Halting atrocities 2 Rapid in Kenya international by Thomas G. Weiss intervention kept Kenya from disaster. Was Kenya unique or a model for future action?

Daily life at the Abu Shouk camp for internally displaced people, in North Darfur, Sudan, June 2, 2005. Al- though the suffering in Darfur is one of the most publicized cases of ongoing genocide, efforts at international intervention have been limited. (AP Ph o t o /Ro n Ha v i v /VII)

ince 1943, when Polish Jewish lawyer Ra- rather than later, of anticipating the four mass- thomas g. weiss is phael Lemkin coined the word “genocide” atrocity crimes. Presidential Professor of (combining the Greek word for family, Since 1994, there had been little evidence of Political Science at The tribeS or race with the Latin suffix for killing), either American or international learning about CUNY Graduate Center governments and citizens have struggled with the need to nip atrocities in the bud. However, and director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for In- “never again.” The never again moments since one notable case stands out, when collective ef- ternational Studies. He World War II’s Holocaust include Cambodia, forts in early 2008 brought carnage and ethnic is President of the Inter- Rwanda and Srebrenica. Every time, collective- cleansing to a halt following the disputed Dec. national Studies Associ- ly, the world asks in horror and shame how it 27, 2007, presidential elections in Kenya. When ation (2009–2010) and could happen once again. the country’s several dozen ethnic groups took to Chair of the Academic Council on the UN Sys- The familiar images of millions dead and the streets after the presidential ballot, it seemed tem (2006–2009). He has displaced in Darfur, a region in Sudan, and the like the beginning of an inevitable downward authored or edited some Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the spiral of yet another African state. 40 books and 150 articles continued suffering and disintegration of Zimba- Yet Kenya, whose game parks, climate and and book chapters about bwe make skeptics doubt the utility of the “re- relative economic development over the last multilateral approach- es to international peace sponsibility to protect,” commonly called “R2P.” several decades have attracted flocks of tourists and security, humanitar- This emerging norm appeals for international ac- and Western investors, just as they once attracted ian action, and sustain- tion when a state is manifestly unable or unwill- British colonists, was the focus of rapid and con- able development. His ing to protect its populations from, or actually is solidated international action. Outside actors did latest authored volumes responsible for, “genocide, war crimes, ethnic not simply defer to the shibboleth of national are What’s Wrong with the United Nations and cleansing and crimes against humanity.” The sovereignty, but acted. Instead of letting Kenya How to Fix It (2009) and central challenge of putting “never” back into continue to slide toward the precipice of disaster, UN Ideas That Changed “never again” is the requirement to act sooner crucial members of the international commu- the World (2009). www.greatdecisions.org 17 2 Great Decisions 2 0 1 0 Kenya map.pdf 11/1/09 11:12:54 AM nity—in this case, African neighbors, Commission on Intervention and State protection purposes may be more ac- the African Union (AU*) and former Sovereignty (ICISS). (In the interest ceptable than in the past, it is far from United Nations secretary-general Kofi of full disclosure, the author was its palatable and certainly not the first Annan as mediator, backed by the research director and also directs the policy option. Given the costs (both po- U.S., the UN and the European Union Ralph Bunche Institute that houses the litical and actual) and limited military (EU*)—as well as Kenyan and inter- secretariat for the Global Centre for the capacities worldwide (especially with national civil society, acted rapidly and Responsibility to Protect.) The ICISS the U.S. otherwise occupied in Iraq and in unison. The worst was avoided and developed a three-part framework: the Afghanistan), the actual deployment of breathing space created. responsibility to prevent; the respon- military force to protect human beings sibility to react in the eye of a mass is relatively rare. R2P and the prevention atrocity storm; and the responsibility Moreover, instead of providing a li- imperative to rebuild after such crises occur. Thus, cense to do anything to citizens within With the possible exception of the codi- the international deployment of armed its borders—the sacrosanct notion of fication of genocide after World War II, forces is neither the first nor the last noninterference in the domestic affairs no idea has moved faster or farther in step. The full R2P spectrum dispels the of other countries—R2P redefines the international normative arena than frequently held view that only military sovereignty as contingent upon a ba- the responsibility to protect, the title of intervention matters. sic respect for human rights. R2P also the 2001 report from the International While military force for human specifies that if a state is manifestly un- willing or unable to honor its respon- sibilities, or itself is the perpetrator of crimes, then the residual responsibility to protect the victims of mass atroci- ties shifts to the international commu- nity of states, ideally acting through the UN Security Council. In short, the responsibility to protect encapsulates the international agreement that mass atrocities are abhorrent. Preventing them through diplomatic, economic and legal measures is of the essence. C But if such actions fail, there is an in-

M ternational responsibility to halt mass

Y atrocities with military force, if neces- sary, and to help rebuild a society after CM an intervention. MY The ICISS, the UN World Summit

