Astrid S. Tuminez. Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefeld Publishers, 2000. x + 337 pp. $74.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8476-8884-5.

Reviewed by David G. Rowley

Published on H-Russia (August, 2001)

Aggressive Russian Nationalism: Cause and In her frst two chapters, "The Problem of Prevention. Russian Nationalism" and "Nation-Building in In Russian Nationalism since 1856, Astrid Tu‐ Russia," Tuminez provides a concise, coherent, minez examines the nature of aggresssive Russian and up-to-date survey of research on nationalism nationalism in Russian society and its relation to in general and on the Russian imperial state. She the Russian state at three critical junctures- sets the groundwork for her subsequent analysis ^Öafter the Crimean War, after the Russo-Japa‐ by advancing three propositions. First, she pro‐ nese War, and after the end of the Soviet Union. poses to treat nationalism as a political construct, quoting Rogers Brubaker's idea that the nation is Her book will fnd two appreciative audi‐ "a cognitive frame" that is used by "political en‐ ences. Students of Russian imperialism, Russian trepreneurs" to serve the ends of state-building. In nationalism, and Russian state-building will fnd other words, nationalism is an ideological tool extremely enlightening her case studies of aggres‐ used by social or state elites for political purposes. sive Russian nationalism and her discussion of (The "real" identity of the Russian people^Ö-if the nature of nationalism and its relation to state- such a thing exists--is not at issue.) Second, she society relations in Russia. Those interested in for‐ holds that the political power of nationalism to eign afairs will need to consider carefully Tu‐ create legitimacy for a state derives ultimately minez' judgment that the most important factor from the claim that the nation is the repository of infuencing aggressive nationalist behavior by the legitimate political authority: "the individual and Russian state has been the hostility of its interna‐ the state's highest loyalty must be to the nation's tional rivals and her conclusion that the most ef‐ core interests or mission" (p. 2). Third, drawing fective way to prevent a nationalistic Russian for‐ support from Hans Rogger, Richard Pipes, and Ge‐ eign policy is to avoid actions that would "intensi‐ ofrey Hosking, Tuminez argues that the Tsarist fy Russian humiliation and feed Russian para‐ regime never attempted to build its legitimacy noia." H-Net Reviews upon the interests of the nation but upon the im‐ Turkish War of 1877-8 and the impetus of great- perial power and greatness of the dynasty. power nationalism toward Russia's entry into Tuminez points out that since nationalism World War I. Both of these chapters are thorough, posits some tie between the interests of the people concise, and up-to-date summaries of the scholar‐ and the purpose of the state, the Russian imperial ship on Panslavism and late imperial nationalism. state could only regard nationalism with fear and In them, Tuminez tells a very complex story, not‐ suspicion. Therefore, Russia lacked that "civic ac‐ ing that Slavophilism and Panslavism showed the cess to state authority" through which appeals to awakening of a public discourse and hints at the national identity can bind the loyalty of the citi‐ possibility that a more astute regime could have zenry. Even if the state had wished to use nation‐ used this force to create a more stable society but alism to build its legitimacy, it lacked the re‐ that "the tsarist monarchy was unable to under‐ sources. "The imperial government," Tuminez as‐ stand this power or fnd ways to use it for the serts, "could barely aford to feed its soldiers, let longer-term consolidation, modernization, and alone educate them and inculcate them with na‐ unifcation (in terms of state-society relations) of tionalist ideas" (p. 38-41). Russia" (p. 99). As a consequence of these considerations, Tu‐ Tuminez arrives at two conclusions. First, she minez argues that Russian "nationalism has been argues that the aggressive stance taken by a weak and uneven force in Russia" and only Panslavs was the result of national humiliation rarely and briefy infuenced Russian foreign poli‐ felt by educated Russians over Russia's defeat in cy (p. 6). Aggressive Russian nationalism, in her the Crimean War. Second, she asserts that analysis, only infuenced Tsarist foreign policy Panslavism was not, in itself, enough to cause the when three factors were operative: "(1) the failure Tsarist regime to go to war. Instead, the Russian of infuential individuals and groups who serve as government acted from a feeling of structural custodians of collective memory and articulators weakness in the late 1870s. Its use of Panslavism of prevailing ideologies to redefne the imperial was not ideologically driven but was merely a state as the basis of Russian "greatness"; (2) a deep means to the end of state power. erosion and breakdown of governance, which a) Tuminez' account of extreme nationalism facilitated the eforts of aggressive nationalist en‐ from 1905 to 1914 develops these ideas further. trepreneurs to capture public attention and sup‐ Her foreign policy point, once again, is that the port, and (b) made a weakened ruling elite vul‐ Russian government promoted extreme great- nerable to the penetration of aggressive national‐ power nationalism both from a sense of weakness ist public opnion; and (3) the occurrence of inter‐ (the government was increasingly alienated from national threats and crises, which intensifed na‐ its own population) and from national humilia‐ tionalist sentiment and augmented pressure on tion (beginning with Russia's loss to Japan in 1905 weakened policymakers to take decisive action re‐ and ending with its diplomatic failures to support fecting an aggressive nationalist agenda." Tu‐ Serbia in the frst and second Balkan wars). "Aus‐ minez concludes that "Of these variables, threats tria's refusal to give Russia and Serbia any face- and crises in the international system have been saving way out of the crisis contributed to a situa‐ the most important precipitating factors..." (p. 7). tion that worked in favor of aggressive nationalist She demonstrates these assertions with stud‐ arguments in Russia" (p. 154). This is hardly a new ies of two major cases in which aggressive Rus‐ point, but it strongly supports Tuminez' basic the‐ sian nationalism was manifested in Russian for‐ sis. eign policy^Ö-the infuence of Panslavism on the

