The discourse of Russian in the separatist ‘ People’s Republic’ A discourse analysis in ‘state’ media, leadership and public opinion: the case of the DPR

Master Thesis Name: Margot Louise Karis Student Number: 1317393 Supervisor: Dr. M.B.D. Benraad Second reader: Dr. C.W. Hijzen Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs MSc Crisis and Security Management Word count: 17.023 Abstract

The annexation of the in March 2014 and the Russian interference in eastern sparked an escalation of violence, insecurity and political upheaval over the last few years, in Ukraine itself but also in the West. These developments form prime examples of ’s ability to destabilise the peace and security of non-Russian regions and to expand its sphere of influence with the purpose of creating a security buffer for the West. At the same time, Russian nationalism has taken an aggressive and imperialistic turn, an underlying development that might have had more influence on the developments in Ukraine than previously researched. Between the combination of (new) Russian nationalism under Putin’s reign and the developments in (eastern) Ukraine interconnections can be made. This research will examine this interconnection by studying a Russian nationalist discourse in the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) in eastern Ukraine, during the Ukraine conflict that started in 2014. A comprehensive discourse analysis of DPR-media news articles, DPR leadership speeches and the general public opinion has shown that elements of Russian nationalism are present throughout the media environment, the leadership, and to a lesser extend throughout the public opinion of the DPR. This thesis stresses the importance of analysing pro-Russian separatist states or regions like the DPR from within to detect the true effects that Russian influence has had over the last few years. Further research and thus knowledge on this topic can aid Western policy-makers to adjust and sharpen their foreign policy strategies towards Russia, Ukraine and regions prone to (pro-Russian) separatism.

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Table of Content

Introduction 4 Goal of the research 6 Research question 7 Scientific relevance 7 Societal relevance 9 Reading guide 9 Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework I. The Construction of (Russian) nationalism 11 1.1.1 Nationalism 11 1.1.2 Russian nationalism 13 1.1.3 Building a framework 16 II. Eastern Ukraine and the 18 1.2.1 History, Identity and Ideology in the Donetsk Oblast 19 1.2.2 Separatism in the region of Donetsk 21 Chapter 2. Methodology 2.1 Research Design – Case Study 24 2.2 Operationalisation 25 2.3 Choice of methodology 25 2.4 Methods of data collection 26 2.5 Internal / external validity and reliability 29 Chapter 3. Analysis 3.1.1 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR ‘state media’ – introducing the source 31 3.1.2 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR ‘state media’ – analysing the source 33 3.2.1 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR leadership – introducing the leadership 42 3.2.2 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR leadership – analysing the leadership 44 3.3 Russian nationalist discourse in the public opinion of the DPR 48 Conclusion 54 Bibliography 57 Appendix 61

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Introduction

When entered the Kremlin as acting Russian president in 1999, with him came a new impulse to Russian nationalism. An aggressive, sometimes even called imperialistic type of nationalism1, used increasingly to expand Russia’s sphere of influence. Simultaneously, it is used to destabilise and polarise Western societies, endangering their societal and political security. The annexation of the Crimea in March 2014 and the Russian interference in Eastern Ukraine war form prime examples of this development. Between the combination of (new) Russian nationalism under Putin’s reign and the developments in (eastern) Ukraine interconnections can be made. This research will examine this interconnection by studying a Russian nationalist discourse in the separatist confederation state in eastern Ukraine, during the Ukraine conflict that started in 2014. The confederation state is split up in two republics ( and Donetsk), this research will focus on the People’s Republic of Donetsk (from now on indicated as DPR, or Donetsk People’s Republic)2 The war in eastern Ukraine escalated as an armed conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine in the spring of 2014. Protests by anti-government and pro-Russian groups grew in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (together called the Donbas region) of Ukraine. These protests were a counter-reaction to the 2014 movement (a pro-EU movement) in Ukraine. The protests were influenced by more extensive groups of pro-Russian demonstrations which took place in the entire south and east of Ukraine and by the Russian annexation of the Crimea which was completed in March of 2014.

3 A picture of pro-Russian protesters in Donetsk in March 2014. The banner says “Donbas is with Russia”.

1 E. Pain, ‘The imperial syndrome and its influence on Russian nationalism’, in: P. Kolstø, and H. Blakkisrud, The New Russian Nationalism, (Edinburgh, 2016), pp. 46-74, p. 46. 2 I want to note that the DPR has not been recognized as an official republic. Technically, it is a non-existent state and still a part of the Donetsk oblast in Ukraine. It is occupied by separatists. However, I will use the name the self-declared republic uses – DPR – for convenience throughout this thesis. 3 Image retrieved from www.kyivpost.com, 7-03-2014, Accessed on 1-06-2018. 4

Eventually the protests in the Donbas escalated into an armed conflict between the Ukrainian government and the two separatist republics, the DPR and the LPR, in the spring of 2014. More than 10,000 people have died during this conflict, and although the heat of the conflict has decreased, cases of civilian casualties are still a reality on both the Ukrainian and the separatist side due to continuous shelling at the frontline (in violation of the Minsk agreements4). Throughout the beginning of the war strong indications were found by journalists and researchers that the leaders of the DPR were of Russian descent. Also, the troops fighting against the Ukrainian government were estimated to consist of 40000 rebels and 6000 Russian paramilitaries.5 Although denied by Russian president Vladimir Putin, Russian interference – both militarily and non-militarily – in the region has been a proven fact.6

7 Map indicating the conflict-area.

When the separatists took over the region and pronounced its independent separatist state on May 14th of 2014, a pro-Russian propaganda machine started operating in the DPR. Russian TV channels were (re-)introduced, Ukrainian channels disconnected, and pro-Ukrainian journalists fled and were replaced by pro-Russian news agencies. DPR citizens have had little

4 The original (Minsk I) agreement consisted of ceasefire deal between Russia, Ukraine and the separatists in 2014. This ceasefire was breached in January of 2015. Germany and France stepped in and created a second agreement in February 2015, a comprehensive deal, including a new ceasefire and a plan to solve the conflict, now known as Minsk II. 5 G. Baczynska & A. Vasovic, ‘Pushing Locals Aside, take top rebel posts in east Ukraine’, www..com, July 27, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-rebels-insight/pushing- locals-aside-russians-take-top-rebel-posts-in-east-ukraine-idUSKBN0FW07020140727, accessed on 4-05-2018. 6 N. Roman, W. Wanta & I. Buniak, ‘Information wars: Eastern Ukraine military conflict coverage in the Russian, Ukrainian and U.S. newscasts’, The International Communication Gazette (2017), 79(4), pp. 357-378, p. 362. 7 Image retreated from: www.nationalia.info, 3-07-2015, Accessed on 1-06-2018. 5 access to Ukrainian news-sources ever since. In these DPR media-outlets and also in the DPR leadership, a Russian nationalist narrative can be detected.

8 Examples of pro-Russian press in the DPR. The flag of the DPR is on the top-right of the picture.

Since the DPR is a secluded area it is hard to capture inside information about the side of the separatists and the citizens of the DPR and their relation to Russia, Russian influence and Russian nationalism. This in itself is a knowledge gap that can be fulfilled both scientifically and societally. Russian nationalism and its influence can be one explanation of why the people of the DPR actually support the separatist state. The history of the Donetsk region in relation to Russia and Russian nationalism can be a cause of the separatist sentiment. To what extent Russian nationalism plays a role will be examined in this research.

Goal of the research As the People’s Republic of Donetsk is a pro-Russian self-proclaimed republic, I am wondering to what extent Russian nationalism is actively present in the region and if this influences the citizens of the DPR. This examination of a possible Russian nationalist discourse in the DPR and its influence on the public opinion of the DPR is the specific goal of this research. It is necessary to mention that, during this research, capturing a discourse does not in any case mean to determine complete certainty of (part of) a society’s worldviews. This research tries to make clear how certain actors (DPR leaders and influencers, as well as citizens who support the DPR) construct an argument and how this argument fits into the wider social practices and security issues in the DPR. This requires a broad view of nationalism, Russian nationalism in particular, and its indicators. Also, it is important to historicise the situation in Eastern Ukraine. By doing this, it might be possible to gain a broader view of the current security-related problems in the region, of the influence of

8 Image retreated from: www.novosti.dn.ua, 16-11-2015, Accessed on 1-06-2018. 6

Russian nationalism and of how strong it is in countries outside the Russian federation. This, in turn, will provide us with another piece of the puzzle of the current discourse of Russian ‘soft power’ (using culture, political values and foreign policies to gain influence in certain countries or to disrupt the security and stability of others).

Research question The research question that I will attempt to answer is: To what extent is a Russian nationalist discourse present in the DPR and how does it influence the DPR citizens and the public opinion during the Ukraine conflict (2014-present)?

The main research question is supported by the following sub-questions that will help to lead to a balanced conclusion: - How does the state media of the DPR use/frame Russian nationalism to promote the separatist republic? - How does the leadership of the DPR use/frame Russian nationalism to promote the separatist republic? - Is there a Russian nationalist discourse present in the general public opinion of the DPR? If so, how is it framed? This research question is both descriptive and explanatory as it is needed to extensively describe the concept of (Russian) nationalism – with its indicators – to understand the influence it has on the security implications of the region and specifically on the citizens / public opinion in the Donetsk People’s Republic.

Scientific relevance In terms of scientific relevance of this paper, as of today, not much research has been done on this topic in terms of extensive analysis of the DPR media and public opinion, especially in relation to a Russian nationalist discourse. It is known that separatist forces are backed by Russian forces and supported by the Russian government, but less is known of why the DPR is supported in the Donbas and whether Russian nationalism plays a large role. Ever since Russian president Vladimir Putin came to power on the last day of 1999 Russian nationalism has been on the rise on the Russian political agenda.9 A Russian nationalist discourse has been propagated, not only domestically but also internationally, especially in regions outside

9 T. P. Gerber, ‘Beyond Putin? Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian Public Opinion.’ The Washington Quarterly 37(3), pp. 113-34., p.115. 7

Russia which are receptive of this influence (e.g. Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, Moldova and Georgia) because of their weak political situations (e.g. Russian-imposed destabilisation due to frozen conflicts), security issues (e.g. high crime rate, corruption) and the demography of the population (e.g. a substantial Russian minority). Since the two ‘republics’ in Eastern Ukraine threaten to become the newest frozen conflict, researching the Russian nationalist discourse in (one of these) republics adds a piece to the Russian ‘soft power’ puzzle. Looking at the broader context of this thesis, Russian ‘soft power’ with the use of propaganda, disinformation or strategic communication as a method, has been an important part of Russian foreign policy and a potential security threat of destabilisation for the West.10 Since strategic communication (especially Russian ‘fake news’ and the like) though the regular media and social media is an important aspect in warfare and society in general, it is also a subject that has been increasingly researched scientifically. Russia, being one of the main generators of self-serving propaganda in the world, started to promote a narrative in the mid-2000s emphasising the “faults of the United States and the West; the dangers of institutions associated with democracy, such as protests and NGOs; the superiority of Russian values and institutions”11, as researchers Theodore P. Gerber and Jane Zavisca indicated in their article ‘Does Russian Propaganda Work?’. This narrative is distributed through official government statements and merges into government-orchestrated mass media and social media to be directed at international and domestic (Russian) audiences.12 Russia does the same in Eastern Ukraine. Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili and Sanda Svetoka described this comprehensively in their research ‘Strategic Communications and Social Media in the Russia Ukraine Conflict’: “As the conflict continues to develop in the east of Ukraine, Russia continues to exploit the opportunities offered by new technologies and the new information environment. It does so with the purpose of influencing the hearts and minds of its audiences.”13 This thesis adds to the research on Russia’s use of modern-day propaganda through the use of (elements of) Russian nationalism, filling in the knowledge gap of the Russian-infused DPR media. Also, the DPR is such a new and secluded self-declared state – in terms of accessibility – that much research is still to be done in this area in general.

10A.P. Tsygankov, ‘Russia and the West: a new Cold War?’, www.sustainablesecurity.org, 2 January, 2018, https://sustainablesecurity.org/2018/01/02/russia-and-the-west-a-new-cold-war/, Accesed on 4-05-2018. 11 T. P. Gerber & J. Zavisca, ‘Does Russian Propaganda Work?’, The Washington Quarterly, 39(2), pp.78-98, p. 79. 12 Ibidem. 13 E. Lange-Ionatamishvili & S. Svetoka, ‘Strategic Communications and Social Media in the Russia Ukraine Conflict’, in: Kenneth Geers (Ed.), Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine, (Talinn, 2015), 104. 8

Societal relevance In terms of societal relevance, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is a still ongoing – sometimes called ‘frozen’ – conflict and involved, especially at the ‘births’ of the DPR and LPR in 2014, many different separatist groups who either cooperated or completely disagreed in terms of their views. In 2018 the ‘republics’ are more or less settled and have built a ‘democratic government’ led by a ‘president’. The process of this development from a divided, chaotic separatist state with many different actors to a more or less established, functioning ‘republic’ is interesting to analyse because it can give insights as to how separatist states develop. By examining the influence of Russian nationalism on the support of the separatist state of DPR it may become possible to gain more understanding of how the complicated conflict in eastern Ukraine developed, its many different actors and the involvement of Russia in the conflict in general. The link with security in particular lays within the fact that eastern Ukraine is currently a conflict-zone with an ongoing civil conflict, which endangers the physical security of citizens in that region. Furthermore, Russia has a long-established role in destabilising its surrounding countries and supporting separatist conflicts (which in turn create instability, criminality and corruption and endanger the security in those regions) to achieve this. Examples are Georgia and Moldova.14 Also, the broader concept of this thesis, disruption of the security of a society and supporting war through the use of disinformation in the (social) media, is a topic that is being researched in the security field during the 21st century developments of the so-called Information Age.15

Reading guide In the sections above, an introduction to the topic is given and the research question(s) are introduced. The further structure of this research is based on an extensive (historical) theoretical framework – which will be the first chapter of this thesis – on Russian nationalism, nationalism literature in general and the history of the Donetsk region. It is necessary to approach this research from a historical perspective because the establishment of the DPR is an accumulation of historical events, as well as an extreme use of historical sentiment in the separatist propaganda of the DPR that can also be found in Russian nationalism. Why this is used in this way and how this has developed needs to be examined through an analysis of the

14 T. Tudoroiu, ‘Unfreezing Failed Frozen Conflicts: A Post- Soviet Case Study’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies (2016), 24(3), pp. 375-396, p. 376. 15 M. D. Cavelty, ‘Cyberwar’, CSS Analysis in Security Policy (2010), no. 71, p. 1. 9 history of the region and its relationship with Russia. In the second chapter, the methodological framework, the methodology of this thesis will be explained and justified. In short, the analysis will be done through discourse analysis because the Russian nationalist discourse in the DPR is being examined. This will be done through analysing articles of an online newspaper, speeches of the leader of the DPR, , and through analysing existing surveys on the public opinion in the DPR. Also, I will be looking at symbols that might consist of indications of Russian nationalism, like the use of flags, pamphlets and pictures. The third chapter will include the analysis, which will be conducted through the three sub-questions stated above. The chapter will be divided into three sub- chapters, each introducing the source and then analysing it. The first sub-chapter will be based on the main media outlet(s) in the DPR and its discourse, the sub-second chapter will focus on the leadership of the DPR and its discourse and the third sub-chapter will focus on the public opinion of the DPR, where possible. Finally, the conclusion of this thesis contains an answer to the main- and sub-questions of this thesis.