CY of 2005 (which endorsed the respon-

CMY sibility to protect principle) and UN secretaries-general Kofi Annan and K Ban Ki-moon have all emphasized prevention. The commonsensical no- tion of moving quickly to forestall di- sasters, however, is more problematic than it seems at first glance. Rushing to the rescue after unexpected natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina or the 2008 earthquake in China is laudable, whereas devoting huge resources to relief after a human-made disaster rather than moving earlier to stop it makes no moral or economic sense. However, when national interests are absent, it appears less politically risky than getting involved. How else to ex- plain the huge humanitarian resources lucidity Information design that were mobilized for Rwanda im- *For definition, see glossary on p. 103 18 kenya/r2p 2 mediately by the same governments ing to bear diplomatic, legal, economic election-related violence early in 2008 that had refused to intervene militarily and military pressure. There are three comes to mind. only a few weeks earlier? International main types of cases where the respon- While robust action clearly is mor- assistance amounted to $1.4 billion in sibility to protect could be applicable. ally compelling in the case of Darfur the last six months of 1994, whereas First, there are countries where mass and the DRC, they also are the most the potentially less costly option of atrocities actually are occurring, and it difficult. They occur in massive ter- sending troops in April was dismissed is necessary to prevent them from get- ritories; action would involve mobi- in spite of the desperate pleas from ting worse. Sudan comes immediately lizing substantial political will and UN force commander Roméo Dallaire, to mind because virtually no one ex- resources, both financial and military, whose 500 ill-equipped UN soldiers cept partisans of President Omar Has- which are always in short supply. In were powerless. san al-Bashir, currently dodging an terms of cumulative death, destruction International Criminal Court (ICC*) and displacement, Zimbabwe seems Getting warrant, would deny that governmen- comparable, especially because many the concept right tal crimes have been anything but rou- observers would argue that drawing If ridding the world of mass atrocities tine in Darfur since 2003. Similarly, the lines between the first and the sec- is to become feasible, the concept of the DRC has been the scene of over 5 ond category is so subjective as to be the responsibility to protect needs to million war-related deaths in this cen- meaningless. These cases have all been be understood neither too narrowly tury, surely qualifying as both “mass” on the international agenda for years, nor too broadly. It is not only about and “atrocity.” Then, there are coun- and the barriers to entry and political the use of military force. And it is also tries in which indicators overwhelm- inertia are very high. not about the protection of everyone ingly suggest that the preconditions Kenya in 2007– 2008 illustrates the from everything. Action is required for mass atrocities are present and also logic of R2P “proximate prevention.” long before the only option remain- getting worse; Zimbabwe is an exam- It was less compelling in terms of ing is the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne ple. After having led the fight against death levels and forced displacement Division. And it may be emotionally white-minority rule, Robert Mugabe but compelling enough by conjuring tempting to say people should be pro- has virtually destroyed his country’s up the fear of another Rwanda while tected from HIV/AIDS and the Inuit economy by creating some 3.5 million early international action still ap- saved from global warming, but if R2P refugees and 1 million IDPs (internal- peared feasible. This is the type of case means everything, it means nothing. ly displaced persons), and has stolen at in which R2P prevention efforts could R2P is above all about taking time- least one election. Finally, there exist succeed, for which political will could ly preventive action, about identifying countries of concern where indicators be mobilized, and in which relatively situations that are capable of deterio- are unsettling and mass atrocities have modest resources could be invested rating into mass atrocities and bring- begun but are manageable; Kenya’s with a substantial potential payoff.  Kenya: pressures for proximate prevention

ollowing flawed presidential elec- and former Sudanese diplomat Francis 22% of the population, followed by the tions in late 2007, international ef- Deng explains the volatile association Luo with 13% and the Kalenjin with fortsF were catalyzed by the compunc- of democracy and elections in diverse 12%. Jomo Kenyatta, the father of tion to avoid another Rwanda. And they societies like Kenya’s, “where people the nation, who became Kenya’s first resulted in a cease-fire, buying time to tend to vote on the basis of their po- president after the country achieved address what caused the violent erup- liticized ethnic or religious identity… independence in 1963, was a Kikuyu tion in the first place. [and] where access to power means who favored his own tribe, including access to resources and services, the arranging for family and allies to make Elections and violence stakes become very high and elections extensive land purchases in the fertile “The scale and speed of the violence highly charged.” Rift Valley. The second president, Dan- that engulfed Kenya following the Two dozen ethnic groups compose iel arap Moi, was a Kalenjin who fol- controversial presidential election of Kenya’s population of almost 40 mil- lowed in his predecessor’s footsteps, Dec. 27, 2007, shocked Kenyans and lion in a country with an area roughly favoring his own people in the army, the world at large,” summarized Hu- 85% the size of Texas or France. The police and civil service. Accordingly, man Rights Watch. Senior UN official largest group are the Kikuyu with about other ethnic and tribal groups were

19 2 Great Decisions 2 0 1 0 angry and resentful at the perceived the election that prepared Kenyans and While popular travel magazines discrimination in land and economic the world for the stunning speed with may have featured Kenya as a “model” opportunities. which violence erupted after the official of stability on a troubled continent, Hu- Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, was elected announcement of results. Odinga was man Rights Watch noted that this repu- president in 2002, ending Moi’s 24- leading by some 1.2 million votes when tation “took little account of Kenya’s year rule. However, this only consoli- suddenly the government-appointed recent history.” Previous multiparty dated long-standing bitterness among Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) elections (in 1992, 1997 and 2002) other groups, due to their nepotistic declared the incumbent Kibaki the win- were marred by violence, but none exclusion from the distribution of ben- ner. Salim Lone, an adviser to Odinga was comparable to the late December efits. The leading Luo political family, and a former UN press official, did not 2007 elections that resulted in an es- the Odingas, mobilized this resentment put too fine a point on it: “The robbery timated 1,300 dead and over 600,000 based on the fact that Luo possession of was blatant.” The rigging was clear displaced. In their day-by-day chronol- land lagged far behind that of the other because the opposition ODM won 99 ogy, Elisabeth Lindenmayer, director two main groups. Raila Odinga had seats in Parliament to the 43 won by the of UN studies at Columbia’s SIPA, and been an ally of Kibaki in the 2002 Ke- PNU, and votes traditionally replicated Josie Lianna Kaye, assistant director nya elections and had held a ministerial national results. The EU, along with of the Center for International Conflict position, but the two men went their international and domestic observers, Resolution, point out the incorrect ini- separate ways in 2005 (just as Oginga denounced the tampering. tial perception that victims were mainly Odinga, Raila’s father, had first served Within minutes, Kenyans in large among the president’s own Kikuyu eth- as Kenyatta’s vice-president before he numbers took to the streets. The Luo nic group in the Rift Valley. In reality, resigned in 1966 and entered the op- raged in the west, attacking properties “victims came from at least four other position). Once out of government, belonging to the Kikuyu. The Kalenjin ethnic groups.” Ethnic cleansing is an Raila Odinga attracted supporters in the central highlands, long irritated unsettling if legally imprecise term from a wide swath of Kenyan society with the Kikuyu takeover of fertile coined in the 1990s for forced flight in who were tired of Kikuyu domination lands, attacked their properties. The the Balkans and specifically identified and cronyism and fed up with growing Kikuyu response, when it came, was by the World Summit as an R2P trigger. poverty, slums and dwindling agricul- equally brutal, especially given the The Kenyan government resists the la- tural land. As the leader of the Orange group’s dominant position in both the bel in relation to the 2008 postelection Democratic Movement (ODM), Odin- police and the army. Human Rights violence, but commonsense would lead ga challenged the incumbent Kibaki Watch documented the excessive use to such a label as the Luo were chased and his party of National Unity (PNU) of force by public authorities, who westward from the Rift Valley while in the 2007 elections. “had little will or capacity to prevent the Kikuyu fled from the West. Indus- There was little in the lead up to violence.” trial production in many places halted.

Kenyans line up to vote outside a polling station in Bissel, southwest of Nairobi, Dec. 27, 2007, during the Kenyan presidential election.

