DOCSLIB.ORG

Kitona Operations: Rwanda's Gamble to Capture Kinshasa and The

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Kitona Operations: Rwanda's Gamble to Capture Kinshasa and The Courtesy of Author Courtesy of Author of Courtesy Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers during 1998 Congo war and insurgency Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers guard refugees streaming toward collection point near Rwerere during Rwanda insurgency, 1998 The Kitona Operation RWANDA’S GAMBLE TO CAPTURE KINSHASA AND THE MIsrEADING OF An “ALLY” By JAMES STEJSKAL One who is not acquainted with the designs of his neighbors should not enter into alliances with them. —SUN TZU James Stejskal is a Consultant on International Political and Security Affairs and a Military Historian. He was present at the U.S. Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda, from 1997 to 2000, and witnessed the events of the Second Congo War. He is a retired Foreign Service Officer (Political Officer) and retired from the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Warrant Officer in 1996. He is currently working as a Consulting Historian for the Namib Battlefield Heritage Project. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 99 RECALL | The Kitona Operation n early August 1998, a white Boeing remain hurdles that must be confronted by Uganda, DRC in 1998 remained a safe haven 727 commercial airliner touched down U.S. planners and decisionmakers when for rebels who represented a threat to their unannounced and without warning considering military operations in today’s respective nations. Angola had shared this at the Kitona military airbase in Africa. Rwanda’s foray into DRC in 1998 also concern in 1996, and its dominant security I illustrates the consequences of a failure to imperative remained an ongoing civil war the southwestern Bas Congo region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). understand that the generals’ view was not with the rebel National Union for the Total As the civilian-marked airplane rolled to always the same as the civilian leaders’ view. Independence of Angola (União Nacional a stop, the doors opened, and a force of This strategic failure has relevance for the para a Independência Total de Angola or, heavily armed Rwandan soldiers poured out. U.S. military as it deals with allies as well as UNITA) force. In supporting the 1996 inva- Within 30 minutes, the main facilities were opponents. Anyone—including the United sion, dos Santos and his party, the People’s secured, and the airfield was in the hands of States—could easily repeat Rwanda’s mistake. Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Labor the invaders. Once the airfield was secured, Party (Movimento Popular de Libertação de additional aircraft began to land and offload Prologue Angola–Partido do Trabalho or, MPLA), saw troops and equipment to reinforce the Laurent Desiré Kabila, a former youth- supporting Kabila as a chance to overthrow initial landing force. So began one of the wing member of the Balubakat, a party their nemesis, Mobutu, for his Cold War most brazen operations in African military aligned with Patrice Lumumba, and the support (at the behest of the United States) of history—all the more remarkable because “Simba” rebels who opposed Zairian President Holden Roberto’s National Liberation Front the small African country that launched Mobutu Sese Seku in the 1960s, was used by of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de the raid did so without outside assistance or Rwanda and Uganda as a surrogate to lend Angola) and Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA. Pro- support. It was the Rwandan army, a small credibility to the rebellion and ousting of Mobutu UNITA forces operating in Zaire but extremely competent force with a reputa- Mobutu during the first Congo war in 1996.2 (DRC) resisted the Rwanda/Ugandan inva- tion for brilliant leadership, discipline, and In planning a second coup, the Rwandans and sion. By supporting the invasion and Kabila, tactical excellence.1 Ugandans counted on the tacit acceptance of Angola was able to disrupt UNITA’s bases In a classic maneuver made up of their plans and intentions by Angola, their and logistical lifeline and was thus better equal parts speed, surprise, and audacity, former ally, which had supported the over- able control its northern and eastern regions. a small force of Rwandan Patriotic Army throw of Mobutu in 1996. Angola was also convinced that Kabila would (RPA) and Ugandan People’s Defense Force Rwanda’s president in 1998 was Pasteur never support UNITA precisely because they (UPDF) troops under the command of RPA Bizimungu, although most political and all had supported Mobutu. Thus by 1998, dos Colonel James Kabarebe commandeered a military decisions were made by then–Vice Santos