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Chapter 1: Theoretical framework

I. The construction of (Russian) nationalism To fully comprehend this research, the concept of nationalism has to be explored. This is not an easy task, while nationalism is a broadly researched concept and has many different definitions and approaches. For this research, I will first explore and explain nationalism in general, by building a framework (based on definitions and theories of different well- established authors) of nationalism that I can use in my analysis. I will look at the relevant indicators of nationalism and how nationalism is constructed. Also, the current ‘state of the art’ regarding the research on nationalism will be explored. Subsequently, Russian nationalism will be explored and linked to the basic nationalism framework. The basis lies in nationalism in general, but Russia has some specific, altering elements that will differ from the classic, ‘European’ oriented type of nationalism. After all, Russian nationalism is the concept that is going to be analysed in this thesis. Since this thesis is researching to what extent Russian nationalism influences the DPR during the ongoing Ukrainian conflict, it lastly is important to historically explore both the Ukrainian conflict from a security perspective, the region of Donetsk and separatism in the region.

1.1.1 Nationalism To create a sound basis for this thesis, the concept of nationalism in general needs to be explored. There are many authors exploring nationalism16 but two of the most well-known ones, Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith, are described here for the sake of this thesis. These authors can be divided into two camps of nationalist theory, namely the primordialist approach – Smith – and the constructivist approach – Hobsbawm.17 The primordialist approach entails that nations are pre-modern formations while the constructivist approach comprehends the view that nations are imagined communities, or socially constructed categories.18

16 The academic field of nationalism studies is very broad. Other interesting literature on nationalism studies that is not mentioned due to the word-limit and the scope of this thesis is written by amongst others Ellie Kedourie, Ernest Geller, John Breuilly and Benedict Anderson. They laid the academic foundation, together with Hobsbawm and Smith, for nationalism studies of the post-war period. More contemporary authors to explore are amongst others Maria Montserrat Guibernau, Michael Billig and Craig Calhoun. 17 G. M. Robinson and A. Pobric, ‘Nationalism and Identity in Post-Dayton Accords: Bosnia-Hercegovina’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie (2006), 97(3), pp. 237-252, p. 239. 18 Ibidem. 11

Eric Hobsbawm argues in the introduction of his book ‘Nations and Nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality’ that “neither objective nor subjective definitions [of nationalism] are thus satisfactory, and both are misleading. In any case, agnosticism is the best initial posture for a student in this field, and so this book assumes no a priori definition of what constitutes a nation… any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of ‘a nation’, will be treated as one.”19 According to him, objective definitions – based on criteria such as ethnicity or language – often fail because these rigid criteria cannot be applied to a complete population of a so-called nation. Exceptions can always be found.20 On the other hand, he argues that subjective definitions of nationalism – focussing purely more on “consciousness or choice as the criterion for nationhood”21 – ignore the fact that objective elements do play a role in defining nations.22 Despite addressing the criticism on the more subjective approach, Hobsbawm’s constructivist view of nationalism and the imagined community leans more towards the subjective approach. Anthony D. Smith, a primordialist, emphasises “the importance of symbolic elements in the language and ideology of nationalism, and to the moral, ritual and emotional aspects of the discourse and action of the nation.”23 He continues that “it is not enough to link a particular national(ist) discourse to specific political actors or social groups, let alone read off the former from the social position and characteristics of the latter.”24 As a primordialist, Smith beliefs that nations and ethnic communities are natural phenomenon that existed throughout history and throughout humanity.25 Also, Smith deems the concept of ethnie important for the mere existence of nationalism. Just like Hobsbawn, Smith also addresses the problematics of seeing nationalism from an either completely objective or subjective point of view.26 He also argues that there needs to be a balance and finds this in the concept of ethnie, or the ethnic community. Ethnie, according to Smith, has attributes like common myths and shared memories27 and nations need these to exist in the first place. In his 1987 book “The Ethnic Origins of Nations”, he mentions six different dimensions of what he considers ethnie: a collective name, a common myth of descend, a shared history, a shared (distinctive) culture,

19 E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 1992), 8. 20 Idem, 6. 21 Idem, 8. 22 Idem, 8. 23 A. D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010), 3. 24 Smith, Nationalism, 3. 25 A.D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Blackwell Publishing, New York, 1987), 12. 26 Idem, 12. 27 Idem, 14. 12 association with a specific territory and lastly a sense of solidarity.28 He does not deny the importance of invention – which Hobsbawm stresses – but tries to present a different view by linking the concept of ethnie, or ethnic community, to nationalism.

1.1.2 Russian nationalism In the 1970s, authors like Alexander Yanov, William Laqueur and John Dunlop published numerous works on (contemporary) Russian nationalism29, or in other words; a different, new kind of nationalism from the Russian nationalism of before the . In the 1970s Russian nationalism was a new phenomenon because prior to this period, most scholars only focussed on Soviet nationalism and in the 18th and 19th centuries on imperial Russian nationalism in the Tsarist empire30 (e.g. Sergei Uvarov and Konstantin Aksakov). During the 1990s a second increase in contemporary Russian nationalist works evolved, focussing primarily on Russian nationalism on the far-right of the political spectrum with elements such as ‘Nazification’ and ‘Faciszation’.31 The fact that the fell apart in 1991 also played a large role in the emergence of a new kind of Russian nationalism. In fact, this period of time was crucial for the development of the current Russian nationalist discourse. William Laqueur argues that the political swing to the right and the nationalist trend in Russia had been a reaction to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.32 The different perspectives on Russian nationalism in the early 1990s include historian Dmitri Likhachev, who argues that patriotism is the “noblest of feelings” and that it “spiritually enriches the individual”33. Likhachev could be indicated as a national liberal. The educated Russian public agreed with many of Likhachev’s ideas. Moreover, they wanted a free Russia and considered the loss of territories that are populated predominantly by Russians (such as in Ukraine and Belarus) a great loss.34 Thirdly, Laqueur argues, there were the political leaders like and Anatoly Sobchak who insisted ever more frequently on Russian interests and concerns.35 Russian nationalism gradually seemed to take a more aggressive, imperialistic turn. The national liberals also hoped that religion would, like old, pre-1917 times, play a

28 Idem, 22-31. 29 M. Laruelle, Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia, (New York, 2009), 1. 30 According to political scientist Heinz H.F. Elau (1944), Tsarist nationalism had the function to Russificate the national minorities of the Empire, of perpetuating the absolutism of the Tsars and to aggressively imperialise. Soviet nationalism had the social purpose of “serving the ultimate ideas of the Communist revolution as well as the achievements of Soviet Socialist construction”. 31Laruelle, Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia, 1. 32 W. Laqueur, ‘Russian Nationalism’, Foreign Affairs (1992), 71(5), pp. 103-116, p. 103. 33 Idem, 104. 34 Ibidem. 35 Ibidem. 13 large role in the country. Moreover, they believed that there was a lack of future in a Russia deprived from the Crimea, Ukraine and White Russia.36 According to Laqueur, this was the strongest point in their thinking and even the radical democrats, who are much less conservative and Western-oriented compared to the national liberals, tended to agree with this range of thought.37 Looking at the and its neighbouring countries, fact is that especially Ukraine has been partially – predominantly the left part – a part of (Tsarist) Russia throughout history from the 17th century onwards. Technically, Ukraine only became independent in 1991.38 The strong feeling of “lost territory” and the glorification of one strong, () is, looking at the history of Russia, not that strange. Another consequence of the fall of the Soviet Union is that Russia ‘lost’ many ethnic Russians under their territory. From 1991 onwards, millions of ethnic Russians’ new reality was that they now lived outside of Russia and had become ethnic minorities.39 These Russians kept their strong connection with Russia and in the 1990s, Laqueur mentioned, there already was growing anger about the treatment of Russians outside Russia.40 The idea that it was the duty of the Russian government to take care and protect Russian interests outside the Russian borders was growing.41 The current discourse regarding contemporary Russian nationalism is somewhat complicated and two-fold. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisud argue that there are two types of nationalism in Russia at the moment. One comes from the Kremlin and is more statist, as the other type comes from below and is more ethno nationalist.42 Either way, it is tightly woven into Russian society. Laruelle states that “nationalism comprises the common denominator, the constitutive element of social consensus and of ‘political correctness’. Nationalist issues, expressed under the label patriotism, have become defining components of Russia’s political language in the sense that all parties speak it.”43 Laqueur already mentioned this in his 1992 article on Russian nationalism, however.44 The Kremlin’s – or actually Putin’s – nationalism was, especially in the beginning of its power, according to Taras Kuzio, “closely bound with

36 Laqueur, ‘Russian Nationalism’, 105. 37 Ibidem. 38 S. Orest, Ukraine: A History, (Toronto, 2000), 576. 39 Laqueur, ‘Russian Nationalism’, 107. 40 Ibidem. 41 Ibidem. 42 A. T. Isbrekken, ‘Russian nationalism on the rise’, www.nupi.no, published on 22-04-2016, http://www.nupi.no/en/News/Russian-nationalism-on-the-rise, (accessed on 22-11-2017). 43 Laruelle, Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia, 1. 44 Laqueur, ‘Russian Nationalism’, 105. 14

Soviet myths and national identity”45. The Kremlin was supposed to become some sort of replacement of the Soviet Union.46 In 2000, Russia’s president Vladimir Putin said in an interview that “[Russian] basic values are none other than patriotism, love of one’s motherland, love of one’s home, of one’s people, one’s cultural values… Everything that makes us a nation, that is the source of our uniqueness, everything that we can be proud of – all this will be the foundation of the [national] idea”.47 Tuminez, just like Kolstø and Blakkisrud, argued in 2000 that Putin’s nationalism fell in the category of moderate statism, which defines Russia largely in civic terms, “including ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, and all others who live on the territory of the Russian Federation”.48 Paul Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield argued in their article “Putin’s Nationalism Problem” that during his current, third presidency, Vladimir Putin has taken on the role of “the saviour of the Russian nation”.49 This new discourse also includes the mission to protect ethnic Russians that live outside the borders of the Russian Federation.50 Furthermore, Kolstø and Blakkisrud argue that in the last few years, the Kremlin has adopted elements of ethno nationalism that came from grassroots- organisations.51 Ethno nationalism is a type of nationalism that refers to “the extreme internalization of national values and policies”52 and it is “the result of emphasis being placed on national sentiment and identity”53. In 2009, academic Alexander Verkhovsky wrote that “neither civic nor even imperial, today’s Russian nationalism is instead almost exclusively ethnic”.54 Nationalist organisations, and now also the Kremlin, focus(es) primarily on the identity of the Russian people and place this identity above others.55 Fighting for the interests of the Russian people and the Russian identity can cross the Russian borders, as many Russian minorities live in neighbouring countries and regions like the Donetsk region in Ukraine. As William Laqueur mentioned already in 1992, Russian nationalism prevailed in pre-Soviet, non-Russian republics56 as a result of the former Soviet Union. These facts are

45 T. Kuzio, ‘The origins of Peace, Non-violence and Conflict in Ukraine’, in: Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives, (2016), 118. 46 Isbrekken, ‘Russian nationalism on the rise’. 47 Idem, 3. 48 Ibidem. 49 P. Chaisty & S. Whitefield, ‘Putin’s Nationalism Problem’, in: Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives, (2016), 157. 50 Ibidem. 51 Isbrekken, ‘Russian nationalism on the rise’. 52 J.F. Mio, Key Words in Multicultural Interventions: A Dictionary, (1999), 114. 53 Ibidem. 54 P. Kolstø, ‘The ethnification of Russian nationalism’, in: Pål Kostlø and Helke Blakkisrud, The New Russian Nationalism; imperialism, ethnicity and authoritarianism 2000-15 (Edinburgh, 2016), pp. 18-45, p. 34. 55 Ibidem. 56 Laqueur, ‘Russian Nationalism’,103. 15 important for this thesis as the research is done not in a Russian region but in the foreign region of Donetsk in Ukraine. But the question that is important in this literature review is; how can Russian nationalism be defined? What are the typical elements of contemporary Russian nationalism? Nationalism in general means, according to the Merriam Webster dictionary: “loyalty and devotion of a nation; especially: a sense of national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups.”57 Nationalism has served as a powerful mobilizing and legitimizing tool for politicians wanting to maintain, exercise or seize political power.58 The concepts of nationalism can be identified as the feeling of kinship on the basis of race, ethnicity, language, religion, territory or citizenship.59 For Russia, after analysing the current statist and ethno-nationalist discourse in the country, the concepts of ethnicity, language, territory and national history seem to be the most important concepts.