20 kenya/r2p 2 The response of the international community was rapid. Initial visits by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, four for- mer African heads of state and U.S. As- sistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer were unsuccess- ful in attenuating the violence. How- ever, on January 8–10, 2008, Ghana’s president and AU chair John Kufuor asked former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to mediate as part of a small team consisting of former Tan- zanian President Benjamin Mkapa and Graça Machel, the former first lady of Mozambique and now wife of former South African President Nelson Man- dela. While Kibaki and the PNU first refused any internationalization of talks, the government eventually was unable to resist them. Former UN chief Kofi Annan speaks to journalists, Oct. 7, 2009, in Nairobi, after meeting Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga to discuss the progress The day he was to leave for Nai- the Kenyan coalition government is making in implementing the reform agenda agreed in robi, Kenya, Annan had to be rushed the peace deal signed in February 2008. (AP Ph o t o /Sa y y i d Az i m ) to the hospital, but the week’s delay permitted him from his hospital bed to The U.S. and the EU, with various car- the bombings of the U.S. embassies in make key telephone calls and insist on rots and sticks, got on board. Annan’s Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, a consolidated international effort. He former employer discretely provided in 1998. emerged as primus inter pares, not only substantive staff support and retreated The three-member Panel of Eminent on the AU panel but more generally. into the background because Odinga so African Personalities arrived in Kenya “We have to make sure there’s one me- clearly favored the UN as a mediator. on January 22, 2008. The first week diation process,” Annan recalled. “Oth- Kibaki, meanwhile, leaned in Washing- was devoted to consultations with vari- erwise you have the protagonists trying ton’s direction because he had ensured ous national and outside stakeholders, to bottom shop, looking elsewhere if Kenya’s market economy and had been including a first ice-breaking hand- they don’t like what you’re offering.” a solid partner in the war on terror since shake between Kibaki and Odinga. The

Protests erupted after the official announcement of results and escalated into a targeted ethnic violence. (AP Ph o t o /Kar e l Pr i n s l o o )

21 2 Great Decisions 2 0 1 0 power and stolen elections that could never be remedied by relying upon the government. Ever the pragmatist, An- nan downplayed the label and opted in favor of Kibaki’s packaging. Why pick nits when international mediation already was taking place? The third agenda item had past and future components. On February 11, the parties agreed to an independent body to investigate the disputed De- cember elections, which implied that a political settlement would also influ- ence other reforms. On the same day, a two-day retreat was announced, first preceded by an informal meeting with parliamentarians, during which Annan sneaked in the notion of a “coalition.” Removing belligerents from cus- tomary surroundings is a typical ma- neuver (for example, to Camp David, The normally bustling streets of Kangemi, an ethnically mixed district in Nairobi, Kenya, were mostly empty on Jan. 2, 2008. Targeted ethnic violence escalated and at first was the U.S. President’s country retreat in directed mainly against Kikuyu people—the community of which Kibaki is a member— Maryland). Despite two days in shirt living outside their traditional settlement areas, especially in the Rift Valley Province. This sleeves instead of suits at the Kilaguni violence peaked with the killing of over 30 unarmed civilians in a church near Eldoret on Lodge in the middle of the Tsavo West New Year’s Day. (Sh as h a n k Be n g a l i /MCT /La n d o v ) National Park, a deal remained elusive. The 41-day One key element was in place, how- panel drew on expertise from a number mediation marathon of sources, especially the UN and the ever, when the two sides agreed to quit Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Nonstop negotiations continued for revisiting the 2007 election results. UN Dialogue. They also decided to adopt a 41 days in a highly guarded basement experts were relieved after discussing transparent communications strategy room in Nairobi’s Serena Hotel. The the modalities of options. As Linden- with the publication of press commu- first handshake on January 24 was the mayer and Kaye summarize: “a recount niqués and other postings on www. occasion to stake out mutually exclu- would require opening all 27,500 ballot dialoguekenya.org. Mkapa facilitated sive and supposedly nonnegotiable boxes, a phenomenal task that would local involvement through Swahili stances—Kibaki’s underlined the le- not give any results fast and could not translations during press conferences. gitimacy of his office, stating publicly be guaranteed to be any fairer than the On January 29, both sides agreed that he was the “duly-elected president” elections themselves; a rerun implied on an agenda with a timetable for and preferring that the conflict be han- that the former election was flawed and implementation, the “Road Map.” As dled internally, while Odinga insisted would therefore be divisive and po- explained by Lindenmayer and Kaye, on new elections and dismissed any litically dangerous, and new elections the first three agenda items were to be possibility of a government of national could take a year and so did not offer a agreed within four weeks: “immediate unity. Despite these disagreements, by solution to the current crisis.” action to stop the violence and restore February 4, the two parties had issued However, the principals were still fundamental rights and liberties; imme- various statements to halt the violence at loggerheads over a future governing diate measures to address the humani- and address key humanitarian issues, structure. At a press conference after tarian crisis, promote reconciliation, including a commitment to help IDP’s the retreat, Annan mentioned the option healing and restoration” of calm; and return to their homes or a safe place. of forming a new government. Taking strategies “to overcome the political Movement on the third agenda item, liberty with the truth, he painted Kibaki crisis.” The fourth agenda item ad- overcoming the political crisis, was and the PNU into a corner. They could dressed structural issues and had a lon- more problematic. Even the title in- no longer pretend that compromise was ger horizon, within a year. The first two volved Annan ruling in favor of “Kenya unthinkable. Originally, power sharing agenda items clearly were linked to the National Dialogue and Reconciliation.” was off the table because PNU negotia- R2P preoccupation with mass atroci- From the outset, Kibaki resisted any la- tors refused to budge from their stated ties, and the latter two were seen as a beling of “international mediation” and position that the Kenyan constitution way to quell the chaos that resulted in emphasized “national dialogue,” while required the president to be both head attacking other ethnic groups. Odinga kept pointing to the abuse of of government and head of state. Mean-

