DOCSLIB.ORG

Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements C O R P O R A T I O N Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements Bryan Frederick, Matthew Povlock, Stephen Watts, Miranda Priebe, Edward Geist For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1879 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9863-4 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The escalation in tensions between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 2014 has led to numerous proposals to enhance U.S. and NATO posture on the Alliance’s eastern flank. Despite its overall military advantages, NATO faces a clear imbal- ance in conventional capabilities in regions bordering Russia, such as the Baltics. To address this local imbalance, analysts and policymakers have designed proposals to increase the appar- ent costs and reduce the probability of success of any attack on a NATO member that Russia might contemplate. Whatever posture enhancements the United States and NATO decide to pursue, their goal is to produce a change in Russian behavior. Therefore, the nature of Russian responses will determine the utility and advisability of whatever actions NATO decides to take. Potential Russian reactions could run the gamut, from tacit acceptance of U.S. and NATO actions and a reduction in any willingness to consider an attack on NATO, to a sharp increase in nearby Russian forces designed to counterbalance U.S. and NATO moves, to a precipitous escalation to direct conflict. Russia could also respond to U.S. and NATO military moves by attempting to exploit nonmilitary vulnerabilities in the United States or other NATO coun- tries. Assessing the likelihood of potential Russian reactions is therefore a vital component of any analysis regarding which posture enhancements the United States and NATO should pursue. This report develops a framework that analysts can use for this purpose. The research reported here was commissioned by Brig Gen Mark D. Camerer, United States Air Forces in Europe, and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of the fiscal year 2016 project U.S. Air Power and Mos- cow’s Emerging Strategy in the Russian Near Abroad. RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF pro- vides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. The research reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000. Additional information about PAF is available on our website: http://www.rand.org/paf/ This report documents work originally shared with the U.S. Air Force on September 29, 2016. The draft report, issued on September 30, 2016, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and U.S. Air Force subject-matter experts. iii Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... iii Figures and Tables .............................................................................................vii Summary ........................................................................................................ ix Acknowledgments .............................................................................................xv Abbreviations ................................................................................................. xvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 Building a Framework for Assessing Russian Reactions ..................................................... 2 Organization of This Report .................................................................................... 3 CHAPTER TWO Current, Planned, and Proposed Postures in Europe .................................................... 5 NATO Posture in Europe and Overall Capabilities ......................................................... 5 U.S. Posture in Europe and Overall Capabilities ...........................................................10 Russian Posture and Overall Capabilities ...................................................................12 Planned Posture Initiatives .....................................................................................15 Posture Enhancement Proposals ..............................................................................19 CHAPTER THREE Factors Affecting Russian Decisionmaking ..............................................................25 Strategic Context ............................................................................................... 26 Russian Domestic Context .....................................................................................33 Characteristics of Posture Enhancements ...................................................................41 Summary of Factors ........................................................................................... 50 CHAPTER FOUR Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements ...........................53 Assessing Potential Russian Reactions to In-Progress NATO Posture Enhancements .................53 Assessing Potential Russian Reactions to Future NATO Posture Enhancements .......................59 CHAPTER FIVE Conclusion ......................................................................................................73 Key Observations Regarding Russian Decisionmaking ....................................................73 Policy Implications ..............................................................................................74 v vi Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements APPENDIXES A. Russian Decisionmaking in Key Cases ............................................................... 77 B. Key NATO and Russian Interactions, 1995–2015 .................................................. 99 References ..................................................................................................... 