no longer saw DRC as a safe haven for civilian airliner and flew over 1,000 miles President Major General Paul Kagame. his enemies. His interests lay with Kabila, not from Goma in the far east of DRC across the Uganda’s president was (and still is) Yoweri with Rwanda or Uganda. Congo River basin to seize Kitona Airfield near the Atlantic coast and then threaten the misconceptions about how decisions are made in many African capital of Kinshasa. The “Kitona Operation” was an countries remain hurdles that must be confronted extremely risky but potentially strategically by U.S. decisionmakers decisive special operation that had as its objective nothing less than the capture of the Museveni. In 1996, both viewed themselves Rwanda’s leaders faced a problem they DRC’s capital, Kinshasa, and the overthrow as representing a “new generation” of African thought they understood and based their of President Laurent Desiré Kabila. Within leaders who were prepared to chart their own calculations on a situation in which their days, however, the raid began to unravel destinies with or without the approval of primary Angolan interlocutors, senior mili- as opposition came from an unexpected others—whether traditional Western powers tary and security officials, misrepresented opponent: Angola. The assault at Kitona is or other African leaders. By contrast, Angola’s their country’s position as well as their an example of a brilliant military operation José Eduardo dos Santos, in power since 1979, decisionmaking mandates. The summer of that ultimately failed because of erroneous could be considered the quintessential “old 1998 was another turning point for the small political assumptions, in this case, a singular style” African strongman. It is not known country, one of many in its 8-year civil war misunderstanding of the strategic political to what extent the generational difference that had led to a genocide in which nearly interests of Angola, the one regional power was a factor in the misunderstanding among 800,000 people were murdered, the Hutu-led that Rwanda and Uganda needed on their Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, but it may have government in Kigali was toppled, and the side more than any other country. It was a strongly influenced the respective leaders’ stability of the new government remained in fault that could have been avoided through assumptions about decisionmaking. question. a better understanding of both the deci- The strategic factors that drove Rwanda Earlier, in 1994, following the victory sionmaking process in Angola and regional and Uganda to turn against Kabila, their of the Tutsi–exile dominated Rwandan power politics. former protégé, and their decision to remove Patriotic Front’s (RPF’s) military wing over Misconceptions about how decisions him from power lay in the civil war that the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armées are made in many African countries, and the began in Rwanda in 1990 and ultimately Rwandaise, or FAR) and its Interahamwe3 importance of the regional political context, led to the 1994 genocide. For Rwanda and militia force, several million Hutus fled west 100 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu STEJSKAL CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAMEROON UGANDA REPUBLIC OF DEMOCRATIC Kisangani CONGO KENY (Brazzaville) REPUBLIC OF THE GABON CONGO Goma ULT Bukavu SA RWANDA AIR AS Kinshasa L BURUNDI WA WITHDRA Kitona TANZANIA Maquela de Zombo ANGOLA MALAWI MOZAMBI ZAMBIA MOROCCO TUNISIA ALGERIA LIBYA EGYPT WESTERN (USCENTCOM SAHARA AOR) MAURITANIA CAPE VERDE MALI NIGER ERITREA SUDAN SENEGAL CHAD THE GAMBIA DJIBOUTI GUINEA- BURKINA FASO BISSAU GUINEA BENIN NIGERIA SOMALIA SIERRA LEONE CÔTE D’IVOIRE ETHIOPIA GHANA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC TOGO LIBERIA CAMEROON EQUATORIAL GUINEA UGANDA REPUBLIC OF CONGO KENYA SAO TOME & PRINCIPE (Brazzaville) GABON DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE RWANDA Cabinda CONGO Enclave BURUNDI (Angola) TANZANIA Operation Kitona SEYCHELLES COMOROS ANGOLA MALAWI MOZAMBIQUE ZAMBIA MADAGASCAR ZIMBABWE NAMIBIA MAURITIUS BOTSWANA Rwandan, Ugandan, Rebel Movements SWAZILAND DRC Government Forces LESOTHO Angolan and Zimbabwean Forces SOUTH AFRICA ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 101 RECALL | The Kitona Operation into neighboring Zaire. Among the refugees southern Africa of “foreign” interference once wanted Kabila’s continued presence as a docile was a large, organized, and armed remnant and for all.7 and compliant neighbor to the north to ensure of the FAR and Interahamwe who, once The AFDL, with Rwandan officers and the eventual victory over UNITA.9 settled among the other refugees in United noncommissioned officers leading the way, Prior to the invasion, the director Nations refugee camps, began preparations