22 kenya/r2p 2 while, the ODM proposed changing Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to tutional change would be the creation the constitution to create the post of a Nairobi, wielding both sticks and car- of the post of prime minister that could prime minister with executive powers. rots in support of the Annan mediation. not be withdrawn by the president. A Advice came from Annan’s former UN She made clear that power sharing was text that had been wrangled about for legal adviser, Hans Corell, who sought necessary and that the U.S. would not weeks was now completed. On the ba- a technical legal solution to a pro- return to its usual warm relations with sis of creating a post of prime minster foundly political problem: the creation Kenya until the crisis was over. for Odinga with deputies from each of a new post raised political problems With time in short supply, on Feb- party, Parliament passed on March 18 for Kibaki, but an informal position ruary 26, the panel suspended talks so the National Accord and Reconciliation of prime minister without power was Annan could directly confront Kibaki Act. In addition to giving some execu- meaningless for Odinga. Accordingly, and Odinga. In addition to the two tive authority to the prime minister, he both sides returned with provisions for principals and fellow panel member and the two deputies received a large the appointment of a prime minister Mkapa, Annan also asked the new AU measure of protection from arbitrary and two deputies, including specifics chair (elected on January 31), Tanza- dismissal. On April 17, Prime Minister for forming and dissolving any coali- nian President Jakaya Kikwete, to join Odinga and other members of the cabi- tion. In another twist of wording, An- what turned out to be the final push. net were sworn in. nan sought to avoid changes in the con- The former and the current presidents How important was the responsi- stitution but to pursue “constitutional” of neighboring Tanzania spoke with bility to protect to Annan who, in his changes. Yet differences among ne- unusual authority when arguing for a words, was “a prisoner of peace” be- gotiators remained even after Annan president with a strong prime minister tween his arrival in late January and came up with a formula that the prime (Tanzania’s had more power than the his departure early in March? He men- minster would have “substantial pow- proposed Kenyan one). tioned in an early interview with the ers and special responsibility delegated Finally, after five hours of knock- Centre for Humanitarian Dialogues that from the powers of the president.” ing heads on February 28, Kibaki and “the Rwandan and Yugoslavian stories As a well-timed reminder of interna- Odinga initialed “Acting Together for came to my mind.” A few months later, tional pressure, in mid-February, Presi- Kenya,” the principles for Kenya’s New York Times columnist Roger Co- dent Bush, on a planned five-nation tour first coalition government. Lawyers hen probed Annan about his motiva- of Africa, did not stop in Kenya but sent for both sides agreed the only consti- tion, and he replied: “We can’t let this

Kenya’s President Mwai Kibaki (second from right), accompanied by new Prime Minister Raila Odinga (far right), former President Daniel Arap Moi, Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka and former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (far left), arrives for the swearing-in ceremony of a 41-member power-sharing cabinet at the State House in Nairobi, April 17, 2008. Kenya began swearing in its largest and costliest-ever cabinet, a power-sharing coalition created to soothe fury over a disputed election that plunged the country into a bloody crisis. (Re u t e rs /Pr e s i d e n t i a l Pr e ss Se r v i c e /La n d o v )

23 2 Great Decisions 2 0 1 0 happen to Kenya! We’d seen a lot of 2008 prevented civil war and bought report to Kibaki and Odinga in mid- destruction in the region—Rwanda, time, but it did not guarantee that the September 2008. The report con- Somalia, Sudan, Darfur—and Kenya belligerents would come to their senses cluded that the 2007 elections were had been the safe haven for refugees. and work toward eliminating the root fundamentally flawed; but few re- And suddenly Kenya itself was going! causes of the violence. forms have followed. Meanwhile, the I think we’ve learned that when you It is useful to review progress on CIPEV found that the root causes of have ethnic violence, if you don’t me- the first three agenda items agreed the violence included the growing and diate quickly, you get a hopeless situ- on February 28 before examining the personalized power of the presidency ation.” fourth. Halting violence and restor- along with inequities in land distribu- The R2P framing was implicit rather ing rights and liberties was the first; tion. It recommended the creation of a than explicit. Some staff on the media- the initial success in halting carnage special tribunal in Kenya “to prosecute tion team said that a more public airing has been followed by uneven gov- crimes committed as a result of post- might have let Kenyans off the hook ernmental efforts to reduce violence. election violence,” in order to “break by thinking that outside help was on “Fundamental freedoms and liberties the cycle of impunity.” In February the way—moral hazard is always lurk- are increasingly being constrained,” 2009, Parliament defeated a bill that ing. The best way to think about the summarized an independent Kenyan would have created such a tribunal. contribution of R2P to the mediation is think tank, South Consulting, hired to Kenya’s leaders are tied in knots due to as background music that contributed do an overview in 2009. Inadequate their own competing agendas and the a sense of urgency, motivating Afri- protection for witnesses is an especial uncomfortable prospects of prosecut- cans, the U.S. and the EU to enter the concern. The second agenda item was ing their own. The CIPEV identified fray with seriousness and due speed. the continuing humanitarian crisis. persons, presumably including some Resources were contingent upon co- Reconciliation has proven problematic of Kenya’s most powerful politicians, operation. given that large numbers of IDPs have and placed their names in a brown A concept need not be in the neon not returned home, thereby leaving a sealed envelope that was later given lights of a UN Security Council resolu- tinderbox that could burst into flame to Annan, who promised to submit the tion to be influential. The values behind again. The third agenda item, over- names to the ICC should the country the responsibility to protect, especially coming the political crisis, remains fail to prosecute them. In July 2009, the prevention of mass atrocities, were a large question mark. The coalition he made good on that threat, and the highlighted on the agenda. Given the government limps along with the rules ICC has now indicated that it will step controversy, it was probably best not of power sharing vague and cohesion in if the government fails to act. Mean- to emphasize R2P, even if the fear of a lacking, symbolized by a regime that while, the TJRC also has made little Rwanda-like catastrophe clearly moti- has some 60 ministers and junior min- progress to date. vated both Kenyans and non-Kenyans isters. Separating the longer- from the alike. “It’s worth noting that the Re- Following the power-sharing agree- shorter-term issues was key to early sponsibility to Protect was explicitly ment, the AU panel appointed former successful activities to protect and not part of the debate in the Council,” Nigerian Foreign Minister Oluyemi succor civilians. Saving lives took U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice Adeniji to begin work on the fourth precedence, but with almost 60% of tells us. “Colleagues who handled this agenda item. Barely a week later, the the population living in poverty, ac- issue in 2008 tell me that it was diffi- negotiators signed four documents, cording to a UN Development Pro- cult even to build support for a Council formally establishing the Independent gram survey, the powder keg that vote of confidence in Annan’s mission. Review Commission (IREC) of the was, remains. Without addressing Raising the R2P flag may be morally 2007 elections, the Commission of the fundamental problems of justice satisfying, but it can be politically Inquiry into Post-Election Violence and development behind Odinga’s fraught.” (CIPEV), the Truth, Justice and Rec- campaign, armed groups undoubt- onciliation Commission (TJRC) and a edly could regroup with relative ease. Problematic roadmap for a comprehensive review The two principals, Mwai Kibaki and postmediation progress of the constitution. Since the passage Raila Odinga, will have to provide What has happened in the first year and of two critical laws—the Constitution leadership and direction, as South a half after the mediation? It would be of Kenya Amendment Act 2008 and Consulting warns, “if the country is hard to disagree with the overview the Constitution of Kenyan Review to avoid another wave of political from the Kofi Annan Foundation that Act 2008—foot-dragging has become violence.” The sense of urgency that “implementation had been slow or in- routine. motivated the parties and their Afri- sufficient,” or a first-hand report in a The results of the four agreements can and international partners in 2008 fall issue of America entitled “Corrup- are telling. The seven-member IREC, must resurface soon or the 2012 elec- tion and Inaction Leave Kenya on the composed of four Kenyans and three tions will be even bloodier than the Brink.” To repeat, the R2P reaction in international experts, submitted its last ones. 