109 Figures and Tables Figures 2.1. NATO Members, by Region ...................................................................... 7 2.2. Russian Military Districts ........................................................................13 A.1. Map of Georgia ....................................................................................89 Tables S.1. Key Factors Likely to Affect Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements ....................................................................................... x 2.1. NATO-Member Ground Forces, by Location and Type, 2015 ............................... 9 2.2. NATO-Member Air Forces, by Location and Type, 2015 ....................................10 2.3. NATO-Member Naval Forces, by Location and Type, 2015 .................................10 2.4. U.S. Forces in Europe, 2015 ......................................................................12 2.5. Russian Forces, by Military District and Type, 2015 ..........................................14 2.6. NATO and Russian Force Comparison, 2015 .................................................15 2.7. Summary of Planned NATO Posture Initiatives ..............................................16 2.8. Posture Enhancement Proposals .................................................................19 3.1. Key Factors Likely to Affect Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements ......................................................................................51 4.1. Status of the Key Factors Likely to Affect Russian Reactions to Near-Term NATO Posture Enhancements ...................................................................58 4.2. Key Strategic and Russian Domestic Factors, Baseline Scenario............................ 64 4.3. Key Strategic and Russian Domestic Factors, Russia Lashes Out Scenario ............... 66 4.4. Key Strategic and Russian Domestic Factors, Weakened West Scenario ...................67 4.5. Proposed NATO Posture Enhancements and the Key Characteristics
Load more

Recommended publications
  • OPERATION NEMTSOV”: 307 Disinformation, Confusion MARCH and Some Worrying Hypotheses 2015
    Centro de Estudios y Documentación InternacionalesCentro de Barcelona E-ISSN 2014-0843 D.L.: B-8438-2012 opiniónEuropa “OPERATION NEMTSOV”: 307 Disinformation, confusion MARCH and some worrying hypotheses 2015 Nicolás de Pedro, Research Fellow, CIDOB Marta Ter, Head of the North Caucasus department at the Lliga dels Drets dels Pobles he investigation into the assassination of Boris Nemtsov reminds previ- ous ones on high-profile political killings, although the uncertainties grow with every new revelation. The verified, documented connec- Ttion between the main suspect, Zaur Dadayev, and Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechen strongman and close ally of Putin strengthens the theory linking the crime to the Kremlin and suggests possible internal fighting within the state security apparatus. Nemtsov joins a long list of critics and opponents who have been assassinated in the last fifteen years. Among the most prominent are:Sergey Yushenkov, member of parliament for the Liberal Russia party (assassinated on April 17th, 2003); Yuri Shchekochikhin, journalist on the Novaya Gazeta (July 3rd, 2003); Paul Klebnikov, US journalist of Russian origin and editor of the Russian edition of Forbes (July 9th, 2004); Anna Politkovskaya, journalist for Novaya Gazeta (October 7th, 2006); Alexander Litvinenko, former KGB/FSB agent (November 23rd, 2006); and Na- talya Estemirova, human rights activist for the Chechen branch of the NGO Me- morial (July 15th, 2009). Each of these assassinations has its own particularities, but none has been properly explained and all of the victims were people who dis- comfited the Kremlin. Despite this, political motivations and possible connections with state apparatus are the only lines of investigation that have been systemati- cally ignored or explicitly denied in all of these cases.
    [Show full text]
  • Mikhail Gorbachev and the NATO Enlargement Debate: Then and Now 443
    Mikhail Gorbachev and the NATO Enlargement Debate: Then and Now 443 Chapter 19 Mikhail Gorbachev and the NATO Enlargement Debate: Then and Now Pavel Palazhchenko The purpose of this chapter is to bring to the attention of research- ers materials relating to the antecedents of NATO enlargement that have not been widely cited in ongoing discussions. In the debate on NATO enlargement, both in Russia and in the West, the issue of the “assurances on non-enlargement of NATO” giv- en to Soviet leaders and specifically Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989-1990 has taken center stage since the mid-1990s. The matter is discussed not just by scholars, journalists and other non-policy-makers but also by major political figures, particularly in Russia, including President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. In the West, there has recently been renewed interest in the subject following the publi- cation of some declassified material by the National Security Archive, a Washington, D.C., non-profit organization with a somewhat mislead- ing name. While some of the aspects of the discussion of the “assurances” are similar in Russia and the West (conflation of fact and opinion, of bind- ing obligations and remarks relating to expectation or intent) the sub- text is different. In Russia most commentators accuse Gorbachev of being gullible and naïve and blithely accepting the assurances instead of demanding a binding legal guarantee of non-enlargement. In the West, the subtext is more often of the West’s bad faith in breaking what is supposed to be an informal “pledge of non-enlargement” given to Gor- bachev.
