DOCSLIB.ORG

Nationalism and the Legacy of Empire Katz, Mark N Current History; Oct 1994; 93, 585; Research Library Core Pg

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Nationalism and the Legacy of Empire Katz, Mark N Current History; Oct 1994; 93, 585; Research Library Core Pg Nationalism and the legacy of empire Katz, Mark N Current History; Oct 1994; 93, 585; Research Library Core pg. 327 "If the states of Asia and Africa after the withdrawal of the European colonial empires are any guide, then ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union is likely to be bitter, violent, and protracted." Nationalism and the Legacy of Empire BY MARK N. KATZ he breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked each other or engage in civil wars because they resolve the disintegration of the last great European their conflicts through peaceful methods. That most of Tcolonial empire. Just as when the European the former Soviet republics have either embarked on powers withdrew from their colonies, the 15 former the path toward democratization or at least stated their Soviet republics, now all independent countries, are intention to do so, appears to offer the hope that experiencing a host of problems: economic disloca­ extreme varieties of nationalism might be tempered by tion, weak political structures, ethnic tension, and democratic institutions offering alternative channels even warfare. for conflict resolution. Although not the sole source of these woes, a Perhaps ethnically exclusive nationalisms in the significant contributing factor is the emergence of post-Soviet states will recede as a result of democratiza­ nationalism. Nationalism, of course, is not necessarily tion, economic development, or other positive factors, destructive; indeed, it is something that occurs in but it is highly doubtful this will occur anytime soon. virtually all nations and can be a unifying force within For there exists in the former Soviet Union, as in many them. But just as happened in many third world parts of the third world, a problem that serves to countries when they gained independence, an often vengeful form of nationalism has developed in the heighten insecurity, and thus to enhance extreme former republics. Some brands are expansionist— nationalism: that the existing borders were drawn by especially in Russia. And while the nationalisms of the imperial power not to reflect actual ethnic and most non-Russian republics are not expansionist, they national differences, but for its own convenience. tend at a minimum to be centered around a specific It is not clear whether or to what extent the newly ethnic group and to exclude those outside it. opened Soviet archives will demonstrate that Moscow Some observers are convinced that especially viru­ deliberately drew and redrew contentious borders lent forms of nationalism are inherently temporary. among neighboring nationalities so they would look to While home to a highly defensive nationalism at first, it Moscow for protection against one another. But what­ is argued, new nations gradually acquire the experience ever the intentions behind them, the artificial bound­ and self-confidence that allow them to put aside aries exacerbated relations among ethnic groups. The nationalist policies recognized as counterproductive.1 union republics often contained two or more nationali­ The many third world states that used to ban or ties that had historically had poor relations Nor were severely restrict Western investment in the domestic borders drawn to include a single ethnic group entirely economy but now actively seek it provide examples of within them; large segments of a nationality were often this. divided among two or more republics. Many observers see democratization as a leading Nationalism in what was once the Soviet Union is means by which extreme nationalism is ameliorated. not, of course, a homogenous phenomenon, and its The theory is that democracies do not go to war with character and intensity vary not only across ethnic groups but also within them. But ethnic-based nation­ alist movements have sprung up throughout the terri­ MARK N. KATZ is an associate professor of government and politics at George Mason University. He acknowledges the tory of the former Soviet Union. They seek territory, assistance of the Earhart Foundation for its support in writing political independence or autonomy, advancement for this paper. their group, or other ends—often at the expense of other peoples. In many of the new countries, national­ 'This argument was forcefully made in Francis Fukuyama, ism in general and territorial disputes in particular are The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press. seized on by Communist-turned-nationalist regimes to 1992). justify their authoritarian rule. And the passing of empire means there is no longer a central authority to A LAND OF THEIR OWN regulate relations among the various nations. When the Soviet Union broke up it was only the 15 so-called union republics that became independent. But living in the territory of the former empire were a A TALE OF TWO TERRITORIES host of ethnic groups besides those that had a union The former Soviet Union offers several major ex­ republic named for them. Many areas in which such amples of nationalists in neighboring states claiming usually smaller groups predominated (or had once the same territory. A land dispute between Armenia predominated) Moscow had demarcated as "autono­ and Azerbaijan kindled a war between the two repub­ mous republics" or "autonomous regions" within the lics that began almost four years before they became union republic, or had allowed other special political arrangements. Many of these ethnic groups have also independent. The conflict centers on the question of asserted their desire for independence. The distinction whether Nagorno-Karabakh, a region the Soviet authori­ between a union republic and an autonomous republic ties had assigned to Azerbaijan despite its predomi­ may have seemed clear to the Soviet inventors of the nantly Armenian population and its proximity to concepts, but it was never clear to the inhabitants of Armenia, should belong to Azerbaijan or Armenia. It the latter, some of which have larger populations