DOCSLIB.ORG

Brief Overview of Statutory Interpretation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Brief Overview of Statutory Interpretation CHAPTER 1 Brief Overview of Statutory Interpretation It is heuristically useful to consider what may be generally thought of as forming certain general principles of statutory interpretation so as to be able to analyse and to identify better what might constitute deficiencies in the methods of interpretation of the TFEU and the ECHR by the CJ, GC and the ECtHR, respectively. Statutory Interpretation1 may 1. ‘Statutory’: ‘Pertaining to or consisting in statutes; enacted created or appointed by statute’; Shorter Oxford Dictionary, vol. II, 3rd edn (Oxford, Clarendon, 1973), 2115; ‘Interpretation’ ‘The action of interpreting; explanation exposition; an explanation given; a way of explaining’. Shorter Oxford Dictionary, vol. I, 3rd edn (Oxford, Clarendon, 1973), 1099; ‘Translation’: ‘The action or process of turning from one language into another: also the product of this; a version in a different language’. Shorter Oxford Dictionary, vol. II, 3rd edn (Oxford, Clarendon, 1973), 2347. It is to be noted that as regards ‘translation’ in the sense of the aforementioned ‘action or process of turning one [human] language into another’ the following analysis is proposed by T Shilling, ‘Beyond Multilingualism: On Different Approaches to the Handling of Diverging Language Versions of a Community Law’ (2010) ELJ (16) 47 at 49-50 argues that the use of multiple translations violates ECHR Art. 6 (2): ‘According to Art 6 (2) of the EU Treaty.’ The Union shall respect fundamental rights guaranteed by [ECHR]. According to Art. 6 (2) of the EU Treaty as to be amended by the Lisbon Treaty the EU shall even accede to the ECHR. The human rights law as developed by the Court of Human Rights under the ECHR requires under two aspects a certain quality of a national law that interferes with a human right: such interference can only be considered as justified by a law if that law is accessible to the citizen and if its effects are foreseeable. Accessibility of a law generally requires its publication in an official journal or in the case of jurisprudence in law reports or a law review. Foreseeability of its effects requires that the law is sufficiently clear for the citizen to foresee if need be with the assistance of a lawyer its effects i.e. what he must or must not do and what he may or may not expect or required from public authorities. As rule of law requirements these aspects must apply also beyond human rights. On the face of its EU laws clearly fulfil the requirement of accessibility: they generally are published in the Official Journal and most Court decisions including nearly all important ones are published in the European Court Reports. Existing problems stem from the EU’s multilingualism concept under which it has as form 1 January 2007, 23 official languages. While Court judgments and individual administrative decisions even if published in the Official Journal in all official languages are authentic only in their respective language of procedure (Note 18 P Kik v OHIM, Case C-361/01 (2007) ECR I 10841, paras 37-38) the other versions being clearly marked as translations all 23 language versions of a legislative act are equally authentic (Note 19 for the founding treaties Art. 314 EC and Art. 53 for secondary legislation CILFIT v Ministero della Sanita (1982) ECR 3415 at para. 18: What are the 49 George Cumming for the purposes of this analysis be conveniently divided into three different ap- proaches in relation to the text of the statute: following Fitzmaurice2 the divisions or approaches to the interpretation of the text involve, firstly, the intentions of the parties; secondly, the textual or ordinary meaning of the words; and thirdly, the teleological or aims and objects method. This classification is not exhaustive but it is felt that the categorizations therein contain the primary analytic methods involved in statutory interpretation. Fitzmaurice3 observes: The ideas of these three schools are not necessarily exclusive of one another and theories of treaty interpretation can be constructed and (are indeed normally held) compounded of all three. However, each tends to confer the primacy on one particular aspect of treaty interpretation if not to the exclusion certainly to the subordination of the others. Each in any case, employs a different approach. For the ‘intentions’ school the prime indeed the only legitimate object is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions or presumed intentions of the parties: the approach is therefore to discover what these were or must be taken to have been. For the ‘meaning of the text’ school the prime object is to establish what the text means according to the ordinary or apparent signification of its terms: the approach is, therefore, through the study and analysis of the text. For the ‘aims and objects’ school it is the general purpose of the treaty itself that counts considered to some extent as having or as having come to have an existence of its own independent of the original intentions of the framers. problems? Quite generally no two texts in different languages will ever have the exactly same meaning. Beyond this truism lies the fact that even significant divergences between different language versions of a text cannot fully be avoided. In the EU context there are two possible sources of this problem which is clearly more acute regarding secondary legislation than regarding the Treaties; in adequate translation and political meddling. In adequate translation is self-explanatory and to a certain degree inevitable: translators are fallible humans. Political meddling happens in the way that members of the different branches of the legislature sometimes develop an interest in the wording of specific language versions which is motivated more politically than linguistically.’ Shilling concludes at p. 66 concerning the violation of ECHR Art. 6 (2) and the conformity of the current system of translations with the aforementioned article: ‘The consequences of the present state of the law are thus at variance with both the quality requirements a law that interferes with liberties has to fulfil under the ECHR. Under both aspects the ‘quality’ of a Community law would be enhanced considerably if that law were authentic in one language only. There is no doubt in my mind that such a state of affairs would come much closer to the goal of permitting the citizen in his own language easy access to a Community law and to foresee its effects than the present one. The ECHR is all about protecting rights that are not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective (Noted 127 ECtHR Artico v Italy, Application 6694/74 Series A no 37, paras 15-16). The equal authenticity of 23 language versions is illusory, the authenticity of only one version accompanied by 22 official translations is effective. Now that the EU has 23 official languages for rule-of-law reasons a reform of its linguistics system is past due.’ 2. GG Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpre- tation and Certain Other Treaty Points’ (1951) BYBIL (28) 1; FG Jacobs, ‘Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft Convention of the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference’ (1969) ICLQ (18) 318; R Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th edn (Vancouver, Butterworths, 2002); J Bell & G Engle, Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd edn (London, Butterworths, 1994), supra. 3. GG Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpre- tation and Certain Other Treaty Points’ (1951) BYBIL (28) 1; ibid., at 1-2; A Carty & RA Smith, Fitzmaurice and the World Crisis 1939-1945 (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2000); JG Merrills, Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and the Discipline of International Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law Books, 1998). 50 Chapter 1: Brief Overview of Statutory Interpretation It is appropriate at this point to consider each of these methods of interpretation in somewhat more detail: (a) Intentional Approach: according to Jacobs4 ‘[this method] attempts to eluci- date the text of the treaty or statute which on this view is merely an expression of the will of the parties by reference to the whole course of negotiations leading to the conclusion of the treaty and seeks to investigate the actual intentions of the parties at the time of the adoption of the final text.’ (b) Meaning of the Text of Textual Approach: following Jacobs5 ‘the textual approach places the principal emphasis on the actual words of the treaty. … Inevitably however an excessive literalism has to be qualified and every advocate of the textual approach readily admits certain qualifications: that extrinsic sources may be used if the text is ambiguous or if the meaning of the words leads to a conclusion which is obviously absurd or unreasonable. (c) Teleological Approach: according once again to Jacobs.6 The teleological approach seeks to interpret the treaty in the light of its objects and purposes. The first question on this approach is not about the meaning of the particular clause which is the subject of interpretation but a broader inquiry into the objects and he purposes of the treaty taken as a whole and individual provisions of the treaty are construed so as to give effect to these objects and purposes. Interestingly, Jacobs,7 not unlike Fitzmaurice, does not see a marked distinction between the three approaches such that he goes on in the same paragraph to relate the teleological approach to the previous two methods: To a certain extent this approach is simply a combination of elements of the first two approaches. In so far as it relies on the objects and purposes of the treaty as they are expressed in the text and especially in the preamble or can be gathered from a reading of the treaty as a whole the teleological approach is essentially a variant of the textual approach.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning
    Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning William N. Eskridge, Jr.* Philip P. Frickey** In the last decade, statutory interpretation has reemerged as an im- portant topic of academic theory and discussion.' This development is welcome, since few topics are more relevant to legal craft and educa- tion than the interpretation of statutes, now our primary source of law. The recent theoretical views, however, contrast with practicing lawyers' strategies of statutory interpretation. When practitioners give advice to clients about what a statute means, their approach is usually eclectic: They look at the text of the relevant statutory provisions, any legislative history that is available, the context in which the legislation was en- acted, the overall legal landscape, and the lessons of common sense and good policy. But when law professors talk about statutory interpre- tation, they tend to posit a more abstract, "grand" theory that privi- leges one or another of these approaches as "foundational."' 2 The commentators' grand theories contrast with the more ad hoc, fact- based reasoning of the practicing lawyer. How do judges interpret statutes? How should they? Many com- mentators argue that judicial interpretation is, or at least ought to be, inspired by grand theory. We think these commentators are wrong, both descriptively and normatively: Judges' approaches to statutory in- terpretation are generally eclectic, not inspired by any grand theory, * Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. ** Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. We thank Daniel Farber, Dennis Patterson, Richard Posner, Suzanna Sherry, and Peter Strauss for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