24 kenya/r2p 2 Too little, too late

he UN Security Council’s dither- Senate concurring, that Khartoum was ment helps explain the hesitancy by ing since early 2003 in spite of committing “genocide.” Meanwhile, many to press Khartoum over Darfur. massiveT murder and displacement in Secretary of State Colin Powell used In December 2007, a hybrid UN and Darfur resembles its inability to ad- the term in Senate testimony in Sep- AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) of- dress the woes of the DRC. Along with tember of that year. ficially took over from AMIS. Mean- insincere mediation in Zimbabwe, the Dallaire, the Canadian general in while, Qatar, the UN, the AU and the dramatic disparity between lofty mul- charge of inadequate UN forces during Arab League sponsored talks in Doha in tilateral rhetoric and the collective lack Rwanda’s 1994 slaughter, comments: February 2009. The Sudanese govern- of international will to prevent mass “Having called what is happening in ment and JEM signed an initial peace atrocities becomes clear. These three Darfur genocide and having vowed to agreement, laying the framework for a cases—each of too little outside atten- stop it, it is time for the West to keep its potential, broader long-term solution. tion too late—contrast sharply with word.” In July 2004, the AU deployed However, the so-called Doha peace Kenya. While no two cases are ever 60 observers with a force of 300 troops process has since stalled. completely comparable, what clearly to Darfur as the African Union Mission The lack of robust international emerges is the value of early interna- in Sudan (AMIS); and the following military efforts has been matched on tional action. month, it launched negotiations in Abu- the legal front; indeed, ICC involve- ja, Nigeria, for inter-Sudanese peace ment in Darfur seemingly has created Darfur talks. While the AU tried to spearhead more problems than it has solved. Half- Although conflict has been long-stand- international political efforts and Khar- hearted “intervention,” be it military or ing between nomadic herders and pas- toum opposed any UN involvement, legal, strengthens the hand of culprits. toralists, the current crisis in Darfur the Security Council did refer Darfur to After issuing an indictment in 2008 dates from early 2003, when rebels the ICC in March 2005 and established without any way to ensure compliance, from the Sudan Liberation Move- the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). the ICC then issued an arrest warrant ment/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and This operation’s task was to reinforce for President al-Bashir in March 2009 Equality Movement (JEM) began at- AMIS and implement the 2005 Com- on charges of war crimes and crimes tacking government posts in western prehensive Peace Agreement (intended against humanity. Whether or not criti- Sudan. Accusing the Arab-dominated to end the even more deadly conflict cism of the theatrical nature of Chief government in Khartoum of neglect- in southern Sudan). The reluctance to Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo or ing the Darfur region and of oppress- endanger that tenuous peace agree- of the ICC’s focus on Africa is justi- ing non-Arabs, rebel groups sought to exploit the army’s overstretch in southern Sudan, the site of a 30-year conflict between its mostly Christian and animist populations, and Muslims in the north. In response, the government of Sudan armed and supplied the Jan- jaweed—militiamen from primarily nomadic black Arab tribes—to attack Darfur’s sedentary ethnic groups. The gruesome numbers are disputed, but es- timates are as high as 400,000 deaths and 2.7 million displaced. New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof’s one-man campaign to focus attention on the crisis laments that “the pub- lishing industry manages to respond more quickly to genocide than the UN and world leaders do.” In July 2004, the U.S. Congress condemned Dar- Sudanese displaced women carry firewood at Abu Shouk camp, in north Darfur, Sudan, where more than 40,000 displaced people receive food and shelter from international aid fur unanimously, voting 422-0 in the agencies, Aug. 30, 2004. Attacks on civilians were a daily occurrence and women were House of Representatives, with the raped by militiamen as they left camps to collect firewood.(AP Ph o t o /Am r Nab i l )