    [Show full text]
  • G20 UPDATE E-NEWSLETTER Issue #17 - October 2013
    subscribeasdf aklsd jflksdj to the flksdjnewsletter flsdkj flksdj df f d f d fd fdfsssflsdjfldsjf lkdsj(click flksdj fklsdjhere) flksdj flkdsjf lksdjf lksdfj G20 UPDATE E-NEWSLETTER Issue #17 - October 2013 2012 2013 2014 CC BY-SA 2.0 (kurt) CC BY-SA 2.0 (LHOON) Reflections on the Summit Must Read In “Investment in the In “Building on mixed In “The G20 St. In “Reflections from the --Insights from the Future: Preliminary success – from St Petersburg Summit – 2013 Russian G20 BRICS results of Russia’s G20 Petersburg 2013 to Bubbles, Casinos and Summit,” Michael --News from “Down Presidency,” Brisbane 2014,” Nancy Inactivity,” Sameer Switow, Global Council of Under” O. Buklemishev, Associate Waites, Head of Policy Dossani, Advocacy the Global Call to Action --New Think Tank professor at the Economics Research & Government Coordinator, Reshaping Against Poverty (GCAP), Publications Department of Moscow Relations, World Vision Global Power, Action Aid reviews highlights of the State University and Australia, provides a view International describes G20 Summit as they relate member of the Expert of the Russian G20 Summit-related issues, to: international Council for the Russian G20 Summit and the transition such as the currency development, remittances, Presidency, provides an in- to the Australian crises and tax reform. infrastructure, gender, and depth report of the G20’s Presidency. tax avoidance. strengths, weaknesses, and tensions in promoting economic recovery. Pages 3-5 Pages 6-8 Pages 9-11 Pages 12-14 Pages 8 | 14 | 15 a UPDATE Introduction Highlights of the Russian G20 Summit Introduction G20 Nancy Alexander, Heinrich Böll Foundation - North America At the September 2013 G20 Summit Arguably, the Summit’s main Buklemishev, the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Minsk II a Fragile Ceasefire
    Briefing 16 July 2015 Ukraine: Follow-up of Minsk II A fragile ceasefire SUMMARY Four months after leaders from France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia reached a 13-point 'Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements' ('Minsk II') on 12 February 2015, the ceasefire is crumbling. The pressure on Kyiv to contribute to a de-escalation and comply with Minsk II continues to grow. While Moscow still denies accusations that there are Russian soldiers in eastern Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly admitted in March 2015 to having invaded Crimea. There is mounting evidence that Moscow continues to play an active military role in eastern Ukraine. The multidimensional conflict is eroding the country's stability on all fronts. While the situation on both the military and the economic front is acute, the country is under pressure to conduct wide-reaching reforms to meet its international obligations. In addition, Russia is challenging Ukraine's identity as a sovereign nation state with a wide range of disinformation tools. Against this backdrop, the international community and the EU are under increasing pressure to react. In the following pages, the current status of the Minsk II agreement is assessed and other recent key developments in Ukraine and beyond examined. This briefing brings up to date that of 16 March 2015, 'Ukraine after Minsk II: the next level – Hybrid responses to hybrid threats?'. In this briefing: • Minsk II – still standing on the ground? • Security-related implications of the crisis • Russian disinformation
    [Show full text]
  • NATO Expansion: Benefits and Consequences
    University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 2001 NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences Jeffrey William Christiansen The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Christiansen, Jeffrey William, "NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences" (2001). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8802. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8802 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ■rr - Maween and Mike MANSFIELD LIBRARY The University of M ontana Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in published works and reports. **Please check "Yes" or "No" and provide signature** Yes, I grant permission X No, I do not grant permission ________ Author's Signature; Date:__ ^ ^ 0 / Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with the author's explicit consent. MSThe»i9\M«r«f»eld Library Permission Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NATO EXPANSION: BENEFITS AND CONSEQUENCES by Jeffrey William Christiansen B.A. University of Montana, 2000 presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts The University of Montana 2001 Approved by: hairpers Dean, Graduate School 7 - 24- 0 ^ Date Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO Enlargement Reloaded
