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France and the Security Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region

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France and the security challenges in the Baltic Sea region «Your security is our security», Florence Parly, Minister for the Armed Forces, Helsinki, 23 August 2018 Mission Lynx, Estonia, 2017. Main Battle Tank Leclerc from 501st Combat Cavalry Regiment progressing during an exercise. Trident Juncture 18, Norway, 2018. Two material transportation barges sailing to the Dixmude Projection and Command Ship. Rovaniemi Air Base, Finland, 2017. Rafale taking off during the Artic Challenge Exercise. The Baltic space, Middle East. In an unprecedented manner since the Cold War, Russia a security challenge conducts exercises and operations on different theatres at the same for France and Europe time (Baltic Sea, Caspian Sea, Black Sea, Levant). Its maritime presence and airstrike campaign in Syria are A partly closed sea, joining the North both symbols of it. Sea and the Atlantic Ocean after a se- ries of straits, the Baltic Sea accounts In reaction, the Allies, including for one-third of the European Gross France, have reinforced their pro- Domestic Product (GDP) and is home tection measures in the East on . From to nearly 200,000 French nationals. behalf of their Eastern Allies Marked by major security challenges, the 2014 Wales Summit, assurance it has seen, over the last decade or measures were taken. They were rein- so, the revival of tensions forgotten forced after the Warsaw Summit in since the end of the Cold War that 2016, notably through the setting-up led to a deterioration of the regional of the enhanced Forward Presence stability. (eFP) in Poland and the Baltic states. Brought about by Moscow’s posture, Most of the countries in the area also to meet the remilitarisation of the region increased defence spending has spread to all the countries bor- the target of spending 2 % of GDP on dering the Baltic Sea. Russia has defence by 2024. The Baltic states and developed a policy of power assertion Poland already devote this share of and strategic intimidation made of their budget to defence. military deployments, threats to use force and use of force on different theatres (Georgia, Ukraine, Syria), Share of the GDP devoted to defence in the Baltic space as well as international law viola- tions, especially with the annexa- Denmark tion of Crimea. Since 2011, it has Estonia Finland 2018 modernised its armed forces in the France 2014 Kaliningrad and Leningrad oblasts Germany and adopted a posture of ‘aggres- Latvia sive sanctuarisation’ by deploying a Lithuania large number of anti-access / area Norway Poland denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Along its Russia Western border, Russia has set up a Sweden (by %) ‘strategic belt’ from the Arctic to the 0 1 2 3 4 5 Main multilateral organisations in the Baltic space EU member state N EU partner state 100 km NATO Ally NATO partner COUNTRY EI2 member state Union State of Russia and Belarus Capital FINLAND Gulf of NORWAY SWEDEN Bothnia RUSSIA HELSINKI OSLO TALLINN ESTONIA STOCKHOLM RIGA Kattegat Baltic LATVIA DENMARK Sea COPENHAGEN LITHUANIA VILNIUS BELARUS GERMANY POLAND Main multilateral organisations in the Several countries in the region haveBaltic spaceCooperation, Nordic Baltic 8 or Northern pursued the modernisation of their Group). militaries by procuring new equip- Despite their long-term military ment. Some reactivated conscription build-up, these countries cannot (Lithuania), reinforced their reserves face alone the security challenges (Finland and Baltic states), or partly posed to the Baltic space, and call remilitarised their territory (Gotland, therefore upon the solidarity of their Finnmark), while strengthening allies and partners. their defence partnerships on a bila- teral basis or within different regional Nearly 200 000 cooperation groups (Nordic Defence French nationals Increase in develop a common strategic culture within the European Intervention France’s strategic Initiative (EI2), which was officially launched in June 2018. and operational Within NATO, France has taken part in the eFP, since its inception partnerships in 2017, according to the decision taken at the Warsaw Summit to rein- As a reaction to the deteriorating force the Alliance’s deterrence and strategic context since 2014, France defence posture. France deployed a has increased its presence in the contingent to Estonia in 2017, then region. to Lithuania in 2018. It will be once It maintains a regular dialogue with its again deployed to Estonia in 2019. In Baltic and Nordic partners, and deve- 2015, French land forces had already lops cooperation bilaterally. Each year, deployed fifteen Leclerc Main battle it holds, with Latvia, Estonia, and Tanks to Poland in the framework Lithuania, the French-Baltic security of the Puma exercise. seminar, a