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Russia’s Strategic Puzzle: Past Lessons, Current Assessment, and Future Outlook
Table of Contents Introduction ...... 1 Professor Yonah Alexander ...... 1 Historical and Contemporary Context...... 6 Professor Matthew Rojansky ...... 6 Dr. Adrian Hänni ...... 10 Dr. Richard Weitz ...... 14 Case Studies ...... 15 1. Separatist Movements ...... 15 Professor John Lenczowski ...... 15 Professor Paul Goble ...... 19 2. The Ukraine Crisis ...... 22 Hon. Yaroslav Brisiuck ...... 22 Ian Brzezinski ...... 27 Dr. Patrick Murphy ...... 32 3. Russia’s Middle East Strategy ...... 34 Professor Shireen Hunter ...... 34 Scott Edelman ...... 42 4. The Sochi Olympics ...... 47 Peter Roudik ...... 47
Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 1
tr du ti
Professor Yonah Alexander ire t r ter i ersity e ter r err ris Studies
Lord Palmerston, Britain’s Prime Minister, famously de lared at t e use Commons in 1848: “…we have no eternal allies, and we have no eternal enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” deed ist ry tea es us t at reig li ies states are ti ated y at t eir leaders perceive as “national interests.” Since nothing is static in evolving strategic tre ds t e relati s i s et ee Russia a d t e rest t e rld a e lu tuated between the status of “foe” a d the status of “friend” in a rda e it er e ti s a d siderati s— t sides—of “national interests.”
It is not surprising, however, that Russia’s policies and actions since the 1917 t er Re luti a e ee i ter reted y t e ester ati s as a rat er complicated “puzzle.” For example, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, during a BBC broadcast in October 1939, commented on Russia’s conduct in the early stages of World War Two: “It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside of an enigma ut er a s t ere is a ey e ey is Russia ati al interest.”
Yet, the “fog” over the meaning of Russia’s “national interest” persisted. President Franklin D. Roosevelt pondered, “I wish someone would tell me about the Russians. I don’t know a good Russian from a bad Russian. I a tell g d re a r a ad re a a tell a g d talia r a ad talia a g d ree e see one. But I don’t understand the Russians.”
e ert eless r t e ast se e de ades a y e rts y li y a ers re rters a d academics have been made to untangle the Russian “puzzle” and recommend “best practices” statecraft vis is M s r i sta e e rge e a i is extraordinary “ arti le” contributed practical diplomatic advice: “It is a sine qua non su ess ul deali g it Russia t at t e reig g er e t i uesti s uld re ai at all ti es l a d lle ted a d t at its de a ds Russia li y s uld e ut r ard i su a a er as t lea e t e ay e r lia e t t detri e tal t Russian prestige.”
As the “Iron Curtain” descended over Europe, an evolving era of escalated r tati et ee East a d est triggered a r li erati a alysis r t g er e tal a d g er e tal s ur es see i g t li t t e ist see i gly l uding the Soviet Union’s unfathomable strategic challenge. Robert Conquest, a distinguished contemporary historian, offered his view, explaining that “ e lit ur i M s ear ester style suits a d s ea a aria t e t e ester liti al dialects… But the S iet leaders are i a t—as u as a y Sulta r Ma di—t e r du t e turies ist ry ery di ere t r ur a d a l g sta di g liti al sy l gy alie t urs i its ti es its udg e ts its intensions.”
t is als use ul t ite t e i sig t ul e tary y alter i a a t er leading observer of international affairs, who asserted that “cold wars cannot be du ted y t eads r a ide l gi al li ts e y rusaders r 2 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
concluded by unconditional surrender.” Regardless of such public discourse, governmental political dispositions have taken different directions. Thus, the United States and its allies have waged a continuous “battle of ideas” seeking to “expose” the dark face of the “evil empire.” President Ronald Reagan in a speech delivered to the ational Association of Evangelists in Orlando, Florida, on March 8, 1983, stated, “…let us pray for the salvation of all those who live in that totalitarian darkness—pray they will discover the oy of knowing od. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.”7
Predictably, the Soviet leadership rejected this and other “vilification” messages by Western “propaganda and psychological warfare.” For instance, President Mikhail orbachev asserted, “The idea that our country is an ‘evil empire,’ the October Revolution is a blunder of history, and the post revolution period a ‘zigzag in history,’ is coming apart at the seams. This kind of perestroika really does not suit some people.”8
As the Soviet Union was nearing its collapse, the West reassessed it policies vis vis the “evil empire.” As President Bush declared in a speech at Texas A M University on May 1 , 1989,
The United States now has as its goal much more than simply containing Soviet expansionism. We seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations. And as the Soviet Union itself moves toward greater openness and democratization, as they meet the challenge of responsible international behavior, we will match their steps with steps of our own. Ultimately, our ob ective is to welcome the Soviet Union back into the world order.9
To be sure, even given the post Cold War epoch that began in the 199 s and is still evolving nearly a quarter century later, the historical cloud over Russia’s intentions, capabilities and operations still lingers on. Selected examples of Moscow’s Middle East experience during this particular period provides at least a glimpse of seemingly conflicting Russian national interests.
More specifically, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s influence in the Middle East declined amid domestic reforms and internal instability. Yet in 199 , Moscow signed a contract with Iran for the construction of light water reactors at the Bushehr nuclear complex, and subsequently it also provided ICBM technology to Tehran.
When ladimir Putin assumed power in Russia in , he began increasing the Russian presence in the Middle East, collaborating more closely with both Iran and Syria. Reportedly, some Russian weapons were provided by Syria to izballah, the Lebanese based terrorist movement. Meanwhile, Moscow has also expanded its relationships with pro Western nations such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, ordan, Turkey, and Israel, and has concluded with them technological, military, energy, nuclear, and trade agreements. At the same time, Russia also provided political support to amas, the terrorist group currently controlling the aza Strip, and is presently backing the Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 3
Palestinian Authority’s push for statehood via the United Nations but in violation of Moscow’s obligations under the Quartet roadmap arrangements for an eventual Middle East peace.
Moreover, despite a dramatic expansion of the brutal civil war in Syria, Russia has continued its arms shipments to the Assad regime. By mid , Moscow also suggested that the U.S. should cooperate with President Assad in combating the slamic State also known as S S, S , or aesh .
uring that period and in subsequent months, Russian military personnel and extensive armament reached Syria in support of the regime. Additionally, Moscow has set up forward operating bases in the country.
n the face of this massive projection of power into the country, including Russia’s launching continuous air strikes against regime opposition forces and “terrorists,” President Barak Obama warned that Moscow’s deepening Syrian military involvement would suck Russia into a “quagmire” or “protracted” conflict. The question arises whether the eneva peace talks, the cease fire arrangements in Syria, and Russia’s “surprise” partial withdrawal of its forces from the country’s five year old battlefield ushers in a new phase of regional cooperation between East and est or only represents the Kremlin’s ambiguous Plan B that would allow it to further redefine the post Cold ar era.
n sum, Moscow’s more assertive foreign policy approach in the Middle East is only one dramatic feature of Russia’s strategic objective to attain, preserve, and increase its great power status. Thus, other major diplomatic, military, and economic efforts have been undertaken by the Kremlin in the broader multipolar world, including the Eurasian region, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Baltics, and elsewhere. Additionally, President Putin, in seeking to end Russia’s international isolation, has been willing to collaborate with his “adversaries” on other specific regional and global challenges such as the Ukraine crisis and terrorism at home and abroad.
The Current Report
For nearly a century, Russia has been traditionally characterized as an “enigma” on social, economic, and strategic levels. From the interwar period through orld ar and the Cold ar to the current evolving post Soviet epoch, international affairs participant observers have sought to decipher the Kremlin’s “national interests” and resulting policies and actions.
This report on “Russia’s Strategic Puzzle Past essons, Current Assessment, and Future Outlook” provides a modest academic effort to focus on a “Historical and Contemporary Context” and on several case studies such as “Separatist Movements,” “The Ukraine Crisis,” “Russia’s Middle East Strategy,” and “The Sochi Olympics.” The contributions to this publication are by a variety of authors, including former American and foreign government officials, a serving diplomat, academics, and professionals. The following speakers made presentations at a number of seminars held during the past three years Hon. aroslav Brisiuck, an Brzezinski, Scott Edelman, Professor Paul oble, r. Adrian H nni, Professor Shireen Hunter, Professor ohn enczowski, r. Patrick Murphy, Professor Matthew Rojansky, Peter Roudik, and 4 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
r. Richard eitz. They all deserve gratitude for their presentations and cooperation on this project.
Mention should also be made of our previous academic engagements in Soviet and Russian affairs over the past four decades, which consist of the production of a great number of works. These publications include Terrorism: An International Journal Political Communication and Persuasion International Journal on Minority and Group Rights Partnership for Peace Review Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base Terrorism: The Soviet Connection Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations and NATO: From Regional to Global Security Provider , to name a few.
Finally, some acknowledgements are in order.
eep appreciation is due to Michael S. Swetnam CEO and Chairman, Potomac nstitute for Policy Studies , eneral Ret. Alfred ray Twenty Ninth Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, Senior Fellow and Chairman of the Board of Regents, Potomac nstitute for Policy Studies , and Professor on allace, r. Chairman, nternational aw nstitute for their inspiration and continuing support of our academic work in the field of global security concerns. As always, Sharon ayani, Research Associate and Coordinator at the nter University Center for Terrorism Studies, deserves gratitude for her professional and publication efforts.
onah Alexander March ,
Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 5
Speech to the House of Commons. Hansard, 1 March 1848. “Treaty of Adrianopole Charges against Viscount Palmerston.” HC Deb 01 March 1848 vol. 97 cc66 . http hansard.millbanksystems.com commons mar treaty of adrianople charges against S P HOC Churchill, inston. The Russi n Enig . BBC Broadcast. ondon. October , . The Churchill Society, ondon. http www.churchill society london.org.uk RusnEnig.html Perkins, Francis. The Roose e t ne ondon Penguin Books, , p. . X. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Foreign irs, olume , no. uly . Conquest, Robert. “Why the Soviet Elite Is Different From Us.” o i Re ie , olume , p. Fall . Lippmann, Walter. “The Russian American War.” The t nti , uly , p. . Reagan, Ronald. “Evil Empire Speech.” March 8, 1983, Speech to the National Association of Evangelists, The National Center for Public Policy Research. http www.nationalcenter.org ReaganEvilEmpire .html orbachev, Mikhail. erestroi : e Thin ing or ur ountr nd the or d. New ork Harper and Row Publishing, . Bush, George H.W. “Transcript of Bush s Remarks on Transforming Soviet American Relations.” The e or Ti es, Remarks at the Texas A M University Commencement Ceremony, May , . http www.nytimes.com world transcript of bush s remarks on transforming soviet american relations.html pagewanted all Ray S. Cline and onah Alexander. Terroris : The o iet onne tion. New ork Crane Russak, . onah Alexander and ennis Pluchinsky. Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting o unist rg ni tions. ondon Frank Cass, . onah Alexander and Richard Prosen, eds. T : Fro Region to o e urit ro ider. Maryland exington Books, . 6 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
Historical and Contemporary Conte t
Professor Matthew Rojansky Director, ennan Institute, Wilson Center
Let me try to introduce our discussion by offering the follo ing statement the West and Russia are currently engaged in a conflict. No , hen you first hear that statement, it might seem to you to be some hat trivial or banal, right Well, of course e are in a conflict. We are yelling at each other all the time, sanctioning, isolating one another. What I mean to suggest is that e are in an u conflict, versus the state of disagreement that e may have been in for the ma ority of the last years.
What is different at this moment is that e are engaged in a ar of ords, e are engaged in mutual isolation, e have leveled sanctions and counter sanctions against one another, e have fro en almost all channels of practical cooperation and dialogue, ith a fe very limited e ceptions. And, significantly, military deployments by both Russia and NAT are no follo ing rhetoric and political isolation in a ay they have not done previously in the past years. So, hile things ere bad and there ere plenty of times they ere bad in the last years, e did not have hat e could described as a “conflict” until after (or in the aftermath of the U raine crisis.
No , hy does the U raine crisis matter so much that it has transformed difficult relations into a conflict Well, to begin to ans er that question, let me quote some of the more no ledgeable people involved
- “Russia’s actions in Ukraine challenge the post World War II world order.” That is President bama. - “Russia’s annexation of Crimea is a blatant violation of international law.” That is Vice President Biden. - “There is an attempt to perturb the existing world order with one uncontestable leader ho ants to remain as such, thin ing he is allo ed everything hile others are allowed only what he allows, and only in his interests.” And that is President Putin.
So, all three, leaders on both sides, are tal ing about international rules, norms, the orld order. There are plenty of ideas about hat those things are I do not thin there is a consensus about ho you define them , but there is no doubt that hat happens in and around Europe is central to defining hat the international order, hat the orld order, and hat, in fact, the state of international la is. As those of you involved ith the International La Institute ill no very ell, international la is far more than hat is simply ritten in treaties and conventions. It is more than the customary international la definition of practice and opinio uris. In other ords, hat e do and hat e thin ought to be the rules.
The presentations of Matthe Ro ans y, Adrian H nni, and Richard Weit ere delivered at a seminar on “Untangling Russia's Puzzle: Past Lessons and Future Outlook” held on anuary 0, 016 at the Inter University Center for Legal Studies administered by the International La Institute . Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 7
The reality is that global order comes from a collective, cumulative sense, gathered over time, of the realities that govern the conduct of states. And here I would like to cite, and I do not have the exact uotation, but I would like to cite an argument by Ivan rastev and ark Leonard, who said that it is more often the case that it is the conduct of uropean nations that defines the world order, rather than the opposite.
