sign in sign up
<<
Home , Statutory interpretation

Rabb, Intisar Advanced : Fall 2016 course

Advanced Legislation: Statutory Interpretation

Harvard School Professor Rabb Fall 2016

M, T 8:40a - 10:10a, Pound 100 [email protected] Office hours: M, 3.30p - 5.00p Griswold 402

Syllabus

Overview With the presence and passing of Scalia from the , statutory interpretation has come to occupy – alongside – the locus of arguments around theories of how to interpret law. Moreover, most modern law is contained in and administrative , which tend to confront alongside in almost every area of practice. Building on basic concepts of Legislation and , this course aims to further explore theories of the legislative process, of statutes, and agency implementation of legislation. We will explore ongoing controversies about legislation, regulation, and interpretation, including deep debates about textualist, purposive and dynamic interpretation; about the use of and canons of construction; and about the constitutional foundations of statutory interpretation. Although there is no single subject matter focus of the course, a significant portion of the substantive areas of law will cover and anti-discrimination law.

Prerequisite For JD students, Legislation and Regulation is required. LLM students will need to seek the permission of the instructor to waive the prerequisite and enroll in this course.

1

Rabb, Intisar Advanced Legislation: Statutory Interpretation Fall 2016 course

Course Organization and Grading The class will proceed as follows. It will be divided into a format that allows us to explore both the theory and practice of legislation and statutory interpretation.

On the first day of each week, we will discuss major theories of statutory interpretation based on two articles that are canonical or noteworthy in the field. This “theory day” is largely lecture, for which students prepare the readings and be ready to engage arguments for or against a specific proposition for the week, drawing from the readings.

On the second day of each week, we will analyze actual statutory interpretation cases, keeping in mind the theoretical issues raised (in the aggregate, not just for that week) and the extent to which they apply to interpreting these cases. For this “case day,” students will prepare the cases as if in preparation for a moot court. One student will act as chief and present a summary of the case. Two to four other students will act as lawyers, arguing for or against the question presented. Every other student should be prepared to comment on how they would vote and why following the “court” session, raising additional arguments where relevant. The chief judge will circulate a proposed opinion on one case in which he or she serves in that role (5-7 pages, due the Friday after the moot court at midnight). Other students will write concurrences or dissents (2-3 pages, due the Sunday after the moot court by midnight).

Short Papers – 40%. Students are required to submit 2 writing assignments throughout the course of the semester plus a final paper or opinion at the end: 1 majority opinion and 1 dissenting or concurring opinion. Majority opinions should each be 5-7 pages in length (double- spaced, 12pt font for text / 10pt font for footnotes, 1-inch margins); concurrences or dissents should be 2-3 pages each (same parameters).

Participation – 40%. On “theory day,” students are expected to prepare for general discussion, including a or critique of a weekly proposition based on articles assigned for the week. On “case day,” students are expected to present at least once as a presiding judge and at least once as a for the petitioners or respondents. Some students will also prepare a short (5-7 minute) presentation of final opinions on the final day of class. Participation will be evaluated based on these contributions.

Final Papers/Opinions – 20%. As a final writing assignment, students may choose between writing a short research paper based on one of the propositions covered in class and/or a supplemental article or book, or writing a revised opinion (majority, concurring, or dissenting) that takes the other relevant opinions into account. Either choice should result in a paper or opinion that is 10-15 pages in length (double-spaced, 12pt font for text / 10pt font for footnotes, 1-inch margins), due the last day of class, when we will present and discuss the cases as a wrap- up to the course.

2

Rabb, Intisar Advanced Legislation: Statutory Interpretation Fall 2016 course

Readings Part I. Interpretive Theories

WEEK 1 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: HISTORY AND MAJOR APPROACHES [9/6] Posner v. Scalia; Revolution v. Reform: Recent Debates in Statutory Interpretation

Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of , THE NEW REPUBLI C (Aug. 24, 2012), available at https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-

