Closing the Gap? Military Cooperation from the Baltic Sea to the Black

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CLOSING THE GAP? MILITARY CO-OPERATION FROM THE BALTIC SEA TO THE BLACK SEA

Edited by Justyna Gotkowska and Olaf Osica WARSAW DECEMBER 2012

CLOSING THE GAP? MILITARY CO-OPERATION FROM THE BALTIC SEA TO THE BLACK SEA

Edited by Justyna Gotkowska and Olaf Osica Authors: Tomasz Dąborowski, Mateusz Gniazdowski, Justyna Gotkowska, Jakub Groszkowski, Andrzej Sadecki, Andrzej Wilk; co-operation: Joanna Hyndle-Hussein © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies

Content editors Justyna Gotkowska, Olaf Osica

EditorS Katarzyna Kazimierska Anna Łabuszewska

Graphic design Para-buch

PHOTOGRAPH ON COVER Agencja Shutterstock dTP GroupMedia

PUBLISHER Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw Tel. + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl

ISBN 978-83-62936-18-2 Contents

INTRODUCTION | 5

PART I THE PREREQUISITES, OBJECTIVES AND PROSPECTS OF MILITARY CO-OPERATION AMONG SELECTED STATES IN THE AREA BETWEEN THE BALTIC SEA AND THE BLACK SEA 1. BACKGROUND | 8 2. CONCLUSIONS | 16

PART II REGIONAL CO-OPERATION, DEFENCE POLICIES, ARMED FORCES AND ARMS INDUSTRIES OF COUNTRIES ANALYSED

I. THE NORDIC STATES | 22

II. THE BALTIC STATES | 46

IV. ROMANIA AND BULGARIA | 77

APPENDICES | 88

GLOSSARY OF NAMES AND ABBREVIATIONS | 88

TABLES | 94 1. Military spending in 2007–2011 | 94 2. Numbers of service personnel at end of 2011 / beginning of 2012 | 96 3. Army – numbers of basic categories of offensive weapons according to CFE | 98 4. Air force – numbers of combat aircraft and combat helicopters according to CFE | 102 5. Navy – numbers of basic warships according to the Vienna Document | 104 6. Basic and prospective types of armament that may be used for military- -technological co–operation | 106 7. Engagement in NATO/EU/US operations | 110 8. Involvement in multinational formations and operations – partners | 112 defence co-operation. and developing to security states closer approaches of individual the tives, and place, objec principles its and taken it which has in circumstances date, the to co-operation of military formats and experiences the presents II tries). Part forces) economic (the the conditions armed (the defence and indus military (defence policies), setting political of the the analysis a detailed contains II Part question. in area the in co-operation technological and military for political, potential of the conclusions analysis of the the presents report Iof this Part subject. this Sofia on and of views Bucharest the US, and the with role of of the perceptions NATO own its relations and between similarities the given Bulgaria, and Romania with co-operation military and develop political furthermore, Group can, and Visegrad occupies position the It in astrong also Nordic-Baltic of region. the countries the develop with co-operation closer can EU, NATO in the Poland and membership geographic its to locationDue and EU. NATO the and within region the in capabilities military to strengthen but rather structures security existing to replace the US.not is Its goal the and Triangle Weimar the from partners the with lations plement defence policy, Western‘ and ‘the of Poland’s i.e. security direction re It co-operation. may com military for regional closer partners land’s natural Po are states those that assumption by The the authors were guided Bulgaria. and Romania as well as Slovakia) and Group Republic, (the Hungary Czech Visegrad the in Estonia), and Poland’s partners Latvia (Lithuania states Baltic Sweden), Norway and Finland, the (Denmark, Nordic i.e. states Sea, the Black the and Sea Baltic the between area the in countries amongoperation selected defence co- and for security potential the to analyse aims The present report defence co-operation. and security regional and multilateral tives of bilateral, objec principles and debates prerequisites, co-operation) and about the British Franco- Nordic or Defence Co-operation the the (such as of EU NATO the and structures outside the initiatives multilateral and bilateral pooling&sharing), defence and (smart EU NATO the and concepts within of co-operation closer in itself manifested It Europe. in has co-operation military-technological and military political, in interest increased an created have recentgether years in to –all defence industries by European problems experienced the and policy policy,EU’s NATO’s security of reorientation US security the transformation, in developing the defence difficulties budgets the The Europe, in contracting INTRODUCTION ------

5 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 6 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 (co-operation) Hyndle-Hussein – Joanna – Tomasz Dąborowski Sadecki Andrzej Groszkowski Jakub – Mateusz Gniazdowski – Wilk Andrzej – Gotkowska Justyna oftopics: authorsby who ateam followingspecific werefor responsible the prepared was Osica, Olaf and Gotkowska by edited Justyna The present report, AUTHORS co-operation Baltic states, Baltic the of policies defence Bulgaria and defence policies of Romania Hungary and Republic, Slovakia Czech defence policies co-operation, of the Visegrad appendices analysed; tries coun of the industries forces arms and armed authors other the with collaboration Iin Part states; Baltic Nordic and the between co-operation military co-operation, defence Baltic and Nordic states, Baltic the defence Nordic policies and of the - PART I

THE PREREQUISITES, OBJECTIVES AND PROSPECTS OF MILITARY CO-OPERATION AMONG SELECTED STATES IN THE AREA BETWEEN THE BALTIC SEA AND THE BLACK SEA 8 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 (1) co-operation. developing in afactor military been also has defence industries domestic of question maintaining the Finally, rising. been have which also tions, foreign opera of everequipment. costs Nor cover more demanding do the they military and of armament maintenance the and of purchases costs rising the to cover insufficient forces are and armed the to assigned tasks the do not match slightly. have rising been The defenceeven budgets where defence expenditures or stable, remained or has decreasing been has where defencequestion, spending context new element the in Financial issues co-operation. are another military and political in interested become to and/or more interests, regional global have which similar and threats, and challenges security of the perceptions similar prompted with countries environment security the in by adverse changes of all, first It context. defined, its today is is co-operation regional The in new factor particular. Poland in with and Europe, Central develop to with co-operation closer striving been also biggest has the ambitions, and potential largest the has which Romania, Western ofBalkans. the countries the with resentments slow pace of the historical overcoming and constraints cial finan as well as region, Sea Black the in countries ofdivergent individual interests the and heterogeneity howeverby the been It region. Sea hindered has Black the and Western of Balkans the countries the with into is entered that been has that co-operation mostvisible the Bulgaria, and of NATO. Romania case the In within Group (V4) members Visegrad a foundation for among the co-operation closer have provided interests policy security foreign and sphere. Shared military the into co-operation of this extension on an cautiously embarking currently are they “Nordic-Baltic (NB8), group 8” the and economic within and co-operation political developing been have closer states also Baltic Nordic and the recentcess. years, In NATO, less suc with within albeit militarily and have politically states co-operated NATO EU. or The the Baltic within states of co-operation member its alongside the functioned of has NORDEFCO and structure single the consolidated in sationally organi later, became in 2009, which started, Nordic first Defence Co-operation how defence.is the This and forhave on provided co-operation abasis security co-operation of institutional formats existing the and The geographic proximity not is Sea anew phenomenon 1990s. Black the the to –it and back dates Sea Baltic the between countries of co-operation the military multilateral and The bilateral BACKGROUND 1. military co-operation takes place in a context defined by transformations transformations by a context defined place in takes co-operation military

The environment. development and security of political the in Changes , i.e. the budgetary situation of the countries in in countries of situation the budgetary , i.e. the . Those changes have. Those changes - - - - spending, the reform of armed forces, military demonstrations close to NATO to close demonstrations forces, of military reform armed the spending, policies security, of European pillars have the been of whatGiven hitherto “unsteadiness” the policy. develop acommon security will Europe that chance little is there States, it Member thought that EU is among the interests security es in Given deep divergenc the eurozone crisis. the lessons from even the and allies, even more apparent), made Libya in operation (which the Defence Policy afiasco and projectis ty EU’s the conviction that Common Securi growing include: the about security think question in countries way the the in recent changes of causes the Other of collectivedefence. terms in and NATO of neighbourhood members, European immediate the ment in policy manage crisis of the terms in –both security European about how ensure to countries) analysed of provoked the (even has US questions policy not all if in reorientation of region. This Asia-Pacific the presence in military and litical it since provides for up astepped US po uncertainty added the to has 2012, management operations. new US defence The strategy, adopted January in on recentcrisis years in have focused been biggest of the allies capabilities the and of NATO’s activity deliver collectivedefence, the structures as command NATO’s to regarding capabilities doubtshave addition, expressed In been real stayed out. that those and Norway, Bulgaria) (Denmark, operation Romania, the in took part that countries the in crisis of causes that of the interpretations for NATO’s acrisis perceived different as of the cohesion, political irrespective was deliver to it. The Libya in operation ability actual its collective defence and to commitment its to regard with but also activities, management of area’crisis about concern is NATO’s there ‘out its to cohesionticular, regard political with par In uncertain. to be transformation of its further direction the and NATO believe security.However, also transition, in toEuropean states be all of United for NATOStates’ Europe presence the in and importance of the aware also are Sweden Finland and area. Euro-Atlantic entire the and neighbourhood of their security security, the national of their guarantors mostimportant the United States as the with NATO relations and regard here analysed states ber NATO of the mem All regions. respective their in co-operation closer towards attitudes their impact on have adifferent and borne degrees varying tion to policy.quesin the However,countries have influencing factors been those Russia’s and policy unpredictable of reorientation US increasingly security the (non-)evolution NATO the and within Union’s European of policy,the security is adding to concerns in the context of increasing Russian defence Russian context of increasing the in to concerns adding is the growing unpredictability of Russia’s foreign unpredictability and growing the internal the shrinking defence budgets of the largest European defence European budgets largest of the shrinking the ------

