Deep Cuts Working Paper No. 8, July 2016

Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics: What Is Desirable? What Is Feasible? by Wolfgang Richter Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics

Introduction

This paper assesses the current mutual threat suppression and violence by indigenous perceptions by NATO, in particular the Baltic right wing forces’. NATO member states States and the Eastern European allies, and the assess the latest mod- Russian Federation. With a particular view –– NATO member states assess the latest ernization of Russian to the Baltic region, it analyzes the respec- modernization of Russian forces as a sig- forces as a significant tive force postures, reinforcement plans and nificant improvement in rapid regional in- improvement in rapid military activities, assesses the plausibility of tervention capabilities. Its main elements regional intervention mutual scenarios, questions possible options are enhanced flexibility, mobility and air capabilities. Its main to deal with the situation and gives concrete defense of land forces as well as long-range elements are enhanced recommendations in the realm of possible precise strike capabilities. flexibility, mobility and arms control agreements and Confidence- and air defense of land Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). As –– In the latter context, frequent Russian forces as well as long- an annex it contains an overview of existing snap exercises in border areas seem to range precise strike bilateral CSBMs in the Baltic region. simulate offensive scenarios, which are capabilities. regarded a military threat. The geography favors Russian rapid regional force accu- 1. Threat perceptions mulations over NATO’s reinforcements with respect to distances, time and pos- NATO, in particular and sibilities for denying regional access to the Eastern European Allies adversary.

(1) Nature of threat. Western allies believe (2) Scenarios. Against this background, two that Russian strategies might pose a security scenarios are viewed as possible: First, a Rus- risk (for some, a direct threat) to the sover- sian surprise attack based on rapid force con- eignty and territorial integrity of the Baltic centrations (possibly in the disguise of a snap States. This assessment is not based on a con- exercise) and exploiting geographical advan- crete Russian force accumulation in the Baltic tages; second, a hybrid destabilization of the region exceeding force postures existing since Baltic States, which would combine stirring the accession of the Baltic States to NATO in unrest among Russian-speaking populations 2004. Rather, it is derived from an assessment through propaganda, initiating and actively of Russian strategic intentions and military assisting armed anti-government movements, capabilities, in combination with military ac- dispatching irregular armed forces in support tivities such as snap exercises: and threatening direct military intervention through concentrations of regular armed –– Russian political and military actions in forces in border areas. and Eastern Ukraine are regarded as severe breaches of the principles of in- Russian Federation ternational law and the foundations of the European security order. In addition, the (1) NATO’s enlargement versus strategic re- Russian justification for implementing the straint agreements. ’s concerns are based “responsibility to protect” Russian-speaking on a long-term evaluation of NATO’s enlarge- minorities in Ukraine has caused particu- ment policies and a deeply felt distrust of lar concern in the Baltic region in view of its perceived anti-Russian intentions. Russia the large Russian-speaking minorities in claims that the West did not honor its com- and . Allies fear that Russia mitments of the 1990s to create a common could use similar reasons for intervening space of equal security, without dividing lines, militarily in the Baltic States, pretending from Vancouver to Vladivostok. In the Rus- to ‘rescue those minorities from political sian view, the U.S.-led alliance had, instead,

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implemented new geopolitical strategies (April 2008) and Georgia’s attack against Rus- against Russia, particularly by extending the sian peacekeepers in South-Ossetia in summer In the Russian view, the military alliance and force postures towards 2008, with U.S. military advisors present in U.S.-led alliance had, Russian borders. While Russia was prepared the country. The threat of then-President of instead, implemented to strike a compromise related to NATO’s Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, to curtail harbor new geopolitical strate- first enlargement, NATO allies did not imple- rights of the Russian Black Fleet in Sev- gies against Russia, ment their core commitments to alleviate astopol and Crimea and Western support for particularly by extend- Russian concerns; that is, to strengthen the regime change movements (as demonstrated ing the military alliance Organization for Security and Co-operation during the OSCE Ministerial Council in De- and force postures to- in (OSCE), establish close NATO- cember 2013 in Kiev) added to the Russian as- wards Russian borders. Russia security cooperation and adapt the sessment that the West was crossing “red lines”. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Russia assessed the February 2014 events on Treaty. Instead, with the second enlargement the Maidan in this context and believed it was to include the Baltic States, NATO created a acting in “strategic defense” to maintain its geographical zone for potential force build- fleet capabilities at Crimea. ups at Russian borders close to St. Petersburg, which is not restricted by any legally binding (3) NATO-Russia confrontation in the Baltic limitations. Furthermore, the region as part of a larger strategy. In the Rus- stationed combat forces in the re- sian view, NATO’s military activities in the gion (Romania and Bulgaria) and initiated Baltic region are not a response to a concrete missile defense installations in Russian threat against the Baltic States, but while, at the same time, rejecting definitions are part of a larger strategy of confrontation for the restraint commitments contained in with Russia intended to punish Russia for the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. its actions in Ukraine. In this context, Rus- sia criticizes the OSCE security dialogue in (2) Russia’s “strategic defense” against perceived Vienna for not duly taking into account the Western hybrid regime change politics. In the findings of observation flights conducted Russian view, breaking points in its relations under the Treaty on Open Skies (OS) and with the West were the western recognition inspections conducted under the OSCE’s Vi- of Kosovo (March 2008), NATO’s invitation enna Document (VD). Russia also perceives to Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance NATO’s military activities in the Baltic re-

(c) U.S. Army Photo by Pfc. Gage Hull/ Released. Link: https://www.flickr.com/ photos/7armyjmtc/25698224164/ No changes made.