Bryan A. Garner, Response to Richard A. Posner, LAW PROSE (Sep. 10, 2012) & Richard A. Posner, Response to Bryan Garner, THE NEW REPUBLI C (Sep. 10, 2012), available at https://newrepublic.com/article/107001/how-nuanced-justice-scalias-judicial-philosophy- exchange Jeffrey Green & Ivan Dominguez, Federal Criminal Statutes are Not Blank Checks for , SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 28, 2016), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/ symposium-federal-criminal-statutes-are-not-blank-checks-for-prosecutors/

Michelle Alexander, Amidst Brutality, ‘There’s an Unfinished Revolution Waiting to be Won’, IN THESE TI MES (Jul. 12, 2016), available at http://inthesetimes.com/article/19286/ following-horrific-violence-something-more-is-required-of-us

SUPPLEMENTAL: Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) [author of foreword to Scalia and Garner, READI NG LAW] Richard A. Posner, , Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the , 37 CASE W. L. REV. 179 (1986-87) Carol Chomsky, The Story of Holy Trinity Church v. : Spirit and History in Statutory Interpretation, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORI ES 3-35 (William Eskridge et al. eds., Foundation Press 2011)

CASE: Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 153 U.S. 457 (1892)

STATUTE: Alien Labor Act of 1885

WEEK 2 VS. PURPOSIVISM: INTERPRETIVE DEBATES [9/12-13]

Antonin Scalia, Common-Law in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3-47 (Amy Guttman ed., PUP 1997)

Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992)

SUPPLEMENTAL: William N. Eskridge, Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509-60 (1998) John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006)

ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGI NG STATUTES (Oxford 2014)

CASE: Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) : Endangered Species Act of 1973 3

Rabb, Intisar Advanced Legislation: Statutory Interpretation Fall 2016 course

WEEK 3 LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY VS. [9/19-20]

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L. J. 381 (1989)

John Manning, Second Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287 (2010)

SUPPLEMENTAL: Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation & Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L. J. 281 (1989) Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public : The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L. J. 427 (2005)

Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007 (2011)

CASE: King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. __ (2015)

STATUTES: Affordable Care Act (ACA) §1311 (42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041) Affordable Care Act (ACA) §1401 (IRS Rule, 26 U.S.C. § 36B) Affordable Care Act (ACA) §1401 (IRS Rule, 26 U.S.C. § 1.36B-2) ACA Definitions, 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 ACA Explanatory Comment, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,378

Part II. Interpretive Methods: The Canons of Statutory Interpretation +

WEEK 4 TEXTUAL CANONS: REALIST CRITIQUES [9/26-27]

Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983)

David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 NYU L. REV. 921 (1992)

SUPPLEMENTAL: LISTS OF CANONS

Karl Llewellyn, Appendix, in Remarks on … Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1949-1950)

Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner, Introduction/Table of Contents, to READI NG LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (Westlaw 2012)

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Appendix, in INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION (Foundation 2016)

CASE: Voisine v. U.S.

STATUTES: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence")

WEEK 5 SUBSTANTIVE CANONS: [10/3-4]

Dan Kahan, Lenity and Federal , 1994 SUP. CT. L. REV. 347 (1994)

EI NER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (HUP 2008): Chapter 9

SUPPLEMENTAL: John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003)

4

Rabb, Intisar Advanced Legislation: Statutory Interpretation Fall 2016 course

James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VANDERBILT L. R. 1-116 (2005)

Anita Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L. J. 909 (2016)

CASE: Shaw v. United States

STATUTE: Bank-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (“scheme to defraud a financial institution”)

WEEK 6 EXTRINSIC SOURCE CANONS: AGENCY DEFERENCE [10/17-18] Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989)

Dan Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law? 110 HARVARD L. REV. 469 (1996)

SUPPLEMENTAL: Note, Justifying the Chevron Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123 HARVARD L. REV. 2043 (2010) William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEORGETOWN L. J. 1083 (2008) Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) + Clear Air Act Amendments of 1977 CASE: Lockhart v. United States

STATUTE: 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (crimes “relating to aggravated sexual abuse …”)

Part III. Positive Theories of Statutory Interpretation: Institutional Dialogue

WEEK 7 THE : INSTITUTIONALIST CASE FOR AGENCY DEFERENCE [10/24-25]

ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGI NG UNDER UNCERTAINTY (HUP 2006): Chapter Four

William N. Eskridge, No Frills Textualism, 119 HARVARD L. REV. 2041 (2006)

