“Russia has openly questioned the legitimacy of the international system, claim- ing the right to a distinctive sovereignty that makes the protection of its cultural body abroad a moral duty.” Russian Nationalism and Ukraine MARLENE LARUELLE Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-pdf/113/765/272/412111/curh_113_765_272.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 ationalist” is probably one of the Russia. China has been using a growing number of first adjectives that appear in most references to its imperial and Communist past, as “Nanalyses of contemporary Russia and well as to an enduring Chinese identity marked by the ongoing events in Ukraine. But what is Taoist religious and philosophical canons. France explained by saying that Russia or President has used its status as a former colonial power to Vladimir Putin’s regime has become national- claim a right and a duty to intervene militarily in ist? Nationalism is a catchall various African countries, while on the domestic Resurgent term that may do more to scene, Nicolas Sarkozy during his presidency orga- Nationalism obscure than to clarify recent nized public debates about national identity and Second in a series developments. Scholars have created a Ministry of Immigration, Integration, debated Russia’s nationalism National Identity, and Codevelopment. Canadian for decades. Even during the final years of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper has led the charge Cold War, they were arguing over whether nation- for Canada’s new Arctic identity, competing aggres- alism was Russia’s traditional “illness,” inherited sively with both Russia and the United States, to from the czarist regime and its Black Hundreds the annoyance of both French-speaking minori- anti-Semitic militia, and then reactivated by Soviet ties and indigenous peoples. leader Joseph Stalin. Or was Russia actually an What makes the Russian case so unusual, then? “a-national” country, a former empire that became For one thing, a variety of interest groups produce a communist internationalist homeland and was varied nationalist narratives. The Kremlin is not then unable to transform itself into a “normal” alone in its public use of nationalist rhetoric— (read Western-style) nation-state? there are several “armed divisions” working in Since this kind of broad, overarching defini- coordination with it. The military-industrial sec- tion of what is and is not nationalist creates end- tor, which still employs millions, and the military less debate, let us try asking different questions: itself, whose recruitment pool of young people is What are the groups that use nationalist agendas diminishing in terms of its size and enthusiasm in Russia today, and in the service of legitimizing for service, manage muscular patriotic campaigns what kinds of actions or world views? How is the in the hopes of protecting their interests. crisis in Ukraine a product of—or a game-changer Many public and private foundations and think for—nationalism in Russia? tanks have sprung up around the Kremlin and the Putin-backing political party, United Russia, MULTIPLE NARRATIVES producing nationalist rhetoric on demand. They There are myriad actors promoting a nationalist capture public funds while their leaders try agenda in Russia. The regime itself (the presiden- to build careers based on nationalist slogans, tial administration and the government) tends seeking to become advisers to the regime. One to manipulate references to Russia’s atemporal such example is the Russian World Foundation, national identity both in domestic and interna- which promotes Russian culture abroad, mainly tional affairs. This is not something specific to among the Russian-speaking diaspora. More recently, the Izborsky Club was created in 2012 MARLENE LARUELLE is a research professor of international as the main nationalist think tank, bringing affairs at George Washington University. together some 30 ideologues. Finally, the media, 272 Russian Nationalism and Ukraine • 273 and television above all, serve to disseminate Aleksei Navalny, the blogger and main figure of consensus-generating views on Russia’s mission anti-regime protests. This democratic movement in the world, its national identity, and the sound- emerged in the second half of the 2000s, but ness of current public policies. gained visibility and legitimacy during the anti- Some institutions promote vibrant national- Putin protests of 2011–12. ist narratives with a larger degree of autonomy Nationalisms from above and below should from the state. Such is the case with the Moscow not be seen as two parallel phenomena that Patriarchate, which represents the Russian never intersect. On the contrary, they are in Orthodox Church. The church’s storyline is not constant dialogue with a whole array of mediat- totally in line with that of the Kremlin: It is more ing platforms and personalities between them. positive about the czarist legacy, and many of its The church plays a mediating role between the politicized groups display monarchist convictions. state and those who call for a nationalist agenda Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-pdf/113/765/272/412111/curh_113_765_272.