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Tuminez once again points to a key domestic mained a stunted entity in the Soviet Union, and faw in the Russian polity and educated society. nationalism did not function to cement state-soci‐ "In 1914, as in 1878, the prominence of national‐ ety relations in a permanent way" (p. 180). One ism did not lead to a more enduring unity of gov‐ might add that the Soviet regime had the same ernment and people in Russia. Although great imperial prejudice as Tsarist Russian against us‐ power nationalism proved a potent ideological in‐ ing national identity as its basis of legitimacy. strument for furthering the aims of the imperial Perhaps the strongest chapter in the book is state, reality soon revealed its weakness and limi‐ Chapter 5, "Recreating Russia: 1989-1998," a sur‐ tation in forging nation-state cohesion" (p.155). vey of the variety of Russian nationalisms that be‐ Although Russian nationalism and Russian gan to appear in Russia in the waning years of the imperialism lived on in various forms in the Sovi‐ Soviet Era and that proliferated after the dissolu‐ et state, Tuminez is quite right in devoting very tion of the union. Tuminez supplements her usual little space to the Soviet Union in this book. At the thorough review of the secondary literature with end of Chapter 2, "Nation-building in Russia," Tu‐ a wide reading of Russian nationalist documents minez gives a succinct summary of Soviet nation‐ and with personal interviews with nationalist ality policies. Building on the work of Ronald leaders. Her characterizations of the various Suny, Richard Pipes, and Yurii Slezkine, Tuminez strands--"westernizing nationalism," "nativism," highlights the paradox of Soviet nationality poli‐ "moderate statism," "aggressive statism," and "na‐ cies. At the same time that it preached interna‐ tional patriotism"--are nuanced and convincing. tionalism and strove to inculcate an imperial Sovi‐ This cacophony of nationalist voices is precisely et identity ("homo sovieticus" as it was termed in what Tuminez' analysis would expect. After all, the West) in its citizens, the Soviet Union never‐ the ignominious withdrawal of Soviet power from theless fostered the development of national iden‐ Eastern Europe followed by the dissolution of the tity in the Republics and "created a structure and Soviet Union itself, could be expected to have platform from which the most potent attacks yet been even more humiliating to Russian patriots against the imperial state could be launched" (p. than Russia's military defeats in the Crimean or 45). Then, at the beginning of Chapter 5, "Recreat‐ the Russo-Japanese wars. ing Russia: 1989-1998," Tuminez surveys the na‐ The surprise is that the Russian government tionalism of Stalin, the internationalism of has not pandered to the demands of the aggres‐ Khrushchev, and the rise of Russian nationalism sive nationalists. In Chapter Six, "The Weakness of in the Brezhnev era. Nationalism," Tuminez points out two very opti‐ This very brief treatment of Soviet Russian mistic trends. First, she credits Gorbachev with nationalism is perfectly understandable since the initiating a non-ideological political discourse that Soviet period doesn't apply to Tuminez' analysis. set the tone for the government and the main‐ Not only is the internationalist component of So‐ stream press throughout the nineties. Following viet identity extremely problematic, but the Soviet Gorbachev the Russian government has deempha‐ Union never experienced national humiliation of sized imperial claims and become more pragmat‐ the sort that imperial Russia did. The humiliation ic. Second, in practice, Russia has followed very was felt only by residents of the Soviet Union's moderate policies toward the "near abroad"^Ö- successor states. Very signifcantly, however, Tu‐ Ukraine/Crimea, Kazakhstan, and the Baltics. And minez notes that under Communist rule "nation- even in cases in Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan building was distorted in favor of service to the where Russia has intervened militarily, in no case state." "In the end, the Russian ^Ñnation' re‐ did it attempt to restore Russian imperial control.