9 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 10 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 have Moscow’s mitigate to and pendence have on Russia states the Baltic influence, de energy reduce to their aspirations location and geopolitical their to Due Afghanistan. in mainly foreign missions, on joint in efforts itself manifested already has willingness this and operation, co- military their in states Baltic the to include willing are Nordic states the concerned, is globally ‘brand’ developing as their far As problems return. in regional own their in interest an United States maintain to the expects partly and but morepartner role effective of the to asmaller Nordic aspires region policy, the security ally in international inefficient an of as perception Europe Given United States’ dimension. the global United the of States in the partner effective an as present to themselves thus and of UN, NATOerations the and op CSDP missions, civilian and military on the by region co-operating the for developing develop to countries). a‘brand’ seeking The are Nordic states in reforms sector security in part taking to aview with capabilities training as well as combat (including capabilities capabilities expeditionary up their need build to the is of co-operation Norway, Denmark the and Sweden, Finland in priority important, security. Another, equally regional role ensuring in NATO’s to co-operation undermine closer their want dominant Finland, non-members the Nordic including states, the of NATO, i.e. Sweden and region’s the However, defence enhancing capabilities. none indirectly ofthus Sea), (Sweden Baltic Finland), to improve the and and interoperability but also Arctic, the and Sea (the region Barents the in activity military expand to ties, defence capabili their increase and ordermaintain to in co-operation itary mil closer couple havefore, pursuing been countries last for those of the years position). geopolitical more comfortable thus and There more its to continental due (excepting Denmark environment security the to changes of those aware have Nordic mostacutely states the been geographicGiven situation, their region). Sea Black the presence in military stepped the up US as as well and oil, gas natural of liquefied transport marine regions Sea the development(dueand Black to of Baltic the fishing), or and transport sea extraction, for energy opportunities (due emerging the to Arctic the and Sea Barents the as such regions important strategically in crises of and tensions likelihood increased over the growing been has concern aggressivepolicies of and Russia, capabilities military policy, growing the and Union’s of cohesionNATO’s European lack the the in security transformation, war). context of the In Russian-Georgian the Estonia, against attack (the cyber past the in neighbourhood immediate the in actions hostile and North) the (the Zapad borders and Ladoga and military exercises, strategic bomber flights in flights bomber strategic exercises, military - - - - - eration and to invest in defence capabilities. While those countries are are countries those eration to While defence invest in capabilities. and Nordic co-op to the similar co-operation ing military to develop acloser are extent) unwill asmaller to Republic, albeit Czech applies(the same the to Slovakia and Therefore Hungary countries. Western Balkan neighbouring the in of apossible Hungary, destabilisation case also the in and, disasters, dustrial in and natural as well as terrorism, and crime organised international ture, infrastruc critical to security, threats cyber and on energy focused largely is societies) V4 their in the from (and among Poland’s especially partners threats (due ‘safe’ relatively geographic location). their to about potential The mindset security military their affect directly that could incidents or possible conflicts Republic Czech Hungary,In the and Slovakia level of ‘Nordic’ security. the affect adversely could which Russia, with conflicts of their potential the but states, also Baltic of the potential military limited not include the only this for The region. reasons the in Estonia and Latvia Lithuania, with co-operation cautious defence about closer are Nordic states ation on the foreign missions, on co-oper However, stance Nordic neighbours. their to their contrast in with co-operation military closer seeking been have states also Baltic the reasons, military and NATO in est recent years). in financial as For well as geopolitical one low of and region the Baltic lowest the of the in been GDPa proportion has (Lithuania’s ambitions as those defence spending to match fail but actions its three, Baltic leader of the the be to aspires Lithuania attitude. pro-Atlantic its despite Russia, with onlinks heavily economic business depends and Latvia structures, Euro-Atlantic the with at integrating arm’s Russia ing and length of policy keep unequivocal an pursues Estonia While states. Baltic among the partners. strategic preference for larger their co-operation with as forces, well as military divergentequipment respective the of and development their directions disparate forces, their armed states’ Baltic of the potential limited by the SNMCMG1). to Squadron Naval However, hindered been has co-operation Component NATO Land of BALTRON Force the the to Baltic Response the and Battalion Baltic NATO the jointly (by contributing within visibility states’ tic Bal the Host to Nation strengthening Support, and regard level –with tary up mili stepped at been mission). the also To has co-operation some extent, Policing Air Baltic of or the region for extension the the in NATOand exercises for more US adoption of the contingency planning, as for such bying issues NATO lob (joint level within political place at the taken has co-operation This more actively. have co-operating been they years, several curity. For last the se understood broadly about their uncertainty rising experiencing been also A separate problem concerns the lack of political cohesion of political lack problem the Aseparate concerns there is little concern about concern little is there ------11 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 12 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 to strengthen Romania’s EU. position NATO in the and strengthen to need US) the the and with relations close threats, (perceived interests security geographic proximity, motivated by the similar particular, Poland in rope, and Eu Central develop to with co-operation closer seeking been also has mania Ro aspirations, political and potential United bigger its States. With military the with alliance contribution their to their as capabilities expeditionary their increase to on and foreign operations, interoperability acquire to standards, forces NATO to armed adapt their fully to is Bulgaria and forority Romania The pri deployed be to Romania. also in are defence system US missile of the elements and region, Sea Black the and region East Middle wider of the cinity vi the in bases transport and US logistics hosting are States. The countries two United Romania’s the Bulgaria’s with co-operation ever closer especially and of by Russia’s a result as ‘counterbalanced’ neighbourhood been has actions immediate the in of destabilisation possibility NATO the cohesion and within Turkey. and Greece, Romania and or between Bulgaria Thetween declining be Bulgaria, and Romania between formats: bilateral in co-operation closer to open have increasingly been nonetheless Bulgaria and Romania regions, two the in structures co-operation multilateral existing the of ineffectiveness the Aware of for them. security external and into internal translates co-operation such because region Sea Black the and Western Balkans of the countries the with have co-operating been Bulgaria and Romania of states. for concern both biggest have the source been terrorism or international migration illegal crime, organised to related rity. challenges now, Until security however, internal the secu their to threats of direct existence the to pointing been haveand thus region Sea Black the in and Western Balkans the in both neighbourhood, their in of conflicts ‘unfreezing’ an and of destabilisation likelihood high a relatively Romania and Bulgaria Republic. Czech the Poland and in shield US missile of the elements project build to left-wing aboutder the were governments, sceptical considerably.works may differ un and then Hungary, example,For Slovakia beyondNATO the or frame EU extending initiatives military and on political positions their diverge that so may also group the in countries individual of the defence policies and security states). approachesthe to Baltic the Nevertheless, the with NATO also (usually within group regional co-operating a politically NATO. V4 Admittedly, within the co-operation form on political tion focus can ques spending.in The countries defenceor capabilities own military their for to increase them impulse into an not does translate awareness this security, Union), cornerstone of their the European as regard they which cohesion eroding of NATO the and (and crisis about ofconcerned the the are

located on the border of several regions and face face and regions of border located several on the ------ing, exercises, use in foreign operations or the creation of joint military units. units. of creation joint or the military foreign operations in use exercises, ing, held, already armament to extend also and they new acquisitions: militarywith equipment not concerned only possible are savings at identifying aimed analyses and Research reasons). for financial postponed been has acquisition (this aircraft of multi-role ajoint considering purchase fighter are Croatia, as well as garia, Bul and Romania Finland. with procedure ajoint in tendering system radar its upgrade will and Plan Defence Modernisation Air National Finnish joined the has The latter Estonia. and of Finland case the in also fruit borne has operation co- Similar rifle. recoilless antitank Gustav Carl for the of ammunition quisition ajoint ac announced they June 2012, In joint purchases. case) make to their in (quite possibilities modest the analyse to too, states, ment. have The Baltic begun equip military and armament same of use the wider make and joint purchases consequently, and, more make defence planning their harmonise to better seek might Nordic countries long the the term In exercises. joint Finnish-Norwegian and training on co-operation personnel in resulted has which II, NASAMS tem sys missile mid-range Norwegian-made the surface-to-air advanced purchased has Finland exercises. and joint maintenance on their and howitzers propelled self- Swedish-made of the Archer Norway purchase have on co-operated the – for equipment Sweden acquisitions example and military and of armament area the in co-operate biggest particular The in the savings. Nordic countries joint generating seen on foreign use missions) are exercises, training, sonnel product (servicing, of the modernisation, cycle life tion throughout the per ‘techflation’). followed as by co-opera (the Joint known process is purchases advanced ever more technologically are equipment, which military ment and arma of acquiring costs rising developto comes co-operation the from closer defence budgets, motivation or stable growing the with of countries case the In ofrange 1.3–1.4% of GDP, decreases. reported have also the in currently consolidation. The Bulgaria, defence and budgets of Romania due public amajorto finance decrease reported recently country the spending, defence in increases of small aperiod –after case Republic aspecial is Czech V4 in 1%Poland’s have of around GDP. partners defence budgets ranging The and states Baltic The defence remaining spending. level of the their creased or in even slightly haveNorway, maintained Estonia and Sweden, Finland Europe, In Northern region. the on depending things different means tive and rela is However, ‘insufficient’ environment. term the security the in changes have development as been co-operation the of regional stimulating in a factor (2)

