats for provisions, or law and order. 123

Rather, in the context of this study, the transformation of eastern and south- eastern Anatolian peasants into modern Kurdish nationalists, state building and the rise and development of national consciousness imply conflict with both the strongly entrenched Turkish nationalism started with at the dawn of twentieth century, and the armed forces of the modern Turkish republic. This transformation of

Kurdish peasants into modern Kurdish nationalists in Turkey that emerged and slowly developed throughout the first half of twentieth century, has gathered pace since the late

1960s.

123 Weber, M. 1978 “The Spirit of Capitalism” (pp. 138-173), Max Weber: Selections in Translation (trans. E. Matthews), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 138-173.

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The next and succeeding sections will analyze this transformation in two periods:

The first period will cover the single party regime of 1923-1946, and the transition to competitive democracy up until the first military coup in the republic’s history in 1960.

The second period will start with the development of modern Kurdish nationalism within the ranks of the Turkish Left in 1960-1980 as well as with the liberalization of the 1990s and EU accession talks of twenty-first century. Each period will be followed by assessment sections on the affects of political modernization on Kurdish nationalism.

The formation of the Kemalist regime (1923-1930s)

As mentioned before (pages 15-16), in the 1924 constitution the terms

“citizenship” and “citizen” had been equated with Turkishness. Accordingly, the

document stated that one had to be a Turk to become a member of parliament and the

like. Certainly Kurds qualify as Turks, but only at the expense of denying their own

ethnic identity. This is where the eventual Kurdish dissatisfaction with the new state

planted: In a state now officially defined as “Turkish” the Kurds were not Turks, and only

by giving up their ethnicity could they be treated as Turks. It is clear that the leaders of

the Kemalist regime perceived Kurds as a potential threat to the integrity of the modern

state they were intending to establish. Exacerbating the problem was the fact that with the

rise of the sheiks and Islamic organization, such as Nakshibendi, in the nineteenth

century, it was Islam that had assumed a major role in bringing Turks and Kurds together.

But with the decision of the new regime to abandon religion as one of its unifying force

and with the abolishing of Caliphate in 1924, another bond that united both communities

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appeared to have been severed. This also provided the sheiks with the justification for rebelling against Ankara.

The mobilization power of Islam among Kurds should not be underestimated that

Kurds had always reacted to violations of its semi-independent status. The abolition of

Caliphate in 1924 played a crucial role in exacerbating the legitimacy crisis of the Ankara government for the Kurds who considered Caliphate as the major hope for Turkish-

Kurdish cooperation. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the Ankara government had a political agenda based on Westernization, secularization, and Turkish nationalism. The nationalist-secularist priorities of the government were clearly reflected in the Law on the

Unification of Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat) which closed all religious schools and effectively banned the education of non-Turkish languages. 124 As the Ottoman tradition

of cosmopolitanism and tolerance for multi-nationalism came to an end, the new

government purged most of the Kurdish officials from senior level public administration

in the eastern provinces. All references to a land ‘Kurdistan’ were removed from the

maps and official documents, and the Turkish names gradually replaced the names of

Kurdish towns and villages. 125 In the subsequent years, the Turkish state followed a program of assimilation which used the national education system and military service as primary instruments of ‘’.

While the process of political modernization was in full swing both with the nation-building and militant secularism during 1920s and 1930s, the Kurdish revolts in the eastern provinces continued. Of all the Kurdish rebellions between 1924 and 1938, the 1924 Sheik Said, 1930 Agri and 1938 Dersim (Tunceli) uprisings proved particularly

124 125 Taspinar, O. Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam , p. 79.

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difficult to suppress. In the last two cases, newly formed Turkish Air Force had to be used. According to the historian Mete Tuncay, the military operation planned to suppress the Sheik Said rebellion alone was more costly in human and financial terms than the

War of Independence. 126

Transition to Multi-Party Politics (1946- 1960)

Turkey’s political system, economic policies and foreign relations underwent fundamental changes after the end of WWII. The political and economic discontent, which was on the rise after two decades of authoritarian rule as well as the international climate played an important role in Turkey’s transition to competitive politics. In 1950, the first competitive general elections in Republican history carried the opposition

Democrat Party (DP) to power with landslide majority. When the DP decided to make use of latent religious sentiment in order to secure votes, the services of certain sheiks were enlisted. The sheiks role was to spread the word to their followers that the vote for the DP meant religious freedom. This allowed sheiks ‘to appeal to Kurdish national sentiment.’ 127 In addition, once transition to competitive democracy was accomplished,

the patterns of political patronage and clientelism began to take root in Turkey. In return

for their cooperation, Kurdish landlords joined the Turkish political establishment and

brought some public services to their constituencies. Of course, the most important pre-

condition for this was to renounce Kurdish nationalism.

Once elected to power with a comfortable majority (See Table 4.1), it was not

particularly surprising that the DP also ended up with authoritarian tendencies. On the

126 Tuncay, M. Turkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek-Parti Yonetiminin Kurulmasi [Formation of the One-Party System in the Republic of Turkey], p. 136. 127 Van Bruinessen (1978), p. 333.

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one hand, economic boom of the early 1950s came to an end towards the second half of the 1950s. On the other hand both the CHP and the military were running out of patience with the DP which they considered as an ‘elected dictatorship’ compromising the

Kemalist principles of the republic. The army put an end to this situation in 1960 with the first of several military interventions in Turkish history.

Assessment (1923- 1960)

The attempts of political modernization of the new Turkish Republic faced two daunting tasks in her first two decades: homogenization and secularization of an ethically mixed and devout Anatolian society. These tasks triggered the fiercest opposition in the Kurdish provinces. Kurds considered themselves to be the indigenous people of their land in which they inhabited for centuries. Also, arguably the most important feature of political modernization, the establishment of centralized state authority was alien to the Kurdish provinces who have always resisted political and economic intervention. Traditionally,

Ottomans relied on the Caliphate or Armenian common enemy to maintain imperial solidarity. Therefore, political modernization with its centralized state functions, such as taxation, military conscription, land registration, police force, and standardized education was most problematic in Kurdish populated eastern and south-eastern regions.

First, during the first two decades of the republic I argue that political modernization proved to be unsuccessful whereas between 1946 and 1960 it raised hopes for containing the problem of rising Kurdish ethnic identity. Although a modern citizenship was introduced with an aim to dominate ethnic/cultural identities, it failed since it became equated with Turkish nationalism. As mentioned, at first Kemalist

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interpretation of citizenship did not include an elaborate ethnic definition of Turkishness, rather it was defined in terms of “territorial, linguistic and political unity by a sense of common roots, morals and history”. However, as the religious dimension of Kurdish discontent erupted by the abolition of the Caliphate, the Kemalist leadership perceived the Kurdish rebellions as a threat to the unity of the state. 128 Martial law enforced by the

Independence Tribunals and the Ankara’s secularization drive from latinization of the alphabet, unification of education system to the ban on traditional headdress led the way to removal of the reference to Islam as the official religion of the republic. Therefore the aim of the citizenship in the new republic shifted from a creation of an umbrella identity, that is Turkishness, that would unite different groups as long as they agree to rank their ethnic (Kurdish) or religious (Muslim) identities in the second place. Rather, the Kurds, as a result of the rebellions, came to be considered as a threat to the unity of the state and exposed to Turkification.

Second, a complementary mechanism to modern citizenship: political pluralism, which can be used by a state to modernize political situation had mixed results. For the

Kemalist establishment, pluralist democracy introduced by the multi-party democracy in

1946 posed a crucial dilemma. Kemalism had provided the republic a secularist and unitary political structure, which came to be perceived and protected by the military as

“the realm of the state” or the main principle of the regime. Regime had to be insulated from the day to day politics. In other words, political pluralism (realm of politics?) had to be properly monitored, so that it would not end up mobilizing Islamic and Kurdish

128 The president of the military tribunal that sentenced the Sheik Said rebels declared, on 28 June 1925: ‘Certain among you have taken as a pretext for the revolt the abuse by the governmental administration, some others have invoked the defense of the Caliphate, but you are all united on one point: to create an independent Kurdistan’.

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discontent against the secular and national principles of the Kemalist regime. In that sense, therefore, political pluralism with an open system for political bargaining to satisfy different groups seemed to be an almost unavoidable conflict between liberal democracy and Kemalist values of the Republic.

In retrospect, we can argue that introduction of political pluralism as part of modernization project was motivated by a mix of populism and opportunism as well as goals at redefining the borders of Kemalism along liberal democratic lines. Initially DP, then followed by CHP for electoral reasons, secularism adopted a relatively soft approach to religion and established clientelistic networks. This pluralist atmosphere triggered a process whereby Kurdish ethnic awareness increased. It was under DP governments in the 1950s, the first waves of Kurdish immigrations to urban centers took place. Taspinar argues, it was during this wave “Joining the rank of millions living in the poor periphery of large cities, politically active and ethnically more conscious Kurdish communities were to emerge throughout the 1960s and 1970s.” 129

Shortly, the 1938 Dersim/ Tunceli defeat shattered the Kurdish national

movement until the 1950s. It is during this period, especially after the introduction of the

multi-party regime that a credible Kurdish identity started to emerge. However this

should not lead us to conclude that political modernization is to blame due to its failure to

integrate Kurds as the modernist approach would suggest. The emerging Kurdish identity

at this time was pretty similar to Scottish identity of the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries which maintained a delicate balance between Scottish nationalism and loyalty

to the Union. As in Scottish nationalism, the newly emerging Kurdish identity did not

129 Taspinar, O. Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam , p. 88. Also Servet Mutlu, supports this point: “By 1965, one fifth of Turkish Kurds lived in the west of the country”: “Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: a Demographic Study,” International Journal of the Middle East Studies , Nov. 1996, p. 532.

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transform itself into a separatist movement. First, political modernization in Turkey was at its infant stage and thus emergence of multiple identities could be contended within the framework of the state. Second, although infant, political institutions were capable of absorbing these new identities successfully. It was after the leftist political resurgence in the post-1960 coup period that led to the formation of a new Kurdish nationalist movement.

Kurdish national movement and the Turkish left (1960-1980)

The 1961 elections signaled the return to democracy, political pluralism and the competitive party system in Turkey. A coalition government was established by CHP and the newly formed Justice Party (Adalet Partisi [AP]). 130 In this climate, the first

conciliatory gesture occurred when the new government allowed the 55 Kurdish notables

who have been deported to western Turkey, to return to eastern Turkey. Also the 1960s

witnessed the emergence of a more vocal civil society.

Most notably Augustus Richard Norton particularly optimistic when he wrote “a

functioning, participant political system in which people vote regularly and meaningfully,

where freedom to speak freely is protected and where the rights of the individual enjoy

significant respect”. 131 Expanding on this, Norton states that “democracy does not reside

in elections” adding “If democracy- as it is known in the West- has a home, it is in civil

society, where mélange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions,

130 AP is the political reincarnation of DP which was dissolved by the military junta. 131 Norton, A. R. (ed.) 1995 Civil Society in the Middle East, (2 vols) Leiden: Brill, p. 4.

