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Ukraine's Enduring Position Outside NATO

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Ukraine's Enduring Position Outside NATO Invited but Denied: Ukraine’s Enduring Position Outside NATO Major Matthew Arndt JCSP 47 PCEMI 47 Master of Defence Studies Maîtrise en études de la défense Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et not represent Department of National Defence or ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce without written permission. papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le Minister of National Defence, 2021. ministre de la Défense nationale, 2021. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 47 – PCEMI 47 2020 – 2021 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE INVITED BUT DENIED: UKRAINE’S ENDURING POSITION OUTSIDE NATO By Major Matt Arndt “This paper was written by a candidate « La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l’une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L’étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions que alone considered appropriate and seul l’auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l’opinion opinion of any agency, including the d’un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de Canadian Department of National la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est Defence. This paper may not be défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de released, quoted or copied, except with reproduire cette étude sans la permission the express permission of the Canadian expresse du ministère de la Défense Department of National Defence.” nationale. » i TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... i List of Figures ................................................................................................................... iii List of Tables .................................................................................................................... iv Abstract .............................................................................................................................. v Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 2: Ukraine’s Pursuit of NATO Membership ................................................... 4 A Legacy of Pivoting Foreign Policy ............................................................................. 4 Development of Ukraine’s Official Foreign Policy .................................................. 4 Ukraine’s Informal Foreign Policy ............................................................................ 6 Internal Divisions in Ukraine since Independence .................................................... 8 The Post-Euromaidan Push for NATO Membership ................................................... 11 Political Consensus for NATO Membership ........................................................... 11 Growing Public Support for NATO Membership ................................................... 14 Ukraine’s Enduring NATO Aspirations ....................................................................... 16 The Need for a Credible Security Guarantee .......................................................... 16 The Symbolic Value of NATO Membership .......................................................... 18 A Decline in Russia’s Political Influence ................................................................ 20 The Potential for and Impact of a Reintegration of the Donbas .............................. 22 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 25 Chapter 3: NATO’s Interests and Values ..................................................................... 27 NATO’s Relations with Russia .................................................................................... 27 The 2008 Bucharest Summit Pledge to Ukraine ..................................................... 27 Post-Bucharest Summit NATO-Russia Relations ................................................... 29 American Foreign Policy since the Bucharest Summit ........................................... 30 Germany’s Foreign Policy since the Bucharest Summit ......................................... 34 France’s Foreign Policy since the Bucharest Summit ............................................. 38 Ukraine’s Stalled NATO Progression ..................................................................... 41 NATO’s Credibility, Core Values and Normative Interests ........................................ 43 NATO’s Credibility ................................................................................................. 43 NATO’s Core Values and Normative Interests ....................................................... 46 The Next Step: MAP .................................................................................................... 49 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 50 Chapter 4: Russia’s Interests and Future ..................................................................... 52 Points of Friction in NATO-Russia Relations ............................................................. 52 NATO Enlargement: From Tempered Objections to Confrontation ....................... 52 Additional Factors in Russia’s NATO Enlargement Opposition ............................ 57 Russian Popular Opinion towards NATO ............................................................... 59 Russia’s Vital Interests in Ukraine ............................................................................... 61 ii Russian Identity ....................................................................................................... 61 Russia as an Independent Great Power ................................................................... 64 Russia’s Future ............................................................................................................. 67 Putin’s Future .......................................................................................................... 67 Scenario Building: Assumptions ............................................................................. 69 Scenario Building: Framework................................................................................ 69 Scenario Building: Expert Perspectives .................................................................. 70 Scenario Building: Russia’s Most Likely Future .................................................... 73 Scenario Building: An Unlikely Path to Ukraine’s NATO Membership ................ 75 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 78 Chapter 5: Ukraine’s Blocked Path to NATO Membership ....................................... 79 Ukraine-NATO-Russia Interaction .............................................................................. 79 Ukraine’s Major Obstacles in Meeting NATO’s Membership Criteria ....................... 80 Hungarian Minority Rights...................................................................................... 80 The Status of Crimea ............................................................................................... 80 The Status of the Donbas ......................................................................................... 83 Implementation of Reforms ..................................................................................... 86 Russia’s Escalation Dominance ................................................................................... 90 Options for Broad Escalation towards NATO......................................................... 91 Options for Localized Escalation toward Ukraine .................................................. 92 Ukraine’s Future ........................................................................................................... 94 Scenario Building: Ukraine’s Most Likely Future .................................................. 95 Scenario Building: An Unlikely NATO Credibility Crisis ..................................... 96 Scenario Building: An Unlikely Path to Ukraine’s NATO Membership ................ 98 Chapter 6: Conclusion .................................................................................................... 99 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 102 iii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1: Summary of significant events and Ukraine’s general foreign policy development with respect to NATO membership since independence .............................. 4 Figure 2.2: Geographic grouping of Ukrainian into four macro-regions ............................ 8 Figure
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