quickly overwhelmed Mobutu’s forces and of Rwanda’s external intelligence service, for a guerrilla campaign into Rwanda’s north- forced him to flee into exile. Kabila declared Colonel Patrick Karegeya, conducted a western territory as a prelude to an offensive himself president and thereafter began pursuing number of meetings with senior officials in to reconquer Rwanda. The new RPF govern- his own erratic agenda, which included promot- Angola. Karegeya received assurances from ment in Kigali had intelligence sources in the ing his Lubakat tribe to the exclusion of other two powerful Angolan rivals, General Manuel camps and discovered the plans. Of additional tribal groups.8 This eventually led to a falling Helder Vieira Dias, also known as “Kopelipa,” concern to Kigali was the information that out between the Rwandans and their protege.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Phytoplankton Dynamics in the Congo River
    Freshwater Biology (2016) doi:10.1111/fwb.12851 Phytoplankton dynamics in the Congo River † † † JEAN-PIERRE DESCY*, ,FRANCßOIS DARCHAMBEAU , THIBAULT LAMBERT , ‡ § † MAYA P. STOYNEVA-GAERTNER , STEVEN BOUILLON AND ALBERTO V. BORGES *Research Unit in Organismal Biology (URBE), University of Namur, Namur, Belgium † Unite d’Oceanographie Chimique, UniversitedeLiege, Liege, Belgium ‡ Department of Botany, University of Sofia St. Kl. Ohridski, Sofia, Bulgaria § Department of Earth & Environmental Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium SUMMARY 1. We report a dataset of phytoplankton in the Congo River, acquired along a 1700-km stretch in the mainstem during high water (HW, December 2013) and falling water (FW, June 2014). Samples for phytoplankton analysis were collected in the main river, in tributaries and one lake, and various relevant environmental variables were measured. Phytoplankton biomass and composition were determined by high-performance liquid chromatography analysis of chlorophyll a (Chl a) and marker pigments and by microscopy. Primary production measurements were made using the 13C incubation technique. In addition, data are also reported from a 19-month regular sampling (bi-monthly) at a fixed station in the mainstem of the upper Congo (at the city of Kisangani). 2. Chl a concentrations differed between the two periods studied: in the mainstem, they varied À À between 0.07 and 1.77 lgL 1 in HW conditions and between 1.13 and 7.68 lgL 1 in FW conditions. The relative contribution to phytoplankton biomass from tributaries (mostly black waters) and from a few permanent lakes was low, and the main confluences resulted in phytoplankton dilution. Based on marker pigment concentration, green algae (both chlorophytes and streptophytes) dominated in the mainstem in HW, whereas diatoms dominated in FW; cryptophytes and cyanobacteria were more abundant but still relatively low in the FW period, both in the tributaries and in the main channel.
    [Show full text]
  • A Silent Crisis in Congo: the Bantu and the Twa in Tanganyika
    CONFLICT SPOTLIGHT A Silent Crisis in Congo: The Bantu and the Twa in Tanganyika Prepared by Geoffroy Groleau, Senior Technical Advisor, Governance Technical Unit The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with 920,000 new Bantus and Twas participating in a displacements related to conflict and violence in 2016, surpassed Syria as community 1 meeting held the country generating the largest new population movements. Those during March 2016 in Kabeke, located displacements were the result of enduring violence in North and South in Manono territory Kivu, but also of rapidly escalating conflicts in the Kasaï and Tanganyika in Tanganyika. The meeting was held provinces that continue unabated. In order to promote a better to nominate a Baraza (or peace understanding of the drivers of the silent and neglected crisis in DRC, this committee), a council of elders Conflict Spotlight focuses on the inter-ethnic conflict between the Bantu composed of seven and the Twa ethnic groups in Tanganyika. This conflict illustrates how representatives from each marginalization of the Twa minority group due to a combination of limited community. access to resources, exclusion from local decision-making and systematic Photo: Sonia Rolley/RFI discrimination, can result in large-scale violence and displacement. Moreover, this document provides actionable recommendations for conflict transformation and resolution. 1 http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2017/pdfs/2017-GRID-DRC-spotlight.pdf From Harm To Home | Rescue.org CONFLICT SPOTLIGHT ⎯ A Silent Crisis in Congo: The Bantu and the Twa in Tanganyika 2 1. OVERVIEW Since mid-2016, inter-ethnic violence between the Bantu and the Twa ethnic groups has reached an acute phase, and is now affecting five of the six territories in a province of roughly 2.5 million people.