In other words, if you were to say that there is an abstraction called “world order,” with which the behavior of uropean states either complies or does not comply, that is getting it exactly backwards. The reality is that although the question, “what is the world order?” is very politically incorrect, it is absolutely accurate in at least describing the last several hundred years of human history: “What is the world order?” depends entirely on what European states do. And that, I posit, is why the Ukraine crisis is so critical in terms of turning the current dynamic between Russia and the West into a conflict. ecause the implications of that crisis are also implications for how uropean states manage their disagreements, whether territorial, or political, or economic, or demographic, or social, or anything else and if they are managed through violence, through war, then it is, in fact, given the current state of the world, the beginning of the end of the entire world order. ou have to understand the premise that flows from the practice of uropean states more than the other way around. So, when President Obama says that, “Russia has upset the world order,” what he actually means is that the behavior of Russia in Ukraine, the conflict between Russian and Ukraine, and other ancillary conflicts that we are now seeing in and around urope, represent a threat that could begin to unravel the world order as it is set by the conduct of the uropean states.
ow in the longer term, this might change, right When the Chinas and Indias and razils and outh Africas of the world are ready to step up and pay the costs of being order setting states in the international system, what happens in urope may not be so critical for defining world order, but it certainly is today.
o, given that this is a conflict that is at that level of seriousness, and that level of import, is there any hope for reversing the slide into apparent disorder and re ection of the rules? Here, I think it is important to ask the question, “What has happened before ” Let me say this: there are cases in the past where the West and Russia, at that time the oviet Union, were in deep and severe enough confrontation and conflict, that it actually produced a settlement that strengthened the world order. And, in particular, I point to the period of d tente and the to elsinki Conference which led to the elsinki Final Act, which actually, much more than anything in the s, defined the post Cold War world order by defining the order in urope first. o, the way the oviet Union (while it still existed , and the West agreed to interact around the core set of disagreement that they had in Central and astern urope and other parts of the region including urasia, was what ultimately determined a relatively peaceful framework for the post Cold War world order.
Let me ust, in very basic terms, suggest that while the current period has some interesting, and I think somewhat compelling, similarities to the Cold War—for example the level of propaganda on both sides, the sense on both sides that there is nothing to gain from cooperation, frozen dialogue, imposed mutual sanctions and counter sanctions, mutual isolation, and so forth—there are also many significant differences. For example, the Cold War came off of a period of to years of 8 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
unprecedented isolation of the Soviet nion from the rest of the world. This was intentional on the part of the Soviets, and on the part of the West, and in other countries that cut off relations.
We are coming instead off of years of unprecedented integration between Russia and the rest of the world in almost every sense: economically, socially, politically. If you ust look at the generation of young people, the millennials like many of you in this audience, you see the degree in which people’s friendships, their Facebook accounts, their international travel particularly folks who live in Washington or oscow , really do not recogni e borders any more. The degree to which business, social organi ations, even politics are integrated between Russia and the West is unprecedented, and that, I think, is not simply going to go away because we are in a state of conflict.
ut perhaps the more important difference, which is particularly evident when you look at the millennial generation, is that very few people take the prospect of conflict escalation to actual physical military confrontation at all seriously. ow, this is very very different from the old War. In the old War, the presumption was that that was entirely possible and in some cases was very likely. Right? Think about the uban issile risis, think about the crisis around the iddle East, echoslovakia, Hungary, any number of crises, any number of third party third country conflicts, that were proxy wars that could have led to a direct exchange, and perhaps a nuclear exchange, between the super powers. Those prospects were taken seriously and now they are not.
If we are honest with ourselves today, particularly those in the younger generation, we see that there is only one answer to that question, and that is that it is pretty much unthinkable. ut see, there is a flip side to that. If it is unthinkable that we would end up in a direct military confrontation with the only other country in the world, that is Russia, that has the capability to obliterate the nited States from the earth in under an hour, then it tends to reduce our incentive to take seriously the problem that we are in a conflict with Russia.
oing back to my original logic, this would tend to reduce one’s incentive to seek a Helsinki type settlement to our current problems with Russia, in and around Europe. And it would tend to reduce the likelihood that this current conflict is going to end in as salutatory a way as the last conflict did.
So now you see the problem, right? It is similar in many ways to a old War, it has some scary implications, and yet somehow, it is not quite scary enough.
So, what might need to happen or what might be possible, given the current circumstances? Well, as I said, the upside is, I think, that reengagement and normalcy are still on the table, particularly because of the degree to which Russia and the West have become engaged and mutually dependent. I think it would have to entail a face saving exit for Russia from kraine, and that has to be within the insk framework. There simply is not another option. I think it is going to have to entail the gradual easing and possibly eventual elimination of all but a few symbolic sanctions that have been imposed by the U.S. and E.U., and of course conversely Russia’s counter sanctions. Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 9
nd, there has ot to be a sy bolic kind of third country issue, and think Syria has presented itself as an issue upon which Russia and est can sy bolically, visibly, publicly, si nificantly cooperate. ecause if we do not have that, we do not have the political capital necessary to persuade people that there is even a reason to try and, think, Syria could be that reason. hat is the positive scenario.
he ne ative is also very co pellin . talked about how the stakes are not seen as hi h enou h, but it is ore than that. e have serious structural proble s in the relationship today. n the old ar, sworn ene ies trusted each other enou h to have what you call workin levels of trust. They may not have trusted one another’s incentive or lon ter oals, but they at least trusted that when other party said it was oin to do so ethin , it had the authority to do that. f you look at the level of utual dislike and disrespect between ba a and utin today, and it is very unlikely that that is oin to be i proved upon by any future erican president, that is all you need to see. here is intense personal en ity and distrust, not only in intentions, but in co petency. utin distrusts the co petency of the erican leadership and vice versa. e talk constantly about how utin lies, utin is a liar. ell, if we cannot trust hi , how can we do a deal with hi
o estic politics on both sides hardly have to say ore than to point out that in Russia, nationalism has become absolutely central, not only to Putin’s success, but to his survival. e has unleashed forces in Russian politics that, were he to disappoint the , were he to appear to betray the oals of Russian nationalis , his very survival, that of his re i e, and that of hi self and his fa ily and those close to hi , would be threatened by so e very dan erous people.
hen, of course, in the erican political conte t, we are constantly re inded in this politically silly season, that resident ba a ca pai ned for office, and ca e to office, pro isin pro ress throu h diplo acy, ri ht En a e ent. hat was his bi word. e used that word freely in the ca pai n. Ri htly or wron ly, the political collective ud ent has been that he failed. he ury i ht still be out on the ran nuclear a ree ent, but he has failed with Russia, he has failed with the usli world. Re e ber his bi airo speech e was oin to win everyone over throu h en a e ent. Ri ht he political kind of collective eit eist says he has failed. nd, the reason that is i portant is because everyone out there, with the possible e ception of ernie Sanders, is oin to ca pai n to his ri ht on forei n policy. So, any future president of the United States, with the possible e ception of ernie Sanders, is oin to take a harder line and be tou her on forei n policy than ba a has been, and that pro ises a kind of structural confrontation between Russia and the United States.
So, have iven you ore or less the opti istic upside, which is that we can aspire to so ethin like a new elsinki order, a new kind of fra ework that allows us to ana e our differences peacefully throu h this sort of process. ut, the downside is that it see s like we are not takin the current conflict seriously enou h, it see s like structurally and personally we have really deep divisions between the leadership on both sides. nd, it see s that ulti ately it is oin to very, very difficult to co e to the kind of resolution that we were able to reach durin the e e of the s.
10 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
Dr. Adrian Hänni niversity of urich
The relationshi bet een Russia and the T member states has s un bet een limited coo eration and confrontation ever since ladimir Putin too the reins of o er in . ver the ast t o years, the situation has deteriorated into a real conflict. The raine crisis has fro en into a stalemate. The nited tates and the uro ean nion a ly sanctions a ainst Russian individuals, officials, and businesses, and Russia counteracts by bannin all food im orts. n yria, the t o sides are en a ed in a deadly ro y ar, as Russia bombs rebel rou s financed, armed, and trained by the nited tates and audi rabia in a multi billion dollar covert action aimed at brin in about the do nfall of yrian stron man ashar al ssad.
f history as evo ed to ma e sense of the current conflict bet een Russia and the est in the last years, the focus has almost e clusively been on the old ar the lobal rivalry that shaped the second half of the “short twentieth century,” setting estern democracies a ainst astern totalitarianism, liberalism a ainst communism, and the . . led T alliance a ainst the oviet led arsa Pact. umerous ne s a er articles, nonfiction bestsellers, thin tan re orts and the covers of ma a ines li e e or the er Re e invo e and arn of a e old ar. ven an merican un band calls itself the e old ar. i i edia has an entry for “Cold War II”: “Cold War II, also known as the e old ar, econd old ar and old ar . refers to a state of olitical and military tension bet een Russia and the estern orld a in to the old ar that sa the lobal confrontation bet een the estern loc and the astern loc led by the USSR.” So it must be a real thing. But is it really
ar ue that the old ar analo y is ill suited to understandin the emer in conflict. oreover, acce tin at face value the narrative that Russia and the est are en a ed in a ne old ar—meanin a conflict that resembles the eo olitical rivalry of the th entury—could lead olicyma ers to choose not only ron but even dan erous strate ies. et me briefly outline four decisive factors that illustrate the uintessential difference ideolo y, economy, influence, and innovation.
The old ar as to a si nificant de ree an ideolo ical conflict. Particularly in its first t o decades, communism constituted a serious alternative to ca italism and liberal democracies, an alternative that a ealed to eo le around the orld. Today, Russia has no relevant ideolo ical base. The influence of much nurtured Russian nationalism is, for obvious reasons, stron ly restricted to nei hborin countries ith a si nificant o ulation of ethnical Russians. lavo hilia, hile roducin stran e effects amon ro Russian se aratists in astern raine, is sub ect to similar limitations. Accordingly, Russia’s potential to project soft power is strongly limited.
esides ideolo ical cultural charisma, the other main foundation to ro ect o er abroad is the economy. Russia’s economy resembles that of a developing country, in that it relies on ener y revenues for economic ro th, and e orts mainly natural resources oil, natural as, minerals, and timber . The oil and as sector, mainly under state control, accounts for more than half of federal bud et revenues and over ercent of Russian e orts as of . il and natural as e orts continue to be Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 11 the main source of hard currency, shaky ground on which to be challenging A , the most powerful alliance in world history.
Russian oil revenues and earnings have now plummeted, since oil prices began collapsing in the second half of . Additionally, Russian oil production has flatlined on a plateau of million odd barrels a day. With the large conventional oil fields in Western Siberia growing old, production will start declining within a decade unless Russia is able to develop its unconventional oil resources—shale oil in Western Siberia and deep sea oil in the Arctic. Because the production of these resources is technologically challenging, Russia needs the help of Western technology and know how, which would in turn re uire that sanctions against Russia be eased. Under the current regime, Western companies are banned from undertaking new unconventional oil projects with state controlled Russian producers.
here are, in fact, strong parallels to a dynamic in the mid s that contributed to the e of the Cold War: oil price collapse, plateauing oil production set to decline, and large dependence on oil revenues for hard currency. or the time being, Russia simply lacks the economic and financial base to rebuild an empire or a large sphere of influence.
hat brings us to the third decisive difference: influence. uring the Cold War, the Soviet Union could make use of a sphere of influence that was global in reach. Besides the satellite states in Central and astern urope, its orbit encompassed clients in ast Asia, Africa, the iddle ast and even in atin America. oday, Russia can only count on a small, disparate gang of allies: the former Soviet Republics of Belarus, Armenia, a akhstan, and yrgy stan ene uela icaragua Cuba whatever remains of Assad’s Syria; and maybe Iran (where, in any case, its influence would be only second to China’s).
Besides of a lack of eo o o e and ue e, Russia is unable to generate o o or major advancements in science and technology. Whether it is nuclear research, robotics, semiconductors, molecular biology, genetics or medical innovation, Russia has largely sunk into insignificance. either Apple, nor oogle, esla, or Uber are Russian companies. Putin’s state does not bear comparison to the Soviet Union in the early Cold War, which shocked the world with the Sputnik satellite in , sent the first human into outer space in , and achieved a higher life e pectancy than the United State far into the s. Without the ability to produce cutting edge innovation, today’s Russian society poses no real challenge to the West.
If we keep on relying on the Cold War analogy, we therefore risk falling into the o r p What I call the o r p is the drawing of wrong or misleading lessons from the past because the fundamental structures and conditions have changed. Today’s world is far removed from the bipolar stasis of the Cold War that ju taposed the peer competitors USA and USSR in e uilibrium. he United States is still the only superpower and by far the most powerful nation, but the margin over its potential competitors has been shrinking. A revanchist Russia and China are increasingly pushing against American supremacy, seeking to build a new international order. ur global state system resembles much more the decade before the outbreak of World War I, when the British mpire went into relative decline, other 12 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
powers such as ermany began challenging its hegemony, and the international system became unstable.
In contrast to the Soviet Union, the system of Putin’s Russia shares more characteristics with the e pansionist C arist Russia of the th century—from the domestic symbiosis between the political leadership and the rthodo Church, to the uest for a land based empire in the “near abroad,” to the ideological centering of urasianism, promoted as an alternative to the secular materialistic West and as the basis to rebuild a resurgent Russian state. If we eep focusing on the Soviet Union and the assumed resurrection of the Cold War, trying tenaciously to understand the new conflict with Russia through the lens of that geopolitical rivalry, we will miss these much more insightful analogies and lessons from historical events that predate the Cold War.
istory, writes ford historian argaret acmillan, helps us to understand those we have to deal with (as well as ourselves): “If you do not know the history of another people, you will not understand their values, their fears and their hopes or how they are likely to react to something you do.” If nothing else, history has provided Russia with the experience of invasions. As Harold Mackinder observes, “the Russians were originally a people […] who, for the sake of their own security, had to see out and con uer—from the igh iddle Ages into the early modern era—the incoming Asiatic nomads of the steppe to the south and east.” The protracted presence of the ongols was succeeded by disastrous invasions of apoleonic rance and then itler ermany. In combination with its flatness and the lac of natural borders to the west and south, this historic vulnerability of being invaded explains Russia’s often paranoid fear of invasion and why, perhaps, insecurity is the uintessential Russian national emotion. This historical lesson helps us better understand Russia’s recurring desire to gain security through the creation of a land based empire and a buffer one in astern urope, as well as its deep seated militari ation, both of which were revitali ed under Putin. It also allowed us to anticipate Russia’s anti access area denial strategy based on comple missile defense systems, and suggests that the way AT e panded eastwards since the s made the new conflict with Russia almost inevitable.