than cannot be said with any degree of certainty that if the now independent union republics. Moscow had, in the 1920s, assigned Nagorno- Inside Russia, one autonomous republic—Chech­ Karabakh and the tiny sliver of territory between it and nya—has declared itself independent. Although Yelt­ Armenia to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic that sin has refused to recognize its independence, he has the current conflict could have been avoided. But it is been unable to prevent the governments of the autono­ clear that the Soviet-engineered borders stirred up both mous republics and other political divisions from Armenian and Azeri nationalists such that each side increasing their authority at Moscow's expense. believes absolutely vital interests are at stake. Neither And Russia is not alone: several of the other newly government has been willing to compromise, though independent states also have one or more regions the war has devastated their economies, aggravated where smaller ethnic groups are demanding indepen­ Armenia's relations with neighboring Turkey, and led dence. Georgia is facing secessionist movements in to political turmoil in Azerbaijan. Compromise would Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Gagauz people and be political suicide, since public opinion in both the "Transdniestrian Republic" have demanded inde­ nations has adopted an extremist nationalist position. pendence from Moldova. In Central Asia, there are It is highly doubtful that greater democratization in secessionist movements in northern Kazakhstan, and either country would alter the situation, at least at eastern Tajikistan, among other places. In the Crimea present. there is a strong movement that favors secession from The Crimean peninsula is another hotly disputed Ukraine. territory. An independent Muslim khanate, the Crimea It is ironic that the union republics asserted their was conquered by Russia in the eighteenth century. right to secede from the Soviet Union but, once After the Bolshevik Revolution it was part of the independent, have refused to recognize any region's Russian republic until 1954, when Khrushchev trans­ right to secede from them. They often forbid referen- ferred it to Ukraine as a gift. When Ukraine became dums on independence in regions where secessionist movements are active, or if they do permit polling, balk independent in 1991, Russian nationalists insisted the at accepting the results as legitimate when the majority peninsula should be returned to Russia. Shortly before chooses secession. In new countries with undemo­ it was abolished late last year, the Communist- cratic regimes, governments are unwilling to allow one dominated Russian parliament formally laid claim to or more regions to determine their own future demo­ Crimea. Although Russian President Boris Yeltsin has cratically, since this would raise demands for democ­ repudiated this claim, the conviction that Crimea racy throughout the republic. should belong to Russia has strong support among the Nor is this a problem that can readily be resolved Russian public. Similarly, Ukrainians of every political through land reallocation. Under the Soviet Union, hue are determined to retain Crimea, afraid that giving Moscow's power was not diminished by transferring it up would be the first step in the dissolution of territory from one republic to another. For the govern­ Ukraine. ments of the newly independent countries, on the There are other territorial disputes between former other hand, relinquishing any territory voluntarily is republics—such as the one over the Fergana Valley in almost unthinkable, since it might precipitate a nation­ Central Asia with its complicated Soviet-era borders— alist backlash and ousting at the next election—or that have not as yet fully engaged nationalist passions possibly sooner, by undemocratic means. This political but have the potential to flare up into similarly reality hardens government attitudes toward actual, intransigent conflicts. and even potential, secessionist movements. This stance does not encourage minority groups to integrate into 1993, for example, the outline of an agreement be­ the larger nation, but instead may inflame their desire tween Russia and Ukraine was announced, under to secede.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism
    Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism MARK R. BEISSINGER Abstract This article examines the role of nationalism in the collapse of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, arguing that nationalism (both in its presence and its absence, and in the various conflicts and disorders that it unleashed) played an important role in structuring the way in which communism collapsed. Two institutions of international and cultural control in particular – the Warsaw Pact and ethnofederalism – played key roles in determining which communist regimes failed and which survived. The article argues that the collapse of communism was not a series of isolated, individual national stories of resistance but a set of interrelated streams of activity in which action in one context profoundly affected action in other contexts – part of a larger tide of assertions of national sovereignty that swept through the Soviet empire during this period. That nationalism should be considered among the causes of the collapse of communism is not a view shared by everyone. A number of works on the end of communism in the Soviet Union have argued, for instance, that nationalism played only a minor role in the process – that the main events took place within official institutions in Moscow and had relatively little to do with society, or that nationalism was a marginal motivation or influence on the actions of those involved in key decision-making. Failed institutions and ideologies, an economy in decline, the burden of military competition with the United States and instrumental goals of self-enrichment among the nomenklatura instead loom large in these accounts.1 In many narratives of the end of communism, nationalism is portrayed merely as a consequence of communism’s demise, as a phase after communism disintegrated – not as an autonomous or contributing force within the process of collapse itself.