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parties and groups come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen.” 132 Indeed democratic emergence is more remarkable given the fact that democracy began to appear only in 1950.

One significant development to support the argument above and reflecting the country’s newfound political liberties was the formation of the first legal socialist party in the republican history: the Turkish Workers Party (Turkiye Isci Partisi [TIP]). Soon after its formation, the Kurdish intellectuals sharing socialist tendencies had joined the party. 133 Also given the underdevelopment of the Kurdish provinces, TIP and other leftist movements managed to attract the support of some parts of the Kurdish population. In addition, White argues that the new era of Kurdish nationalism began with the formation of the Eastern 134 Revolutionary Cultural Centers (Devrimci Dogu Kultur Ocaklari

[DDKO]) in 1969. 135 There were other formations and attempts prior to the DDKOs, however, the latter was the first legal Kurdish organization in Turkey. 136 They were formed as a reaction to the provocative anti-Kurdish articles 137 and influenced by the

Marxist-Leninist ideology.

132 (ibid.), p. 7 133 In 1970, at the Party’s Fourth Congress, the first statement concerning Kurds was made: “There is a Kurdish people in the East of Turkey…The fascist authorities representing the ruling classes have subjected the Kurdish people to a policy of assimilation and intimidation…” From Nazan, K. “The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire”, p. 29. 134 White argues the term East is a diplomatic substitution for the name of the motherland Kurdistan. White, P. J. Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? p. 134. 135 White, P. J. Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? p. 129. 136 There were bilingual journals in the late 1950s and 1960s such as Deng (Voice), Yeni Akis (New Current), and Dicle-Firat (Tigris- Euphrates). Also in 1965, the first Kurdish nationalist organization formed since 1938: the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (PDKT). It was modeled on the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) founded and led by famous Barzani clan. Although the PDKT enjoyed some growth, it disappeared from the political stage by the end of the decade. See Bozarslan, H. 1992 “Political aspects of the Kurdish problem in contemporary Turkey”, in Kreyenbroek, P. G. and Sperl, S. (eds), The Kurds. A Contemporary Overview , NY: Routledge, pp. 98-99 and White, P. J. Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? , p. 131-132. 137 First of these articles appeared in 1967 in the Turkish magazine Otuken , journal of the extreme right- wing Nationalist Action Party. This article, for instance stated that Kurds were a backward people…who wanted to cut Turkey into pieces…When we tell the Kurds their home truths, they do not blush with shame,

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Overall, in this climate of political pluralism and democratization in the latter part

of the 1960s, Kurdish politicians seemed content within the Turkish left-wing and right-

wing political parties. Also since the new constitution allowed greater political diversity,

the 1960s witnessed ideological polarization. The CHP and AP respectively shifted their

ideological orientations further to the left and the right of the political spectrum. Taspinar

argues, even the severe restrictions on Kurdish political and cultural expression by the

republican Kemalist tradition did not radicalize assimilated (also urban, western Turkey)

Kurds and pragmatic Kurdish politicians in the east, who preferred operating within the

national political establishment.

Unfortunately, increasing ideological polarization accompanied by political

violence and the inability of the government to curb street violence paved the way to

second military intervention in republican history on March 1971.

The Turkish military declared martial law and restricted many of the freedoms introduced in the 1961 Constitution, especially freedom of the press, universities’ autonomy, and the right of some groups to unionize.138 In addition to the TIP, groups

such as DDKOs were outlawed. It was also at this time that the role of the National

Security Council 139 (MGK- Milli Guvenlik Kurulu ) was strengthened.

In 1973 new elections were held and another era of multiple, polarized parties, with short term coalition governments lasted until 1980. During this period, Turkey ruled

because they do not have faces of human beings”. Another article states “Let the Kurds ask the Armenians about us” referring to the fate of Armenians at the hands of Ottomans with assistance from Kurds during the WWI. These abbreviated quotations are taken from White, P. J. Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers, pp. 132-133. 138 Dodd, C.H. 1990 The Crises of Turkish Democracy , Huntington: Eothen Press, p. 16 139 The MGK composed of top generals, the Prime Minister, and the President became a body that provided unsolicited “suggestions” to the civilian government. It was not until 2003, the MGK’s power has been curtailed by the conditions attached to Turkey’s possible accession to the EU and the military members of the council replaced by civilian equivalents.

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by ten different government coalitions. The divisions between different political parties had already expanded into the civil bureaucracy in the 1960s, but between 1973 and

1980, politicization of bureaucracy, trade unions, associations and even the police and military reached new heights. 140

Within the institutionalized political system, the urban Kurds tended to support

Ecevit’s left-leaning CHP, while the countryside, still largely in control of the landlords

and sheiks, tended to vote for the Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamic National Salvation Party

(MSP- Milliyetci Selamet Partisi ) or Suleyman Demirel’s AP.

Initially, Romano argues, the Kurdish nationalists continued to seek the inclusion

of a Kurdish program within both the legal political parties and the radical Turkish leftist

groups. However, they soon became frustrated with their lack of progress on the issue.

CHP while willing to recognize the need for help in promoting economic and social

development in the Kurdish regions, refused to even recognize that there is a Kurdish

question in Turkey existed (See page 26-27). From the point of the Turkish left, the

hardships faced by the Kurds in Turkey were the same as those faced by average Turks:

class oppression, exploitation…etc Also much of the left in Turkey was also as Turkish

nationalist as it was leftist, and the response to so-called separate Kurdish concern was

“Yes to liberty and equality, no to separatism.” 141 The institutionalized political system

remained closed for the Kurdish aspirations throughout the 1970s.

140 “The police force, teachers associations… divided into rival left-wing and right-wing associations. DISK (Devrimci Isci Sendikalari- Revolutionary Trade Unions Confederation) organized frequent violent demonstrations…” For more detail, see Dodd, The Crises of Turkish Democracy , pp. 47-48. 141 Cigerli, Sabri (1999) “Les Kurdes et leur histoire”, Paris: L’Harmattan, p. 129 in Romano, D. 2006 The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 47.

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Nonetheless, in the 1970s, many Kurdish nationalists broke away to form their own Kurdish left-wing organizations. In addition to the Kurdish Democratic Party of

Turkey (1965) and DDKO (1969), the groups that emerged from Turkish left-wing movements include: Bes Pacacilar (1976), Sivancilar (1972), DDKD- Revolutionary democratic Culture Association (1975), TKSP- Turkish Kurdistan Socialist Party (1975),

Kawa (1976), Denge Kawa (1977), Rizgari (1977), Ala Rizgari (1979), KUK- Kurdistan

National Liberationists (1978), TSK- Kurdistan Socialist Movement (1980) and of course, the most notorious and the violent one which led the Kurdish in

Turkey in 1980s and 1990s and caused the death of 30,000 people one led by Abdullah

Ocalan the PKK- Kurdistan Workers’ Party (1978). 142

1983 until present: Rise of the PKK, the EU and political openings

The military coup in 1980 brought a period of severe repression and martial law. The

Turkish and Kurdish left met the same unhappy fate, except for one major exception: the

PKK. After the military coup, the military regime further clamped down on any form of

distinct Kurdish identity. 143

Turgut Ozal, who served alternately as both the prime minister and the president of Turkey during 1983-1993 period broke several Kemalist taboos toward the end of his term in office. Ozal, who was part Kurdish himself recognized that some fundamental changes were necessary to bring Turkey’s Kurdish citizens back into the political moderation. To this end, Law 2932 (which declared the mother tongue of Turkish citizens to be Turkish) was finally abolished along with articles 141, 142, and 163 of the

142 This list is taken from Imset, I. The PKK . In some cases, the year of foundation is an approximation, given the difficulty in obtaining accurate data. 143 For details of 1982 Constitution and the PKK see pages 26-31

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Turkish Penal Code (which penalized Marxist and Islamic political activity) in 1991.

While there has been some relaxation on the private use of the Kurdish language, any discussion of the ‘Kurdish Question’ remained subject to prosecution in the State

Security Courts. In any case, in 1993 after some heavy losses in the battlefield, the PKK has announced a unilateral ceasefire, which many people believed President Ozal had played a crucial role. 144 It should also be noted that this ceasefire did not even mention

autonomy, self-determination, or separation, rather the main emphasis was negotiated

solution to Kurdish problem with a commitment to the unity of Turkey. 145 The Turkish

political leaders followed in the wake of Ozal’s death lacked influence and willingness to

solve the problem.

Perhaps the biggest setback for the PKK occurred in February 1999, when

Turkish agents captured Ocalan, the PKK leader, in Kenya. 146 Ocalan was tried in Turkey

and sentenced to death, but the Turkish authorities refrained from carrying out Ocalan’s

sentence. In October 2002, the death sentence was officially commuted to life

imprisonment as part of the EU accession talks. At its Helsinki Summit in December

1999, the EU officially invited Turkey to become a candidate member, thus fulfilling one

of Ankara’s most important foreign policy goals. This positive trend continued with the

December 2002 Copenhagen Summit, after which the EU declared that if Turkey fulfilled

the Copenhagen criteria for membership, accession negotiations would start without a

delay after the EU summit of December 2004. AK Party government, which has roots in

144 Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p. 138. 145 McDowall, D. A modern history of the Kurds, p. 437. 146 In the fall of the 1998, Turkey had massed troops on the Syrian border and threatened war with Syria if Damascus insisted on continuing to allow Ocalan to reside there. The Syrians eventually expelled Ocalan, who then went to multiple countries including Russia and Italy in search of a new refuge. He was eventually captured in Kenya immediately after he left the Greek Embassy. Greek minister of Foreign Affairs resigned after the event.

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political Islam completed the criteria and Turkey currently is in the accession negotiation phase. Since 2001 the government in Turkey has begun introducing changes in its legislations, especially in order to please the EU. If ascension to the EU also remains a possibility, Kurds in Turkey could reasonably expect increasing protections and recognition of their identity as Kurds, which would in turn leave fewer Kurds feeling that recourse to arms was necessary.

Assessment (1960- present)

The results of political modernization; electoral politics, the more liberal 1960

constitution, and the resulting political freedoms seem to have allowed the left, which

provided a roof for the Kurdish nationalists, in Turkey to organize and grow. However

this growth quickly surpassed the limits that the political system would tolerate.

Prevented from pursuing a meaningful change from within the institutionalized system,

leftist groups resorted to subversion and tactics outside “legally accepted channels”, just

as Kurdish groups had done in 1920s and 1930s. Extreme right-wing neo-fascist counter-

movements also emerged to pursue their aims outside the system. A favorable political

situation for the left went no further than this.

From the perspective of political modernization, the emergence of so many leftist

Kurdish nationalist groups during 1970s is somewhat puzzling. On the whole, the

opportunities provided by the political system did not appear much better than the climate

in the 1960s. As stated earlier, although bureaucratic system and police suffered from

increasing political divisions in the 1970s and such divisions may have given Kurdish

nationalists some extra room to maneuver, state security forces could still be counted on

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to harshly repress any manifestation of separatism. Elite allies with power and resources supporting Kurdish nationalists were no more available in the 1970s than in the 1960s.

