Report Strengthening the Strategic Balance in the Baltic Sea Area
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Report Strengthening the Strategic Balance in the Baltic Sea Area March 2016 Kalev Stoicescu Henrik Praks ISSN 2228-0529 ISBN 978-9949-9448-5-9 Strengthening the Strategic Balance In the Baltic Sea Area 2 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 3 2. The Role of Deterrence and Defence ......................................................................... 4 3. NATO’s Defence Posture ............................................................................................ 7 3.1. The Armed Forces of the Baltic states ................................................................ 7 3.2. Polish Armed Forces ........................................................................................... 8 3.3. Other Allied forces in the Baltic region .............................................................. 8 3.4. NATO reaction forces ....................................................................................... 10 3.5. European military capabilities .......................................................................... 11 3.6. US force posture in Europe .............................................................................. 12 4. Russian Military Posture .......................................................................................... 14 4.1. Russian Armed Forces ...................................................................................... 15 4.2. The Western Military District ........................................................................... 16 4.3. Kaliningrad Oblast and the Baltic Fleet ............................................................ 18 4.4. The Pskov and Leningrad Oblasts ..................................................................... 19 4.5. Belarus .............................................................................................................. 19 5. Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) ...................................................................... 21 6. The Most Likely Worst Scenario .............................................................................. 23 7. NATO’s Defence Posture Compared to Russia’s Military Posture in the Baltic Sea Area .............................................................................................................................. 25 8. Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................ 27 Annex 1 – Russian Armed Forces ................................................................................. 32 Annex 2 – Russian brigade and BTG typical build-up .................................................. 34 Annex 3 - Russian Military Posture in the Kaliningrad Oblast ..................................... 35 Annex 4 - The Suwałki gap ........................................................................................... 36 Some Key References................................................................................................... 37 Strengthening the Strategic Balance In the Baltic Sea Area 3 1. Introduction In the past decade, a new reality has emerged that has profoundly worsened the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic space. Russia has followed an increasingly aggressive anti-Western policy of revisionism and has become, once again, a direct and open threat to NATO. This is particularly true for the Eastern Flank of the Alliance, including the Baltic states and Poland. NATO, as a whole, is vastly superior to Russia, militarily1 and especially economically. But in the sub-regional context of the Baltic Sea area the picture looks quite different, given the obvious imbalance of conventional forces there and certain advantages perceived by Russia, especially those concerning geography and time. The purpose of this paper is to identify the best possible ways to achieve and sustain a durable strategic balance in the Baltic Sea area in order to minimise the risk of overt or covert Russian aggression against the countries of the region. The focus is on regional defence and deterrence against Russia, in terms of the allied combat-ready conventional forces that need to be in place or ready to be deployed to the North- Eastern Flank of NATO. However, due to the methodology adopted in this paper, it is not intended to simply and mechanically calculate the increase in NATO’s forward presence in the Baltic states and Poland and the sufficient and timely reinforcements that would be necessary to counter any type of Russian aggression in the region. The emphasis is on deterrence (think-tanking), rather than warwaging (tank-thinking). While the further strengthening of overall societal resilience and the self-defence capabilities of the Baltic states is an important element in deterring possible Russian aggression, this paper’s focus is on the overall efforts required of the Alliance as a whole to improve the military strategic balance in the region. This paper will argue, from the outset, that NATO’s deterrence against Russia has a particular dimension in the Baltic Sea region.2 Russia will certainly strive to avoid a full-scale war with NATO,3 even if it may threaten to escalate a potential crisis situation, but it could, nevertheless, be tempted to provoke and exploit a “local conflict”. The Western concept of deterrence includes strong political and economic pillars,4 but these alone – in the context of the Baltic Sea area - may not persuade an opportunistic and antagonistic Russia to ignore a favourable moment, even if it miscalculates, to gain political and military victories. Russia may be ready to make certain deals with the West (e.g. JCPOA5 concerning Iran or potentially in Syria), but this has little to do with true cooperation and the strengthening of European security. Dialogue with Russia is necessary, alongside solid deterrence, in order to secure communication and avoid miscalculation, but it should not feed illusions and wishful thinking. Russia’s 1 Except the nuclear component. 2 It is worth mentioning that certain allies on NATO’s southern rim are struggling with other types of threats and challenges, particularly massive illegal immigration. However, the role of NATO, as a defensive military alliance, in dealing with southern non-military threats is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, the preservation of strong solidarity at 28 is crucial for the future of the Alliance. 3 Which would be essentially a WWIII scenario that goes beyond the scope of this study paper. 4 Besides NATO, the EU plays, in this sense, and equally important role. 5 The 5+1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Strengthening the Strategic Balance In the Baltic Sea Area 4 ambitions and intentions are clear – to break up the post-Cold War security architecture, to undermine NATO and the EU, and to weaken the Transatlantic Link – and these goals are not going to change in the foreseeable future. The conclusions and recommendations of this paper are both political and military, and are based on a thorough analysis of the political considerations formulated above and of the requirements for deterrence and defence set out below. They stem from a comparative examination of NATO and Russian military postures, their conventional force distributions in the Baltic Sea theatre, potential reinforcements and Russia’s anti-access and area denial capabilities, and considerations of the most likely worst-case scenario. This paper reflects the personal opinions of the authors and is based solely on public information. The authors are very thankful to the National Defence Committee of the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament) for having sponsored the paper, as well as to a large number of interviewees from Estonia and allied nations for providing valuable insights and background information. 2. The Role of Deterrence and Defence The core business of NATO is to preserve the peace and prevent attacks against allied territory. In the Baltic Sea region this requires the establishment of a credible deterrence and defence posture directed at Russia. Deterrence is aimed at persuading a potential aggressor that the costs of its actions will far outweigh the benefits and/or that the probability of success is low enough not to warrant those actions. Deterrence can be achieved either by threatening to impose unacceptable costs in response to unwanted actions (deterrence by punishment) or by threatening to deny an adversary the ability to achieve its military and political objectives through aggression (deterrence by denial). The strategy of deterrence by punishment may combine various political, economic and military (conventional and nuclear) instruments. Deterrence by denial relies mostly on conventional military forces and is closely linked to the existence of capabilities for forward defence and to the resilience of the targets of aggression. To be successful, a deterrence posture needs to be credible in the eyes of the adversary. World history abounds with cases where deterrence failed because the attacking states underestimated the other party’s ability and/or determination to fight.6 Therefore, the credibility of deterrence requires: 1) political will and resolve to respond forcefully to aggression; 2) effective means of response (military capability); 3) visible signals of resolve and the capability to influence an adversary´s perceptions. Thus NATO´s defence and deterrence strategy in the Baltic Sea region and its military posture has not only to assure the populations