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Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers during 1998 war and Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers guard streaming toward collection point near Rwerere during insurgency, 1998 The Operation Rwanda’s Gamble to Capture and the Misreading of an “Ally”

By James Stejskal

One who is not acquainted with the designs of his neighbors should not enter into alliances with them. —Sun Tzu

James Stejskal is a Consultant on International Political and Security Affairs and a Military Historian. He was present at the U.S. Embassy in , Rwanda, from 1997 to 2000, and witnessed the events of the . He is a retired Foreign Service Officer (Political Officer) and retired from the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Warrant Officer in 1996. He is currently working as a Consulting Historian for the Battlefield Heritage Project. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 99 RECALL | The Kitona Operation

n early August 1998, a white Boeing remain hurdles that must be confronted by , DRC in 1998 remained a safe haven 727 commercial airliner touched down U.S. planners and decisionmakers when for rebels who represented a threat to their unannounced and without warning considering military operations in today’s respective nations. had shared this at the Kitona military airbase in . Rwanda’s foray into DRC in 1998 also concern in 1996, and its dominant security I illustrates the consequences of a failure to imperative remained an ongoing the southwestern Bas Congo region of the Democratic of the Congo (DRC). understand that the generals’ view was not with the rebel National Union for the Total As the civilian-marked airplane rolled to always the same as the civilian leaders’ view. of Angola (União Nacional a stop, the doors opened, and a force of This strategic failure has relevance for the para a Independência Total de Angola or, heavily armed Rwandan soldiers poured out. U.S. military as it deals with allies as well as UNITA) force. In supporting the 1996 inva- Within 30 minutes, the main facilities were opponents. Anyone—including the United sion, dos Santos and his party, the People’s secured, and the airfield was in the hands of States—could easily repeat Rwanda’s mistake. Movement for the Liberation­ of Angola–Labor the invaders. Once the airfield was secured, Party (Movimento Popular de Libertação de additional aircraft began to land and offload Prologue Angola–Partido do Trabalho or, MPLA), saw troops and equipment to reinforce the Laurent Desiré Kabila, a former youth- supporting Kabila as a chance to overthrow initial landing force. So began one of the wing member of the Balubakat, a party their nemesis, Mobutu, for his most brazen operations in African military aligned with , and the support (at the behest of the ) of history—all the more remarkable because “Simba” rebels who opposed Zairian President ’s National Liberation Front the small African country that launched Mobutu Sese Seku in the , was used by of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de the raid did so without outside assistance or Rwanda and Uganda as a surrogate to lend Angola) and ’s UNITA. Pro- support. It was the Rwandan army, a small credibility to the rebellion and ousting of Mobutu UNITA forces operating in but extremely competent force with a reputa- Mobutu during the in 1996.2 (DRC) resisted the Rwanda/Ugandan inva- tion for brilliant , discipline, and In planning a second coup, the Rwandans and sion. By supporting the invasion and Kabila, tactical excellence.1 Ugandans counted on the tacit acceptance of Angola was able to disrupt UNITA’s bases In a classic maneuver made up of their plans and intentions by Angola, their and logistical lifeline and was thus better equal parts speed, surprise, and audacity, former ally, which had supported the over- able control its northern and eastern regions. a small force of Rwandan Patriotic Army throw of Mobutu in 1996. Angola was also convinced that Kabila would (RPA) and Ugandan People’s Defense Force Rwanda’s president in 1998 was Pasteur never support UNITA precisely because they (UPDF) troops under the command of RPA Bizimungu, although most political and all had supported Mobutu. Thus by 1998, dos commandeered a military decisions were made by then–Vice Santos no longer saw DRC as a safe haven for civilian airliner and flew over 1,000 miles President Major General . his enemies. His interests lay with Kabila, not from in the far east of DRC across the Uganda’s president was (and still is) Yoweri with Rwanda or Uganda. basin to seize Kitona Airfield near the Atlantic coast and then threaten the misconceptions about how decisions are made in many African capital of Kinshasa. The “Kitona Operation” was an countries remain hurdles that must be confronted extremely risky but potentially strategically by U.S. decisionmakers decisive special operation that had as its objective nothing less than the capture of the Museveni. In 1996, both viewed themselves Rwanda’s leaders faced a problem they DRC’s capital, Kinshasa, and the overthrow as representing a “new generation” of African thought they understood and based their of President Laurent Desiré Kabila. Within leaders who were prepared to chart their own calculations on a situation in which their days, however, the raid began to unravel destinies with or without the approval of primary Angolan interlocutors, senior mili- as opposition came from an unexpected others—whether traditional Western powers tary and security officials, misrepresented opponent: Angola. The assault at Kitona is or other African leaders. By contrast, Angola’s their country’s position as well as their an example of a brilliant military operation José Eduardo dos Santos, in power since 1979, decisionmaking mandates. The summer of that ultimately failed because of erroneous could be considered the quintessential “old 1998 was another turning point for the small political assumptions, in this case, a singular style” African strongman. It is not known country, one of many in its 8-year civil war misunderstanding of the strategic political to what extent the generational difference that had led to a in which nearly interests of Angola, the one regional power was a factor in the misunderstanding among 800,000 people were murdered, the -led that Rwanda and Uganda needed on their Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, but it have government in Kigali was toppled, and the side more than any other country. It was a strongly influenced the respective leaders’ stability of the new government remained in fault that could have been avoided through assumptions about decisionmaking. question. a better understanding­ of both the deci- The strategic factors that drove Rwanda Earlier, in 1994, following the victory sionmaking process in Angola and regional and Uganda to turn against Kabila, their of the –exile dominated Rwandan power politics. former protégé, and their decision to remove Patriotic Front’s (RPF’s) military wing over Misconceptions about how decisions him from power lay in the civil war that the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armées are made in many African countries, and the began in Rwanda in 1990 and ultimately Rwandaise, or FAR) and its Interahamwe3 importance of the regional political context, led to the 1994 genocide. For Rwanda and force, several million fled west