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 The church’s official memory also differs from the based on the promotion of conservative values, state’s. This is obvious, for example, in its numer- as well as Cossack organizations, Russia’s tradi- ous canonizations of the Soviet regime’s victims, tional paramilitary militias. The Rodina party, led while the state, by contrast, claims continuity by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin, has a with the Soviet Union. Last but not least, the central place in creating a continuum of debate church requested that it be recognized as a kind between bottom-up and top-down nationalisms of primus inter pares among religious institutions, and in fostering personal connections. A growing which would enable it to gain access to the public number of successful Orthodox businessmen such education system, but this attempt failed in part as Vladimir Yakunin and Konstantin Malofeev also due to resistance from secular state structures. contribute to this dialogue by funding grassroots activities while also safeguard- FROM ABOVE AND BELOW ing the business interests of the It would be erroneous to The more radical Russian elite. (Malofeev is believed to see Russian nationalism only nationalists now call for be directly involved in funding as a top-down production. the pro-Russian insurgency in Nationalist slogans also come the fight to move from eastern Ukraine.) “from below.” Many political the Donbas to Russia. Grassroots nationalist claims groups, with a range of legal are formulated according to statuses, claim to be national- two major narratives. The first ist in one form or another—for example, the one is civilizational: Russia is a unique country two historical opposition parties, the Communist whose destiny is to be among the great powers, Party led by Gennadi Zyuganov and Vladimir and whose culture both represents the distinctive Zhirinovsky’s badly named Liberal-Democratic “Russian soul” and carries a universalism that Party of Russia (it is neither liberal nor democrat- legitimizes messianic tendencies. This narrative ic). There are also many groups that would qualify can take many forms, emphasizing the imperial or as national-populist or far-right on the European Soviet history of the country, its geography (one- political spectrum: the movement Russkie (The sixth of the land on earth), its achievements in Russians), which includes the former Movement arts and literature, its Orthodox religion and con- Against Illegal Immigration as well as some skin- servative values, or the contemporary geopolitical head circles; the Eurasianist Movement, led by issues that allow Russia to appear as the antithesis the fascist geopolitician Alexander Dugin; and a of US unilateralism. plethora of smaller groups, which often have char- The second narrative is xenophobic: It claims ismatic leaders and short shelf lives. that Russia’s national identity is at risk from an It should be noted that although the politi- invasion of immigrants from the southern areas cal orientations of these groups often favor an of the former Soviet Union (Central Asia and authoritarian regime, there is a growing trend of the Caucasus), China, and the wider Islamic democratic nationalism. The so-called national- world. Approximately two-thirds of Russian citi- democrats call on Russia to follow the European zens believe that there are too many immi- model and become a democratic nation-state. grants in Russia (many consider Russian citizens Among them are Konstantin Krylov, leader of from the North Caucasus, such as Chechens and the unregistered National Democratic Party, and Dagestanis, to be immigrants as well), want them 274 • CURRENT HISTORY • October 2014 to be expelled, and support calls for establishing international law and did not want a new area to a visa regime with the former Soviet states. This be subjected to Russia’s nondemocratic and cor- narrative is not exclusive to Russia either; it is a rupt regime. For all others, the time had come for phenomenon that can be observed in all coun- reconciliation with a regime that some of them tries in Western and Central Europe, and in other had denounced for years as leading an a-national, forms in the United States. What is unique is the or even anti-Russian, policy. high level of ethnic violence and anti-immigrant With the third stage of the conflict, the pro- riots in Russia, which exceeds the European norm. Russian insurrection in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas Russian nationalisms from above and below region, nationalist circles have had to elaborate a overlap on several points, but with a twist: The more complex positioning. They support Putin xenophobic aspect drives bottom-up national- in his interpretation of the conflict (that the ism yet is used sparingly by the authorities, who Russian-speaking population’s rights have not Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article-pdf/113/765/272/412111/curh_113_765_272.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 see in it the potential for social instability.