    [Show full text]
  • Why European Timber Company DLH Should Be Held to Account for Profiting from Liberian Conflict Timber
    BANKROLLING BRUTALITY Why European timber company DLH should be held to account for profiting from Liberian conflict timber A REPORT BY GLOBAL WITNESS 2010 COVER: OTC logs to DLH awaiting export from Liberia, 2001 Credit: Global Witness CONTENTS THE ALLEGATIONS 2 HISTORY OF LIBERIa 3 The First Liberian Civil War (1989–1996) 3 The Second Liberian Civil War (1999–2003) 3 Post Civil War 4 REVENUE FROM TIMBER USED TO FUND THE CONFLICT 5 Liberian timber imported into France by European timber companies 5 KEY ACTORS AND COMPANIES IN LIBERIA’s TIMBER INDUSTRY FROM 1999-2003 6 Charles Taylor 6 Gus Kouwenhoven and the Oriental Timber Corporation (OTC) 6 Mohammed Salamé and the Mohammed Group of Companies (MGC) 7 Abbas Fawaz and the Maryland Wood Processing Industries (MWPI) 7 Oscar Cooper and the Inland Logging Company (ILC) 7 Demetrius B. Taylor 7 Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, Jr 7 THE DEFENDANT(S) 8 Dalhoff, Larsen, Horneman (DLH) 8 THE COMPLAINANTS 9 Global Witness 9 Sherpa 9 Greenpeace 9 Amis de la Terre 10 Alfred Brownell 10 2 | GLOBAL WITNESS FEBRUARY 2010 Global Witness and Sherpa, with Greenpeace France, Amis de la Terre and a prominent Liberian activist lodged a legal complaint before the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Nantes (France) against the French company DLH France, part of the Dalhoff, Larsen, Horneman Group (DLH), one of the world’s leading international timber and wood products wholesalers.1 THE ALLEGATIONS The complainants have evidence that and divert public scrutiny of its Liberian between 2001-2003, DLH purchased, purchasing and importation practices in imported into France and distributed order to make profits.
    [Show full text]
  • Adult Authority, Social Conflict, and Youth Survival Strategies in Post Civil War Liberia
    ‘Listen, Politics is not for Children:’ Adult Authority, Social Conflict, and Youth Survival Strategies in Post Civil War Liberia. DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Henryatta Louise Ballah Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2012 Dissertation Committee: Drs. Ousman Kobo, Advisor Antoinette Errante Ahmad Sikianga i Copyright by Henryatta Louise Ballah 2012 ii Abstract This dissertation explores the historical causes of the Liberian civil war (1989- 2003), with a keen attention to the history of Liberian youth, since the beginning of the Republic in 1847. I carefully analyzed youth engagements in social and political change throughout the country’s history, including the ways by which the civil war impacted the youth and inspired them to create new social and economic spaces for themselves. As will be demonstrated in various chapters, despite their marginalization by the state, the youth have played a crucial role in the quest for democratization in the country, especially since the 1960s. I place my analysis of the youth in deep societal structures related to Liberia’s colonial past and neo-colonial status, as well as the impact of external factors, such as the financial and military support the regime of Samuel Doe received from the United States during the cold war and the influence of other African nations. I emphasize that the socio-economic and political policies implemented by the Americo- Liberians (freed slaves from the U.S.) who settled in the country beginning in 1822, helped lay the foundation for the civil war.
