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UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Rethinking the Resource Curse: Natural Resources and Polywar in the Ituri District, Democratic Republic of the Congo Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/320469nv Author Fahey, Dan Publication Date 2011 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Rethinking the Resource Curse: Natural Resources and Polywar in the Ituri District, Democratic Republic of the Congo By Dan Fahey A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Environmental Science, Policy and Management in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Prof. Nancy Peluso, Chair Prof. Kate O’Neill Prof. Michael Watts Prof. Ron Hassner Fall 2011 Abstract Rethinking the Resource Curse: Natural Resources and Polywar in the Ituri District, Democratic Republic of the Congo By Dan Fahey Doctor of Philosophy in Environmental Science, Policy and Management University of California, Berkeley Professor Nancy Peluso, Chair This dissertation examines the people, events and processes that contributed to the onset and duration of war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with a focus on armed conflict in northeast Congo’s Ituri district. Building upon theories about the typology of war and critically engaging literature that depicts Congo’s wars as civil wars, I argue that war in Congo was a polywar of numerous internal and international conflicts taking place in the same geographic area. The concept of polywar helps to make sense of how several disparate armed conflicts coalesced in 1996 to produce a regional war that absorbed pre- existing conflicts and spawned new wars. One such new war started in June 1999, when a relatively minor dispute in Ituri escalated into a major war that killed 60,000 people before it ended in November 2007. Two natural resources – gold and land – figured prominently in war in Ituri, although in ways anomalous to conceptions of the resource curse equating resource abundance with increased risk of civil war. I argue that Ugandan interests in Ituri’s gold were more important than internal Congolese interests in explaining the onset of the second Congo war in 1998, while land disputes were tangential to the local struggles for political and economic power that produced the brutal inter-communal “war within the war” in 1999 in Ituri. This dissertation provides new insights into how local, regional, and international interests in natural resources can contribute to the onset and duration of war. This dissertation demonstrates how historical patterns of governance over people, territory, and mineral resources intersected with more recent struggles for political and economic power to produce war. The interaction of space, natural resources, and power helped to launch and to sustain war in Congo and in Ituri, but these links also provide insights into ways to transform conflict to produce peace and security for the Iturian and Congolese people. Table of Contents List of Tables, Charts, Figures, Maps, and Photos…iv Acronyms and Abbreviations…vii Preface…xii Introduction…xiv War in Congo: An overview…xv Objectives…xviii Road map…xix Maps…xxii Chapter 1. Theorizing War and Natural Resources…1 Political ecology…2 What is war?...3 Violence…4 Linking violence and war…5 Summary…11 Natural resources and war…12 Defining natural resources…12 Resource scarcity and abundance…15 Environmental scarcity…15 Resource abundance…16 Three problems with quantitative studies…19 Qualitative studies…24 Summary…25 Ethnicity and war…25 Summary…29 International assistance…30 Defining international assistance…30 Aiding war?...31 Summary…35 Theorizing war in Ituri…35 A new framework…35 Chapter 2. Historical Roots of Congo’s Polywar…39 Geography and natural resources…39 The people…40 Foreign intrusions…42 Colonialism…44 Gold and the new Ituri…48 Religion…55 i Colonial land policy…56 Summary…58 Ituri during the Mobutu era…59 Gold production and trade…60 Modes of artisanal and small-scale production…61 Emergence of the gold trade…62 Foreign patronage…65 Local processes…66 Regional issues in the 1990s…67 Uganda and Ituri…67 Conclusion…70 Chapter 3. The Start of Congo’s Polywar…72 The path to war…72 The first Congo war…78 The birth and death of UN intervention…83 The US role…85 Uganda enters the fight…86 Advance of the RPA/AFDL alliance…88 Another war enters the polywar…90 March to Kinshasa…90 Finances and natural resources…91 Uganda’s amazing gold exports…94 Diplomatic initiatives…96 End game diplomacy…97 Call me by my true name…98 Conclusion…100 Chapter 4. Golden Dreams, Golden Realities…103 The interbellum…105 Fallout from the second Rwandan genocide…106 Uganda: “Go for it!” in Congo…108 Uganda: border (in)security…111 The second