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In her concluding chapter, "The Future of have pointed out already, Tuminez continually Russian Nationalism," Tuminez seeks explana‐ raises the question of state-society relations, argu‐ tions for this unexpected moderation in two ing that neither the Tsarist nor the Soviet regimes realms^Ö-the domestic and the international con‐ attempted to bind society and state together on texts of Russian nationalism. She is encouraged by the basis of nationalist legitimation. She makes it the fact that the dissolution of the Soviet Union clear that Tsarist Russia was ruled by a hereditary left the Russian Federation more homogenous and dynasty whose highest value was the glory of its geographically compact and therefore more con‐ empire; and whose goal was to shore up a rotten ducive to nation-building (instead of empire- and collapsing regime. Even on those rare occa‐ building). Most importantly, however, Tuminez sions when it appealed to nationalism, it had in seeks to substantiate her argument "...that the in‐ mind its own interests and not those of the peo‐ ternational system was a determining factor in ple. the rise and impact of aggressive nationalism in Thus the international environment is not the Russia in the past," (p. 280) by comparing late only variable to have changed over the course of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russia the last century. The nature of the Russian state is with late twentieth-century Russia. In the frst profoundly diferent. The only late twentieth-cen‐ case Russia experienced a national humiliation, a tury state that faced incipient collapse and that weak state, an upsurge of aggressive nationalism might have used aggressive nationalism to save it‐ in society, and a provocative international envi‐ self was the Soviet state, and appealing to nation‐ ronment, to which the leaders of the Russian state alism is precisely what Gorbachev declined to do. responded with aggressive nationalist policies. In The leadership of contemporary Russia is made the second case, she contends, only one of these up of elected ofcials who are trying to build a variables was missing^Ö-the hostile and provoca‐ new state and not trying to defend an old one. tive international environment--and the leaders Most importantly, for a whole host of rea‐ of the Russian state ignored the loud chorus of ag‐ sons--because of Soviet nationalities policy, be‐ gressive nationalists and pursued moderate poli‐ cause of Yeltsin's political strategy of "playing the cies. Russian card," or simply because "the nation-state It is here that Tuminez ofers her foreign poli‐ is the agent of modernity"--Russia's new leaders cy conclusions. "...Western actors should, as much must do what the Tsars and the Commissars did as possible, give Russia ^Ñbreathing space' as its not do, that is, to seek to create a bond between people seek to redefne their national identity...by state and society and build state legitimacy on the avoiding actions that intensify Russian humilia‐ interests and well-being of the Russian nation. In tion and feed Russian paranoia" (p. 283). "...West‐ other words, whether they like it or not, Russia's ern actors should continue to engage Russia as a new leaders must appeal to the majority of Rus‐ partner or collaborator on many fronts..." (p. 283). sian citizens and must ignore the loud but few On the other hand, in a mild update of the idea of voices of extremism. "containment," Tuminez adds that "...Western poli‐ Tuminez, herself, points out that the Russian cy should not tolerate or justify Russian actions people do not favor aggressive nationalism (p. that clearly encourage imperial thought and be‐ 202). The simple existence of multi-party elections havior..." (p. 284). in Russia (whatever our ultimate evaluation of This is surely a laudable recommendation, how "democratic" Russia is) must add an entirely but I think that another (and complementary) new dimension to Russian politics. There were, of conclusion is also implicit in her analysis. As I course, no public opinion polls in late Tsarist Rus‐

4 H-Net Reviews sia, but it would not be at all surprising if the overwhelming majority of Russians in 1900 were as opposed to aggressive imperialism as their de‐ scendants are a century later. But the Russian state ignored national interest and allowed its policies to be guided by people who did not have to earn the approval of a national vote. This is no longer possible, and it would seem that what is limiting the infuence of aggressive nationalism in contemporary Russia is not so much international restraint or moderation by Russian leaders, but the anti-imperialism of the Russian people themselves. A conclusion that might be drawn is that the best way to resist ag‐ gressive nationalism in Russia is to promote the economic prosperity that seems to be the prereq‐ uisite to a healthy civil society. It is rather surpris‐ ing that Astrid Tuminez, an executive associate at AIG Global Investment Corporation and former consultant to the World Bank, did not make her implicit point more explicit. Overall, however, Russian Nationalism since 1856 is a well-researched and well-written book that tells an interesting and important story. As former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn is quoted on the book's back cover, "Policymakers will gain both historical and practical insights from this well- written and thoughtful work." I would add that it will also serve undergraduates as an outstanding survey of the history of Russian nationalism.

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Citation: David G. Rowley. Review of Tuminez, Astrid S. Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy. H-Russia, H-Net Reviews. August, 2001.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=5389

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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