    [Show full text]
  • Of the United Nations Mission in the DRC / MONUC – MONUSCO
    Assessing the of the United Nations Mission in the DRC / MONUC – MONUSCO REPORT 3/2019 Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Copyright: © Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2019 ISBN: 978-82-7002-346-2 Any views expressed in this publication are those of the author. Tey should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Te text may not be re-published in part or in full without the permission of NUPI and the authors. Visiting address: C.J. Hambros plass 2d Address: P.O. Box 8159 Dep. NO-0033 Oslo, Norway Internet: effectivepeaceops.net | www.nupi.no E-mail: [email protected] Fax: [+ 47] 22 99 40 50 Tel: [+ 47] 22 99 40 00 Assessing the Efectiveness of the UN Missions in the DRC (MONUC-MONUSCO) Lead Author Dr Alexandra Novosseloff, International Peace Institute (IPI), New York and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo Co-authors Dr Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Igarapé Institute, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Prof. Tomas Mandrup, Stellenbosch University, South Africa, and Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen Aaron Pangburn, Social Science Research Council (SSRC), New York Data Contributors Ryan Rappa and Paul von Chamier, Center on International Cooperation (CIC), New York University, New York EPON Series Editor Dr Cedric de Coning, NUPI External Reference Group Dr Tatiana Carayannis, SSRC, New York Lisa Sharland, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra Dr Charles Hunt, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University, Australia Adam Day, Centre for Policy Research, UN University, New York Cover photo: UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti UN Photo/ Abel Kavanagh Contents Acknowledgements 5 Acronyms 7 Executive Summary 13 Te effectiveness of the UN Missions in the DRC across eight critical dimensions 14 Strategic and Operational Impact of the UN Missions in the DRC 18 Constraints and Challenges of the UN Missions in the DRC 18 Current Dilemmas 19 Introduction 21 Section 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Democratic Republic of Congo Crisis: an Assessment of African Union's Principle of Non-Indiference
    European Scientific Journal August 2015 edition vol.11, No.22 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CRISIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AFRICAN UNION'S PRINCIPLE OF NON-INDIFERENCE. John Danfulani,PhD Department of Political Science, Kaduna State University- Nigeria Abstract Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has a troubling history of civil wars since gaining political independence from Belgium in 1960. All DRC's civil wars had external dimensions who got involved to either defend ideological client or protect economic or strategic interests. The 1998 unsuccessful attempt to oust President Laurent Kabila attracted two blocks of opposing multi-national forces into DRC. It was an instance of interference in internal affairs of DRC by neighbouring states and their allies. The status of pro-Kinsasha forces was clear in international law because they were invited by a legitimate government. While that of anti-Kinsasha group cannot be situated within the ambit of any international law hence making their presence in DRC at the time of the civil war illegitimate. Activities of anti-Kabila forces were not covered by AU's July 2000 principle of non- indifference. Interference by foreign forces on the side of the rebel was a brazen act of aggression and flagrant disrespect for the territorial integrity of DRC. AU must act to safeguard abuse of the non-indifference clause by member states and stiffer sanctions imposed on belligerent actors. Their involvement prolonged the civil war and caused collapse of every state institution in DRC. Keywords: AU, Non-indifference, Aggression, Sanction, Territorial integrity Introduction Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one political entity in continental Africa with a troubling history of many civil wars and sundry forms of skirmishes with disastrous internal and trans-borders consequences.