Financial issues. and the possibilities of shared servicing, upgrades, personnel train personnel upgrades, servicing, of shared possibilities the and

have been as important defence budgetsInsufficient important have as been ------13 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 14 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 defence of national territory. national of defence to the related for some tasks on responsibility to take willing partners The The partners. various with area this in co-operate to willing are Bulgaria, and Romania as Hungary, well and as vakia Republic, Similarly, Slo Czech the regard. this in some specialisation pursue to possibly, and, centres training ranges and firing use more of include effective to co-operation this extend to would willing be they that havetonia declared Es and Latvia HostLithuania, to Nation Support regard exercises. with cially espe states, Baltic among the established been also has Co-operation abroad. missions and region the in collaboration to regard with interoperability ing 2012–2017), to enhanc contributing also where it generates whilst savings years for the programme (the Nordic joint states ofco-operation the exercise the in area important “easiest” it achieve. to an is the is one that and savings, of source apotential also is training and joint in Co-operation exercises budget. military the defending in argument an as treated commitments resulting the involvement and co-operation are lic regional in Repub V4, Czech the the from in only development. Poland’s Among partners for capabilities impulse an than rather cuts, for further arationale as treated is co-operation military closer Moreover,Hungary co-operation. and Slovakia in for military opportunities the restrains this and for new purchases partners incentive to seek an hardly is spending decreasing equipment, the military and armament existing on upgrading mainly become focused and contracting are all). air forceno combat with As budgets at first maythe be V4 country vakia onto policing NATO air (Slo as such defence tasks for national responsibility partners for joint purchases. As defence spending in the individual countries and and countries individual the in defence spending As for joint purchases. partners ing erod gradually Hungary, and 1% are Republic, of Slovakia Czech GDP the in as little as to now dropped has which spending, military in cuts The extensive Republic. Czech the in (MATC) established be to is Centre Aviation Training aMultinational Initiative, of the part As region. side the out V4 from the members and joined been by all countries Force. Task has ter HIP Helicop HIP Czech-coordinated offramework the the of within helicopters family Mi-8/17/171 the possess that countries among the operation and training personnel newer of Jversionacquisition pipeline), the possibly on the co-operation in the and Norway (the Jversion) and Sweden and the (theby E/H Denmark versions, with held aircraft work include Examples C-130 on a project the to jointly use transport

the defence capabilities of those countries and is forcing them to seek forcing to seek is them and countries of defence capabilities those the arms industries are also an important factor in the states’ willingness to seek seek to willingness states’ the in factor important an also are This may lead to, This alia inter , attempts at ceding at ceding , attempts ------a possible area of co-operation in view of the need to make savings. savings. need make to of view of the in a possible co-operation area as appears therefore operations external in Joint region. participation the from partners over with working together allies largest their with fer co-operation tended to pre have of also NATO.members Bulgaria and Similarly, Romania “old” the on with co-operation rather focused remain have and been members only. extent V4 limited Individual to avery co-operation contributed closer to have far so part V4 have taken they NATO which in the operations countries, the regards As co-operation. of that aspects join to invited be selected will states The deploy to operations. Baltic peacekeeping a joint on UN battalion of creation for the to foreign missions, facilities transport and of joint logistic creation the from ranging abroad, broader co-operation considering are they longer logistics). the In term, (transport, contingents Afghanistan from their of withdrawal on the by co-operating savings make to seek will Nordic states the term, short the In concerned. is abroad co-operation veloping operational de as far as leaders Norway, the are (Denmark, countries Sweden, Finland) cerns the rising costs of participation in in of participation costs rising the cerns con co-operation for military partners why seek reason countries Another formatof (V4+B3). V4 states the Baltic the include to co-operation extending in Republic interested Czech the buyers, make could which potential one is of the Lithuania combat aircraft. and a buyer training L-159 for the ALCA find to efforts in mainly itself manifests support this industry. Currently arms its of products of the export the supports RepublicThe also governmentCzech of the ammunition. equipment and military of armament, joint purchase for tenders the organise to states Baltic individual with agreements framework cluded bilateral con Swedenrecently has exercises. and training personnel upgrades, service, in forcesarmed on co-operation their offer the of equipment combination with in and armament offer often defence contractors developing, their and are region stood under broadly forces the in of countries armed the which in directions the serve They co-operation. ob military to developinternational efforts countries’ two the in factor important an is industries arms their need support to the and area, this in active are equipment. Sweden particular Norway in and military and armament manufactured of use domestically on the based co-operation for military partners (Sweden, dependent Norway, onlargely exports Republic) Czech seek to tend the industries have arms large that countries particular, In co-operation. ble military of possi directions the consideration setting in important an is companies mestic development of do technological promote to production and the domestic arms the need maintain to the NATO/EU still, in awhole or at as stands best declines international missions international . The Nordic Nordic The ------15 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 16 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 jective (the priority is to keep and develop military capabilities, and to increase increase to and capabilities, develop and keep to military is jective (the priority ob military clearly defined a has The Nordic co-operation purposes. different andserves premises on different based defence is co-operation and security regions, Different and motivationsobjectives different co-operation. In of Romania. after partner Greece second its is mostimportant Turkey include For Bulgaria) Serbia. and Bulgaria, (other than partners tant Romania’s took June place 2012. in Croatia Slovenia mostimpor and Austria, Hungary, Republic, Slovakia, Czech of the defence of ministers the meeting first –the co-operation military in need Austria include to the raised have also They countries. Western Balkan the and Slovenia, Croatia as well as Hungary) ny, Republic), Czech for United for the Kingdom (especially the (mainly Italy Germa include V4 of the partners partners (forFrance Important Denmark). Nordic (for states), (for all Denmark), Germany and and lands Norway, Finland United Kingdom (for the include Sweden),countries Norway and Nether the Nordic of the partners ally. Important main their US as the regard Slovakia) sole exceptionof the (with question in countries of the United States;the all especially partners, other develop with co-operation also needs, they military and interests political on their depending time, butrangements, same at the “core” forces ar the co-operation as armed of their partners regional with co-operation equipment). military They treat military and armament same the or may purchase use region outside from the (partners military and rity”) (the of aversion secu “regionalisation political the to both are which reasons alone, for neighbours their to arrangements co-operation their limit to eficial do not here consider it ben analysed The countries Differentconstellations. objectives for and tivations co-operation. mo term medium and short divergences their as in well as potential, military in differences quantitative and qualitative challenges, and threats of security perceptions the countries’ in differences and by foremost, first hampered, be would The acoalition formationof such Bulgaria. and Romania and members V4 the states, Baltic Nordicthe states, the include would simultaneously that NATO EU) (within or defence the coalition and security coherentand regional Nor given region. it is alasting possible the in build to involve countries all have do not to which even necessarily projects co-operation or multilateral bilateral for co-operation” various “regional acollectiveterm tion. merely is co-opera military blueprint no and is single for political there that onstrate dem II, Part in more detail in The of discussed above examples co-operation, CONCLUSIONS 2. ------one of the tools of their foreign one forces of tools policy of their the are armed the Bulgaria, and Republic, Romania Czech the Latvia, Lithuania, of Denmark, case the security, in of while national forces guarantors as armed their treat Estonia policy. Norway and Sweden, security foreign Finland, and their in forcesarmed rolethe the of of understandings have different also ferent states small. are states remaining of the potentials the and potentials, medium Norway have and Finland comparison, In potentials. military large relatively of defence, have terms independent in relatively are that countries two only potentials different have question radically in forces countries of the armed the sense forces. this In armed sation of the organi the as country’s well of replace to it, as ity the equipment capacity and qual and on capacity, mobilisation of quantity, personnel, type on the quality training the and the number as such factors by defined is potential military factors, economic political and geographical, internal and on external pends Different potentials. Differentpotentials. EU. the and NATO with countries of those integration the support to been has countries Western Balkan Bulgaria’s the key. and with co-operation of Romania The aim Tur i.e. and region, Russia players the in dominant the and Ukraine) Romania, Georgia, (Bulgaria, countries Sea medium-sized Black and small the between co-operation for a platform and communication at creating and stability gional re at have improving The aimed countries two not military. political, marily the Black Sea co-operation between Romania between co-operation Sea Black the and Bulgaria The objectives of have undertakings. more impededany ambitious industries arms their competition between and rivalries political potentials, ited military lim However, forces defence industries. and partners’ armed the their tween V4 at developing joint aimed be have co-operation projects initiated countries –the ambitions NATO. some military has objectives It within also political its on NRF. the tion to The mainly V4 of co-operation focused the been has far so joint contribu their NATO presence in states’ through Baltic the on marking Host Nation on concerning cooperation Support focused and been it has years level, recent in military At the impulses. external NATO) requires and within objectives (lobbying concerns for political Baltic serves largely hand, other the NATO from co-operation, on EU. “assistance” Baltic any orwithout The the have own, able states for been dic generate to on co-operation their impulses Nor 1950s, the the to back dating traditions co-operation and sovereignty to NATO, vis-à-vis as well EU, as within UN, the on foreign Nordic operations countries of the visibility the increase to desire the being that objective, interoperability),andandpolitical a effectiveness In contrast to the defence potential of a state, which de of which a state, defence potential the to contrast In the US. With their attachment attachment their US. With the . Sweden and Romania, the the . Sweden Romania, and . In Slovakia and and Slovakia . In have pri been Dif ------17 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 18 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 and planned development put planned on of and results, moreand emphasis co-operation, a gradual in They preferabottom-up consists them. achieve that approach to means financial the and goals defined they clearly efficient, have effective, are –they co-operation to military attitude serious most the onstrating Different philosophies of co-operation. Turkish Group. Battle Appendices). See Group, Italian-Romanian- Battle the Group, Balkan Battle ian-Slovenian the Italian-Hungar (the the “107” given for state and the important partners other Groups) Battle or with Visegrad the Nordic, ofCzech-Slovak and the case the (in neighbours their form of with policy, co-operation another as and curity region’s the se in emphasise to activity instrument an as them treat countries The co-operation. participating regional about further aform of bringing are have lobbying states been for). Groups Baltic EU, –the Battle the Vilnius Within in Centre Security Energy or the lence Tallinn (the in Cyber Defence Centre of NATO Excel Centres the accredited states) or by Baltic working within the and Denmark (NRF14: NRF joint the to contributions by making and region, for the in Peace NATO and exercises of framework Partnership the within Sweden Norway and Libya), have in co-operated Denmark, while ghanistan, Af in co-operate Estonia and Denmark and Latvia, Norway and Finland, and (Sweden NATO, operations workWithin countries on international together co-operation. form of multilateral the take to tend exercises and training nel person service, in followingco-operation equipment and military ment and Joint of arma acquisitions (e.g.UN NORDEFCO), structures. those or within outside NATO, both co-operation the and EU the military and velop political of de agiven region Countries frameworks. Different organisational territory). land Sea, Baltic the Arctic, Sea/the (the Barents directions different mentionedfrom coming as above), onDenmark threats focused are exceptionof the (with environment security changing of the understandings Nordicdespite Even states, similar foreseeable the the future. in likely as nario asce such do not treat V4 from Bulgaria and or evenland’s partners Romania Nordic-Baltic Po region, the in apossible as scenario regarded is means such involving or pressure means of use way.military same hostile the the While threats and challenges security perceive the they that mean not necessarily does EU NATO in the and status peripheral asimilar, share and neighbours are analysed being countries the that Theperceptions. fact threat Different foreign policy.of their theperspective from even significance of forces little are armed the Hungary