    Research Paper Research Division - NATO Defense College, Rome - No. 81 – September 2012 NATO Enlargement Reloaded by Karl-Heinz Kamp 1 The dispute about who will become a new NATO member and when is Contents set to make it back on the transatlantic agenda. Debates in the Alliance have for years been dominated by the operations in Afghanistan or the Two Difficult Membership evolution of NATO’s partnership approach, but now the enlargement Applicants 2 question is coming up again and might lead to strong disagreements The Roots of the Debate 3 among the allies. All NATO nations certainly concur that the door for Russia and Enlargement 4 new members should remain open; the question is which countries Georgia in NATO – Pros and Cons 5 should join the Alliance, and when? How to Deal With the Membership Question? 7 At NATO’s Chicago Summit in May 2012, US Foreign Secretary Hillary Clinton suggested that Chicago should be the last NATO summit not explicitly focusing on enlargement.2 From this statement, which went largely unnoticed by the public, it can be logically inferred that all forthcoming summits should deal with inviting new members to join NATO, showing the degree of emphasis the US government is set to place on the enlargement issue in the coming years. Even if a statement of this kind in Chicago – in the midst of the presidential campaign and at the first NATO summit on US territory since 1999 – is partly directed to a domestic audience, it still shows the current Research Paper mood in US political circles: NATO enlargement is regarded as a ISSN 2076 - 0949 unique benefit, and the United States sees itself as the spearhead of (Res.
    [Show full text]
  • 10 Years After Bucharest Why NATO Should Double-Down on Georgian
    C - 0; M - 95; Y - 100; K - 2; PANTONE 485 CP C - 0; M - 98; Y - 91; K - 30; PANTONE 7621 CP C - 0; M - 97; Y - 87; K - 60; PANTONE 7624 CP POLICY BRIEF EUROPE IN THE WORLD PROGRAMME 3 JULY 2018 10 years after Bucharest Why NATO should Amanda Paul Senior Policy Analyst, EPC double-down on Ana Andguladze Georgian membership Policy Researcher, ISPED 2018 is a momentous year for Georgia: it marks the interest to strengthen ties with Tbilisi. As a reliable 100th anniversary of the first Democratic Republic of partner that shares common interests and values, the Georgia. It is also the 10th anniversary of the war with country offers the West a strategic foothold in the South Russia (August 2008) and of the Bucharest Summit, Caucasus. The Alliance must reaffirm its membership when Tbilisi was promised a seat at NATO’s table. commitment and reiterate that no third country has a veto on its enlargement. It should further deepen A decade on, NATO-Georgia cooperation has practical cooperation and bolster Georgia’s ability substantially deepened. The country now meets to defend itself. Reaffirming NATO’s support would NATO standards in many areas: it has modernised its reassure Georgian society, boost reform efforts and move armed forces and interoperability between Georgian the country ever closer to the Alliance. troops and the armies of NATO countries has increased. Georgia has contributed more to international NATO missions than many existing members and also meets the Alliance’s defence spending target. Tbilisi has also undertaken reforms to strengthen democracy, eradicate Georgia has contributed more to corruption and ensure civilian control of the military.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Hybrid Tactics in Georgia
    Russian Hybrid Tactics in Georgia Niklas Nilsson SILK ROAD PAPER January 2018 Russian Hybrid Tactics in Georgia Niklas Nilsson © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center American Foreign Policy Council, 509 C St NE, Washington D.C. Institute for Security and Development Policy, V. Finnbodavägen 2, Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden www.silkroadstudies.org “Russian Hybrid Tactics in Georgia” is a Silk Road Paper published by the Central Asia- Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Joint Center. The Silk Road Papers Series is the Occasional Paper series of the Joint Center, and addresses topical and timely subjects. The Joint Center is a transatlantic independent and non-profit research and policy center. It has offices in Washington and Stockholm and is affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council and the Institute for Security and Development Policy. It is the first institution of its kind in Europe and North America, and is firmly established as a leading research and policy center, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders, and journalists. The Joint Center is at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security, and development in the region. Through its applied research, publications, research cooperation, public lectures, and seminars, it functions as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion regarding the region. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this study are those of
    [Show full text]
  • Boris Nemtsov 27 February 2015 Moscow, Russia
    Boris Nemtsov 27 February 2015 Moscow, Russia the fight against corruption, embezzlement and fraud, claiming that the whole system built by Putin was akin to a mafia. In 2009, he discovered that one of Putin’s allies, Mayor of Moscow City Yury Luzhkov, BORIS and his wife, Yelena Baturina, were engaged in fraudulent business practices. According to the results of his investigation, Baturina had become a billionaire with the help of her husband’s connections. Her real-estate devel- opment company, Inteco, had invested in the construction of dozens of housing complexes in Moscow. Other investors were keen to part- ner with Baturina because she was able to use NEMTSOV her networks to secure permission from the Moscow government to build apartment build- ings, which were the most problematic and It was nearing midnight on 27 February 2015, and the expensive construction projects for developers. stars atop the Kremlin towers shone with their charac- Nemtsov’s report revealed the success of teristic bright-red light. Boris Nemtsov and his partner, Baturina’s business empire to be related to the Anna Duritskaya, were walking along Bolshoy Moskovo- tax benefits she received directly from Moscow retsky Bridge. It was a cold night, and the view from the City government and from lucrative govern- bridge would have been breathtaking. ment tenders won by Inteco. A snowplough passed slowly by the couple, obscuring the scene and probably muffling the sound of the gunshots fired from a side stairway to the bridge. The 55-year-old Nemtsov, a well-known Russian politician, anti-corrup- tion activist and a fierce critic of Vladimir Putin, fell to the ground with four bullets in his back.
    [Show full text]
  • Dear Members of the FIDE Electoral Integrity Committee, I Write Regarding the Complaint That You Have Received from Mr. Arkady
    Dear members of the FIDE Electoral Integrity Committee, I write regarding the complaint that you have received from Mr. Arkady Dvorkovich, I would like to note the following; 1. The positions of principals are awarded to people on the basis of their experience and the valuable voluntary contribution towards the functioning of FIDE. This has been a standing principle. With regards to the countries mentioned in Mr. Dvorkovich's complaint; Austria, Georgia, Greece, Germany, I further inform you that; a) Nikolopoulos, Takis (GRE), Japaridze, Marika (GEO), Tandashvili, Margarita (GEO) were proposed for nomination by the Organizers b) Deventer, Klaus (GER), Kytharidis, Argiris (GRE) were proposed for nomination by Europe (ECU) c) The Chief Arbiter, Takis Nikolopoulos, proposed for nomination in order to ensure the best possible team for the pairings, the remaining three officials; Herzog, Heinz (AUT) (Owner Of Swiss Manager Program - Olympiad Version, Used In Every Olympiad Since 2010) Krause, Christian (GER) (Swiss Pairings Programs Commission Chairman, Owner Of The Swiss Pairings Program For Olympiad - Countercheck Of Swiss Manager), Stubenvoll, Werner (AUT) (Qualification Commission Chairman, Swiss Manager Program Specialist) Subsequently, out of the eight persons mentioned by Mr. Dvorkovich, neither FIDE nor I have nominated any of them. I only approved these persons, in accordance with FIDE regulations. I fear that the attack which Mr. Dvorkovich attempts to make is mainly a political one, especially in regards to Georgia, which being the country that organises the Olympiad was entitled to even more than two Principals that they were awarded to them. Regrettably, although Mr. Dvorkovich runs for the presidency of a global sports organization, he is unable to separate that from his own country's political agenda, or the clear need for a politically independent FIDE President, in accordance with the principles of the IOC to which FIDE is affiliated.