To avoid the o r p while drawing lessons from the past, history should be treated li e a rearview mirror (to e pand on an image used by the eminent Cold War historian ohn ewis addis). The appropriate sectional view of the road over which we have passed helps us understand where we came from and who else is on the road, enabling us to drive safely. owever, if we angle the mirror incorrectly to focus on the wrong points, a crash becomes inevitable.
Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 13
uring orld ar I, defensive weapons dominated due to a combination of trenches and greater and faster firepower, resulting in the infamous trench warfare. The long stalemate on the estern front that led to enormous losses convinced the rench military leaders and politicians in the interwar period that the future of warfare lay in defense. rance therefore paid too much attention to defense. The most visible symbol of that doctrine was the Maginot ine: a vast line of concrete fortifications and weapons installations constructed on the rench border to ermany, uxembourg and Swit erland. In the s, the rench invested their hopes and a ma or share of their defense budget in this defensive wall, while, at the same time, advances in mobile artillery, tanks and combat aircraft made it possible to bypass or attack fortifications. In spring , the erman e r invaded rance, bypassing the line to the north, and con uered its archenemy with a r e campaign. Margaret Macmillan, e ses uses o s or , ondon: Profile ooks, , p. . ited in Robert . aplan, e Re e e o eo r p e p e s s ou o o s e e s e, ew ork: Random House, , p. . 14 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
Dr. Richard Weitz irector Senior ellow, enter for Political Military Analysis, Hudson Institute
The U.S. Russia relationship remains one of the most important in world affairs. The ability of either country to achieve many of its priorities depends on securing a modicum of support from the other. The two states possess the most powerful militaries, exert substantial global diplomatic influence, and play ma or roles in the world economy. et both states find it difficult to manage a relationship in which they are neither adversaries nor allies.
The most enduring problem is that Russian leaders tend to attribute excessively hostile motives to the United States, while U.S. leaders typically think too little about Russia and its interests when making decisions that at times have severely harmed the relationship. or example, in recent years, Moscow has exaggerated the anti Russian intent and impact of U.S. policies, framing them as plots to overthrow the current presidential administration and replace it with one more pliable to ashington. Rather than hostility, the main driver of U.S. policy is American indifference toward Russia, which also hurts ties. onetheless, both governments have shown that they can achieve unemotional pragmatic transactional bargains in pursuit of mutual interests—when they make an effort to identify them and take them into account in their decision making.
or several reasons, Russian U.S. relations are unlikely to improve anytime soon:
- Although Russian and U.S. officials can envisage various short term tactical deals, their long term aims for Ukraine, urope, and other global issues are very different and often incompatible. - Russian and U.S. leaders also profess to believe that they can manage a prolonged period of cold ties. U.S. officials think they can achieve many of their global goals without Moscow’s active support, while Russian leaders claim that they can minimi e the impact of estern sanctions by expanding economic ties with other partners and boosting Russia’s own domestic production to compensate for estern export controls. - As a result, social and economic relations between Americans and Russians remain underdeveloped, given the si e of their populations and national economies. Their diplomatic engagements remain focused on managing the Ukrainian conflict but have otherwise become episodic and shallow.
Russia and the United States share overlapping interests in many areas. At a minimum, these common interests will keep the relationship from become too adversarial. At best, they could provide a foundation for surmounting some of the impediments to deeper or broader cooperation described above. ut the constituencies favoring strong bilateral ties in both countries are small, consisting mainly of arms controllers and foreign policy experts. These conditions have meant that the U.S. Russia agenda is still dominated by the issues that policy makers grappled with during the old ar—nuclear deterrence, arms control, claimed spheres of influence, and concerns about their international credibility. This situation positions the two parties in the kind of adversarial relationship that prevailed during the old ar. An enduring improvement in bilateral relations will not occur until both governments see more of their interests aligned with those of the other country. Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 15
ase tudies
eparatist Movements
Professor John Lenczowski ounder and resident o he nstitute o orld olitics
want to give a ew introductor thoughts to tr to put separatist terrorism in a larger political and historical conte t
s we now, terrorism is the re uent attendant to national or tribal separatism and man who engage in this t pe o action de ine it on grounds o national determination or that it is the onl weapon that the wea can use against the strong
Modern separatist terrorism began as part o the anti imperial and anti colonial movement in the earl th centur and one could argue that the assassination o rchdu e ran erdinand ic ed this all o ince then we have seen separatist terrorism in all sort o regions o the world lgeria, en a, srael, as ue terrorism in pain, rish terrorism in reat ritain, alestinian terrorism, urdish, u b cois, uerto Rican, Muslim rotherhood terrorism initiall to ree g pt rom ritish rule and then associated with more recent terrorist organi ations, hechen terrorism against Russian rule, and all sort o others
tentimes, terrorist actions have been ta en against more rather than less liberal regimes, which is a great iron ome o these movements were genuine national independence movements, which, or the most part did not sanction terrorism, but which nevertheless had their e tremist element thers were national liberation movements, which were based on Mar ist eninist ideolog and were connected to the oviet nion or its pro ies Man o these movements received terrorism training within the R, which included ideological, propaganda, intelligence, and communications training Man modern terrorist activities in the latter part o the th centur , which continue toda , have roots within that terrorism training apparatus
he Mar ist eninist ideolog associated with these movements inspired a re ection o absolute moral standards and the adoption o a contingent moralit where the ends justify the means. One only need look at Lenin’s speech to the Youth Leagues of 1920 the omsomol he second hal o that speech articulates the classic e pression o Mar ist eninist moralit , which re ects absolute moral standards—ob ective standard o right and wrong—as a “bourgeois prejudice.” According to Lenin’s logic, anything that is good is that which accelerates the revolution, and that which is evil harms the revolution nd so, is it good or evil to blow up a school bus ull o innocent children ell, i it helps the revolution—sa , b creating more o a police state environment thus alienating a large part o the population, it is good his is a complete re ection o
he presentations o ohn enc ows i and aul oble were delivered at a seminar on “ ombating eparatist errorism ssessment o ast essons, uture utloo , and est ractices Response trategies held on ugust , at otomac nstitute or olic tudies 16 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
moral standards. on ersely, if by blo ing up that bus, you end up aking up the sleeping giant of the ci il society so that it ill resist and fight off the terrorist group or the re olutionary group, then that, according to this philosophy, is e il.
Lenin thus raises a fundamental philosophical uestion o er hether there is an objecti e moral order in the orld. or my part, if you reject the notion that there are objecti e moral standards that apply to all people at all times and in all places, and if you subscribe to the notion that all morals are matters of personal preferences and that the morals of society are therefore the accumulations of personal preferences, then basically the morals of society are established by po er struggle, and that is hat Yonah Ale ander described as the doctrine of “Might makes Right.” Here, moral standards are established either by majority ote, or, to take it to its logical e treme, by those ith the biggest guns and the greatest ill to use them. f e reject objecti e moral standards, then ho are e to critici e Adolf itler and his confederates After all, as that just another lifestyle choice
ometimes terrorist actions ha e been stimulated amongst separatist groups as part of a strategy of di ide and rule. his is hat the did in order to create inter ethnic conflicts ithin the o iet nion. A classic e ample as hen they di erted A erbaijani and Armenian desires for independence into inter ethnic hatred bet een those t o groups. his effort culminated in the stimulation and perpetration of pogroms by radicals in one group against the other, most notably A erbaijani pogroms against Armenians in Baku in January, 1990. The Kremlin’s strategy was to create enough ostensibly spontaneous inter ethnic iolence to justify dispatching the o iet armed forces to restore peace and protect the Armenian population. n fact, as o iet eneral mitri Ya o later admitted, the troops ere sent to dismantle the organi ational structure of the independence minded A erbaijani opular ront, thus keeping A erbaijan ithin the o iet orbit.
n some cases, terrorism contributed to the success of separatist or independence efforts. n more cases, ho e er, terrorism has pro ed to be counter producti e. errorism adopted by elements of the hechen separatist mo ement ga e osco sufficient ammunition to commit its o n false flag terrorism in order to discredit the hechens and to arouse the ussian population against them. lease remember the bombings of apartment buildings in three ussian cities in 1999 hich ere attributed to hechen terrorists. n the third of these, in ya an, local police caught members of the FSB (the KGB’s successor), not Chechens, planting a bomb hich then was defused. The FSB’s covers story was that this was a “training exercise.” The circumstances ere murky enough, and official propaganda effecti e enough, that the remlin as able to persuade enough ussians that the hechens ere at fault. he result as that ladimir utin as able to stimulate popular support for the re i al of the ar against hechen separatists.
errorism in many of these cases as designed to be propaganda of the deed. ts purpose as to radicali e and polari e both sides of the conflict in the interest of building up greater resistance to the rule of the ruling po er or po ers.
he principle of national self determination has helped fuel separatist iolence and terrorism in many instances here the case for genuine separation as not necessary merited. ational self determination as used uite idealistically to break up the Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 17 colonial empires after orld ar and to restore independence to historic nations like oland. But taken to its logical extreme, the national self determination principle can lead to the utter balkani ation of the world. t is a principle that can militate against the possibility of fraternal multi ethnic and multi confessional nations and societies.
t was this principle that underlay the breakup of ugoslavia, an excellent example. But this principle came into conflict with the doctrine of u poss e s ur s, which basically means “as you possess under law.” This is a principle of territorial integrity that provides that new states should have the same borders that their preceding dependent or subsidiary area had before independence. So we saw the conflict between this principle and the principle of national self determination particularly in Bosnia Her egovina where the Bosnian Serbs resorted to war in order to prevent a Bosnian independence arrangement that would incorporate their population.
Here lies a significant problem there is no agreement or law that specifies the definition of a people or a nation that should have its self determination. The Bosnian Serbs did not agree that they were Bosnians. They were Serbs who wanted to be part of the ma ority population that had dominated ugoslavia. They wanted to remain united with their Serbian brethren and did not believe that the borders of Bosnia Her egovina should have been drawn in a way that would include them within that enclave. They warned everybody that if a referendum were held within those particular borders, according to that principle of u poss e s ur s, then there would be war and so there was. They warned us, and when the referendum took place, they were so aggravated that they resorted to war which included terrorist violence.
ltimately, all of these problems of separatism, separatist violence, and terrorism are not solvable by a single principle or ideological template. Some nations or peoples will have the will to maintain separate existence and they may never be repressed into submitting to rule by others. Such people will resort to violence to keep their separate identity as an issue, and you cannot wish this away. n every case, the only principle that really matters in solving these problems is prudence.
And here let us look to the American eclaration of ndependence. ts signers essentially asserted the self determination principle, but ustified war only after recogni ing the necessity of proving to the world the validity of their grievances against British rule. As the Declaration stated: “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind re uires that they should declare the causes which impelled them to the separation.” Recogni ing the need to demonstrate a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, they go on to invoke the principle of prudence
“Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more dispose to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same ob ect, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government and to provide new guards for their future security.”
18 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
That is our Declaration of ndependence. t refers to the decent opinions of mankind and to the principle of prudence.
hat are other policy implications of all of this ere are two brief thoughts: am sure of my colleagues in the panel have some other ideas about this.
irst, since terrorism is the propaganda of the deed, it re uires counter propaganda. t re uires a response in the realm of ideological warfare. t is based on an immoral principle: the re ection of absolute moral standards. And so, it re uires the assertion by those nations and peoples who disagree with this that there are absolute standards of right and wrong, and that killing innocent people, regardless of the putatively worthy end, is not going to send you to heaven. Those assertions have to be made by moral leadership in those countries that pri e living in what might be called “decent civilization.”
inally, it is necessary to show how terrorism has been incredibly counter productive in so many instances of separatism and that resorting to terrorist violence is not necessarily going to help at all in the cause of achieving independence.
Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 19
Professor Paul Goble o e o icial it t e and . . e a t ent o tate and vice dean o t e ocial cience and anitie at dente nive it in allinn
e e a e e eo le in t i cit o a e o e e cient in c ed lin eetin a o t i e o i o tance t an ona le ande . t even e a e ceeded i el in t e c ent it ation at lea t it e ect to t e ian ede ation and t e o ect o te o i t violence. n t i ail odo ov t e oli a c tin t in ail and o no live a oad called on ian to en a e in a civil di o edience not o e in ille al action and ille al o de o t e ian tate.