The Nordic states have Nordic dem The states been ------rather than attempting to create a joint political and military space. military and ajoint create to political attempting than rather level, technological and military political, at the links of and co-dependencies networks at building aim should them Poland’sent with assets, co-operation differ and potentials different possess ferent and approachesco-operation to way.dif However, a similar US in demonstrate the countries different with as role perceive of relations the NATO they the as and Bulgaria and Romania with co-operation military and develop to political possibility Group, the has and Visegrad Nordic-Baltic positionthe holds access in region, the to astrong has EU, NATO in Poland the of and geographicmembership its Because location and forces.armed the benefit generatecould and savings that co-operation military real produce little they and implement to ity them, proponent’s the have in capabil presented which no and basis formulated real are initiatives political sometimes visibility. They approach: prefer a top-down (at briefly)region’sthe least orderincrease to in coalitions political building and capabilities military at preserving aimed about co-operation, declarations ambitious with start to tend Bulgaria, and Romania also to some extent V4 The initiatives. and, of their members visibility political the than rather - - - 19 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 PART II

REGIONAL CO-OPERATION, DEFENCE POLICIES, ARMED FORCES AND ARMS INDUSTRIES OF COUNTRIES ANALYSED 22 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 tion of the Nordic states in other international forces (EUBG, NRF), the Nordic forces NRF), the (EUBG, international other in Nordic states tion of the participa never the put intention With at was brigade-level, into practice. this deploying to aview ajoint unit with nations of contributions out individual the catalogue”, “forces set which so-called develop to manage did the Nordic states the While However, failed. foreign operations in at joint attempts participation Cold to back dated War which times. missions, peacekeeping onoperation UN of Nordic co- system replace to the meant It abroad. ration on was operations NORDCAPS established Nordic states 1997the In Forces). Armed gian Norwe the in defence system air an as serves also which II NASAMS made decided Norwegian- buy to the Finland (in 2009 co-operation of successful example another as may serve system missile surface-to-air advanced range mid- II NASAMS the using on joint exercises Finland Norway and between for weapons. The those co-operation storage servicing and ammunition ing, train in co-operation and systems self-propelled artillery ish-made Archer by Sweden joint Swed Norway of procurement the cesses and the include decided not on co-operate it. to The suc ultimately Nordic states the as failed also has submarines The Viking joint to forpurposes. build project different them use and specifications different with helicopters ordered partners the because upgrades and operation joint from savings servicing, expected the not generate helicopter, out) NH90 will delayed seriously is the ordered and Sweden (Norway, opted and countries only,dic has Finland Denmark since Nor the which under Nordic Helicopter Programme, clear. The Standard from far formatis equipment. The success of this of, military acquisitions of NORDAC task the 1990s, Since the of NORDEFCO structure single consolidated into the became 2009 in –which NORDSUP and –NORDAC, formats NORDCAPS veloped three in Nordic de Initially, NATO’s co-operation for Peace programme. Partnership joined Sweden Finland and after only established it 1991, was and place after took on co-operation discussions The issues. first security national on their Nordic states among the not 1950s co-operation did any include the in launched arrangements co-operation Cold of regional the War, catalogue During the 1.1. 1. I. NORDIC DEFENCE CO-OPERATION DEFENCE NORDIC