    [Show full text]
  • Judicial Interpretation of Statutes April 2020
    Judicial Interpretation of Statutes April 2020 Executive Summary Courts in the United States serve several functions. They oversee civil and criminal trials, issue orders requiring or prohibiting certain actions, decide whether a particular law violates the constitution, and determine the meaning of language in a contract or law. This publication discusses the role the courts play in interpreting statutes. The primary focus of statutory interpretation is the language of a statute. Courts only move beyond that language when there is ambiguity. This publication discusses the tests and tools the court uses to resolve ambiguity and includes questions for legislators to consider when crafting legislation. Authority to Interpret Statutes The judicial system in the United States adopted the common law system from England.1 Under that system there were few statutes. Courts developed the law by relying on general principles, following decisions of prior courts, and applying that guidance to the specific facts of a case. The common law tradition gave courts great power to say what the law was, and there was an understanding that courts in the United States retained that power. In one of the most famous decisions by the United States Supreme Court, Marbury v. Madison, the court said: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”2 Every court has the authority to interpret statutes. Minnesota has three levels of courts— district courts, the court of appeals, and the supreme court.
    [Show full text]
  • Statutory Interpretation--In the Classroom and in the Courtroom
    University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1983 Statutory Interpretation--in the Classroom and in the Courtroom Richard A. Posner Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard A. Posner, "Statutory Interpretation--in the Classroom and in the Courtroom," 50 University of Chicago Law Review 800 (1983). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom Richard A. Posnerf This paper continues a discussion begun in an earlier paper in this journal.1 That paper dealt primarily with the implications for statutory interpretation of the interest-group theory of legislation, recently revivified by economists; it also dealt with constitutional interpretation. This paper focuses on two topics omitted in the earlier one: the need for better instruction in legislation in the law schools and the vacuity of the standard guideposts to reading stat- utes-the "canons of construction." The topics turn out to be re- lated. The last part of the paper contains a positive proposal on how to interpret statutes. I. THE ACADEMIC STUDY OF LEGISLATION It has been almost fifty years since James Landis complained that academic lawyers did not study legislation in a scientific (i.e., rigorous, systematic) spirit,' and the situation is unchanged. There are countless studies, many of high distinction, of particular stat- utes, but they are not guided by any overall theory of legislation, and most academic lawyers, like most judges and practicing law- yers, would consider it otiose, impractical, and pretentious to try to develop one.
    [Show full text]
  • Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties
    CURTIS J. MAHONEY Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties ABSTRACT. With the nation's treaty obligations proliferating and foreign affairs cases taking up a growing share of the Supreme Court's docket, it is surprising how undertheorized the field of treaty interpretation remains. To fill this void, some have suggested that textualism, which has had a major impact on statutory interpretation over the past two decades, should be applied to treaty interpretation. This Note rebuts that notion and suggests instead that courts draw from modern contract theory in developing canons of treaty interpretation. AUTHOR. Yale Law School, J.D. zoo6; Harvard College, A.B. 20oo. The author wishes to thank Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., for introducing him to the field of statutory interpretation and for advising the research project that led to this Note. He also wishes to thank Professor Akhil Amar, Aaron Crowell, Justin Florence, Kate Wiltenburg Todrys, and Kimberly Gahan for their comments on earlier drafts. Finally, he wishes to thank Rebecca Iverson Mahoney for all of her love and support. 824 Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal NOTE CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 826 I. STATE OF THE DOCTRINE 827 A. Treaty Interpretation in the Supreme Court 829 B. The Theoretical Problem 833 II. THE CASE FOR TEXTUALISM APPLIED TO TREATIES 834 A. Originalism and Treaty Interpretation 834 B. Public Choice Theory and the Structural Case for Textualism in Statutory Interpretation 838 C. The Structural Argument Applied to Treaty Interpretation 841 D. The Practical Application of Textualism to Treaty Interpretation 844 III.
