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Is Nationalism a Force for Change in Russia?

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Is Nationalism a Force for Change in Russia? Is Nationalism a Force for Change in Russia? Marlene Laruelle Abstract: This essay defines three categories of Russian nationalist actors: nonstate actors, whose agenda Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 is anti-Putin; parastate actors, who have their own ideological niche, not always in tune with the presiden- tial administration’s narrative, but who operate under the state umbrella; and state actors, in particular, the presidential administration. In the future, the Russian ethnonationalism embodied by nonstate ac- tors is the main trend that could pose a serious threat to the regime. However, the Kremlin is not “frozen” in terms of ideology, and its flexibility allows it to adapt to evolving situations. One of the most plausible scenarios is the rise of a figure inside the establishment who would be able to prevent the polarization of Russian nationalism into an antiregime narrative and could co-opt some of its slogans and leaders, in or- der to gradually channel the official narrative toward a more state-controlled nationalism. Is nationalism a force for change in Russia? If nation- alism is an ideology supporting the overlap of “na- tion” and “state,” then nationalists are those who push for a political agenda through which the nation and the state are intrinsically assimilated into each other. They may, for example, call for the state to grow to include territories that they consider as belonging to the nation, or separate from territories they see as alien to it. In the Russian case, the nation is not nec- MARLENE LARUELLE is Research essarily defined by a restrictive Russian russkii( ) “eth- Professor of International Affairs and Associate Director of the Insti- nicity,” but by a larger vision fed by the country’s im- tute for European, Russian and Eur- perial past. I exclude from nationalism Russia’s quest asian Studies at the Elliott School of for great power, which I consider to belong to another International Affairs, The George repertoire, that of legitimizing the country’s actions Washington University, and Codi- on the international scene and its branding. rector of ponars Eurasia. She is There are myriad actors promoting a nationalist the author of Russia’s Strategies in the agenda in Russia. In this essay, I distinguish three main Arctic and the Future of the Far North (2013), In the Name of the Nation: Na- categories of actors: nonstate actors, whose agenda tionalism and Politics in Contemporary is anti-Putin and who call for a national revolution Russia (2009), and Russian Eurasian- to defend the Russian nation against the current re- ism: An Ideology of Empire (2008). gime; parastate actors, who have their own ideological © 2017 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00437 89 Is Nation- niche, not always in tune with the presiden- than the nationalist sentiments of non– alism a Force tial administration’s narrative, but who op- ethnic Russians. But what do we under- for Change in Russia? erate under the state umbrella, in the gray stand by the term Russian nationalism? It zone of the Kremlin’s “ecosystem” of in- is a blurry yet loaded notion. Convention- terest groups, lobbies, and personal con- ally, scholarly works devoted to Russian nections; and state actors, in particular, the nationalism have tried to dissociate the presidential administration. This dissoci- plural nature of the phenomenon by clas- ation is critical in order to advance a com- sifying its contents into two broad catego- prehensive assessment of what we mean by ries: imperial nationalism and ethnic na- Russian nationalism and to explore its po- tionalism.4 I find this line of division to be tential for being a force for change in Rus- artificial and not heuristic. The main ide- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 sia in the next ten to fifteen years. ologists of Russian nationalism belong to both categories: Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Nationalisms are diverse, especially in often seen as a proponent of an imperi- a country like Russia. With the exception al Russia, has been known for making re- of a short period between the perestroi- peated racist statements about the need to ka years and the mid-1990s, nationalism protect the Russian nation from external among non-Russian ethnic groups (around ethnic influences. Aleksandr Dugin, pro- 21 percent of the country’s population was lific theoretician of neo-Eurasianism, the identified as non–ethnically Russian in the quintessence of imperial Russia, is also fa- 2010 census) has been limited.1 In today’s mous for introducing in Russia fascist the- Russia, non-Russian nationalisms do not ories about Aryan races and their “spiri- emerge