THE NORDIC STATES NORDIC THE History of co-operation of History was to co-ordinate research into, and research co-ordinate to was for the purposes of collabo purposes for the . ------Council. Nordic up by the were taken issues, or on Arctic security onco-operation cyber operation). foreign services, between co-operation as some Finally, ideas, such co- force development and task offormed NORDEFCO military (stabilisation newly the within object of analysis the became by Others mostNordic states. force) response were rejected ajoint ajoint maritime amphibiousIceland, unit, of ofof solidarity, policing Stoltenberg’s joint declaration air (mutual proposals Some situation. acrisis in used be could capabilities level, how joint military to identify, political at necessary the was Stoltenberg Report, to the cording ac Suchadeclaration, Nordic state. on another or pressure against attack eventity”, the of would in respond an on country how i.e. each a declaration of for solidar a “mutual declaration called report policy. the akeysection, In security foreign and in co-operation strengthen to proposals set out thirteen Report Stoltenberg the 2009 in resulted Thoseco-operation. efforts defence and security level up step to worked their Nordic states political at the the co-operation, of military closer possibilities the analysing to parallel In possible. as capabilities operational much as keep to thus seek should by Denmark, lowed some on later in aspects jointly, units such Norway, orfol by creating units tics Sweden Finland, and logis and support of use national the forces co-ordinating and Nordic armed for the joint training equipment, organising military By harmonising them. or give co-operation, up some of or multilateral of bilateral part as partners strategic with capabilities have would Nordic share either to states the report, the to According co-operation. military of areas potential 140 identified 2008 published in Ajoint report were followed and co-operation on later by Finland. for possibilities such explore to sible the solution. Sweden Norway and started pos as a identified forces was Nordic armed the between Co-operation troops. of numbers decreasing the and some capabilities of maintaining costs rising would the concern countries two the facing biggest the challenges showed that which other, of independently conductedeach Sweden, analyses and acting Norway 2007 developing In and capabilities. of on co-operation maintaining of NORDSUP The purpose Ukraine. and Western Balkans the in forces reforms armed for Peace (Common Supportkeeping Operations),missions Training the and of peace for participants training Region, Africa Eastern the in reforms sector security and building capacity of training, areas the in most visible is abroad Nordic co-operation Currently, out structured redundant. be to turned unit , established in 2008, was to explore the possibilities possibilities explore to the was 2008, in , established which which ------23 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 24 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) evacuation medical Work helicopters. co-ordinate to progress in is of unit a Norwegian supporting are personnel army, Swedish technical and (OMLT) mentoring operational Afghan of the the in co-operating Norway are and cutFinland and to Sweden, costs. effectiveness operational their increase joint solutions have seeking to been partners –the Afghanistan in mission the on been up has date to focus main the area, “Operations” the In system. lery artil Archer of the joint exercises Sweden Norway and and organise system; II NASAMS conduct of the joint exercises Finland Norway and Scandinavia; southern in forces exercises air havefor and made been navy plans North; High the in units of air joint exercises on agreement regular an signed Finland Norway, plans: exercise Sweden national and the expanded consolidated and 2012–2017, years for the established been which has plan joint Nordic exercise a combined area, Exercises” and “Training the In established. been has tions Opera considered (without success), Military for in Centre Gender the and been Academy has of aNordic Military establishment Education” the and area, Resources “Human the deployed be In could missions. peacekeeping on UN Force Task 2020’, of creation ‘Battalion the concerning gress ajoint that unit pro in are Analyses unit. of creation or a joint transport even the Nordic air aircraft), (the C-130J transport transport air of tactical co-ordination the cerns conproject the most promising possible have co-operation identified; been of Ten such areas date), maintenance. and subsequently, and, servicing its in to II NASAMS and of new equipment (Archer purchases in held and currently equipment of military maintenance and servicing the of in co-operation areas possible development identify to capabilities plans, national co-ordinate and of afew harmonise to years: timeframe the of within co-operation projects tify objective iden to is the “Capabilities” area, place. the In have taken changes ex officer staff and development considered, being are technological to regard of with co-operation possible addition, In areas Nordic states. of the planning long-term the in defence trends identify to and future the in possibly lacking needed and capabilities the analyse to progress in Workoperation. currently is long-term defence atco- facilitating aims The Development” “Strategic area accede could at to stage. alater partners other which co-operation or trilateral on bilateral based be could and countries participating not have all include to NORDEFCO would within co-operation that was Theco-operation. assumption of five covering areas amandate and structure organisational given an was NORDEFCO Defence (NORDEFCO), Co-operation 2009. in established was Nordic co-operationformats, the existing the to consolidate desire the coupled process, with political and military dual of this aconsequence As 1.2. Status of co-operation of Status ------the Nordic states increase their visibility and boost their significance within within significance their boost and visibility their increase Nordic states the developing in countries, capacity or build by to working together Afghanistan) policy. (Libya, on foreign missions By of security co-operating foreign and main do the in at gains generating aimed also is NordicThe ofstates co-operation the unison. in act to capability the and interoperability crease in to meant also is co-operation Finally, aircraft). (the C-130Junits transport joint it or creating jointly equipment managing used, the fectively operating example forby ef moreeffectively, unchanged, levels spending keeping while more them or use to capabilities their maintain to Nordicable countries the en to examples). expected as also is Co-operation serving systems II NASAMS and equipment Archer (with military and of armament modernisation and servicing joint maintenance, exercises, and jointmore from savings training for even inputand opportunities in joint acquisitions, financial smaller through at savings generating aimed is Co-operation economiccreate gains. it supposed to is of all, of First benefits. at generating aimed kinds is two NORDEFCO point Nordic of within the co-operation ofFrom view states, the defence policy. and of security area the to co-operation existing the have extending identity apositive in been and factor work culture language, in proximity. Similarities cultural from benefits also co-operation Nordic Finally, societies. and governments their for visible both are operation co- this positiveof effects the and high rather is Nordic states tion among the level of decades, the integra several back dating areas, other in co-operation well-established their to Due states. “small” rather count as Nordic countries EU, NATO the the and Within co-operation. their facilitates Nordic states the of proximity Secondly, stability. and structural the security tors of regional guaran NATO USA the and as the view Nordic states the sovereignty.cal All politi and integrity territorial to their threat or indirect adirect as Russia perceive to again now, of started NORDEFCO 2008 core until members ca. in Moreover, UN. the have and Norway,EU the which been Sweden Finland, and NATO, the within field this in significance their boost to seek and policy curity se international in marginalised being fear –they interests similar and tions loca geographical proximity. The have Nordic states strategic similar the is Nordic Firstly, Defence of Co-operation. facilitate there A number factors Centre. Coordination Nordic Movement by the co-ordinated Afghanistan, from and to transport cargo non-military and of military area the in most advanced is operation co- and Sweden’s, Afghanistan, Norway’s and northern in Finland’s logistics ------25 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 26 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 co-operation with the NATO non-members, Sweden and Finland. Assuming NATO Assuming the non-members, with co-operation Sweden Finland. and of view closer its in relativised North High the to regard 5with Article under seeNATO’s to doesnot wish commitments member, particular Norway in conducive as seen be could of security”.aNATO a“regionalisation to that As therefore avoid anyinitiatives will The states ficientNordic that purpose. for insuf is potential military regions) their Sea because Barents the and Baltic (the Europe Northern defence of and understood abroadly security for the more responsibility assuming as interpreted be to co-operation their want They region. NATO do not US and the of in the activity forpresence and the co-operation military their of implications extending the analyse carefully very Nordic states the addition, conditions. In Arctic capable in of operating aNavy and operations, able on operate to international Army on an focuses Force country’s Air capable the of an territory,Denmark defending and and Army have to an seeking is Finland region, Sea Baltic the in prevalent tions condi for in operations Force primarily Air suitable on aNavy and phasis conditions, Sweden em Force puts the Arctic Air capable in and of operating for forces:developmentties on Norway a Navy the focuses while armed of the priori into different translate of threats directions of the perceptions fering apriority. probably Those remain dif will and are engagement Arctic the in ever more importantly, and, operations international by Russia, threatened be to does not which consider itself For Denmark, aspect. mostimportant the as territory defence of the land its views Finland and a priority as North High Norway seesthe whereas operations, international and region Sea Baltic the priorities: Swedenon haveNordicgeographical focuses states different the thedefencepoliciesin location, of geographic tor. differences the to Due fac impeding an also are they co-operation, stimulated originally tors that Russia’sWhile were one fac neighbourhood its of in the aggressiveactions into question. soon called was ther fur co-operation of extending feasibility military and political the pectations, ex generated high and of NORDEFCO were enthusiastic beginnings the While 1.3. forces. armed Finnish Swedish and by the adoption of the NATO standards facilitates and interoperability Norway improves and their Denmark with Finland) and den “can more”. afford The ongoingthe NATO co-operation of non-members (Swe region’sthe Nordic states the – not together only because defence potential USA. the regards EU, as NATO and the and

Prospects of co-operationProspects Nordic co-operation also enhances enhances Nordic also co-operation ------vide a good basis for deeper regional integration. integration. for agoodvide regional deeper basis Nordic may pro co-operation ever, future, NATO if the continues in erode to EU. How the within policy active NATO their with and co-operation growing combined with non-alignedstatus their in guarantees such seek Finland and Norway, and for Sweden Denmark while of security guarantee principal main the remain will allies major USA and European the with NATO relations and defence Nordic policies states, and of the security among the ate more synergy may cre co-operation “technical” such While dependencies. cessive military ex level or but developing creating without current them, at the capabilities defence”, ofcertain “smart terms in co-operation i.e. seetheir to maintaining would Nordic like states All partners. among the of rolestasks and sharing than more pooling expect territory. therefore should One defend to their ties capabili using in dependent sovereignty, on partners them erational or make op or autonomy decisions their the political of their restrict to not allowed be will projects of Norway, such case the In Sweden extent. Finland, a greater and equipment to military and armament same the use to and joint procurements consequently, more and, make defence planning, their harmonise further to may positive, seek Nordic states generally the is experience co-operation the if long (10–20 years), the term In jointly to foreign operations. a view conducting with place, take to expected be also can logistics) flagship projects (transport, Several operations. on international and training, and onoperate exercises co- also will it, they upgrade and to service equipment, and military ment and arma jointly to develop co-operate or purchase will Theprojects. countries military concrete in However, to result expected be Nordic can co-operation materialise. to unlikely is security for their sponsibility more re assume to for be should Nordic states them among the operation of co- aim the that Stoltenberg Report ideaTherefore, the proposed in the issues. security orderinvolve to NATO in regional largest in members them the USA and the with developing been have Nordic links states therefore the orderprevent to of In security” region. a“regionalisation Sea Baltic the in conflicts aversionin an entangled of and becoming to tions non-alignment (due tradi by strong Russia), long its to guided with border are particular in of Finland and countries, The two policies of the for Sweden Finland. and unacceptable equally is region Sea Baltic of the for security the responsibility ------27 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 28 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 terknabe Denmark has been and remains the USA’s the remains and been „ has Denmark 1990s. the since security foundation the of been Denmark’s USA has the with partnership Close exercises. for military in, Danish-led example, Russia includes and co-operation policy, military of apolicy it limited pursues defence and of security area Similarly, the Russia. in with economic relations to develop pragmatic seeks Denmark neighbourhood. in nearest its influence its strengthen to atendency with pragmatic, as regarded is policy Russian threat. but not amilitary for Denmark, Arctic of asource problems the is sia in of NATO. security Rus or the security of perception own its threat Danish the affect did not conflict Georgian-Russian The threats. security defined broadly of US to, understanding able the adapt been itself adopt, to and has Denmark security, national its to threats military no direct Facing Shelf). Continental of the Limits on the Commission UN by the would regulated be issues these have that agreed parties the all Arctic, the in shelf continental the to claims Canadian and Russian Danish, competing exist (while Russia there putes with dis not is involved Denmark territorial any security, as in military is so and the autonomous benefits government of Greenland), extraction (oil gas and tional arena. interna the position in a significant to maintain of strategy its part as marily seen be pri should region, the step in to up presence its efforts Denmark’s as well as issues, Arctic with dealing forums policy. in Activity security and eign for Greenland’s “access” has by running country the which to issues, Arctic become more involved actively also policy. has in 2007, Since Denmark around defence and of security area the in United States, especially the with closely CSDP, opted the out eurozone and co-operating therefore of been the has and has for Denmark issue Copenhagen. an is tandem ny Franco-German or the Germa united Union on the centred European enlarged an in marginalisation about concern possible the combined with sovereignty political of maintaining However, militarily. question no the athreat longer under be to considersitself to NATO,states the accessionBaltic the and Denmark and of Poland unification German politics. After international country’sin the significance serving (despite EU CSDP)tion the the in pre- opting outwhile and eurozone of the country’s by the and to avoid aspiration threat marginalisa a military perception the of theabsence of by defined is defenceDenmark’s policy 2.1. 2. DENMARK

Defence policy ” in Europe, i.e. a model ally that quickly responds and adapts to the the to adapts and responds quickly that i.e. Europe, ally ” in amodel