100 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Stejskal

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

CAMEROON

UGANDA REPUBLIC OF DEMOCRATIC CONGO KENY () REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Goma ULT SA RWANDA AIR AS Kinshasa L WA WITHDRA Kitona Maquela de Zombo ANGOLA

MALAWI MOZAMBI

MOROCCO

ALGERIA WESTERN (USCENTCOM SAHARA AOR)

MAURITANIA - GUINEA

SIERRA LEONE CÔTE D’IVOIRE

TOGO

EQUATORIAL GUINEA UGANDA REPUBLIC OF CONGO SAO TOME & PRINCIPE (Brazzaville) GABON DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE RWANDA Cabinda CONGO Enclave BURUNDI (Angola) TANZANIA Operation Kitona

COMOROS

ANGOLA ZAMBIA

MADAGASCAR

ZIMBABWE Rwandan, Ugandan, Rebel Movements

SWAZILAND DRC Government Forces

Angolan and Zimbabwean Forces

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 101 RECALL | The Kitona Operation into neighboring Zaire. Among the refugees of “foreign” interference once wanted Kabila’s continued presence as a docile was a large, organized, and armed remnant and for all.7 and compliant neighbor to the north to ensure of the FAR and who, once The AFDL, with Rwandan officers and the eventual victory over UNITA.9 settled among the other refugees in United noncommissioned officers leading the way, Prior to the invasion, the director Nations camps, began preparations quickly overwhelmed Mobutu’s forces and of Rwanda’s external intelligence service, for a guerrilla campaign into Rwanda’s north- forced him to flee into exile. Kabila declared Colonel Patrick Karegeya, conducted a western as a prelude to an offensive himself president and thereafter began pursuing number of meetings with senior officials in to reconquer Rwanda. The new RPF govern- his own erratic agenda, which included promot- Angola. Karegeya received assurances from ment in Kigali had intelligence sources in the ing his Lubakat tribe to the exclusion of other two powerful Angolan rivals, General Manuel camps and discovered the plans. Of additional tribal groups.8 This eventually led to a falling Helder Vieira Dias, also known as “Kopelipa,” concern to Kigali was the information that out between the Rwandans and their protege. minister of state and head of military house Zairian President was con- By early summer 1998, Kabila was facing in the Office of the President, and General doning, if not directly supporting, the activi- Congolese popular discontent over Rwanda’s Fernando Garcia Miala, director of Angola’s ties of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe.4 Despite heavy-handed tactics in the eastern DRC External Security Services and Military Intel- warnings provided to the by and a perception that he was a puppet of two ligence, that their country would remain on the new Rwandan government, nothing was foreign powers. This led him to send home the the sidelines. Thereafter, Karegeya briefed done to stop these preparations and the RPF Rwandan forces that installed him and had Kagame that the invasion plan could proceed decided it had to act alone. been protecting him in Kinshasa, including without fear of outside intervention. But, The 1996 offensive that followed was Colonel Kabarebe, whom Kabila had named unknown to the Rwandans and Ugandans, launched by Rwanda into Zaire initially only his defense minister after assuming power. the discussions were not briefed to dos Santos, to eliminate the threat from the camps in the Additionally, he began to consolidate his who repudiated the agreement once the inva- extreme eastern border of Zaire and, it control of the country by allying with some sion commenced as he perceived a danger to was hoped, to enable the refugees to return home to Rwanda. The RPF believed the the dynamics of the mission changed; the Rwandans found ex-FAR/Interahamwe were effectively holding many of them hostage. (The RPF themselves actively opposing another country’s armed forces leadership’s supposition was in fact correct as many Hutus returned to Rwanda after the of the groups “his” AFDL had just defeated, his own interests.10 Dos Santos had befriended camps were liberated.5) Quickly overrunning including the remaining Rwandan ex-FAR Kabila and gained an influence over him the