Khodorkovsky’s appeal has already been reposted by literally hundreds of websites, and a ite e a ed to a e t at it in da e ill ee te o i t action o t o ind o i l o e all te o i t action t o e not connected it t e tin e i e and a a o action t e e i e it el de i ned to t to di c edit an one o tand a ain t i . at a ta e t e o o additional a e ion in aine o it a ta e t e o o a te o i t incident in t e cit o o co t at can t en e la i l la ed on o eone el e. t tin ill e e on i le e i not t e a te t e on on t e ace t e ea t t e a ead t e c ent e t e actl i t. e ill o o t o o a not to old i e on i le o an t in .
oda o ld li e to do add e t ee i e . i t o ld li e to tal a o t t e s o e a ati in t e ian ede ation. at i eca e e all too o ten l to et e t in ic a e ve di e ent. n ealit t e e a e lot o di e ent ind o e a ati lot o di e ent ind o te o i t action and lot o di e ent ind o otivation. ten i o do not li e t e otivation t en o eval ate action in a a tic la a and i o do li e t e otivation o eval ate it in anot e a .
econd o ld li e to tal a o t t e o le o tate te o i ic i ani e ted t e ian ede ation ot in all a and la e. ne o t e eate t intellect al ail e o t e e t ove t e la t t o decade a een t e el con ident and on a tion t at e ne eve t in e needed to no a o t ocietie and co ld a l to ia idea and in tit tion develo ed el e e e it little e a d o it di tinctive a t.
nd t i d o ld li e to a e t ee concl din e a a o t t e elation i et een el dete ination and i e ial cont ol. e elation i et een t o e t o conce t i not nea l a i le a an o ld li e to t in .
n t e ian ede ation at e ent t e e a e cate o ie o e a ati t ove ent e i t a e t e active one a in t e o t a ca t o e o act all e ect to ac ieve inde endent tate ood. e a o nt o violence t at t e en a e in i elativel all co a ed to t e a o nt o violence o ic t e a e la ed. e ec en ave done al o t none o t e t in o ic t e a e la ed e t e t e o co a a t ent ildin t e e lan t a ed o an t in el e. i e elt in tin a ade t e i ta e an do o actin li e t i i a ea e i e t at can e e tin i ed it ate t en o t o ate at a ea e i e o ead it o do not t it o t. 20 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
hat that kind of repression has done is to transfor the nature of the efforts at national self deter ination in the orth au asus into an sla ist ove ent he threat we and os ow fa e in the orth au asus today are a dire t produ t of the Russian government’s behavior, not what the orth au asians were about happen to have been a supporter of he hen independen e in the s and knew hokhar udayev uite well r udayev on e told e on his satellite phone that he was a very ood usli that he prayed three ti es a day f ourse, if you are really a ood Muslim, you pray five times a day. But he didn’t know that. He had been a major eneral in the oviet ir or e and had been a e ber of the o unist party sin e the age of 18. He didn’t know about Islam and wasn’t an sla ist in any eanin ful way at all
he se ond kind of national separatis that e ists in the ussian ederation i ht be alled anti ipatory separatis his is the nationalis of the peoples of the iddle ol a, the atars and ashkirs pri arily, as well as the uryats and the uvans further east hese people would like to be independent but know their prospe ts for independen e e ist only if the ussian ederation o es apart any of the believe it is very real, and share their view will ive you only one ood pie e of advi e today: don’t buy any maps; buy stocks in companies which print maps because you will ake oney as borders are oin to han e
ll too often in the est, people whose lives were defined by havin rown up in the lon est period without border han es in the history of urope assume that is normal. It isn’t. Even in Europe there was never any period as stable in ter s of borders as that one and elsewhere borders have been even ore fle ible and oft han ed
he third kind of separatist hallen e in the ussian ederation is the ost serious, be ause it has the potential to tri er all the others ost people in the est have a epted the idea that the reat ussians are a solidly unified nationality n fa t, they are anythin but here are si nifi ant re ional hallen es, in ludin in the first instan e iberia and that is no lau hin atter f the entire orth au asus were allowed to leave, ussia would lose per ent of its territory and ust about per ent of its population f os ow loses iberia to the ibiryaki ove ent, it loses so ethin far ore funda ental
n on lusion, would like to ake several o ents about how we view terroris as su h e tend to de ide that so e violent a tion is terroris if it arried out by a substate actor rather than a state and especially if we don’t like those who are arryin it out as opposed to those we do f we are oin to do what ohn en owski ur es us to do, we need to aintain a o on oral fra ework nd it is i perative that we ake ud ents about what people do re ardless of what position they are in
oreover, we need to fo us on terroris as provo ation ost terrorist a tions in the ussian ederation sin e have been or ani ed by or with the assistan e of the oviet, then the ussian se urity a en ies hat in ludes the killin of people in the three apart ent blo ks in , eslan, and ost thin s routinely bla ed on the he hens ow, were so e of the people who e e uted those thin s he hens es, that is true but they were ontrolled or led, so eti es by false fla te hni ues Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 21 and sometimes by more direct control of the B and B. e must find out who is really responsible and not blame those it is easy to blame. If you doubt what I just said, please read John Dunlop’s book on the events of 1999; he provides the best outline.
nd finally, we need to recogni e that there are submerged peoples and that self determination is not something that was appropriate only in the past. I live just down the street from where oodrow ilson was born, and so it is perhaps not perverse that I actually believe that peoples have the right of self determination up to and including the formation of independent states. e live in a country that got its start by asserting this right, and I believe it remains critically important that when we talk about terrorism especially in relation to self determination, we keep three things in mind:
irst, as I have already said, we need to focus on who takes actions and why, not e cluding some and assuming that only others are involved.
econd, we must stop taking the morally indefensible position that we have rights that others don’t. That may be fine if you are among the winners, but there will be new winners. nd we need to remember that some of these will use any means necessary to achieve their ends. here is a rather bitter joke about what you call a successful terrorist: “Your Excellency.”
he current international system, of course, is not based on rights of peoples, it is based on rights of states. In some ways, the fact that the nited tates of merica e isted in 1 meant that the successor to the eague of ations could not be called the nited tates e call it the nited ations but we tilt in the direction of states rather than of nations.
And finally, we need to stop acting as if we can freeze history. We can’t; we can at best manage it at the margins. nd we cannot achieve what we would like in the short term, a world in which everyone would live in a liberal democratic, capitalist, polyethnic, poly confessional and stable country. We do but we can’t ensure that everyone will or even that everyone will want to. Many don’t see that as a desirable goal, at least in part because they have had some e perience with regimes that have treated them very badly. o not confuse the right of self determination with the uestion of the means that some people pursuing that make you use of. o not allow them to discredit the idea because if you do, you go back to the uestion of being a supporter of ord orth and I do not think that is a good idea.
22 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
. The kraine risis
Hon. Yaroslav Brisiuck Deputy hief of Mission, Minister ounselor, Embassy of kraine
kraine has been in the spotlight of global attention for uite a while, for the past twelve months. t is because, as we believe, the events in kraine have global significance and global conse uences.
The present crisis in kraine how did we arrive at this situation, and what are the causes and what can we do to resolve this crisis n our view, the short answer is very clear. t is not a domestic krainian crisis; this crisis is brought to us from the outside by an overt aggression and intervention of the ussian ederation, which does not want kraine to get out of its orbit, and potentially sees the events, the changes that are going on in kraine, as a threat to ussia itself, to the current regime in the remlin.
o how did it all start, and what is the reason behind all this kraine, practically since its independence, declared its European aspirations. ut, in reality, little was done over the years to realize them. We can compare kraine to oland, where oland was twenty years ago and where kraine was twenty years ago. ight now olish D is three times as high as Ukraine’s. Russia did not object to Ukraine’s European aspirations at first. t ob ected, very strongly, our desire to oin AT . And in ussia practically blocked our attempts to get membership action plan from AT . ut at the same time they said that the European integration is okay and they did not have anything against it. At that point in time, it was not realistic. owever, kraine was negotiating the association agreement since , and closer to the middle of 1 , the prospects of signing the agreement and our getting closer to Europe and outside of Russia’s orbit became more realistic. And we immediately saw the strong pressure from ussia in terms of economic measures, restrictions of market goods, and so on and so forth.
The dramatic events in the winter of last year 1 1 presented opportunities for ussia to intervene into the situation. As we all know, do not think need to recount the events, as a result of mass protests resident iktor Yanukovych was ousted. ussia declared that the events that are happening in kraine are a coup d’état; the junta and neo azis seized power even though this is not true. Everything was done in accordance with legal procedures. The resident fled the country, the rime Minister Azarov at that time resigned, and arliament was the only institution that continued to work. y votes, the constitutional ma ority, which was sufficient for the impeachment of the resident, the arliament removed him from power and appointed Turchynov as acting resident and Yatsenyuk as rime Minister. evertheless, ussia did not accept the legitimacy of those changes and decided to intervene under the pretext of the need to protect its “compatriots” as the ussians call the ussian speakers who live in kraine. Then the events in rimea ensued
The presentations of Yaroslav risiuck, an rzezinski, and atrick Murphy were delivered at a seminar on "The Ukraine Crisis: Quo Vadis?” held on ovember , 1 at otomac nstitute for olicy tudies. Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 23 where the Russian uma authori ed utin on arch st to use troops in the territory of Ukraine.
t is interesting rofessor Ale ander raised the issue of self determination and separatism in this conte t. n Crimea the people who could ha e rights to self determination are Crimean Tartars. owe er the majority of Crimean Tartars were deported in and o er the past twenty years Ukraine was making efforts for them to resettle in Ukraine. Crimean Tartars boycotted the referendum of arch th and the data that Russian organi ations themsel es show indicates that only about fifteen or twenty percent of the population actually supported the anne ation of Crimea e en though the official statistics are o er ninety percent—o er eighty percent turnout in the elections and o er ninety percent in fa or of Russia. The Council on e elopment of Ci il ociety and uman Rights under utin indicates that only thirty percent of oters took part in the referendum and slightly more than half of them actually oted for succession.
We all know the story where Russian troops crossed Ukraine’s border inside the Crimea took o er the authorities and pulled off this referendum in about two weeks. The same scenario pretty much replicated itself or is being replicated in the East of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk, so called People’s Republics, with strong support of Russia militarily which continues to deli er troops and armaments and special forces up to this date.
The conse uences of these e ents are truly of a global scale global magnitude. E ents such as the anne ation of Crimea did not happen since orld ar . The entire international security architecture is being undermined by Russia’s actions. By anne ation of Crimea Russia iolated the United ations Charter the elsinki inal Act the tatute of the Council of Europe and bilateral agreements with Russia including a big treaty where Russia recogni ed Ukraine and our borders as of . And most importantly these actions iolated the udapest emorandum of whereby Ukraine ga e up the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world at that time which was bigger than the U China and rance combined: strategic and tactical nuclear missiles.
t became apparent that the mechanisms en isioned in the udapest emorandum did not fulfill the purposes that they were designed for. E en though we had security assurances from Russia and from other countries like the United tates and the United ingdom unfortunately at this point the situation remains that the territorial integrity of Ukraine is iolated. This sends a clear message to e eryone that unless you ha e weapons with which you can protect yourself no guarantees can be enough to pre ent a foreign aggression. The situation could ha e been different if we were part of the orth Atlantic Alliance but as said Russia effecti ely pre ented Ukraine from proceeding down that path in where it pressured a number of European countries that depend on Russia for energy.
hat could be done and what ha e we tried to do to resol e this crisis? ince April there ha e been a number of attempts and negotiations in different formats to put an end to it and reach an agreement. n April th there was a meeting in ene a and an agreement signed by Ukraine Russia the United tates and the European Union where all the parties agreed that armed groups must disarm and 24 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
acate the buildings that they iolently sei ed. nd would like to make one small point on the buildings. he actions o the separatists in the ast—the ma ority o those people are not Ukrainians they are not Ukrainian citi ens. ll the leaders o the Donetsk Republic and the Luhansk Republic are Russian citi ens like trelko , irkin and Borodai. hey ha e a track record o ser ing in the B, the Russian ecurity er ice. nd a telling e ample o the act that this is not a local con lict by the people who protested the central authorities is that in one o the cities, in harki , the protestors tried to take o er a go ernment building. hey took o er a building o the theater by mistake. pparently local people who know their town would not make such a mistake.
acating the taken o er buildings was one o the agreements that parties reached. yi would stop the antiterrorist operation which we started at the beginning o actual con lict with the separatists, and the will monitor the implementation o the agreement. t became apparent at the end o pril that the separatists had no intention to comply with those agreements, and in act, eight obser ers were kidnapped—those who tried to monitor the implementation o this agreement. hen again, in the beginning o une, oreign inisters o Ukraine, Russia, rance and ermany met in Berlin and agreed on a sustainable cease ire, on the resumption o talks within the contact group, and oint border control at checkpoints. hat did not bring about tangible results in the armed con lict. n une th we had the meeting in ormandy with Poroshenko, Putin, erkel, and ollande. lso, talks continued but the crisis continued to de elop. ter his election, President Poroshenko introduced a i teen point peace plan, which became a basis or urther agreements in this ield.
nd as a side note—as a result o the election campaign, the political orces in Ukraine that Russia was threatening e eryone with—neo a is or radicals and so on and so orth—they got something like one percent o the otes. he party o Rabino ich got twice as many otes as the radicals who oscow wanted to present as a threat.
o, shortly a ter President Poroshenko came into o ice he proposed a i teen point peace plan as one thing, and the second thing that he did was to initiate the unilateral cease ire as a good aith attempt on our side to stop the crisis. t was, indeed, unilateral. he separatists did not ollow suit, and o er that one week people were killed, wounded—so it did not work out. here were a number o contacts, including phone contacts, with President Putin, and contacts as part o the trilateral contact group with the participation o Ukraine, Russia and the and the separatists and as a result on eptember th and th insk agreements were signed. We belie e that these agreements are the basis how this con lict could be sol ed.
he key elements o this agreement is bilateral cease ire with the monitoring, decentrali ation o power in Ukraine, monitoring o the border o Ukraine Russia, release o all hostages, the amnesty law, early local elections in the ast o Ukraine, and retreat o unlaw ul military units and Russian troops rom the territory o Ukraine. Un ortunately, we continue to see iolations o the insk agreements. n ctober th there was a meeting in ilan between President Poroshenko, Putin, hancellor erkel, President ollande, and talian Prime inister Ren i as well as the uropean ommission President Barroso, trying to induce Russia to abide by those agreements. But a ter three rounds o talks, the Russian side continued its line that Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 25
by the Donetsk and Luhansk “Republics ” There is a difference bet — —the “DNR” and “LNR ” They were at the gunpoint of the militants. Most unfortunate was the reaction
—
26 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
hat could be the possible rationale for Moscow’s actions in general, and for continuing to support this conflict in the ast ne of the possible rationales is trying to repeat the rimean scenario and anne the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that are occupied by the terrorists right now to create possible access from Russia to Transdnistria which is a fro en conflict that has been going on for o er twenty years potentially to possibly place another outh tream type pipeline from Russia to urope bypassing krainian territory. t could also be an idea of federali ing kraine and pre enting it from mo ing towards urope by ha ing this anti urope encla e in kraine. t could be a bargaining chip for legitimi ing the anne ation of rimea. r it could also be for boosting popularity of the utin regime in the face of economic difficulties and pre enting e ents like Maidan from happening in Russia.