Economic interests are of secondary importance in this context this in importance of secondary are Economic interests Mus ------participate in the EU’s military operations, in contrast to civilian operations. operations. civilian to contrast in operations, EU’s the in military participate does not country the opted that out CSDP has of means the Denmark that fact EU.the The within integration further of thepopularity adversely affecting have eurozone, holdto troublesof which been due the areferendum the to unlikely also government are The issue. current hold on this areferendum not did right, nationalist of support the dependedon the government, which CSDP the under operation co- out opting of military Denmark, in parties opinion of most political the In activities. military and of civilian ordination ment (development abroad police, co- co-operation, judges) the enhance and engage up step civilian its also ones. It will civilian partly including of tasks, widerange a capable troops develop performing of with “flexible capabilities” therefore continued will involvement Denmark operations. high-intensity in context), have mentioned addition to its been this in in Ukraine and Georgia Balkans, the Africa, East Pakistan, developing (Afghanistan, in ties countries activi reconstruction and up reforms step sector involvementits security in will Denmark management, crisis to approach placed onbeing acivil-military is policy security NATO. international in more more emphasis and As within policy of adjustment Denmark’s an Consequently,USA. expect one also should for the ally important an remain to a way as such in new US strategy to this “adapt” to try presumably development US policy.a logical will in Denmark –it perceived is as Denmark in discussion any provoked has region hardly of The Europe. USA’s security the tees Asia-Pacific the towards reorientation USA at core) its the NATOguaran with by aconviction that relations (with involvement active Denmark’s NATO’s in involvement“Atlanticism” greater operations. and UN in right-wing the under of governments 2001–2011 may at most evolve towards “Super-Atlanticism” developed 2011) Denmark’s ment (in power autumn since govern socialist and EPAA). democratic into the frigates new social Under the (following incorporate to apossible Huitfeldt I. considering upgrade) is the and system, into the incorporation its and Thule, in Greenland, radar of the grade up givenconsent its the to has defencevelopment system, US missile of the de the supported has NATO (Denmark within US initiatives in participate to areadiness and policy; for support US security level ofa high interoperability; to leading co-operation military bilateral operations; high-intensity in part take to readiness Denmark’s US along with by the initiated foreign operations Forces involvement in Armed the in: Danish of consists the policy security in of NATO US partnership and policies. The US-Denmark transformations is not in the interests of Denmark. The right-wing of Denmark. interests not the is in crisis management is also motivated also is management crisis ------29 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 30 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 fighting vehicles and the Piranha III armoured personnel carriers (in service service (in carriers personnel armoured III Piranha the and fighting vehicles CV9035 the infantry 2A5DK tanks, Leopard the advancement: of technological Forces’ levels Armed potential). of Its various equipment the 75% represents (at capabilities expeditionary high has The Army forces battalion. special elite NATO to Force commitment Response (NRF), an Danish and as readiness basic one in brigades, including component of mechanised two operational consists Forces. The Armed core of its Danish of the branch largest the is Army The budget. the increasing without operations intensive its involvement international able in been maintain to has Denmark way, expected). this be should In reductions (further territory fence of national exclusivelyresponsible for de structures the downsizing Forces’ and potential) (to capabilities Armed 60% of the expeditionary their at increasing sation aimed Forces have Armed undergoing areorgani force. been the response Since 2005, a mobile crisis towards were concentrated forces on defence that tasks armed an from moving military, its transforming been consistently has Denmark billion. US$ to 4.1–4.2 decrease to expected is process,2015 from spending of this a result need As reduce to motivated been by spending. the Forces, has now progress, in Armed of the downsizing and for The investment. reorganisation earmarked is spending of this Aquarter US$ 4.5 billion. approximately to corresponding of GDP 1.4% recent years, in around oscillated has spending es vary. Military branch of different capabilities and potentials but capabilities, the peditionary ex large with trained, and equipped Forces well relatively are Armed Danish (over of decisivebut personnel majority the 80%) professional soldiers. The are nature), (today conscription voluntary of arather on universal based is service Military Home separate Guard. Force) formally Air the the and Navy and the Army, component (the operational policy. an include They security eign and of for Denmark’s instrument important an but are have potential limited Forces ( Armed Danish The 2.2. education training. in and as well equipment, as of military maintenance the and joint operations as acquisitions, such up areas step Nordic in co-operation to seek it will that announced government has current the spending, military However, in cuts Denmark. to the considering interest of been little recently The outside missions. mostEU remaining Denmark in result could this increase, operations EU’s of the number Should civil-military the

(NORDEFCO) has until (NORDEFCO) co-operation until has of military dimension regional Armed forces and the arms industry forces arms Armed the and 18,000 troops in peacetime, 125,000 in wartime) - - - - - Sweden and Switzerland). Danish companies mainly deal with overhauls and and overhauls with deal mainly Sweden companies Switzerland). and Danish France, UK, Germany, USA, equipment the (from the military and mament mostof ar its imports industry. The country arms asmall has Denmark Arctic. the and Atlantic Northern the in it has interests of because the marily pri is territory. This defence to of related national not directly are that erations op out naval carry independently relatively can Denmark hand, other the On of acontingent deployed part state. as only foreign operations in by another part Force take Air can equipment. The Danish military and arms heavy transport to of absence ameans the is foreign operations in participate to ability Denmark’s contingent facilities). troops (complete Whatland limits logistic own its with even deploy it independent capabilities: can an considerable expeditionary has Forces, Armed Denmark of the potential Given on total own. its operations the out carry to unable Force fact in Air is the and limited, is country’sthe territory defence of Forcesregular the in Armed Danish of the The independentability branches. service other the to assigned are units selected component lighter and acomplementary Army, is of the even though most part not component to have a ground defence. for air its decided also has Denmark be to modernised. are service in still aircraft fighter soletethe combat componentand F-35made,F-16 been yethas with fighters the ob considerations, replaceno decisionto financial to Due replaced. been have fleets aircraft transport The and helicopter planned. been has upgrade NATO. with closely Force’s The Air equipment obsolete, now is largely an and co-operate independent and not Force operationally Theare Air combat units NRF.the to commitment Danish is one of which F-16A/Bthe aircraft, fighter combat-oriented with equipped strictly squadrons two There are tasks. iliary operations). rescue sea port, The trans (fisheries, sea the patrol orderbetter to in created was Command Arctic the and were reorganised Faeroes Command Island the and Greenland mand Com Island component the 2012 In Home of the Guard. maritime over by the taken have fully been functions forces. Patrolling coastal and submarine its given up it example, frigates). received has state-of-the-art missile Denmark (for recent years in re-armed fully been has which combat purposes, strictly and a component for Atlantic, the Northern in fisheries) (mainly interests of a component fleet consisting responsible oceanic economicfor defending Forces. It Armed of aprimarily is the branch advanced most technologically the also is and capability strike high relatively Navy has The M113. graded up repeatedly the However, remains art. Army’s carrier the personnel basic state-of-the as regarded be combat can readiness) maintain that units the in Air ForceAir mainly performs support and aux and support performs mainly The Home The Guard for the ------31 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 32 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 threats. Finland also maintains regular military relations with Russia. Russia. with relations military regular maintains also Finland threats. non-military Russia’s mitigating to working aview with as with regions border as well affairs internal and justice and protection onoperation environmental co- along with relations economic social develop and political, and deeper sia other, Rus on work to the and, with extensively defend to territory its ability the maintain to one is,onhand, the for priority Finland the reason For this community. immigrant largest the and Finland, visiting of tourists portion pro account largest for also the electricity). Russians (oil, and gas country the in consumed supplier of the 70% energy and of the partners trade important however, time, most same one At is the of Russia Finland’s threats. potential aggressivepolicies involves and assertive increasingly pursues that a country of neighbour the being that for Finland a reminder was war Russian-Georgian The disposal. waste generation nuclear and energy or waters, nuclear inland pollution of the or sea Russia, in or economic instability political from sulting re threats itterritory. addition, concerned about In is possible non-military its against attack security, or astrategic for implications Finland’s with region of Sea use force), of (limited) Baltic (the the threat in pressure crises military economic or it political, face might that possibility out doesthe not rule land Fin threat. as a no country regards officially,Finland der, that, fact despite the long a1,300 bor kilometre shares Finland which with Russia, to refer mainly based is defence on planning which The scenarios of economic opportunities. asource as but also threat, non-military and of amilitary terms in Russia views security. Finland to Finland’s challenge greatest the ception as of Russia per the by defined is defence policy of context Finland’s strategic The 3.1. 3. partners. volvement of external in the without it ships builds the or equip arm cannot nevertheless, which, (Odense Steel sector Shipyard), Forces shipbuilding the is Armed Danish of the needs for the fully capable almost of providing The industry only market. ian civil the towards oriented largely are and small, usually privately owned, are F-35 the (Terma). including aboveopment The programmes, listed companies devel major in armament able participate to are level, they technological high Defence). Data (Maersk their to systems communication Owing and command (Falck-Schmidt elements Defence Systems), armour as equipment and well as and optoelectronics Lindberg), NEA (Terma, or radio-electronics electronics as such produce They componentsupgrades. also for armament, imported FINLAND

