Is Nationalism a Force for Change in Russia?

Home , National Bolshevik Party, Russians (organization), Russian nationalism, Russian world

Marlene Laruelle

Abstract: This essay defines three categories of Russian nationalist actors: nonstate actors, whose agenda Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 is anti-Putin; parastate actors, who have their own ideological niche, not always in tune with the presidential administration’s narrative, but who operate under the state umbrella; and state actors, in particular, the presidential administration. In the future, the Russian ethnonationalism embodied by nonstate actors is the main trend that could pose a serious threat to the regime. However, the Kremlin is not “frozen” in terms of ideology, and its flexibility allows it to adapt to evolving situations. One of the most plausible scenarios is the rise of a figure inside the establishment who would be able to prevent the polarization of Russian nationalism into an antiregime narrative and could co-opt some of its slogans and leaders, in order to gradually channel the official narrative toward a more state-controlled nationalism.

Is nationalism a force for change in Russia? If nationalism is an ideology supporting the overlap of “nation” and “state,” then nationalists are those who push for a political agenda through which the nation and the state are intrinsically assimilated into each other. They may, for example, call for the state to grow to include territories that they consider as belonging to the nation, or separate from territories they see as alien to it. In the Russian case, the nation is not nec- MARLENE LARUELLE is Research essarily defined by a restrictive Russian russkii( ) “eth- Professor of International Affairs and Associate Director of the Insti- nicity,” but by a larger vision fed by the country’s im- tute for European, Russian and Eur- perial past. I exclude from nationalism Russia’s quest asian Studies at the Elliott School of for great power, which I consider to belong to another International Affairs, The George repertoire, that of legitimizing the country’s actions Washington University, and Codi- on the international scene and its branding. rector of ponars Eurasia. She is There are myriad actors promoting a nationalist the author of Russia’s Strategies in the agenda in Russia. In this essay, I distinguish three main Arctic and the Future of the Far North (2013), In the Name of the Nation: Na- categories of actors: nonstate actors, whose agenda tionalism and Politics in Contemporary is anti-Putin and who call for a national revolution Russia (2009), and Russian Eurasian- to defend the Russian nation against the current re- ism: An Ideology of Empire (2008). gime; parastate actors, who have their own ideological

89 Is Nation- niche, not always in tune with the presiden- than the nationalist sentiments of non– alism a Force tial administration’s narrative, but who op- ethnic Russians. But what do we under- for Change in Russia? erate under the state umbrella, in the gray stand by the term Russian nationalism? It zone of the Kremlin’s “ecosystem” of in- is a blurry yet loaded notion. Convention- terest groups, lobbies, and personal con- ally, scholarly works devoted to Russian nections; and state actors, in particular, the nationalism have tried to dissociate the presidential administration. This dissoci- plural nature of the phenomenon by clas- ation is critical in order to advance a com- sifying its contents into two broad catego- prehensive assessment of what we mean by ries: imperial nationalism and ethnic na- Russian nationalism and to explore its po- tionalism.4 I find this line of division to be

tential for being a force for change in Rus- artificial and not heuristic. The main ide- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 sia in the next ten to fifteen years. ologists of Russian nationalism belong to both categories: Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Nationalisms are diverse, especially in often seen as a proponent of an imperi- a country like Russia. With the exception al Russia, has been known for making re- of a short period between the perestroi- peated racist statements about the need to ka years and the mid-1990s, nationalism protect the Russian nation from external among non-Russian ethnic groups (around ethnic influences. Aleksandr Dugin, pro- 21 percent of the country’s population was lific theoretician of neo-Eurasianism, the identified as non–ethnically Russian in the quintessence of imperial Russia, is also fa- 2010 census) has been limited.1 In today’s mous for introducing in Russia fascist the- Russia, non-Russian nationalisms do not ories about Aryan races and their “spiri- emerge as a potential force for change for tual fight” against Jews. Aleksandr Solz- several reasons. henitsyn, champion of an ethnic Russia First, the main secessionist region of the that would avoid any new imperial tempta- country, the North Caucasus, has changed tion, can be defined as “imperialist” from a profoundly since the First Chechen War Ukrainian or a Kazakh point of view, since (1994–1996). Social resentment is now he called for all territories populated by expressed through Islamism and no lon- Eastern Slavs to join Russia. Even Vladimir ger through postcolonial calls for parti- Putin’s statement about Russia as a divid- tion and independence. Second, the “sov- ed nation, used to justify Russia’s annex- ereignty parade” of the years of the Soviet ation of Crimea in March 2014, aroused collapse seems to belong to the past, even if debates among scholars about whether it one could envision its renewal in the event should be interpreted as a sign of ethnona- of a new collapse of central authority in tionalism or of imperialism.5 Moscow. If there are drivers that could push toward fragmentation of Russia’s territori- In order to avoid the pitfall of over-fo- al unity, they are more likely to be shaped cusing on ideology, I propose to look at by economic realities–for instance, by the Russian nationalism not through its con- Far East’s economic interaction with China, tents, but through its actors. Historical- South Korea, and Japan–rather than by ly, the study of Russian nationalism has ethnic issues.2 In the event of a collapse of been part of the field of political philoso- central authority in Moscow, economic and phy, with the focus on ideas and concepts, political decentralization would not neces- their intellectual legacies and logical order. sarily lead to territorial partition.3 We are thus still lacking a sociology of in- Nationalism championed by ethnic Rus- tellectual life in Russia and an “ecology” sians would potentially be more powerful of the places of its production: think tanks,

