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Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics: What Is Desirable? What Is Feasible? by Wolfgang Richter Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics

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Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics: What Is Desirable? What Is Feasible? by Wolfgang Richter Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics Deep Cuts Working Paper No. 8, July 2016 SUB-REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL FOR THE BALTICS: WHAT IS DESIRABLE? WHAT IS FEASIBLE? by Wolfgang Richter SUB-REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL FOR THE BALTICS Introduction This paper assesses the current mutual threat suppression and violence by indigenous perceptions by NATO, in particular the Baltic right wing forces’. NATO member states States and the Eastern European allies, and the assess the latest mod- Russian Federation. With a particular view – NATO member states assess the latest ernization of Russian to the Baltic region, it analyzes the respec- modernization of Russian forces as a sig- forces as a significant tive force postures, reinforcement plans and nificant improvement in rapid regional in- improvement in rapid military activities, assesses the plausibility of tervention capabilities. Its main elements regional intervention mutual scenarios, questions possible options are enhanced flexibility, mobility and air capabilities. Its main to deal with the situation and gives concrete defense of land forces as well as long-range elements are enhanced recommendations in the realm of possible precise strike capabilities. flexibility, mobility and arms control agreements and Confidence- and air defense of land Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). As – In the latter context, frequent Russian forces as well as long- an annex it contains an overview of existing snap exercises in border areas seem to range precise strike bilateral CSBMs in the Baltic region. simulate offensive scenarios, which are capabilities. regarded a military threat. The geography favors Russian rapid regional force accu- 1. Threat perceptions mulations over NATO’s reinforcements with respect to distances, time and pos- NATO, in particular Baltic States and sibilities for denying regional access to the Eastern European Allies adversary. (1) Nature of threat. Western allies believe (2) Scenarios. Against this background, two that Russian strategies might pose a security scenarios are viewed as possible: First, a Rus- risk (for some, a direct threat) to the sover- sian surprise attack based on rapid force con- eignty and territorial integrity of the Baltic centrations (possibly in the disguise of a snap States. This assessment is not based on a con- exercise) and exploiting geographical advan- crete Russian force accumulation in the Baltic tages; second, a hybrid destabilization of the region exceeding force postures existing since Baltic States, which would combine stirring the accession of the Baltic States to NATO in unrest among Russian-speaking populations 2004. Rather, it is derived from an assessment through propaganda, initiating and actively of Russian strategic intentions and military assisting armed anti-government movements, capabilities, in combination with military ac- dispatching irregular armed forces in support tivities such as snap exercises: and threatening direct military intervention through concentrations of regular armed – Russian political and military actions in forces in border areas. Crimea and Eastern Ukraine are regarded as severe breaches of the principles of in- Russian Federation ternational law and the foundations of the European security order. In addition, the (1) NATO’s enlargement versus strategic re- Russian justification for implementing the straint agreements. Russia’s concerns are based “responsibility to protect” Russian-speaking on a long-term evaluation of NATO’s enlarge- minorities in Ukraine has caused particu- ment policies and a deeply felt distrust of lar concern in the Baltic region in view of its perceived anti-Russian intentions. Russia the large Russian-speaking minorities in claims that the West did not honor its com- Estonia and Latvia. Allies fear that Russia mitments of the 1990s to create a common could use similar reasons for intervening space of equal security, without dividing lines, militarily in the Baltic States, pretending from Vancouver to Vladivostok. In the Rus- to ‘rescue those minorities from political sian view, the U.S.-led alliance had, instead, Page 2 SUB-REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL FOR THE BALTICS implemented new geopolitical strategies (April 2008) and Georgia’s attack against Rus- against Russia, particularly by extending the sian peacekeepers in South-Ossetia in summer In the Russian view, the military alliance and force postures towards 2008, with U.S. military advisors present in U.S.