25 2 Great Decisions 2 0 1 0 since World War II. The vast major- ity of deaths have resulted from non- violent, easily treatable causes such as malaria, diarrhea, pneumonia and mal- nutrition. An estimated 45,000 people continue to die every month, and the UN describes the frequency and inten- sity of rape as worse than anywhere else in the world. The UN’s peacekeeping efforts in the DRC are its largest ever, but they appear feeble in comparison with the magnitude of the suffering. In Novem- ber 1999, the UN authorized the UN Organization Mission in the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to help monitor and implement the Lu- A young Tutsi refugee gazes upon the Tutsi camp of Nyarushishi, Rwanda, Aug. 25, 1994. saka Ceasefire Agreement, which had Some 12,000 Tutsis who lived in the camp said they would eventually go back to the Rwan- been signed a few months earlier by dan capital, Kigali, but for now preferred the safety of the Red Cross camp of Nyarushishi. the heads of state of Angola, the DRC, Up to 500,000 Tutsis were massacred by mainly Hutu soldiers and supporters of Rwanda’s former government. (AP Ph o t o /Je a n -Marc h Bo u j u ) Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia (as witness) and Zimbabwe. With a fied, the counterproductive nature of from a virulently anti-UNAMID Su- monitoring and humanitarian assis- ICC action was clear. Many observers danese government that banks on other tance mandate, MONUC’s strength called on the Security Council to ex- states’ reluctance to challenge its sov- has increased with additional soldiers ercise its right to defer prosecution for ereignty.” and police. In 2009, there were more a year in order to facilitate the peace Public attention by such groups than 18,000 uniformed personnel, still process in Darfur and keep intact the as the Save Darfur Coalition has im- ludicrously inadequate for such a vast tenuous agreements in the South. As a proved somewhat the situation of dis- territory. result, the spoilers’ hand was strength- placed persons from the height of vio- October 2006 elections replaced the ened. The Non-Aligned Movement,* lence in 2003-2005, but international transitional government in December the Group of 77* and regional groups action has been too little and too late. If with one led by Joseph Kabila, but state of the global South backed al-Bashir, past is prelude, Darfur’s suffering will fragility made the DRC fertile ground who in turn felt empowered and re- continue. for further conflict fueled and funded sponded by expelling 13 foreign and by neighbors. Since November 2007, 3 domestic nongovernmental organi- Democratic when the governments of the DRC and zations (NGOs) who were working to Republic of Congo Rwanda agreed to refrain from arming assist the people of Darfur. His actions Hostilities in the DRC since 1998 have belligerents, MONUC has shifted to could qualify as yet another crime been referred to interchangeably as the providing operational support to DRC against humanity. “Second Congo War,” “Africa’s World government forces to perform disarma- By the end of 2009—some two and War” and the “Great War of Africa.” ment, demobilization and reintegration a half years after its authorization— They officially ended in 2003 follow- (DDR). However, such efforts have hopefully UNAMID will be 75% ing a regionally brokered peace agree- failed with “serious consequences for operational. But even then, it will be ment in December 2002, which estab- MONUC’s public image.” UN peace- overwhelmed and unable to react to lished a transitional government and keepers were allegedly involved in atrocities. Moreover, implementing led to elections in 2006. But fighting— “sexual exploitation, the smuggling the responsibility to protect would dic- most notably in the eastern provinces of gold and fraternizing with rebel tate overriding sovereignty, rather than of North and South Kivu—continues groups.” The allegations were an ugly waiting for an invitation from those in to claim countless lives amidst atroci- reminder of the scandal of 2004 when Khartoum responsible for atrocities. ties. As reported by the International peacekeepers and civilian personnel Unlike peace operations elsewhere— Rescue Committee (IRC), almost 5.5 were found to have been involved in and also in contrast to Kenya where million people have died since 1998, rape, prostitution and pedophilia. a reluctant government was dragged with similar numbers displaced. The The inability of MONUC to protect along—in Darfur, as Global Peace IRC’s 2007 mortality survey awarded civilians has been an ongoing criticism Operations 2009 reports, the interna- the DRC the dubious honor of being of the mission, while the presence of tional force “faces willful opposition the world’s most lethal armed conflict numerous rebel groups, some of who

26 kenya/r2p 2 are alleged to have participated in ly to his own supporters and cronies. national efforts to resolve the crisis in Rwanda’s genocide, further compli- Frenzied and chaotic implementation Zimbabwe have consisted largely of cates the situation on the ground. As led to a sharp decline in Zimbabwe’s ineffective sanctions and diplomacy. In voiced by many others, this may be a agricultural exports and hard-currency 2002, the Commonwealth suspended case of too little resources for too vast reserves, which has continued unabated Zimbabwe over human rights abuses a conflict. Global Peace Operations since. Mugabe’s decision to print hun- and its conduct in the 2002 elections, 2009 reports that UN performance dreds of trillions of Zimbabwean dol- while the EU also imposed targeted has “exposed the disconnect between lars led to hyperinflation and chronic sanctions in response to the elections MONUC’s mandate and its capabili- oil and food shortages. Furthermore, in (the U.S. followed suit in 2003). The ties” and threatened to undermine UN 2005, the government launched Opera- International Monetary Fund* formally peacekeeping “as an effective suspended financial and techni- conflict management instrument.” cal assistance in 2002. The fact Going further, the report has char- that these efforts were led by the acterized the military effort there former colonial master—Britain as “feckless,” with only 17,000 and the Commonwealth—and by poorly equipped troops “stretched other Western powers made the over a territory four times the size rhetoric of “imperialism” harder of France,” ignominiously offer- to dismiss in Africa than one ing “the specter of a replay of the might have expected in the face combined failures in Srebrenica of massive human rights abuses and Rwanda. and the bankruptcy of one of the The numbers alone might continent’s wealthiest countries. not qualify this case as requir- This ineffective pattern of ac- ing robust R2P attention, but the tion was repeated in the aftermath existence of rape and other mass of the disputed March 2008 pres- atrocities along with the target- idential and parliamentary elec- ing of civilians probably would. tions. The regime withheld the Moreover, the underlying dynam- official election results for weeks, ics—the culture of impunity, hate and Mugabe refused to concede speech, ethnic conflict, enormous defeat even after acknowledging economic disparities and a long that Morgan Tsvangirai’s Move- history of ugly atrocities—pro- ment for Democratic Change had vide warning signs as the crimes gained a number of parliamentary of the past inform the risk levels seats. Attempts to impose tar- for future atrocities. Yet the size geted sanctions through the UN of the outside intervention that were vetoed by both China and would be required is so large, Russia in July 2008. Mbeki did and the amount of political will help broker a power-sharing deal needed is so great, that the appli- that left Mugabe as president and cation of R2P is even less likely eventually installed Tsvangirai as in 2010 than a decade ago. Faustine Janjira, right, with her son Ricardo at their home prime minister in February 2009, in Highfields, a high density surburb in Harare, Oct. 17, 2006. Janjira lives with her sisters who have 10 children but numerous issues have arisen Zimbabwe and struggles to feed the big family as only one member of since. Meanwhile, the hardship The head of government since 1980, the family works. Mugabe’s violence directed against po- caused by food and oil shortages, litical opponents and his policies designed to consolidate Robert Mugabe’s image as a valiant his personal position have led to the country’s precipitous forced displacement and political guerrilla hero has been replaced by economic decline since 1998. (AP Ph o t o /Ts v a n g i ra y i violence has led to a continuing one of a tyrant refusing to abdicate Mu k w a z h i ) sharp decline in life expectancy his throne. He has unleashed violence tion Murambatsvina, an urban demoli- among Zimbabweans—in 2006 the against political opponents and imple- tions campaign that forcibly displaced World Health Organization ranked the mented policies designed to consoli- hundreds of thousands of people, vir- country as among the world’s worst, date his personal position, leading to tually all supporters of the opposition. with a life expectancy of 34 years for the country’s precipitous economic Some 3.4 million people fled abroad, females and 37 years for males. decline since 1998. and 1 million are internally displaced. If not the crisis in Zimbabwe, then In 2000, Mugabe began a fast-track Whereas inadequate regional and what would qualify as an R2P self-in- land reform and resettlement program to UN peacekeeping forces were de- duced atrocity? The Security Council redistribute white-owned farms, most- ployed in Darfur and the DRC, inter- has been less active in Zimbabwe than