Moreover, political elite supporting the Turkish state were even more polarized by the

1970s, though they still appeared as unified as ever when it came to opposing Kurdish particularism.

What then escalated the growth and influence of Kurdish nationalism in the

1970s? One remaining element of political modernization may provide some explanation.

In the 1960s, the growing Kurdish urban, non-tribal elite may have held some hopes for

pursuing Kurdish nationalist aspirations from within the institutionalized system. The

1960 Constitution and the increased freedoms it provided, along with the growth of

Turkish left may have encouraged them to pursue their agendas through these seemingly

available channels. It is true that by the mid 1970s, such hopes proved to be futile and the

1971 coup and the resulting constitutional amendments took back the gains of 1960 and

made it clear that pluralism in Turkey would not be permitted to challenge basic Kemalist

principles. However, this does not challenge the fact that the processes of political

modernization in Turkey have planted the seeds of modern Kurdish nationalism.

Therefore I conclude that the frequently interrupted attempts for modernization process in Turkey have two consequences for this project’s thesis. On the one hand, it caused the development of a credible Kurdish nationalist movement which can be and is willing to be contained within the institutional structure of modern politics in Turkey.

This also supports the modernist proposition (H2) that political modernization reduces and contains separatist nationalism. On the other hand, frequent military coups and very narrowly interpreted Kemalist principles provided Kurdish nationalists little room to

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expand and practice their aspirations within the institutionalized system. Seeing little opportunity to exercise their political rights, nationalist Kurds came to the conclusion that the time was ripe to found their own specifically Kurdish movements. 147

The last question we have to tackle in this assessment is: Can a focus on political modernization or lack thereof account for the emergence of the PKK and mass Kurdish dissent in the 1980s and 1990s? First of all, the modernist approach criticized in this study explains the form of dissent the Kurdish nationalist movement took in the 1980s.

With the 1980 coup and the preceding 1971 military intervention, political modernization processes were interrupted in Turkey. Given the fact that the modernization process halted, the institutionalized system appeared more closed than ever to Kurdish nationalists. Martial law and a new constitution that focused on restricting freedoms and strengthening state control did not sit well with those who were critical of Kemalist policies. In 1993 Ankara officially banned the use of Kurdish in public, which was already de facto policy since the 1930s. With the mainstream political parties unwilling or unable to address the Kurdish issue (see discussion before) and with civil society crushed under the coup, the only form of dissent was left that which the PKK adopted: violent subversion and guerilla war. With no one in the government to bargain with, it is no surprise a radical Marxist Kurdish nationalist movement willing to use violence against the state emerged. As I already noted the plethora of similarly extreme-left

Kurdish movements emerged in the 1970s due to the political structures of Turkey, which were conducive to the emergence of such a form of dissent.

147 Kutschera states that “Abdullah Ocalan and a handful of other Kurdish leaders, of course, came to the decision that given the closed political system, the formation of a clandestine leftist Kurdish party was necessary”. Kutschera, C. (1979) “Le Mouvement National Kurde”, Paris: Bayard Editions, cited and translated in Romano, D. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement , p. 48.

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Second, multi-party democratic politics in Turkey created divisions in the ruling political elite. However the polity tended to unify to oppose the threat of Kurdish particularism. When such divisions threaten the state’s ability to protect itself against subversives, as in the 1960s and 1970s, the military intervened.

Third, the only elite allies initially available to Kurdish nationalist came from the political left, which further affected the character these movements can take. However, the strength of elites in the left in Turkey was not great. Financial resources, the power to influence government policy, and large organized networks were sorely lacking.

Fourth, although continuing international support has been important for the

Kurdish nationalism, such importance should not be exaggerated. Syria, and other supporters (Greece, Armenia, Iran and Iraq have all been accused) had to be careful not to be too obvious with their support, since they face a myriad of possible consequences. 148

Therefore, in terms of political modernization the Kurdish nationalist movement, inside or outside the institutional system in Turkey does not seem to have had sufficiently favorable circumstances to develop into a mass legal movement due to a closed institutionalized political system, some instability and division within Ankara’s political elite, the presence of relatively weak elite allies and limited international support. When the final variable, state repression, is factored in, the ways to reduce separatist Kurdish nationalism in Turkey through use of modern state mechanisms looks much less favorable. Overall, crediting the modernist hypothesis (H2), I conclude that lack of

148 For more on these incentives and disincentives affecting international support of the PKK and other Kurdish groups, see Kirisci, K. and Winrow, G. The Kurdish Questions and Turkey, ch. 6.

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progress in political modernization especially since 1970s, is responsible for providing suitable grounds for the development of Kurdish nationalism.

From the modernist perspective, one promising issue in Turkish politics recently was the start of the EU accession negotiations. As mentioned earlier, the EU pressure led to plethora of reforms such as the legalization of broadcasts and education in Kurdish in

Turkey. However as of October 2007, the PKK terror and Kurdish nationalism are two issues that are on top of the political agenda. The PKK terror continued to accelerate in

2007 and cost more lives of Turkish soldiers and civilians. Turkish National Assembly passed a resolution to allow Turkish military to do whatever it takes to stop the PKK including a military incursion to northern Iraq.

Although further pressure from the EU will likely cause the Turkish government to make additional adjustments to its legal code, the only real measure of such changes will involve a determination of whether or not they lead to changes in practice. In addition, a permanent solution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey cannot come into being by some structural adjustments. Without a public spirit of critical debate concerning the

Kurds and some understanding of their point of view, conflict resolution will remain remote. In the following sections, I will inquiry the possibility for such public spirit by analyzing the last of our hypothesis: the impact of socio-cultural modernization on

Kurdish nationalism.

III- Socio-cultural modernization and Kurdish Nationalism (H3) Having examined Kurdish nationalist challenges to the Turkish state from the

“economic” and “political” perspectives, this section will consider the same issue from

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the perspective of social and cultural modernization. As was the case in previous two sections, an attempt will be made to limit the bulk of the explanatory focus to answer whether socio-cultural modernization had a diminishing affect on Kurdish separatism. H3 will be supported if this analysis finds that socio-cultural modernization in Turkey replaced traditional sources of Kurdish identity, such as tribal, religious, and class with a national one, namely Turkish identity.

Kurdish Identity (until 1960)

Although the principal focus of this section centers around the period since 1960 until today on the cultivation of Kurdish ethnic nationalist sentiment in Turkey, such subject requires minimum discussion of the Kurdish history in the country. We must arrive at some understanding of prevalent Kurdish identities before the 1960s in order to evaluate changes that occurred in more recent years.

The concepts of culture and identity centers around generalized attitudes and ideas within a given population. As mentioned before the Kurdish identity has always had to compete with other possible identities, such as tribal and religious. However, as far back as seventeenth century, some Kurdish elites displayed a nationalist ethnicity.

Ehmed-e Xani, a Kurdish mullah and leading intellectual of the 1600s was concerned with elevating the Kurdish language as one of the pillar upon which a Kurdish state could be built: ‘The two tasks, political (i.e., formation of a Kurdish state) and literary (i.e., writing and compiling in native tongue) were considered by Khani to be two sides of the same coin. He did not view language cultivation as an end in itself. A prestigious literary

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language, together with a sovereign king, was the hallmark of a civilized and independent

Kurdish nation.” 149

Nonetheless, a politicized ethnic identity does not appear to have pre-dominated the identities of large parts of the Kurdish population until well into the twentieth century. The first two large scale Kurdish revolts that included some important nationalist references were the Kocgiri and Sheik Said uprisings of 1920s mentioned earlier. If, for important segments of the population, a Kurdish nationalist identity had predominated over other identities at the time, the rebellions would have enjoyed much greater success.

Instead, the Turkish government was able to recruit large numbers of Kurds to help to suppress those in revolt. One would at least expect Kurdish nationalists to refrain from aiding outsiders to suppress fellow Kurds, despite particularistic tribal or religious differences. Evidence from time indicates that large numbers of both rival Kurdish elites and their followers participated in the suppression of Kocgiri and Sheik Said revolts. 150

Kemal Ataturk in 1920 was able to frame the ongoing struggle of the nascent

Turkish state as a contest between Western powers, who supported the Christian

Armenians and Greeks, and Muslim-Ottoman Turks and Kurds. By framing the issue in

this manner, Kurdish nationalism countered by an appeal to Kurds’ Muslim identity, and

the revolt were then crushed by Turkish and Kurdish forces. 151

149 Hassanpour writes “The pen and the sword: literacy, education and revolution in Kurdistan”, in Peter Freebody and Anthony R. Welch, “Knowledge, Culture and Power: An International Perspective on Literacy as Policy and Practice”, Hassanpour, A. “The Making of Kurdish Identity”, p. 42. 150 The demands made by the Kocgiri rebels were Kurdish nationalist in nature and not particular to tribe or religious interest. For example, acceptance by Ankara of Kurdish autonomy, the release of all Kurdish prisoners, the withdrawal of Turkish officials from areas with a Kurdish majority. 151 Here I must also note that Mustafa Kemal and the leaders of the new Turkish Republic were probably well aware that the population under their control did not share a common language, religion, or culture, but they could forge one out of the geographical unit that the War of Independence had left them. Therefore everyone found themselves within the new Turkish borders in 1923 became Turkish. Through strong central government, a uniform education system, and the imposition of a single language (Turkish), the

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In terms of Sheik Said rebellion, Kurdish challengers had better chances to unite due to abolition of sultanate and caliphate along with other secularizing reforms. Also there were groups such as Azadi (mentioned earlier, fn. 45, p. 17) which provided inspirational and organizational force. However, the Sheik Said rebellion failed because of the same problem: lack of unity. Especially the revolt’s framing both in nationalist and religious grounds denied the rebels crucial Alevi support. The Alevi Kurds, in the light of many years of religious persecution at the hands of Sunni Kurds, had no desire to see a rebellion led by a Sunni Sheik succeed. Van Bruinessen argues “[for the Alevis] an independent Kurdistan, under the authority of Sunni sheiks, could only be to their disadvantage”. 152

Nevertheless, the large numbers of Kurdish uprisings that broke out in Turkey during the 1920s and 1930s remained potent symbols for Kurdish nationalists later on. In a way, I suggest that Turkish state became the victim of her own modernization process.