hat is the solution and what has been the international response The international response has been truly o erwhelming—an almost uni ersal condemnation of Russia’s actions. The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution with over one hundred countries supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity. nly ele en countries opposed that resolution including Russia uba North orea yria and se eral others. The same reaction came from the uropean nion from N T from the and a number of countries. s a response sanctions were imposed to force Russia to withdraw and stop fueling this conflict and inter ening in our affairs. These sanctions are beginning to work gradually. e had se eral le els of sanctions and our position is that these sanctions should not be rolled back—they should be further increased because we continue to see iolations of the agreements to which Russia was a party. e welcome a statement that ederica Mogherini made today in arsaw that the issue of sanctions is still on the table and oreign Ministers of the uropean nion would re iew this issue on No ember when they met.
e see a solution in the implementation of the Minsk agreement which pro ides a clear path to peace which is ceasefire pulling away the troops from line of combat release of all hostages and repeal of the No ember nd “elections.” We count on continued support from our partners—the nited tates the uropean nion—in forcing the other side to abide by those agreements.
nd last but not least the key—maybe not to the resolution of this conflict itself— but to overall improvement of the situation is Ukraine’s continued reforms and mo ement towards urope. e recently held elections on ctober elections to the parliament of kraine whereby the ma ority of M s are from pro uropean parties. e are waiting for the formation of the coalition which should be done in the ne t few days. The official results will be certified on No ember th. Right now with o er percent of ballots counted it is clear that we ha e a pro uropean arliament with pro uropean go ernment and pro uropean resident.
o despite the conflict we will continue to implement all the necessary reforms and continue to count on assistance from the uropean nion and our partners as we mo e forward. Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 27
Ian Brzezinski ormerly eputy Assistant ecretary of efense for urope and NAT olicy and currently Resident enior ellow, rent cowcroft enter on nternational ecurity, Atlantic ouncil
am going to start off with two uibbles that have. ne is with the title, and it follows from Yaroslav’s comments. The phrase “Ukraine risis” is used often to describe what is happening to Ukraine, and it is infers an inaccurate depiction of events there. As aroslav pointed out, it is not an internal crisis that is occurring it is an e ternal invasion. t is a mistake for NAT , for our uropean allies, and especially the U. . Administration to avoid pointing out that factual reality. y intentionally avoiding this reality, we have ended up generating policies that are sadly inade uate. t is an invasion. The insurrection we see in Ukraine, generated by pro ies, led by pro ies, fought by pro ies, has been backed by Russian military e uipment it has been supported by the Russian military and is supported by the Russian government. t has been directed by a foreign power. t is an invasion.
The second thing that kind of irks me in Washington is when people kind of go ‘Well—you know, Ukraine has wasted years through its corruption, weakness, lack of commitment, and determination to drive forward real reform. There is truth this statement. I lived in Ukraine in ’93 and ’94 and I saw a lot of corruption there and I saw all the inade uacies. ut can tell you one thing is very different from oland. oland did not have Russia breathing down its back, in its knickers, pumping in money to corrupt politicians and to stymy business development. oland was not sub ected to a blit krieg of information and propaganda. oland was not sub ect to trade embargoes. t was not permeated by intelligence operatives.
t is ama ing how far Ukraine has come, being ne t to a great power which has devoted a huge amount of resources to breaking down the emergent Ukrainian sense of a national identity. And when one looks at Ukraine today compared to twenty years ago one cannot be but impressed as the strength of the national identity that has evolved under those circumstances. o, when you critici e Ukraine for its inade uacies, let us not forget that a lot of its problems were e ternally generated and e ternally sustained.
Now, why should we care about this, here in Washington, , or in some uropean capitals What we have here is an unprovoked violation of territorial integrity of a uropean nation—by the way, Europe’s second largest nation and one situated at an important crossroads between urope and urasia. aroslav pointed out the dangerous precedent has been set by allowing a treaty, designed to reinforce efforts to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to be grossly violated and largely ignored.
think, even more important has been the reintroduction of a very dangerous principle into urope, the principle of ethnic sovereignty. utin is ustifying his invasion of Ukraine on the grounds that he has the right to unilaterally redraw borders when he has a concern about the status of an ethnic minority beyond his borders. This is the same principle of ethnic sovereignty that wrought horrors to urope twice during the last century and many times before. 28 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
Russia’s invasion is certainly a threat to the vision of a Europe whole, free, and secure. utin has invaded Ukraine in large part because the Ukrainian people want to oin Europe. This also a real challenge to U. . leadership, to T , and to the West as a whole. utin is using this invasion to demonstrate that the United tates, T , and the EU lack the diplomatic economic and military capacity to counter a ussian power.
What does this invasion tell us about ussia any tend to kind of look at this war as an isolated event, but the fact is, that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a continuum in Putin’s foreign policy. It is part of a campaign plan or campaign history that includes energy embargos against Ukraine and the altics, a cyber attack on Estonia, and the invasion of eorgia.
With seven years of precedents, Russia’ invasion of Ukraine is clearly not an isolated event. It is part and parcel of a revanchist policy by utin. e defines ussian greatness, not in terms of ideology but in terms of territory and nationalism, and, for that matter, an ugly form of nationalism.
The really dangerous thing is he is backing it up with military power. nd I am struck by the difference between ussian military capability in and what we have seen demonstrated in Ukraine. emember the pictures of the drunk ussian soldiers staggering on the backside of the battlefield, when ussia invaded eorgia ussia actually had some difficulty invading eorgia. It won that conflict by mass, certainly not by skill. eorgians were knocking down aircraft and U s.
It is also important to remember what stopped utin in eorgia in that summer of . They would have kept on going had not the United tates, demonstrated a little bit of muscle, that involved flying eorgian troops and humanitarian supplies into the country with U air lifters, basically signaling that they were ready directly to risk a fight with ussian forces. That stopped utin.
ompare that ussian military to what we recently saw in rimea. I was really struck by the , to 3 , pecial orces that deployed and fanned across that peninsula. lick e uipment, crisp uniforms, unbelievable communications discipline. This is a very different entity that we are dealing with. It shows how determined oscow has been in learning from the lessons from . It is reaping the benefits of a significant moderni ation of its armed forces. That was a professional force that we saw in rimea. It is a professional undertaking we see in Eastern Ukraine.
nd oscow is backing this moderni ation up with a billion ac uisition budget that is yielding new deployments in the rctic, new deployments in elarus, fifth generation aircraft, a shift of forces over to the Western rontier, and massive military e ercises. I met with a senior European chief of defense, and I asked him, “What has struck you most about Russian military modernization plans?” And he said without a snap, “their ability to decide quickly and to quickly mobilize large amounts of forces.” Indeed we have seen utin initiate on short notice e ercises in the scale of , . iterally, utin gets on a weekend, calls up a military district, and says I want an e ercise, and they have got 9, thousand people out there.
Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 29
ur largest A e ercise for collective defense was teadfast azz that had five thousand, maybe not even that, of which two thousand were desk ockeys. his is an order of magnitude about which we should be concerned. And these e ercises are being complemented by increasingly assertive shows of force by the Russian forces, not ust in Ukraine, but in the Arctic and the altic. hese demonstrations of military force are intended remind the West that Putin is a big deal, and they are intimidating, particularly to the entral European neighbors.
o what should our response be? I was a little bit surprised when some say that we should be impressed by the international response to Russia’s aggression. I am the opposite. I have been underwhelmed. I see a lot of rhetoric and completely inadequate action.
Let’s examine the West’s economic sanctions against Russia. They have had no discernible effect Putin’s calculus. He is beefing up the outskirts of Mariupol as we speak, with convoys going into Eastern Ukraine this last weekend, maybe even additional artillery pieces. What we have are targeted sanctions against specific and limited set of Russian entities. And the fact remains that even with these sanctions millions of dollars are sloshing back and forth over the Russian border, including in the energy sector.
We need to impose sectoral sanctions. therwise, what we have right now are red badges of courage for those who have been targeted—pins that demonstrate loyalty to Putin and little more. ome oligarchs have been actually boasting that they have been sanctioned. o date, our sanctions have had little to no impact on Russian decision making.
Allow me an aside to share with you my view of economic balance of power between Russia and the EU. Russia is a trillion economy. As enator c ain says, it is no more than a gas station with only one product, gas and oil, and one client the EU. he EU is a trillion economy. It is globally integrated. It has an e cess of terminals that it does not know what to do with. It gets only one third of its gas from Russia. And the EU, by the way, is the biggest source for foreign investment into Russia. oreover, it is backed by a trillion economy, the U. . economy. ow is it that a trillion gas station is able to intimidate a trillion economy si times its size that is backed by a trillion economy? he answer has to be a mi found in the West of strategic shortsightedness, moral fecklessness—allowing a neighbor to be invaded while one sit on one’s hands—and pure corporate greed. It is really, really disappointing. We are not leveraging the economic capabilities that we have.
The West’s military response has been even more limited. As I pointed out, Russia mobilizes and e ercises on a given day thousand. At one time during the invasion of rimea and the heating up of the events in Eastern Ukraine, some estimates had thousand Russian troops mobilized on Ukraine’s border. What has the West done? What has been its response? A dozen or so aircraft in the altics and Iceland and into Romania backed by handful of companies, units of or so soldiers. It is grossly inadequate. It is no surprise this has done nothing to change the Russian military calculus. It is a symbolic show of force. At best, it thickens the red line on NATO’s Eastern frontier.
30 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
We should be doing a lot more in the military side. We need battalion level deployments on NATO’s eastern frontier. Moreover, look how slow we are in our reactions to Russia’s aggression! The European Reassurance Initiative was rolled out by Obama in une and a NATO readiness action plan was decided in eptember— months after Russia’s blatant seizure of Ukrainian territory. And it is still today not clear what specific actions the RI or RAP will entail.
This does not communicate resolve to Russia. This certainly does not bolster Ukrainian confidence. What should we be doing with Ukraine? We should be providing lethal assistance to the Ukrainians anti tank weapons air defense weapons and other capabilities that would enable them to impose real costs on the invading force.
Instead we have communicated to both yiv and Moscow that we see Ukraine on the far side of the red line.
How can we give anti tank weapons to yrian rebel organizations and not the Ukrainian armed forces which I think are probably more reliable than the former? It is even more disillusioning to the Ukrainian military when one recalls that they contributed to an Article exercise November of last year teadfast azz in Poland. When the West fails to provide real military assistance to enable Ukraine to better defend itself that alone sends a terrible message. It is a message of disillusionment for the Ukrainians and one of encouragement to Putin and his cronies.
We ought to be doing NATO exercises in Ukraine. I am glad that U OM led an exercise there in une but there should be more of them. It helps the Ukrainian military train it is a demonstration of commitment and it complicates Russian military planning. We ought to be putting not O surveillance capacities but allied surveillance capacities and trainers into Ukraine. This is what we did for eorgia after the invasion. Why? ecause it was the most effective way to help the eorgian build up their capability and it brought into the mix a Western presence that little bit more dicey for Russian military planners because they did not know what they were going to get involved with. If they were going to strike in they might end up hitting an American or uropean and that complicated their plan. We should be doing things like that.
We need to do more on the information front. I am so glad the tate epartment is doing more on that but it is limited in resources. One needs more than ten or twenty million dollars when going up against the kind of propaganda efforts that the Russians are imposing on Ukraine and others.
o where are we now? Is the worst yet to come? I do not know if the worst is yet to come but there is more to come. One should very concerned by the continued flow of Russian e uipment and personnel into astern Ukraine—particularly this weekend— and the recent repositioning of ‘separatist’ forces.
I am worried that the Ukrainian military is getting chewed up. Its combat capability has been significantly degraded over the last eight months. o if there is another big showdown over Mariupol it is not ust going to be the loss of Mariupol but it could be a real crippling of the Ukrainian ability to exercise conventional resistance to Russian aggression. o I am pessimistic. Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 31
On a more positive note, one has to be impressed at how this invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the strength of the Ukrainian national identity. It is something that we should be fostering, and it is something that we should not take for granted.
or this reason real thought has to be given to how NATO responds to any Ukrainian e pression of interest in membership. e are going to have the most pro reform, the most pro estern, the most Europe oriented and the most pro NATO government in yiv in Ukraine’s history. Are Washington and Brussels thinking strategically about how we are going to embrace those aspirations And it ust cannot be, “no, we do not want to hear about it.” We have to have a strategy to think about how we embrace it in a way that is constructive and gives them more confidence.
hat we need is strategy that integrates stronger, sectoral economic sanctions, a more robust military response along NATO’s frontiers, and real tangible efforts to help the Ukrainians defend themselves, all coupled with a broader vision that embraces Ukraine’s European and transatlantic aspirations. That is going to be the most effective way to reverse Russia’s course.
e have got to change course, we have got to have a firmer response, we have got to be more committed to Ukrainian sovereignty then we have. Otherwise we are going to end up with a far more complicated, perhaps more devastating problem.