    [Show full text]
  • Theories of Legislation and Statutory Interpretation: Natural Law and the Intention of the Legislature Patrick J
    Washington University Jurisprudence Review Volume 1 | Issue 1 2009 Theories of Legislation and Statutory Interpretation: Natural Law and the Intention of the Legislature Patrick J. Kelley Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence Part of the Jurisprudence Commons Recommended Citation Patrick J. Kelley, Theories of Legislation and Statutory Interpretation: Natural Law and the Intention of the Legislature, 1 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 47 (2009). Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol1/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Jurisprudence Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Theories of Legislation and Statutory Interpretation: Natural Law and the Intention of the Legislature Patrick J. Kelley* INTRODUCTION Lately, legal scholars have explored an area of research that some of them now call “legisprudence,” which includes the study of the relationship between theories of the legislative process, and theories and techniques of statutory interpretation.1 This relationship is of practical concern to students, lawyers, and judges called on to interpret and apply the law. A significant precondition to thoughtful legisprudence is critical analysis of different theories explaining the legislative process. The agenda in the legal academy for discussing theories of legislation has been set by the brilliant teaching materials put together by William Eskridge and Philip Frickey.2 In the first section of this article, I survey a number of modern theories of legislation and test them by considering their adequacy as an explanation of a federal statute, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA),3 which provides an instructive example of a modern social welfare statute.
    [Show full text]
  • The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation Kevin M
    Vanderbilt University Law School Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2004 The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation Kevin M. Stack Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75 Colorado Law Review. 1 (2004) Available at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/223 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW Volume 75, Number 1 2004 THE DIVERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION KEVIN M. STACK* INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 2 I. THE CONVERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY ........................... 10 A. Scalia's Textualist Originalism........................................ 10 B. Eskridge's Dynamism ......................................................... 15 II. THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF ORIGINALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ..................... 22 A. MajoritarianOriginalism ................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation Mark L
    NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 76 | Number 4 Article 3 4-1-1998 Are Statutes Really Legislative Bargains - the Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation Mark L. Movsesian Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really Legislative Bargains - the Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1145 (1998). Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol76/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARE STATUTES REALLY "LEGISLATIVE BARGAINS"? THE FAILURE OF THE CONTRACT ANALOGY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION MARK L. MOVSESIAN* Recent scholarship draws an analogy between contract and statutory interpretation. In this Article, Professor Movsesian explores and rejects that analogy. There are key differences between contracts and statutes, he argues; the intentionalism of contemporary contract law is inappropriate in the context of statutory interpretation. After critically examining the literature on the topic and demonstratingthe operative distinctions between contracts and statutes, Professor Movsesian provides a useful illustrationin the form of the famous case of Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States. Professor Movsesian shows how a comparison of contract and statutory interpretationsheds light on a number of interesting questions, including the characterof third- party beneficiary contracts, the nature of political representation, the role of bicameralism and presentment in the legislative process, and the ongoing debate about the use of legislativehistory in determining the meaning of statutory language.
    [Show full text]
  • Precedent in Statutory Interpretation Lawrence M
    NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 94 | Number 4 Article 2 5-1-2016 Precedent in Statutory Interpretation Lawrence M. Solan Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 1165 (2016). Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol94/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2016) PRECEDENT IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION* LAWRENCE M. SOLAN** In interpreting statutes, judges frequently refer to their obligation to avoid substituting their own policy preferences for those of the legislature. This principle, “legislative primacy,” has been the most significant motivation for the movement against the use of such extrinsic evidence of legislative intent as a statute’s legislative history. This history is not enacted and can be cherry- picked by judges or anyone else wishing to create a narrative that favors one side or the other. This Article addresses another source of evidence that is not enacted and is subject to selective citation: judicial decisions. U.S. judges are relentless in citing each other as reasons for deciding statutory cases. On occasion, citations demonstrate that the issue before the court has already been decided. Most of the time, however, courts cite each other to demonstrate coherence with a legal narrative, whether the law’s enactment history, the social history surrounding its enactment, the courts’ jurisprudence concerning other issues involving that statute, or the relationship between the law in question and the corpus juris.
    [Show full text]
  • The History of Statutory Interpretation: a Study in Form and Substance, 6 Cardozo L
    University of Miami Law School University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository Articles Faculty and Deans 1985 The iH story of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance William S. Blatt University of Miami School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles Part of the Jurisprudence Commons Recommended Citation William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 799 (1985). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE HISTORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A STUDY IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE William S. Blatt* A history of statutory interpretation has yet to be written, either for the civil or the common law.' Max Radin's observation of 1942 remains true today. Although the process of statutory interpretation has received considerable atten- tion, its history has not. Courts and commentators generally view the field as ahistorical, consisting of a few timeless rules.2 Perhaps this lack of appreciation is related to the modem con- sciousness of the tension between form and substance. Formal justice is associated with rules that are based on ascertainable facts, restrain official arbitrariness, and provide certainty. Substantive justice is as- sociated with standards that direct courts to assess a particular fact situation in terms of the overall objectives of the legal order.
