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Andreas Umland the FASCIST THREAT in POST-SOVIET RUSSIA an Investigation Into the LDPR-Ideology 1990-1993, and Some Tentative Su

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Andreas Umland the FASCIST THREAT in POST-SOVIET RUSSIA an Investigation Into the LDPR-Ideology 1990-1993, and Some Tentative Su Andreas Umland THE FASCIST THREAT IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA An Investigation into the LDPR-Ideology 1990-1993, and Some Tentative Suggestion on the Appropriateness of the `Weimar Russia' Metaphor Contents Abbreviations Part I: Fascist Tendencies in Zhirinovskii's Writings in the Newspaper Liberal 1. The Research Framework and Political Context of the Chapter Right-Wing Extremism and Peace Studies Zhirinovskii versus Gaidar 2. The `Whys' of Studying Fascism in Russia 2.1. The Significance of Zhirinovskii's Political Ideas The LDPR's Direct Influence on Russian Politics The LDPR's Indirect Influence on Russian Politics 2.2. `Fascism' - a Redundant Label? 2.3. `Fascism' in Post-Soviet Russia `Fascism' vs. `Right-Wing Extremism' The Moscow Anti-Fascist Centre `Fascism' as a Legal Term `Fascism's' Pre-Eminence 3. Identifying Fascism 3.1. Some Methodological Problems of Empirical Fascist Studies in Russia `Fascism' a Special Notion in Russia? Zhirinovskii a Fascist?: Pros and Cons My Approach to Zhirinovskii's Fascism The Procedure of this Inquir 3.2. Some Problems of a Theoretical Conceptualization of Fascism Generic Fascism as a Sub-Type of Right-Wing Extremism Concepts of Fascist Ideology 1 3.3. An Operational Definition of Fascism Griffin's `Fascist Minimum' A Note on Contemporary Russian Political Terminology 4. Palingenetic Ultra-Nationalism in Zhirinovskii's Articles in Liberal 4.1. The Newspaper Liberal 4.2. Zhirinovskii's Articles in Liberal Number 2-3, 1990 Number 4-5, 1992 Number 6-7, 1992 Number 8-9, 1992 Number 10, 1992 Number 1 (11), 1993 Number 2 (12), 1993 Number 3 (13), 1993 4.3. The Last Dash to the South a Mere Propaganda Trick? The Last Dash as One Among Several LDP Agendas The Last Dash as a Non-Issu The Salience of International Affairs The `South' as a Recurring Issu Part II: Weimar Russia': Misleading Catch-Phrase or Pertinent Metaphor? 1. Introductio The Rationale of the Paper's Second Part The Focuses of Part II The Paper's Omissions The Limits of Comparing Economic Data Part II's Structur 2. Controlling for Politics: Some Important Similarities in the Party Spectra, Intellectual Discourses, and Organizational Resources of Inter-War Germany and Post-Soviet Russia 2.1. Political Parties 2.2. Right-Wing Extremist Contaminations of the Democratic Regimes 2.3. Ultra-Nationalist `Social Capital' 2.4. Para-Military Organizations 2.5. Conclusions 3. Sketching the Paradigm: Some Basic Characteristics of the Political Culture, Economy, Society and International Environment of Weimar Germany 3.1. A Holistic-Institutional Interpretatio 2 3.2. Some Further Variables and Intervening Factors The Rise of Nationalism New Demographic Development The Disillusionment with `American-Style' Modernism The Failure of the Welfare State The Unrefomred Agriculture The Political-Institutional Variable Economic Crises 4. Comparing the Cases: Some Notable Similarities and Dissimilarities Between Post-Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany 4.1. The Simultaneity Problem and Hangover Effects in Germany and Russia The Simultaneity Problem The Persistence of Old Elites 4.2. Socio-Economic Conditions and Institutional Defects in Weimar Germany and Post-Soviet Russia The Salience of Russian Nationalism, and Russia's International Environment Further Destabilizing Social and Institutional Factors 5. Conclusions Bibliography Abbreviations 3 AiF Argumenty i fakty AO Aktsionernoe obshchestov (stock corporation) AP Associated Press APR Agrarnaia partiia Rossii (Agrarian Party of Russia) AZiP Assotsiatsiia zakonnosti i poriadka (Assciation for Lawfulness and Order) CDPSP The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press CNN Cable News Network CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CPS Communist Party of the Soviet Union D Den' (Moskva) DemRossiia Demokraticheskaia Rossiia (Democratic Russia) DK Devichii kal (A Virgin's Excrements) DN Deutsche Nationalzeitung (München) DPR Demokraticheskaia partiia Rossii (Democratic Party of Russia) DS Demokraticheskii soiuz (Democratic Union) DT Daily Telegraph DVU Deutsche Volksunion (German People's Union) EKh Ekspress-Khronika (Moskva) ELDP Evropeiskaia liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia (European Liberal-Democratic Party) FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) G The Guardian Gazprom Gazovaia promyshlennost' (Gas Industry) GKChP Gosudarstvennyi komitet chrezvychainnogo polozheniia (State Committee of Emergency) GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (Private Limited Company) GMM Global Money Management GRU Glavnoe razvedovatel'noe upravlenie (Main Intelligence Administration) I Izvestiia IABLoko Iavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin-Bloc (iabloko = apple) IHT International Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine) In Inostranets