27 2 Great Decisions 2 0 1 0 in Darfur or the DRC. Given the nature reality are African diplomatic disar- mark of sorts that suggests how dif- of widespread and self-induced suffer- ray and differences between the West ficult it is to move governments to act ing, this record provides yet another il- and South Africa, resulting in a total against the preferences of other states lustration of insufficient political will absence of regional unity and inter- even when those choices involve mass to mitigate atrocities. Underlying this national muscle. This case is a bench- atrocities.  Lessons learned or spurned?

he UN Security Council’s inabil- or to consider the crisis as purely an in- rather than imposed, and ultimately Ke- ity to address the woes of Darfur ternal matter of the state.” nyans embraced peace. The existence andT the DRC demonstrate the dramatic The normative and operational po- not only of Wabenzi (Swahili for Mer- disconnect between lofty multilateral tential of R2P is substantial. What les- cedes owners) but also a middle class, norms and the ugly political realities sons from the 41 days in Kenya might which had much to lose, and a strong of trying to end mass atrocities. Half- be helpful for earlier and more decisive civil society, which sought a peaceful hearted economic, military and legal U.S. and international action in Africa solution, provided constituencies for sanctions have accomplished little. And and elsewhere? the mediation. They also contribute to the hands-off approach to Zimbabwe il- Five lessons result for timely and current support for the agreement and lustrates much the same, with a heavier concerted efforts to prevent mass atroc- perhaps its sustainability. A powerful dose of African diplomatic disarray. Are ities because, in Annan’s words, “ef- motivation for outsiders and Kenyans there any chances for effective interna- fective external assistance proves that was wishing to avoid watching decades tional action in the face of conscience- the responsibility to protect can work.” of investment and development assis- shocking horrors? Some optimism First, while “never again” undoubtedly tance go up in smoke. should result because the responsibil- represents wishful thinking, another Third, diplomats and analysts often ity to protect does not set the foreign slogan that has more traction is “acting stress the value of regional partners policy bar impossibly high. Surely it is sooner rather than later.” The success- rather than the universal UN. Kenya’s not quixotic to say no more Holocausts ful outcome of the mediation in Kenya neighbors pushed for a settlement; and and Rwandas—and to mean it? has hardly been a foregone conclusion; the AU moved expeditiously to iden- Hence, it is instructive to acknowl- because it began almost immediately tify three well-respected mediators edge the successful application in Ke- after the eruption of violence, there from the continent. “African solutions nya of R2P’s prevention motivation were a relatively limited number of ac- for African problems” is an oft-uttered and logic. Protecting people from fur- counts to be settled. Some 1,300 deaths mantra; but in this instance it was ac- ther atrocities motivated the mediation and 600,000 IDPs is hardly trivial, but curate. Taking the Kenyan case to the and diplomatic pressures from every the numbers could have been far worse. UN undoubtedly would have delayed direction: ending violence and atroci- This reality—especially when viewed action; a consensus Presidential State- ties were priorities on the agenda. “The in the historical light of Rwanda or the ment in February was the Security involvement of international actors… ongoing glare of Darfur, the DRC and Council’s only effort, which endorsed has been considerable,” concluded Hu- Zimbabwe—motivated Kenyans and the AU process and the operational sup- man Rights Watch, “a model of diplo- outsiders to act. The responsibility to port that Annan’s efforts received from matic action under the ‘Responsibility protect is, of course, more than sheer the UN Secretariat. In New York, more to Protect’ principles adopted by the numbers, but the fear of bigger ones vigorous action would have been re- UN.” The collective efforts in Kenya and a destabilized country were im- sisted by the usual spoiler governments are “a sign of how rapid response, with portant stimuli. Looking through R2P in the global South, who would have support from neighbors and the inter- lenses added urgency. raised the specter of sacrosanct state national community, can save lives and Second, Kenyans desperately want- sovereignty and noninterference in the bring hope,” Nobel laureate Tutu argued ed the mediation to succeed. As Annan domestic affairs of states, enshrined at the time. “In contrast to the crises in summarized, “Kenya was bleeding and in UN Charter Article 2(7). And there Rwanda in 1994 and Darfur in 2003, the people wanted peace… The leaders would probably have been the usual we see today in Kenya the formation found the courage…to seek a political pussyfooting from the North. But the of an international consensus that it is settlement and stop the killing.” Outside AU has a crucial provision in its Con- unacceptable to ignore violence of the helping hands are far more likely to be stitutive Act, Article 4(h), that permits kind that has occurred in recent months effective when they are demand-driven faster and, in theory, more intrusive ac-

