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HOW to DEFEND the BALTIC STATES by R HOW TO DEFEND THE BALTIC STATES By R. D. Hooker, Jr. October 2019 HOW TO DEFEND THE BALTIC STATES __________________________________________________ R. D. Hooker, Jr. Washington, DC October 2019 THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Published in the United States by The Jamestown Foundation 1310 L Street NW Suite 810 Washington, DC 20005 http://www.jamestown.org Copyright © 2019 The Jamestown Foundation All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this report may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written consent. For copyright and permissions information, contact The Jamestown Foundation, 1310 L Street NW, Suite 810, Washington, DC 20005. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Jamestown Foundation or any other organization or government nor the official position of the National Defense University or the US Department of Defense. For more information on this book of The Jamestown Foundation, email [email protected]. ISBN: 978-0-9986660-8-2 Front cover image: Culmination of NATO Saber Strike 2017 exercises, Orysz, Poland, June 16, 2017 (Source: VOA). Jamestown’s Mission The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy makers and the broader community about events and trends in those societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information. Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is delivered without political bias, filter or agenda. It is often the only source of information which should be, but is not always, available through official or intelligence channels, especially in regard to Eurasia and terrorism. Origins Founded in 1984 by William Geimer, The Jamestown Foundation made a direct contribution to the downfall of Communism through its dissemination of information about the closed totalitarian societies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. William Geimer worked with Arkady Shevchenko, the highest-ranking Soviet official ever to defect when he left his position as undersecretary general of the United Nations. Shevchenko’s memoir Breaking With Moscow revealed the details of Soviet superpower diplomacy, arms control strategy and tactics in the Third World, at the height of the Cold War. Through its work with Shevchenko, Jamestown rapidly became the leading source of information about the inner workings of the captive nations of the former Communist Bloc. In addition to Shevchenko, Jamestown assisted the former top Romanian intelligence officer Ion Pacepa in writing his memoirs. Jamestown ensured that both men published their insights and experience in what became bestselling books. Even today, several decades later, some credit Pacepa’s revelations about Ceausescu’s regime in his bestselling book Red Horizons with the fall of that government and the freeing of Romania. The Jamestown Foundation has emerged as a leading provider of information about Eurasia. Our research and analysis on conflict and instability in Eurasia enabled Jamestown to become one of the most reliable sources of information on the post-Soviet space, the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as China. Furthermore, since 9/11, Jamestown has utilized its network of indigenous experts in more than 50 different countries to conduct research and analysis on terrorism and the growth of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda offshoots throughout the globe. By drawing on our ever-growing global network of experts, Jamestown has become a vital source of unfiltered, open-source information about major conflict zones around the world—from the Black Sea to Siberia, from the Persian Gulf to Latin America and the Pacific. Our core of intellectual talent includes former high-ranking government officials and military officers, political scientists, journalists, scholars and economists. Their insight contributes significantly to policymakers engaged in addressing today’s newly emerging global threats in the post 9/11 world. i HOW TO DEFEND THE BALTIC STATES Table of Contents Introduction…………………………………………………………………1 The Threat…………………………………………………………………...2 Strategic Imperatives………………………………………………………10 Campaign Design…………………………………………………………..22 The Warfight……………………………………………………………….24 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….36 Annexes A–E Russian Order of Battle, Western Military District (WMD)………...37 NATO Ground Order of Battle (Notional)…………………………...39 NATO Air and Maritime Order of Battle (Notional)………………...41 Campaign Strategy Framework………………………………………..42 Situation Maps…………………………………………………………..45 Author Biography………………………………………………………….48 ii R. D. Hooker, Jr. Introduction “On NATO’s eastern flank we will continue to strengthen deterrence and defense, and catalyze frontline allies and partners’ efforts to defend themselves.” – US National Security Strategy 2017 n recent years, the United States’ National Security Strategy and almost every major US think tank has called attention to the parlous state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank. IThere, some of NATO’s newest and smallest member states are threatened by an aggressive and revanchist Russian Federation. In particular, the three Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—face powerful Russian forces with tiny armies and modest defense budgets. Despite presidential guidance contained in the US National Security Strategy, these frontline countries remain all but undefended. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the prize is tempting: an opportunity, at low risk, to seize NATO territory and fracture the Alliance. As an urgent priority, Washington, as leader of NATO, should take on defense of the Baltics as a critical priority. Indeed, without effective defense, there can be no effective deterrence. Troops participate in Russia’s Zapad 2017 strategic-operational military exercise. (Source: Russian Ministry of Defense) 1 HOW TO DEFEND THE BALTIC STATES The Threat nside and outside NATO, in the Pentagon, in Brussels and in capitals like London, Berlin and Paris, many dismiss the threat altogether. On paper, the NATO allies possess far stronger economies and militaries than Russia, as well as nuclear weapons that make direct confrontation, according to the skeptics at least, I 1 all but unthinkable. According to this thesis, Putin is a pragmatic and careful leader , mindful of NATO’s potential strength and unlikely to test NATO resolve. This school of thought sees Russia’s aggression in Georgia, Donbas, Crimea, and Syria as aberrations or at least as lesser cases that do not apply here. To test this proposition, one can begin with a sober appreciation of Russian capabilities and likely intentions. Russian Capabilities First, what is Russia’s capability to conduct offensive operations in the Baltic States? While lacking the strategic mobility and power projection capabilities available to the United States, Russia is formidable along its periphery and especially in its Western Military District (MD), opposite NATO’s eastern flank.2 On the ground, the Western MD includes the recently reconstituted 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA), the 6th and 20th Combined Arms Armies (6CAA and 20CAA), and the 11th Army Corps in Kaliningrad.3 Also located in the Western MD but under national control are three airborne divisions and three Spetsnaz special forces brigades. These forces are supported by some ten rocket and artillery brigades as well as five air-defense brigades, including some 30 tank or motor rifle brigades/regiments, with one naval infantry brigade.4 Subtracting those forces defending Kaliningrad or retained to mask Ukraine or Poland, this force includes approximately 60 maneuver battalions and 50 artillery battalions. Perhaps half of these are combat ready and available to participate in an attack on 1 “The escalation dynamics of this conflict are not favorable to Russia. A conventional entanglement can quickly spiral out into nuclear conflict, or escalate globally bringing the full power of the US military to bear against a Russia that is far too vast for its armed forces to defend. The risk and costs of a conventional incursion in the Baltics grossly outweigh Moscow's prospects for military gains.” Michael Kofman, “NATO Deterrence and the Russian Specter in the Baltics”, The Wilson Center, August 9, 2016. 2 The Western Military District and the “Western Operational Strategic Command” are distinct entities but commanded by the same 4-star officer. The latter functions as a Joint Strategic Command in time of war. Lester Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “The Russian Way of War”, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 2016, p. 29. 3 1st GTA carries a famous designation dating back to the Great Patriotic War and is the only tank army in the Russian order of battle. “Endowing this newly re-established formation with such heritage can be seen as a clear political message intended to intimidate and to draw attention to its specific, overtly offensive operational role within the [Russian] military. “ Igor Sutyagin and Justin Bronk, “Russia’s New Ground Forces”, Routledge Whitehall Papers, August 2017, p. 95. 4 All Russian divisions and brigades have their own organic artillery and air defense units as well. Of note, Russian tank and motor rifle brigades include two tubed artillery and one rocket battalion—far more artillery than NATO brigades. 2 R. D. Hooker, Jr. the Baltic States on short notice.5 These would constitute the first echelon and would spearhead a potential invasion in the first 30 days.6 They are equipped
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