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ISSUE BRIEF Toward Effective Air Defense in Northern

FEBRUARY 2018 GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE

orthern Europe, particularly the Baltic region, is at the forefront of a new competition between NATO and a revanchist capable and willing to use military force to alter the European security order. Since 2014, both the Nand NATO have responded to the changing security environment in with a bolstered exercise program more focused on high-end warfighting and the introduction of NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in , , , and . These efforts provide a foundation, and the beginnings of a deterrence force, for NATO and the region’s continued work to build effective and sustainable defense and deterrence in northern Europe. They are, however, in themselves insufficient without additional enablers, sufficient forward logistics, robust command and control, reinforcement arrangements, and planning and capabilities for the air and maritime domain. In this regard, establishing integrated and robust air defense for the region is the next logical step in protecting NATO’s forward presence, pre-positioned equipment, and the United States’ and NATO’s ability to access and operate in the broader region during a potential crisis or conflict.

Effective air defense in northern Europe must start with a thick sensor The Scowcroft Center for network and then rely on both ground-based assets and aviation, along Strategy and Security with robust command and control, all exercised in a joint setting. No brings together top policymakers, government single nation is able to provide all of these elements by itself; therefore, and military officials, business building effective and integrated air defense must be both a NATO and leaders, and experts from regional effort, supported by contributions from Alliance members. In Europe and this context, the face a particular challenge given their to share insights, strengthen geography and role as frontline states, and also because of the modest cooperation, and develop common approaches to defense resources available and the need to balance investments key transatlantic security among many important priorities in building their national defense challenges. This issue brief capacities. However, with an approach that is integrated with the air was produced in partnership defense efforts currently underway in the region, and within NATO, the with the Ministry of Defense of Baltic States could make valuable contributions to their own defense Lithuania, and continues the Transatlantic Security Initiative’s and to the Alliance’s ability to reinforce the periphery if required. longstanding focus on security in northern Europe and in The Threat in and from the Air Domain particular the Baltic Sea region. The air domain is contested in ways that the United States and its NATO allies have not seen since the end of the Cold War. After nearly three ISSUE BRIEF Toward Effective Air Defense in Northern Europe ISSUE BRIEF Toward Effective Air Defense in Northern Europe