    [Show full text]
  • Statutory Interpretation and the Role of the Courts After Brexit
    Forthcoming in European Public Law 2019 Statutory interpretation and the role of the courts after Brexit MARTIN BRENNCKE* This article evaluates the impact of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 on statutory interpretation and on the role of the courts in the United Kingdom. The Act’s new interpretative obligations create a myriad of issues that will occupy litigants and courts in the future. I explain how the complexities of the Act should be disentangled and how courts should exercise their policy choices under the terms of the Act. I show that the assumption that Brexit is a clear break from EU law is in several respects contradicted by the detail of the legislative scheme. The EUWA’s strong theme of legal continuity has the consequence that domestic law will remain considerably intertwined and aligned with EU law after exit day. I also demonstrate that the 2018 Act adjusts the relationship between the courts and Parliament in a way that is not foreseen. EU membership has shaped this relationship and Brexit does not mean that it is profoundly restructured. The Act has the potential to strengthen rather than weaken the institutional and constitutional position of the courts. Keywords: European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018; Brexit; Supreme Court; retained EU law; judicial law-making; statutory interpretation; parliamentary sovereignty 1 INTRODUCTION As the United Kingdom is preparing to leave the European Union, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (EUWA) converts most of existing EU law into domestic law.1 In this process, the EUWA creates new interpretative obligations, which are riddled with ambiguity, vagueness and gaps.
    [Show full text]
  • Interpretation of EU Law
    Interpretation of EU Law Interpretation of EU Law primary law, such as the creation of a common market. Considering the spirit and purpose of a Hannes Rösler 1. Subject and purpose provision as well as the comprehensive pro- gramme of the European Community can be Neither primary nor secondary EU law contains problematic when different purposes (eg free interpretation rules similar to those in Arts 7–9 market and protection interests) conflict. This CISG, Arts 5:101–5:107 PECL, Arts 4.1–4.8 applies to those directives that serve the overall UNIDROIT PICC and Arts 31–33 VCLT (→ inter- interest of achieving the internal market but also pretation of international uniform law). Instead, address issues such as employee or consumer the → European Court of Justice (ECJ) was protection. created as an independent and supranational On the whole, the judgments often reflect effet court with exclusive jurisdiction over the inter- utile. The practical effectiveness of EU law fre- pretation of European Community and Union quently seems to be the main objective of the law (Art 220 EC, now largely replaced by Art 19 court in its interpretation and development of TEU). This non-political body promotes unity, law (→ principle of effectiveness). This approach continuity and acceptance of EU law. The ECJ can be witnessed in the extending of employ- with its power to provide authoritative inter- ment protection to part-time workers by classi- pretation became a ‘motor of integration’ en- fying them as employees (ECJ Case 53/81 – Levin suring and extending the primacy of EU law. [1982] ECR 1035, para 15).
    [Show full text]
  • Questionable Uses of Canons of Statutory Interpretation: Why the Supreme Court Erred When It Decided Any Only Means Some Anthony L
    Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 96 Article 3 Issue 3 Spring Spring 2006 Questionable Uses of Canons of Statutory Interpretation: Why the Supreme Court Erred When It Decided Any Only Means Some Anthony L. Engel Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Anthony L. Engel, Questionable Uses of Canons of Statutory Interpretation: Why the Supreme Court Erred When It Decided Any Only Means Some, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 877 (2005-2006) This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 0091-4169/06/9603-0877 THE JOURNALOF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 96, No. 3 CopyrightC 2006 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printedin U.S.A. QUESTIONABLE USES OF CANONS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: WHY THE SUPREME COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED "ANY" ONLY MEANS "SOME" I. INTRODUCTION 1 In Small v. United States,2 the United States Supreme Court held that the phrase "convicted in any court" in the United States Criminal Code's unlawful gun possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),3 includes only convictions handed down by domestic, and not foreign, courts.4 With this decision, the Court resolved a circuit split over the question of whether a defendant's convictions from jurisdictions other than U.S.
    [Show full text]