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NATO Enlargement Reloaded Research Paper Research Division - NATO Defense College, Rome - No. 81 – September 2012 NATO Enlargement Reloaded by Karl-Heinz Kamp 1 The dispute about who will become a new NATO member and when is Contents set to make it back on the transatlantic agenda. Debates in the Alliance have for years been dominated by the operations in Afghanistan or the Two Difficult Membership evolution of NATO’s partnership approach, but now the enlargement Applicants 2 question is coming up again and might lead to strong disagreements The Roots of the Debate 3 among the allies. All NATO nations certainly concur that the door for Russia and Enlargement 4 new members should remain open; the question is which countries Georgia in NATO – Pros and Cons 5 should join the Alliance, and when? How to Deal With the Membership Question? 7 At NATO’s Chicago Summit in May 2012, US Foreign Secretary Hillary Clinton suggested that Chicago should be the last NATO summit not explicitly focusing on enlargement.2 From this statement, which went largely unnoticed by the public, it can be logically inferred that all forthcoming summits should deal with inviting new members to join NATO, showing the degree of emphasis the US government is set to place on the enlargement issue in the coming years. Even if a statement of this kind in Chicago – in the midst of the presidential campaign and at the first NATO summit on US territory since 1999 – is partly directed to a domestic audience, it still shows the current Research Paper mood in US political circles: NATO enlargement is regarded as a ISSN 2076 - 0949 unique benefit, and the United States sees itself as the spearhead of (Res. Div. NATO Def. Coll., Print) ISSN 2076 - 0957 the movement in favor of this. (Res. Div. NATO Def. Coll., Online) NATO Defense College With regard to most countries currently applying for NATO Research Division membership, the issue is hardly controversial within the Alliance.3 Via Giorgio Pelosi, 1 00143 Rome – Italy web site: www.ndc.nato.int e-mail: [email protected] 1 Karl-Heinz Kamp is the Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College. The views expressed in this paper are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Imprimerie Deltamedia Group the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Via Portuense 1555, 00148 Rome, Italy 2 At the Atlantic Council meeting on May 21, Foreign Secretary Clinton stated: “... I believe this summit www.deltamediagroup.it should be the last summit that is not an enlargement summit”. See http://www.state.gov/secretary/ rm/2012/05/190466.htm © NDC 2012 all rights reserved 3 In December 2011, NATO defined Georgia, FYROM, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina as “aspir- ant countries” and gave particular recognition to their interest in membership. 1 Research Paper No. 81 - September 2012 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia revival of the debate is set to bring the Georgia issue (FYROM)4 was ready to join NATO as early as to the fore again. However, the battle order has in 2009, together with Albania and Croatia. An almost the meantime apparently changed to a significant bizarre dispute about the name of the country led degree. In particular, informal discussions within the Greece to veto FYROM’s accession and keeps it still Alliance in mid-2012 showed that Washington heads pending. Other allies, particularly the United States, a large majority of NATO members in favor of are becoming increasingly impatient with the Greek enlargement (including Georgia), whereas Germany obstructionism on this question. In March 2012, 54 and only a few others still strongly oppose such a members of the US Congress sent a letter to president step. Obama pressing for timely admission of FYROM. The FYROM case is thus more a procedural issue, This paper evaluates what is at stake in the newly and not a dispute on a “yes” or “no” to membership. emerging enlargement debate. What are the pros The very moment Athens lifts its blockade, FYROM and cons of Georgian NATO membership, and can become a member immediately. how should the Alliance proceed? Montenegro was admitted to NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) in December 2009, and is said to Two Difficult Membership Applicants have progressed significantly in meeting membership requirements since then. Bosnia-Herzegovina was The dispute over Georgian membership within invited to join the MAP in April 2010, albeit with NATO dates back to the Bucharest Summit in April certain conditions attached. According to those in 2008. Georgia was one of the first to sign NATO’s favor of their accession, both these relatively small Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, and countries deserve an invitation to join NATO in always justified its strong desire to join the Alliance the near future. This holds all the more true as their with what it perceived as the threat emanating from integration