SUPPLEMENTAL: Adrian Vermeule, The Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005)

Anita Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1823 (2015)

Chris Walker, What King v. Burwell Means for , YALE J. REG.: NOTI CE & COMMENT [BLOG] (June 25, 2015)

CASE: Nichols v. United States

STATUTE: Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42U.5.C. §§ 16913(a), (d) (registration and updating requirements)

5

Rabb, Intisar Advanced Legislation: Statutory Interpretation Fall 2016 course

WEEK 8 CONGRESS: OVERRIDING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION DECISIONS [10/31, 11/1] Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, The Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 SOUTHERN CAL. L. R. 205 (2013) Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEXAS L. R. 1317 + Appendix (2014)

SUPPLEMENTAL: William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L. J. 331 + Appendix (1991) Deborah Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859 (2012)

TEXAS LAW REVIEW: SEE ALSO [BLOG], VOL. 92-93 SYMPOSIUM ON CHRISTIANSEN & ES KRI DG E ARTI CLE (2013-2015) [Responses by James Buatti & Richard L. Hasen; James J. Brudney, Victoria F. Nourse, and Deborah A. Widiss]

CASE: Mathis v. United States

STATUTES: Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (“violent felony”) Iowa Code §702.12 (“burglary”)

WEEK 9 COURTS: HOW COHERENT IS LEGISLATIVE INTENT? [11/7-8] Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons, 65 STANFORD L. R. 901 (2013) Ryan Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works, 66 DUKE L.J. __ (forthcoming 2017)

SUPPLEMENTAL: Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a They, Not an It: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INTʾL REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992)

John Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005) Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613 (2014)

CASE: Luna Torres v. Lynch

STATUTE: Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 1101(a)(43) (“aggravated offense”)

Part IV. Normative Theories of Statutory Interpretation: Institutional Roles

WEEK 10 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS DEMOCRACY (LEGITIMATE USE OF JUDICIAL POWER?) [11/14-15] Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARVARD L. REV. 593 (1995) Victoria F. Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEORGETOWN L. J. 1119 (2011)

SUPPLEMENTAL: WILLIAM N. ES KRI DG E, JR., DYNAMI C STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (HUP 1992)

6

Rabb, Intisar Advanced Legislation: Statutory Interpretation Fall 2016 course

John Manning, Textualism and the of the Statute, 101 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1 (2001) [with response by William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power,” 101 COLUMBIA L. REV. 990 (2001)] Richard Fallon, Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685 (2014) CASE: Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami

STATUTE: Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613, (a)(1)(A) ("an aggrieved person” eligible to pursue relief for Act violations)

WEEK 11 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS ENACTED LAW (AGAINST BACKGROUND VALUES?) [11/21-22]

JEREMY WALD RON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (Clarendon 1999): Chapters 3 and 4

Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as a Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585 (1994)

SUPPLEMENTAL: Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARVARD L. REV. 405 (1989)

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989) Bertrall Ross, Against Constitutional Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2011)

CASE: Ivy v. Morath

STATUTE: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132 (prohibiting deprivation of or discrimination as to “services, programs, or activities”) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 (a) (similar)

WEEK 12 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS JUSTICE (VIEWING LAW AS INTEGRITY?) [11/28-29]

RONALD DW OR KI N, LAW’S EMPIRE (HUP / Belknap, 1986): 313-54 [+ pp. 15-23]

Dworkin v. Scalia: Ronald Dworkin, Response to Justice Scalia, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 115-27 + Antonin Scalia, Reply to Professor Dworkin, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 144-49

SUPPLEMENTAL: GUIDO CALABRESI , A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (HUP 1982) William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, Superstatutes, 50 DUKE L. J. 1215 (2001) [Preview/Summary of A REPUB LI C OF STATUTES (YUP 2010)] Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 Boston U. L. Rev. 551 (2010) [review of RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2010)]

CASE: Beckles v. United States

STATUTE: Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B) (“violent felony”) United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.), § 4B1.2(a)(2) (“crime of violence”)

7

Rabb, Intisar Advanced Legislation: Statutory Interpretation Fall 2016 course

Part V. Oral Argument

WEEK 13 FINAL ORAL ARGUMENTS [12/5]

8