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Russian Aggression Against Ukraine and the West’S Policy Response The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation Statement for the Record Russian Aggression against Ukraine and the West’s Policy Response Steven Pifer Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe The Brookings Institution March 4, 2015 1 Russian Aggression against Ukraine and the West’s Policy Response Introduction Mr. Chairman, Senator Shaheen, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and the U.S. and West’s policy response. What began as an internal Ukrainian political dispute became a Ukraine-Russia crisis in early 2014. Since then, Moscow has used military force to seize Crimea, supported armed separatists and ultimately sent regular Russian army units into eastern Ukraine. A ceasefire agreement was reached in Minsk last September, but the separatists and Russians failed to implement its terms. The Minsk II ceasefire agreed on February 12 may now be taking effect but seems fragile at best. Implementing other terms of the agreement will prove difficult. Driving Russia’s aggression has been a mix of geopolitical and domestic political considerations. The Kremlin’s goal over the past year appears to have been to destabilize and distract the Ukrainian government, in order keep that government from addressing its pressing economic, financial and other challenges as well as from drawing closer to the European Union through implementation of the EU-Ukraine association agreement. Beyond Ukraine, the United States and Europe face a broader Russia problem. Moscow has operated its military forces in a more provocative manner near NATO members and has asserted a right to “protect” ethnic Russians and Russian speakers wherever they are located and whatever their citizenship. That policy could pose a threat to other states, including Estonia and Latvia, both members of NATO. The United States and the West should pursue a multi-pronged strategy to deal with Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and Moscow’s generally more confrontational approach. First, NATO should bolster its ability to deter Russian threats to the Alliance’s members, particularly in the Baltic region. This means enhancing NATO conventional force capabilities there, including capabilities to deal with the hybrid warfare techniques that Russia has demonstrated in Ukraine. Second, the West should support Ukraine, including through provision of substantial financial assistance if Kyiv proceeds with a serious reform agenda. Avoiding a financial collapse of Ukraine will require that the European Union and United States supplement the International Monetary Fund’s extended fund facility program. Third, the West should maintain economic and other sanctions on Russia until Moscow demonstrates a full commitment to a negotiated settlement in eastern Ukraine and takes 2 demonstrable and substantive measures to implement that settlement. Should Russia not do so, or should separatist and Russian forces resume military operations, the United States and European Union should impose additional sanctions. Fourth, the United States should make preparations to provide increased military assistance to Ukraine, including defensive weapons. Provision of that assistance should proceed if the separatists or Russians violate the ceasefire, or if Moscow fails to implement the terms of the Minsk II agreement. Fifth, the West should leave the door open for Russia to change course and help end the conflict in eastern Ukraine, even if expectations of such a change in Moscow’s course are modest at best. Finally, while Ukraine has correctly deferred the issue of Crimea for now, the West should continue to not recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of the peninsula. If Russian actions regarding eastern Ukraine merit sanctions relief, the United States and European Union nevertheless should maintain some sanctions, including measures specifically targeted at Crimea, until the peninsula’s status is resolved to Kyiv’s satisfaction. Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine Russia and the other independent states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 agreed to respect the state borders as they existed at the time. Unfortunately, Russia did not hold to that commitment. The Kremlin has supported separatist efforts and “frozen” conflicts in Transnistria, a breakaway part of Moldova, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia, breakaway regions from Georgia, whom Russia recognized as independent states following the August 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict. Moscow has again violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another state, this time, Ukraine. Ukraine went through a wrenching internal political crisis from November 2013 to the end of February 2014, triggered by then-President Yanukovych’s surprise decision not to sign an association agreement with the European Union. Following the security forces’ use of deadly force against demonstrators in Kyiv on February 19-20, Mr. Yanukovych signed a power-sharing agreement with the three main opposition party leaders. Given public anger over the killings the two previous days, it is unlikely that the opposition leaders could have persuaded the demonstrators to accept the agreement. In any case, they had little chance. After signing the document, Mr. Yanukovych abandoned his post and disappeared, later turning up in Russia. What had been an internal political crisis became a Ukraine-Russia conflict at the end of February 2014, when soldiers, in Russian combat fatigues without insignia, seized Crimea. The Ukrainians referred to them as “little green men.” In a March 3 press conference, President Putin denied that they were Russian soldiers. Just weeks later, he publicly admitted that they were and awarded commendations to their commanders. 3 In April, armed separatists began to seize buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine. Many were pro-Russian locals, but more “little green men” appeared. Moscow supported the separatists with funding, arms and leadership. For example, last April, the self-proclaimed prime minister and defense minister of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” came from Russia and had apartments in Moscow. Further evidence that outsiders played a major role in the early days was the seizure of the opera house in Kharkiv, which they apparently mistook for the city administration building. Over the course of the late spring and summer, as Ukrainian forces conducted a counter- offensive in Donetsk and Luhansk (also referred to as the Donbas), Russia provided the separatists with heavy arms, such as tanks, artillery and surface-to-air missile systems. These apparently included the Buk (SA-11) surface-to-air missile that tragically shot down Malaysia Air flight 17 in July. The Ukrainian military nevertheless made progress against the separatists during the summer, significantly reducing the amount of territory they held. On or about August 23, regular units of the Russia army invaded Ukraine and attacked Ukrainian units in the Donbas. When a ceasefire agreement was worked out in Minsk on September 5, Ukrainian losses reportedly included between 50 and 70 percent of the armor the Ukrainian army had deployed in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Unfortunately, the September ceasefire never took full hold. The separatists and Russians did not implement key elements, such as the requirements for withdrawal of foreign forces and military equipment, or for securing the Ukraine-Russia border under observation by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Instead, the Russian-backed separatists over the next five months took additional territory in eastern Ukraine, adding more than 500 square kilometers to what they had held on September 5. Last month, with fighting escalating, German Chancellor Merkel and French President Hollande met with Ukrainian President Poroshenko and Russian President Putin in Minsk to seek a new settlement. After a marathon all-night negotiation, they announced a new agreement (Minsk II) providing for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons away from the line of contact, and a series of steps to regulate the political and economic status of eastern Ukraine. The terms of Minsk II are substantially worse for Kyiv than the terms of the unfulfilled September 2014 agreement. Implementing the Minsk II agreement will require good faith and flexibility on all sides that has not been shown previously during this conflict. Many analysts expect the agreement to break down at some point. It appears that Mr. Poroshenko agreed to Minsk II in the face of a deteriorating military situation and an urgent need for breathing space so that he could focus attention on a looming financial crisis and a very necessary economic reform agenda. Given Mr. Poroshenko’s acceptance of Minsk II, Ukraine’s supporters have little choice but to support the agreement and its implementation, however difficult its terms may appear. 4 Unfortunately, the separatist and Russian forces did not initially observe the ceasefire, which was supposed to begin on midnight on February 14. They attacked the Debaltseve salient occupied by Ukrainian army units, which withdrew on February 18. The Ukrainians then reported ominous signs of preparations for a separatist/Russian attack on the large port city of Mariupol in southern Donetsk province. Greater restraint was shown after February 25. While some shelling continues, the line of contact has been markedly quieter than
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