1.1.3 Building a framework It is quite difficult to capture (contemporary) Russian nationalism in just one of the two typologies of nationalism explained in the first sub-chapter of this thesis. No nation has a nationalism entirely primordial or constructivist. It has elements of both. However, the current discourse of ethno-nationalism in Russia is an indication for a predominantly primordial type of nationalism. Although the argument above was that nationalism ‘from above’ (from the Kremlin/Putin) has been statist and ‘from below’ ethno-nationalist, it was also mentioned that in the last few years, Putin has slowly adopted elements of the ethno-nationalist discourse. This is important when analysing contemporary Russian nationalism. Theodore P. Gerber analysed Russian nationalism and states that Putin has “invoked a range of nationalist images, themes and tropes over the years in his efforts to define his goals, justify his policies and maintain public support.”60 He names examples that fit Smith’s ‘dimensions’ of ethnie. First of all, Gerber names the threat that Western powers pose to Russia as an example.61 This can create a strong sense of solidarity because when continuous emphasis is being put on a ‘common enemy’ (the West), a nation is ‘in need’ of solidary supporters to potentially fight this enemy. The same discourse – but, of course, much more severe – took place during the

57 Merriam Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalism, accessed on 12-05- 2017. 58 A. Tuminez, ‘Russian Nationalism and Vladimir Putin’s Russia’ (April 2000), PONARS Policy Memo 151, 1. 59 Ibidem. 60 Gerber, ‘Beyond Putin?’, 115. 61 Ibidem. 16

Second World War, when Russia was invaded by Germany and the term ‘The Great Patriotic War’ was used, instead of Second World War or World War II, which was and is commonly used in other countries around the world. The term ‘Great Patriotic War’ indicates, using the word ‘Patriotic’, that this was a war fought for the fatherland (the then Soviet Union) and it created a strong sense of solidarity and willingness to fight against this common enemy (Germany). To this day, the term has been used in history books at Russian schools. Although a full-fledged war – as with Germany in the 1940s – cannot be compared to the current situation between Russia and the West, it presents an example of how strong this sense of solidarity in Russia has been and still can be. Secondly, Gerber names the distinctive culture of the Russian people, being their Orthodox faith, collectivism or traditional family values.62 This links to Smith’s dimension of the shared distinctive culture.63 In a speech that Putin gave on in 2016 (June 12th) he stressed the value of Russia’s past, its great history and the “indissoluble centuries-long ties between generations, our best traditions and the rich heritage of our nation”64. Emphasis lays on traditions and culture in this speech, as it often does in Putin’s speeches. Also, president Putin often gives speeches at religious affairs or holidays. Here, he emphasises the importance of the Orthodox religion65 and links the religion directly to the .66 Thirdly, Gerber mentions the historical greatness and achievements of Russians.67 This links to Smith’s dimension of a shared history.68 Again, the Great Patriotic War could be named as an example. In 2014, Putin attended the opening of a new building for the Belarus State Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War where he stressed greatness of the Soviet achievement and the continuation of this achievement today: “Our fathers and grandfathers won because they stood together, and this will continue to be the case”.69 Although this is not a solely ‘Russian’ achievement, it is still seen, as already mentioned, as one of the most important historical achievements in Russia.

62 Ibidem. 63 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 12. 64 Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the official reception to mark the national holiday Russia Day”, (speech, , June 12th, 2016), Kremlin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52145 (accessed on 28-11-2017). 65 Vladimir Putin, “Speech following a prayer service at St Panteleimon Monastry”, (speech, Greece, May 28th, 2016), Kremlin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52033 (accessed on 28-11-2017). 66 Vladimir Putin, “Speech at a meeting with the Holy Kinot”, (speech, Greece, May 28th, 2016), Kremlin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/52033 (accessed on 28-11-2017). 67 Gerber, ‘Beyond Putin?’, 115. 68 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 12. 69 Vladimir Putin, “Speech at a ceremony marking the opening of a new building for the Belarus State Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War”, (speech, Minsk, July 2nd, 2014), Kremlin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46140 (accessed on 28-11-2017). 17

Fourthly, the importance of a strong, centralised state, also for protecting Russians, is deemed as an example by Gerber.70 Smith can be incorporated here with both the dimension of the association of a specific territory and the dimension of a common myth of descend.71 Of course, the Russian territory as it is now is important for Russia, but the territorial question goes beyond the current Russian territory. In 2014, the annexation of the Crimea has been a bold move that indicated the fact that Putin reaches further in terms of territory and ‘protecting’ Russians outside its territory. Also, the Russian involvement in Eastern Ukraine has indicated this. These moves are not just geopolitical power-games, but can be explained additionally by the complicated common history of Russia and Ukraine. In Smith’s words, it can be explained by a common myth of descend. In Putin’s (in)famous 2014 speech regarding the annexation of the Crimea, he stated the following:

To understand the reason behind such a choice it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other. Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea. This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolizing Russian military glory and outstanding valor.72

Common history and a certain myth of descend clearly come forward in this speech. Also, indications of the importance of the Crimea as Russian territory come forward as well – Sevastopol as the “birthplace of Russia’s Black Fleet”, for example.

II. Eastern Ukraine and the Donetsk oblast To understand the situation and the forming of the Donetsk People’s Republic in eastern Ukraine and especially the oblast, or region of Donetsk, a small historical framework of the region should be demonstrated. The history of the region will bring more clarity in why the separatist discourse has been so present.

70 Gerber, ‘Beyond Putin?’, 115. 71 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 12. 72 Vladimir Putin, “Speech on Crimea”, (speech, Moscow, March 19, 2014), Prague Post, https://www.praguepost.com/eu-news/37854-full-text-of-putin-s-speech-on-crimea (accessed on 28-11-2017). 18

73 Map of Ukraine. Pink/purple area is the Donbas region.

1.2.1 History, identity and ideology in the Donetsk Oblast The Donetsk region is a Ukrainian region in the east of Ukraine, bordering Russia. Throughout history, the region has been part of Russia off and on. The area is highly debated by historians as to who settled in the Donbas first – before Czarist rule. Ukrainian historians claim that the area should be considered native Ukrainian because the area was under control of the Kyivan Rus’ in Middle Ages and in the 16th century under the influence of the . On the other hand, Russian historians argue that the Donbas has been a no-man’s land between Ukraine and Russia and both ethnicities (Russian and Ukrainian) started settling in this area from the 16th century onwards.74 What is not debated is that the Donetsk oblast has been a largely industrialised area since the industrialisation from the 1860s onwards, which attracted large numbers of Russian migrants. A second wave of Russian migrants entering the region took place after World War II.75 Even before the industrialisation, during the 15th-18th centuries, Ukraine was conquered by Russia. During that time, Russian Czarist policy considered the Ukrainian people as part of the true Russian nation. As a result, Ukrainians were expected to assimilate to Russian culture and language.76 In 1917-1920, Ukraine was independent77 but this changed again after the Russian Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet Union. Ever since, especially in the

73 Image retrieved from: www.voanews.com, September 15, 2017. Accessed on 5-05-2018. 74 J.G. Janmaat, Nation Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian- speaking Population, (Utrecht/Amsterdam, 2000), 14-15. 75 Janmaat, Nation Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine, 15. 76 Idem, 16. 77 Ibidem. 19 centre, south and east of Ukraine, Russian migrants entered and settled in the country. The Russian presence in Ukraine is so large, that Jan Germen Janmaat goes as far as indicating Ukraine as bi-national; Russian and Ukrainian.78 In the Donetsk region almost 40% of the population is considered ethnic Russian79 and most people use the as their main language and speak it at home.80

81 Map of linguistic division in Ukraine. Donetsk and Luhansk are predominantly Russian-speaking regions.

In terms of culture, the East of Ukraine identifies with the Ottoman and primarily the Russian culture, while the centre and the West of Ukraine identifies more with Central Europe. This has been the case since the beginning of the 20th century and this discourse is still strong.82 Researcher Riabchuk explains this interesting division of visions of the Ukrainian identity of the past and the future in Ukraine. On the one hand, there is the National Ukrainian or Eastern/Central European vision, which holds that Ukraine is a European nation that has been occupied for long periods of time by Russia and the Soviet Union, but strives to ‘return to

78 Janmaat, 18. 79 2001 Census. State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/, accessed on 29-10- 2017. 80 L. Bilaniuk and S. Melnyk, ‘A Tense and Shifting Balance: Bilingualism and Education in Ukraine, in: Aneta Pavlenko, Multilingualism in Post-Soviet Countries (2008), p. 85. 81 Image retrieved from www.polgeonow.com, 8-03-2014, Accessed on 6-05-2018. 82 M. Riabchuk, ‘Ukraine’s ‘muddling through’: National identity and postcommunist transition’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2012), 45(3-4), pp. 439-46, p. 439. 20

Europe’ and follow the course of for example or Lithuania.83 On the other hand, there is the ‘project’ that Riabchuk names ‘Little Russian’ or ‘post-crypto Soviet’ or ‘East Slavonic’. This view is a lot more fluid and difficult to explain than the European/Ukrainian view, but it comes down to superiority of the Russian culture and language as well as the historical view of the superior Russian urban colonizers against the backward Ukrainian provincials. This view is highly conservative, anti-Western, pro-Soviet, Ukrainophobic and authoritarian.84

1.2.2 Separatism in the region of Donetsk In the 1990s, politically, the population in the east of Ukraine supported leftist and centre-left parties, which “[had] strong ties with Russia, advocate the adoption of Russian as a second language and oppose to economic reform”.85 The Donetsk region in itself was the base for Ukraine’s main pro-Russian political faction, namely the Party of Regions. This party became part of the Ukrainian government in 2002 and grew to be the largest party between 2006 and 2014. It was also former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych’86 political party. In 2004, the Party of Regions wanted to establish a new political project which was called the South- East Ukrainian Autonomous Republic, in which the Donetsk region was also included. Already politically divided and distanced from the west of Ukraine, unrest was instigated in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions by the Party of Regions on the eve of the escalation of the conflict in 2014. Since 2014, the Ukraine conflict escalated into a civil conflict between Ukraine and the pro-Russian separatist forces of the Donetsk-Luhansk region. The region was not satisfied with Kyiv’s pro-European approach and on April 6th, 2014 they self-declared the People’s Republic of Donetsk, based in the heart of the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine.87

83 Idem, 443. 84 Ibidem. 85 Janmaat, Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine, 20. 86 Viktor Yanukovych was between 2010 and 2014. He was removed from power in February of 2014 and fled to Russia due to the pro-Western Ukrainian revolution. 87 A. Renner, ‘Euromaidan and Donetsk: peace paradigm analysis of the Actors, Causes and Goals of Donbas’, Peace Paradigms SIS 607-003, (2014), 1. 21

88 Separatists occupying the city Hall of Donetsk, right after the announcement of the DPR on April 6th 2014.

Some scholars see the separatist movement as a ‘grass-root’ movement with ‘genuine popular support’89 while others have put the blame on Russia as a provocateur of the conflict.90 The situation in Ukraine can be described as a civil conflict or civil war because it is a “war between organised groups within the same state or country”91. In this case, the government of

Ukraine fights against the separatist forces in eastern Ukraine. Although it is clear that the Donetsk region was highly dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine on the eve of the declaration of separation, the specific (public) reasons for support of the separatists have not been brought to the attention yet. Researcher Elise Giuliano has conducted a research project on the appearance of separatism support in Donetsk just before the establishment of the DPR and during its first couple of months in 2014. She indicates that in April of 2014, 27.4% of the respondents of a survey on separatism support reported that Donetsk should secede from Ukraine and join Russia.92 Although not a majority, it is one third of the five million inhabitants of the region. She identifies numerous reasons for the grievances and the turn to separatism of the public in Donetsk. The first, but certainly not the only one, is political loyalty to Russia. Giuliano explains that especially the older generations in Donetsk identify with present-day Russia because they see the Russian Federation as the closest construction to the USSR. The pro-European Maidan-protests in Kyiv in 2014 deepened these assumptions.93 A second reason for separatism support has economic roots, Giuliano argues. She claims that redistribution in Ukraine was seen as discriminatory and that there were negative perceptions of potential EU membership on the economic welfare of the

88 Image retrieved from www.springtimeofnations.blogspot.com, Accessed on 1-06-2018. 89 R. Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, (London, 2015), 149. 90 Kuzio, “The Origins of Peace, Non-Violence and and Conflict in Ukraine, 112-113. 91 J. Fearon, ‘Iraq’s Civl War’, Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2007). 92 E. Giuliano, ‘The Origins of Separatism: popular grievances in Donetsk and Luhansk’, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 396, October 2015, 1. 93 Idem, 2. 22 region.94 The Donetsk oblast has had a flourishing industrial history, which means that a large part of Ukrainian economy is dependent on the region and many separatist supporters indicated this as unfair because they felt as if they had to work harder than the rest of the country.95 In terms of potential membership of the EU, many residents of the Donetsk region felt more culturally and economically connected and attracted to the Eurasian Customs Union (with Russia) and believe(d) that EU membership would destroy the status quo in terms of stable jobs and income.96 Thirdly, the supporters of the separatist republic felt betrayed by Kyiv for the following reasons: 1) Kyiv’s condemnation of the Berkut special police – which former Ukrainian president Yanukovich used to put down Maidan-demonstrations97 –, of whom many came from the Donbas, 2) the government’s failure to put down the Ukrainian nationalist far right – Ukrainian ultra-nationalism, with xenophobic and Russo-phobic features98 – which created fear and resentment in Donetsk, and 3) the Ukrainian parliament’s attempt to withdraw the law on Russian language.99 Against the background of the reasons, posed by Giuliano above, the separatist state of DPR was able to form in 2014. There are multiple reasons for support of separatism in the region and in this thesis the focus will lay on the identification with Russia and the influence of Russian nationalism in Donetsk. Looking at previous research projects and at the history of the region, there are certainly indications that Russian nationalism, or at least Russian sentiment, is present in Donetsk. In the next (methodological) chapter of this thesis, it will be made clear how these assumptions can be indicated and analysed.