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gion as intended to create a military basis for mounting pressure on Russia. It holds that the exclave is geographically exposed and vulnerable to hostile military action.1 Russia does not rule out responding in kind should NATO terminate its commitment to maintain restraint with respect to the station- ing of additional substantial combat forces in the region.

2. Current force postures, reinforce- ment plans and military activities

Regional Russian force capabilities (c) U.S. Army Photo by Pfc. Michael Bradley/Released. Link: https://www.flickr.com/photos/7armyjmtc/25698278804/ According to a recent RAND study, Rus- No changes made. sia could, at short notice, assemble from its Western Military District, including the region, it would be insufficient to offset the , 25 maneuver battalions weaknesses of the allied land forces available In the Russian view, for offensive operations in the Baltic region.2 for initial operations. NATO’s military activi- They would be supported by ten artillery and ties in the Baltic region six attack helicopter battalions and approxi- The study concludes that, under these con- are not a response to mately 27 air combat squadrons. In addition, ditions, NATO would not be capable of a concrete Russian two Iskander and three Tochka short-range defending Estonia and Latvia. Furthermore, threat against the Baltic ballistic missile battalions are available. The augmenting available ground forces with re- States, but are part study concludes that the Russian army corps inforcements from is assessed of a larger strategy of is capable of winning a combined arms battle as difficult: moving from to the Baltic confrontation with in the region and taking Riga and Tallinn region – a distance of between 600 and 1,000 Russia intended to within three days after launching offensive km – they would have to pass the “Kalinin- punish Russia for its operations. Thus, Russia would be capable of grad Gap” (a 70 km broad strip between the actions in Ukraine. confronting NATO with a fait accompli and Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus) and could be “unpleasant choices”. slowed down by Russian air and flank attacks.

Baltic and current allied force capabilities Allied reinforcements assigned to the region NATO’s reassurance initiative, agreed upon According to the RAND study, Baltic indig- at its Wales Summit in September 2014, is enous forces are estimated to consist of only a reaction to growing threat perceptions of three infantry brigades with limited light Baltic and other Eastern allies. The decisions artillery, but no tank battalions or air forces. taken aim at improving rapid reaction capa- While allies assist in air policing, U.S. and bilities (Readiness Action Plan) and establish- UK forces assigned to the region could, after a ing a persistent presence along NATO’s Eastern short warning, provide 9 battalions including borders. To that end, the NATO Response two Stryker and two attack helicopter battal- Force (NRF) will be further developed to an ions, which would bring the number of bat- Enhanced NRF, its strength increased from talions available for initial operations to 20. 19,000 to 40,000 personnel, the readiness of Their weakness, however, is the lack of armor an advanced element of 5,000 enhanced to en- and heavy artillery. Although allies could able short-term deployment (Very High Readi- mount significant air power in the ness Joint Task Force, VJTF) and the headquar-

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(c) U.S. Army Photo by Spc. Courtney Hubbard/Released. Link: https://www.flickr.com/photos/7armyjmtc/26296395576/ No changes made. ters of the Multinational Corps North-East “European Activity Set” (EAS) can be activat- (MNC NE) in Szczecin augmented. In addi- ed for exercises and deployment of an armored In view of the worsen- tion, the frequency and size of NATO land brigade of 5,000 personnel strength, which ing security situation and sea exercises in Eastern Europe, the Baltic would be flown in from outside the region. in Europe and multiple Sea and the Black Sea were significantly in- While such rotating assets are assessed to be security challenges creased, their areas enlarged and the number compatible with the restraint commitment globally, several NATO of reconnaissance flights multiplied. Eight contained in the NATO-Russia Founding states have announced small headquarter elements and logistical Act, a number of allies as well as academicians increases in defense units are being stationed in the Baltic States, believe that these measures are insufficient. budgets and invest- Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and They deem it indispensable to station substan- ments in infrastructure, Bulgaria to prepare for command and control tial combat forces in the region permanently logistics, transport and as well as logistical support of reinforcements in order to credibly defend allies and deter ag- procurement of hard- after arrival NATO( Force Integration Units). gression. In this context, the above-mentioned ware. RAND study concludes that the short term Bilaterally, the United States undertook to availability in the Baltic region of seven bri- maintain a continuing presence in Eastern gades, including three heavy armored brigades, Europe with a focus on the Baltic region and was necessary to conduct initial operations Poland by rotating land and air combat units to “fundamentally change the strategic picture and increasing the number of bilateral exer- from Moscow”. cises. Furthermore, Washington has initiated the forward deployment of 250 armored ve- In view of the worsening security situation hicles and other materials in the Baltic States, in Europe and multiple security challenges Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and . This globally, several NATO states have announced