90 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences media, universities, the Academy of Sci- Russia led Europe in the mid-2000s with Marlene ences, and so forth. Ideologies are often about fifty thousand skinheads and other Laruelle fuzzy and shifting, and say nothing about neo-Nazi groupuscules. Their numbers the personal strategies, institutional sta- declined sharply in the second half of the tus, and networks of their producers and 2000s, once the authorities, particular- funders. Typologies by ideological content ly in Moscow and the Moscow region, re- tend to remain sterile if they are not com- alized that they might pose a danger not bined with a more sociological approach only to migrants and other groups identi- to the strategy used by each group to speak fied as their enemy, but to state structures to its constituency and to try to impact the as well. Skinheads were particularly influ- political or cultural arena. ential and visible at the time of Andrei Be- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 A more sociological approach may thus lov’s Movement Against Illegal Immigra- help us apprehend the mobilization poten- tion (dpni), which was disbanded in 2011. tial of nationalism as a force for change in Attempts to unify them under one politi- contemporary Russia. Accordingly, nation- cal umbrella have been numerous, but have alism should be understood as both bottom- always failed, the most structured example up and top-down: it is not a unidirectional being the Russkie movement.7 The third message, but one whose function is to cre- group is made up of national democrats: a ate social consensus between elites and the rather small cluster that became very vis- population, the state and the society. Even ible during the 2011–2012 anti-Putin pro- when propagated by state structures, na- tests,8 then faded to some extent during the tionalism is envisioned as capturing the Ukrainian crisis, for reasons I will explain general mindset or zeitgeist of the popula- below, but is probably destined to become tion, which, to use Weberian terms, con- a rising element on the nationalist scene. sents to this ideological domination. These three groups are shaped by one ideological principle: they are all viscer- The Russian nationalists who are easi- ally anti-Putin and believe that the current est to identify are nonstate actors, whose Russian state is antinational and does not actions are noticeable through two main defend the interests of the Russian nation. mediums: the Internet and social media They all call for a national revolution to on one side, and street violence on the overthrow the current elite and establish a other. Among nonstate actors, there are new, genuinely national regime. This rev- three main groups with different ideolog- olutionary feature sharply distinguishes ical backgrounds. them from actors operating under the state The first on the scene were the Nation- umbrella and who do not favor a change al Bolsheviks led by Eduard Limonov–the of regime. so-called Limonovtsy–who created a vivid These three groups share a relatively simi- youth counterculture around music, aes- lar sociological background: their members thetics, dress codes, and street violence tar- are young people, from teenagers to young geting official institutions, such as police adults, who are more attracted by a way of headquarters and judicial administrations. life at the margins of the society and by a They emerged in 1993–1994 and have been strong feeling of community and friend- able to survive red tape and political repres- ship than by an ideological message.9 Thus, sion to the present day; they still shape a members of one group can easily shift to an- large part of Russia’s youth subcultures other: the bridges between them are more and protest mindset.6 The second group is important than their ideological differences made up of, broadly speaking, skinheads. might suggest. At the organizational level,

146 (2) Spring 2017 91 Is Nation- these movements are relatively similar: Russia as that of a European nation-state, alism a Force weak institutionalization, regular reconfig- being both pro-Western in geopoliti- for Change in Russia? uration and recreation of new structures, cal terms and pro-democracy in political and a cult of personality of the leader, often terms. On that basis, they reject the Bol- steeped in paramilitary culture (with some shevism and anti-Westernism of the Na- exceptions). The three groups also share an tional Bolsheviks and the violence and ambiguous relationship to state structures: leadership cult of the skinheads. They they proclaim their hostility to the current consider those two groups to be unac- leadership, but they have “patrons” inside knowledged allies of the Putin regime be- the system, mostly in the security services cause they both defend authoritarianism.