IuG Iuridicheskaia gazeta Ispolkom Ispolnitel'nyi komitet (Executive Committee) ITAR-TASS Informatsionnoe telegrafnoe agenstvo Rossii - Telegrafnoe agenstvo Sovetskogo Soiuza (Informational Telegraph Agency of Russia - Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) KGB Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopastnosti (Committee of State Security) KDP-PNS Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskaia partiia - partiia narodnoi svobody (Constitutional- Democratic Party - Party of People's Freedom) Kolkhoz Kollektivnoe khoziaistvo (Collective Farm) Komsomol Kommunisticheskii soiuz molodëzhy (Communist Union of Youth) KPRF Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) L Liberal (Moskva: LDP) LG Literaturnaia gazeta LDPB Liberal-Democratic Party of Bulgaria LDPR Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia Rossii LDPS Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union LR Literaturnaia Rossiia ME Megapolis-Express (Moskva) MAFC Moscow Anti-Fascist Centre MGIMO Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi institut mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) 4 MID Ministerstvo innostrannykh del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) MM Moscow-Magazine MN Moskovskie novosti MK Moskovskii komsomolets Mosgorspravka Moskovskaia gorodskaia spravka (Moscow City Inquiry Office) MP Member of Parliament MUR Moskovskii ugolovnyi rozysk (Moscow Criminal Investigation Department CID) natsmeny natsional'nye menshinstva (national minorities) NBP Natsional-bol'shevistskaia partiia (National-Bolshevist Party NDR Nash dom Rossiia (Our Home is Russia) NEG Novaia ezhednevnaia gazeta NG Nezavisimaia gazeta NKVD Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrennykh del (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) NORD Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe russkoe dvizhenie (Russian National Liberation Movement) NPSR Narodnaia partiia Svobodnaia Rossiia' (People's Party `Free Russia') NRPR Natsional'no-respublikanskaia partiia Rossii (National-Republican Party of Russia) NRS Novoe russkoe slovo (New York) NSDAP/AO Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands/ Auslandsorganisation (National-Socialist Workers Party of Germany / Foreign Division) NTV Nezavisimoe televidenie NV Novoe vremia NZZ Neue Züricher Zeitung O Ogonëk OG Obshchaia gazeta OMON Otdel militsii osobogo naznacheniia (Special Tasks Police Department) OMRI Open Media Research Institute P Pravda PER Politicheskii ekstremizm v Rossii: Informatsionno analiticheskii biulleten' (Moskva: Fond `Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo') PES Partiia ekonomicheskoi svobody (Party of Economic Freedom) PKD Partiia konstitutsionnykh demokratov (Party of Constitutional Democrats) Politizdat Politicheskoe izdatel'stvo (Political Publisher) PRES Partiia rossiiskogo edinstva i soglasiia (Party of Russian Unity and Accord) PZh Pravda Zhirinovskogo (Moskva: LDP) RAU Rossiisko-amerikanskii universitet (Russian-American University) R Rossiia Rbls Roubles RF Rossiiskaia federatsiia (fomerly: Nardodnyi deputat) RG Rossiiskaia gazeta RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Libert RKhDD Rossiiskoe khristiansko-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie (Russian Christian-Democratic Movement) RKP Rossiiskaia kommunisticheskaia partiia (Russian Communist Party) RLP Rossiiskaia liberal'naia partiia (Russian Liberal Party) RLDP Rossiiskaia liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia (Russian Liberal-Democratic Party) RNF Rossiiskii narodnyi front (Russian People's Front) RNS Russkii natsional'nyi sobor (Russian National Assembly) ROL Radical Opposition Leaders (Moskva: What the Papers Say) ROS Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soiuz (Russian All-People's Union) RSDRP Rossiiskaia sotsial-demokraticheskaia rabochaia partiia (Russian Social-Democratic Labou Party RSFSR Rossiiskaia sovetskaia federativnaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika (Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic) 5 RSPP Rossiiskii soiuz promyshlennikov i predprinimatelei (Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs) RV Rossiiskie vesti S Segodnia SI Sotsiologicheskie issledovnaiia SED Sozialistische Enheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) Sovkhoz Sovetskoe khoziaistvo (Soviet, i.e. State, Farm) Sp Der Spiegel (Hamburg) SR Sovetskaia Rossiia SS Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron) St Stolitsa SZh Sokol Zhirinovskogo (Moskva: LDP) taz die tageszeitung (Berlin) TsK KPSS Tsentral'nyi komitet Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soiuza (Central Committee of the CPSU) TVO Treuhand-, Verwaltungs- und Organisations-GmbH (Trust-, Administration- and Organization- Private Limited Company) WWW World Wide Web Z Die Zeit (Hamburg) Za Zavtra (Moskva) Part I: Fascist Tendencies in Zhirinovskii's Writings in the Newspaper Liberal 6 1. The Research Framework and Political Context of Part I of This Paper `I am not a fascist, am I?' Vladimir Zhirinovskii at a juridical hearing concerning allegations against him that he is a fascist. (Z, 5 August 1994,
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