28 kenya/r2p 2 tions because of “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant caglecartoons.com/manny francisco, manila, the phillippines to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances.” Fourth, there are no panaceas for ear- ly intervention and prevention, and each response to a potential mass atrocity has to be tailored to the specifics of a case and a moment in time. Nonetheless, Ke- nya demonstrates that outsiders should mobilize behind a single voice and put their political, economic and diplomatic resources where their mouths are. In this case, mediation was facilitated not only by diplomatic pressure but also by menacing the suspension of military and development assistance and invest- violations must be addressed. Some immediate term in Kenyan politics. ment. Initially neither the PNU nor the leverage results from the 3.75 billion First, ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno- ODM sought mediation, but coerced Kenyan shillings (about $50 million) Ocampo visited Kenya and announced consent eventually worked. As Annan pledged by Washington for the imple- that he would seek a formal investiga- noted, “We recognized that strong and mentation of the power-sharing agree- tion into crimes against humanity as coordinated international support from ment and reconstruction, which was spelled out in the court’s statute. The the AU, the UN, the EU, the U.S. and underlined by Secretary of State Hillary ICC is getting bad press in parts of Af- others was needed right from the start.” Clinton during her August 2009 visit to rica as a “white-man’s court” because Or as columnist Roger Cohen quipped: the region. And sanctions remain an most of its cases are African. But Ke- “Intervening in a country’s domestic af- option should local parties continue to nyans appear to feel differently as their fairs, in a world where the West seems resist meaningful change. elected officials have stonewalled for in relative decline, is most acceptable Kenya is at a crossroads. The first 18 months and thwarted the establish- when a regional organization takes the case of successful R2P prevention ment of a Kenyan tribunal to bring jus- lead, the UN Security Council issues a should not become the first case of such tice for the election violence. Second, a supportive statement, and U.S. power is efforts to go awry, which is certainly long-awaited review of the constitution used not in the sledgehammer mode, but possible unless local parties become recommended a substantial reduction with some sensitivity and precision.” more serious about reform. The post- in presidential powers and an increase Fifth, successful prevention is no ex- conflict dimensions of R2P require, at in those of the prime minister. The sug- cuse to rest on collective laurels. Annan a minimum, mitigating the causes for gestions stem from the original power- correctly stated that the early efforts the original violence. To date, little evi- sharing agreement and are intended were an essential but totally insufficient dence exists of such a commitment. to remove some of the temptations of first step because they “represented a The responsibility to protect should the “big man” syndrome in Kenyan ‘cease-fire’ allowing a restoration of not be merely Band-Aids, and parties politics. The implementation holds the calm for space to address the funda- have to engage rather than fall back potential for violence as does the pros- mental problems of Kenya.” It is ur- into old routines. Patience may be a vir- ecution of the suspects whose names gent for Kenya and its partners, includ- tue, but so too is impatience in moving currently are in front of the ICC in The ing the U.S., to pick up the pace so that sooner rather than later to the longer Hague. But an even greater danger lies the elections of 2012 are not a rerun of and steeper road toward sustainable in doing nothing. 2007. On the one hand, outside donors peace. While more outside help is re- As is now well-known, U.S. Presi- with carrots and sticks should congratu- quired, ultimately Kenyans themselves dent Barack Obama is a child from a late themselves on effective action. have to make the provisional govern- marriage between his Kansas mother On the other hand, Human Rights ment work and address land reform, and his Luo father. A widely cited joke Watch reminds Washington and other poverty, inequality and unemployment. is that the U.S. is more likely to elect Western capitals that it is partly their The grand coalition—which some have a Luo than Kenya. Perhaps, however, fault as well. “Decades of turning a labeled the “government of national the East African country can adapt an blind eye to corruption, impunity and impunity”—was cobbled together to Obama slogan: “Kenyans, yes you mismanagement by Kenya’s govern- tackle these issues but has not. can.”  ments has contributed to this crisis.” In In November, as Gr e a t De c i s i o n s Opinion Ballots order for the power-sharing agreement went to press, two events took place After page 16 to work, long-standing human rights with significant implications for the

29 kenya/r2p Discussion

uestions the DRC? How much do U.S. and Western interests rely on preventing mass atrocities in these countries? Q 7. To what extent should R2P be seen as a way to buy time, 1. Intervention by the international community was effec- as opposed to a concerted effort to solve the root problems tive in avoiding an escalation of violence in Kenya in the that lead to mass atrocities? short term, but failed to produce a long-term solution that 8. How can international intervention be prevented from be- addresses the root sources of the problems in the country. ing perceived as a continuation of Western imperialism? Is Was international intervention a mere Band-Aid, stalling but the ICC’s focus on Africa justified? What steps can be taken not preventing a greater crisis? What are the prospects for a to ensure that international efforts are embraced instead of lasting peace in Kenya? imposed? 2. What role should the U.S. and the EU play in implement- 9. The MONUC has allegedly been involved in sexual ex- ing and enforcing R2P? Should they provide military support ploitation, smuggling, and fraternizing with rebel groups. and then take a backseat and allow regional leaders to come What do such abuses mean for the UN peacekeeping pro- up with “African solutions for African problems?” cess? What solutions can be offered when those sent to al- 3. Who should evaluate the potential of a situation escalating leviate a problem exacerbate it? to mass atrocities, whether or not the sovereign government 10. What is the true value of R2P if once the time comes to is doing enough to prevent such mass atrocities? How should implement the doctrine, the powers involved refuse to invoke they decide? its name explicitly? 4. How does the international community ensure that rapid, 11. The prosecution of perpetrators of mass atrocities in Ke- swift intervention does not turn into rash intervention? nya, Sudan and other countries has been delayed in order 5. Why was there such a rapid response to the violence fol- to safeguard peacekeeping efforts and tenuous agreements. lowing the 2007 Kenya elections and such a concerted effort Does preventing further violence take precedence over enact- to remedy the situation before the violence escalated? Why ing justice? Is it effective in maintaining the peace? Does has there not been a similar effort in Sudan, the Democratic the failure to punish such offenders encourage a culture of Republic of Congo or Zimbabwe? impunity? 6. Are moral obligations a strong enough motivator for West- notes: ...... ern powers to deploy troops to nations such as Sudan and ......

eadings Hamburg, David A., ed., Preventing Genocide: Practical Steps toward Early Detection and Effective Action. Boulder, CO, R Paradigm Publishers, 2008. 352 pp. $24.95 (paper). The physician and former foundation head draws together medical and political Albright, Madeleine K., and Cohen, William S., cochairs, Prevent- insights. ing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers. Washington, D.C., American Academy of Diplomacy, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Human Rights Watch, “Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Vio- Museum and the U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008. 174 pp. Available lence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance.” Human Rights Watch, free online at www.academyofdiplomacy.org/programs/Genocide March 2008. 81 pp. Available free online at www.hrw.org/sites/ Report.html. This bipartisan report contains concrete policy propos- default/files/reports/kenya0308web.pdf. This authoritative report als for the Obama Administration. was published just after the settlement in March 2008.

Deng, Francis M., Identity, Diversity, and Constitutionalism in Lindenmayer, Elisabeth, and Kaye, Josie Lianna, “A Choice for Africa. Washington, D.C., U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008. 308 pp. Peace? The Story of 41 Days of Mediation in Kenya.” Interna- $19.95 (paper). A distinguished African diplomat and lawyer re- tional Peace Institute, August 2009. 36 pp. Available free online at flects on the difficulties of combining Western democracy in diverse www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/kenyamediation_epub.pdf. African societies. This is an essential, day-by-day depiction of the 2008 mediation.

Evans, Gareth, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Weiss, Thomas G., Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Ac- Atrocity Crimes Once and for All. Washington, D.C., Brookings tion. Malden, MA, Polity Press, 2007, 176 pp. $19.95 (paper). The Institution, 2008. 348 pp. $19.95 (paper). A leading normative en- author’s in-depth interpretations of the responsibility-to-protect trepreneur interprets contemporary efforts to stop mass atrocities. norm.

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