or among some mps, who help them avoid The nationalism that national democrats Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 or at least limit judicial difficulties. The na- claim for themselves is that of European tional democrats can be partly dissociated populist movements that are able to work from the two other groups on the grounds within a democratic environment, along that they also have more intellectual lead- the lines of the French National Front, the ers, such as Konstantin Krylov at the journal Austrian Freedom Party, and the Jobbik Voprosy natsionalizma or Yegor Prosvirnin party in Hungary. with the website Sputnik i pogrom. Obvi- The three groups have seen their ideologi- ously, the closeness of anticorruption law- cal stances challenged during the Ukrainian yer and prominent political activist Alek- crisis: they had either to rally with Putin sei Navalny with the national democrats, and recognize his annexation of Crimea as very noticeable during the anti-Putin pro- an authentic nationalist act, or to condemn tests but diminished today, contributed to him, whether for acting illegally (national their greater visibility, popular support, and democrats) or for failing to go so far as to modest respectability.10 incorporate Donbas (National Bolsheviks Beyond their detestation for the Putin and skinheads). Limonov and some oth- regime, the three groups are deeply divided ers decided to partly reconcile with Putin. ideologically. The National Bolsheviks National democrats and skinhead groups combine Russian nationalism with leftist saw some of their supporters split between references to Bolshevism and anarchism, fighting on the Ukrainian side with the local and have been influenced by Western Eu- far-right groups, such as Pravyi Sektor and ropean punk and postpunk culture. They the Azov Battalion, and the majority fight- condemn xenophobia and only legitimize ing on the side of the Donbas insurgency.11 violence against state structures and skinhead groups. Skinheads and other neo-Nazi A second group, parastate actors, oper- groups position themselves on the oth- ate in the gray zone of the Kremlin’s ad- er side of the political spectrum: they in- ministration. They support the regime in voke White Power theories, claim links many respects and develop under its um- with Western European and U.S. counter- brella, but they also dispose of their own parts, and focus their violence not against autonomy and ideological niche. In Putin’s state structures, but against anyone identi- system, everything considered a matter of fied as alien to the Russian nation: internal national security or regime security is un- migrants, external migrants, Roma, Jews, der his direct or nearly direct supervision, antifascist groups, and homosexuals. while nonstrategic questions and the ev- National democrats see themselves as eryday management of the state are left to opposing both National Bolsheviks and a broader group of patrons, each in charge skinheads because they see the future of of supervising a domain, in a somewhat

92 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences loose hierarchical pattern. Multiple actors Baburin, who has taken a more pro-Soviet Marlene operate in this gray zone, maintaining ob- nationalist stance. Vladimir Zhirinovsky Laruelle vious connections to Putin’s inner circle’s and, to a lesser extent, Gennadii Zyuganov main figures, but without knowing exact- may be included in this category, as sym- ly the degree of support they have, the red bols of “constructive” or “systemic” op- lines they dare not cross, and the strength position to the Kremlin, each with his own and resources of competing groups. These ideological and electoral niche and some parastate actors can be divided, schemati- official status in the Duma. This was also cally, into four main categories. the case, for two decades, of former Mos- The Russian Orthodox Church consti- cow mayor Yurii Luzhkov, who played a tutes an actor in itself, with an ideologi- critical role in developing Russia’s policy Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 cal agenda that resembles the state’s, but toward compatriots.13 does not overlap with it. First, the Church A third group of actors includes the mil- has a very diverse structure, and second, it itary-industrial complex, the army, and all has long-term objectives that contradict security services. They promote and fund some aspects of the regime’s short-term several activities and associations that can agenda. We saw examples of such diver- be described as nationalist. At the local lev- gences during the conflict with Georgia el, they fund institutions for the patriot- in 2008 and then with Ukraine in 2014, ic upbringing of children and teenagers, when the Moscow Patriarchate open- which have flourished all over Russia in ly refused to recognize the rupture and the last decade. These include the para- played a paradiplomatic role of maintain- military training structures and, more in- ing good relations with the republic and directly, the historical reenactment groups its elites and offering underground chan- and search brigades (poiskoviki) that have nels to pursue dialogue. Ideologically, the come under the media spotlight with the Church does not support the state narra- cult of personality of Igor Strelkov, one of tive of rehabilitation of the Soviet regime the Donbas warlords. At a more ideologi- and remains very critical of it, conduct- cal level, they fund the Izborskii Club, the ing many memorial activities that directly nationalist and conservative think tank contradict the state discourse. The Church launched in 2012 that brings together some also has not had all its legal claims satisfied thirty figures, ranging from Sergei Glaz- by the secular power.12 yev, a close adviser to the president, to the The second group of parastate actors journalist and writer Aleksandr Prokhan- consists of all official figures and repre- ov, and includes famous nationalist pub- sentatives of the state apparatus, includ- licists such as Aleksandr Dugin, Mikhail ing government members and Duma dep- Kalashnikov, and Nikolai Starikov.14 Their uties. Some, like Sergei Naryshkin, former political representation is channeled by chairman of the Duma, now director of the the Rodina Party, led by Dmitrii Rogozin, Foreign Intelligence Service, do not make deputy prime minister in charge of the mil- explicitly nationalist comments, but are itary-industrial complex. Rodina works as still known for protecting nationalist ide- a launch platform for some radical nation- ologists. Others have built their political alist themes that the presidential admin- legitimacy on an outspoken nationalist po- istration does not want to address direct- sition corresponding to a particular ideo- ly, such as open references to ethnonation- logical niche: for example, Natal’ya Na- alism, nativism, and antimigrant theories, rochnitskaya, who represented political and maintains links with European pop- Orthodoxy since the early 1990s, or Sergei ulist parties and far right groups, includ-