Page 5 Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics increases in defense budgets and investments ed more than 3,000 flights of NATO aircraft in infrastructure, logistics, transport and pro- near its borders, twice as many as in 2013.4 The fact that about curement of hardware. In 2015, these figures increased again. 50 percent of Russian speaking minorities are Military activities not “state citizens” and 3. Plausibility of scenarios are, thus, excluded from In 2014/15, the number of land and sea exer- the right to vote gives cises and close-border overflights of both sides Russian hybrid action to destabilize the rise to concern. reached the highest level since the end of the Baltic States Cold War: In 2014, NATO states conducted 162 multinational and 40 national exercises. In This scenario focuses on the possibility that 2015, there were approximately 270 exercises.3 Russia could stir unrest among the Russian Half of them served to reassure Eastern allies. speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia (25- In March 2015, the spectacular show of force 30 percent of the populations)5 and support it of a U.S. Cavalry Regiment parading through with covert paramilitary action while intimi- Eastern Europe with armored vehicles (“Dra- dating national governments through force goon Ride”) drew particular public attention. concentrations at the borders. To assess the plausibility of this scenario, four basic ques- Russia also conducted a high number of exer- tions must be answered: To what extent are cises in the Western Military District includ- these minorities vulnerable to agitation, e.g. ing short-term alert exercises (snap exercises) through lacking economic or political integra- involving Northwestern border areas, without tion? What can the Baltic States do to increase the regular 42 days advance notification. Ac- their resilience? What could NATO’s role be cording to U.S. sources they comprised up to in supporting them? And, is there plausible 150,000 personnel. reasoning for why Russia might wage hybrid warfare against NATO countries? Between March 2014 and March 2015, the European Leadership Network recorded 66 (1) It appears that economic integration of incidents of close encounters between Russian Russian speaking minorities has generally air and sea forces and those of NATO coun- been successful. Politically, they are allowed to tries, and . NATO recorded speak their languages, pursue their traditions 400 intercepts of Russian aircraft in 2014, and culture, freely voice their opinions and four times higher than in 2013. Russia record- assemble peacefully. “State citizens” of Russian

(c) U.S. Army Photo by Spc. Courtney Hubbard/Released. Link: https://www.flickr.com/ photos/7armyjmtc/26229937782/ No changes made.

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origin can represent their interests in politi- member states and thereby risk pan-European cal parties, national parliaments and local and global countermeasures by the West (see Given current force administrative functions. However, the fact below). postures and the ex- that about 50 percent of Russian speaking mi- posed geography of the norities are not “state citizens” and are, thus, Russian sub-regional surprise attack Baltic States, Russia has excluded from the right to vote gives rise to the military potential to concern. 6 On the other hand, accepting incor- (1) Given current force postures and the ex- gain operational advan- poration into the Russian Federation does not posed geography of the Baltic States, Russia tages in a limited area seem to be an attractive alternative for most of has the military potential to gain operational by launching a surprise the well-integrated Russian speakers. advantages in a limited area by launching a attack. surprise attack. Ignoring the strategic implica- (2) Estonia and Latvia, with high propor- tions of such a scenario, NATO would be left tions of (mainly Russian speaking) 15 with two choices for responding symmetrically percent “non-state citizens”, could improve to this perceived risk: establishing the sub-re- resilience by facilitating the acquisition of gional force balance by the permanent station- citizenship, granting voting rights to more ing of substantial combat forces or ensuring Russian speaking people and promoting soci- rapid reaction by reinforcements from outside, etal cohesiveness. together with the capability to enforce access.

(3) NATO’s role in support of Estonia and (2) However, such a narrow sub-regional Latvia in case of internal unrest is limited. A focus does not take into account the strate- hybrid scenario lacks the element of surprise, gic implications of a Russian attack against is rather the result of a developing crisis and a NATO member state. In accordance with requires policing rather than full-fledged Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, an attack military operations. More importantly, deal- against one member state is regarded an attack ing with internal unrest is, first and foremost, against all, i.e., a sub-regional Russian attack a national task and involves internal security would trigger a war between Russia and the forces. Foreign military intervention in sup- whole alliance, which would have an advan- port of governments against parts of the tage from its general military superiority in population would be counterproductive and Europe and beyond. fuel allegations of suppressing people’s dem- onstrations and intervening in internal affairs. In this context, NATO’s reaction would not Allies could, however, guard borders in order (have to) be confined tosymmetric responses to prevent third states from launching military in the sub-region. Asymmetric responses could interventions in support of rebels. However, exploit Russian vulnerabilities, from the geo- In short, the surprise at- such involvement would require careful con- graphically exposed Kaliningrad Oblast to Rus- tack scenario would be sideration of the legal and political implica- sian outposts in disputed territories in Europe, driven by a narrow focus tions and would certainly not warrant perma- in or Russian naval groups abroad. Also, on limited sub-regional nent stationing of additional combat troops. internal unrest could pose risks to the security capabilities without and defense of the Russian Federation. taking into account (4) The main limitation of this scenario is the strategic consequences. lack of a convincing political rationale. Why Furthermore, political isolation and the com- Therefore, it lacks a should the Russian Federation want to de- plete loss of economic links to the West would convincing strategic ra- stabilize a NATO member state in peacetime be the inevitable consequences of a Russian at- tionale. Why would Rus- and, thus, risk direct strategic confrontation tack against a NATO country. Russia’s current sia choose to exchange with the West? What would its purpose be course of returning to strategic cooperation as comparatively small and which strategic implications would Russia a global power on an equal footing with the and probably short-term be willing to cope with? There is no advantage United States, such as common action against territorial gains for a to be gained for Russia by waging hybrid ac- terrorism and other global security threats, strategic disaster? tion in two geographically exposed NATO would be thwarted.