camps, the RPA began to pursue the armed and Interahamwe, as well as the local Congo- that the Angolan leader was not eager to lose, militias westward into the Congo River basin. lese Mai-Mai militias. While Kabila probably especially when no one knew who the next As this happened, Mobutu ordered Zairian felt the militias would act as a buffer against a Congolese leader would be. This factor would military forces to oppose the intruders and Rwandan invasion, the Rwandan leadership prove decisive in the end game. the dynamics of the mission changed; the perceived Kabila’s support for the militias as a Rwandans found themselves actively oppos- threat to Rwanda itself. The Military Operation: The ­Successful ing another country’s armed forces.6 Rather The Rwandans and Ugandans inter- Aspect of the Plan than backing away, the Rwandans took their preted this as an irrevocable break that, Colonel James Kabarebe knew the ­coalition of forces, which by now included combined with Kabila’s apparent support terrain and the enemy best, having marched Ugandans, Zairian (an ethnic for (or tacit acceptance of) the Hutu militias the ground with his troops and led both group closely related to Rwandan ), in eastern Congo, convinced Kagame and the Zairian/Congolese rebels, as well as the Burundians, and rebel Congolese army and Museveni that Kabila had to go. Kabila’s fears RPA in 1996 and through 1997. He would militiamen—including one Laurent Desiré became a self-fulfilling prophecy. the most dangerous and audacious part Kabila—and moved farther west toward The Rwandan and Ugandan decision of the invasion, the air assault deep into Kinshasa. At that time, Kabila was pushed to invade in 1998 was linked to their sense of enemy territory to seize the key province of forward to nominally head the coalition imminent danger from the militias that were Bas Congo and then to capture the capital known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces engaged in a cross-border insurgency in north- of Kinshasa. On August 2, 1998, breakaway for the Liberation of the Congo (Alliance des western Rwanda at the time. In their minds, elements of Kabila’s newly created Congolese Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du it was a continuation of the 1996 operation Army Forces (Forces Armées Congolaises, Congo-Zaïre or, AFDL) by former Tanzanian to eliminate the ex-RPF and Interahamwe. or FAC) in Goma led by Major Sylvain President . The leaders of the However, it is now clear that Kagame and Mbuki declared their opposition to Kabila so-called Front-line States, ’s Museveni had not fully considered their allies’ and launched a ground assault westward, Mugabe, Angola’s dos Santos, South Africa’s motivations for their earlier support or the supported by Rwandan and Ugandan army , and Namibia’s , potential regional political ramifications that forces. Simultaneously, Kabarebe seized a along with Nyerere, saw the “rebellion” as would result from a renewal of the conflict. In civilian Boeing 727 airliner that was on the akin to their own liberation struggles, for they dos Santos’s view, the removal of Mobutu had tarmac of Goma Airfield and loaded it with had always viewed Mobutu as a puppet of the achieved MPLA’s aim and nothing was to be his assault force. The plan was simple and imperialist West. His departure would rid gained in another regime change. Dos Santos elegant, but it was built on a faulty premise:

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incursion, on August 22, after intense lobbying Then–Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame and deal making, the presidents of three coun- tries—Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Sam Nujoma of Namibia, and dos Santos of Angola—agreed to Courtesy of Author help Kabila to repulse the invaders. But these leaders were also seeking influence and a share of DRC’s immense mineral reserves, especially in the case of Zimbabwe.13 A Zimbabwean businessman, Billy Rautenbach, was given the position of director of Gécamines, DRC’s parastatal and mining company, which permitted Zimbabwe to siphon off large sums of money as well as raw resources from the mine’s lucrative operations.14