94 Ibidem. 95 Idem, 3. 96 Ibidem. 97 Idem, 4. 98 Idem, 5. 99 Idem, 2. 23

Chapter 2: Methodology

2.1 Research design – Case Study For this research, a case study will be conducted in which the case(s) studied are the state media, the leadership and (in short) the public opinion of the Donetsk People’s Republic between 2014-present. The chosen design allows to provide a more in-depth picture of how the Donetsk People’s Republic conducts its leadership and frames itself politically and whether Russian nationalism plays a large role in this frame (and therefore possibly in the Republic in general). This, in turn, indicates an underlying explanation of the war-situation in the Donbas area, endangering the security on multiple fronts of the citizens in that area. The decision not to look at more than three cases was made due to feasibility issues. The limited time period would not have allowed an in-depth analysis that is needed to answer the main research question. The choice for the case of the Donetsk People’s Republic lies in the fact that it forms a prime example of a region receptive to the Russian sphere of influence and Russian soft power, which is the overarching subject of this thesis. The analysis of the Russian nationalist discourse is one method to funnel this broad subject. The choice for the Donetsk People’s Republic and not the Luhansk People’s Republic derives from the fact that the Donetsk People’s Republic has established a media-empire (Donetsk [International] Press Centre, or DONi News) with several outputs (Facebook page, V-Kontakte page, Twitter account, a news-website translated in many languages and a YouTube channel) also available in English. The DONi News centre is the “official” state media source since September 1st, 2016.100 The website of the leader of the DPR, Alexander Zakharchenko, is also available in English (including transcripts of speeches). This makes researching this case easier, as the language barrier (Russian) is less present. There are more news websites available in Russian supporting the DPR (one example being Donetskaya Narodnaya Respublica (www.dnr- online.ru) propagating the same pro-Russian and pro-DPR media frame. Lastly, it is necessary to capture the public opinion in the DPR (in relation to the Russian nationalist discourse) to complete the triangulation of the methods and draw a wider perspective. The general time frame is 2014-present because in 2014, the Eastern Ukrainian conflict escalated and simultaneously the Donetsk People’s Republic had been self-declared as an

100 https://dninews.com/?q=content/about-us. IMPORTANT NOTE ON 8-06-2018: as of the 8th of June 2018, the DNI news website seems to be down. This has happened before (due to a hack, assumingly by the Ukrainian government) and came back a few weeks later. If the website will not be up again in the next few days/weeks, I refer to the attached document with a selection of articles I collected from the website and copied into a separate document, to check the authenticity of my sources. 24 independent republic. However, the analysis of the news-articles conducted will be based upon a research from fall 2015 until present, as the DONi news website did not exist before that time.

2.2 Operationalisation The operationalisation of this thesis will take place in the analysis part. The main concepts of this thesis are (Russian) nationalism and (pro-Russian) separatism and the Donetsk region. For Russian nationalism I will use a primarily primordial, ethnicity-based approach – following Anthony Smith’s research – with indicators like a collective name, a common myth of descend, a shared history, a shared (distinctive) culture, association with a specific territory and lastly a sense of solidarity.101 I will look for these indicators through media content analysis such as news-website/paper articles and the analysis of speeches of the leader of the DPR. Down below, the details of the specific sources that I will use will be further explained. In terms of separatism, I will look at indicators such as political views, feeling of suppression, economic grievances, identity and ethnicity. Again, media analysis will be done (news- website and newspaper articles) as well as the analysis of speeches of the leader of DPR. Lastly, the Donetsk region is an important concept because the region in itself is a geographically and historically complicated region and a potentially important reason for the appearance of Russian nationalism and separatism.

2.3 Choice of methodology For this research, a qualitative approach will be used and this approach will be discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is a qualitative research method used in many different academic disciplines. Due to this diversity, discourse analysis has different meanings in different academic fields.102 According to D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen and H.E. Hamilton, all meanings fall into the following three main categories: “(1) anything beyond the sentence, (2) language use, and (3) a broader range of social practice that includes non-linguistic and nonspecific instances of language.”103 Generally, classic discourse analysis is used in linguistics studies. However, Critical Discourse Analysis is broader and not only focused on the linguistics of a text. As Van Dijk argues, “critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are

101 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 22-31. 102 D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen & H.E. Hamilton, ‘Introduction: What is discourse analysis?’ in: T.A. van Dijk, ed., Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Vol. 1: Disciplines of Discourse, (London, 1985) 1-10, 1. 103 Ibidem. 25 enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality.”104 It focuses primarily on understanding and analysing social problems and political issues through the use of texts. Norman Fairclough is one of the most well-known scholars on CDA. He and Wodak have summarized ten characteristics of CDA:

1. CDA addresses social problems 2. Power relations are discursive 3. Discourse constitutes society and culture 4. Discourse does ideological work 5. Discourse is historical 6. The link between text and society is mediated 7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory 8. Discourse is a form of social action. 105

Using (critical) discourse analysis in this research is valid because the concept of nationalism is part of a power relation (often used as a tool to exert power), is often of influence on society or culture (or comes forth from it), is ideological, and often formed by history. Furthermore, the link between the texts I will analyse and society is definitely important, because the texts try to influence society in a certain way. Van Dijk explains that the functions of ethnocentrism, , nationalism and racism discourses (in mass media, literature and film) are to emphasize the superiority of the own nation, ethnicity, race, the “Us” etc. and represent the “Other” as intellectually, morally and biologically inferior.106

2.4 Methods of data collection For the media analysis, a selective sample of articles of the DPR online newspaper ‘DONi Donbas News Agency’ will be taken. Since 1 September 2016, DONi News Agency is considered as the ‘official’ state media of the DPR. The website contains of different ‘sections’ of news articles – Donbas life, Defence, Editorial and World – and I will primarily focus on the ‘Donbas Life’ section. In this section articles are posted focussing on everyday life, national holidays and the general public opinion. These articles contained most

104 T.A. van Dijk, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in: T.A. van Dijk, ed., Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Vol. 1: Disciplines of Discourse, (London, 1985), pp. 352-372, p. 352. 105 N.L. Fairclough and R. Wodak, ‘Critical discourse analysis’ in: T. A. van Dijk (ed.), Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Vol. 2. Discourse as Social Interaction, (London, 1997), pp. 258–84, pp. 271-80. 106 T.A. van Dijk, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, 361. 26 information and indicators about the potential Russian nationalist discourse in the DPR. I will use articles that are relevant for a possible indication of Russian nationalism. Below, I created a table to show the indicators I will analyse and how I will find them in the text.

Table 1: INDICATORS EXAMPLES WORDS/THEMES/PHRASES IN TEXT

Collective Name - Russia, Malorossiya, Common Myth Of Descend - Malorossiya, Novorossiya - Russian Myths (e.g. Zukhov & Vatutin, two Russian-Soviet war-heroes) - Russian language, Russian descent (e.g. “We are all of Russian descent…”) Shared History - Great Patriotic War (e.g. “Our heroes fought…”) - Russian national holidays (e.g. Russia Day) - Russian history Shared (Distinctive) Culture - Russian values (e.g. “Our true Russian values…”, anti-gay, collectivist) - Russian culture (also national holidays) - Orthodoxy - - Symbols Association With Specific - Territorial phrases (“”, Territory “Malorossiya”, “Novorossiya”, “Russian lands”) Sense Of Solidarity - Partnerships with Russia (e.g. “The Russian Orthodox Church donated…” “Russian convoy’s entered the DPR…” “Russia donated…”) - Establishment of Russian language (e.g. “Russian language now first language again in schools DPR…”) - Vladimir Putin (“The great leader…”) - Symbols Extra: Ukraine as the evil - Ukraine as the enemy (e.g. “criminals”, “corrupt”, “Other” “Ultra-nationalists”)

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- Ukraine and Nazi ideology (e.g. “Nazis are in power in Kiev”, “Ukrainian Neo-Nazis”) - Anti-Ukrainian myths/history

To illustrate my method, I will use an example of one article that was published on the DONi news website on the 5th of June, 2016. I have highlighted all possible indicators and interpreted them:

Sunday, June 5, 2016 - 13:37 Donbass is a historic part of Russia (=common myth of descend, association with territory), said the Head of the LPR at the forum "The Great Russian Word" in Yalta. 'We are glad that the Crimea has returned to the harbor of Russia. There is no taiga here (in Donbass), but in our vast fields we know for sure that it is an ancient area of a bear habitat (= bear is symbol for Russia, so connected to common myth of descend + territory). It is well known that "a bear does not give up its taiga", said Plotnitsky. According to him, the most important task for both Donbass and Ukraine is the struggle for forming the Russian consciousness in children (= shared distinctive culture). 'The first thing we asked from Russia as humanitarian aid (= sense of solidarity) was not food, but textbooks of Russian history, language, literature (= shared history + shared distinctive culture),' said the Head of the LPR. The head of the DPR parliament Dennis Pushilin agreed with him. According to him, the result of the nationalist propaganda in Ukraine is 'the youth who are considering normal to burn people, and then do selfies against their background'. (= Ukraine as the evil “Other”) Plotnitsky said that last year only the Crimea provided about 2 thousand citizens of the Republic of Lugansk with rest. 'However, it should not be only rest, we need joint camps to let children communicate. They have a lot of things to tell each other,' suggested Plotnitsky, adding that the Orthodox Church should also be involved (= shared distinctive culture) in the educational work. According to him, in Ukraine there are still many supporters of the Russian world. (= sense of solidarity) 'We know that the people there are just intimidated,' (= Ukraine as the evil “Other”) said Plotnitsky. DONi News Agency https://dninews.com/article/plotnitsky-called-donbass-part-russia

The sample of the articles will be a selective sample as I have to filter the articles myself and indicate which ones are relevant for my discourse analysis and which are not. However, I will remain critical throughout the research process and not ignore possible contradictory articles to my discourse. Speeches of the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Alexander Zakharchenko, will also be analysed in the same way as I illustrated above. Furthermore, symbols such as flags or certain typical Russian images (e.g. the bear) will be considered a supportive element of my analysis. Lastly, surveys on the topic of the public opinion in eastern Ukraine will also be used, especially for the last sub-chapter of the thesis. My research will in general be supported empirically by using articles and books.

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2.5 Internal / external validity and reliability The qualitative research method of discourse analysis with a case-study design will fit best for this research because it allows in-depth analysis of the pro-DPR/pro-Russian media- environment, the leadership and the public opinion in the DPR, which cannot or only partially be achieved with a quantitative method like surveys. As far as the internal validity of this research, analysing three different aspects (newspaper articles, speeches and public opinion) strengthens my case, because it allows a more holistic view of how the DPR frames itself, in how far Russian nationalism plays a role and whether this mirrors in the public opinion. For the last aspect, the public opinion, it must be mentioned that this aspect is difficult to analyse. It cannot be stated with certainty that the news-articles or speeches have direct influence on the public opinion in the DPR. However, propaganda through media and speeches is a proven method to influence society.107 Also, however desired, due to feasibility and time it was not possible to conduct a series of interviews with citizens of the DPR. The republic is very closed off and the language barrier plays a role as well. Some of the sources (although many available in English, even on Facebook) will be in Russian and difficult to decipher for me. As a further point concerning the internal validity, the content of the articles and speeches is biased (pro-Russian only) so a neutral and critical mind is necessary at all times. Also, I have to be aware of blindness towards everything outside my discourse and remain critical. The three research questions supporting the analysis helped guiding the method of analysing the Russian nationalism discourse, as did the indicator-scheme (table 1), which created a systematic technique to avoid subjectivity. However, complete subjectivity is never unavoidable in a qualitative study, especially in discourse analysis, because some form of interpretation by the researcher is needed. Although, building a method and a framework will limit the subjectivity as much as possible. Further, all steps made in this research will be presented in the main body of this research. This will be done to keep a transparent track of the interpretations made in the analysis. The external validity of a case study is often criticised because case studies are difficult to apply to other or broader contexts. However, the external validity of this research can be found in the fact that through this study it might be possible to gain a broader view on the influence of Russian nationalism and how strong it is in countries outside the Russian federation, especially due to the fact that there are and have been more active and frozen conflicts (e.g. Moldova or South ) due to Russian influence. It can be an underlying

107 H. Koppang, ‘Social Influence by Manipulation: A Definition and Case of Propaganda’, Middle East Critique, 2009, 18(2), pp. 117-143, p. 121. 29 explanation of why these conflicts escalate. Thus, this thesis will provide us with another piece of the puzzle of the current discourse of Russian ‘soft’ (and sometimes hard) power. Also, the study can provide additional insights in why separatist states evolve in general.

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Chapter 3: Analysis

This chapter will be divided into subchapters that will analyse the discourse of the ‘state media’, the leadership of Zakharchenko and thirdly the public opinion in the DPR. The purpose of this analysis is to indicate Russian nationalism or the use thereof in the media- outlets, the leadership of the DPR and (to a certain extent) in the public opinion of the citizens of the DPR. Besides indicating this discourse/frame, it is analysed whether the presence of this discourse draws wider conclusions in terms of Russian disinformation-activities and the fact that this discourse has provided for an underlying cause of the escalation of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the endangering of the security of the area. To conduct the analysis, for each sub-chapter, Anthony Smith’s theory on nationalism will be used, predominantly focussing on his take on the concept of ethnie, in combination with Theodore P. Gerber’s analysis of Russian nationalism – explained in the theoretical framework above. Smith’s indicators of this concept are: a collective name, a common myth of descend, a shared history, a shared (distinctive) culture, association with a specific territory and lastly a sense of solidarity.108 As already explained in the theoretical framework, these concepts can be linked to the typology of Russian nationalism and are therefore fit to be used in this analysis.