    [Show full text]
  • Mainstream Russian Nationalism and the “State-Civilization” Identity: Perspectives from Below
    Nationalities Papers (2021), 49: 1, 89–107 doi:10.1017/nps.2020.8 ARTICLE Mainstream Russian Nationalism and the “State-Civilization” Identity: Perspectives from Below Matthew Blackburn* The Institute of Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden *Corresponding author. Email: [email protected], [email protected] Abstract Based on more than 100 interviews in European Russia, this article sheds light on the bottom-up dynamics of Russian nationalism. After offering a characterization of the post-2012 “state-civilization” discourse from above, I examine how ordinary people imagine Russia as a “state-civilization.” Interview narratives of inclusion into the nation are found to overlap with state discourse on three main lines: (1) ethno-nationalism is rejected, and Russia is imagined to be a unique, harmonious multi-ethnic space in which the Russians (russkie) lead without repressing the others; (2) Russia’s multinationalism is remembered in myths of peaceful interactions between Russians (russkie) and indigenous ethnic groups (korennyye narodi) across the imperial and Soviet past; (3) Russian culture and language are perceived as the glue that holds together a unified category of nationhood. Interview narratives on exclusion deviate from state discourse in two key areas: attitudes to the North Caucasus reveal the geopolitical-security, post-imperial aspect of the “state- civilization” identity, while stances toward non-Slavic migrants in city spaces reveal a degree of “cultural nationalism” that, while
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Nationalism and Pamiat
    University of Northern Iowa UNI ScholarWorks Presidential Scholars Theses (1990 – 2006) Honors Program 1991 Russian nationalism and Pamiat Brian Granger University of Northern Iowa Let us know how access to this document benefits ouy Copyright ©1991 Brian Granger Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pst Part of the Other Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Granger, Brian, "Russian nationalism and Pamiat" (1991). Presidential Scholars Theses (1990 – 2006). 73. https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pst/73 This Open Access Presidential Scholars Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors Program at UNI ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Presidential Scholars Theses (1990 – 2006) by an authorized administrator of UNI ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. l Br.i.an Granqe:r: Preside ntial Scholars Thesis 1991 University of Northern Iowa I?"u.s ~:;.i.an Nat :i.onal:i s m and. Pam:i._ at_' _ More than seventy years after the October Re volution a crisis in the Sov.i.et Union haE:; cnusr:)d its c itiz.1:,•nf., to ffu.:[ f e r a lof;f; of: f::a1 th. This disillusionment s e e mingly stems from the lack of suc cess in economic reform and. the chnos of the democratization policy imple mented since the rise to power of M. S. Gorbache v in March 1985 . The following reaction has not merely c ondemne d. Gorbachev'r.;; "exper.i.mentat:i.on" with the Pand.orn' ~,; box of pereutroi)<<::1 ancl.gl<::isnout.