146 (2) Spring 2017 93 Is Nation- ing some with a definite neofascist back- references to Tsarist Russia, the Romanovs, alism a Force ground. This third group displays a Rus- and the Church.17 for Change in Russia? sian nationalism that can be defined as It is inherently difficult to assess the lev- “Red,” in the sense that the Soviet lega- el of autonomy of these parastate actors. cy plays a critical role in it, although it has I define them asnationalist entrepreneurs in been updated with ethnonationalist and the sense that they have genuine room to religious references. maneuver, to determine their ideological A fourth, more loosely defined group preferences, and to cultivate their own net- would include Orthodox businessmen, the works. But their entrepreneurship remains two most famous being Vladimir Yakun- fragile, and must work in permanent nego-

in, head of Russian Railways until 2015, and tiation and tension with competing groups Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 Konstantin Malofeyev, who directs the Mar- and with the presidential administration shall Capital Partners investment funds.15 itself. Just as the oligarchs’ empire is not These Orthodox businessmen have personal secure, remaining dependent on individ- connections to members of Putin’s inner ual loyalty, the ideological empire of these circle (Yakunin himself is one of them) entrepreneurs is also unstable and can be and regular contacts with the Moscow Pa- challenged and dismembered. triarchate. They have built their legitimacy on Orthodox charity foundations and Is the state itself an actor of Russian na- played a paradiplomatic role for the Russian tionalism today? Here I identify the pres- state on several occasions, with Yakunin ident and the presidential administration promoting a “dialogue of civilizations” at an as the critical institutions embodying the annual conference at Rhodes, and Malofe- state. Can we identify a Russian national- yev defending Russian interests in West- ism that is promoted by the state? I argue ern Europe. Both Yakunin’s and Malofe- that the state does not produce national- yev’s foundations, respectively named for ism per se, but rather an eclectic combina- St. Andrew the First and St. Basil the Great, tion of ideological references, closer to a cultivate European far-right networks and blurry Weltanschauung than to any kind of monarchist émigré circles. They were, for doctrine.18 In this kaleidoscope, what can instance, instrumental in advancing one be identified as nationalist is much more of Putin’s pet projects for France: the con- marginal than, for instance, what belongs struction of the largest Orthodox cathedral to the repertoire of conservatism.19 in Europe, inaugurated in Paris in October The role of a state leader is to embody the 2016. However, there are some indications, state and the nation, and to provide a grand though difficult to document, that these Or- narrative for it that goes beyond political di- thodox businessmen do make mistakes and visions, economic ups and downs, geopo- cross the invisible line of what is authorized litical reconfigurations, and intrasociety so- or not. This was the case when Yakunin was cioeconomic and cultural gaps. It is thus, by fired in 2015,16 and when Malofeyev had definition, a language tinged with pathos, to pull back from the Donbas insurgency, with different colors and tones depending which he was funding and supporting, af- on the national culture and historical ref- ter the Kremlin decided the insurgency nar- erences. In many aspects, Putin’s speech- rative had gone too far in calling for a na- es about the nation–the state-sanctioned tional revolution that would threaten Pu- grand narratives such as the opening of the tin himself. In contrast to the third group, Sochi Olympics–are not different in es- this group displays a Russian nationalism sence from those of many other countries, that is more White than Red, with implied including Western ones. Emphasizing the