into Alliance structures would not pose Russia. In 2008, according to Georgian polls, 77% insurmountable problems and, by contrast with such of the public supported a referendum on NATO cases as the (former) application of Ukraine, should membership. In the weeks prior to the summit, not stir up Russian protest. Georgia as well as Ukraine strengthened their demands for membership, the immediate goal being The crunch point of the enlargement question, admission to the MAP. In NATO, there was a tacit however, is Georgia, a country that was involved in consensus to keep the door for both countries open, a war with Russia and still has Russian occupation but at the time it was felt that it was still premature forces on its territory in the renegade regions of to take them into the MAP. Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2008, the George W. Bush administration was pushing strongly for At the summit, President George W. Bush surprisingly Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO – in the case started touting again for rapid NATO membership of Georgia, despite (or because of) its dispute with for both countries. Many allies were highly skeptical Russia – whereas Germany, France and many others with regard to the wisdom of such a step. Ukraine is were opposed to rapid admission of these two the second largest country in Europe (after Russia), countries. The case was settled with a compromise, with a large pro-Russian population in its Eastern and hardly anything more has been done on it since part and with particular historical significance for then. Now, after a long, undeclared “cease-fire” Moscow. Its integration into NATO did not seem within the Alliance over enlargement, the upcoming feasible, and could have led to fierce Russian protest, 4 Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. 2 No. 81 - September 2012 Research Paper probably ending NATO-Russia cooperation once against Georgia if the country had already been a and for all. While Georgia would have been a much member of the Alliance. Opponents of Georgian smaller bite to digest, it was already engaged in a long- membership pointed to the difficult situation for smoldering conflict with Russia over its renegade Alliance if one of its members were to be involved regions (Russia had shot down a Georgian drone in a war with Russia. over Abkhazia). There was thus general concern that the escalation of the conflict could drag NATO into In the meantime, the other “difficult” NATO an Article 5 situation if Georgia were to become a applicant (Ukraine) indicated that it was no longer NATO member. interested in speedy admission to the Alliance. In June 2010 the Ukrainian parliament adopted a law In Bucharest, NATO reached consensus by not declaring that the country would pursue a non-bloc taking Georgia and Ukraine into the MAP, but giving policy, i.e. it would not participate in political-military both countries an explicit promise that they would alliances but would further develop its partnership be admitted to the Alliance. The Summit declaration with NATO from a non-aligned position.6 Hence, it stated: “We agreed today that these countries will is Georgia which remains the major stumbling block become members of NATO”,5 without specifying in the upcoming enlargement debate. a concrete date for admission. Another important step at this time was the foundation of the NATO- Georgia Commission, in addition to the already The Roots of the Debate existing NATO-Russia Council and NATO-Ukraine Commission, in order to emphasize the special Since the end of the East-West conflict, the question status of Georgia in comparison to other applicant of whether or not to accept new members in countries. NATO has been highly disputed. Supporters at the time pointed to the benefits new members could In the short term this settlement appeased all sides bring to NATO, while skeptics warned against the – albeit with a price to pay, in that NATO gave up a repercussions on the relationship with Russia or core principle of its enlargement policy since the mid- pointed to the difficulties of finding consensus 1990s: taking in new members on an individual basis in an ever-growing Atlantic Alliance. Particularly according to their merits, which have to be proved in Germany, one of the driving forces in the first in a gradual and transparent process. The Bucharest enlargement round after the Cold War, some statement, instead, gave a guarantee for membership wanted to limit the enlargement process to a very (sooner or later), without referring to merits or prior small number of states: the argument for this was achievements. This was one of the many “falls from that NATO should prove its capability to enlarge, grace” in the entire enlargement process – politically but should neither overstretch its capacity to necessary at the time, but sowing the seeds for later integrate new members nor fuel Russian concerns trouble and inconsistencies.
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