    [Show full text]
  • Manifestations of Nationalism: the Caucasus from Late Soviet Times to the Early 1990S
    Europe-Asia Studies ISSN: 0966-8136 (Print) 1465-3427 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ceas20 Manifestations of Nationalism: The Caucasus from Late Soviet Times to the Early 1990s Nada Boškovska & Jeronim Perović To cite this article: Nada Boškovska & Jeronim Perović (2018) Manifestations of Nationalism: The Caucasus from Late Soviet Times to the Early 1990s, Europe-Asia Studies, 70:6, 853-861, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2018.1489631 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1489631 Published online: 31 Jul 2018. Submit your article to this journal View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ceas20 VOL 70, NO. 6, AUGUST 853–861 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, 2018 Vol 70, No. 6, August 2018, 853–861 Manifestations of Nationalism: The Caucasus from Late Soviet Times to the Early 1990s NADA BOŠKOVSKA & JERONIM PEROVIĆ WHEN MIKHAIL GORBACHEV INTRODUCED HIS POLICY OF REFORMS, he was not prepared for the rise of nationalism and ethnic conflict that would grip the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. As a native of the ethnically mixed Stavropol Krai in the North Caucasus, Gorbachev, according to his own account, was well aware of the multinational character of the Soviet Union and the sensitivities of some of its ethnic minority groups (Nahaylo & Swoboda 1990, p. 231). However, in line with Marxist thinking, which anticipated the decline of nationalism, he was brought up believing that the ‘friendship among peoples’ was strong and that in socialism nations would ultimately grow ever closer together until their complete fusion (sliyanie) into a supranational ‘Soviet people’.
    [Show full text]
  • The German Fear of Russia Russia and Its Place Within German History
    The German Fear of Russia Russia and its place within German History By Rob Dumont An Honours Thesis submitted to the History Department of the University of Lethbridge in partial fulfillment of the requirements for History 4995 The University of Lethbridge April 2013 Table of Contents Introduction 1-7 Chapter 1 8-26 Chapter 2 27-37 Chapter 3 38-51 Chapter 4 39- 68 Conclusion 69-70 Bibliography 71-75 Introduction In Mein Kampf, Hitler reflects upon the perceived failure of German foreign policy regarding Russia before 1918. He argues that Germany ultimately had to prepare for a final all- out war of extermination against Russia if Germany was to survive as a nation. Hitler claimed that German survival depended on its ability to resist the massive faceless hordes against Germany that had been created and projected by Frederick the Great and his successors.1 He contends that Russia was Germany’s chief rival in Europe and that there had to be a final showdown between them if Germany was to become a great power.2 Hitler claimed that this showdown had to take place as Russia was becoming the center of Marxism due to the October Revolution and the founding of the Soviet Union. He stated that Russia was seeking to destroy the German state by launching a general attack on it and German culture through the introduction of Leninist principles to the German population. Hitler declared that this infiltration of Leninist principles from Russia was a disease and form of decay. Due to these principles, the German people had abandoned the wisdom and actions of Frederick the Great, which was slowly destroying German art and culture.3 Finally, beyond this expression of fear, Hitler advocated that Russia represented the only area in Europe open to German expansion.4 This would later form the basis for Operation Barbarossa and the German invasion of Russia in 1941 in which Germany entered into its final conflict with Russia, conquering most of European 1 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943, originally published 1926), 197.
    [Show full text]
  • UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title The Party Politics of Political Decentralization Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6jw6f00k Author Wainfan, Kathryn Tanya Publication Date 2018 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles The Party Politics of Political Decentralization A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Kathryn Tanya Wainfan 2018 c Copyright by Kathryn Tanya Wainfan 2018 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION The Party Politics of Political Decentralization by Kathryn Tanya Wainfan Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2018 Professor Michael F. Thies, Chair In this dissertation, I ask why certain types of parties would agree to support creating or empowering sub-national governments. In particular, I focus on nationalized parties { those that gain support from throughout a country. Political decentralization can negatively impact nationalized parties in at least two ways. First, it reduces the amount of power a party can enjoy should it win control of the national-level government. Second, previous studies show that political decentralization can increase party denationalization, meaning regional parties gain more support, even during national-level elections. I argue that nationalized parties may support decentralization when doing so reduces the ideological conflicts over national-level policy among voters whose support they seek. By altering political institutions, a party may be able to accommodate differing policy prefer- ences in different parts of the country, or limit the damage to the party's electoral fortunes such differences could create.