94 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences uniqueness of the nation, its great qualities, an ideal-type that cannot be found in re- Marlene its contributions to the world, or the con- ality. Second, it is a binary grid of inter- Laruelle tinuity of the state beyond political regime pretation that overlooks the existence of changes is not specific to Russia. a third way: state nationalism. What is specific, at least compared with It is difficult for Putin and the presiden- many Western countries, is that the na- tial administration to promote a civic nation’s master narrative is intimately artic- tionalism in the Western sense of the term, ulated and instrumentalized by the regime since this would mean focusing on the in- to secure its legitimacy and to marginal- dividual rights of citizens to express their ize opponents, real or imagined. Putin’s support for but also their dissatisfaction speeches therefore are not a sign of an in- with the regime. Civic nationalism under- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 herent and essentialist Russian national- stood as giving rights to citizens to criticize ism that is different from those existing in the status quo cannot function in the cur- the rest of the world; but the state’s use of rent Russian political environment. This the national grand narrative it produces has to be articulated with the loss of legiti- in domestic political struggle is a critical macy of the notion of rossiiskii (the Russian characteristic of the regime. state and citizenship), which is still used in Contrary to what some scholars and all official documents as a legal term, but experts thought they observed during the is slowly losing its meaning in the Russian Ukrainian crisis, Putin and the presiden- public space, except for the national mi- tial administration do not favor Russian norities, for whom dissociating between ethnonationalism. In fact, they consid- civic and ethnic identity makes obvious er it threatening to the country’s stabili- sense. For the majority population of eth- ty and unity. They exhibit respect for ethnic Russians, russkii (defining Russians ethnic and religious diversity and cultivate nically as well as linguistically) tends to re- their power vertically, creating relation- place rossiiskii, without implying a change ships with the national republics’ elites, of meaning: both terms are considered as which are among the most fervent sup- equal and interchangeable, as we see, for porters of the status quo. However, they instance, with the growing overlap be- also have to manage the rise, via parastate tween russkaya istoriya and rossiiskaya istoriya actors, of discourses that call for valorizing (both referring to Russian history). the status of ethnic Russians, linguistically What the regime is pushing for is state and culturally. This trend is embedded in nationalism: the symbol, embodiment, the steady level of xenophobia displayed and quintessence of the nation is the by Russian society, which, though weak- state. This state “covers up” for the eth- ened by the Ukrainian crisis, is likely des- nic diversity of the country, protecting mi- tined to rise again in future years. More- norities while giving preeminence to eth- over, the state-sponsored rehabilitation of nically Russian cultural elements; it guar- the Soviet past, in the hope that a general- antees stability in exchange for political ized Soviet nostalgia would help to secure loyalty and deference; and it embodies the Kremlin’s legitimacy, and of Russia’s historical continuity in the face of regime historical continuity between the Tsarist changes and collapses. This state nation- regime and the Soviet one contributed to alism combines features from the Soviet valuing ethnically Russian elements. regime, growing references to the Tsarist Can we determine whether the lan- past, room for autonomous voices of na- guage used by the state pertains to a civ- tional minorities, and ideological borrow- ic or an ethnic nationalism? First, this is ings from the globalized culture, ranging

146 (2) Spring 2017 95 Is Nation- from references to the neoliberal manage- olution or shock therapy, and that it has alism a Force rial world to so-called conservative values. to reform itself in a gradual manner, at its for Change in Russia? It is an eclectic piece of bricolage. own rhythm. Putin’s aim can be summed up as follows: Atop this foundation, there are sever- this vision of the world has to be precise al ideologies available for collective con- enough to enable the marginalization and sumption, and none of them are given su- delegitimization of those who challenge periority. One can be nostalgic for the So- the regime, but still vague enough that the viet Union or for the Tsarist Empire, and vast majority of people will subscribe to it. can consider any one of Ivan the Terri- The Kremlin’s Weltanschauung thus plays ble, Nicholas II, Stolypin, Lenin, Stalin,