3.1.1 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR ‘state media’ – introducing the source From the fall of 2015 onwards, the news centre DONi Donbass News Agency was launched. On its website, it is described as a media outlet that collects and shares trusted and confirmed information from the DPR and the LPR.109 From September 2016 onwards, leader of the DPR Zakharchenko ordered DONi News to be the official media of the ‘state’ of the DPR.110 The media outlet can be considered as a representative outlet for the discourse of the Republic, being directly linked to the ‘state’. It is important to mention that the news agency has been highly influenced and reportedly financed by Russia and is by no means a ‘neutral’ media outlet. The website has been known for its ‘fake news’ reports. However, the neutrality or the authenticity of these articles isn’t the most relevant aspect for the analysis of these texts, as I am analysing the discourse of these articles, or in other words; what argument the actors are trying to make with their texts and which message they want to bring across to the general public. There are actually more websites like DONi News Agency that promote the same

108 A.D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 22-31. 109 https://dninews.com/?q=content/about-us. 110 Idem. 31

‘news’. Another example of a newspaper supporting the DPR is Donetskaya Narodnaya Respublica (www.dnr-online.ru), which has the same point of view as DONi News Agency, but is only available in Russian. DONi Donbass News Agency is also available in English and therefore easier to interpret without the Russian language barrier. In 2017, researcher Anna Matveeva conducted a research on the war in Eastern Ukraine and included a chapter on media throughout the conflict. She argues that the ‘rebels’ (the separatists of both the DPR and LPR) used the internet and social networking websites to first establish their information channels, via Live Journal or VKontakte (the Russian equivalent of Facebook) to tell their side of the story.111 It was difficult to do so through ‘regular’ media outlets such as TV and newspapers, as the Ukrainian government banned 15 Russian channels from Ukrainian TV in 2014 in order to stop the cultural influence from the Russian side.112 However, it is important to state that the Russian media was not the most important information channel for separatist support. The emerging separatist media-channels which they conducted themselves were even more important. Matveeva also states that these channels were funded by and established with the aid of foreign actors who joined their cause113, which is also the case for DONi News Agency, as this ‘agency’ was conducted with the help of the Finnish Janus Putkonen. Matveeva characterises the separatist media outlets as “a particular construction of reality, favourable to their cause. It included ideological, emotional and, at times, religious connotations…victimhood, such as civilian casualties, was emphasised to invoke a feeling of indignation…”114 The emphasis of victimhood is a large characteristic of the DONi News Agency as well, as the website continuously posts articles on how many citizens were wounded or died that day because of ‘Ukrainian shelling’.115 The main point of this subchapter is to analyse a selective sample of articles of the DONi News Agency website – mainly from the ‘Donbass Life’ section – and capture the Russian nationalist discourse through use of linguistics, certain phrases and Russian nationalist characteristics. Furthermore, to conduct the analysis of this sub-chapter, the following sub- question is used for this section: how does the state media of the DPR use/frame Russian nationalism to promote the separatist republic?

111 A. Matveeva, Through Times of Trouble, Conflict in Southeastern Ukraine Explained from Within, (Lexington Books, Maryland, 2018), 205. 112 Ibidem. 113 Ibidem, 206. 114 Matveeva, Through Times of Trouble, 206. 115 An example of three articles posted in a time period of 19-01-2018 until 24-01-2018: https://dninews.com/article/five-dokuchayevsk-residents-wounded-due-kiev-forces-shelling, https://dninews.com/article/kiev-forces-shoot-civilian-bus-grey-zone-man-dies or https://dninews.com/article/dpr-serviceman-perishes-due-ukrainian-shelling-over-past-week. 32

3.1.2 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR ‘state media’ – analysing the source The first of Smith’s indicators, a collective name, is in the first place not a characteristic of the DPR’s Russian nationalist discourse. The ‘state’ has created its own republic with a distinctive name; the Donetsk People’s Republic. This has nothing to do with the Russian Federation, it is rather a display of the independent ‘state’ of Donetsk, the name directly linked to the region. However, on 18 July 2017, an article was published that Zakharchenko had ‘created’ the ‘new state’ of Malorossiya, or translated; .116 The territory of the new ‘state’ would have to cover the Donetsk and the Luhansk republics. However, both the LPR and Russia rejected Zakharchenko’s claim, resulting in Zakharchenko withholding from the plan after just a few days of the declaration.117 Although not pursuing this ambitious plan – which would be very hard to realize anyway without support and because it is in direct violation of the Minsk agreements –, it was quite a bold statement to make. This, once more, demonstrates the discourse of the ‘state’ media of the DPR. When analysing the word ‘Malorossiya’, it is of course directly linked to the country of Russia (Rossiya) and the adverb ‘little’ (malo) could indicate a desire to be (an extended) part of Russia or at least strongly associated with the country and its culture. In the declaration, the creation of the ‘state’ was presented as a “return to history”118. The name ‘Malorossiya’ dates back to the 19th century when Ukraine was part of the Russian empire, and indicates (most of) the region which is now Ukraine.119 The phrase has been used off and on ever since. In the 1920s, Little Russia was associated with “the tradition to treat the Ukrainian people, language and culture as branches of the Russian nation, language and culture”.120 During Soviet times the phrase was not used often, but after the fall of the Soviet Union and the revival of Russian nationalism around 1991 the term came to the (political) surface once more.121 In the declaration of this ‘state’, the idea of a new Ukraine was represented. The ‘state’ of Malorossiya should eventually take over Ukraine in its whole:

116 ‘Malorossiya – Zakharchenko announces creation of new state (tv report), www.dninews.com, 18 July 2017, https://dninews.com/content/malorossiya-zakharchenko-announces-creation-new-state-tv-report, accessed on 26 January 2018. 117 ‘DPR Head: final decisions regarding establishing Malorossiya not taken’, www.dninews.com, 28 July 2017, https://dninews.com/article/dpr-head-final-decisions-regarding-establishing-malorossiya-not-taken, accessed on 27 January 2018. 118 ‘Official Declaration of the Malorossiyan Federation’, ww.dninews.com, 18 July 2018, https://dninews.com/article/official-declaration-malorossiyan-federation-full-text-07182017, accessed on 27 January 2018. 119J. Steele, Eternal Russia: Yeltsin, Gorbachev, and the Mirage of Democracy, (Harvard University Press, 1994), 216. 120 S. Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, (Cambridge, 2006), 300. 121 Idem, 302. 33

We, representatives of the regions of the former "Ukraine", propose to re-establish the state and to proclaim the state of MALOROSSIYA under historical background out of the former "Ukraine". In this case, it is of fundamental importance to rename the country, since "Ukraine" as a state is guilty of war crimes, mass terror and genocide of its own people.122

This indicates indeed a return to history – the 19th century – when the phrase was used to indicate the time when the most part of modern-day Ukraine was part of the Russian empire. This is not explicitly stated in the declaration, because the point of the declaration seems to be to create a sovereign state –

Malorossiya is an INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN state with a new name, a new flag, a new constitution, a new state structure, new principles of social and economic development, and new historical prospectives. But this is NOT A REVOLUTION! This is a return to history. This is a novelty that restores, not destroys.123 –

But then again, the “return to history” seems to indicate this strong association with the Russian empire and being a part of it. Other articles around the time-frame of when the declaration was written also indicate this. For example, on the 21st of July, an article was published that , a Russian writer who gained popularity in the DPR, claimed that Malorossiya aimed to create a unified state with Russia and Belarus.124 And on the 16th of August an article was published about the adviser of the Russian president, Sergey Glazyev, reportedly claiming that Malorossiya and Novorossiya need to return to Russia.125 The article claimed that Glazyev stated:

The people never recognized in any form the current Ukrainian Nazism. Thanks to the wise decision of our [Russian] president, the Crimea returned bloodlessly, legitimately, with triumph. But, unfortunately, we could not do justice to the rest of the Russian world ... I want to say that until we return Little Russia and Novorossia to Russia, we will live with this decaying wound - the captured part of the Russian world where millions of people are trained in anti-Russian hysteria. We will

122 ‘Official Declaration of the Malorossiyan Federation’ (my emphasis). 123 Idem. 124 ‘Zakhar Prilepin: Malorossiya aims at creating a united state with Russia, Belarus’, www.dninews.com, 21 July 2017, https://dninews.com/article/zakhar-prilepin-malorossiya-aims-creating-united-state-russia-belarus, accessed on 29th of January 2018. 125 ‘Glazyev: ‘Malorossiya, Novorossiya need to return to Russia’, www.dninews.com, 16 August 2017, https://dninews.com/article/glazyev-malorossiya-novorossiya-need-return-russia, accessed on 29th of January 2018. 34

always be under the threat of security and escalation of this hybrid war on the front that is most vulnerable to us.126

The message seems to be mixed: on the one hand, Zakharchenko wants to create an independent state to replace Ukraine but on the other hand, the ‘state media’ presents messages that claim to join Russia. Reports on the creation of the new ‘state’ were quite confusing and the point of the creation was not really clear. The director of the DONi News website, Janus Putkonen, was reportedly involved in the process of the declaration of Malorossiya and wrote an article on the 19th of July explaining the idea behind the ‘state’, referring to the Wikipedia page of Little Russia and ’s legacy, a Ukrainian Cossack who established a treaty with the Russian tsar in 1654, to unify the territory with the Russian Tsardom.127 Both Wikipedia pages – although filled with assumptions and unreliable sources – refer indeed to a certain unity with Russia and its culture. Although in the first place not a part of the DPR’s Russian nationalist discourse, the ‘collective name’ - Malorossiya – did make a brief appearance in the DPR ‘state media’ in the form of Malorossiya and its historical background. The strong association with Russia (the name) and the background (unity with Russia) of the ‘state of Malorossiya’ indicates indeed a Russian nationalist discourse in the DPR state media. Smith’s concepts of a common myth of descend and the association with a specific territory will be used together for the sake of this analysis. Since these concepts have to do with the origin of a certain state (a common myth as in the idea behind that state, and the territory as in the actual place where this state is/was supposed to be) this, too, can be linked to the ‘creation’ of the ‘state’ Malorossiya in July of 2017 explained above. However, before this declaration, articles expressing association with Russian territory and descend were already published. On the 16th of May, 2016, an article was published in which a Russian political analyst (Alexei Anpilogov) stated that “Donbass has now become an informal Russian region and is closer to the Russian Federation than to Ukraine”128. And on the 5th of June 2016: “Donbass is a historic part of Russia” and that “the most important task for both

126 Idem, my emphasis. 127 Janus Putkonen, ‘Birth of Malorossiya – restoring peace and order, creating sovereign people’s federation’, www.dninews.nl, 19 July 2017, https://dninews.com/article/birth-malorossiya-–-restoring-peace-and-order- creating-sovereign-peoples-federation. Accessed on 29 January 2018. 128 ‘Donbass already lives Russian rather than Ukrainian realities’, www.dninews.com, 16 May 2016, https://dninews.com/article/donbass-already-lives-russian-rather-ukrainian-realities. Accessed on 29 January 2018. 35

Donbass and Ukraine is the struggle for forming the Russian consciousness in children”.129 Again, on the 13th of June 2016, on the celebration of ‘Russia Day’: “The country [Russia], we are part of… the residents of the Donetsk People’s Republic feel the assistance on the part of the Russian Federation in full and considered themselves as part of the big Russian world.”130 The strongest discourse in terms of territory and myth of descend can be found in the declaration of Malorossiya, however. This ‘myth’, upon which the name and the ‘new state’ is based, claims that the territory of Ukraine is part of the Russian world and is directly connected to its culture and its language.131 The Wikipedia page that is being linked to in the ‘explanatory’ article on the DONI news website – which is being taken as the ‘official’ explanation of ‘the myth’ – says the following:

Up to the very end of the nineteenth century Little Russia was a prevailing designation for much of the modern territory of Ukraine controlled by the Russian Empire as well as for its people and their language as can be seen from its usage in numerous scholarly, literary and artistic works. Ukrainophile historians Mykhaylo Maksymovych, Nikolay Kostomarov, Dmytro Bahaliy, Volodymyr Antonovych acknowledged the fact that during Russo-Polish wars "Ukraine" had only a geographical meaning of borderlands of both states but "Little Russia" was an ethnic name of Little (Southern) Russian people.132

So instead of connecting with the land of Ukraine, the DPR rather connects with Russia in its myth of descend. In terms of territory, the DPR, or the Donetsk Oblast, is bordering Russia directly. However, when ‘establishing’ the new state of Malorossiya, an article on the website explained that the goal of this creation of the ‘new state’ was to eventually overtake Ukrainian territory and create a sovereign state, not a new part/extended part of Russia. This differs with the initial often used name for the region, ‘Novorossiya’ (which means new Russia), which, according to the article on the DONi website, did imply an extension of the Russian territory.133 So although the common myth of descend of the DPR has many links with the Russian world, strongly othering itself from the Ukrainian descend, in terms of territory the

129 ‘Plotnitsky called Donbass part of Russia’, www.dninews.com, 5 June 2016, https://dninews.com/article/plotnitsky-called-donbass-part-russia. Accessed on 29 January 2018. 130 ‘Hundreds of Donetsk’s residents take part in meeting on account of Russia day in DPR’s capital’, www.dninews.com, 13 June 2016, https://dninews.com/article/hundreds-donetsk’s-residents-take-part-meeting- account-russia-day-dpr’s-capital. Accessed on 29 January 2018. My emphasis. 131 Putkonen, ‘Birth of Malorossiya’ and Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations, 300. 132 ‘Little Russia’, www.wikipedia.org, 18 December 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_Russia, accessed on 3 February 2018. 133 Putkonen, ‘Birth of Malorossiya’, accessed on 7 February 2018. 36

DPR does see itself as part of ‘a’ Russian world (ideologically) but not in terms of actual land territory. Moving on to the concept of shared history, quite a strong connection with Russia can be detected. This is seen mostly by the similarities in celebrations/commemorations of historic events (like wars, national holidays, etc.) between the DPR and Russia. Following the news website, a lot of attention was brought to the (yearly) recurring national events or holidays of the DPR. These national holidays seem to be very important for the DPR. Some are established only for the DPR but others adopted from Russia (not celebrated in Ukraine before the establishment of the DPR) and established as national holidays in the DPR as well. For example, on the 4th of November, National Unity Day is celebrated in Russia. This national holiday marks the end of the ‘’ and the end of the Polish-Muscovite War (1605-1618). Moreover, it is celebrated that all classes in Russian society united and preserved Russian statehood, even when there was no Tsar or patriarch to lead them.134 On the 4th of November of 2017, an article was published on the DONi website that Zakharchenko announced Unity Day as an official holiday in the DPR as well.135 In the article, Zakharchenko was quoted stating the following:

this holiday is devoted to the most important period of Russian history…the event determined formation of the Russian world, for which we are fighting nowadays. The Donetsk People’s Republic, just like Russian citizens-in-arms 405 years ago, is the forward stronghold of the Russian world, which protects our values, culture, traditions, language and faith.136