States pursuing modernization programs such as Turkey, seek to remove such private ethnic identification and if possible replace it with a national, in this case Turkish identity. As the discussion of Kemalist interpretation of Turkish identity showed,

Turkishness was supposed to provide an umbrella identity for the Anatolian mosaic of cultures. The rhetoric of the national government was one of civic nationalism where nation—state would be built along European lines. It is true that the British in the eighteenth century, as well as majority of Frenchmen, Italians, and Germans more recently, shed their local languages and adopted standard English, French, Italian, German, in the process creating a national culture and hence a nation. Mustafa Kemal, who admired French Revolution (and the laicism) probably inspired by it, in the sense that, at the time of the French revolution, no more than half the French spoke French – Breton, Basques, Alsatian, Occitanian, Catalan, Corsican, and Fleming identities existed. Spears, I. 2004 “States- within-states: an Introduction to their empirical attributes”, in Kingston, P. and Spears, I. (eds.) States within States , New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.22. Also, one must read ’s Forging a nation for an excellent historical account of the struggle for the United Kingdom. The rhetoric of national government was one of civic nationalism where diverse population unified by Turkish citizenship but retained their particularistic ethnic and linguistic attributes. However, as shall be elaborated below in practice state-building was along ethnic lines. 152 Van Bruinessen, M. Agha, Sheik and State, p. 294.

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diverse population unified by the Turkish citizenship but retained their particularistic ethnic and linguistic attributes. However, in practice, nation-building in Turkey evolved along ethnic lines mostly as a result of the early Kurdish rebellions. When this transformation of the state rhetoric into an ethnic one coupled with disorienting processes of modernization during the early years of the republic, people who may have had little awareness of their Kurdish ethnicity or viewed ethnicity as a private matter experienced a forced change of heart when the state persecuted them or razed their village because of their ethnicity.

Here we can elaborate more on relationship between modernization and diffusion

of the Kurdish nationalist identity. Modernization introduced changes that increased the

size and dynamism of the Kurdish intelligentsia as well as improving the education level

of the general population and exposing them to a larger political arena of the region. As

discussed in the economic modernization section, by the 1950s, major changes in Kurdish

feudal relations of production began to take place. This was in part due to immigration or

deportations from rural Kurdish areas, as well as the government’s land reforms. 153 The rural-urban migration increased, and the Kurdish working class and the modern bourgeoisie settled in Ankara and Istanbul began to grow. Larger numbers of Kurds entered the skilled artisan and professional work force, increasing the numbers of

Kurdish mechanics, printers, electricians, lawyers, doctors and journalists. Increasing the education and participation in social, economic, political and cultural life of the Republic became available to the Kurdish populations. 154

153 Hassanpour, A. 1984 “The Kurdish Experience”, The Middle East Report 189 (July-August), pp. 4-5. 154 Ibid.

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In effect, as the increasing numbers of Kurds came into contact with the nationalist ideologies of other groups, they began to re-examine their own identities. For instance, Mahmut Altunakar, a Kurdish MP from DYP, related the following experience of his youth: “Until I arrived in Kutahya I did not know I was Kurdish. We used to throw stones at those calling us Kurds in Diyarbakir. We came to Kutahya and they called us

Kurds. They baited us with “Where is your tail?” Going to school was an ordeal. Then we understood our villagers were right, we are Kurds”.155 In many cases this self-reflection led to an increased sense of Kurdish nationalist identity, mirroring the nationalisms of other peoples around them. 156

As (H3) suggested, tribal, religious or other identities may not have been

completely forsaken, but insertion into a larger environment often encouraged the

adoption of a larger ethnic identity that took precedence over the other allegiances.

However for some Kurds that larger identity was not the Turkish identity which would

reduce separatist inspirations as (H3) suggests. Rather, it was the Kurdish ethnic national

identity with exclusionary and particularistic tendencies. In other cases, options included

assimilation to the national Turkish identity, acceptance of Turkish civic identity co-exist

with a private Kurdish identity, adoption of a pan-Islamic outlook or other variations and

mixes of identities. One thing is clear, more circumscribed tribal, village, or regional

attachments declined as a result of modernization. However rather than Turkish identity,

in some cases Kurdish ethnic identity replaced the traditional loyalties.

155 McDowall, D. A modern history of the Kurds , p. 403. Also, Romano, apart from his personal interview with Abdullah Ocalan, argues that the PKK founder Ocalan, originally an admirer of Ataturk and viewed himself as Turkish. During his years as a political science student in Ankara, however, he claims to have ‘rediscovered’ his Kurdishness and developed a nationalist Kurdish ethnic identity, Romano, D. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, pp. 111-2. 156 The reader may wish to refer to Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism for a deeper analysis of this process.

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Assessment (until 1960)

Before proceeding, it is useful to summarize the issues of socio-cultural modernization and separatist Kurdish nationalism raised above. First, a complex web of different identities (religious, tribal, national, linguistic, regional and class) exists within the population we refer to as Kurdish. At different times and for different groups, many competing identities took precedence over a Kurdish national identity, such as tribal and religious. Second, at the same time, a general sense of belonging to the Kurdish ethnicity has existed for many hundreds of years within a large segment of the population I am discussing (for example: Ehmed-e Xani, p. 65). This ethnic identification served as the necessary precursor and building block for a politicized Kurdish identity. Particularly among part of the Kurdish urban elite, such an ethnic identity often already superseded other identities by the time of the revolts of the 1920s and 1930s. Third, changes brought about as a result of modernization and urbanization facilitated the adoption of a more

Kurdish nationalist identity among average Kurds. State repression of Kurds, international trends and events 157 , the experience of Kurds in neighboring countries, and contact with refugee Kurds from Iraq all had the effect of moving general Kurdish attitudes and thinking towards a more politicized ethnic identity. Fourth, armed and particularly guerilla style opposition, to an intrusive and repressive central government, in the rest of the twentieth century, remained one of the oldest and accepted items for some part of the Kurds.

157 For example Algerian independence struggle, other anti-colonial wars of liberation, and civil rights protests.

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1960- present

After crushing a long series of Kurdish revolts, it seemed that Ankara was succeeding

with its homogenization program. From 1938 until 1961, Kurdish national activity

appeared largely dead. The Turkish education system, media, and public discourse in

general proceeded as if Kurds did not exist within the country. All things specifically

Kurdish, be they language, cultural practices, names, history or literature were either

excluded or taken over and determined to be actually Turkish in origin. 158 Everyone within the borders was happy to be Turkish and equal on this basis. It was hoped that with a unified population behind them, Turkey’s leaders could build a prosperous, secular and modern nation-state. For some time one might have been justified believing that the state policy was succeeding.

The new Turkish constitution of 1961 created an opening for freedom of expression, which led to a resurgence of Kurdish intellectual and cultural activity.

However the government responded by placing new bans on Kurdish language and publications, especially Kurdish language material brought into the country from abroad.

The official denial of Kurdish lasted until 1991. In 1991, portions of the official ban on public use of Kurdish language were repealed by then the president Turgut Ozal, and an effort was made to recognize that the Kurds could possess a private Kurdish identity. As

Barkey and Fuller argued Ozal managed to challenge the Kemalist consensus and introduced new ideas and open realms of inquiry and thinking: “He did this almost single-handedly, and often with members of his own party opposing him.” 159 Ozal’s

definition of the problem and of the need for cultural concessions to the Kurds has in fact

158 For more on this, see, McDowall, D. A modern history of the Kurds , chs. 9, 19, 20. 159 Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish question , p. 136.

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accelerated the process of building expectation and of heightening the ethnic consciousness. Unfortunately, it is difficult to argue that, the changes were due to parts of modernization process. Rather, by that time the conflict with the PKK had made it, to a certain extent, impossible to continue to ignore the Kurdish reality in the country. The

PKK attacked military and civilian targets such as Kurdish villages, Turkish targets in

Europe, state facilities, teachers, schools and massacred entire families. Bomb attacks have been staged in the west of Turkey, especially tourist sites intending to disrupt tourism. These violent attacks gave the state some powerful propaganda images with which to paint the terrorist as a “bunch of bloodthirsty bandits who had hit the mountains”. 160

1990s and the EU

Ankara’s response to the PKK insurgency was simple: the PKK is a small band of terrorists who lacked popular support and were unrepresentative of Kurds in Turkey.

While forced to concede that Kurds in the southeast were indeed unhappy with Ankara,

Turkish officials contended that the cause of disgruntlement was social and economic nature, and not one of competing nationalisms. Hence the solution to the problem lay in a combination of socio-economic development for the southeast and a strong military response to PKK terrorism. 161

160 Imset, I. The PKK , p. 311. Since the nature, tactics and organization of PKK is beyond the scope of this study, I keep the analysis of PKK minimal. Readers may want to read The PKK for vivid account of PKK terrorism. 161 After the capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, the group scaled down its original goals of Kurdish statehood to autonomy within Turkey, a federal state, or even just a formally multi-cultural state that guarantees Kurdish rights. The adoption of the new name of “KADEK” in April 2002, and then “Congra-Gel” (People’s Democracy Congress) in November 2003, was also indicative of the group’s attempt to move itself out of the post- September 11 terrorist camp. The United States, Europe, Canada,

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Certainly, liberalizing long-established restrictions on the Kurdish language and

culture since 1990s amounted to one of Turkey’s greatest challenges. Moreover, the

conferring of cultural and linguistic rights became an important issue in the EU accession

process because such moves were closely tied to the need for negotiated political solution

to the Kurdish issue generally. Cultural and linguistic freedoms represent a dramatic

change in attitude in Turkey, indicating a willingness to acknowledge the presence of

alternative identities within the country and to concede to the legitimacy of a distinct

Kurdish culture.

Constitutional changes implemented in 2001 in relation with the EU accession

talks did not materially improve minority protection, but reforms brought in via sixth and

seventh reform packages have had some impact particularly in three fields; broadcasting,

personal names and language. It is in the context of these reforms that Turkey’s account

of social and cultural modernization can be considered.

First, the new Law on Broadcasting in Traditionally Used Languages and

Dialects 162 finally provided enforceable provisions allowing the state TRT [Turkish

Radio Television] channel, as well as private, national television channels, to broadcast in minority languages. TRT accordingly began broadcasting in Bosnian, the Kurmanci and

Zaza dialects of Kurdish, Arabic and Circassian on 7 June 2004, and these broadcast continue to be aired. 163 Also number of television and radio stations, based in Kurdish

Australia and others placed the PKK on their list of terrorist groups, which signaled a major victory for the Turkish state. 162 Came into effect on 25 January 2004. 163 The maximum duration permissible for broadcasting programs on radio and television are 60 minutes per day and 5 hours per week. Due to restrictions retained from previous regulation, programs focus on news, music and traditional culture. One can follow TRT’s regular broadcasting in these languages live on http://www.trt.net.tr .

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regions, have applied and are awaiting the results of their applications. 164 In response to complains from private entrepreneurs about the delay of application, the European

Commission reported in October 2004 that although permission has not yet been granted,

‘it has been reported that these applications will be based favorably.’ 165

Second, liberalization of restrictions on the Kurdish language has proved

contentious in personal names; an issue of central importance to the Kurds which fails to

find reference at all in the European Commission’s Report of October 2004. Kurdish

names were effectively prohibited in the public domain. Apparent concessions were made

in the Sixth Harmonization Package. The condition that children may not be given names

that are not appropriate to the ‘national culture’ and Turkish ‘customs and traditions’ was

replaced with one stating that only names which contravene ‘moral norms’ or that ‘offend

public’ are prohibited. The problem remains to a lesser extend due to regulations, which

clarify that names must consist of letters contained in the Turkish alphabet. 166 Since ‘q’,

‘w’, and ‘x’ (common letters in Kurdish language) do not exist in the Turkish alphabet,

names consisting those letters cannot be registered. This issue has been sparked very

recently by Atilla Koc, the minister of cultural affairs, when he suggested that the Turkish

alphabet may be modified to include 32 letters rather than 29. 167 Although, there are no

preparations to modify the alphabet, availability of such discussions in public domain by

prominent politicians leaves the door open for future references.