The Reversal Dos Santos’s Angola had the most powerful forces of all the allies available and began immediately to undo what Kabarebe that Rwanda’s and Uganda’s allies from knew that if they could control the and had wrought with an assault south across the the first Congo War that deposed Mobutu, the mercantile traffic that supplied Kinshasa, Congo River from its Cabinda enclave that namely Angola and Zimbabwe, would they could strangle the government. More- quickly recaptured Moanda. With a large, remain neutral. Despite indications that over, if the huge hydroelectric plant at the armor-heavy column, the Angolans cut off these countries would stay on the sidelines, Inga Dam complex on the Congo River could Kabarebe’s comparatively lightly armed rear that would not be the case. be captured, the invaders would control all guard from the main force, placing the entire On August 4, Kabarebe’s force landed the electrical power for the western part of plan in jeopardy. Left with few options, Kaba- in Kitona and quickly dispersed across the the country. A third component of Kabarebe’s rebe attacked Kinshasa, forcing his way into installation and secured key points. Kabarebe plan was even more ingenious: the several the city to the perimeter of the Ndjili Interna- then met with the former Zairian Army Forces thousand soldiers suspected of being loyal tional Airport. At the same time, Rwandan (Forces Armées Zaïroises or, FAZ) army offi- to Mobutu who were interned at the Kitona Tutsis and ethnically related Congolese cers who were being “re-educated” at Kitona. Airbase rallied to Kabarebe and augmented ­Banyamulenge civilians were being hunted Kabarebe was in a good position to understand his own small force to complete the mission. down and killed in Kinshasa as Congolese both their plight and their motivations. He The incursion forced Kabila to face government-controlled radio began to broad- had been the FAC chief of staff when Kabila not one but two fronts, as a joint force made cast messages warning of Tutsi spies and sabo- ordered approximately 2,000 ex-FAZ soldiers up of Rwandan and Ugandan army forces teurs in the that were reminiscent and officers to be interned there because he along with the rebellious FAC launched an of hate messages broadcast by Radio Télévi- did not trust them. After about 30 minutes of attack from the east that quickly captured the sion Libre des Mille Collines during the 1994 negotiations, an agreement was reached and eastern third of DRC. . That, and the arrival Kabarebe had his “army.”11 After capturing the seaports, Kabarebe’s of Zimbabwean helicopter gunships and an With the airfield secured, several force then turned east, reinforced by the ex-FAZ (Forças Armadas additional aircraft brought more troops from soldiers. By August 10, his force had moved 40 Angolanas or, FAA) armored column that Goma until the Kitona raiders totaled two kilometers up river and seized the river port threatened his rear, forced Kabarebe to break battalions (800 men), including a 31-man, city of Boma, followed by the railhead/pipeline off the engagement at the end of August. He self-contained UPDF light artillery unit. The terminal at . They took Inga Dam on knew that his continued advance could well raiders set up blocking positions to the east of August 13 and turned off the power on August mean large-scale ethnic killings.15 the airfield and then headed west with a small 14, plunging most of the DRC into darkness. Although outgunned and outnumbered element to seize the port cities of Banana and The force had quickly moved 110 kilometers in and with little maneuver room, Kabarebe Moanda about 6 kilometers away, which they 6 days meeting little resistance. Kabila’s FAC chose to conduct a tactical withdrawal rather did on August 5. had no will to fight Kabarebe and ran back to than surrender. To preserve his force and When Kabarebe’s force took control Kinshasa or melted into the jungle, although link up with the main invasion force in the of Kitona Airbase and the coastal , his they outnumbered the invaders three to one.12 east, he and his officers decided to move 360 small force effectively closed DRC’s connec- Leadership, discipline, and a fearsome reputa- kilometers south into Angola to get to a suit- tion to the outside . Under Mobutu, the tion made the difference for the Rwandans. able airfield for exfiltration. Moving swiftly, capital city of Kinshasa had been effectively By August 17, 1998, Kabarebe and his Kabarebe’s force brushed off their pursuers reduced to one means of resupply: the Atlan- forces were located 30 kilometers west of and punched through another Angolan force tic Ocean port of Banana, which lies at the Kinshasa and President Kabila was under of around 400 defenders to seize the airfield at mouth of the Congo River. The Rwandans pressure. Alarmed by the success of Rwanda’s Manuela do Zombo in mid-September 1998. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 103 RECALL | The Kitona Operation