    [Show full text]
  • The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:Lessom from the Rwanda Experience
    The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience March 1996 Published by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Editor: David Millwood Cover illustrations: Kiure F. Msangi Graphic design: Designgrafik, Copenhagen Prepress: Dansk Klich‚, Copenhagen Printing: Strandberg Grafisk, Odense ISBN: 87-7265-335-3 (Synthesis Report) ISBN: 87-7265-331-0 (1. Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors) ISBN: 87-7265-332-9 (2. Early Warning and Conflict Management) ISBN: 87-7265-333-7 (3. Humanitarian Aid and Effects) ISBN: 87-7265-334-5 (4. Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda) This publication may be reproduced for free distribution and may be quoted provided the source - Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda - is mentioned. The report is printed on G-print Matt, a wood-free, medium-coated paper. G-print is manufactured without the use of chlorine and marked with the Nordic Swan, licence-no. 304 022. 2 The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience Study 2 Early Warning and Conflict Management by Howard Adelman York University Toronto, Canada Astri Suhrke Chr. Michelsen Institute Bergen, Norway with contributions by Bruce Jones London School of Economics, U.K. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 3 Contents Preface 5 Executive Summary 8 Acknowledgements 11 Introduction 12 Chapter 1: The Festering Refugee Problem 17 Chapter 2: Civil War, Civil Violence and International Response 20 (1 October 1990 - 4 August
    [Show full text]
  • Democratic Republic of Congo
    DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 350 Fifth Ave 34 th Floor New York, N.Y. 10118-3299 http://www.hrw.org (212) 290-4700 Vol. 14, No. 6 (G) – August 2002 I counted thirty bodies and bags between the dam and the small rapids, and twelve beyond the rapids. Most corpses were in underwear, and many were beheaded. On the bridges there were still many traces of blood despite attempts to cover them with sand, and on the small maize field to the left of the landing the odors were unbearable. Human Rights Watch interview, Kisangani, June 2002. A Congolese man from Kisangani covers his mouth as he nears the Tshopo bridge, the scene of summary executions by RCD-Goma troops following an attempted mutiny. (c) 2002 AFP WAR CRIMES IN KISANGANI: The Response of Rwandan-backed Rebels to the May 2002 Mutiny 1630 Connecticut Ave, N.W., Suite 500 2nd Floor, 2-12 Pentonville Road 15 Rue Van Campenhout Washington, DC 20009 London N1 9HF, UK 1000 Brussels, Belgium TEL (202) 612-4321 TEL: (44 20) 7713 1995 TEL (32 2) 732-2009 FAX (202) 612-4333 FAX: (44 20) 7713 1800 FAX (32 2) 732-0471 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] August 2002 Vol. 14, No 6 (A) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO WAR CRIMES IN KISANGANI: The Response of Rwandan-backed Rebels to the May 2002 Mutiny I. SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................................................2 II. RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................................................3
    [Show full text]
  • Banyamulenge, Congolese Tutsis, Kinshasa
    Response to Information Request COD103417.FE Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada www.irb-cisr.gc.ca Français Home Contact Us Help Search canada.gc.ca Home > Research > Responses to Information Requests RESPONSES TO INFORMATION REQUESTS (RIRs) New Search | About RIRs | Help The Board 31 March 2010 About the Board COD103417.FE Biographies Organization Chart Democratic Republic of the Congo: The treatment of the Banyamulenge, or Congolese Tutsis, living in Kinshasa and in the provinces of North Kivu and South Employment Kivu Legal and Policy Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa References Publications Situation of the Banyamulenge in Kinshasa Tribunal Several sources consulted by the Research Directorate indicated that the Refugee Protection Banyamulenge, or Congolese Tutsis, do not have any particular problems in Division Kinshasa (Journalist 9 Mar. 2010; Le Phare 22 Feb. 2010; VSV 18 Feb. 2010). Immigration Division During a 18 February 2010 telephone interview with the Research Directorate, Immigration Appeal a representative of Voice of the Voiceless for the Defence of Human Rights (La Voix Division des sans voix pour les droits de l'homme, VSV), a human rights non-governmental Decisions organization (NGO) dedicated to defending human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (VSV n.d.), stated that his organization has never Forms been aware of [translation] “a case in which a person was mistreated by the Statistics authorities or the Kinshasa population in general” solely because that person was Research of Banyamulenge ethnic origin. Moreover, in correspondence sent to the Research Directorate on 22 February 2010, the manager of the Kinshasa newspaper Le Phare Research Program wrote the following: National Documentation [translation] Packages There are no problems where the Banyamulenge-or Tutsis-in Kinshasa are Issue Papers and concerned.