Defence policy ------withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. In Finland’s view, USA plays Finland’s the In akey 2014. in Afghanistan from withdrawal the of NATO’s after status states future about concern partner the expressed region), Sea Baltic it even the though has in exercises (operations, training, continue to develop rather co-operation will The country future. immediate join to NATO seek the in will Finland that It unlikely is have raised. been this possible accession for against about Finland’s NATO. to and years Arguments for NRF. several underway been the to Adebate amphibious unit has 18) an and Force (F/A- Air unit an forces unit, contribute to aspecial it plans years coming laboratory), (the the ABC in and NRF joined the also Finland 2012, In regard. this NATO in members with co-operate to and country’s defendto the territory capabilities also competences thus and and interoperability enhances es which Forc of Armed its transformation the in instrument an as operations and cises exer for Peace involvementits (since NATO 1994) and training, Partnership in NATO up stepping with been co-operation It has Groups. of use Battle operational the supports also dices). Finland “107”; the in seeAppen Germany and (Sweden NBG the in partners priority its Groups with Battle and operations EU in participate to for Finland important is units). and it For reasons, commands these international within co-operate to opportunities and more interoperability (through defence its ing capabilities at boost and EU country’spositionthe in the political at strengthening aimed CSDP also is the in participation Finland’s members. defence of European its of collective charge in being it NATO views still as structures, command and planning no EU are States, e.g. Member there since and Finland), of certain and defencepolicies (it EU the does not, however,in thesecurity darity affect soli political strengthening be to clause considersthe Finland Currently tion. one of of was cau Lisbon Treaty into the defence clause ofinclusion amutual the towards attitude its therefore and states, Baltic defend,to for the example, committed does not to be want Finland into a collective defence organisation. CSDP, the transforming and from ment EU CFSP of at the the preventing aimed involved actively been develop also the in has security. Finland national hance EU the in Membership 2013–2014. in Council Security UN the in membership to aspiration its with up stepping connection involvement its in again been missions UN in United the within policy Nations has security Recently Finland framework. develop to its country for the important NATO. with eration It traditionally is develops and co-op operations management crisis EU and UN in participates independently defend its territory to ability anon-aligned on is whose placed the state is priority Finland and the eurozone is in part perceived as away perceived en to as part in eurozone is the and . At the same time, however, time, same . At the it actively since the mid-1990s and treats mid-1990s treats the since and ------33 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 34 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 does not have any fully developed tactical level units, although the three three the although level units, developeddoes not tactical have fully any Army The measures). other along with fort, defence ef home guard the consolidating and Command aCorps forming (by operations out regular carry to capability their Forces expand to intend Armed 2010, Finnish in the started changes parallel of the part bytime) 2015. As war 230,000 in and (tovolve of peacetime 12,300 personnel in number the reducing in will that have planned been defence infrastructure the in cuts changed, un remain Forces will Armed of the tasks and structure the While savings. of financial implementing a programme started Finland 2012 In vestments. for in earmarked is of 25% spending US$ Around 3.5approximately billion. 1.5% on centres approximately of spending GDP, Military differ. i.e. branches service different of the capabilities and basis),a permanent potentials but the on component (the operational trains trained and equipped well relatively are Forces The Armed conscription. on universal based is service troops). Military Defence (Local Army, Force Navy,the home Air and guard avoluntary well as security. state’s of the agenuine guarantor as time). treated therefore are They component, of capacity erational mobilisation war 350,000 in alarge and op the to 34,700 within expand to quickly capacity the with peacetime Forces (15,000 in have Armed troops potential amedium Finnish The 3.2. NORDEFCO framework. the within etc. upgrades, servicing, joint purchases, consequently, equipment and, military and armament of harmonising domain become to probably more for the open in co-operation prompt will Finland try Defence Minis by the The planned savings e.g. management, Africa. in crisis on more co-operation to is open territory. The defence country ofthe national concern that issues to regard with especially Nordic co-operation, extending at issue home. cautious been about a far,controversial So however, has Finland possible as accession to NATO remains standards, operability, and procedures of inter terms in NATOdevelop Denmark) (via with Norway co-operation and NORDEFCO within co-operation Regional industries. arms of collaboration the the and work of PfP frame the place within US takes the with co-operation volves Finland’s risks. US it stepping presence, (reducing butup) the also respect in this in change Any Sea. Baltic of the security the especially security, and role European in Armed forces and the arms industry forces arms Armed the and The Armed Forces include an operational component of Forces operational consisting The an include Armed is the largest branch of the Armed Forces. During peacetime, it peacetime, Forces. Armed During of the branch largest the is

is a way for Finland to indirectly indirectly to awayis for Finland ------Armed Forces to take part in operations abroad, on the other hand, is limited. limited. is hand, other on abroad, the operations in part Forces take to Armed Finnish of the The ability on land. irregular) and regular out (both operations carry independently to it Finland enables situation: adjusted this to been has conditions).industry arms terrain Thethe and profile of climate the to owing enemy (largely by the taken areas in warfare guerrilla including erations, op Forces to conduct irregular have Armed capability extensive Finnish the well-developed homeand guard, potential mobilisation its With support. nal and/or exter armament and parts of spare stockpiles available onhinges the independently operate to Force, capability Air the of the case territory. the In defence of national out regular carry independently to capability tively high Navy) the have and arela Army the Forces (and Armed especially The Finnish batteries. missile anti-ship four land-based equip form to and plans it years coming the In units. of coastal number large a relatively Navy has ish multi-role larger Finn by 2020. vessels the acquire to It notable is that plans minelayers. The of Navy and a flotilla boats missile of of flotillas two consists no Army. bigger held by Navy the Itshas core vessels. The are helicopters all Army) and of the structure the in (they are defence units air no ground-based includes Its structure purchased). be to more are of which aircraft, transport C-295 (the CASA recent years in capabilities transport developed tactical has Force The Air squadron. atraining and potential) modernisation alarge (with of F/A-18C/D squadrons three are core there Hornet multi-roleaircraft fighter units. brigades, among other able deploy to infantry are and six veloped wartime in well-de component are alighter forms Defence troops Army. of the The Local volunteer guard the home also is there cadre component’s operational additionthe to In USA. the from launchers missile cal tacti 70 to developingpurchase is offensiveits Army – plans has capabilities it The decommissioned. Finnish being gradually are of armament Older types 1980s. the to back date standards technological their and upgraded partly only Army’s the in items equipment have been Other howitzers. gun GH APU 52 155 mm the and XA-361 self-propelled mortars the carriers personnel moured XA-360ar wheeled AMV the vehicles fighting CV9030 infantry the includes of items equipment levels vary. of State-of-the-art various equipmentlogical techno equipment, the even though military and armament with saturated largely is forces battalions). helicopter The and Army independentspecial with regiment aspecial and regiment one signal regiment, ment, one engineering defence regi one air regiments, (two general independentregiments as well as brigades, armoured two brigades and infantry two includes also Army of the The structure readiness. basic brigades maintain best-equipped mechanised is relatively modern and is strictly combat-oriented. At strictly its is Force and Air modern relatively The is (Local Defence troops) which which troops) Defence (Local ------35 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 36 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 frigates into the Aegis system); (2) to develop co-operation (building civil and and system); (2) Aegis civil into the frigates develop to (building co-operation F. the Norway’s incorporate to also Nansen and on co-operation, and der refusal bor maritime of the 2010 delimitation on (hence agreement the the relations bilateral in risk (1) Norway’s seeks: minimise to relations. Russia towards policy bilateral in source of conflict potential a remains of Svalbard status The conflict. Norway’s in of atuse force forcing achange aimed policy, nor even a military involving the pressure Russian it may limited face that possibility out the rules (2008). war Norway neither Russian-Georgian (2007) the since North and the in flights bomber strategic resumed Russia since prominence gained ception has per this and context, this in challenge main fisheries).the perceivedas is Russia or extraction intensive (crises/conflicts shipping),gas and over oroil “military” or more extraction resource (accidents energy to related nature in may “civil” be Those threats for Norway, threats. nomic of growth asource potential but also eco further of guarantee a are region that in fishing and transport maritime extraction, gas of and oil opportunities The expanding archipelago. Svalbard North High Norwegian of context the Oslo’s strategic in The challenges by defined is defence policy 4.1. 4. Forces. Armed Finnish suppliers of the principal the Sweden remain The USA and limited. is sector of shipbuilding its capacity the industry, and no aerospace has (Environics). Finland for security products CBRN and Lapua) (NAMMO produceequipment ammunition (Noptel). also companies Finnish training Defence Force &Security),and simulators to Air (Insta forcluding the in Elesco). systems, ktrobit, for armament These subassemblies from range Ele Electro-Hill, (Control Finland, Express electronics for understood broadly FY-Composites, ExoteArmour, tion, Temet). Moreover, it demand for caters the Protec Verseidag Ballistic Burgmann, Protection (Ballistic market protection ballistic the aleader in defence). also is air (including units Finland artillery and mechanised equipment infantry, for the military and armament nearly all Group Vehicles, apotentate (Vammas, The provides is Patria Hagglunds) and equipment role. play for Army adominant the military and armament companies producing which in industry arms extensive an has Finland contingents. states’ other low, is do within only so capacity can logistic they Navy have notthe adapted), adequately been however, expeditionary their as Force (the Air and operations such in part take can Army of the units Selected NORWAY