    [Show full text]
  • Taming the Trolls: the Need for an International Legal Framework to Regulate State Use of Disinformation on Social Media
    Taming the Trolls: The Need for an International Legal Framework to Regulate State Use of Disinformation on Social Media * ASHLEY C. NICOLAS INTRODUCTION Consider a hypothetical scenario in which hundreds of agents of the Russian GRU arrive in the United States months prior to a presidential election.1 The Russian agents spend the weeks leading up to the election going door to door in vulnerable communities, spreading false stories intended to manipulate the population into electing a candidate with policies favorable to Russian positions. The agents set up television stations, use radio broadcasts, and usurp the resources of local newspapers to expand their reach and propagate falsehoods. The presence of GRU agents on U.S. soil is an incursion into territorial integrity⎯a clear invasion of sovereignty.2 At every step, Russia would be required to expend tremendous resources, overcome traditional media barriers, and risk exposure, making this hypothetical grossly unrealistic. Compare the hypothetical with the actual actions of the Russians during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Sitting behind computers in St. Petersburg, without ever setting foot in the United States, Russian agents were able to manipulate the U.S. population in the most sacred of domestic affairs⎯an election. Russian “trolls” targeted vulnerable populations through social media, reaching millions of users at a minimal cost and without reliance on established media institutions.3 Without using * Georgetown Law, J.D. expected 2019; United States Military Academy, B.S. 2009; Loyola Marymount University M.Ed. 2016. © 2018, Ashley C. Nicolas. The author is a former U.S. Army Intelligence Officer.
    [Show full text]
  • STRATEGY of “CONSTRAINMENT” Countering Russia’S Challenge to the Democratic Order
    Atlantic Council STRATEGY OF “CONSTRAINMENT” Countering Russia’s Challenge to the Democratic Order PREPARED BY Ash Jain and Damon Wilson (United States) Fen Hampson and Simon Palamar (Canada) Camille Grand (France) IN COLLABORATION WITH Go Myong-Hyun (South Korea) James Nixey (United Kingdom) Michal Makocki (European Union) Nathalie Tocci (Italy) Acknowledgment The Atlantic Council would like to acknowledge the generous financial support provided by the Smith Richardson Foundation for this effort. STRATEGY OF “CONSTRAINMENT” Countering Russia’s Challenge to the Democratic Order PREPARED BY Ash Jain and Damon Wilson, Atlantic Council (United States) Fen Hampson and Simon Palamar, Centre for International Governance Innovation (Canada) Camille Grand, Foundation for Strategic Research (France) IN COLLABORATION WITH Go Myong-Hyun, Asan Institute for Policy Studies (South Korea) James Nixey, Chatham House (United Kingdom) Michal Makocki, former official, European External Action Service (European Union) Nathalie Tocci, Institute of International Affairs (Italy) © 2017 The Atlantic Council of the United States and Centre for International Governance Innovation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council or Centre for International Governance Innovation, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to: Atlantic Council Centre for International Governance Innovation 1030 15th Street, NW, 12th Floor 67 Erb Street West Washington, DC 20005 Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 6C2 ISBN: 978-1-61977-434-6 Publication design: Krystal Ferguson The views expressed in this paper reflect those solely of the co-authors.
    [Show full text]