In the article, the Russian history is definitely phrased as ‘important’, not only for Russia but also for the DPR. Furthermore, the ‘stronghold of the Russian world’ is directly linked to the traditions and culture of the DPR. Another similar national holiday is Day of Knowledge (September 1st), this marks the start of the new academic year. This day stems from the Soviet history (1984) more so than from Russian history, but it is still celebrated in the Russian world to this day. It is considered a national holiday in the DPR as well, according to an article published on the 1st of September 2017.137 The DONi news website also devoted articles to Russia Day, which is celebrated on June 12th in Russia since 1994. The article in

134 ‘Everything you need to know about National Unity Day in Russia’, www.sputniknews.com, 4 November 2017, https://sputniknews.com/russia/201711041058808277-russia-national-unity-day/. 135 ‘Zakharchenko: National Unity Day becomes holiday in DPR’, www.dninews.com, November 4, 2017, https://dninews.com/article/zakharchenko-national-unity-day-becomes-holiday-dpr. 136 Idem, my emphasis. 137 See: https://dninews.com/article/dpr-education-science-minister-congratulates-all-donbass-residents- academic-year-beginning (September 1, 2017). 37

2016 stated that on June 12th, a ‘festive meeting’ devoted to Russia Day was held in the city centre of Donetsk while in 2017, the DPR organised a historical quest about Russia, also devoted to Russia Day.138 In both articles, Russia was praised for its assistance to the DPR and the strong historical interrelation between the DPR and Russia was emphasised.139 Another recurring subject on the DONi news website is the Great Patriotic War. This is, already explained in the theoretical framework, an important subject and collective memory in Russia. The term comes back on the website quite often in multiple articles, some devoted to war-veterans, others to celebratory parades and holidays (for example on the 9th of May140) and others in comparison to the war between the Donbas and Ukraine. Close to a shared history links a distinctive culture. Elements of this Russian culture are (according to Gerber) the Orthodox faith, collectivism and/or (conservative) traditional family values.141 The Orthodox faith seems to be of great importance in the DPR, as a lot of articles are devoted to honouring religious events or celebrations.142 Also, in the articles the Orthodox faith is often directly linked to the Russian Orthodox Church, which reportedly provided aid to the DPR (a selection of article headings on the website: “Donetsk diocese received 240 tons of humanitarian aid from Russian Orthodox Church”, “Russian Church sends over 132 million rubbles to help Donbass refugees” and “Russian Church collected 500 tons of humanitarian aid for Donbass residents in 2015”).143 The DPR often seems to organise religious gatherings on Orthodox holidays, emphasising the importance of the orthodox faith. Traditional family values are also considered part of the Russian nationalist discourse. President Putin has projected these conservative values as important for the Russian people.144 In one of his speeches, Putin stressed “traditional families, real human life, including religious life”.145 These ‘traditions’ are, according to sociologist Dmitry Uzlaner, “family (as opposed to the destruction of family); differentiated and unequal gender roles (over against gender

138 See: https://dninews.com/article/hundreds-donetsk’s-residents-take-part-meeting-account-russia-day-dpr’s- capital (June 13, 2016) and https://dninews.com/article/dpr-‘young-republic’-public-organization-activists-hold- historical-quests-devoted-russian (June 12, 2017). 139 Ibidem. 140 See: https://dninews.com/article/donbass-people-never-kneel-alexander-zakharchenko-victory-parade. 141 Gerber, ‘Beyond Putin’, 115. 142 Several articles glorifying the Orthodox faith: https://dninews.com/article/donbass-region-has-atmosphere- orthodox-culture-–-alexander-zakharchenko. , https://dninews.com/article/zakharchenko-epiphany-confession- faith, 143 in the same order: https://dninews.com/article/donetsk-diocese-received-240-tons-humanitarian-aid-russian- orthodox-church, https://dninews.com/article/russian-church-sends-over-132-million-rubbles-help-donbass- refugees, https://dninews.com/article/russian-church-collected-500-tons-humanitarian-aid-donbass-residents- 2015. 144 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the General Assembly”, (speech, Moscow, December 12, 2013), transcript by: www.russialist.org. Accessed on 1-03-2018. 145 Ibidem. 38 equality); sexual (self-)restraint (over against sexual freedom); the repression of individual interests and expression (as opposed to the freedom of the individual); an emphasis on responsibilities (over against an emphasis on rights); collective social control and solidarity (as opposed to anomie and individualism); and finally the rhetoric of prioritizing the ‘‘spiritual’’ (over against the presumed prioritization of the ‘‘material’’).”146 In the DPR the same discourse can be detected, noticed also from the DONi news website. An article was posted with the news that the DPR Head had established a state award for families with many children.147 In this article, these large families were projected as “socially responsible families, practicing a healthy way of life.”148 Moreover, especially in the beginning of the establishment of the DPR, articles were published about the amount of children being born in the DPR. This can indicate a display of growth – and perhaps strength and security – of the DPR, but also of the importance of family and reproduction in the DPR. In terms of sexual freedom and individual expression, an example of which being homosexuality, the DPR has an equally conservative point of view as the Russian government. When Ukraine proposed the possibility of same-sex marriage, the DPR explicitly stated its opposition to this possibility. In an article published in March 2016 it was stated that “In [the] Republic there is the clear position – a man must marry a woman and the same-sex marriage will be there never. It is not a part of our mentality.”149 The strong Orthodox discourse in the region, as well as Russia’s point of view on this issue150 also plays a role. The final aspect of Russian nationalism (in terms of Smith and Gerber) is the sense of solidarity. This sense of solidarity is framed as being solidary with the nation and often this comes with framing a common enemy and/or strong othering. As seen in the theoretical framework, Russia has seen the West as a common threat. Although the DPR first and foremost tries to build its own secure and independent state and wants to propagate this in the media, it can’t be ignored that similarities with the Russian attitude can be detected in the DPR media as well. Especially solidarity with Russia has been projected in many articles on the website through (alleged) direct connections with the Russian Federation in terms of religion (the Russian Orthodox Church), education, humanitarian aid, cultural events, the language and even the currency. For example, in terms of education, it was stated on March

146 D. Uzlaner, ‘Perverse : A Lacanian interpretation of Russia’s turn to traditional values’, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society, 22(2), pp. 173-193, p. 176. 147 ‘DPR Head establishes state award for families with many children’, www.dninews.com, January 29, 2018, https://dninews.com/article/dpr-head-establishes-state-award-families-many-children, accessed on 1-03-2018. 148 Ibidem. 149 ‘Kiev’s issue of same-sex marriage is not relevant to DPR’, www.dninews.com, March 11, 2016, https://dninews.com/article/kiev’s-issue-same-sex-marriage-not-relevant-dpr, accessed on 2-03-2018. 150 D. Healy, Russian Homophobia from Stalin to Sochi, (New York, 2018), 19. 39

23, 2016 that the DPR universities “have found their partners in the Russian Federation and concluded treaties with them for cooperation”151. Also, on April 28, 2016, an article was posted about increasing “patriotic education” in DPR schools, for which the DPR had invited experts from the Russian Federation.152 In August 2015, twenty-six Russian TV channels were introduced in the DPR.153 Moreover, in schools and everyday life, what was left of the use of the is for the most part replaced by the Russian language.154 These developments not only express clear solidarity (with Russia) but also strong othering from Ukraine and the west. As published in an article, the DPRs ‘minister of culture’ argued that “the people of the former Donetsk oblast are spiritually and culturally Russian people, their ukrainization is nothing else but violence”.155 As the DPR is at war with Ukraine, its common enemy is first and foremost Ukraine. Especially at the highest point of the conflict (2015 and beginning of 2016), articles posted in the ‘Defence’ section were mostly about framing Ukraine as ‘the’ (brutal) enemy.156 The othering from Ukraine has a strong connection with the Nazi-ideology of the Ukrainian nationalist far right – Ukrainian ultra-nationalism, with xenophobic and Russo-phobic features157 – which created resentment and a feeling of insecurity in the Donetsk oblast prior to the conflict. This discourse is also strong on the DONi news website, including articles with phrases like “torchlight processions of neo-Nazi on Kiev’s streets”158 and “Nazi threats”. As the conflict progressed and somewhat cooled down in the next years (early spring 2017 and onwards), the state media started to publish

151 ‘18 DPR universities concluded treaty with Russian universities for cooperation’, www.dninews.com, 23 March 2016, https://dninews.com/article/18-dpr-universities-concluded-treaty-russian-universities-cooperation. Accessed on 23-02-2018. 152 ‘DPR authorities adopt best practices from Russian colleges concerning patriotic education for youth’, www.dninews.com, 28 April 2016, https://dninews.com/article/dpr-authorities-adopt-best-practices-russian- colleges-concerning-patriotic-education-youth, Accessed on 23-02-2018. 153 ‘DPR Ministry of communications has expanded tv broadcast Russian channels’, www.dninews.com, August 28, 2015, https://dninews.com/article/dprs-ministry-communications-has-expanded-tv-broadcast-russian- channels. Accessed on 2-03-2018. 154 For example, a signboard of Donetsk railway Station was translated from Ukrainian into Russian in 2015: https://dninews.com/article/signboard-donetsk-railway-station-was-translated-russian. Also, in schools: ‘450 people have expressed their wish to pass the Ukrainian language and almost 9,5 thousand people (school leavers of the 9th and 11th grades) decided to pass the Russian language,’ added the Deputy Minister of Education and Science of the Donetsk People’s Republic. https://dninews.com/article/almost-95-dpr-school-leavers-choose- russian-language-passing-state-final-examination 155 ‘Kiev’s ukrainization of the Donbass can be only forcible’, www.dninews.com, September 22, 2015, https://dninews.com/article/kiev’s-ukrainization-donbass-can-be-only-forcible-paretsky , Accessed on 2-03- 2018. 156 Some examples of headings: https://dninews.com/article/kiev-planning-big-provocation-order-blame-dpr- eduard-basurin (August 2, 2015), https://dninews.com/article/ukrainian-troops-are-building-military-presence (August 11, 2015), https://dninews.com/article/ukrainian-forces-violated-ceasefire-regime-almost-30-times (August 8, 2015), https://dninews.com/article/ukrainian-bloodsuckers-open-fire-dockuchayevsk (September 14, 2016). 157 Giuliano, ‘The Origins of Separatism: popular grievances in Donetsk and Luhansk’, 5. 158 https://dninews.com/article/dpr’s-leader-aleksandr-zakharchenko-commented-day-ukraine’s-liberation-nazi- invaders 40 more and more articles about framing the United States – and the West in general – as enemies and weak states.159 This happened in 2015 already, but the intensity of publishing anti-western articles increased in 2017. An example of such an article on anti-Westernness and anti-Americanness has the heading “CIA Documents: USA has been Nazifying Ukraine since 1953 – Project Aerodynamic”.160 Here, the U.S. is framed as an aider of the DPR’s first and foremost enemy: Ukraine and its ‘Nazism’. Another example, from 2017, shows a similar discourse, condemning the (reported) U.S. weaponry aid to Ukraine.161

The US Congress demands that the deliveries of the so-called lethal weapons [to Ukraine] be started. That is why, it is important that the US White House and the Department of State should realize that this may turn into new tragedies and should feel their responsibility," Ryabkov said at a roundtable discussion in the lower house of Russia’s parliament on Russian-US relations.162

And similar, the following heading: “US European commander demanding more troops to fight Russia”.163 In another article, the EU is framed as a controlling entity, restricting free speech:

The West champions itself as the bastion of free speech, but a European Union official has made it clear that if a person's views do not mirror their policy, a world of hurt awaits them as the EU openly admits free speech is NOT part of their agenda.164

This discourse fits one side of Riabchuks typology – explained in the theoretical framework – of the Ukrainian identity, namely highly conservative, anti-Western, pro-Soviet, Ukrainophobic and authoritarian.165 Although the DPR state media frames Ukraine as their common enemy and there is a strong othering discourse from the Ukraine, creating solidarity with the state of the DPR,

159 Examples of anti-western headings: https://dninews.com/article/kiev-sends-british-mercenaries-donbass, January 23, 2017, 160 ‘CIA Documents: USA has been Nazifying Ukraine since 1953 – Project Aerodynamic’, January 19, 2018, www.dninews.com, Accessed on 9-03-2018. 161 ‘US arms deliveries to Ukraine may turn into new tragedies – Russian diplomat’, www.dninews.com, March 1, 2017, https://dninews.com/article/us-arms-deliveries-ukraine-may-turn-new-tragedies-russian-diplomat, Accessed on 9-03-2018. 162 Ibidem. 163 ‘US European commander demanding more troops to fight Russia’, www.dninews.com, March 29, 2017, https://dninews.com/article/us-european-commander-demanding-more-troops-fight-russia, Accessed on 9-03- 2018. 164 ‘Intelligence Briefing: EU Truth Control’, www.dninews.com, March 17, 2016, https://dninews.com/article/intelligence-briefing-eu-truth-control, Accessed on 9-03-2017 (my emphasis). 165 Riabchuk, 443. 41 there are also some indications for a similar Russian nationalist discourse (strongly anti- Western). The US and the EU are strongly criticised, framed as ‘weak states’ at times and as enemies, providing insecurity for the Donbas, at others while Russia is framed as the strong, secure and righteous state, suffering from never ending critique and threats from the West. ‘Fake news’166 or exaggerated anti-western news articles are omnipresent on the DONi news website.