and Su-34 fighter bombers. Air power is, of course, “A Russian attack on inherently strategically mobile, so additional aviation the Baltic States would assets could be quickly brought to bear in the region during a crisis. In addition, Russia maintains Iskander very likely include an ballistic missile batteries with considerable range and initial phase of major air striking power, which could be used to attack basing areas, assembled forces and command and control and long-range strike nodes, or, through intimidation, to deter NATO from operations attack to cut off acting during a crisis. Additionally, Russia places great emphasis on the use of cruise missiles, such as Kalibr, NATO and national forces.” which have considerable reach, good precision, and can be fired from air, sea, or ground platforms. Those decades during which NATO air power enjoyed air missiles are already present in the enclave. supremacy and could operate in relative safety, and From the long-term perspective, Russia continues NATO member forces on the ground did not have to to renew its air power capabilities with the recent be concerned with attacks from the air, the pendulum introduction of the Su-35, and the anticipated arrival is swinging in the other direction. Potential adversaries of the T-50 PAK, Russia’s first fifth-generation fighter. now field modern and sophisticated air forces, along Along with long-range strike systems and manned with long-range strike weapons that can be delivered aviation, NATO and the northern European nations by either air or ground platforms. As NATO once again must consider the emerging threats from unmanned focuses on collective defense and deterrence for its aerial systems, whether large or small. These types of members, particularly in northern Europe, the Alliance systems are being used by Russia and are a priority must once again tackle airborne threats and to advance in terms of further development. Unmanned systems NATO’s ability to operate in the air domain. While this have been used to provide intelligence, surveillance, is an Alliance-wide concern, it has particular urgency and reconnaissance for strikes and battle damage for northern Europe and the Baltic States. assessments in both and Ukraine. Russia is As part of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission, two American F-15s fly over Lithuania during a training mission, April 2014. A Russian attack on the Baltic States would very likely also fielding increasingly capable electronic warfare Photo credit: US Air Force/Flickr. include an initial phase of major air and long-range systems, which were put on display during the most recent Zapad exercise. strike operations to cut off NATO and attack national profile strike exercises against targets in both NASAMS (National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile forces already assembled in the region, command Russia’s growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) and . System) while Latvia invested in the short-range and and control nodes, infrastructure needed to support network in the Baltic Sea region is also part of NATO’s portable Stinger system. Estonia received the first NATO’s reinforcement efforts, and to provide Russian air defense problem. Russia’s A2/AD network includes Current and Future Posture and batch of the Mistral short-range missile system in 2015. ground units with close air support. Indeed, current long-range surface-to-air missile systems, such as the Capabilities in the Region In addition, in 2017, allied ground-based air defense Russian doctrine emphasizes that “strategic objectives S-400, with associated sensors and command and While the Baltic Sea region consists of a number systems, or components of them, have been deployed can be achieved with mass aerospace strikes early in a control. The coverage provided by S-400 and similar of small and medium-sized states, it is not without to the Baltic states for exercises, including a US Patriot conflict with victory achieved without the seizure and systems stretches into the airspace of NATO allies capabilities in terms of air power and air defense, with battery in Lithuania, and in Sweden during the exercise occupation of territory by forces.”1 This type of effort and partners in the Baltic Sea region, which would additional capabilities expected in the coming years. Aurora 17. was rehearsed close to the Baltic region during the challenge NATO’s ability to achieve air superiority, let NATO member Poland and NATO partner Sweden are Russian exercise Zapad 2017 in September. Russia’s NATO air power has been present in the Baltic region alone air supremacy, over its Baltic members. both planning to introduce the Patriot surface-to-air since 2004, when Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined ability to conduct sustained air operations has also missile system, which adds a medium-range air defense the Alliance. Intended to guard the sovereignty of been demonstrated in Syria, where its air power has In addition to the wartime challenge of Russian capability to the region, and provides some capacity to Baltic airspace, the air policing mission today is flown been used to great effect. aviation and long-range strike systems, the Baltic Sea contend with the ballistic missile threat as well. Denmark out of two air bases in Lithuania and Estonia, and region has become a focal point for increased Russian has plans to introduce the F-35 into service, while both Russia’s air power options are robust. It maintains usually includes eight jets from NATO-member air air activity in peacetime. Since 2014, there have been Poland and are considering options for their considerable air power assets near the Baltic Sea region, forces. Since 2014 and the annexation of , the many close encounters between NATO and Russian next generation of fighter jets that would be able to including Su-27 and MiG-31 fighters, Tu-22 bombers, Air Policing effort has at times been expanded with aircraft in the region, where Russia violates aviation operate in a contested environment. safety protocols. At times Russian aircraft have flown as many as sixteen aircraft. The United States has also dangerously close to commercial aircraft flying in the The Baltic States have also made national investments participated in this effort, either as part of a planned 1 Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power: Building a area. Russian aircraft also continue to practice high- in modest air defense capabilities. Lithuania recently rotation or in response to increased Russian activities Military to Support Great Power Aspirations (Washington, DC: started acquisition of the mid-range air defense system in the broader region. Outside of the NATO Air Policing Defense Department, 2017), 33.