    [Show full text]
  • The Congo War and the Prospects of State Formation Rwanda and Uganda Compared
    [675] Paper The Congo war and the prospects of state formation Rwanda and Uganda compared Stein Sundstøl Eriksen No. 675 – 2005 Norwegian Institute Norsk of International Utenrikspolitisk Affairs Institutt Utgiver: NUPI Copyright: © Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt 2005 ISSN: 0800 - 0018 Alle synspunkter står for forfatternes regning. De må ikke tolkes som uttrykk for oppfatninger som kan tillegges Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. Artiklene kan ikke reproduseres - helt eller delvis - ved trykking, fotokopiering eller på annen måte uten tillatelse fra forfatterne. Any views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The text may not be printed in part or in full without the permission of the author. Besøksadresse: C.J. Hambrosplass 2d Addresse: Postboks 8159 Dep. 0033 Oslo Internett: www.nupi.no E-post: [email protected] Fax: [+ 47] 22 36 21 82 Tel: [+ 47] 22 99 40 00 The Congo war and the prospects of state formation Rwanda and Uganda compared Stein Sundstøl Eriksen [Summary] This paper analyses the effect of the Congo war on state power in Rwanda and Uganda. Drawing on theories of European state formation, it asks whether the Congo war has led to a strengthening of the state in the two countries. It is argued that this has not been the case. Neither the Rwandan nor the Ugandan state has been strengthened as a result of the war. I argue that this must be explained by changes in the state system, which have altered the links between war and state formation.
    [Show full text]
  • A Lagrangian Perspective of the Hydrological Cycle in the Congo River Basin Rogert Sorí1, Raquel Nieto1,2, Sergio M
    Earth Syst. Dynam. Discuss., doi:10.5194/esd-2017-21, 2017 Manuscript under review for journal Earth Syst. Dynam. Discussion started: 9 March 2017 c Author(s) 2017. CC-BY 3.0 License. A Lagrangian Perspective of the Hydrological Cycle in the Congo River Basin Rogert Sorí1, Raquel Nieto1,2, Sergio M. Vicente-Serrano3, Anita Drumond1, Luis Gimeno1 1 Environmental Physics Laboratory (EphysLab), Universidade de Vigo, Ourense, 32004, Spain 5 2 Department of Atmospheric Sciences, Institute of Astronomy, Geophysics and Atmospheric Sciences, University of SãoPaulo, São Paulo, 05508-090, Brazil 3 Instituto Pirenaico de Ecología, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (IPE-CSIC), Zaragoza, 50059, Spain Correspondence to: Rogert Sorí ([email protected]) Abstract. 10 The Lagrangian model FLEXPART was used to identify the moisture sources of the Congo River Basin (CRB) and investigate their role in the hydrological cycle. This model allows us to track atmospheric parcels while calculating changes in the specific humidity through the budget of evaporation-minus-precipitation. The method permitted the identification at an annual scale of five continental and four oceanic regions that provide moisture to the CRB from both hemispheres over the course of the year. The most important is the CRB itself, providing more than 50% of the total atmospheric moisture income to the basin. Apart 15 from this, both the land extension to the east of the CRB together with the ocean located in the eastern equatorial South Atlantic Ocean are also very important sources, while the Red Sea source is merely important in the budget of (E-P) over the CRB, despite its high evaporation rate.
    [Show full text]
  • The Tragedy of Goma Most Spectacular Manifestation of This Process Is Africa’S Lori Dengler/For the Times-Standard Great Rift Valley
    concentrate heat flowing from deeper parts of the earth like a thicK BlanKet. The heat eventually causes the plate to bulge and stretch. As the plate thins, fissures form allowing vents for hydrothermal and volcanic activity. The Not My Fault: The tragedy of Goma most spectacular manifestation of this process is Africa’s Lori Dengler/For the Times-Standard Great Rift Valley. Posted June 6, 2021 https://www.times-standard.com/2021/06/06/lori- In Africa, we are witnessing the Birth of a new plate dengler-the-tragedy-of-goma/ boundary. Extensional stresses from the thinning crust aren’t uniform. The result is a number of fissures and tears On May 22nd Mount Nyiragongo in the Democratic oriented roughly north south. The rifting began in the Afar RepuBlic of the Congo (DRC) erupted. Lava flowed towards region of northern Ethiopia around 30 million years ago the city of Goma, nine miles to the south. Goma, a city of and has slowly propagated to the south at a rate of a few 670,000 people, is located on the north shore of Lake Kivu inches per year and has now reached MozamBique. In the and adjacent to the Rwanda border. Not all of the details coming millennia, the rifts will continue to grow, eventually are completely clear, but the current damage tally is 32 splitting Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and much of deaths, 1000 homes destroyed, and nearly 500,000 people Mozambique into a new small continent, much liKe how displaced. Madagascar Began to Be detached from the main African continent roughly 160 million years ago.
    [Show full text]