Courtesy of Author Courtesy of Author of Courtesy Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers during 1998 Congo war and insurgency Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers guard refugees streaming toward collection point near Rwerere during Rwanda insurgency, 1998 The Kitona Operation RWANDA’S GAMBLE TO CAPTURE KINSHASA AND THE MIsrEADING OF An “ALLY” By JAMES STEJSKAL One who is not acquainted with the designs of his neighbors should not enter into alliances with them. —SUN TZU James Stejskal is a Consultant on International Political and Security Affairs and a Military Historian. He was present at the U.S. Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda, from 1997 to 2000, and witnessed the events of the Second Congo War. He is a retired Foreign Service Officer (Political Officer) and retired from the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Warrant Officer in 1996. He is currently working as a Consulting Historian for the Namib Battlefield Heritage Project. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 99 RECALL | The Kitona Operation n early August 1998, a white Boeing remain hurdles that must be confronted by Uganda, DRC in 1998 remained a safe haven 727 commercial airliner touched down U.S. planners and decisionmakers when for rebels who represented a threat to their unannounced and without warning considering military operations in today’s respective nations. Angola had shared this at the Kitona military airbase in Africa. Rwanda’s foray into DRC in 1998 also concern in 1996, and its dominant security I illustrates the consequences of a failure to imperative remained an ongoing civil war the southwestern Bas Congo region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). understand that the generals’ view was not with the rebel National Union for the Total As the civilian-marked airplane rolled to always the same as the civilian leaders’ view. Independence of Angola (União Nacional a stop, the doors opened, and a force of This strategic failure has relevance for the para a Independência Total de Angola or, heavily armed Rwandan soldiers poured out. U.S. military as it deals with allies as well as UNITA) force. In supporting the 1996 inva- Within 30 minutes, the main facilities were opponents. Anyone—including the United sion, dos Santos and his party, the People’s secured, and the airfield was in the hands of States—could easily repeat Rwanda’s mistake. Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Labor the invaders. Once the airfield was secured, Party (Movimento Popular de Libertação de additional aircraft began to land and offload Prologue Angola–Partido do Trabalho or, MPLA), saw troops and equipment to reinforce the Laurent Desiré Kabila, a former youth- supporting Kabila as a chance to overthrow initial landing force. So began one of the wing member of the Balubakat, a party their nemesis, Mobutu, for his Cold War most brazen operations in African military aligned with Patrice Lumumba, and the support (at the behest of the United States) of history—all the more remarkable because “Simba” rebels who opposed Zairian President Holden Roberto’s National Liberation Front the small African country that launched Mobutu Sese Seku in the 1960s, was used by of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de the raid did so without outside assistance or Rwanda and Uganda as a surrogate to lend Angola) and Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA. Pro- support. It was the Rwandan army, a small credibility to the rebellion and ousting of Mobutu UNITA forces operating in Zaire but extremely competent force with a reputa- Mobutu during the first Congo war in 1996.2 (DRC) resisted the Rwanda/Ugandan inva- tion for brilliant leadership, discipline, and In planning a second coup, the Rwandans and sion. By supporting the invasion and Kabila, tactical excellence.1 Ugandans counted on the tacit acceptance of Angola was able to disrupt UNITA’s bases In a classic maneuver made up of their plans and intentions by Angola, their and logistical lifeline and was thus better equal parts speed, surprise, and audacity, former ally, which had supported the over- able control its northern and eastern regions. a small force of Rwandan Patriotic Army throw of Mobutu in 1996. Angola was also convinced that Kabila would (RPA) and Ugandan People’s Defense Force Rwanda’s president in 1998 was Pasteur never support UNITA precisely because they (UPDF) troops under the command of RPA Bizimungu, although most political and all had supported Mobutu. Thus by 1998, dos Colonel James Kabarebe commandeered a military decisions were made by then–Vice Santos no longer saw DRC as a safe haven for civilian airliner and flew over 1,000 miles President Major General Paul Kagame. his enemies. His interests lay with Kabila, not from Goma in the far east of DRC across the Uganda’s president was (and still is) Yoweri with Rwanda or Uganda. Congo River basin to seize Kitona Airfield near the Atlantic coast and then threaten the misconceptions about how decisions are made in many African capital of Kinshasa. The “Kitona Operation” was an countries remain hurdles that must be