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and Estonia, as well as across the broader region. By 2020, the Baltic region is expected to spend some “One of the most urgent $2 billion on defense, with a significant amount going requirements is integrated toward investments in new capabilities. air defense, an effort that Given these strategic and resource considerations, the Baltic States and NATO should consider the following will require investments recommendations: at the national and NATO Alliance-Wide levels.” Transition the NATO Air Policing Mission into an Air be based along Lithuania’s budding medium-range Defense Mission. NATO’s Air Policing mission over air defense capability, which was recently acquired. the Baltic States has served the region and NATO well A Baltic initiative on air defense should be initiated since 2004. However, given the new circumstances in with a scoping exercise on what is affordable and the region and NATO’s return to collective defense and effective given available resources and the capabilities deterrence, it is now time to transition this effort to already available or being introduced in the broader an air defense mission instead. This would include the Baltic Sea region. Polish-Baltic cooperation should increased presence of NATO-member fighter jets and also be explored, as well as a US role to facilitate the airborne surveillance assets, bolstered command and cooperation. control functions, and new rules of engagement for the units deployed in the mission to deter and defend Contribute to Air Domain Awareness. As part of a joint against aggression in the region. Baltic approach to air defense, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should consider how they can contribute to Add an Air Defense Element to the eFP Groups. Many of better air domain awareness, which is key to effective the nations leading and participating in the eFP groups air defense. Adding additional sensors in the Baltic in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have their States, and sharing the resulting air picture with NATO own national surface-based air defense capabilities, and other nations in the broader region, would do A Russian Sukhoi Su-35 jet fighter in flight, August 2009. Photo credit: Aleksandr Markin/Wikimedia. ranging from short to long range assets. These much to help thicken the sensor network in the region, national capabilities could be leveraged for exercises NATO members could also contribute additional sea- in the region, and could initially build familiarity and and air-based defenses. effort, the United States has also had a more frequent The Way Ahead for Air Defense in Northern interoperability with the operational environment. presence in the Baltic Sea region, occasionally with Europe Link NATO Air Defense Mission to Baltic Ground- Consider the Baltic Sea Maritime Domain for Air F-35s. Air defense currently constitutes a weak link in Based Air Defense. Effective air defense for the Baltic Defense. The Baltic States themselves offer little in the emerging defense and deterrence construct in States would require closer integration between From a broader perspective, it is important to note that the way of strategic depth. Sea-based air defense northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region. The Russian NATO’s Air Defense mission and the ground-based the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is assets in the Baltic Sea would offer an opportunity challenge, from and through the air, is very real and air defense systems currently in the region. This could proceeding apace, including with installations in Poland. for deepening the air defense network in the region continues to evolve. New capabilities, in terms of be done by linking the sensors supporting national air While intended for the threat of ballistic missiles from during a crisis. This would require exercises to ensure manned and unmanned systems as well as precision defense systems with the command and control nodes rogue nations, the system also has applicability to a integration and interoperability, as well as a forward strike systems, will make this challenge tougher over supporting the Baltic Air Defense mission. broader range of challenges. naval presence on a rotational basis in the Baltic Sea by time. NATO and the region, however, are not without NATO-member sea-based air defense assets. capabilities, capacities, and possibilities that could be Consider a Baltic Contribution to EPAA. Building This renewed focus on air defense capabilities and national capabilities for defense against ballistic capacities in northern Europe is happening within a combined into a coherent air defense construct for northern Europe. Baltic Cooperation and Integration missiles would be cost-prohibitive for the Baltic States, broader context of increased interest in air defense Create a Regional Approach for Baltic Air Defense. even when considering the increased availability of across NATO. The region is facing similar To meet the challenge, northern Europe requires The Baltic States are small nations with limited means. defense resources in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. challenges to those found in the Baltic Sea region, interoperable and integrated systems that together But given the positive trends in defense spending in However, the Baltic States should consider a national and Romania, for example, recently announced the offer a layered air defense capability. Some of these the region, the aggregate availability of resources contribution to the overall EPAA effort currently procurement of its own Patriot system. components can be delivered by EPAA or by the for defense investment is considerable. A regional underway. Baltic sensor systems could contribute to national capabilities of major NATO allies, but there approach should be leveraged that would pool the the EPAA sensor network to enhance early warning are important roles that the Baltic States can play as available resources to procure larger and more capable capacities, for example. EPAA sensors could also well. This is increasingly possible given the growing air defense systems, including medium-range systems, contribute information to a Baltic air defense network. availability of defense resources in Lithuania, Latvia, for the region. A regional approach to air defense could