32 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
Dr. Patrick Murphy ormer U. . government official, including in the Office of the ecretary of tate, and currently isiting ellow, nter University enter for egal tudies
The present crisis started early in the spring of , when the Ukrainian people forced their corrupt and pro Russian resident anukovych out of office. Within a few days and to everybody’s surprise, the man I sometimes call “ras utin” threw away $50 billion worth of Olympic goodwill by sei ing the rimean eninsula for Russia. And within a few weeks he started a minor league civil war in Eastern Ukraine because, he claimed, Russian speakers were being oppressed. Recent Ukrainian overnment elections in which Russian speakers took part seem to indicate that those Russian speakers much prefer to live in a democratic state which is pro European but where Russian is a minority language, to living in other Russia with utin as dictator.
By now his forces, Ukrainian Russian or actual Russian citi ens, have more or less secured their base in onetsk and uhansk, and may advance on ariupol as well. This would give them a seaport and set the stage for further Russian advances to form a land bridge with rimea and perhaps even eventually with Russian held Transdnistria in oldova. Of course, such developments would cut off Ukraine itself fully from its present Black ea saltwater shores, and would add its great port city of Odessa to “Novorossiya.” Pro Russian forces also shot down a alaysian Airways plane with a loss of nearly lives, and all together are responsible for the loss of several thousand lives.
Mentioning Moldova brings up the question, “Why are we talking about Ukraine in a way we never spent much time on oldova or eorgia, both of which have suffered partial Russian occupation for several years?” The reason is that Ukraine is the canary in the coal mine Ukraine has a direct border with several NATO members, oland, lovakia, ungary, and Romania. Thus, what happens in Ukraine has a direct effect on NATO itself, and particularly on the three Baltic Republic NATO members, Estonia, atvia, and ithuania. As if to underline the point, utin sent Russian air force planes over the seas bordering weden, Norway, the United ingdom, ermany, etc., all the way to ortugal before turning back. utin did NATO and Ukraine itself a favor by doing so—some of the West European countries seem less than enthusiastic about such “old fashioned” NATO ideas as Article 5’s “an attack on one is an attack on all.” utin reminded these countries, plus neutral weden and inland, that we are all in this together. A poll from late showed that for the first time more wedes favored oining NATO than opposed it.
One of the curious things about the West’s response to Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine is, in a way, the West’s refusal to call it what it is and to meet it head on. Apparently, when ice resident Biden recently declared that Russia had “invaded” Ukraine, he had to retract that statement. The West’s financial sanctions seem always to be “a day late and a dollar short,” though to be fair, they are having an effect, perhaps a serious one along with the drop in the price of oil on the Russian economy.
And when the European Union recently signed an association agreement with Ukraine, it also signed a “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement” or DCFTA with that country. t is the latter that really implements changes both in trade between Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 33
Ukraine and urope, and within the battered Ukrainian economy itself. The Russians strongarmed the U into postponing the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement from November 0 to December , 0 5, during which time they will presumably do all they can to stop its implementation from ever fully occurring. Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Danylo ubkivsky resigned in disgust at these developments.
trangest of all, the West so far has refused to provide Ukraine any lethal weapons. The U. . is providing MR s or Meals Ready to at, as well as blankets, etc., but as Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko courageously told an enthusiastic U. . Congress in the fall of 0 , “. . . one cannot win the war with blankets.” And when enators Carl evin and ames Inhofe recently wrote a bi partisan article in the s o os titled “Why Ukraine should have U.S. weapons,” even they limited such aid to “providing defensive weapons that would help Ukraine defend its territory. . . . T hese weapons are lethal but not provocative because they are defensive.” They would include anti tank weapons, but apparently no tanks as such. ut how can Ukraine win back its own territory if it does not have what the senators must think of as offensive weapons? Finally, how can one in many cases even so easily distinguish between defensive and offensive weapons?
The ironic thing is that the Ukrainians have had enough of being pushed around for centuries by their neighbors, especially Russia. Many people forget that when the ermans invaded the oviet Union in World War II, they met with ferocious partisan warfare, no matter what it cost the partisan or guerrillas if they were captured. And where did this partisan warfare largely take place? In Ukraine. I have already read that Ukrainian grandfathers are telling their grandchildren (of BOTH sexes), “Seventy years ago it was our turn; now it is yours.” The mothers of Russian soldiers have repeatedly told the press that they were ama ed to get cell phone calls from their sons, saying that the sons were in Ukraine. When some of these sons return home in body bags, that would—and already has begun to—have an effect on the ordinary Russian citi ens who gave Putin a pass on, for instance, Crimea. The Ukrainians will fight to the last man and woman to prevent a full Russian takeover of their country. It does appear that Putin is somewhat aware of that, as he has not really pushed very hard recently though the latest reports are that more unmarked military vehicles have entered Ukraine .
Putin is in this game for the long haul. Are we?
34 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
. Russia’s Middle East Strategy
Professor Shireen Hunter Research rofessor at the enter for uslim hristian Understanding at eorgetown University, with which she has been associated since , as isiting ellow and then isiting rofessor
onah Alexander has asked me to talk about Russia and the iddle ast and more specifically on Russian ranian relations. However, before saying anything on the sub ect, must say that am not an expert on Russia. However, when wrote a book about slam and Russia had to study a fair amount about Russian history, politics, identity, etc. That is why it took me four, five years to write the book. mean that took about four or five years to do that. So learned a few things about Russia, although will never ever claim to be an expert on Russia. Russia is a very complex country and you really have to have dedicated a whole lifetime to understanding it. But there a couple of things that learned about Russia which also might help us to understand Putin’s mentality. Some of the factors which shape Putin’s mentality are rooted in Russia’s history and Russia’s relationship with the West. Others are related to the difference between the Russian understanding or the Russian narrative of the post Soviet era, and the Russian perception of how the West treated Russia and the Western understanding of the post Soviet era and the Russia Western relations. think if we do not understand these factors we will not understand utin. onse uently, we might lapse into oversimplifications and we might even enter a period of unnecessary confrontation with Russia beyond what we have already seen.
One of the things that we have to understand about Russia is the feeling that most Russians have that they are a great power although their population has dwindled and their empire is gone. This belief in Russia as a great power is ingrained in Russian psychology. n fact, that is how they define themselves. They believe that Russia has been, and is going to remain, a great power. So think that one of the things that Russians have done in the past and what maybe utin is doing, sometimes clumsily and in the fashion that is not going to be useful to Russia itself, relates to this factor. or example, one of the things that utin is doing in Syria is basically to show that Russia is here and that other powers should take into account. He saying to the U.S. and others that you cannot ust ignore Russia and run the world the way you want. ow, he may fail in this ob ective because Russia now does not have the same sort of power that it did before. However, it still has a lot of power, especially military. do not think that Russia is very much concerned about Assad. t sees Assad as someone who will allow Russia to retain its position in Syria, to retain its position in the eastern editerranean and so on and so forth. And it may be using Assad as a bargaining chip. Russia wants to be part of this so called international community, but as an e ual player, not ust by courtesy. To be present in great power gatherings but remain uiet. This is one element in Russia’s policy and Putin’s behavior that we must understand.
The presentations of Shireen Hunter, Andrew Bowen, and Scott delman were delivered at a seminar on “Russia’s Middle East Strategy: Quo Vadis?” held on October , at otomac nstitute for olicy Studies. Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 35
not er t ing is Russia’s istori al a i alen e regarding t e est es e ially oining t e est is goes to t e ti e o Peter t e reat all t e de ates t at a ened a ter Peter’s re or s So e Russians sin e t at ti e a e anted to e o e art o t e est ut ot ers a e elie ed t at Russia is a sui generis i ili ation and is Eurasian in ara ter So e o t is elie is really a ro anti notion and not rooted in reality ut ne ert eless it is t ere t ey do so eti es eel t at and t ere ore t ey are a i alent a out ole eartedly oining t e est
n t e ot er and o e er a e also to say t at t is Russian eeling as een ed y t e a t t at t e est as really ne er seen Russia as art o itsel irst o all t ere is t e di ision et een t e Eastern ristianity and t e estern ristianity is is a real distin tion and you did not need t e late Sa untington to oint t is out e ot er t ing is t at t e Euro eans ne er really a e ted Russia as art o Euro e no atter t e Russians tried to oin Euro e e a ous saying attri uted so eti es to a oleon t at s rat a Russian and you ill ind a atar e resses t is estern ie o Russia do not ean t is in any ay disres e t to t e artars o li e ery u ent to atarstan li e t e in redi ly ey are ery ery ni e eo le os ita le and ar ut t at is o t e esterners ie t e Russians eaning t at Russia is not Euro ean t at Russians are siati So t in t at t ere is al ays going to e t is ind o ull and us et een Russia and t e est t in t at en e are analy ing Putin e s ould ay attention to t ese a tors do not t in t at e s ould inter ret Putin’s e a ior solely in ter s o t e rise o anot er e isode o Russian i erialis elie e t at t is a roa an e o e a sel ul illing ro e y es Putin ants Russia to e treated as a great o er ut t at does not ne essarily ean t at e ants to re reate t e e ire or go a to t e So iet era ie s and t e elie in an e istential on li t it t e est or si ilar notions t in t ese are so e o t e t ings e need to understand
e ot er t ing t at e need to understand a out t e urrent situation and a out at as led to t e Putin eno enon is to a e a ore realisti ie o t e eltsin era e er e tions o t e Russians and esterns o t e eltsin era are dia etri ally o osed to ea ot er sa t is di eren e irst and t is not ust old o unists or e tre e nationalists o a e a negati e ie o t e eltsin era Many young Russian and e en Russian de o rats eel t e sa e ay Most eo le in Russia do not li e eltsin and t e eltsin era is seen in Russia as a eriod o a solute national u iliation nd you do not a e to e a o unist or ar i erialist to eel t at at a ened to Russia as ery trau ati ing and u iliating e ot er t ing is t at at t ese Russians eel e en goes or eo le li e ndrei o yre Yeltsin’s irst oreign inister Peo le li e o yre ere t e ost ro estern Russians ey o ed t at in t e ost So iet era Russia and t e est ould a e a artners i and Russia ould e an e ual artner in anaging t e ost So iet international syste t t e least t ey o ed t at t e region o t e So iet e ire as going to e gi en to Russia to anage n a t re e er reading one o o yre state ents in i e says t at Russia is going to e t e agent o i ili ation in entral sia and t e au asus and ill lin t e it t e est and so on and so ort So en t is did not a en it generated a ong any Russians a strong sense o etrayal y t e est Es e ially a ter t ey a e to elie e t e estern understanding o oo eration it Russia as t at Russia ad to agree it ate er t e est as doing any ere in t e orld and t e inute t ey disagree on so et ing t en t ey are going to e a used o i erialis or re erting to o unis or e o ing nonde o rati and so 36 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
n n a t n less a e s n t an a e i sel sai t at t e este ne s un e stan in e ati n is t at Russia s ul n its ea in a ee ent it este n e isi ns all t e ti e an in essen e ust e a silent a tne
a n t t in t sa t at t e Russians a e i t in t is inte etati n n t a e a in t is i t t e nest n t n is i t asi all eat e s a e all t e sa e e it ina Russia u e e i a es e iall i u a e a s all e i usl u an li e t e alues ne e t an an t e ut essentiall eat e s all e a e in t e sa e a a a ealist en it es t inte nati nal elati ns ust te a a a e i s s a e li e t ei il en t e a e t tal a ut t e ne t e ents alt u t e e ie e as siti e n it sai t at t e e le ts a ealist ias ell a n t as a e t at
ene all s ea in e s ul inte et Putin in t is li t Putin’s als a e essentiall t e ll in ne t se u e Russia’s inte ests Russia as i usl its n inte ests e a le e an l at t e le it aine in i e ent a s ut a n t in t et int t at e a le it is i tant t eali e t at us e a e i ea t aine t e ause e as i sel a ainian u t a int Russia’s esi e t a e i ea a is un e stan a le e sa e is t ue ist ainians en an nne ti n et een t e ie an Rus’ an t e P in e us n t n is i t ut still it is a in t t e Russians s sai n t a e a in t is i t t is is n t i t ut t in all t is is ute a ut t i ea el n s is useless u ant t i e i ea t t e i inal in a itants t en u s ul i e t e a t ata s e ause at e ine t e ut t e ata s i ea t e int is t at it e en s n e e u ant t sta t ist an en u ant t sa an a ti n is a essi n an t e t in
elie e t at t e a Putin as ne a ut t e uesti n i ea an aine as een e n an as een e unte u ti e an t in ulti atel it is in t a ainst Russia’s n inte ests ut a ust t in t a a nuan e t t t e is ussi n e ause t e is u se s a as een s u ust a ut u in n Russia u in u in u in t at t in it is i tant t as n t a e t n t a e t i usl ut t a e an un e stan in at is t e Russian na ati e all t ese issues an e ents
e e e l at t e i le ast issue an Russia’s li t a s it in t is nte t i st Russia as a se i us se u it n e n en it es t sla i ilitan Y na le an e ea lie e e e t ust ne te ist in i ent e et ate sla ist e t e ists in Russia na el t e in i ent in t e s eate ut t e e e e an an t e in i ents e s et u a t e eslan sie e e e a still in a estan an n us etia te ist in i ents ta e la e e t au asus is a aul n it is n t uiet et n u n it is i tant i u all it t au asus i u a e Russian an all it s ut Russia ain it all e en s u l at t is t in ut t e tt line is t at an t e sla ist e t e ists a e eal t eat t Russia Russians a e als n e ne a ut t e su t t ese u s e ei e au i a ia e a t is e n t tell t e t ut a ut e tain t in s e e sa s t at t e au is a e i tene al Qa’ida an ust e elusi nal ean a e u e e seen an t in a enin in Ri a an te ist a t in Ri a s et in a ens is a ainst t e i ites in t e easte n in e Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 37
s i i a a is Qa da a d a i as is a a a us a a d s a ad a i i a i audis a us d s a is u s i s u a si a a a us d u i i i a s as i s u s i i i a d Russia s is us d a a u s s a a d i i s i s i s a d u ad s s u i Russia s a d is s a ss a is is s u i a is ui i i a i u d a a s a a d s
Russia a s as a ai i d a i i is a s ia i i i a i i d i a i ia i ia is u u a i Russia us i s a d us i au asus u a s i a s i as s a a a s a a d i ia a d a s aus a a i u i Russia as a a i i i Russia as sa di a as as a au i a s a ia i Russia a a d s as i a Russia i’i a ia sus a i a u i a ia i is u d us a a i d d
is is s u i u d i a Russia a s a s s a “hey, u a us a a i s u a here.” i a is a i Russia’s i i idd as ai s a i a i i a ai s i u i a u i is sa i “ us as a a d a ” i a is is i s a s a a u s s ai a s a u s s i i udi is a is ai a said u s ad issu s a su s i u a u i a a u i u s s i s
us a i i a Russia a ia a i s s a i i a d s a said a a ’s a i s i Russia si R u i as a fool’s a ai Iran’s s i is a a a as d Russia s Russia s a a i u a d a a d i a d i idd i ds d a ia s a asi a a d Russia a
Russia i us as a i s i a a i i a i si Russia ’s asi a a i a u a a as a a a Russia a d a ad ai a s i a is is a aus a is i i a is a i is u au asus u a a a a i a s a s a s as ia i a a a us i a a d as ui a ia assa id i a ai s ads s s is i Russia a d is i a a d a i a
a sa a a s asi i i s Russia a d a a i is a u d u i a as u u i Russia’s a i u a i s a a a a d s i a ds Russia a is u i u a d a s a is s a a Russia is a i i a d a d a i Russia a d is a i s u d a a is u s i
38 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
o e in i h here are e ono i onfli s of in eres e een Iran an Russia hile Iran’s an Europe’s e ono i rela ions are o li en ary. Iran an ro i e uro e i h na ural as, an uro e an ro i e Iran i h all in s of e hnolo y an in es en fun s. ean hile Russia an s o sell ener y o uro e an herefore oes no an Iran’s en ry in o he uro ean ar e s . o hey an o on rol Iran’s ener y ar e s. u oil an o her Russian ener y fir s are o in o Iran. I hin ha if he Iranians o no a h i , hey are oin o u a eal ha Iran oul no allo Iran ha e in e en en ealin s in he as ar e .