confronted extremely risky but potentially strategically by U.S. decisionmakers decisive special operation that had as its objective nothing less than the capture of the Museveni. In 1996, both viewed themselves Rwanda’s leaders faced a problem they DRC’s capital, Kinshasa, and the overthrow as representing a “new generation” of African thought they understood and based their of President Laurent Desiré Kabila. Within leaders who were prepared to chart their own calculations on a situation in which their days, however, the raid began to unravel destinies with or without the approval of primary Angolan interlocutors, senior mili- as opposition came from an unexpected others—whether traditional Western powers tary and security officials, misrepresented opponent: Angola. The assault at Kitona is or other African leaders. By contrast, Angola’s their country’s position as well as their an example of a brilliant military operation José Eduardo dos Santos, in power since 1979, decisionmaking mandates. The summer of that ultimately failed because of erroneous could be considered the quintessential “old 1998 was another turning point for the small political assumptions, in this case, a singular style” African strongman. It is not known country, one of many in its 8-year civil war misunderstanding of the strategic political to what extent the generational difference that had led to a genocide in which nearly interests of Angola, the one regional power was a factor in the misunderstanding among 800,000 people were murdered, the Hutu-led that Rwanda and Uganda needed on their Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, but it may have government in Kigali was toppled, and the side more than any other country. It was a strongly influenced the respective leaders’ stability of the new government remained in fault that could have been avoided through assumptions about decisionmaking. question. a better understanding of both the deci- The strategic factors that drove Rwanda Earlier, in 1994, following the victory sionmaking process in Angola and regional and Uganda to turn against Kabila, their of the Tutsi–exile dominated Rwandan power politics. former protégé, and their decision to remove Patriotic Front’s (RPF’s) military wing over Misconceptions about how decisions him from power lay in the civil war that the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armées are made in many African countries, and the began in Rwanda in 1990 and ultimately Rwandaise, or FAR) and its Interahamwe3 importance of the regional political context, led to the 1994 genocide. For Rwanda and militia force, several million Hutus fled west 100 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu STEJSKAL CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAMEROON UGANDA REPUBLIC OF DEMOCRATIC Kisangani CONGO KENY (Brazzaville) REPUBLIC OF THE GABON CONGO Goma ULT Bukavu SA RWANDA AIR AS Kinshasa L BURUNDI WA WITHDRA Kitona TANZANIA Maquela de Zombo ANGOLA MALAWI MOZAMBI ZAMBIA MOROCCO TUNISIA ALGERIA LIBYA EGYPT WESTERN (USCENTCOM SAHARA AOR) MAURITANIA CAPE VERDE MALI NIGER ERITREA SUDAN SENEGAL CHAD THE GAMBIA DJIBOUTI GUINEA- BURKINA FASO BISSAU GUINEA BENIN NIGERIA SOMALIA SIERRA LEONE CÔTE D’IVOIRE ETHIOPIA GHANA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC TOGO LIBERIA CAMEROON EQUATORIAL GUINEA UGANDA REPUBLIC OF CONGO KENYA SAO TOME & PRINCIPE (Brazzaville) GABON DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE RWANDA Cabinda CONGO Enclave BURUNDI (Angola) TANZANIA Operation Kitona SEYCHELLES COMOROS ANGOLA MALAWI MOZAMBIQUE ZAMBIA MADAGASCAR ZIMBABWE NAMIBIA MAURITIUS BOTSWANA Rwandan, Ugandan, Rebel Movements SWAZILAND DRC Government Forces LESOTHO Angolan and Zimbabwean Forces SOUTH AFRICA ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 101 RECALL | The Kitona Operation into neighboring Zaire. Among the refugees southern Africa of “foreign” interference once wanted Kabila’s continued presence as a docile was a large, organized, and armed remnant and for all.7 and compliant neighbor to the north to ensure of the FAR and Interahamwe who, once The AFDL, with Rwandan officers and the eventual victory over UNITA.9 settled among the other refugees in United noncommissioned officers leading the way, Prior to the invasion, the director Nations refugee camps, began preparations quickly overwhelmed Mobutu’s forces and of Rwanda’s external intelligence service, for a guerrilla campaign into Rwanda’s north- forced him to flee into exile. Kabila declared Colonel Patrick Karegeya, conducted a western territory as a prelude to an offensive himself president and thereafter began pursuing number of meetings with senior officials in to reconquer Rwanda. The new RPF govern- his own erratic agenda, which included promot- Angola. Karegeya received assurances from ment in Kigali had intelligence sources in the ing his Lubakat tribe to the exclusion of other two powerful Angolan rivals, General Manuel camps and discovered the plans. Of additional tribal groups.8 This eventually led to a falling Helder Vieira Dias, also known as “Kopelipa,” concern to Kigali was the information that out between the Rwandans and their protege.