    [Show full text]
  • Andreas Umland the FASCIST THREAT in POST-SOVIET RUSSIA an Investigation Into the LDPR-Ideology 1990-1993, and Some Tentative Su
    Andreas Umland THE FASCIST THREAT IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA An Investigation into the LDPR-Ideology 1990-1993, and Some Tentative Suggestion on the Appropriateness of the `Weimar Russia' Metaphor Contents Abbreviations Part I: Fascist Tendencies in Zhirinovskii's Writings in the Newspaper Liberal 1. The Research Framework and Political Context of the Chapter Right-Wing Extremism and Peace Studies Zhirinovskii versus Gaidar 2. The `Whys' of Studying Fascism in Russia 2.1. The Significance of Zhirinovskii's Political Ideas The LDPR's Direct Influence on Russian Politics The LDPR's Indirect Influence on Russian Politics 2.2. `Fascism' - a Redundant Label? 2.3. `Fascism' in Post-Soviet Russia `Fascism' vs. `Right-Wing Extremism' The Moscow Anti-Fascist Centre `Fascism' as a Legal Term `Fascism's' Pre-Eminence 3. Identifying Fascism 3.1. Some Methodological Problems of Empirical Fascist Studies in Russia `Fascism' a Special Notion in Russia? Zhirinovskii a Fascist?: Pros and Cons My Approach to Zhirinovskii's Fascism The Procedure of this Inquir 3.2. Some Problems of a Theoretical Conceptualization of Fascism Generic Fascism as a Sub-Type of Right-Wing Extremism Concepts of Fascist Ideology 1 3.3. An Operational Definition of Fascism Griffin's `Fascist Minimum' A Note on Contemporary Russian Political Terminology 4. Palingenetic Ultra-Nationalism in Zhirinovskii's Articles in Liberal 4.1. The Newspaper Liberal 4.2. Zhirinovskii's Articles in Liberal Number 2-3, 1990 Number 4-5, 1992 Number 6-7, 1992 Number 8-9, 1992 Number 10, 1992 Number 1 (11), 1993 Number 2 (12), 1993 Number 3 (13), 1993 4.3.
    [Show full text]
  • The Russians and the Turks: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Era of Empires
    The Russians and the Turks: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Era of Empires NORMAN STONE,SERGEI PODBOLOTOV,MURAT YASAR Comparing Russia and Turkey might appear to be a far-fetched enterprise. The differences are obvious, even too obvious to be dwelt upon at any length. There is a problem as to definition—what was nationalism about— and there is a difficulty as regards effect and timing. Russian nationalism (as distinct from empire-loyalism) is a nineteenth-century creation and Turkish nationalism came into being even later. Russian nationalists did not have to create a state until very, very late in the day—the end of the twentieth century, where Lenin’s body still lies in Red Square next to the symbols of imperial Russia. Turkic nationalists came into their own during the War of Independence after 1918, when, in response to Greek and other invasions, a new Turkish State was created. Its makers maybe had a long ancestry in terms of Muslims versus Christians, but their ancestry in terms of Turkish nationalism was quite short, not much longer than a single gen- eration. In fact you can more or less date Turkish nationalism back to a conference in Paris in 1902, when various associations, broadly known as “Young Turks,” established a single “Union and Progress” association (which, like the almost contemporaneous Russian social-democratic con- gress, famously split). This essay will suggest that, despite these obvious differences, when it comes to imperialism and nationalism, there are never the less tantalizing comparisons throughout. A symbol: in both, the word ‘empire’ and ‘na- tionalism’ had to be adapted from imports (for instance, in Turkish, im- paratorluk).
    [Show full text]
  • Nicholas Brooke Phd Thesis
    THE DOGS THAT DIDN'T BARK: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND NATIONALISM IN SCOTLAND, WALES AND ENGLAND Nicholas Brooke A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 2016 Full metadata for this item is available in Research@StAndrews:FullText at: http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/8079 This item is protected by original copyright The Dogs That Didn't Bark: Political Violence and Nationalism in Scotland, Wales and England Nicholas Brooke This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 30th June 2015 1 Abstract The literature on terrorism and political violence covers in depth the reasons why some national minorities, such as the Irish, Basques and Tamils, have adopted violent methods as a means of achieving their political goals, but the study of why similar groups (such as the Scots and Welsh) remained non-violent, has been largely neglected. In isolation it is difficult to adequately assess the key variables behind why something did not happen, but when compared to a similar violent case, this form of academic exercise can be greatly beneficial. This thesis demonstrates what we can learn from studying ‘negative cases’ - nationalist movements that abstain from political violence - particularly with regards to how the state should respond to minimise the likelihood of violent activity, as well as the interplay of societal factors in the initiation of violent revolt. This is achieved by considering the cases of Wales, England and Scotland, the latter of which recently underwent a referendum on independence from the United Kingdom (accomplished without the use of political violence) and comparing them with the national movement in Ireland, looking at both violent and non-violent manifestations of nationalism in both territories.