164 Independent Communications Network, BIA ( Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi ), Annual Media Report, 2004. For more information, visit http://www.bianet.org/index_eng_root.htm . 165 European Commission, ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s progress Towards Accession’, 2004, p. 40. 166 A Government Circular of 23 May 2002. 167 Altintas, B.E “Koc vows to compensate 170 years of Topkapi neglect”, May 7, 2007, Today’s Zaman, p. 4..

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Finally, another important area of reform in the context of cultural and linguistic rights has been in Kurdish language teaching. The Law on Teaching in Different

Languages and Dialects Traditionally Used by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives, part of the seventh harmonization package in EU accession talks, has marked a dramatic departure from state norm by facilitating the opening of private Kurdish language courses. According to EU progress report, several private Kurdish language courses opened, beginning in May 2004. 168 However, the teaching of Kurdish remains banned

from the state education system. Article 42 of the constitution maintains that ‘no

language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens’. It

would be against the nature of the unitary system to expect such a radical change in the

education system of a unitary country.

Overall, then, Turkey while having made concession in the field of cultural rights

which at first sight appear groundbreaking, there is a room for progress especially in the

implementation of reforms in key public institutions, the media, and other aspects of day-

to-day life.

Assessment (1960- present)

Has the modernist theoretical perspective on socio-cultural conditions (H3)

employed in this section explained satisfactorily the emergence and growth of a Kurdish

nationalist challenge to Ankara? To a certain extent: yes. Attempts for modernization

have caused development of modern Kurdish identity but failed to contain it within the

institutional borders of the Turkish nation-state. Due to multiple regime interruptions by

military coups and the repressive state policies towards a possible threat to the unity of

168 European Commission, ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s progress Towards Accession’, 2004, p. 49.

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state, this emerging Kurdish identity could not be accommodated within the Turkishness umbrella. As our survey has showed the granting of cultural rights in Turkey is a highly sensitive issue and constitutes a benchmark in assessing Turkey’s progress towards modernization/ democratization. Broadly, modernization theory suggests that, where a state allows or facilitates the flowering of alternative identities and cultures within its borders, this is seen to cultivate a value in itself, namely a richer, more open and vibrant society. Furthermore, where minorities are not granted cultural rights, the state makes a clear statement that such minorities are not valued or accepted; instead they are treated as outsiders, alienated from mainstream conceptions of the state.

One of the greatest challenges to cultural modernization, though, is that for some governments, group identities distinct from the official national identity provoke fears that the territorial integrity of the state will be undermined. Accordingly it is perceived that conferring cultural rights will lead to a greater cultural awareness among minorities, inspire the radicalization of minority claims and ultimately fuel demands for autonomy.

Such fears have certainly been evident in Turkey and to a certain extent our inquiry has proved that facilitating cultural rights caused, for instance with 1961 constitution, a significant resurgence of Kurdish identity and politicized separatist nationalism. Analysis of Turkish socio-cultural modernization provides a threefold argument:

First, this section has demonstrated that at the very least, a private ethnic Kurdish identification existed amongst some Kurds who found themselves within the new Turkish

Republic. The Turkish state, aware of the multi-ethnic nature of its subject population, pursued a modernization policy that would mold a unified Turkish nation within the state boundaries it had attained.

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Second, the state control of education and media gave Ankara an early advantage and Kurdish population successfully assimilated in Turkish nationhood until 1960. By the

1960s, the new liberal constitution, modernization and advances in communication technology began to shift some power to Kurdish nationalists. Kurdish insurgents especially the PKK, separatist and terrorist organization, promoted an opposing vision and sought to mobilize Kurdish opposition to the state, based on the politicized Kurdish ethnicity. The cultural impact of the separatist PKK’s contest with the Turkish state polarized society in Turkey. While the bulk of the population in Turkey remained hostile to terrorist tactics of PKK, within some part of the Kurdish population Kurdish national sentiment experienced an awakening.

Third, Turkey has made substantial concessions in terms of cultural modernization which appears groundbreaking as a result of EU accession process. It has been commonly asserted among NGOs that Turkey has made vast efforts in improving the legislative and administrative protection of .

Turkey has proved committed to the modernization project in all of the perspectives we have analyzed. However, Turkey is also tied up in paranoia over increased cultural rights spelling the break-up of the Turkish Republic. True that Turkey has a way to go before cultural pluralism is realized. Fundamental to this process must be the realization/ or understanding by Turkey that conferring cultural rights upon the Kurds is hardly likely to spark greater Kurdish discontent and discord. Instead, if (H3) is correct, the reverse is true; it is through denying cultural rights that Kurdish dissatisfaction and impeding achievement of a peaceful and enduring solution to the

Kurdish question has emerged.

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With regard to the modernist hypotheses, which predicted that modernization of socio-cultural conditions will reduce separatist Kurdish nationalism, I argue that they fail to understand the link between culture and national identity. Thus modernist accounts wrongly assume that more cultural rights will diminish separatist calls. Kurdish case provides an interesting example of how cultural modernization, although limited due to frequent regime interruptions in Turkey, and modernist approach fails to grasp the true nature of national identity. This is not to say that modernists fail to acknowledge the importance of national identity and culture. Modernists, such as Gellner, Anderson and

Hobsbawn acknowledge nationalist evocation of the past, but they fail to give ethnicity any causal force in orienting populations through the transition. The major difference between modernists and ethnosymbolist, and what Kurdish case has shown, arises over the question of invention or the construction of the nation and the centrality of modern political elites and state institutions in its formation. is critical of what we can term as a top-down approach to culture formation, which visible in the works of

Gellner and Hobsbawn. Such a top-down approach, as this project agrees is simplistic and equates nationalism with a political nationalism focused on the achievement of legal citizenship and the subversion of nationalism. The terms ‘invention’ and ‘construction’ have strong connotation not only of novelty but also with intentionality and manipulation.

Therefore, modernists are proposing a view of nationalism, which operates within a sort of tabula rasa .

Kurdish and Scottish cases on the other hand suggest that nationalism so not operate on a blank tablet. Kurdish as well as Scottish nationalist movements shows us the importance of exploring the pre-existing ethnic sentiments as a causal force in the rise of

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nationalism, where nationalism forms a revolt against modernizing states; Great Britain and Turkey, which are perceived to be assimilating populations to an alien . Both Kurdish and Scottish nationalisms possessed a cultural aspect, which focused on the moral regeneration of the historical community, attempting an inner renovation of ethnic base, promoting high cultures, education centers, cultural and political self-help organizations. In this manner, cultural modernization, such as citizenship right, which modernist accounts thought as a remedy to separatism could not contain the claims for difference by Kurdish and Scottish communities.

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Chapter 5- CONCLUSION

Summing up the Debate

This project has sought to critically survey some of the core literature on modernist accounts of nationalism, scrutinizing the conceptual tools with which we make sense of it in two prominent cases of Scottish and Kurdish nationalisms. The underlying argument has been that there are shortcomings with modernist approaches and that the fruitfulness of framing debates on nationalism along the modernization processes may be exhausted.

I begin this conclusion by summarizing the major points that have been made in

the preceding chapters on the relationship between processes of modernization and rising

nationalism among Scots and Kurds (see Table 5.1, Table 5.2 and Table 5.3). In the light

of these considerations, I then go on to explain four major problems related with

modernist accounts: (1) Nationalism and the formation of nations should be examined in

a larger time span rather than just the last two centuries (2) The notions of ‘invented’ and

‘imagined’ should be replace by ‘reconstruction’ and ‘rediscovery’ of the ethnic past (3)

Nationalism is not a history specific and transitory force (4) The nature of modernity is

based on instability in the form of accelerating dynamism which generates new

nationalisms. Instead of modernist account, I adopt an ethno-symbolic framework,

building on the work of John Armstrong 1 and Anthony Smith 2. As mentioned earlier, the

ethnosymbolist approach seeks a middle ground between opposed primordialist and

modernist stances, and views modern nation as a novel species of ethnic group whose

1 Armstrong, J. Nations Before Nationalism . 2 Smith, A.D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations and Nationalism and Modernism.

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formation has to be understood in a longer period of time. I will conclude this dissertation by expressing few, necessarily speculative, reflections on the future of the study of nationalism.

Economic Modernization and Nationalism -modernist theories of nationalism assert that the demands of industrial and capitalist economies generate relatively unified national identities and thus reduce separatist nationalism (H1). In various ways, scholars such as Gellner 3, Hobsbawn 4, and

Greenfeld 5 include a prominent place for the idea that economic modernization reduces separatist nationalism because it integrates core and periphery (H1.1) and promotes welfare and reduces regional differences (H1.2). 6 Table 5.3 shows the summary of findings for (H1).

3 Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalisms . 4 Hobsbawn, E. Nations and Nationalisms since 1780 . 5 Greenfeld, L. 2001 The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth, MA: Harvard University Press. 6 A major sub-theme in this regard is the idea of the “uneven development” of the modern economy as a stimulus to separatist nationalism. This is most explicit in Gellner’s allegory of ‘Empire of Megalomania’ and its embedded territory of ‘Ruritania’ The Ruritanians were largely peasants speaking a variety of dialects and observing a religion different from the language and religion of the dominant Megalomanians who the empire named after them. In the nineteenth century, rapid population growth, industrialization and rural urban migration caused Ruritanians to understand how different they are from the dominant majority. Gellner writes “What this amounts to is this: during the early period of industrialization, entrants into the new order who are drawn from cultural and linguistic groups that are distant from those of the more advanced centre, suffer considerable disadvantages which are even greater than those of weak proletarians who have the advantage of sharing the culture of the political and economic rulers.” In other words, the cultural/linguistic distance and capacity of Ruritanians to differentiate themselves from others provides the basis for nationalist mobilization. Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalisms , pp. 58-62.

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Table 5.1 Summary of findings (H1) Scots Economic modernization helped integrate regions (H1.1) and promote 1707- 1960s welfare (H1.2), thus reduce regional differences (H1), and thereby reduced separatist nationalism. Scots (H1) discredited. It cannot explain the rise of Scottish separatism, which 1960s- present continued to be privileged minority as (H1’.1) suggested. Economic models are reductionist, thus (H1’.3) supported. Reasons for Scottish nationalism are: 1. Suffered economic decline, although still privileged minority. 2. Shift from liberalism of 19 th century to Keynesianism in the 20 th century and then back to liberalism during 1980s. 3. Loss of Empire status. Kurds Initially, economic modernization suggested (H1,) (H1.1), (H1.2) to be 20 th century-1970s correct later as economy develops. Kurds Expectations did not match the reality. Higher government spending did not 1970s-present reduce separatism, thus (H1’.2) supported. Econ. Models are reductionist, (H1’.3) supported.