forum of discussion between Since 2014, France has actively parliamentarians, decision-makers from contributed to NATO assurance Ministries of Defence and Ministries of measures in Northern Europe by Foreign Affairs, as well as academic deploying the three components of experts. its armed forces. Since 2015, France has also signed France was the first country to act intergovernmental agreements by deploying, from 2014, four Rafale with the three Baltic states and to Poland, then by participating each Denmark, four letters of intent with month to air surveillance missions Poland, as well as a framework paper over Romania and Poland with a E-3F with Finland. These agreements aim at «Sentry» aircraft (AWACS). increasing our strategic exchanges and France’s involvement is not new. fostering interoperability between It has constantly taken part in NATO . In doing so, France our armed forces Air Policing missions over Estonia, confirms that it shares the security Lithuania and Poland. France is the interests of its partners and is willing second largest contributor to Air to remain involved in the region. Policing missions with seven de- At multilateral level, France also ployments since 2007. From April works together with some of its to September 2018, it deployed four partners in the region (Denmark, Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircrafts to Estonia, Finland and Germany) to Estonia for monitoring, control FrenchFrench commitmentcommitment inin thethe Baltic Baltic space space N 100 km Atlantic Ocean FINLAND Gulf of NORWAY SWEDEN Bothnia HELSINKI OSLO STOCKHOLM TALLINN Tapa D628 ESTONIA Ämari RIGA Baltic LATVIA North Kattegat Sea iauliai Sea DENMARK COPENHAGEN Rukla D628 LITHUANIA VILNIUS Malbork BERLIN Drawsko Pomorskie WARSAW GERMANY POLAND FRANCE Frances eranent resence in the region eFP - Lynx mission : Defence Mission a solidarity-based engagement Centre of Excellence Frances contriutions to assurance easures since Nearly Participation in Air Policing mission 300 soldiers 2014 : 4 Rafale, then 4 Mirage 2000 (C/5) aircraft in Malbork (Poland) 2016 : 4 Mirage 2000-5 aircraft in Šiauliai (Lituania) 13 MRAV 2018 : 4 Mirage 2000-5 aircraft in Ämari (Estonia) Participation in the eFP multinational battalion 2017 : Tapa (Estonia) 2018 : Rukla (Lithuania) 4 Leclerc MBT 2019 : Tapa (Estonia) Deployment of a Leclerc armoured combat VAB APC company (2015) COUNTRY Countries concerned with the 12 annual E-3F AWACS flights Panhard LAV Maritime reconnaissance (6 deployments each year, D628 maritime and air assets) and identification missions in the To sum up, 4,000 French soldiers framework of the enhanced Air from all armed forces are mobilised Policing mission. each year since 2014 to carry out about twenty activities on the Eastern France also ensures a regular pre- flank, principally in this area, for an sence in the Baltic Sea by deploying annual cost of 40 to 50 million euros. annual maritime surveillance pa- This momentum will be maintained trols. In 2018, it took command of in 2019. the NATO Maritime Component, which enables the projection of a command platform within five days. Since 2014, 26 E-3F AWACS Last but not least, it participates in missions achieved over Poland about ten military exercises each and 6 directly over the Baltic year in Northern Europe with air, Sea. land, and maritime assets. France’s regular participation in major exercises in the area Focus Aurora 17 Aurora 17 took place in Sweden from 11 to 29 September 2017. Focused on the defence of Gotland, it was the first very large exercise in Sweden in twenty years. 22,000 soldiers from eight nations (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Norway, Sweden and the United States) were involved. France deployed 130 soldiers, as well as a surface-to-air missile system SAMP/T. Focus Trident Juncture 18 Organised every two year by NATO, Trident Juncture 18 was held in Norway, Iceland, and the North Atlantic from 25 October to 7 November 2018. It has been the Alliance’s largest exercise in ten years, bringing together 51,000 soldiers from thirty-one nations. This exercise was based on a scenario of military intervention following the activation of the collective defence principle (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty). France deployed up to 2,700 soldiers during this exercise. France’s participation to Centres of Excellence in the Baltic region France participates in the three NATO Centres of Excellence in the Baltic states through respectively one representative to the Strategic Communi- cations Centre of Excellence in Riga, two representatives to the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn and one representative to the Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Vilnius. It also participates in the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki since its creation in April
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