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Also the reaction by Russia’s ally, Belarus, to a Russian attack against the Baltic States might pose a risk to Russian calculations. Military action from Belarus’ territory would be crucial for Russian attempts to close the gap towards Kaliningrad in order to secure augmentation and logistical supply and to block NATO’s land movements intended to reinforce the Baltic States.

In short, the surprise attack scenario would be driven by a narrow focus on limited sub- regional capabilities without taking into ac- count strategic consequences. Therefore, it lacks a convincing strategic rationale. Why would Russia choose to exchange compara- tively small and probably short-term territo- (c) Vitaly V. Kuzmin. Link: http://vitalykuzmin.net No changes made. rial gains for a strategic disaster? the foreseeable future. Countries facing ter- Unintended escalation risks of current ritorial conflicts would suffer most from a new military activities split of Europe.

The number and size of current unusual military Rapid reinforcement activities of both sides, particularly in border areas, harbor high risks of unintended incidents Rapid reinforcement would not necessarily and escalation. This is aggravated by the lack of aim at establishing an operational force bal- verifiable restraint, limited transparency and the ance in the sub-region, but rather at building absence of direct military-to-military contacts up a credible deterrence to reassure allies. A in the region. Also, the poor state of the security multinational response force would demon- dialogue contributes to misperceptions. Such a strate the political determination of all NATO fragile situation undermines security, not only in countries to defend allies that face aggression the region, but in the whole of Europe. and confront the aggressor with strategic con- sequences. Strengthening rapid response capa- bilities and stationing limited force integration 4. Options units on the spot might be kept within the re- straint commitments contained in the NATO- Permanent stationing Russia Founding Act. Such action could be stabilized by (re)confirming mutual restraint NATO’s permanent stationing of substantial commitments and enhancing CSBMs. combat forces in the Baltic region would entail the break-down of the NATO-Russia Arms control and Confidence and Security- Founding Act. It would deepen mutual dis- Building Measures (CSBMs) To be relevant, arms trust and might incite reciprocal Russian control should calculate action. A race for dislocation of troops in Arms control and CSBMs aim at limitation the space and time the region might result in the creation of a of military capabilities, restraint of military needed to concentrate new line of politico-military confrontation activities as well as transparency and verifica- significant combat throughout Europe with incalculable conse- tion of both in order to stabilize the situation forces at the line of quences for the security in Europe and the and, at least, ensure early warning. To that departure for offensive globe. It would destroy any hope of returning end, arms control and CSBMs must respond operations. to security cooperation in the OSCE area for to concrete security concerns and be militar-

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ily relevant, i.e. they must take into account of the Vienna Document. Thus, transparency plausible military scenarios and likely courses measures, combined with verification and of operations. Arms control and CSBMs do observation, could help to ease tensions, avoid not evaluate intentions, but contribute to con- misperceptions and reduce the dangers of fidence building by verified compliance. escalation.