he o her hin is ha , al hou h urren ly Iran is a inor o e i or for Russia in he au asus an o so e e en in en ral sia, o en ially i oul e o e a ore serious ri al. ou no , eo le al a ou ur ey’s influen e in en ral sia an so on. es, ur i lan ua es are si ilar, I s ea one of he . u he fa is ha ul urally, en ral sian ul ure is u h ore influen e y ersian ul ure al hou h no i h an o erlay of o ern ul ure In a a hs an hen I en o he hno ra hi useu , hey sho e e ha u un il he i le of he en ie h en ury hey use o ea h olestan’s aa i— he ersian oe —as a ain e oo . o are he region’s usi an o her re resen a i e ar s. fe ays a o I rea a ee or so e hin in a e si e y so e o y ho is ery e re e an ur is or ha e er. e sai ha “Why are you e s s ill lo in ersian usi an son s ou s u i Uzbeks.” o really, his is rue. o e i es you shoul rea arious e si es i h usi , e ., o un ers an he s a e of in er e hni rela ions. I lis en o ersian, f han, an a i usi . o I see he o en s ha are a e. o e i es he e en of e hni ani osi y as oun s e.
o, I hin ha Russians see Iran’s o en ial as a ri al. he sa e is rue in he au asus. or e a le, Iran an e an al erna i e o Russia for r enia. r enia oul refer ha . u es ern oli y has e lu e Iran fro he au asus an en ral sia, an no e are o lainin ha Russia is u in as o eor ia. he fa is ha in he s, e i no allo eor ians o es a lish rela ions i h Iran. he ar na e an e his rela ionshi i h Iran, u e sai no. e sai e are oin o on ain Iran an ha is i . ou anno ha e any hin o o i h Iran. o, e lef he fiel o en o he Russians.
o u in i h e han in his in a ou Iran an i h el o e a ore ro inen role for Iran, es e ially ha ur ey has han e un er r oğan. u I hin for os of he ‘90s an he early s, u in as e re ely sus i ious of he reli ious o ern en —you no , he Isla is o ern en —in Iran. u hen Iran, unli e ur ey an he ra s, eha e ery ell urin he he hen risis. i ri renin ro e a ou i , ho Iran as seen as ore res onsi le. I also hin i as your oss, n re , i i ri i es ho sai ha Iran as he oo i on he lo in er s of he hnya an e re is in he au asus.
he o her hin I ha e o say is ha he ini ia i e in se in he a e in Iran Russian rela ions has al ays een i h Russia. ean hile, he re i e, es e ially he har liners, has al ays seen Russia as a ore a e a le ar ner han he es , e ause of lar ely i s o session i h eri a. herefore, he re i e has al ays an e o ha e oo rela ions i h he Russians, an i has een he Russians ha ha e hesi a e in oin eyon a er ain oin . ar of his a i u e has een e ause ha any of hese uys, I ean he Iranian re olu ionaries, ere lef is s in lu in Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 39 so e Isla ists. In a t Iran’s re olution as as a le tist re olution ith an Isla i eneer. e ause the people ho a e the re olution—the u ahi een the a a’iyan an so on—they ere essentially o unist an they use Isla to popularize this an this is in lear in the riting. n again like onah le an er talking about books i you rea y last book entitle r e I sho ho this as. o there is this eeling that the syste the regi e is u h ore re epti e to ussia than it is to the West.
he other thing rankly is that the regi e oes not see the ussian ulture as threatening to the hereas they in the Western ulture eri an ulture in parti ular but also European ulture as being ore attra ti e an hen e ore threatening. o I think that this is another thing. I think that ernar e is as right hen he talke o the se u ti e allure o the Western ulture. hat is true. utin is orrie about that too. I ean all the stu that you hear or ussians about the West’s e a en e. I a not saying hether estern ulture is goo or ba . o ething being se u ti e oes not ne essarily ean it is goo but be that as it ay it is ore appealing.
In short the initiati e has al ays been ith ussia. n I think that basi ally ussia has use Iran instru entally. or e a ple ussia has bargaine ith the Iran ar ith the West. or e a ple they sai i you ant us to go along ith san tion on Iran then on’t pressure us an o not put issiles or hate er in olan . he ussians ha e really use Iran.
o the uestion that I ha e is hether the latest ussian Iranian lirtation is anything i erent ro the past r ussia again is sho ing Iran the gar en path an at so e point ill betray it again I think one an argue that up to a point things ha e been hanging an perhaps ertain geopoliti al shi ts are taking pla e an that it oul be on ei able that ussia ight try to use Iran ore as a partner rather than as an instru ent in its plans or Eurasia an the i le East. or e a ple e ill see i Iran is a epte into the hanghai ooperation rganization as a ull e ber et . an so on an so orth. hen o ourse is the hinese ele ent there. o this ight be it. n i portant a tor oul be the state o ussian Western relations espe ially Western san tions on ussia. he Ukraine proble I o not think is going to be resol e so easily. n also san tions. an tions as e kno on e i pose are ery har to li t. o I think that it oul be that the ussians ight be al ulating that Iran ill be a ore aluable partner e ono i ally. here are talks that they are going to in est in Iran. I sa an ite that ussia is going to open a i e billion ollar re it line or Iran or ertain pro e ts. hey say that they are going to buil railroa s an o this an that. I ill belie e it hen I see it. I as one o the e people that argue that the ushehr plant is ne er going to be built. n i it is e er built it is ne er going to be eli ere . n e en no that it is eli ere I a not sure hether it is un tioning an pro u ing anything or not.
I ean this also goes to the essen e o great po er beha ior. reat po ers o not like e iu size po ers to prosper be ause they be o e ri als. n that is a a t o li e. I ean Iran’s pre i a ent is that Iran is not as big as let us say hina. obo y an tou h hina you get lost in that ass o hu anity. n also it is not s all an in onse uential. I think that has been Iran’s pre i a ent or the past 00 years. n so they ha e to be s art. 40 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
e er I a s a e t sa t at as ar as Iran s n erne t ere are e e n Iran t at are a are t ese a ts an e e are a are t at ss a as an ate Iran e are a are t at na as an ate Iran I ean Iran ans s e nese r ts n t e nese are n re re at r I ean t e e en tr e t earn t e Iran ans t ate sa r n an t en an t ate t n na an t en ete t Iran an e rts
I t n t ere are a n Iran ans rat er e t a e ser e n re at ns art ar t r e an e en t er a t t e r e s t at ne t e reas ns Iran as ne t ss a r na as een e a se er a as n t en t e an t ns e nta n n Iran as re e t at W en n ’ a san an a e a ea t n t e n ress se san t ns n t e ran t e ss an Iran an re at ns a e e e as a a t t t t e West as treate Iran n e en n t e er ans are sa n t at es te t e n ear ea t s n t e s t t t t e san t ns et I t s es n Iran n t a e t ns e n ss a an na
n r a as e e n t a t rea nterests t st a t n t s n a e W at are rea r nterests n r a Was rea as ar ssa s a I ean a ter a t e ssa s a n t t a ar s n e at Is a at a sra etter r I I W s t t at e sa as ar as t e a e n t rea t t at e t e nse en es Assad’s e art re We a e a s e e r s ners r s a e a es a s are sa n t at e a se t e sa as ar st s as ar st t er se Iran ans et n a s are aran ere s n a an sat s t e a s aran ers n ann t e a e t ee se re I I t n t at a ere are t t et e n atter at r se t at n e are n t t t et I a n t n t e e e Erdoğan as st t ete e e er a t e rea as a e se t e tan a n e sa s t e e I a r at er n e sa s as ar ssa st n rse e n t see t e a e t re n n r s a e a es n t e re n n s a as e e a t n t s n a e
n n t t e ss ans n n t s as a re a a ens n as e a ree t erate t ss a e e are n t sa t n ns an e ann t a e t n n e a se t n ns ere t en e s n t n n ra ne t en e s n t n ne t a t en e s n t n n a a t en n sset a an s n an s rt
ee n s t at ss a st as a ea an t I t n t at a e en s n e an e t e t er re na a ers W s n t er a n e en t a ea t ssa r e a e t sa “ an sta t ears an t en e see t n s r t ” r e en a e a re e ent re at ns e e t Iran e a se a t e state ents a ter t e n ear ea a e een ne at e ne at e ne at e
n e a s a e t n erstan t at t er ntr es t a e nterests It s n t a a t n t s ntr r at n t e t er ntr ntr es a e nterests n t e r nterests ten n t n e t rs t e est n e es an ne n t e e r n r r se an n e ate r eren es r n t a n I a n t s est n at ne s e a se e er t n as ses an Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 41
s s s a s a a s a s a d d s d s s d sa s s a s a a d a s d a d a a a s s a a a s a d a s s a a a s d a s s s a s a a ad
42 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
Scott Edelman a a ad s a a s a a d
a ad s a a d d s a a d d as a A a d said, the “surprise about the surprise,” which strikes me as odd because in fact I think there really should not a as s s ss a s a a ssa s a d a d a a
A d d a as d a s a a s s d s s s a s ad d d— a d s ss s a s a as a s a a a s a a ad s s a a a s s a d a s s— s as a s d s a s a a s s as s d a d a a d d s d a a a d s a a a a a d a a as a d as a s s a a a s s called “unipolar moment,” a period of only one major power, for a short period of a d sa s a s s a a d a a a s a d a d s d a a s a a s s as a a s s s d d a a s d a a s s a s a d s a s a ass s s da a s s s a d a As a s a a d a a d ad dd as A d s a d a a s s ss a
d s a a d s s a s s a s sa d s a s early 1990’s— as a s a —sa a d a as a a a ss a a s a s a a as a a d a as a s d a d s a d a a a s ss a s ss ad
A s d s a a d a d a s a d ss a s a d a s s a a a as ad a s a s as d a ss a a s a s sa d a s s a a s a a d a s d A d a s a ss a s a a A a s a a a d d a d
s a a a a a s ad a s a as as a a d s a s— s a d a s — a d ss d a a a d ss a s s d a a as s s s d ssa a s a s s A d a s a a a s d da Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 43
i htenin our focus to why the iddle ast and why ussia in the iddle ast art of it, of course, is what we see on onah le ander’s map. The Middle East, especially the astern editerranean, simply is in the ussian backyard It has always been there but the ussians ha e ne er really been able to project a reat deal of power out there, partly because since the econd orld ar the editerranean, with the stationing of America’s Sixth Fleet, has been an American lake. The other si nificant area on the map, of course, is the ulf re ion, which—since the ritish withdrew in 19 1 1972 from “east of Suez” —has been an merican pond
ut despite their limitations, the ussians ha e asserted themsel es in the re ion s you know, we were fortunate that the old ar was not fou ht directly between the two major superpowers, but was almost entirely fou ht on the mar ins It was fou ht in the hird orld, in atin merica, in outheast sia, and in the iddle ast tartin in the 19 0s with the break we had with asser in ypt, the o iets found that there were lar e issues between the nited tates and the rab countries that they could e ploit—particularly the rab Israeli conflict—which enabled them to enhance their influence in the re ion his actually created a per erse incenti e for them to be as disrupti e as possible in the re ion ecause the more the situation was disrupted, the more that the nited tates and its allies could not stabili e the re ional situation, the more the o iets could increase their political influence o iet arms sales to re ional clients were a bi part of this In the 19 0s and there are some of us in this room who remember those days personally and well , one of the bi est achie ements of ecretary of tate enry issin er and the iddle ast peace process he championed was to et the o iets out of the iddle ast at least out of most of the iddle ast, as they remained on the mar ins in their support for yria and their relationship with Ira , they had a sort of relationship with uwait, and so forth ne of the reasons issin er had for workin as hard as he did to ameliorate rab Israeli tensions was to eliminate that wed e issue for the o iets hen it became apparent that resident adat in ypt was an ious to et the ussians out, we were more than happy to step into their place t that point, by the late 19 0s, we were successful in pushin the o iets far out of influence in the re ion and it remained that way for the rest of the old ar, e en with the ussian pied terre in yria nd when the old ar ended, the yrians found themsel es e posed, more threatened by urkey and by others in the re ion, precisely because the ussians could not support them to the e tent that the former o iet nion had been able to do
ookin at the re ion today from the merican point of iew, one of the major reasons we care about the iddle ast, and especially the ulf re ion, is oil and as, and the fact that the ulf re ion remains to this day is a major source of world ener y en as we mo e towards ener y independence in orth merica, we are still affected by world ener y prices and their effect on the wider world economy
In the ulf re ion, our ori inal concept be innin in the 19 0s was to create a kind of stable local balance of power, but one dominated by Iran under the hah as a pro y for our interests ome of us remember that durin the 19 0s, it was the rab ulf countries which were irritatin us because of the oil embar o and the later dramatic increases in oil prices, and it was ecretary of State Kissinger in the early ‘70s’ who implicitly threatened to in ade the rab ulf countries to sei e their oil if they threatened too much harm hat concept worked reasonable well until the hah fell in 44 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
1979. After that, we—especially during the ran ra ar and then following the ra i in asion of Kuwait—increasingly mo ed our force into the ulf to the point where today, we are not ust the dominant power there but the guarantor of free trade and free traffic through the Strait of ormuz and throughout the ulf region.