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Atlantic Council Board of Directors Conclusion and the US Role NATO has taken important steps to increase defense and regional exercises is key to catalyzing investments INTERIM CHAIRMAN R. Nicholas Burns Reuben Jeffery, III Robert Rangel deterrence in northern Europe, but more work remains and cooperation, which could later be transitioned to *James L. Jones, Jr. *Richard R. Burt Joia M. Johnson Thomas J. Ridge to be done. One of the most urgent requirements NATO. Michael Calvey Stephen R. Kappes Charles O. Rossotti is integrated air defense, an effort that will require CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, INTERNATIONAL James E. Cartwright *Maria Pica Karp Robert O. Rowland investments at the national and NATO levels. This will The air defense challenge in northern Europe, ADVISORY BOARD John E. Chapoton Andre Kelleners Harry Sachinis necessitate close coordination to ensure that sensors, particularly in the Baltic States, is considerable. But Brent Scowcroft Ahmed Charai *Zalmay M. Khalilzad Rajiv Shah shooters, and command and control systems are it can be overcome through careful and coordinated Melanie Chen Robert M. Kimmitt Stephen Shapiro available and aligned to provide layered air defense. investments and cooperation. This will require political CHAIRMAN, Michael Chertoff Henry A. Kissinger Kris Singh The United States has a role to play as a leader of the will, resources, but most importantly strong leadership. INTERNATIONAL George Chopivsky Franklin D. Kramer James G. Stavridis transatlantic alliance, with air defense capabilities ADVISORY BOARD General Philip M. Breedlove, USAF (Ret.) is a board Laura Lane Richard J.A. Steele and capacities that are unrivaled. The United States David McCormick Wesley K. Clark director at the Atlantic Council and previously served David W. Craig Richard L. Lawson Paula Stern can also help energize regional cooperation through as Commander of US European Command and NATO’s PRESIDENT AND CEO *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. *Jan M. Lodal Robert J. Stevens participation in exercises, planning, and capabilities Supreme Allied Commander Europe. *Frederick Kempe development in the region. Early US leadership in Nelson W. Cunningham *Jane Holl Lute Robert L. Stout, Jr. EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRS Ivo H. Daalder William J. Lynn *Ellen O. Tauscher *Adrienne Arsht Ankit N. Desai Wendy W. Makins Nathan D. Tibbits *Stephen J. Hadley *Paula J. Dobriansky Zaza Mamulaishvili Frances M. Townsend VICE CHAIRS Christopher J. Dodd Mian M. Mansha Clyde C. Tuggle *Robert J. Abernethy Conrado Dornier Gerardo Mato Melanne Verveer *Richard W. Edelman Thomas J. Egan, Jr. William E. Mayer Charles F. Wald *C. Boyden Gray *Stuart E. Eizenstat T. Allan McArtor Michael F. Walsh *George Lund Thomas R. Eldridge Timothy McBride Maciej Witucki *Virginia A. Mulberger Julie Finley John M. McHugh Neal S. Wolin *W. DeVier Pierson Lawrence P. Fisher, II Eric D.K. Melby Guang Yang *John J. Studzinski *Alan H. Fleischmann Franklin C. Miller Mary C. Yates *Ronald M. Freeman James N. Miller Dov S. Zakheim TREASURER Laurie S. Fulton Judith A. Miller *Brian C. McK. Henderson HONORARY DIRECTORS Courtney Geduldig *Alexander V. Mirtchev David C. Acheson SECRETARY *Robert S. Gelbard Susan Molinari Madeleine K. Albright *Walter B. Slocombe Gianni Di Giovanni Michael J. Morell James A. Baker, III DIRECTORS Thomas H. Glocer Richard Morningstar Harold Brown Stéphane Abrial Murathan Gunal Edward J. Newberry Frank C. Carlucci, III Odeh Aburdene Sherri W. Goodman Thomas R. Nides Ashton B. Carter *Peter Ackerman Ian Hague J. Nuland Robert M. Gates Timothy D. Adams Amir A. Handjani Franco Nuschese Michael G. Mullen Bertrand-Marc Allen John D. Harris, II Joseph S. Nye Leon E. Panetta *Michael Andersson Frank Haun Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg William J. Perry David D. Aufhauser Michael V. Hayden Sean C. O’Keefe Colin L. Powell Matthew C. Bernstein Annette Heuser Ahmet M. Oren Condoleezza Rice *Rafic A. Bizri Amos Hochstein Sally A. Painter Edward L. Rowny Dennis C. Blair Ed Holland *Ana I. Palacio George P. Shultz *Thomas L. Blair *Karl V. Hopkins Carlos Pascual Horst Teltschik Philip M. Breedlove Robert D. Hormats Alan Pellegrini John W. Warner Reuben E. Brigety II Miroslav Hornak David H. Petraeus William H. Webster Myron Brilliant *Mary L. Howell Thomas R. Pickering *Esther Brimmer Wolfgang F. Ischinger Daniel B. Poneman *Executive Committee Members

Reza Bundy Deborah Lee James Arnold L. Punaro List as of November 30, 2017

6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that ­promotes constructive US leadership and engagement in ­international ­affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in ­meeting today’s global ­challenges.

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