(1) Limitations. Limitations of key armaments (3) Political restraint commitments. In a less can help curtail the capabilities needed for of- formal way, mutual political commitments - fensive operations. However, the definition of such as those contained in the NATO-Russia the area of application is crucial. Limitations in Founding Act - to exercise restraint about the the vicinity of the line of contact can help stop permanent stationing of additional substantial a destabilizing accumulation of forces in border combat forces in sensitive geographical areas areas. However, their military relevance is small helped in the past to avoid destabilizing force if such limited areas are too narrow and do concentrations even where CFE limitations not consider reinforcement capabilities from did not apply. Such reciprocal commitments adjacent areas as well as long-range air power. could also be taken bilaterally, e.g. under the Thereby, geographical asymmetries must be umbrella of the Vienna Document Chapter X taken into account. To be relevant, arms control (see below). should calculate the space and time needed to concentrate significant combat forces at the Ideally, a combination of such measures line of departure for offensive operations. should be agreed upon to respond to security concerns and ease tensions in the Baltic Re- Against this backdrop, the bipolar CFE gion. Treaty applied the following military logic: Pan-European limitations of holdings were meant to reduce overall attack capabilities and 5. Feasibility: Status of Arms con- prevent large-scale offensive operations after trol agreements and CSBMs full preparation. The purpose of regional limi- tations was to (1) establish a balance of land forces at the line of confrontation at reduced CFE Treaty and ACFE plus levels in order to prevent surprise attacks; (2) limit capabilities of follow-on echelons and The Baltic States are not States Parties to reinforcements in adjacent areas of both sides the CFE Treaty of 1990. Before they left the and balance the times needed for their deploy- CFE area of application (1991), the Baltic ment to the front line; (3) increase the time region belonged to the CFE region IV.3. needed for their mobilization through special Special limitations for that region were in- storage site rules; (4) gain further early warn- tended to limit the second strategic echelon ing time through information and notification of the Soviet land forces and, therefore, also No legally binding as well as verification on the spot. comprised the Belarus and Carpathian Mili- agreement exists in tary Districts. The CFE Treaty did not, how- the Baltic region about (2) CSBMs. Early CSBMs (1970s/1980s) ever, envisage that the former Baltic Military limitations of national responded to the concerns at the time that District would ever become NATO territory. and stationed forces in unusual military activities, such as large-scale Therefore, the CFE regional limitation re- Estonia, Latvia, Lithu- military exercises, could be used for launching gime of 1990 would not have any conceptu- ania and the Russian surprise attacks or building bases for large- al relevance to a NATO-Russia force balance Federation. Further- scale offensive action. Therefore, CSBMs or restraint in the Baltic region. more, the intrusive aimed at early notification and observation CFE information and of such activities in order to win early warn- Up to 2009, NATO States claimed that verification regime can- ing time to prepare needed defenses. Such the Baltic States could only become CFE not be applied. provisions are still part of the core elements States Parties once the CFE Adaptation

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Agreement (ACFE) had entered into force. Vienna Document (VD) At the same time, they rejected starting ACFE ratification procedures by linking it Since the politically binding Vienna Docu- to further political ends.7 While the entry ment (VD) belongs to the whole OSCE into force of the ACFE was pending8, the community, Russia and the Baltic States are Baltic States joined the Alliance in 2004. In participating in its implementation. The VD consequence, for the first time since 1990, does not entail any limitations of holdings NATO’s second enlargement included an and its information and verification regime is area that directly bordered Russia, but was far less intrusive than that of the CFE Treaty. not subject to legally binding limitations It provides for notification and observation of national or stationed forces. Repeated of unusual military activities based on thresh- Russian requests in 2006 and 2007 that the old values agreed upon in 1992. Long term ACFE be ratified and the Baltic States ac- transparency of the development of force cede to CFE remained unsuccessful. By the structures and capabilities is based on annual end of 2007, Russia suspended its partici- information exchanges, area inspections and pation in the CFE Treaty. troop evaluation visits, though with limited scope and quotas: A new attempt to revive conventional arms control was made in 2010 with informal talks − The VD scope is limited to combat and in a new format (“at 36”), which included six combat support troops of regular armed Baltic and West-Balkan NATO member states forces. that were not States Parties to the CFE Treaty. − Its passive inspection and evaluation The talks failed due to renewed U.S.-Russian quotas are small (three inspections per contention over host nation consent to Rus- country, one evaluation visit each for sia’s stationing of forces in disputed territories Estonia, Latvia and and two in Georgia. Since then, no substantial dia- for Russia). logue on reviving pan-European conventional − Threshold values for notifications and arms control, which could have a bearing on observations of maneuvers and other the situation in the Baltic region, has been unusual military activities still represent initiated. The prospects are dim that this situ- Cold War levels (9,000 respectively ation will change soon. 13,000 combat troops involved). − Notification of “snap exercises”, without In consequence, no legally binding agreement advance notice to troops involved, does exists in the Baltic region about limitations not need to be 42 days ahead, but only of national and stationed forces in Estonia, once the “troops involved commence Latvia, Lithuania and the Russian Federation. such activities” and the duration of the Furthermore, the intrusive CFE information exercise exceeds 72 hours. and verificationregime cannot be applied. − Notification of multiple simultaneous Therefore, regional CSBMs can be imple- exercises is not required if they are not mented only on the basis of the far more lim- linked by a common operational pur- ited provisions of the Vienna Document and pose and joint command and control the Open Skies Treaty. and if any individual one does not ex- ceed the thresholds. It should be noted though that the CFE Treaty is still being applied in neighboring In consequence, notification of large exercises Belarus and Poland and is, therefore, relevant is not required if participating combat troops to transparency and restraint of force capabili- do not exceed the thresholds. Notification ties in countries adjacent to the Baltic region. of multiple simultaneous exercises is also That could be enhanced through additional not necessary if they are not linked to one bilaterally agreed measures. common operational purpose under a single