as a potential force for change for tual fight” against Jews. Aleksandr Solz- several reasons. henitsyn, champion of an ethnic Russia First, the main secessionist region of the that would avoid any new imperial tempta- country, the North Caucasus, has changed tion, can be defined as “imperialist” from a profoundly since the First Chechen War Ukrainian or a Kazakh point of view, since (1994–1996). Social resentment is now he called for all territories populated by expressed through Islamism and no lon- Eastern Slavs to join Russia. Even Vladimir ger through postcolonial calls for parti- Putin’s statement about Russia as a divid- tion and independence. Second, the “sov- ed nation, used to justify Russia’s annex- ereignty parade” of the years of the Soviet ation of Crimea in March 2014, aroused collapse seems to belong to the past, even if debates among scholars about whether it one could envision its renewal in the event should be interpreted as a sign of ethnona- of a new collapse of central authority in tionalism or of imperialism.5 Moscow. If there are drivers that could push toward fragmentation of Russia’s territori- In order to avoid the pitfall of over-fo- al unity, they are more likely to be shaped cusing on ideology, I propose to look at by economic realities–for instance, by the Russian nationalism not through its con- Far East’s economic interaction with China, tents, but through its actors. Historical- South Korea, and Japan–rather than by ly, the study of Russian nationalism has ethnic issues.2 In the event of a collapse of been part of the field of political philoso- central authority in Moscow, economic and phy, with the focus on ideas and concepts, political decentralization would not neces- their intellectual legacies and logical order. sarily lead to territorial partition.3 We are thus still lacking a sociology of in- Nationalism championed by ethnic Rus- tellectual life in Russia and an “ecology” sians would potentially be more powerful of the places of its production: think tanks, 90 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences media, universities, the Academy of Sci- Russia led Europe in the mid-2000s with Marlene ences, and so forth. Ideologies are often about fifty thousand skinheads and other Laruelle fuzzy and shifting, and say nothing about neo-Nazi groupuscules. Their numbers the personal strategies, institutional sta- declined sharply in the second half of the tus, and networks of their producers and 2000s, once the authorities, particular- funders. Typologies by ideological content ly in Moscow and the Moscow region, re- tend to remain sterile if they are not com- alized that they might pose a danger not bined with a more sociological approach only to migrants and other groups identi- to the strategy used by each group to speak fied as their enemy, but to state structures to its constituency and to try to impact the as well. Skinheads were particularly influ- political or cultural arena. ential and visible at the time of Andrei Be- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/2/89/1830948/daed_a_00437.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 A more sociological approach may thus lov’s Movement Against Illegal Immigra- help us apprehend the mobilization poten- tion (dpni), which was disbanded in 2011. tial of nationalism as a force for change in Attempts to unify them under one politi- contemporary Russia. Accordingly, nation- cal umbrella have been numerous, but have alism should be understood as both bottom- always failed, the most structured example up and top-down: it is not a unidirectional being the Russkie movement.7 The third message, but one whose function is to cre- group is made up of national democrats: a ate social consensus between elites and the rather small cluster that became very vis- population, the state and the society. Even ible during the 2011–2012 anti-Putin pro- when propagated by state structures, na- tests,8 then faded to some extent during the tionalism is envisioned as capturing the Ukrainian crisis, for reasons I will explain general mindset or zeitgeist of the popula- below, but is probably destined to become tion, which, to use Weberian terms, con- a rising element on the nationalist scene. sents to this ideological domination. These three groups are shaped by one ideological principle: they are all viscer- The Russian nationalists who are easi- ally anti-Putin and believe that the current est to identify are nonstate actors, whose Russian state is antinational and does not actions are noticeable through two main defend the interests of the Russian nation. mediums: the Internet and social media They all call for a national revolution to on one side, and street violence on the overthrow the current elite and establish a other. Among nonstate actors, there are new, genuinely national regime.
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