-led alliance had, Russian borders. While Russia was prepared the country. The threat of then-President of instead, implemented to strike a compromise related to NATO’s Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, to curtail harbor new geopolitical strate- first enlargement, NATO allies did not imple- rights of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sev- gies against Russia, ment their core commitments to alleviate astopol and Crimea and Western support for particularly by extend- Russian concerns; that is, to strengthen the regime change movements (as demonstrated ing the military alliance Organization for Security and Co-operation during the OSCE Ministerial Council in De- and force postures to- in Europe (OSCE), establish close NATO- cember 2013 in Kiev) added to the Russian as- wards Russian borders. Russia security cooperation and adapt the sessment that the West was crossing “red lines”. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Russia assessed the February 2014 events on Treaty. Instead, with the second enlargement the Maidan in this context and believed it was to include the Baltic States, NATO created a acting in “strategic defense” to maintain its geographical zone for potential force build- fleet capabilities at Crimea. ups at Russian borders close to St. Petersburg, which is not restricted by any legally binding (3) NATO-Russia confrontation in the Baltic limitations. Furthermore, the United States region as part of a larger strategy. In the Rus- stationed combat forces in the Black Sea re- sian view, NATO’s military activities in the gion (Romania and Bulgaria) and initiated Baltic region are not a response to a concrete missile defense installations in Eastern Europe Russian threat against the Baltic States, but while, at the same time, rejecting definitions are part of a larger strategy of confrontation for the restraint commitments contained in with Russia intended to punish Russia for the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. its actions in Ukraine. In this context, Rus- sia criticizes the OSCE security dialogue in (2) Russia’s “strategic defense” against perceived Vienna for not duly taking into account the Western hybrid regime change politics. In the findings of observation flights conducted Russian view, breaking points in its relations under the Treaty on Open Skies (OS) and with the West were the western recognition inspections conducted under the OSCE’s Vi- of Kosovo (March 2008), NATO’s invitation enna Document (VD). Russia also perceives to Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance NATO’s military activities in the Baltic re- (c) U.S. Army Photo by Pfc. Gage Hull/ Released. Link: https://www.flickr.com/ photos/7armyjmtc/25698224164/ No changes made. Page 3 SUB-REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL FOR THE BALTICS gion as intended to create a military basis for mounting pressure on Russia. It holds that the Kaliningrad exclave is geographically exposed and vulnerable to hostile military action.1 Russia does not rule out responding in kind should NATO terminate its commitment to maintain restraint with respect to the station- ing of additional substantial combat forces in the region. 2. Current force postures, reinforce- ment plans and military activities Regional Russian force capabilities (c) U.S. Army Photo by Pfc. Michael Bradley/Released. Link: https://www.flickr.com/photos/7armyjmtc/25698278804/ According to a recent RAND study, Rus- No changes made. sia could, at short notice, assemble from its Western Military District, including the region, it would be insufficient to offset the Kaliningrad Oblast, 25 maneuver battalions weaknesses of the allied land forces available In the Russian view, for offensive operations in the Baltic region.2 for initial operations. NATO’s military activi- They would be supported by ten artillery and ties in the Baltic region six attack helicopter battalions and approxi- The study concludes that, under these con- are not a response to mately 27 air combat squadrons. In addition, ditions, NATO would not be capable of a concrete Russian two Iskander and three Tochka short-range defending Estonia and Latvia. Furthermore, threat against the Baltic ballistic missile battalions are available. The augmenting available ground forces with re- States, but are part study concludes that the Russian army corps inforcements from Central Europe is assessed of a larger strategy of is capable of winning a combined arms battle as difficult: moving from Poland to the Baltic confrontation with in the region and taking Riga and Tallinn region – a distance of between 600 and 1,000 Russia intended to within three days after launching offensive km – they would have to pass the “Kalinin- punish Russia for its operations. Thus, Russia would be capable of grad Gap” (a 70 km broad strip between the actions in Ukraine. confronting NATO with a fait accompli and Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus) and could be “unpleasant choices”. slowed down by Russian air and flank attacks. Baltic and current allied force capabilities Allied reinforcements assigned to the region NATO’s reassurance initiative, agreed upon According to the RAND study, Baltic indig- at its Wales Summit in September 2014, is enous
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