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operational command. Notice of snap exer- quota to be carried out in the territories of cises must be given only shortly before they the Kaliningrad Oblast and Lithuania. This NATO member states are initiated. Such stipulations leave room for provision was cancelled by Russia in April have made detailed circumvention of the spirit of the VD or, at 2014 after Lithuania had taken action in proposals in the Forum least, may potentially lead to misperceptions. support of Kiev. for Security Cooperation to modernize the Vienna Within these limits, a number of inspec- It is noteworthy that, in the areas adja- Document and offset its tions and observations have been carried cent to the Baltic States and the Russian shortcomings. Russia out in the region, including by Baltic States oblasts Pskov and Kaliningrad, further is not likely to agree and other allies in neighboring Russian ter- regional measures are still in existence: In soon since it insists on ritories, e.g. in Pskov and Kaliningrad. No 2001 and 2004, Belarus had agreed to one linkages to reviving con- unusual military activity or stationing of ad- more reciprocal evaluation visit each with ventional arms control ditional combat forces has been observed. Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. Poland and and generally improving Belarus agreed to permit one more inspec- the security atmosphere NATO member states have made detailed tion, expand the scope of military informa- in Europe. proposals in the Forum for Security Coop- tion and give notification of one military eration to modernize the Vienna Document exercise below VD thresholds. Also, Russia and offset its shortcomings. Russia is not and Finland agreed to allow for one more likely to agree soon since it insists on linkag- reciprocal evaluation visit above the regular es to reviving conventional arms control and quota. generally improving the security atmosphere in Europe. Within the Alliance, a consensus In order to contain and deescalate the cur- for launching another conventional arms rent crisis, VD regional measures offer a control initiative does not seem to exist ei- flexible tool for stabilizing measures, such ther. It is high time that both sides terminate as intensifying cross-border security co- linkages and embark on a two-pronged ap- operation, lowering thresholds for mutual proach to increasing CSBMs and revitalizing notification and observation of exercises, conventional arms control. allowing for more frequent inspections and evaluation visits, particularly in border ar- Regional Measures (Vienna Document eas, and establishing an incident prevention Chapter X) and response mechanism through direct military-to-military contacts. Such special VD Chapter X encourages participating measures do not require a consensus by all States to agree on and implement addi- VD participating States in the Forum for tional bilateral and regional measures with Security Cooperation, but could be agreed neighboring countries to deescalate ten- upon on a bilateral or multilateral basis sions, with a focus on border areas. Such without prejudice to principal positions. measures are of a voluntary nature and are often used in a sub-regional context. Open Skies Treaty (OS)

In the Baltic region, additional bilateral After the beginning of the Ukraine crisis CSBMs were agreed upon between Russia Western countries and the Ukraine carried and the Baltic States at the beginning of the out a high number of Open Skies observa- past decade, among them CFE-like infor- tion flights over Russian territories adjoin- In order to contain and mation exchanges. The latter were termi- ing Ukraine and the Baltic States, includ- deescalate the current nated by Russia after it suspended its par- ing the Kaliningrad and Pskov Oblasts. crisis, Vienna Document ticipation in the CFE Treaty. In addition, There, no stationing of additional sub- regional measures offer in 2001 Russia and Lithuania had agreed stantial combat forces or unusual military a flexible tool for stabi- to allow for one reciprocal evaluation visit activities in violation of VD provisions was lizing measures. beyond the regular Vienna Document observed. Generally, the high number of

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passive quotas for observation flights over were invoked in the Forum for Security Co- the territories of Russia and Belarus (42 per operation in Vienna in the contexts of the In the absence of the year) is conducive to maintaining regular Ukraine crisis and the tensions in the Baltic CFE-Treaty in the region, observations of Russian military activities. regions. Surprisingly, in the security dialogue, the Founding Act is the the results of VD inspections and OS observa- only remaining political Also the Baltic States and Poland are States tion flights did not play a significant role in agreement on mutual re- Parties to the Open Skies Treaty. Their an- discussion and easing tensions. States should straint. It should be kept nual passive quota, to be used by the Rus- make better use of such findings to base the as a basis for limiting sian Federation and Belarus, amounts to discussion on indisputable facts found by the destabilizing accumula- one each for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania cooperative use of agreed CSBMs. tions of forces and as a and two for Poland. threshold against which NATO-Russia Founding Act military activities can be Open Skies observation flights are of high measured. value for surveying the situation in the region In the context of the envisaged first enlarge- and should continue on a regular basis. What ment of the Alliance, the NATO-Russia is worrying, however, are certain tendencies Founding Act (1997) stipulates that no ad- to denounce the Treaty as a means of “espio- ditional substantial combat forces would be nage” and to introduce artificial restrictions permanently stationed. The commitment which are intended to diminish transpar- was made subject to a rebus sic stantibus- ency of military activities of the states being clause. A reciprocal commitment was agreed observed. States Parties to the Treaty should to by Russia with respect to the regions counter such tendencies, live up to their treaty bordering the Baltic States and Poland (Ka- obligations and underline its value for increas- liningrad and Pskov Oblasts). It was formal- ing transparency and stability. ized in an annex to the Istanbul CFE Final Act (1999). On a bilateral basis, Russia and Security Dialogue at the OSCE Forum for have concluded a similar agreement Security Cooperation in Vienna relevant to .