The findings of this project, from analyzing British economic modernization and

Scottish nationalism from the Treaty of Union to the first half of twentieth century, support the modernist hypothesis (H1). The economic modernization accomplished its goal of closing the gap between center and periphery (H1.1) and reduced the regional differences (H1.2). The findings of this study on the relationship between Turkish economic modernization and the rise of Kurdish nationalism also fit well with the modernist approach and the ‘uneven development’ sub-theme. The industrialization, which started to take-off in the 1950s, and capitalist development in Turkey were not experienced evenly. Social and political cost of rapid and uneven implantation of capitalism and industrialization in Turkey was Kurdish nationalism. At this point, according to modernist approach, as Turkey marched towards more modern economy, as in the British case, the expected result would be integration of core and periphery (H1.1) and promotion of welfare and reduction of differences between Kurdish east and south- east and the other regions in Turkey (H1.2).

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However, the analysis of the cases in the latter part of the twentieth century discredits (H1) and supports the rivaling hypothesis, which suggested that economic modernization may play a role in fostering separatist nationalism (H1’). During this time period, though Scottish economy has experienced an economic decline, so does the rest of the Union and thus Scots continued to protect their position as a privileged minority.

Therefore, modernist account cannot provide an explanation for the rising Scottish separatism, where Scots could be considered as either economically privileged or economically even with the rest of the UK (H1’.1). The Kurdish case also discredits (H1) and provides support for (H1’.2), which suggested that economic underdevelopment of the region could not be the single, most important cause for separatist nationalism since east and southeast Turkey has received the largest shares of GNP since 1970s for regional development, although with lesser certainty when compared to Scottish case. During the

period of economic liberalization in the post-1980 era, public spending in the east and

south-east had tripled when compared to other regions in Turkey. Although rising public

spending in the region did not even out the differences between regions, according

modernist accounts we would expect a decreasing levels of Kurdish separatist

nationalism since this was a step towards reducing regional differences. Rather, as we

have seen, Kurdish nationalism has reached its peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s and

the PKK terror continued its destructive path even in 2007.

Scottish and Kurdish cases showed that to some extent cultural cleavages and

ethnic sentiments could be explained by economic characteristics. For instance, relative

deprivation factors proved to be important, more so in the Kurdish case when compared

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to Scotland. However, rising nationalism cannot be reduced to a matter of material interest that attributing separatist Scottish and Kurdish ethnic sentiments to purely economic and spatial reasons would be wrong. As this study has argued the rising

Scottish and Kurdish nationalisms in the latter part of the twentieth century, cannot be explained as merely a discontent caused by regional economic inequalities and exploitation. Rather, as Smith and other ethno-symbolist critiques of economic models has suggested, economic exploitation can only exacerbate a pre-existing sense of ethnic grievance.

In the abstract, both Nairn’s ‘uneven capitalism’ and Hechter’s ‘internal colonialism’ are plausible. However they do not fit the facts, because such attempts invert the actual sequence of events by placing the origins of nationalism within the less developed regions or underdeveloped countries. For instance, according to their formulation, Scottish and Kurdish nationalisms must predate English or Turkish nationalisms. However, nationalism originated in core areas (for ex. the Young Turks or the Committee of Union and Progress at the end of the nineteenth century in the Turkish case and the rise of English nationalism at the end of the eighteenth century 7 in the

British case) before the establishment of credible nationalist movements in the periphery.

Therefore, separatist Scottish and Kurdish nationalisms, which can be seen as a reaction to uneven development of capitalism between core and periphery, postdate English and

Turkish nationalisms.

Overall this study contends that, in contrast to modernist theories, it is difficult to correlate the strength and intensity of a nationalist movement with the degree of

7 For more on the rise of English nationalism during this period, see Newman, G. 1987 The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History 1740- 1830, New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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economic exploitation and backwardness. I argue that, in line with ethno-symbolist perspective, neither uneven development nor internal colonialism alone can create the sense of separateness and that such views based on economic exploitation need a strong pre-existing sense of distinctiveness (ethnic ties) to work on.

Political modernization and Nationalism Modernist scholars who focus on the transformations in the nature of politics expected that such transformations would reduce separatist nationalism as suggested in (H2). 8 It has been predicted that a modern state with bureaucratic and legal institutions integrates regions and groups (H2.1), defines individuals as citizens and thus diminish demands for separate rights (H2.2) and generate broad support for the national identity (H2.3) and that all of this reduces separatist nationalism. Table 5.2 shows the summary of findings for

(H2).

Table 5.2 Summary of findings (H2)

Scots (H2) is supported. Political modernization united regions and groups (H2.1) 1707- 1960s created liberal conceptions of citizenship (H2.2) and gained broad support (H2.3). Scots (H2) discredited. Reasons: 1960s- present 1. Demise of popular participation at the expense of technocracy. 2. Social democracy subjected to Conservative rule. 3. Prospects of sovereign and equal member of the EU. Thus, support for (H2’) Kurds Resistance and repression during single party regime. 20 th century-1970s - 1950 Multi-party politics,1961 Constitution liberal politics support (H2). Kurds 1971 coup closed political system, 1980 coup, turmoil strengthened Kurdish 1970s-present ethnic identity and . Thus lack of progress. But if (H2) is true, expect better atmosphere due to EU accession talks.

8 Among them are John Breuilly “Approaches to Nationalism”, Paul Brass Ethnicity and Nationalism , Eric Hobsbawn Nations and Nationalism since 1780.

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Scotland gave up its formal statehood to sign a Treaty of Union with England in

1707. While retaining a high measure of civil autonomy, Scotland became part of the

Union state in which the processes of political modernization of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries created a centralized state with liberal institutions, thus bringing support to (H2.1) by integrating Scottish administration with the British entity. The developing Scottish middle class shared a popular enthusiasm for the Union and the

Empire. The causal relationship was simple: Scotland benefited from the Union which paved the way to a healthy support for the Union as well as a non-separatist Scottish nationalism as suggested by (H2.2). Scotland needed the Union to realize its full potential while the Union needed Scotland to prevent de-generation to English take-over. In other words, modernizing state apparatus managed to invoke a national British rhetoric thus generated mass support as predicted by (H2.3).

In the Kurdish case, the War of Independence, with a promise of creating a modern unitary republic capable of integrating regions and ethnic groups as predicted in

(H2.1) managed to invoke a national rhetoric and generated broad support among the non-Turkish groups such as Kurds in Anatolia. Also the notions of ‘citizenship’ and

‘citizen’ in the 1924 constitution understood as common history and culture rather than ethnic origins, aimed at creating an modern polity of individuals which will diminish separatist movements (H2.2) and an umbrella identity that can be used to forge a coalition between Turks and Kurds which will generate support for national identity

(H2.3).

However modernist accounts of the link between political modernization and nationalism do not give us a satisfactory picture of why Scottish nationalism made a

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separatist turn after 1960s. Scotland is fully industrialized and had successfully scaled the slopes of modernization in the nineteenth century. According to modernist theory, the story should be complete and the differences between Scotland and England should not be enough to provoke nationalism. Rather in May 2007 SNP, with a promise for referendum on the Scottish independence came out victorious from the Scottish parliamentary elections for the first time in the devolved Scottish Parliament. 9

How can we account for the Scottish case? This project has found out three arguments, which paved the way for rising Scottish nationalism since 1960s. First, growth of Scottish administrative apparatus along the lines of technocracy risked demise of popular participation for technocratic efficiency. The Scottish state grew too much to pose a threat to individualism. Calls for a return to classical liberalism by the

Conservatives rivaled by demands for more individual control of government institutions by the leftists. Given the reduced role of the Conservatives and the traditional popularity of the left in Scotland, the left won the argument and the Scottish Parliament, which could be under popular scrutiny established. Second, social democratic majority in

Scotland subjected to the Conservative rule throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The

Conservative vote declined steadily in Scotland while the Scottish Office increasingly controlled by the Conservatives. This political divergence between Scotland and England contributed to the increasing popularity of the SNP. Third, the prospects of becoming a sovereign and equal member of the EU have outnumbered the advantages of being in a

Union with minority population with England. Overall, this project suggests that the relationship between political modernization and Scottish nationalism is simple: the more

9 SNP raised its share of seats from 27 to 47 and came out as the first party in May 2007 elections. SNP followed by Labour (46 seats), Conservatives (16) and Liberal Democrats (16). Currently SNP is the ruling party in Scotland with a minority government.

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the Scottish state modernized the more autonomous and thus distinct they were compared to the British (English?) state. The process of political modernization, which led to the

Scottish political distinctiveness, could not be contained within the traditional Union state framework. Therefore, Scottish nationalism today is a by-product of political modernization of British state, which discredits (H2) and supports the hypothesis, which suggested that political modernization may foster separatist nationalism (H2’).

The Kurdish case followed a separatist turn in the aftermath of the formation of the republic. A series of Kurdish rebellions broke out as the modern republican state decided to abolish caliphate and declare its commitment to secularism. The reason was that elitist approaches to nation-building in the first years of the Turkish Republic underestimated the local networks, as suggested by (H2’.1). The Kemalist elite underestimated the local commitments among Kurds and risked Kurdish resistance to political modernization as well as to principles of modern state such as secularism as early as 1920s. Islam was the single most important common denominator among diverse

Kurdish groups and it proved to be an invaluable source of conflict between Kurds and modernizing Turkish elite. Moreover, as predicted by (H2’.1), further modernization attempts by the elite proved to be problematic in Kurdish regions throughout the single- party era, which were alien to centralized state authority with modern functions such as taxation, land registration and police force. Therefore, the aspects of political modernization in Turkey are responsible for creation of solidarity and eventually separatist nationalism among Kurds.

In the late nineteenth century within the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were not ethnically self-conscious rather they defined themselves on religious grounds very much

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like Arabs, Albanians and Turks. However this has changed with the foundation of the

Republic. The article of the first constitution of Turkey had not referred to citizenship but used a much broader definition simply calling “the people of Turkey Turkish regardless of their religion and race.” The 1931 program of the CHP- established by Mustafa

Kemal- defined nation as a “social and political whole formed by citizens that are united by a common language, culture and objective.” Again there was no reference to ethnicity.