3.2.1 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR leadership – introducing the leadership Throughout the first two years of the conflict it was difficult to indicate the influential actors and leaders of the DPR and the LPR. In the fall of 2017, the website of the pro-Ukrainian NGO published an article based on an Ukrainian research project (conducted between the summers of 2016 and 2017 by Ukrainian Think Tank Depo Donbas: https://dn.depo.ua/ukr/donetsk/separskiy-donbas-hto-zapravlyaye-na-miscyah-v- zaharchenkivskomu-dnr-20170611587050), creating an overview of the leadership of the DPR. According to the article, the leadership consisted of roughly five actors in the beginning of 2014 – (a former member of the party), (a representative of a Russian ‘scheme’ company), Andrey Purgin (a prominent separatist leader), (one of Russian president’s Putin’s personal advisers) and Alexander Zakharchenko (a Ukrainian citizen who led one of the separatist militia groups fighting Ukraine).167 Most of them have direct or indirect ties to Russia. Alexander Zakharchenko became the ‘official’ leader of the DPR in the fall of 2014 and now has most of the political power of Donetsk in his hands.168 According to Euromaidan Press, “the [Zakharchenko] group includes the representatives of the so-called new Donetsk clan under the leadership of Zakharchenko, as well as Yanukovych-era bureaucrats from the oblast administration, city and rayon councils.”169 Other influential (sub)groups in the political field of the DPR are among others the Vostok Militia (separatist group not connected to Zakharchenko), the “Regionaires” (members of the former Party of the Regions), the “Free Donbas” group (sympathisers of the Novorossiya ideology) and local radical communist

166 For example, the heading of an article of April 2016 “Brussels try[tries] to bribe Dutch” https://dninews.com/article/brussels-try-bribe-dutch, and in the article itself the following assumption: “To this end, the Dutch will probably be bribed or bestowed with some privileges.” 167 ‘Who is Who in the Kremlin proxy “Donetsk People’s Republic”’, www.euromaidanpress.com, 31 October, 2017, http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/10/31/who-is-who-in-the-kremlin-proxy-donetsk-peoples-republic/. Accessed on 9-03-2018. See appendix 1 for the infographic. 168 Idem. 169 Ibidem. 42 parties.170 However, in general, Zakharchenko is the most important figure in terms of representativeness and leadership of the DPR. The characteristics of his leadership are quite similar to researcher Pavel Baev’s description of Putin’s (autocratic) leadership in his article ‘Portrait of an Accidental Autocrat’ namely: “a swing from energetic advancement to a prosperous future to defensive conservatism with pronounced religious orthodoxy and ugly nationalistic manipulations, thus alienating the pro-Western and independent-minded social groups, particularly the younger generation, even further.”171 Zakharchenko also speaks of a prosperous future (for the DPR, in his case) on many occasions, one example being:

The Head of the Republic Alexander Zakharchenko arrived to congratulate children and their parents on the opening of the kindergarten, as well as to assess the conditions in which the children will be educated. "Today is a joyful event not only for the employees of the Makeyevkoks, their children and kindergarten workers, but today is also a joyful day for each of us. The opening of the kindergarten is a small victory, an indication that together we have achieved a major victory – the resumption of production and the beginning of the restoration of industry. I congratulate you all on this!" Alexander Zakharchenko said. In addition to that, the Head of State stressed that one of the primary tasks set before the authorities of the Republic was to ensure the comprehensive development of the younger generation. "Children are our future, it is for them that we are building the Republic and today we are fighting for their happy future," the Head of the Donetsk People's Republic noted.172

And another example:

The Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) Alexander Zakharchenko has expressed his hope for the fact that the Republic will win in the Donbass conflict soon and for reunification with the cities which are temporarily controlled by Kiev. Alexander Zakharchenko has stated this during the Q&A session with the residents who live in a part of Donbass temporarily controlled by Kiev. “We are Donbass and will be always together. Illegal overthrow of the power took place in Ukraine in 2014. When the war is over? – this question can’t be covered on the air. The war is over, when we will win and we can see it in the near future,” said Alexander Zakharchenko.173

Characteristics like religious orthodoxy, nationalistic manipulations (non-neutrality of the media and pro-Russian propaganda) and conservatism have already been touched upon in

170 Ibidem. 171 P. K. Baev, ‘Portrait of an Accidental Autocrat’ The International Spectator (2013), 48(3), pp. 136-37, p. 137. 172 ‘DPR Head: we are fighting for our children’s future’, www.dninews.com, November 16, 2017, https://dninews.com/article/dpr-head-we-are-fighting-our-childrens-happy-future. Accessed on 9-03-2018. 173 ‘Zakharchenko: ‘We’ll win and we can see it in the near future’, www.dninews.com, March 22, 2017, https://dninews.com/article/zakharchenko-‘we’ll-win-and-we-can-see-it-near-future’. Accessed on 10-03-2018. 43 paragraph 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 and are also part of the DPR’s leadership discourse, put forward by Zakharchenko as the public leader. To investigate the presence of Russian nationalism in the DPR, I will look at several speeches and statements of the leader Alexander Zakharchenko, throughout the years of 2015, 2016 and 2017. This way, the potential Russian nationalist discourse in the DPR leadership can be analysed. In this sub-chapter, the following sub-question for this section will therefore be used: how does the leadership of the DPR use/frame Russian nationalism to promote their separatist republic?

3.2.2 Russian nationalist discourse in DPR leadership – analysing the source As the ‘state media’, analysed in subchapter 3.1.2 above, is directly connected to the state leader, a same kind of discourse can be detected throughout the speeches of the leader of the DPR. However, it is interesting to analyse these speeches separately, as they are longer and have a different kind of dynamic and rhetoric, and are connected directly to the most influential actor – who is publicly very present – of the DPR. As the ‘state-media’ and Zakharchenko’s speeches are connected (whenever a speech is given, a media article covering this speech is also published on the DONi news-website) there is some overlap between these two sources, and therefore this chapter will be shorter in terms of analysis. Although the emphasis of Zakharchenko’s statements and speeches is on building an independent state (the DPR) – “our young independent state”174, phrases like “the freedom of Donbass”175 and ‘our people’ – throughout the texts, especially in the speech of 2015, strong association with the Russian nation can be detected. Zakharchenko uses phrases and examples like “the history of the Russian state”176 and “the eternal norm of the Russian world”177. He describes and promotes nationalism for their independent state, pressing for a common ideology and pleading to “speak in our native language and honour the traditions of our ancestors”178 (as indicated in the theoretical framework, distinctive culture, ideology and history are all indicators of nationalism) but this is all strongly associated with Russian norms

174 Zakharchenko, “Message of the head of the DPR to the People’s Council, December 25, 2015”, Edited autotranslation by Quemado Institute, December 26, 2015. Link: https://quemadoinstitute.org/2015/12/26/alexander-zakharchenko-state-of-the-nation-address-transcript/., accessed on 13-10-2017. 175 Ibidem. 176 Ibidem. 177 Ibidem. 178 Ibidem. 44 and values. The ‘native language’ that the leader of the DPR wants to promote is Russian, and the norms and values come from ‘Mother Russia’ and the former USSR:

A just society based on the values that lie at the foundation of the thousand-year history of the Russian state: solidarity, mutual assistance, participation in the fate of those near to us and of society as a whole.179

Zakharchenko literally mentions the word ‘solidarity’ (even in combination to Russia), which is a direct indicator of Russian nationalism. Also, the dynamic of the texts consists of emphasising a strong ‘self’ with the support of Russia180, as well as strong othering. This representation of a strong ‘self’ and the dynamic of othering is an indicator of Russian nationalism as such as how Gerber in combination with Smith described it (also present in the concept of solidarity). The (evil) ‘other’, the enemy, even, is in this case Ukraine. Of course, a similar development as the analysis of the ‘state media’ website. The function of othering is to create a common enemy which functions as a scapegoat that the DPR can blame. Also, by creating a common enemy in ‘the other’ (Ukraine), the feeling of nationalism towards the DPR (and perhaps Russia) is strengthened. In his speeches, Zakharchenko simply denounces Ukraine as the ‘bad guy’ and Russia and the DPR as the ‘good guys’. One of the examples of strong othering can be found in one of the texts: “…infiltrating into our territory from the Ukraine side – saboteurs, spies, smugglers, drug dealers.”181 Also, Zakharchenko depicts the leadership in Ukraine as a ‘Nazi gang’182. The function of the nationalist discourse is to create support for an independent, pro- Russian state. In the years 2015-2016 the leadership of the DPR wanted independency from Ukraine but (as also extensively explained in sub-chapter 3.1.2) in on 18 July 2017 the DPR claimed to have established a new country, ‘Malorossiya’, and hoped to eventually overtake the whole of Ukraine183. In Zakharchenko’s declaration-speech on the 18th of July, it is

179 Idem. 180 Zakharchenko, 2015; Zakharchenko, “Q&A Session of the Head of the DPR with the Donetsk region’s residents in the temporarily Ukraine-controlled territory”, March 22, 2017. Link: https://av- zakharchenko.su/inner-news-eng/Pryamaya-liniya1/Pryamaya-liniya-Glavy-Donetckoj-Narodnoj-Respubliki2/. Accessed on 13-10-2017. ;DONi News Agency, “Official Declaration of the Malorussiyan Federation”, www.dninews.com, July 18, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20170718172531/https://dninews.com/article/official-declaration-malorossiyan- federation-full-text-07182017, accessed on 14-10-2017. 181 Zakharchenko, Q&A March 2017. 182 Zakharchenko, 2015. 183 DONi News Agency, 2017. 45 stressed that this declaration is not a call for revolution, but a “return to history”184. The term ‘Malorossiya’ was used in the 19th century in the Russian Empire, to describe the land that is now known as Ukraine.185 So, again, a strong connection to the old Russian Empire can be detected here. A “new flag”186 for this ‘new nation’ has also been developed, which is actually a borrowed flag from a 17th century Cossack Bohdan Kmelnytsky187 who transferred Polish- confiscated Ukrainian land back to Russia.188 The affinity with Russia and Russian history is felt especially throughout this declaration-speech. What is also notable in Zakharchenko’s leadership are images of ‘official state events’ (especially when giving official speeches, signing declarations, etc.) spread on news-websites and other DPR-websites of him, the DPR flag and the Russian flag. Examples of such images:

189 Zakharchenko is seated on the left. The Russian flag on the left, the DPR flag on the right.

190 Zakharchenko in the middle. The DPR flag on the left, the Russian flag on the right.

184 Idem. 185 A. Taylor, ‘Ukrainian separatists claim to have created a new country: Malorossiya, or Little Russia’, www.thewashingtonpost.com, July 19, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/19/ukrainian-separatists-claim-to-have-created- a-new-country-malorossiya-or-little-russia/?utm_term=.c60b7a10c25f, accessed on 14 October, 2017. 186 DONi News Agency, 2017. 187 Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, ‘From “Malorossiya” With Love?’, www.medium.com, July 19, 2017, https://medium.com/dfrlab/from-malorossiya-with-love-8765ed30242d, accessed on 14 October 2017. 188 Taylor, ‘Ukrainian separatists claim to have created a new country: Malorossiya, or Little Russia’. 189 Image retrieved from www.dninews.com, January 24, 2018. Accessed on 10-03-2018. 190 Image retrieved from www.dninews.com, December 29, 2017. Accessed on 10-03-2018. 46

According to historian Timothy Baycroft, national flags are “ways to promote nationalism through history with little risk of evoking dangerous memories…they simply take on the historical connotations which are attributed to them. They have a flexibility that allows a specific interpretation of history to be attributed to and associated with them.”191 He also argues that “the widespread portrayal of its images and symbols [in this case national flags] reminds the population of their historical links. Those links…may be selected to represent the way the promoters of the nation wish the nation to be seen and thought of.”192 When the DPR was established in 2014, the Ukrainian flag was immediately removed and replaced with the DPR flag. However, the continuous representation of the Russian flag side-by-side the DPR flag certainly must project a certain (strong) message on the ‘citizens’ of the DPR, that of not only DPR patriotism but also Russian patriotism. Showing two flags at official state events can make it seem as if this self-proclaimed state is trying to annex itself to Russia (an idea Russia has been rejecting publicly) or at least consider itself a part of the Russian ‘land’. As Baycroft has argued, promoting a national flag can be used as a tool to promote nationalism. Thus, while the DPR openly promotes the Russian national flag as well it can be argued that, as a national flag is such a strong representation of a land’s nationalism, the republic promotes Russian nationalism openly through the use of symbolism. Throughout Zakharchenko’s speeches it is clear that the leadership of the DPR leans on Russia for support:

Russia has not deserted us in the most difficult moments, and do not forget us now. We can say only one thing: thanks to brotherly Russia, and thanks to the brotherly Russian people. We will not forget your kindness nor your simple human participation.193

Moreover, Zakharchenko goes as far as claiming that Russia will help them in “liberating Kiev”.194 This seems like a bold statement, because Russia hasn’t even recognized the DPR as an independent state. In large parts of the texts, this point is being downplayed195 or ignored altogether196. In a question and answer session on March 22, 2017, Zakharchenko received a question of a critical DPR citizen who mentioned that the DPR did not do as well

191 T. Baycroft, Nationalism in Europe, 1789-1945, (Cambridge, 1998), 27, 28. 192 Idem, 28. 193 Zakharchenko, 2015. 194 Zakharchenko, “Q&A Session of the DPR Head Alexander Zakharchenko with residents of Ukraine”, April 14, 2017. Link: https://av-zakharchenko.su/inner-news-eng/Pryamaya-liniya1/Pryamaya-liniya-Glavy-DNR- Aleksandra-Zaharchenko-s5/. 195 Zakharchenko, Q&A March 2017. 196 Idem. 47 economically as Zakharchenko claimed, and that reunification with the Russian Federation would probably be “impossible”.197 Zakharchenko, in turn, just answered with “do not read the Ukrainian press in the morning”198, ignoring the critical question completely. All in all, the speeches emphasise the strong will of the leadership of the DPR to establish an independent state with Russian norms and values. Indicators for a discourse of Russian nationalism (association with the Russian language, Russian history and love for ‘brotherly’ Russia) are found throughout the texts. Although it goes too far to argue that Russian nationalism as a concept is the largest aspect of Zakharchenko’s leadership, Russian influence in general is definitely present in his leadership.