war…115 The role of Uganda…117 Things fall apart…119 Economic motives move to the fore…121 Shifting alliances in Ituri…126 The end of the beginning…128 Endgame battles in the Kilo belt…130 Conclusion…135 Chapter 5. What Caused the War in Ituri? A Reassessment of Received Wisdom…139 The Ituri war…140 Walendu Pitsi…141 ii Five theories…143 The path to war…147 Leyna…147 The Yoza letter…151 Incident at Ugwaro…152 Arrests of Lendu leaders…153 The war begins…154 Linga and Jiba…154 Peace talks…156 Incident at Fataki…157 Escalation…158 Conclusion…160 Chapter 6. Guns and Butter: Uganda and Ituri, 2003-2009…166 Political and military aspects…168 The changing polywar…172 MONUC’s “robust approach”…178 External involvement…182 Resistance and surrender…183 Uganda’s other wars…184 Rearming and disarming…186 Economic aspects…195 Ituri’s armed groups…195 Uganda’s interests…198 Conclusion…203 Chapter 7. Rethinking the resource curse…205 Natural resources and polywar…208 Gold…208 Land…211 Summary…214 Looking back, looking forward…216 Methods…219 Bibliography…226 iii List of Tables, Charts, Figures, Maps and Photos TABLES Table 1. Quantitative Indicators for the CH Model of Civil War Onset…21 Table 2. Relation between Resource Characteristics and Types of Conflict…24 Table 3. The First Congo War as Described in Major Conflict Lists…73 Table 4. Uganda, Exports by Value to Rwanda, 1994-98 (US$, current year $)…77 Table 5. Uganda, Exports by Value to Zaire/Congo, 1994-98 (US$, current year $)…77 Table 6. The Conflicts of the First Congo War (1996-97)…79 Table 7. Combat Actors in the First Congo War…80 Table 8. Supporting Actors in the First Congo War…81 Table 9. The Second Congo War in Conflict Lists…104 Table 10. Uganda’s Official Trade with Zaire/Congo, 1994-2002 (millions US$, current year$)…121 Table 11. Uganda, Gold Exports by Fiscal Year (1 Jul-30 Jun) and Value (million US$, current year dollars), 1993/94-2008/09…122 Table 12. Uganda, Major Exports, 1996-2004 (percentage of total exports by value)…131 Table 13. Compilation of the Causes of the War in Ituri from Interviews and Literature…140 Table 14. Uganda, Informal Cross-Border Trade with DRC, 2005-08 (millions US$, current year$)…199 Table 15. Uganda, Gold Exports by Destination, 2002-09 (kg)…202 Table 16. List of Interviewees…219 CHARTS Chart 1. Gold Production from Ituri’s Kilo Belt, 1905-1960 (kg)…54 iv Chart 2. Kilo-Moto gold production, 1960-1996 (kg)…61 Chart 3. Total Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Zaire, 1986-1996 (millions US$, current year $)…63 Chart 4. Exports of Gold from Uganda, 1995-97 (kg)…65 Chart 5. Total Official Development Assistance (ODA) per Capita, 1990-1996 (millions US$, current year$)…66 Chart 6. Uganda, Percent of Total Exports to Rwanda and Zaire, 1994-97…68 Chart 7. Uganda, Gold Exports and Domestic Production, 1994-1998 (kg)…96 Chart 8. Uganda, Gold Exports by Quarter, 1997-99 (kg)…124 Chart 9. Uganda, Gold Exports and Domestic Production, 1994-2007 (kg)…125 Chart 10. Uganda, Monthly Gold Exports, 2001-03 (kg)…135 Chart 11. Uganda, Monthly Gold Exports, 2007 (kg)…201 FIGURES Figure 1. Evolution of Congolese Armed Groups in Ituri, 1998-2003…156 Figure 2. Letter to the Chief of Yoza from the chiefs of Bangosa and Mokpa, 8 May 1999…152 Figure 3. Geographic Distribution of Ituri Non-State Armed Groups, March 2005…167 Figure 4. Ituri Armed Groups, June 2004…168 Figure 5. Transit Sites for Ituri Disarmament and Community Reintegration, September 2004…171 Figure 6. The Disarmament and Community Reintegration (DCR) process…172 Figure 7: Polywar in DRC, June 2004…173 Figure 8. UN Peace Keeping Operations comparison, July 2004…174 Figure 9. Ituri Non-State Armed Group Commanders, March 2005…176 Figure 10. MONUC’s Desired End State, March 2005…177 Figure 11. MONUC Campaign Plan, March 2005…179 v Figure 12. MONUC Post-Ituri Plans, March 2005…180 Figure 13. Identification card for Mathieu Ngudjolo…198 MAPS Map 1. Administrative Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo… Map 2. The Ituri District, DRC… Map 3. Northeast Djugu territory, Ituri…146 Map 4. The Leyina Concession, Walendu Pitsi, Ituri…149 PHOTOS Photo 1. “UPDF pushes deep into Zaire as Kinshasa protests to UN,” The Monitor (Uganda), 3 December 1996…87 Photo 2. “Kabila paid Uganda in gold, says report,” The Monitor (Uganda), 21 September 1997…95 Photo 3. “Get your share of Congo,” The Monitor (Uganda), 24 September 1997…109 Photo 4. Bosco Ntaganda in Mongbwalu, November 2002…133 Photo 5. Entrance to the Leyna concession, June 2009…148 Photo 6. Dju hill seen from the Leyna concession, June 2009…150 Photo 7. Former secondary school classroom in Jiba, June 2009…155 Photo 8. Hotel in Fataki formerly used as a UPDF base…157 Photo 9.
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