    [Show full text]
  • Imagining Turan: Homeland and Its Political Implications in the Literary Work of Hüseyinzade Ali [Turan] and Mehmet Ziya [Gökalp]
    Middle Eastern Studies ISSN: 0026-3206 (Print) 1743-7881 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20 Imagining Turan: homeland and its political implications in the literary work of Hüseyinzade Ali [Turan] and Mehmet Ziya [Gökalp] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis & Arzu Opçin-Kıdal To cite this article: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis & Arzu Opçin-Kıdal (2020) Imagining Turan: homeland and its political implications in the literary work of Hüseyinzade Ali [Turan] and Mehmet Ziya [Gökalp], Middle Eastern Studies, 56:3, 482-495, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2019.1706167 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2019.1706167 Published online: 31 Jan 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 109 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fmes20 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 2020, VOL. 56, NO. 3, 482–495 https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2019.1706167 Imagining Turan: homeland and its political implications in the literary work of Huseyinzade€ Ali [Turan] and Mehmet Ziya [Gokalp]€ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Arzu Opc¸in-Kıdal Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey While scholarly interest in the influence of Tatar intellectuals on Turkish nationalism has been strong, less attention has been paid to the interactions between Russian Azerbaijani and Ottoman Turkish intellectuals. While the work of Ismail Gasprinski1 and Yusuf Akc¸ura,2 leading figures in the nationalist mobilization of Turkic populations of the Russian Empire, has attracted substantial consideration,3 the work of Huseyinzade€ Ali [Turan],4 has remained relatively neglected.
    [Show full text]
  • Crisis in Russian Studies? Nationalism (Imperialism), Racism and War
    Crisis in Russian Studies? Nationalism (Imperialism), Racism and War TARAS KUZIO This e-book is provided without charge via free download by E-International Relations (www.E-IR.info). It is not permitted to be sold in electronic format under any circumstances. If you enjoy our free e-books, please consider leaving a small donation to allow us to continue investing in open access publications: http://www.e-ir.info/about/donate/ i Crisis in Russian Studies? Nationalism (Imperialism), Racism and War TARAS KUZIO ii E-International Relations www.E-IR.info Bristol, England 2020 ISBN 978-1-910814-55-0 This book is published under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license. You are free to: • Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format • Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material Under the following terms: • Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. • NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes. Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission. Please contact [email protected] for any such enquiries, including for licensing and translation requests. Other than the terms noted above, there are no restrictions placed on the use and dissemination of this book for student learning materials/scholarly use. Production: Michael Tang Cover Image: Triff/Shutterstock A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
    [Show full text]
  • Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union
    SOVEREIGNTY AFTER EMPIRE Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union Galina Starovoitova UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE CONTENTS Key Points v Foreword ix 1 Introduction 1 2 Contemporary Nationalism and the Problem of Self-Determination 3 3 Hopes and Disappointments: Case Studies 9 4 Approaches of Decision Makers: Interviews with Mikhail Gorbachev, Jack Matlock, Sam Nunn, and Margaret Thatcher 30 5 Criteria for Self-Determination 36 6 Conclusion 39 Notes 41 Acknowledgments 43 About the Author 45 About the Institute 47 v on case studies and the observations of political lead- ers and top-level foreign policy officials. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONTEMPORARY NATIONALISM Contrary to the scenarios of global integration, nation- alism has not weakened in global society, but has, in KEY POINTS fact, gained strength. National feelings are rooted in the idea of a linguistic, religious, and psychological community based on the ancient kinship of the mem- bers of a given ethnic group. Only a powerful internal security apparatus could maintain the Soviet Union’s facade of a multinational socialist federation, so it is not surprising that the em- pire disintegrated upon communism’s discreditation. The Soviet republics exercised their right to secede soon after the August 1991 putsch. Holding a status below the union republics in the Soviet hierarchical system, autonomous territories were not so privileged. INTRODUCTION THE UNATTAINABLE RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION The “right” to self-determination has recently reemerged as the focus of much debate, as its fulfill- At a time when ethnic groups are striving to affirm ment—or denial—quite often results in mass violence.
    [Show full text]