These two examples summarize the aim of the Mustafa Kemal and his leadership: they developed a definition of a nation which could have molded together the remnants of the

Ottoman society into one nation. However, the survey of the development of Turkish state showed that such theoretical formulations, which aimed at developing civic nationalism, did not take the form of a real civic nationalism in practice. There were a series of popular uprisings against Ankara’s attempts to centralize and modernize the

Turkish state. But the absence of a democratic tradition in the Ottoman and the Turkish polity make it extremely difficult for decision-makers in Ankara to pursue a policy based on civic integration as opposed to ethnic- Turkish nationalism. Therefore, this study concludes that in the first decades of the republic, political modernization, first, failed to integrate regions and groups as suggested by (H2.1), second, could not lead to establishment of modern state defined as polity of individual as suggested by (H2.2) and third, failed to create a national rhetoric which would diminish separatist class as suggested by (H2.3). Rather the political modernization project in Turkey created its own mirror image during the first years of the republic, that thanks to modernization attempts,

Kurdish identity started to form its modern shape.

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The transition to multi-party regime in 1946 and the atmosphere of political pluralism created by the 1961 constitution raised hopes for containing Kurdish dissent. In this mood of greater political diversity, non-separatist Kurdish ethnic awareness continued to grow as a part of the national identity, which provides support for (H2.3).

Also the Kurdish politicians seemed to be content with the political parties and the national political establishment as suggested by (H2) which predicted that political modernization could be an integrating force for the developing Kurdish identity. The

Kurdish identity in the 1960’s presented itself as a partner in the cultural mosaic of

Anatolia as well as a force that can help integrating Kurdish regions with the rest of

Turkey. However, the liberal premises of Turkish modernization have not lived too long and the political system became increasingly closed to accommodate Kurdish demands. 10

Therefore, Turkish case during the first two decades of multi-party parliamentary era provides a support for modernist perspective (H2) on two accounts. First, for the period of political pluralism in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the significance of the changing institutional forms of the state in terms of (a) integrating Kurdish politicians into national political establishment as a result of transition to multi-party regime (H2.1), (b) diminishing Kurdish separatist demands due to recognition of liberal rights and liberties as in the 1960 constitution (H2.2) and (c) invoking a national rhetoric in which Kurds felt themselves as part of the national identity (H2.3), contained calls for Kurdish nationalism. Second, Turkish political establishment which became increasingly closed for Kurdish concerns from 1970s and onwards supports modernist approach since it

10 The frequent military coups, political, social and economic turmoil of 1970s and 1980s, and the increasingly defensive and narrow interpretation of the Kemalism left very little room for Kurdish nationalists to voice their demands within the institutional system.

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exemplifies how various groups, such as Kurds, when not adequately conceived as a legitimate part of the society and the political establishment can turn to violence and non- institutional means to voice their demands. If this is true, that modern political institutions are capable of integrating separatist demands of minorities by providing multiple channels of participation in decision-making process, we can expect some progress in the Turkish case in the near future due to reform attempts during EU accession negotiations. 11

Modernist accounts prioritizing aspects of political modernization focus on ‘top-

down’ method and elite manipulation of the ‘masses’ rather than on ‘the dynamics of

mass mobilization per se’ .12 As a result, they fail to pay appropriate attention to the

needs, interests, hopes and longings of ordinary people. They failed to notice that these

needs and interests are differentiated by class, gender, religion and ethnicity. 13 Modernist

accounts, for the most part did not provide a satisfactory analysis of the effects of

political modernization on the lower classes. As I have elaborated earlier (see chapter 2),

ethno-symbolism concentrate on the subjective ‘ethno-history’ which continues to shape

our identity and helps to determine our collective goals and destinies. Therefore, in

Scottish and Kurdish cases it is more fruitful to focus on the ways in which these groups

have been mobilized by their own cultural and political traditions, their memories, myths

and symbols. 14 The past can be interpreted and used to forge a political community in nation and state building process. But, it is not any past that elites use it is the past of a

11 I must note that, although EU reforms have been initiated with Sixth and Seventh reform packets in the early 2000s (as outlined in the 4 th chapter), PKK continued its terror in 2007. In May 2007, 52 military personnel and civilian has been killed as a result of PKK attacks. Also DTP candidates ran for the office in July 2007 elections independently and managed to send 20 of their candidates to the Turkish Parliament, who then formed a group after the elections. Currently DTP is represented in the parliament with 20 MPs. 12 Smith, A. D. The Formation of National Identity, p. 40. 13 Ibid. 14 Smith, A. D. National Identity, p. 21.

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particular community with distinct traditions. This past acts as a constraint on the manipulation of elites, hence on ‘invention’ of tradition. New traditions can only be accepted by the masses in so far as they can be shown to be continuous with the living past. In short, then, the role and the capacity of the modern state is limited and constrained by the pre- existing ethnic ties. This was also consistent with findings on economic modernization variable. In contrast to modernist perspectives, the study of political modernization and separatist nationalism should consider ethnic identity as an independent variable rather than just a consequence of the modernization process.

Cultural Modernization and Nationalism Socio-cultural modernization affects nationalism because, aspects such as language, communication, and evolving technologies, have a diminishing social effect on separatist nationalism as suggested in (H3). For instance, as we saw before, the standardization of language and mass literacy, along with technical knowledge, and their uniform provision through a state-sponsored education system, were central to Gellner’s conception of nationalism. Socio-cultural modernization was expected to reduce separatist nationalism by replacing traditional loyalties with a national identity (H3.1) and by promoting a homogenous national culture (H3.2). Table 5.3 shows the summary of findings for this hypothesis.

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Table 5.3 Summary of findings (H3)

Scots “Unionist Nationalism” gained popularity, thus (H3) is supported. 1707- 1960s Britishness provoked an umbrella national identity (H3.1) and promoted a balance between national culture and Scottish identity (H3.2). Scots (H3) discredited. Reasons: 1960s- present 1. Scottish Renaissance (1920s) prepared basis for devolution. 2. Rising anxiety over immigration alienated Scots. 3. Loss of the British Empire Although causality cannot be proven (H3) has more to do with conflict than reconciliation in the second period. Kurds Modernization resulted in double effect. In this period, modern Kurdish 20 th century-1970s identity developed (H3) and found its place within the national identity (H3.1), which also promoted a homogeneous culture especially in urban centers (H3.2). Kurds Double effect (cont’d). As (H3’) suggested, (H3) also created a Kurdish 1970s-present group that’s uneasy with Turkish majority. Although causality cannot be proven (H3) has more to do with conflict than reconciliation in the second period.

Scottish nationalism is one of the most puzzling among others since it seems unusually culture-light. In comparison with, for example, Wales and Catalonia, which are much more linguistically different from their host states, Scotland has developed the most effective national movement of all- namely, a strong nationalist party committed to full sovereignty within the European Union. Shortly, Scotland has developed and advanced a form of nationalism without strong differentials of language, religion, and other cultural means . Therefore, the conventional modernist ways of explaining nationalism in terms of

cultural specifities do not apply.

The survey of Scottish cultural modernization of eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries have shown that Scotland had experienced a ‘unionist nationalism’ and thus

supports the modernist hypothesis on the value of modernizing socio-economic in

reducing separatist nationalism (H3). Nationalism in Scotland during this period took the

form of unionist nationalism in which British identity superseded loyalty to Scottish

identity as suggested in (H3.1) and promoted a national culture that is capable of

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accommodating sub-nationalities as suggested in (H3.2) The British state successfully satisfied the demands, especially of those coming from Scottish civil society and the

Scottish middle class had no reason to break out of the Union with England. Therefore I conclude that, this project has found support for (H3) that modernizing socio-cultural conditions during eighteenth and nineteenth centuries not only reinforced Scottish identity but also created a convenient atmosphere, which Scottish and British identities co-existed peacefully.

In the twentieth century we observe that strong Scottish identity has coincided with a revived nationalist movement providing support for the rival hypothesis which suggested that socio-cultural modernization may lead to rising ethnic sentiments and thus separatist nationalism (H3’). This study has found three arguments that support this contention. First, the Scottish Renaissance, which occurred in the 1920’s and was initiated by literary figures such as Hugh McDiarmid, has provided a firm foundation for the devolution movement later in the century. 15 Second, rising immigration in the second

half of the century and the reaction it created especially in the rhetoric of Conservative

politicians has accelerated the feelings of being left out not only for new immigrants but

for Scots (and to lesser extend for the Welsh) as well. 16 Third, the loss of the Empire status created a narrow English nationalism rather than some form of internationalism, which might have held separate ethnic groups together under British identity. Therefore this study concludes that the aspects of socio-cultural modernization, which created a

15 According to McDiarmid, Scottish psyche could not be adequately expressed in the alone, and that there is a need to develop and write in literary Scots (which is often referred to as Lallans) was the only way to have a coherent national voice. 16 The anxiety over immigration proved to be a convenient resource for Conservative politicians to secure their seats. However, anti-immigrant policies of consecutive Conservative governments alienated those Scots who used to consider themselves both as British and Scottish and produced more Yes votes in the referendums.

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balance between the Scottishness and the Britishness in the nineteenth century, paved the way to the strengthening of the Scottishness especially in the second half of the twentieth century to a degree that cannot be contained under British identity.

Kurdish identity as a general sense of belonging to a Kurdish ethnie 17 existed for

centuries but it developed into a full force ethnic identity only during the twentieth

century. Aspects of modernization such as exposure to a larger (national) political arena, improving education standards, rural-urban migration, the emergence of the Kurdish working class as well as the Kurdish bourgeoisie settled in major urban centers, growing numbers of Kurdish professionals, increasing contact with other groups, their identities and ideologies, and overall more and frequent participation in social and cultural life of the republic caused Kurds to re-examine their own identities.

At this point, we can observe two consequences of the modernization process on the Kurdish national identity. On the one hand, modernizing socio-cultural conditions produced results that support (H3). During the republican era, Kurdish communities dispersed across Turkey due to urbanization and hence weakened their ties to their homeland and to each other credit (H3.1), which suggested that modernization replaces traditional loyalty with national identity. As a result, significant portion of Kurdish population became more than temporary appendages that can easily be lifted and mobilized for a separatist cause. They can simply be considered as success story of the modernization as they became individuals struggling to pursue their goals while

17 An ethnie [ethnic community] is ‘ a named unit of population, with common ancestry, myths and shared historical memories, elements of shared culture, a link with historic territory, and some measure of solidarity, at least among elites’. A nation is ‘a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, sharing mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’. Smith, A. D. Nationalism: theory, ideology, history, p. 19. Here, I must also note that the central focus of ethnosymbolism is the relationship between ethnie and nation.

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possessing a distinct identity than the majority in Turkey. 18 On the other hand, bringing

Kurd and non-Kurd into close proximity and interaction with each other, the same modernization processes made some portion of Kurds aware of their disadvantaged position and hence strengthened their resentment and provide fuel to separatist ideas and increased exclusionary nationalist ideas. This perspective provides support for the (H3’) which suggested that modernizing socio-cultural conditions fosters separatist nationalism.