On several occasions in 2014 and 2015, con- Since 2006 Russia has requested that such flict prevention mechanisms, in accordance terms be defined and has made concrete with Chapter III of the Vienna Document, proposals, which were rejected by the United

(c) www.kremlin.ru. No changes made.

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States. In 2007, the United States stationed control, including for the Baltic region, once rotating brigade combat groups in Romania it returns to regular operation. and Bulgaria and defined them as “not sub- stantial”. 6. Summarizing recommendations The reassurance initiative, agreed upon at the Wales NATO summit in September 2014, The following recommendations are geared maintained the understanding that logisti- to maintaining politico-military stability in cal preparations and small headquarter ele- NATO-Russia relations, avoiding a spiral ments as well as a rotating presence of smaller of escalatory military build-up measures, combat units in the Baltic region were in scaling-down the risks of unintended mili- line with the provisions of the Founding Act. tary clashes and deescalating the situation, At NATO’s Warsaw summit in July 2016, particularly in the Baltic Region: further decisions will be taken which could call into question its validity and continued (1) Based on the NATO-Russia Founding applicability. Claiming that Russia had bro- Act, states could confirm their commitment ken agreed principles and referring to the to keep restraint with respect to the per- rebus sic stantibus clause, a number of allies, manent stationing of additional substantial including the Baltic States, believe that the combat forces in the Baltic States and the Founding Act is obsolete. Kaliningrad and Pskov Oblasts. Similar bi- lateral commitments of Russia and Norway In the absence of the CFE-Treaty in the could be reconfirmed as well. At the same region, the Founding Act is the only remain- time, neither side would be prevented from ing political agreement on mutual restraint. enhancing the capabilities of rapid reaction It should be kept as a basis for limiting de- forces, preparing logistics for their reception stabilizing accumulations of forces and as a on the spot and conducting exercises. threshold against which military activities can be measured. In this context, it would be (2) Such an agreement could be based on the useful to combine such restraint with gen- understanding that exercises in the region, eral VD transparency measures and regional particularly those in border areas, which CSBMs so that the transparency of unusual significantly exceed the above threshold, will military activities would be increased once be placed under strict transparency through they significantly exceed this threshold. early notification and observation. To that end, both sides should agree on intensified Rome Declaration and NATO-Russia- cooperation of neighboring states as foreseen Council (NRC) in chapter X of the Vienna Document and, in particular, lower the current observation The Rome Declaration of 2002 stipulated thresholds (Chapter V, VI) and allow for the terms under which the NATO-Russia more frequent inspections and evaluation Council should have proceeded. Accord- visits than foreseen in Chapter IX. ingly, members of the Council should have acted in their national capacities to avoid (3) Open Skies observation flights should confronting Russia with block positions. The be used and intensified to further increase Declaration also provided for a comprehen- transparency in the region. Additional and sive list of items for common deliberations, reciprocal voluntary observation flights could including conventional arms control. Such be considered at a sub-regional level. States proceedings were not implemented and the should make full use of the potential of the Council was suspended at the beginning of Open Skies Treaty, including the use of ad- the Ukraine crisis. However, the NRC could vanced cameras, once they have been certi- still provide a venue for discussions on arms fied in accordance with Treaty provisions.

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States Parties to the OS Treaty should live up measures should be imbedded in a larger to their treaty obligations and allow requested détente process aiming at restoring security OS flights to be carried out in line with treaty cooperation and rebuilding trust in Europe provisions. They should refrain from intro- on the basis of the OSCE acquis. It should ducing artificial restrictions, which are intend- address intentions and perceptions as well as ed to diminish transparency of the military capabilities. To that end, mutual (re)confir- capabilities of the country being observed. In mation of compliance with the principle of particular, they should counter tendencies to non-intervention in internal affairs of states denounce the OS Treaty as a means of “espio- seems as important as the revitalization of nage” and underline its value for increasing conventional arms control. transparency and stability. (7) Russia should particularly address the (4) Where applicable, CFE inspections should fears of the Baltic States and formally state be used to survey areas adjacent to the Baltic that it has no intention of interfering in the region. To intensify transparency and build internal affairs of neighboring countries. Al- trust, additional and reciprocal voluntary lies should recommit to relinquishing active inspections could be considered on a bilateral pursuance of regime change policies while basis, e.g. between Belarus, Poland and Ger- upholding the OSCE acquis of common many. norms and standards. Both sides should re- commit to the OSCE objective of creating a (5) As a further measure, states involved in common area of undivided cooperative secu- the region through military activities should rity based on shared principles. consider establishing an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) in order to (8) Restoring security and rebuilding trust avoid miscalculations and escalation. To that is possible only if established fora are used end, direct military-to-military communica- to renew dialogue. To that end, the security tion links are needed. In addition, for patrol dialogue should be resumed, not only in the flights, a five mile distance from international OSCE but also in the NATO-Russia Coun- borders in the Baltic Region and beyond cil. CSBMs and conventional arms control should be maintained and mutually agreed should be put back on the agenda. When upon. considering the security situation in Europe, the facts found through the implementation (6) Given the strategic nature of the tensions of cooperative arms control and CSBMs between NATO and Russia, such regional should be duly taken into account.

