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The Deterrent Value of Host Nation Support in the Baltic Sea Region

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The Deterrent Value of Host Nation Support in the Baltic Sea Region FALLING IN: THE DETERRENT VALUE OF HOST NATION SUPPORT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION FALLING IN: The Deterrent Value of Host Nation Support in the Baltic Sea Region Kathleen J. McInnis and Connor McPartland Foreword by General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA (Ret.) Study and Editorial Director: Christopher Skaluba Contributing Authors: Clementine G. Starling and David Millner 1 ATLANTIC COUNCIL FALLING IN: THE DETERRENT VALUE OF HOST NATION SUPPORT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION Atlantic Council SCOWCROFT CENTER FOR STRATEGY AND SECURITY FALLING IN: The Deterrent Value of Host Nation Support in the Baltic Sea Region Kathleen J. McInnis and Connor McPartland Study and Editorial Director: Christopher Skaluba Contributing Authors: Clementine G. Starling and David Millner 2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL FALLING IN: THE DETERRENT VALUE OF HOST NATION SUPPORT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION ISBN-13:978-1-61977-175-8 Cover: US Marines with 2nd Tank Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary, sits on a US Marine Corps M1A1 Abrams tank during exercise Arrow 2019 at the Pohjankangas Training Area near Niinisalo, Finland, May 15, 2019. Arrow 2019 is an annual multinational exercise with the purpose of training mechanized infantry, artillery, and mortar field skills in a live-fire exercise along with the partners from the Finnish Defense Forces. (US Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Scott Jenkins) This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. May 2021 © 2021 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to: Atlantic Council, 1030 15th Street NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005 3 ATLANTIC COUNCIL FALLING IN: THE DETERRENT VALUE OF HOST NATION SUPPORT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. The Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative brings together top policymakers, government and military officials, business leaders, and experts from Europe and North America to share insights, strengthen cooperation, and develop innovative approaches to the key challenges facing NATO and the transatlantic community. This publication was produced in partnership with the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense under the auspices of a project focused on defense and deterrence in the Baltic Sea region and with additional support from Ambassador Colleen Bell. 4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL FALLING IN: THE DETERRENT VALUE OF HOST NATION SUPPORT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword ...................................................................................................................................... 6 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 7 US Interests in the Baltic Sea Region ............................................................................. 8 HNS in Military Geographical Context ............................................................................. 10 The Russian Challenge ...................................................................................................... 10 Allied Capabilities ................................................................................................................12 Baltic Military Capabilities .................................................................................................12 Deterrence for the Baltic States ......................................................................................14 HNS as an Enabler of Deterrence ...................................................................................15 Baltic Host Nation Support ...................................................................................................16 Lithuania: HNS State of Play .............................................................................................16 Latvia: HNS State of Play ...................................................................................................17 Estonia: HNS State of Play ................................................................................................18 Baltic-Wide Efforts to Improve Mobility and HNS .......................................................19 Baltic HNS Shortcomings ................................................................................................ 20 Options: an Agenda for HNS ................................................................................................21 Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................25 About the Authors ..................................................................................................................25 5 ATLANTIC COUNCIL FALLING IN: THE DETERRENT VALUE OF HOST NATION SUPPORT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION FOREWORD n early 2021 the world watched as Vladimir Putin’s Russia Poland. Over 2019-20 I was honored to co-lead the Atlantic once again used its military power to intimidate its neighbors, Council’s Task Force on Military Mobility. Our report, Moving massing thousands of troops near the border with Ukraine. out: A comprehensive assessment of European military While the situation has not escalated as of the time of writing, mobility, offers the most complete analysis of ongoing efforts IRussia’s continued aggressive behavior towards its neighbors to improve military mobility in Europe—an essential task for should serve as a reminder that the security environment in effective deterrence. Europe remains uncertain. This new report, Falling in: The deterrent value of host nation We thankfully haven’t seen this kind of aggression against support in the Baltic Sea region, picks up where Moving out our allies in the Baltic states. Part of the reason for this is the left off—if Moving out was about moving forces from one end security guarantee provided by NATO and reinforced by the of Europe to the other, Falling in is about what those forces can efforts that the Baltic states and the Alliance have taken over expect to find once they get to the other side. The vital forward the last several years to strengthen deterrence in the region. deployments of US and allied forces to the Baltic Sea region is The Baltic states themselves have all made and continue to only possible with the support of the receiving countries and make tremendous investments in their own militaries, investing Falling in highlights the often-overlooked importance of Host in key capabilities and expanding their armed forces. NATO Nation Support to NATO’s posture in the Baltic Sea region. This has demonstrated its commitment by creating and exercising volume is a natural addition to the Scowcroft Center’s series the Enhanced Forward Presence among other actions. of reports on posture and deterrence in Europe and is an Through the European Deterrence Initiative and Operation important contribution to those seeking detail on deterrence Atlantic Resolve the United States has also made significant and defense in the Baltic states. contributions to the region including infrastructure investments and rotational troop deployments that serve as a reminder of As the United States continues its global posture review this the United States’ commitment to its Allies. report should be a helpful reminder not only of the deterrent power of US forces but also of the efforts being made by The Atlantic Council has been at the forefront of the discussion key allies in enabling that deterrent presence. The future of around deterrence in northeastern Europe, providing US deterrence in Europe is a team effort, and the support of our and allied policy makers with a wealth of analysis and allies on the ground makes it all possible. recommendations to strengthen deterrence. In 2018-19, my predecessor as SACEUR, General Philip Breedlove, helped General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA (Ret.) spearhead the report Permanent deterrence: Enhancements to the US military presence in North Central Europe which Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO assessed the feasibility of an expanded US footprint in Former Commander, United States European Command 6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL FALLING IN: THE DETERRENT VALUE OF HOST NATION SUPPORT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION INTRODUCTION ATO’s founding premise, enshrined in Article 5 of the minority populations, and relatively exposed position within Washington Treaty, is one of collective defense: that NATO—were postured as potential next targets for a Russia an attack on one ally is an attack on all.1 Given the looking to forcibly expand its sphere of influence and weaken tensions and adversaries the Alliance has faced
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