As for the ussians and ran, they are looking for acuums, looking for opportunities, wedges, which they can fill and in which they can insert themsel es. n Syria, the ongoing collapse of the Syrian regime is a threat to an important client of both nations but also an opportunity for them to take a more acti e regional role. The ongoing challenges to the central go ernment in ra following the American e acuation from that country also creates opportunities for ran in particular to in ect itself.
These actions are, again, traditional and predictable. oth ussia and ran are looking to defend something called “national interest.” Some of our leaders seem to ha e forgotten that it is normal for countries pursue their own national interests as they percei e them. eople in the regional ha e only limited trust of all outside powers, including the nited States, because they understand them to be pursuing their own national interests.
n Syria, ussia is perfectly happy to support the Assad regime despite its despotic nature, to the extent that it enables them to maintain their small base in Tartus, to maintain some influence in the region and to be an essential part of whate er solution is reached. f at some point Assad personally no longer fulfills that purpose, Moscow’s attitude will be “fine,” they will find somebody else, and Assad understands that.
The eastern Mediterranean is the area where the ussians are, at the moment, asserting themsel es most directly. First of all, this is a matter of simple geography. ust look at the map you can see that it is ery much in their backyard. eyond their immediate concerns in Syria, belie e there may also be a long term concern— do not think this is the main concern dri ing them by any means, but a long time concern as we ha e noted before—that ussia, which is economically dependent on the export of natural gas and to a lesser extent oil, looks to ha e a presence where a new competitor may be de eloping. The ulf, of course, remains its ma or competitor in natural gas and oil, and the ussians cannot be happy o er decreasing world energy prices caused, in part, by the supply of oil and gas from multiple producers. ut the ussians also ha e been reading the newspapers and they know that substantial natural gas disco eries ha e been made—not enormous, not ulf le el, but nonetheless substantial—gas disco eries ha e been made in the eastern Mediterranean in recent years off the coast of Egypt, srael, ebanon and yprus and this represents potential competition for Russia’s European market. There are already negotiations underway with Turkey and some of the European states about this. Eastern Mediterranean gas may not be a complete substitute for ussian gas, but it can be a supplementary supply, a way of insulating the Europeans and the Turks from hea y handed ussian influence because of their monopoly control of gas supplies and a possible check on prices.
So, again, all of this is perfectly natural, and it should be understood as such. ussia and ran, by the way, are not the only powers taking a closer look at both necessities and opportunities in the wider Middle East region. thers, especially in Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 45
Asia, that are dependent on gas and oil coming from the ulf region are increasingly acti e out there. uring the time was in ahrain working as an ad isor to the American a y, we saw the hinese, for e ample, occasionally sending some into the area. At the time when Somali piracy became a growing concern, the effort to combat it also pro ided an opportunity for increased deployments in and near the Arabian Sea by a ariety of na al powers, including the Russians, the apanese, the hinese, and many of the Europeans, all of whom sent ships into the Arabian Sea to learn, inter alia how to operate there, sometimes in coalition with us and sometimes indi idually. The Russians ha e since followed up by sending ships occasionally into the ulf. ut at this time, no other na al power can seriously compete with us there. So far, the other powers that ha e looked at increasing their presence in the ulf region because of their concerns o er oil and gas supplies, the more successful ones, ha e done so in coalition or in cooperation with the nited States. The Royal a y is still out there, although they are ery much a unior partner of the nited States. The rench ha e a small na al base of their own in Abu habi. And in fact, there has been some reporting recently about a temporary remo al of an American aircraft carrier from the ulf region. or more than a decade we ha e always had at least one and often two aircraft carriers continuously operating in the ulf region. uring the time ne t year when we won’t have that, the slack will be taken up by the French, who are sending the Charles de Gaulle which, while not a “super carrier,” can nonetheless operate well in the ulf, but in cooperation with us and in coalition with us. The hinese ha e also been out there, on their own, of course.
f you want to look at who is ery concerned with future security in the ulf, particularly in light of ranian threats from time to time to mine the Strait of ormu , it is interesting to see who has most recently oined our efforts in the region. Regarding the ranian posturing, e en if they ne er actually did that mine or otherwise shut down traffic through the Strait of ormu , ust the mere threat of their doing so could cause insurance rates to shoot up and ha e a drastic effect on oil and gas prices, and beyond that on the greater world economy. n response in recent years, we ha e held some ery public coalition counter mining e ercises in and around the Strait of ormu . And it was interesting to see that the third largest participant after the nited States and the Royal a y in these e ercises was apan. The participation of the apanese a al Self efense orces was, in fact, their largest outside of area deployment since the Second orld ar, this because they are also deeply concerned their energy supplies from the region.
To conclude, what is the future of all of this think the Russians ery much continue to look opportunistically for occasions when they can insert themsel es into the region. There is a limit to how much they can do. The eastern Mediterranean is still much easier for them because of Tartus and because of its pro imity to the lack Sea. They do not really ha e the capability to pro ect significant power in the wider Middle East region including the ulf , but they can sell arms to some of the players—including ran—and they can try to e ercise influence on regional de elopments. or the foreseeable future, howe er, it will still be either the nited States or an American led coalition of estern powers that guarantees o erall security that area.
inally, we should remember that the Russians are going to find operating militarily in the region ust as problematic as we ha e in ra and elsewhere. They 46 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
ay be pursuin their own national interests, but there are other national and sectional interests in play at the sa e ti e nd a inal thou ht, so ethin ust saw this morning in the “Daily Telegraph,” it was a wonderful quote from a Russian ilitary trainer in yria sayin —practically tearin out his hair in e asperation— sayin the orces they train and supply i ediately turn around and sell their new weapons to the ene y an e perience with which we are also a iliar n the end, they are oin to ind that they cannot stabili e the situation by the selves either ut they will continue to assert the selves, they will be a vital player, and none o this should surprise us
Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 47
The o hi lympi s
Peter Roudik Dire tor, lo al egal Resear h enter, aw i rary of ongress
ame here from the aw i rary of ongress ery ody nows that we are the largest law li rary e ha e million of oo s, ut in addition to these million of oo s, the fa t that per ent of our oo s are in foreign languages is espe ially interesting en more, we ha e a staff of people, meri an attorneys, who had training in laws of foreign ountries They are admitted to pra ti e law in foreign ountries and an interpret foreign laws and an e plain to meri an legislators and the meri an pu li how to resol e a pro lem a ording to the laws of a foreign ountry ou an hear from my a ent that am o ering, in addition to my administrative duties, Russia and other former Soviet republics, and I’m a legal spe ialist for these urisdi tions o eing the only go ernment employee at this panel ha e to start my tal a out legal framewor , whi h was reated y the Russian authorities in order to ma e these games se ure, with a dis laimer that e erything that will say will e on my own will not ma e the i rary responsi le for what am saying here
efore we will start to tal a out lessons learned from the uni h lympi s, ha e to say that in order to e a good learner you ha e to define terms ou ha e to ome to an agreement regarding the definitions Re ently, it was a ind of onfusion how different terms, different definitions, were understood y the organi ers of the games or e ample, they promised to ma e the games most memora le and they made them most warm They promised to ha e the most impressi e games, and these games turned out to e the most e pensi e They promised to ha e the most se ure games and these games are pro a ly the most regulated and the most monitored in regards to the eha ior of athletes, spe tators, and ournalists
urrent laws, and will tal mostly a out three ma or regulations whi h were passed during the last half a year, ontrol who is oming to the games, what people are doing there, how they behave, what they can say there. It’s not enough to buy a ti et to go to the lympi ames n order to attend an e ent you ha e to get a special spectator’s pass. In order to get a spectator’s pass people should submit copies of their entry ti ets together with a spe ial appli ation, and a lot of additional personal information in ad an e, and no ody an e sure that they will get this pass eryone who is older than two years of age is required ha e a spe ial adge, whi h serves as a spectator’s pass. There are reports that people who were somehow involved in different opposition related a ti ities were denied a ess to the lympi s and they couldn’t come to Sochi.
The presentation was delivered at a seminar on “Olympics Security Lessons: rom uni h to o hi” held on e ruary , at the nter ni ersity enter for egal tudies administered y the nternational aw nstitute 48 Russia’s Strategic Puzzle
But even if somebody was able to get this spectator’s pass and come to Sochi, there is the so called Regulation which was passed in ecember and entered into force in anuary of this year. his document is called Rules of Spectators Behavior at fficial Sporting vents. It defines where people can stay at these events, what they can say, how they will e press support to their team. or e ample, anything that is bigger than inches in any dimension cannot be brought to the stadium. he regulation defines what ind of clothes spectators can wear or not wear in order to attend an event, what ind of food they can ta e, and what pac aging is re uired. or e ample, plastic bottles are prohibited there. he Regulation specifically spea s to drums, loud spea ers, noise, and music e uipment. his stuff cannot be ta en to the stands unless special permission was received.
In order to receive a permission, people need to submit an application two days in advance. hen within the ne t hours permissions will be issued, and local police will be notified. ans will get a special designated place on the stands, and a person whose name will be stated in the permit as a designated individual will be allowed to eep this e uipment or a drum or whatever else that will be defined in the permit. he Regulation specifies that no wording in any language can be put on this e uipment and there are special provisions regarding banners and flags. or e ample, nothing can be longer than two yards. All mottos, inscriptions, and messages on the banners should be in Russian language or translated into Russian. And it’s not enough just to translate. It doesn’t matter that your team doesn’t understand Russian. You have to translate and bring an official notari ed certificate that your translation is e actly the same as the message you want to state. In regards to the flags, there is a special re uirement. All flags should be fireproof and the fireproof certificate needs to be present and shown to local police. therwise a person will be removed from the stands.
If because of all these restrictions somebody will decide not to go to the games and will send something to his friends who went to Sochi, that also cannot be done so easily. here is a special regulation under which all mail sent to Sochi should be unsealed. You probably read recently in the e or es that hobani yogurt was not allowed to be received by American athletes because some postal service regulations were violated. I would say that many of these regulations are in violation of original Russian laws, but they were passed and are enforced in Sochi today.
Recently, the u r published an article saying that there is a deafening silence in Sochi in regard to political protests and political statements. It is obvious why it happened so. ast August, utin issued a special decree, which prohibited all non lympics related gatherings in Sochi and neighboring territories through the end of arch. ater, this decree was amended and a special area about ten miles away from Sochi was designated for conducting protest events. At the same time, a Russian law which allows people to conduct single man protest, pic ets, and other events was not repealed. owever, local police strongly prosecute such events and you can see media reports that people were detained for doing such type of activities. here is another regulation which I want to mention to you. It was passed last ovember and regulates Russia’s Strategic Puzzle 49 eavesdropping in Sochi. leven thousand cameras, drones, and pieces of eavesdropping e uipment are probably another reason why you can hear this defining silence in the region.
robably you read the report that all computers of our B team which covers lympics were hac ed immediately as they connected to public i i in Sochi. hat is because of this ovember regulation called n Specifics of roviding ommunication Services in Sochi. his regulation authori es Russian security services to collect all data and metadata gathered by operators and providers of communication services. his regulation specifies that all journalists, members of official delegations, athletes, judges, and spectators are subject to monitoring. According to regulation, all records of connections, sending messages, and even information on payments made to get these communications shall be recorded in a special database, and this data will be ept for the ne t three years allowing remote access to the Russian ederal Security Service.
wo Russian investigative journalists reported about this system in the estern media, and what was the response of the Russian government he official Russian government website, oice of Russia, published on its website a statement saying, “Don’t be scared of phone tapping during Sochi it’s for your own safety.” Well, maybe it is for safety, but to what degree is it legal? Russia doesn’t have its own federal intelligence court of review. So who will monitor use of this data I want to add that Russia’s own Supreme Court issued guidance, which says that all metadata collected in regard to electronic communications, telephone numbers, and information on electronic traffic should be considered personal, private information, and collecting of this information re uires court orders. f course in the case of Sochi it is not done.
So is the lesson learned? I don’t know. Olympic Games are continuing, nothing happened yet, and hopefully nothing will happen until the end. But we should ma e sure that measures which were underta en by the Russian government are within the e isting legal framewor , and that rights of those who are protected by implemented security measures will not be abused or misused for the sa e of security.
Academic Centers
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