3.3 Russian nationalist discourse in the public opinion of the DPR The public opinion of the citizens of the DPR is by far the hardest discourse to analyse. Firstly, the Russian or Ukrainian language barrier plays a large role. Secondly, the anti- western censorship of the DPR (social)media-usage plays a role. Thirdly, it is difficult to detect neutral sources in a completely divided (either pro-Russian or pro-Western) media- world. And as the republic has been so closed-off and also rather new, it is difficult to find academic research projects that have researched the public opinion in the DPR in a neutral and in-depth manner. Ever since the occupation by the separatists, the Donetsk oblast has become an isolated ‘republic’ with closed borders and limited access for independent researchers or journalists being able to visit the republic. Nevertheless, some researchers have managed to carry out interviews or surveys in the republic regarding the public opinion in the DPR in the time period of 2014-now. These surveys will be used to shortly describe the public opinion in the DPR and analyse elements of a (possibly) Russian nationalist discourse therein. The question asked in this sub-chapter is the following: is there a possible Russian nationalist discourse present in the general public opinion of the DPR? If so, how is it framed? In August of 2016, Donbas Think Tank conducted a survey among the citizens of Donbas, both on the separatist and the Ukrainian side of the region. With the survey the think tank tried to indicate the specific features of the mind-set and identity of the residents of controlled (Ukraine) and uncontrolled (DPR) territories of the Donetsk region.199 Although not

197 Idem. 198 Idem. 199 Analytical Report on the survey results ‘Specific features of the mindset and identity of the residents of controlled and uncontrolled territories of the Donetsk region’: conclusions and recommendations, Kiev, 2016. 48 specifically focussed on a possible Russian nationalist discourse in the separatist region of Donetsk, some questions retrieved from the survey can be interpreted through this point of view. For example, with the statement “in regards my values and way of thinking I am significantly different from residents of Russia but am more similar to residents of other regions of Ukraine” only 9% of the respondents from the DPR agreed, versus 35% of the respondents from the Ukrainian-led side of Donbas.

200 However, with the same question but phrased the other way around: “in regards my values and way of thinking I am significantly different from residents of Ukraine but am more similar to residents of Russia” 42% of the respondents from the DPR agreed, versus only 20% of the respondents from the Ukrainian-led region of Donbas.

201

Retrieved from Euromaidan Press: http://euromaidanpress.com/wp- content/uploads/2016/08/Report_on_results_of_a_research_on_the_Donetsk_region_eng.pdf. 200 Idem, 6. 201 Ibidem. 49

A significantly higher percentage deems itself more similar to Russia and predominantly different from Ukraine. Those ‘values and way of thinking’ can be part of a shared (distinctive) culture. However, with the statement “In regards my values and way of thinking I am significantly different from residents of other regions of Ukraine and Russia”, 31% of the DPR residents agreed:

Compared to the response to the other two statements, this is a rather large percentage as well. It is hard to interpret the percentages without any further elaboration of the respondents, but it does follow the research already conducted in the previous chapters: a predominantly pro- Russian discourse (not particularly in favour of the DPR separatist leadership), a predominantly pro-DPR (as a separate state) discourse or a combination of these two discourses (pro-Russian and pro-DPR). So this shared (distinctive) culture can be filled in by either a number of values linked directly to the DPR in itself (particularly focussing on the association with the territory and a strong sense of solidarity as the separatist state of DPR) or by the Russian values which were previously defined as Orthodox faith, collectivism and/or traditional family values. On aspects like the economy, politics, and mass media the citizens of the DPR seem to lean towards Russia for security. For example, 48% of the DPR citizens want an economic and political unity with Russia, while 30% prefers not to join any unity, 9% suggests to join the EU and 13% finds this question difficult to answer.

50

202

This outcome (most respondents wanting an economic and political unity with Russia) does not mean that there is a connection to Russian nationalism in this regard. It just indicates a tendency to lean on Russia for (economic or political) support and security. Another survey conducted amongst the residents of the DPR (and the Ukrainian controlled part of Donbass) in May 2017 by German researcher Gwendolyn Sasse shows that quite a large part of the DPR citizens trusts (36.3% trusts in general, 28.2% rather trusts) the Russian president Vladimir Putin. Also, the DPR citizens have more trust in the Russian mass media (54,1%)203 than they have in the Ukrainian mass media (14%)204 .

This can be explained by amongst others the strong pro-Russian discourse of the DPR ‘state’ media outlets – as explained in the previous chapters – and the presence of multiple Russian

202 Analytical Report on the survey results “Specific features of the mindset and identity of the residents of controlled and uncontrolled territories of the Donetsk region”: conclusions and recommendations, 11. 203 G. Sasse, ‘The Donbas – Two parts, or still one? The experience of war through the eyes of the regional population’ ZOiS Report 2/2017, 14. 204 Idem, 13. 51

TV-channels and newspapers and the lack of neutral or pro-Ukrainian media outlets.205 As seen in the previous chapters, on these news-websites a Russian nationalist discourse can indeed be indicated. Being the largest source of media available to the DPR citizens, it most likely influences the public opinion in the DPR towards a pro-Russian discourse. However, as the surveys indicate, although the majority of the DPR citizens identify with Russia and lean towards Russia for support, it goes too far to conclude that there is a Russian nationalist discourse amongst the DPR public opinion. There are certainly aspects of this discourse that can be indicated, but these are not strong enough. As Sasse’s survey concluded, “mixed Russian-Ukrainian identities, whether rooted in ethnicity, native language, language use, or a combination of ethnic and civic criteria, remain present across the whole Donbas region…”206 and “For Kyiv it would be premature to effectively give up on occupied territories; while Moscow could not count on the unwavering loyalty of the population of the DNR/LNP [DPR/LPR]”207. These quotes indicate a clear ‘in-between-ness’ of identity and perhaps its feeling of nationalism of citizens in the DPR. Donbas Think Tank’s survey indicates a strong “ongoing formation of the new identity, a DPR citizen, among the residents of the uncontrolled territory”208 and with it “a relatively strong feeling of socio-cultural otherness among the residents of the uncontrolled area (compared with the residents of the controlled area) which implies the feeling of their dissimilarity with the residents of Ukraine and Russia.”209 These quotes indicate a more independent ‘DPR identity’, connected to the new ‘republic’ and its territory.

All in all, there is infusion of Russian nationalism in the DPR propagated through the DPR approved mass media and through the leadership of the DPR. The discourse of Russian nationalism is one way to demonstrate the region’s broad support of and feeling of belonging to a Russian world, not a Ukrainian/Western one. It has mentally aided the escalation of the conflict and endangered the security of the now four-year war-zone of Donbas. The DONi news website analysed in this research is only one example of the pro-Russian news outlets (e.g. www.dnr-online.ru, www.dnr24.su and the Russian TV channels) that shows this discourse. In addition to that, the leader of the DPR depicts the same message in his speeches

205 N. Roman, W. Wanta & I. Buniak, ‘Information wars: Eastern Ukraine military conflict coverage in the Russian, Ukrainian and U.S. newscasts’, The International Communication Gazette (2017), 79(4), pp. 357-378, p. 363. 206 Sasse, ‘The Donbas – Two parts, or still one?’, 17. 207 Idem, 18. 208 Analytical Report on the survey results ‘Specific features of the mindset and identity of the residents of controlled and uncontrolled territories of the Donetsk region’: conclusions and recommendations, 11. 209 Idem, 12. My emphasis. 52 towards the citizens of the DPR. The public opinion surveys show that the residents of the DPR have more support for Russian media, the Russian president, and a feeling of non- Ukrainianess in comparison to the residents of government-controlled regions. As there is no counter-message (in the form of neutral media outlets or of an opposition party) easily available in the DPR, the population of the region will continue to read and hear mostly pro- Russian and more importantly, anti-Ukrainian outings. This might drift the population further away from choosing to support government-controlled Ukraine. Chances of reintegration, peace and security will become more difficult. The chances of an annexation of the region to Russia, another possible scenario, are difficult to estimate. On multiple occasions the Kremlin has rejected this idea. However, the Kremlin’s actions like recognising DPR and LPR passports and the use of the Russian currency in both regions210 might show otherwise.

210 D. Mclaughlin, ‘Russia denies planning annexation of eastern Ukraine, www.irishtimes.com, March 17, 2017. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/russia-denies-planning-annexation-of-eastern-ukraine- 1.3014810, Accessed on 13 May 2018. 53

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to examine a possible Russian nationalism discourse in the separatist state DPR in eastern Ukraine, and analysing whether this discourse has been an underlying reason for the conflict. The analysis focused on the aspect of the ‘state’ media, the DPR leadership and the public opinion in the DPR. Contributing to the literature already available on Russian nationalism, the history of the Donetsk oblast, the conflict in the Donbas area and the current relations between Russia and Ukraine – presented in the theoretical framework of the thesis – this analysis has shown a complex discourse in the DPR, consisting of: 1) an artificial pro-Russian and pro-separatist state (DPR) media- and leadership discourse with strong elements of Russian nationalism and 2) a discourse in the public opinion which indicates a feeling of being mixed Russian-Ukrainian but also strongly something other than Russian or Ukrainian. The Russian nationalist elements indicated in the DPR state media were that of a collective name, as in the case of the use of the name ‘Malorossiya’ in numerous articles on the news- website and framing this as ‘the’ new state, linking the DPR to the name Rossiya, or Russia – even though this didn’t last for long. Secondly, the elements of a common myth of descend and territory – again, the idea of ‘Malorossiya’ is historically linked to Russian territory, according to the DONi news website – can be indicated, however this should not be overestimated. Most of all, the DPR wants to promote the idea of a separatist state. So although the common myth of descend of the DPR has many links with the Russian world, strongly othering itself from the Ukrainian descend, in terms of territory the DPR does see itself as part of ‘a’ Russian world (ideologically) but not in terms of actual land territory. Thirdly in Russian nationalism there is the concept of shared history. In the DPR too, quite a strong connection with Russia can be detected. This is seen mostly by the similarities in celebrations/commemorations of historic events (like wars, national holidays, etc.) between the DPR and Russia. Following the news website, a lot of attention was brought to the (yearly) recurring national events or holidays of the DPR and several of these celebrations are Russian holidays (like “Unity Day”) which were not celebrated in this area prior to the establishment of the DPR. Fourthly, the element of a distinctive (Russian-like) culture is also found in many articles on the website. A substantial amount of articles cover Orthodox matters or holidays, directly connected to the Russian Orthodox Church and indicate the same conservative values (large, patriarchal families and opposing same-sex relationships for

54 example) as Russia is known for. Lastly, the element of solidarity is framed in the articles as being solidary with Russia in their word-view, which is anti-Western. However, the anti- Ukrainian discourse is stronger on the DONi website as the DPR deems this more important. This anti-Ukrainian discourse has more direct influence on the DPR, the DPR can use this to create more support for their separatist state. In terms of the discourse of the leadership of the DPR, it more or less equals the analysis of the discourse in the DPR media. What is an interesting addition, is the use of the Russian flag in almost every image of leader Zakharchenko in a formal setting (e.g. reading or signing a law/declaration). Flags are a strong symbol for nationalism. It can be argued that, as a national flag is such a strong representation of a land’s nationalism, the republic promotes Russian nationalism openly through the use of symbolism. This can be done consciously or just out of brotherly solidarity towards Russia – not having to do anything with trying to suggest the DPR as part of Russia – but either way, it sends a message to the outside world. From this analysis, it can be concluded that the elements of Russian nationalism are indeed strongly present but the first and foremost function of the DPR state media and its discourse is to support the DPR state, which makes the DPR state-nationalism stronger than the Russian nationalist one. However, the similarities between the two discourses are quite strong and this is the interesting find of this thesis. The second conclusion of the analysis, a discourse in the public opinion which indicates a feeling of being mixed Russian-Ukrainian but also strongly something other than Russian or Ukrainian can be an explanation for the susceptibility of separatism in this area. Here, it is much harder to find elements of the Russian nationalist discourse because on the one hand, in a practical matter, it is hard to access the area to conduct e.g. large amounts of interviews and in this thesis I had to rely on surveys, and on the other hand it is clear that the feeling of “otherness” from both Russia and Ukraine in the area is quite strong. However, because of the censorship of the media – and as seen, this does have strong Russian nationalist elements – and this being one of the largest sources of information for the DPR citizens every day, it can be of great influence on the public opinion in the DPR for the future if these types of sources remain the largest information sources available. The pro- Russian feeling in the DPR has already risen due to the conflict in the area211 and might rise

211 The ZOiS report conducted a question asking the Ukrainian-controlled and the DPR controlled area of Donbas whether they feel more Russian, more Ukrainian, more strongly both or no change as a result of the events 2013-2016. Of the DPR group, 26.1% answered “more Russian”, compared to only 3.4% of the Ukrainian-controlled Donbas area, which is quite a big difference. 45% of the DPR group answered “no change”, 20.4% answered “more strongly both” and 8.5% answered “more Ukrainian”. 55 more. This development will increase the ever-widening gap between Ukraine and the separatist states, decrease the economic, political and societal security in the area and it might encourage Russia in their use of soft power. One way or another, pro-Russian (military) influence, propaganda and disinformation has influenced the escalation and sustainability of the separatist conflict over the last four years. Russia will most likely continue to support the separatist republics to keep their sphere of influence and security buffer, an important aspect of the country’s geopolitical strategy. It will be worthwhile to continue to closely observe the discourse – not particularly Russian nationalist, but pro-Russian in general – in the DPR (and the LPR respectively), not only to monitor the conflict but also to understand how separatist states (in particular pro- Russian ones) develop.

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Appendix 1 – Infographic leadership DPR 2016-2017

Source: Euromaidanpress.com

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