the card of the lowest common denomi- Gagarin, or Putin as the supreme hero of Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 nator, cultivates the register of the implic- Russian national history. One can desire it, the symbolic, the parable, and provides that Orthodoxy should become the state a large repertoire from which each person religion or be glad about the secularity of can draw almost at will. The flexible charac- state institutions and celebrate the counter of this Weltanschauung confirms the fun- try’s religious diversity. One can see Russia damentally instrumental character of ideas the country of ethnic Russians in a per- ology for the Kremlin: the authorities want manent struggle for their survival against to avoid tying themselves to an overly rig- minorities or celebrate the country’s mul- id concept that would limit their leeway for ticultural harmony. One can endorse the action, and to be able to shift from one reg- most complete isolationism or exalt Rus- ister to another without having to account sia’s commitment to creating a multipolar for it. Flexibility also has another virtue: it world with its allies. One can wish for the consolidates the popular consensus around resurrection of pan-Slavism among Or- the regime, since nearly everyone can iden- thodox Slavic “brothers,” or of Eurasian- tify with the broad directives proposed. ism across the Turkic-Mongolian world, There is a shared foundation to this Welt- or of the “Russian world” embracing the anschauung, a basic minimum for each and Russian diasporas, or find a model in the every one: namely, to declare oneself a pa- Byzantine Empire or in present-day China. triot, to show a certain pride in the resur- gence of the country since the fall of the Based on this overview of Russian na- ussr, to cultivate a certain Soviet nostal- tionalism and its contemporary actors, gia, and to criticize the unbridled liber- can we identify nationalism as a force for alism of the Yeltsin regime that brought change in the Putin regime? the country to the brink of civil war. To- Nonethnic Russian nationalism could re- day, those who endorse the pure and sim- emerge under the label of Islamism, both ple adoption of the Western model are re- in the North Caucasus and, more danger- jected. Russia’s right to oversee its “near ously for Russia, in the Volga-Urals re- abroad” and the reemergence of a “voice gion, as well as among labor migrants. of Russia” in the world are considered le- Ethnic Russian nationalism embodied by gitimate. It is good form to defend a cyn- nonstate actors with an anti-Putin agen- ical vision of the international commu- da could pose a more serious threat to the nity as being manipulated by dominant status quo. While the National Bolsheviks interests masked by great idealistic prin- and neo-Nazi groups are likely to remain ciples, and to share in a culture of conspir- marginal, the national-democrat trend re- acy. There is support for the idea that Rus- flects the current sociological evolutions of sia cannot permit itself to have a new rev- Russian society, attracted by the European

96 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences way of life and identifying with Europe as a groups–are well aware of the risk of a grass- Marlene “white” country facing the threat of “inva- roots antiregime nationalism. They dis- Laruelle sion” by migrants and Muslims. This xeno- covered it during the anti-Putin protests phobic nationalism, increasingly linked to in 2011–2012 with the Navalny phenom- what has been defined, for Europe, as “wel- enon, but some signs were already notice- fare chauvinism”–the view that the wel- able a few years before. Since the second fare state is being exploited by migrants half of the 2000s, some antipolice and an- and that only natives should have access tistate corruption narratives have emerged to public goods–is mainstream in many during the numerous antimigrant riots in European societies. It will probably grow several of Russia’s cities and suburbs. This in Russia, too, given the current econom- grassroots nationalism is different from the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 ic crisis, which tends to intensify symbol- state- and parastate-sponsored versions in ic tensions around migrants both domes- its higher level of xenophobia and ethnona- tic and foreign, along with the need for the tionalism; state and parastate structures are North Caucasus to be heavily subsidized by favorable to a more Soviet-style national- the center (thus the “Stop feeding the Cau- ism, believing in the “community of desti- casus” campaign launched by Navalny and ny” of all the peoples of Eurasia, and there- other national-democrat figures). More- fore being friendlier to non–ethnically Rus- over, Russian public opinion is very much sian groups. shaped by its reading of Europe’s current However, this dissociation works only refugee crisis, and there is an obvious mir- at a broad, general level. A closer look re- ror effect between the way the Russian me- veals that the Rodina party positions itself dia depict the European situation and how as a bridge between the state and some of many Russians characterize a threat they these grassroots ethnonationalist move- want their own country to avoid. ments, especially the skinhead ones. Per- With the current economic crisis, hopes sonal links and supports were solidified in for a continuous rise of living standards in the mid-2000s when Rogozin’s adviser, Russia, especially for the middle classes, are Andrei Savelyov, a member of the Duma, collapsing and could produce a chain reac- worked closely with Belov and his dpni tion, partly delegitimizing Putin’s regime movement, with the hope of bringing the and giving birth to new waves of popular street activism of skinhead groups under protests. As in 2011–2012, the anti-Putin Rodina’s control. The new Rodina, which nationalists would be part of such a grass- reemerged in 2012, follows the same log- roots movement and could play a critical ic of connecting with radical grassroots role in offering the ideological “glue” nec- groups as well as their European counter- essary to build a coherent anti-Putin dis- parts. There are therefore some sections course: it could link state corruption, eth- of the parastate landscape that support a nic criminality by minorities and migrants, more ethnonationalist agenda and try to and the endless thirst for public subsidies to disconnect it from its original anti-Putin the North Caucasus into one story about the orientation. regime not giving enough care to the Rus- One may also notice, at the parastate level, sian ethnic majority and its needs. It is very a growing trend toward a new brand of improbable that the determinants of such Russian nationalism that would engineer resentment would not include any nation- a consensual vision of the Russian nation alist claims, one way or another. and overcome traditional lines of divide. However, the state structures–the pres- The Izborskii Club works as a laborato- idential administration and the parastate ry for producing this new unifying narra-