For several weeks, the beleaguered force held that ended only after long negotiations. The 6 John Pomfret, “Rwandans Led Revolt in off the FAA and worked to extend the airfield singular fault in the planning was political. Congo,” , 9, 1997, A1. 7 to 1,400 meters to enable large transport Rwanda and Uganda miscalculated Angolan Gérard Prunier, Africa’s —Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Con- aircraft to use it. At one point an RPA unit at a President dos Santos’s readiness to accept the tinental Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University defensive post positioned 100 kilometers from overthrow of Kabila. Their understanding of Press, 2009), 116. the airfield stopped an FAA armored convoy Angola’s position was based on representa- 8 , Dancing in the Glory of Mon- 16 that was en route to recapture the field. tions of senior Angolan officers that did not sters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War Finally, once the runway was prepared, air- reflect political reality. The only way this of Africa (Philadelphia: PublicAffairs, 2011), 203. craft began to land and extract the Rwandan, mistake could have been avoided would have 9 Robert E. Gribbon, In the Aftermath of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda (Lincoln, NE: Rwanda and Uganda miscalculated Angolan President dos iUniverse, 2005), 276. 10 Author’s discussion with a senior Rwandan Santos’s readiness to accept the overthrow of Kabila military officer, Kigali, September 1998. 11 Prunier, 182. 12 Charles Onyango-Obbo, “Daring RPA Raid Ugandan, and eastern Congolese forces. Most been through direct negotiations between in Congo, Angola; and a Heroic UPDF Unit,” The of the ex-FAZ had already made the choice to Kagame and dos Santos. Amazing as it may Sunday Monitor (), April 16, 2000. return to their homes or to remain in Angola seem today, the two leaders never discussed 13 Kevin C. Dunn, “A Survival Guide to Kin- with antigovernment UNITA rebel forces. Rwanda’s plans because the Rwandans did shasa: Lessons of the Father, Passed Down to the Some 30 flights were made over the next not fully appreciate the power structure or Son,” in The African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. several days, and as the defensive perimeter political interests of the Angolan government. John F. Clark, 65 (: Macmillan, 2004). was collapsed inward, successive numbers Kitona could have had a place in the 14 Author’s conversation with a Congolese official of Kabarebe’s forces were flown out. The last annals of great victories. Instead it is a little- in Goma, September 1998. Rautenbach’s Ridge- flight was literally loaded with troops running known example of brilliance unhinged by fate. pointe Overseas Developments, Ltd., took control of from their positions to the airplane, with the Gécamines shortly after Zimbabwe’s entry into the war. 15 commanders being the last to leave. It is not Epilogue Ouzani. 16 Onyango-Obbo. clear how many casualties the Rwandans took Following the Second Congo War, 17 Ibid. in the operation—the secretive RPA will not Kabarebe served as chief of Rwanda’s Defense discuss the operation openly—but it is believed Forces before he became minister of defense in that the majority of the force was repatriated. 2010, a capacity in which he still serves. Paul The Ugandans stated that their small part of Kagame became President of Rwanda in 2000, the force returned home without any losses.17 a position he still holds. Angolan General Miala was imprisoned for coup plotting in 2007, while The Final Analysis “Kopelipa” remains a principal advisor to dos When the decision is made to go to war, Santos. Also in 2007, Colonel Karegeya was a successful plan for victory rarely involves cashiered from the RPA for insubordination timidity or restraint. Risks must be taken, espe- and conduct unbecoming. He is currently in cially when one chooses to engage a country exile in South Africa and is a vociferous critic far greater in size, with forbidding distances of the Kagame government. Kabila was assas- to conquer, and to fight an army that has more sinated by his bodyguards in 2001. JFQ soldiers and equipment at its disposal. The tactical aspect of the Kitona Operation is a testament to the great skill of its planner and Notes commander, as well as the fighting capabilities 1 Greg Mills, “The Boot Is Now on the Other of a small African nation’s army. Foot in Rwanda: Lessons from Both Sides of Insur- The Kitona Operation was an auda- gency,” RUSI Journal 153, no. 3 (June 2008), 72–78. cious strategic gamble by the Rwandans to 2 Che Guevera wrote of Kabila: “Nothing me avoid a protracted struggle in their bid to to believe he is the man of the hour.’’ See Bolivian Diary oust Laurent Kabila. As long as neighbor- [of] Ernesto “Che” Guevara, trans. Carlos P. Hansen and ing countries stayed out of the conflict, Andrew Sinclair (London: Cape-Lorrimer, 1968). the chances of its success were very high. 3 A word meaning “those who However, once Angola, and to a lesser degree fight together.” 4 Zimbabwe, entered the fray, the odds changed International Crisis Group (ICG), “Africa’s ­dramatically. The Kitona military plan was Seven Nation War,” ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report No. 4, May 21, 1999, 2. not faulty; rather, it was well planned for 5 Author’s conversation with a United Nations strategic effect and could have achieved its High Commissioner for Refugees officer, Kigali, desired aim. As it was, the so-called Second Rwanda, 1997. Congo War turned into a protracted affair

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