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Annex: Bilateral Agreements on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Baltic Region

(1) Arrangement on complementary (4) Declaration on additional CSBMs, 5 CSBMs, 15 May 2000 March 2004

Participants: Participants: - Finland, Russian Federation - Belarus, Latvia

Objectives: Objectives: - One additional evaluation visit - Conduct of one additional VD 99 evalua- tion visit; (2) Agreement on complementary CSBMs, - Exchange of additional military informa- 19 January 2001 tion; - Information exchange on most significant Participants: military activities - Lithuania, Russian Federation (5) Set of CSBMs complementary to VD Objectives: 99, 20 July 2004 - One additional evaluation visit; (suspended 2014) Participants: - Exchange of additional military informa- Belarus, Poland tion on armed forces in Lithuania and Kaliningrad area in CFE format (suspended Objectives: 2008) - Conduct of one additional VD 99 evalua- tion visit; (3) Agreement on Vienna Document 1999 - Conduct of one additional VD 99 inspec- Complementary CSBMs, 19 July 2001 tion; - Exchange of additional military informa- Participants: tion; - Belarus, Lithuania - Prior notification of the largest military activity below the VD 99 threshold; Objectives: - Expanding the scope of military informa- - Increasing the number of evaluation visits tion exchanges and inspections; - Exchange of additional military informa- tion; - Joint assessment meetings Source: OSCE

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1 See Stephan Frühling, Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/ 6 In November 2014, 24.6 percent of the registered population AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge,” in Survival 58: 2 (2016), of Estonia was declared as “Russian speaking” (excluding those of pp. 95-116. https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/ Belarusian origin). 6.5 percent of them were registered as persons sections/2016-5e13/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-april- with “undetermined” citizenship; 8.5 percent held citizenship of the may-2016-eb2d/58-2-07-fruhling-and-lasconjarias-de87. Russian Federation. Cf. “Citizenship”, Estonia.eu, January 12, 2015, http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html. In: Merle 2 David A. Shlapak, Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence Maigre: “Nothing New in Hybrid Warfare: The Estonian Experience on NATO’s Eastern Flank. Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. and Recommendations for NATO”. GMF Policy Brief, February 2015. (2016) Rand Corporation www.rand.org/t/rr1253. 7 NATO claimed that Russia had to fulfill all “Istanbul Commit- 3 Rainer L. Glatz, Martin Zapfe, NATO Defence Planning ments” first. However, no unified interpretation existed among allies between Wales and Warsaw. Politico-military Challenges of a about what these conditions meant exactly. In summer 2007, NATO Credible Assurance against Russia (SWP Comments 5, January replaced its position with a “Parallel Action Plan” (PAP). Sporadic 2016). http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ Russian-U.S. PAP Talks petered out in 2008 and ended with the comments/2016C05_glt_Zapfe.pdf. Russo-Georgian war in summer 2008. An evaluation of NATO’s changing positions is not a subject of this paper. 4 Ian Kearns, Lukasz Kulesa, Thomas Frear, Russia – West Dangerous Brinkmanship Continues. European Leadership Network. 8 Only Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have ratified the March 2015. www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/russia-west- ACFE. dangerous-brinkmanship-continues_2529.html.

5 In Lithuania the Russian-speaking population amounts to 6 percent. Only 0.7 percent of the population is “foreign”. Lithuania does not share common borders with the Russian Federation except for the Russian Kaliningrad exclave.

Front page: (c) U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Daniel Cole, U.S. Army Europe Public Affairs, Link: https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope_im- ages/21459363410/ No changes made.

Page 16 Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics

About the Author Wolfgang Richter (Colonel ret.) is Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin, Research Group on Security Politics. His previous assignments in- clude, inter alia, Head of the military section of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, and to Disarmament fora of the United Nations, New York (1995-1999); Head of de- partment (global and European arms control), Federal Armed Forces Centre for Verification Tasks (1999-2005); and Head of the military section of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE, Vienna. Contact: [email protected]

About Deep Cuts

The Deep Cuts project is a research and of realistic analyses and specific recom- consultancy project, jointly conducted by mendations, the Commission strives to the Institute for Peace Research and Secu- translate the already existing political com- rity Policy at the University of Hamburg, mitments to further nuclear reductions the Arms Control Association, and the into concrete and feasible action. Deep Primakov Institute of World Economy Cuts Working Papers do not necessarily and International Relations of the Rus- reflect the opinion of individual Commis- sian Academy of Sciences. The Deep Cuts sioners or Deep Cuts project partners. Commission is seeking to devise concepts on how to overcome current challenges to For further information please go to: deep nuclear reductions. Through means www.deepcuts.org

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