146 (2) Spring 2017 97 Is Nation- tive that would satisfy both the Sovieto- the civilizational narrative about a white alism a Force philes and those more nostalgic for the Tsa- and Christian Europe having to protect its for Change in Russia? rist Empire and for Orthodoxy. This push values from migrants and Islamism could to combine a divergent ideological reper- become a dominant frame of discourse for toire has been interpreted by some schol- the Russian population, and will have to be ars, such as Timothy Snyder and Alexander accommodated, one way or another, by the Motyl, as a sign of fascism in today’s Rus- political leadership. sia. I reject the terminology of fascism to de- How might the probable growth of grass- scribe the current regime. The Russian es- roots nationalism, shaped by xenophobic tablishment is largely nihilistic in terms of sentiments, interact with the regime’s am-

values and does not believe in a revolution- biguous quest for a more definitive ideolo- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 ary ideology that would dramatically mod- gy in future years? One of the most plau- ify the country and create a new mankind; sible scenarios is the rise of a figure inside on the contrary, the narrative promoted by the establishment, such as Dmitrii Ro- the state is one of the status quo, conserva- gozin, who would be able to prevent the tism, and counterrevolution. polarization of Russian nationalism into an antiregime narrative and could co-opt The current Russian regime is not fro- some of its slogans and leaders, in order zen in terms of ideology. It cultivated an to gradually channel the official narrative intense nationalist atmosphere during the toward a more state-controlled national- Ukrainian crisis only to calm it down later. ism. The story of Russian nationalism is a Since mid-2016, it has reintegrated some story of co-optation by the authorities of liberal figures, such as former finance min- topics and leaders, and of mutual interac- ister Aleksei Kudrin, who has been asked to tions with some segments of the popula- draw up a new economic program for the tion. Whoever succeeds in capturing the country, and former prime minister and mobilization potential of Russian nation- head of Rosatom, Sergei Kiriyenko, now alism will, once in power, have to maintain deputy director of Russia’s presidential ad- the state as its cornerstone: only a focus ministration, without having to change its on the state avoids a too-radical ethnona- doctrinal paradigm. This flexibility allows tionalism that would destroy the unity of it to adapt to evolving situations. Russia’s the country, and preserves the consensual demographics will probably play in favor storyline of Russia as a great power having of a rise of ethnonationalism: as in Europe, the right to a say on the future of the world.

endnotes 1 Elise Giuliano and Dmitry Gorenburg, “The Unexpectedly Underwhelming Role of Ethnicity in Russian Politics, 1991–2011,” Demokratizatsiya 20 (2) (2012): 175–188. See also Elise Giuliano, “Theorizing Nationalist Separatism in Russia,” in Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine, ed. Dominique Arel and Blair A. Ruble (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wil- son Center Press with Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). Census results are available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm. 2 For the 1990s situation, see Dmitry Gorenburg, “Regional Separatism in Russia: Ethnic Mo- bilization or Power Grab?” Europe-Asia Studies 51 (2) (1999): 245–274; Dmitry Gorenburg, Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Elise Giuliano, Constructing Grievance: Ethnic Nationalism in Russia’s Republics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011).

98 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 3 See Nikolay Petrov, “Analysis of Interconnection Between Democratic Institutions Develop- Marlene ment at National and Subnational Levels: The Case Study of Russia and Its Regions,” Labora- Laruelle tory for Regional Development Assessment Methods, Center for Fundamental Research, Na- tional Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, 2015, https://www.hse.ru/ en/org/projects/144505261 (accessed May 13, 2016). 4 Pål Kolstø, “The Ethnification of Russian Nationalism,” in The New Russian Nationalism: Impe- rialism, Ethnicity, and Authoritarianism, ed. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh: Edin- burgh University Press, 2016), 18–45. 5 See Kimberly Marten, “Vladimir Putin: Ethnic Russian Nationalist,” The Washington Post, March 19, 2014; and Marlene Laruelle, “Misinterpreting Nationalism: Why Russkii is Not a Sign of Ethnonationalism,” ponars Eurasia Policy Memo No. 416 (Washington, D.C.:

ponars Eurasia, 2016). Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 6 See Fabrizio Fenghi, “Making Post-Soviet Counterpublics: The Aesthetics of Limonka and the National-Bolshevik Party,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity (forthcom- ing 2017). See also Andrei Rogachevskii, A Biographical and Critical Study of Russian Writer Eduard Limonov (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003). In French, see Vera Nikolski, National- bolchevisme et neo-eurasisme dans la Russie contemporaine (Paris: Mare et Martin, 2013). 7 See Sergei Belikov, Skinkhedy v Rossii (Moscow: Academia, 2005); Victor Shnirel’man, “Chis- til’shchiki moskovskikh ulits.” Skinkhedy, SMI i obshchestvennoye mneniye (Moscow: Academia, 2007); Aleksandr Verkhovskii, ed., Russkii natsionalizm: ideologiya i nastroyeniye (Moscow: sova, 2006); and Aleksandr Verkhovskii and Galina Kozhevnikova, eds., Radikal’nyi russkii natsionalizm. Struk- tury, idei, litsa: spravochnik (Moscow: sova, 2009). See also Robert Horvath, “Russkii Obraz and the Politics of ‘Managed Nationalism,’” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Eth- nicity 42 (3) (2014): 469–488; and Richard Arnold and Ekaterina Romanova, “The ‘White World’s Future’?: An Analysis of the Russian Far Right,” Journal of the Study of Radicalism 7 (1) (2013): 79–107. 8 Pål Kolstø, “Russian Nationalists Flirt with Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 25 (3) (2014): 120–134. 9 See Hillary Pilkington, Elena Omel’chenko, and Al’bina Garifzianova, Russia’s Skinheads: Ex- ploring and Rethinking Subcultural Lives (London and New York: Routledge, 2010). 10 Marlene Laruelle, “Alexei Navalny and Challenges in Reconciling ‘Nationalism’ and ‘Liber- alism,’” Post-Soviet Affairs 30 (4) (2014): 276–297. 11 Marlene Laruelle, “The Three Colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian Nationalist Mythmaking of the Ukrainian Crisis,” Post-Soviet Affairs 32 (1) (2015): 55–74. See also Anton Shekhovstov, “Der Rechte Sektor. Zwischen Polittechnologie, Politik und Straßenkampf,” in Euromaidan– Was in der Ukraine auf dem Spiel steht, ed. Juri Andruchowytsch (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2014), 159–172. 12 See Aleksandr Verkhovskii, Politicheskoye pravoslaviye: russkiye pravoslavnye natsionalisty i fundamen- talisty, 1995–2001 (Moscow: sova, 2004); Anastasiya Mitrofanova, Politizatsyia “pravoslavno- go mira” (Moscow: Nauka, 2004); and Nikolai Mitrokhin, Russkaya pravoslavnaya tserkov’: sovre- mennoye sostoyaniye i aktual’nye problemy (Moscow: nlo, 2004). 13 For more on all these figures, see Marlene Laruelle, In the Name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 14 Marlene Laruelle, “The Izborsky Club, or the New Conservative Avant-Garde in Russia,” The Russian Review (75) (4) (2016). 15 Ilya Arkhipov, Henry Meyer, and Irina Reznik, “Putin’s ‘Soros’ Dreams of Empire as Allies Wage Ukraine Revolt,” Bloomberg, June 15, 2014. See also Novaya gazeta, November 21, 2012. 16 Roland Oliphant, “Vladimir Putin ‘Fires Close Ally Vladimir Yakunin After Son Applied for British Citizenship,’” The Telegraph, October 9, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/

146 (2) Spring 2017 99 Is Nation- worldnews/vladimir-putin/11923174/Vladimir-Putin-fires-close-ally-Vladimir-Yakunin-after alism a Force -son-applied-for-British-citizenship.html (accessed May 13, 2016). for Change 17 in Russia? Marlene Laruelle, “Holy Russia: The Revival of Political Orthodoxy and Its Networks Abroad,” article submitted for review, 2016. 18 On the public relations aspect of this brand, see Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005); and Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia (New York: Public Affairs, 2014). 19 Marlene Laruelle, “Russia as an Anti-Liberal European Civilization,” in The New Russian Na- tionalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity, and Authoritarianism, ed. Kolstø and Blakkisrud, 275–297. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021

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