When coupled with repressive state policies, the latter affect of socio-cultural modernization is the promotion of Kurdish identity that does not fit comfortably with the national identity, and thus providing an obstacle for the promotion of homogenous national culture

Two arguments must follow this last point. First, although the Scottishness and

Kurdishness has become more intense in the latter part of the twentieth century, this study cannot confirm a strong causal relationship between socio-cultural modernization and strengthening of separatist Scottish and Kurdish identities. In other words, although one can observe the rising tendency to differentiate Scottish from British and Kurdish from Turkish, we cannot establish a causal link between rising ethnic minority identities and support for separatism and independence. Thus, strengthening or diminishing of

Scottishness and Kurdishness should not be seen as a failure or success of aspects of socio-cultural modernization. Second, nevertheless, the Scottish identity came into conflict with the British identity, as did the Kurdish identity with Turkish identity. This must be seen as politically important. Therefore, although I cannot set up a significant

18 Some of the famous political and cultural figures of Kurdish background in Turkey are Hikmet Cetin, a former minister of foreign affairs (1991-1994) and former speaker of the parliament; Bedrettin Dalan, a very popular mayor of Istanbul (1984-1989) and a former MP (1991-1995); Yasar Kemal, one of the most famous novelists of Turkey; Ibrahim Tatlises, one of the most popular singers in the country and even the late president Turgut Ozal.

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causality between these variables, it is certain that the socio-cultural modernization in the twentieth century has more to do with creating and reinforcing conflict, and thus crediting the hypothesis that suggested modernizing socio-cultural conditions may foster separatist nationalism (H3’) rather than the reconciliation of the differences between groups discrediting modernist accounts which proposed that modernizing socio-cultural conditions reduces separatist nationalism (H3).

Theoretical implications The ‘modernist’ classification I have adopted in this project was conditioned by a concern for reflecting the general tendency in the field, not by a belief in the validity of the classification. There are number of difficulties with this kind of classification. First and foremost, ‘modernist’ term does not accurately represent the works concerned. The concept of ‘modernism’ is even more problematic as it became a kind of catch all term under which a number of quite divergent approaches are subsumed. Nevertheless, this study has found four theoretical arguments countering the modernist accounts in two prominent cases: Scottish and Kurdish nationalisms.

1) The only apparent point of intersection among these divergent interpretations

(economic, political and socio-cultural), is their belief in modernity of nations and

nationalism; hence the term ‘modernist’. Although this assumption seem to be

fundamentally correct, Scottish and Kurdish cases calls the need of nations to be

contextualized within the larger phenomenon of ethnicity which shaped them.

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2) By joining ethno-symbolist scholars 19 , I tend to expand this common

denominator. The modernists regard nations not only as a concomitant of

modernization processes, but also as ‘invented’, thus ‘false’ or ‘artificial’,

constructions which become instruments of elites and leaders in their universal

struggle for power. Drawing on the analysis of Scottish and Kurdish cases, this

study argues that there is an ethnic essence to all modern nationalisms. Thus it is

more adequate to talk about the ‘reconstruction’ or ‘rediscovery’ of the ethnic

past.

3) Again, along the lines of ethno-symbolist, I argue that the modernists are wrong

to believe that nationalism is a historically specific and transitory phenomenon.

Nationalism, either civic or ethnic, is here to stay with us.

4) Modernist approaches have a misleading tendency to represent modernity as a

relatively stable state, failing to appreciate the accelerating dynamism of

modernity, which continues to generate new nationalisms.

Starting with the first point, to what extend can we agree with the argument on the modernity of nationalism? As mentioned in the second chapter, there is no need to debate much on the primordialist approach. As Brubaker notes, very few scholars today continue to subscribe to the view that nations are primordial, unchanging entities. 20 Almost everybody admits that nations are born at a particular period in history, notwithstanding disagreements on the precise date of their emergence or the relative weight of pre-modern

19 For example, John Armstrong Nations Before Nationalism , Anthony D. Smith The Ethnic Origins of Nations , John Hutchinson Modern Nationalism . 20 Brubaker, R. 1996 Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 15.

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traditions and modern transformations in their formation. The pseudo-scientific ideologically motivated belief, that nations exist since the beginning of human kind, has little support in the academia.

This is largely due to the modernist studies, which have been trying to show for the last four decades that the picture drawn by the primordialists is far from representing the reality about nations and nationalisms. The general assumptions of modernism seem to be fundamentally correct. Most of the nations today are products of the developments of the last two centuries. To substantiate this claim, it suffices to consider the case of

‘language’. Modernist scholars have revealed that in France, for example, fifty per cent of the people did not speak French at all and only 12-13 per cent spoke it correctly in 1789. in the case of Italy, on the other hand, only 2.5 per cent of the population used Italian for everyday purposes at the moment of unification. 21 It is possible to multiply these examples. What is important is that in most cases nationalism becomes paramount after the state is established. As Massimo d’Azeglio has said “We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians”. 22

However, this study argued that modernists by depicting the last two centuries as

shaped by a single decisive transition risks being monolithic. Political revolutions,

industrial take-off and the decline of religious authority were the main features of this

transition. For the advocates of this ‘revolutionary model of modernization’, as

Hutchinson put it, nationalism is one of the by-products of momentous transition to

modernity. Although, as the Scottish and Kurdish cases have shown that transition to

modernity is an important event, the process of formation of nations and nationalism

21 Hobsbawn, E. Nations and Nationalism since 1780 , p. 60-61. 22 Cited in ibid ., pp. 44-45.

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needs to be examined by focusing on a much larger time span. In other words, post- eighteenth century nationalism can only be understood within the framework of a ‘wider theory of ethnic formation that refers to the factors that may be common to pre-modern and modern periods’. 23

In addition, Smith argues that modernist accounts underestimate the significance

of local cultural and social contexts. For him, what determines the intensity, character,

and scope of nationalism, is the interaction between the tidal wave of modernization and

these local variations. 24 In this manner, as we have seen such accounts cannot

satisfactorily explain the eruption of nationalism among Scots and Kurds. Why, Scots,

not Welsh, a group that has less cultural resemblance to the English, proved to be more

susceptible to nationalism? Or, why, in comparison, with other ethnic groups in Turkey,

have the ‘Kurds’ been much more difficult to assimilate? Obviously, modernity have

played its part in generating separatist Scottish and Kurdish nationalisms, but this does

not tell us much about the timing, scope, and character of these completely different

nationalisms.

As for the second point, all scholars included in the modernist category argue that

it became possible and necessary to ‘imagine’ or ‘invent’ nations as a result of changing

economic, political or social conditions. The transformation emphasized by each scholar and the underlying factors they identified display a great diversity. For instance, according to Nairn, the key to understanding nationalism is ‘uneven development’; for

Hechter, it is ‘internal colonialism’; for Brueilly, the rise of modern state; for Gellner, industrialization; for Anderson, a series of interlinked factors, ranging from a revolution

23 Hutchinson, J. Modern Nationalism , p. 24. 24 Smith, A.D. The Formation of National Identity , p. 42.

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in the conceptions of time to ‘print capitalism’. What joins them, or what remains constant in their theories, is the belief that all human collectivities were subject to some fundamental changes at some point in history, which disrupted the existing order; thereby forcing them to find new ways of organizing social/political life. The thread of their argument runs as follows: the older forms of organization become redundant under the impact of changes in economic, political and social life, which also create the conditions necessary to ‘imagine’, ‘invent’ new forms.

There is nothing modern about the attachments individuals feel for the communities of which they are member. Modernist model simply fails to understand the emotional power of nationalism. For instance, Perry Anderson criticizing this failure of modernist accounts in general and Ernest Gellner’s theory in particular, contends that

“[w]here Weber was so bewitched by its spell that he was never able to theorize nationalism, Gellner had theorized nationalism without detecting the spell”. 25 This point

also forms one of the core arguments of the ethno-symbolist critiques of modernist

theories. Anthont Smith, the leading exponent of the ethno-symbolist approach, begins

for instance, by asking the following question: why should people ardently identify with

an invented high culture and be willing to lay down their lives for it? 26 Scottish and

Kurdish cases prove that there is a clear link between pre-modern attachments and

contemporary collective ties felt for the abstract community of the nation, which consists

of millions of strangers. Holding the traditional structures have been eroded by the

revolutions of modernity, the modernists fail to notice that the impact of these revolutions

have been marked more in certain areas than others and has penetrated some strata of the

25 Perry, A. 1992 A Zone of Engagement , London: Verso, p. 205. 26 Smith, A.D. “History and Modernity: Reflections on the Theory of Nationalism”, p. 134.

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population more profoundly than others, such as Scots not Welsh; or Kurds not

Circassians. Therefore, the resurgence of nationalism among Scots and Kurds tells us that ethnic ties are persistent and durable. Drawing on our cases, this study objected to the notions of ‘invented traditions’ and ‘imagined communities’, and claimed that these turn out to be more akin to ‘reconstruction’ or ‘rediscovery’ of aspects of the ethnic past. As

Smith notes, although the past can be interpreted in different ways, it is not any past, but rather the ‘past of that particular community, with its distinctive patterns of events, personages and milieux’. 27 This past acts as a constraint on the manipulation of elites, hence on invention. New traditions will be accepted by the masses in so far as they can be shown to be continuous with the living past. Therefore this dissertation concludes that nationalism is modern but never contingent: every nationalism is constructed around particular ethnic traditions. There is an ethnic/ national essence underlying many if not all contemporary nationalisms and Scottish and Kurdish nationalisms are examples of that ethnic essence.

A third line of criticism is about the modernist take on nationalism as a historically specific and transitory period. According to this, nationalism will rapidly loose ground as the nation-states march towards modernity especially when confronted with the forces of . For instance, Hobsbawn argues that the fragments of ethnic and linguistic nationalisms we witness today are no more than ephemeral reactions of weakness and fear of those who feel threatened by the processes of modernization. As the Scottish and Kurdish cases have shown this was a rather naïve prediction. Given the fact that nationalism continues to flourish, not only in a developing country such as

Turkey but also in some of the most advanced industrial societies such as Great Britain, if

27 Smith, A.D. National Identity , p. 358.

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in sometimes less violent forms, nationalism is here to stay with us. Therefore modernists are wrong to consider nationalism as a temporary force that will diminish as the modernization processes matures.

Finally, the modernists tend to conceive modernity as a relatively stable state, as a stage of historical development in which nationalism eventually reaches its full development. For instance, Gellner viewed traditional agrarian society as static, hierarchical and bound together by social structure, while modern industrial society is dynamic, egalitarian and bound together by culture/ language. For Gellner, once a society has emerged into the modern era, it has achieved a stable state, the final stage of history.

Therefore modernist approach falsely suggests, in the style of nineteenth century uni-linear evolutionism, that there is some determined path all societies must follow.

Rather this study argued that far from stability, it is instability in the form of series of accelerating directional trends and dynamism that characterize modernity and generate new nationalisms. In the case of Scotland, a historic nation embedded within the British state became mobilized around the cause of greater governmental autonomy when faced by an erosion of established local power. In the case of Kurdish nationalism, pervasive regional disempowerment of the mass of the population by the central authority, in conjunction with external political and economic forces, has led to a violent terrorist movement seeking to form a popular base for claiming control over the region. Therefore this study concludes that modernity and processes of modernization should be considered as a source that is capable of reproducing nationalism.

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