Defence policy which includes the wider Barents Sea region with the the with region Sea Barents wider the includes which ------through which it can influence European countries and as a body co-legitimising bodyas a co-legitimising and countries European influence it which can through continue to need NATO a channel However, US as will the that believes it also conditions. global theway new to adjustto as a regionlogical Asia-Pacific the USA’s the Norway views 2014. NATO after towards reorientation within tance impor gain will developing post-conflict in countries sectors and security involvement development that or the reforms of in Norway expects Denmark, NATO. USA and the with As with relations in gains political and mandate, UN of aclear existence territory, the defend to national ployments on capabilities its foreign de of impact the the as engagement its ing such abroad, operations in However, it when now of consider places on factors anumber more emphasis relations. of transatlantic maintenance acontribution to the as position and al internation own its away build to as this treating though, management, crisis NATO’s in not give up participation its Norway will exercises. national in extent agreater to participating improved, for bystructures NATO example command be should collectivedefence capabilities that and NATO’s structures, command and commands national the between created be should links that enhanced, be NATO’s near awareness andsituational should borders areas geographic specific on expertise that restored, be should contingency planning regional that narios, sce threat on various based process be should defence planning the that gued ar Norway has 4. Article under for convening of the consultations threshold” a “low 5and of advocated Article a broader interpretation also It has balanced. be should operations fend management NATO’s for those crisis and territory de to capabilities the that 2008 since NATO,Within arguing been Norway has (e.g. North High F. mentioned the above). the in case frigates tensions Nansen proposed by shape G.W. the in fence system increase might Bush) that or issues de US missile opposition the to Afghanistan, OEF in operation and Iraq from withdrawal Norwegian worldview by the compatible leftist (manifested the to in as regarded are that on some issues roomfor left manoeuvre has 2005, since Norway power in in been has which socialists, and democrats social tion of the equipment). however, time, same storage coali At the the of the US military for MCPPN programme the equipment acquisitions, military in and dustries in arms (co-operation the between relations bilateral close very it maintains ally, whom United important its most the Norway States as with treats Cold exercises). the Response through part NATO’s in ensuring territory and presence on Norwegian North, High the in ties developing presence and capabili its up stepping military its defence spending, increasing Norway’s rights, sovereign its enforce to phasising ability and right em (by exercises); “deter” to (3) joint POMOR the contacts, military military ------37 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 38 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 peacetime and 83,000 in wartime) and are regarded as the guarantor of guarantor the as regarded are and wartime) in 83,000 and peacetime Forces in (23,000 troops have Armed potential amedium Norwegian The 4.2. of involvementahead foreign operations). in NATO’s Norway’s and and enhancing defenceter capabilities, own reliability defence (af policy and country’s of the priority security most important third 2013–2016, years for document the the strategic defence ministry’s Norwegian Group) the to Northern is,according the NORDEFCO and (within allies and partners its with co-operation of military NATO.transformation Multilateral USA’s Group) the to response Northern in the (within rope and reorientation Eu Northern in dialogue and co-operation military and political strengthen to seeking is Norway hand, the other On more effective. them or make to ties capabili maintain the to need and resources financial comes insufficient from motivation here NORDEFCO) main (within –the decisions operational and cal autonomy politi in maintaining jointly to develop while one capabilities hand, region.The on objectives the the in co-operation are, military and political Finally, Norway’s up to step aspiration the includes also defence policy to co-operation. join countries third for difficult it more make of might Lisbon provided for Treaty by the instruments the that concern expressed it has time, same At project. the obsolete an be to political CSDP the considering while projects, co-operation practical in part ues take to Norway contin Nevertheless, erode. could relations transatlantic that risk the more Norway is concerned about Currently formed into aUSA–EU dialogue. NATO trans within dialogue multilateral CSDPif emerged and astrong if Norway become could marginalised that fears from stemmed policy this past, &sharing pooling and NBG operations, in EDA, participation CSDP the in years eral involved been Union, a non-member Norway has As European for of the sev case. best NATO the in or within broader co-operation case, worst defence of policies of the the NATOin states member a renationalisation USA’s the Norway than Norway’s In reorientation. process may view, lead to this for concern a much more serious are countries by European defencein spending context of collectivedefence, the In cuts training. and exercises through Europe possible US pledge as of much use the as up step to presence its in make to ing seek Norway is continue decline, to rope’s USA for will the importance relative Eu As Europe. in bases US military of because the also and actions, US military Armed forces and the arms industry forces arms Armed the and (through information exchange agreements with the the with agreements exchange information (through projects). the In ------some of its units are also assigned to the other branches of the Armed Forces. Armed of the branches other the to assigned also are some of units its Army, the but component alighter Homeis The Guard within Battalion). tic Arc formation of an the (including Army the in investments for increased the 2013–2016 long-term F-35 of provides defence the aircraft, plan fighter chase pur system). additionthe to In artillery new Archer the replaced (by being are or tanks), 2A4 (the Leopard upgraded being carriers), are personnel armoured (the equipment M113 upgraded havebeen and either of armament kinds Other state-of-the-art. be considered can that the only item are vehicles fighting try level Army’s of the TheThe CV9030 equipment technological varies. infan Forces. of awell-developed ItsArmed core brigade (the consists Brigade Nord). 2018. around enter service will which offirst the F-35aircraft, fighter purchase to taken been cision has ofcombat F-16A/B) component squadrons obsolete, (three ade already and is The system. missile mid-range II surface-to-air advanced of-the-art NASAMS state- have with equipped been defence squadrons air two and replaced, been have fleets aircraft transport and helicopter –the upgraded partly been It has roles. support and plays corvettes). Force auxiliary missile Air The mainly ern mod with equipped being currently (e.g. is Guard Coast the veloped parallel in de being are on at land) (units and sea squadron Coastal the and Guard Coast frigates). fivemissile state-of-the-art The Navy’sthe componentandoceanic (for it recent acquired years branches in example, remaining the than vanced ad more is technologically and capability strike highest the Navy has The beginning. Home are Guard the and Army the in investments and undergoing modernisation, currently Force Air is the top priority; the development been the Navy has of the North, High on the focus objective. of Because the a secondary as seen being erations op international in participation with North, High the in act to capabilities at developing presence and level of ahigh military at maintaining aimed are years, for have several underway which been modernisation, and structuring The re terms. real in by 7% increase to budget expected is military 2016, the 2013– for In investments. earmarked is amount of this Aquarter US$ 6billion. 1.6% of GDP, around centred been has years approximately to corresponding recent in spending voluntary. Military increasingly is conscription universal professional soldiers and with manned are units combat readiness system: widely.manning mixed a vary has Norway branches service different of the capabilities and potentials but forces the units, special sis), with saturated and ba on aregular component (the operational trains trained and well-equipped Forces relatively Navy) Force The Home are the Armed and Air and Guard. security state’s the . They include an operational component operational (the. They Army, an include the is the largest branch of the Norwegian Norwegian of the branch largest the is Army The ------39 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 40 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 regional security as a priority. Earlier, it had focused on indirect threats and and threats apriority. as Earlier, on indirect it focused had security regional (2008), war treating to Sweden partly reverted Russian-Georgian the After policy. security international in position by participating actively national inter own its strengthen to Sweden seeks this, addition to region.In Sea Baltic the in security, especially to regional challenges and threats the of context Sweden’s strategic The by mainly defined is defence policy 5.1. 5. supplier of Norway’s main the as Army. Germany placeUS and of the Force. Swedentaken recent years Air In has Norwegian supplier for the main the The United States remains produce armament. heavy does not Spain). industry, no and aerospace with Norway has co-operation in frigates built the were fleet (UmoeMandal; Norwegian for the warships art state-of-the- played the aconsiderable role building industry in shipbuilding (Kvaerner Eureka). systems The support Norwegian service and command and Optronics) Simrad equipment (Kvaerner Eureka, training and armament components for optoelectronic and (Vapensmia), electronic as well arms as (the world launchers and potentate Kongsberg Defence &Aerospace), small Raufoss), (Nammo ammunition missiles as produce such munitions mainly industry arms extensive an Norway has capability). this increase componentfurther developedin to being (and fleetis order of alogistics the territory defence to of related national not directly are outing that operations carry independent in relatively Navyployed is The states. Norwegian by other of contingents de part only as missions in part Force take Air can the and The Army even is more limited. operations international in part take to Army of the The operations. ability out irregular carry to good capabilities ensures Thehand, independent operations. well-developed other on Home the Guard, out carry to no ability Force has fact Air in the and limited, is try’s territory Forces coun defend the independently to Armed Norwegian of the The ability allocated. been Homehas the Guard for of foracquisition new armament mentioned the plan above, funding the up. stepped been Under has of units Home Guard training the and recent years, –six-fold Home by the Guard mainly used in are –which fence infrastructures of developmentde on the modernisation and spending increased Norway has SWEDEN

Defence policy , dominated by companies that by that companies , dominated - - - - - work nation of the Nordic Battle Group which is on standby every four years); every workGroup on is standby Nordic which ofnation Battle the Groups EU, (it Battle it the sition. EU In advocates: aframe of is use the the po international its involvement away of as strengthening operations EU in Cold of end the War. the its Sweden after operations management regards work for Sweden’s involvement its and policy crisis in security foreign and frame main United the Nations of as the importance the in decline a relative component), civilian its but not of collective defence. ledstrengthen to This (and management on crisis focused apolicy pursue should EU the that guing advocated EU It1990s. astrong has involved actively Sweden been has EU in non-alignedstatus. its continues emphasise to and 5, Article under those to equivalent does not commitments create declaration the that maintains However, assistance. Sweden receive to providevelop and military capabilities states). those from Forces pledgedcommitment It would Armed its de also that of asimilar expectation an or (and EU Nordic expressed states against attack” pledgedlaterally event not of passivethe stay to in a“catastrophe or military Sweden which in uni of solidarity” of 2009, adoption,a “declaration in the and Sweden’s in changes have prompted policy further threats and cent challenges NATO The become and re had EU region members. the in mostcountries that Cold of end the War,the Sweden’s fact the position, and geopolitical changed included for favour The in of this reasons 1812 to non-alignment. back dating ity Coldend ofWar. the Sweden late 1990s of policy its neutral abandoned the In Sweden’s the since have defence undergoingchanges policy been extensive not impossible. altogether but unlikely, as regarded is region ofSweden the countries or one other of the against attack mayemployed. be measures Adirect military which in region, the in may occur crises that Sweden possibility outhood. the does not rule neighbour of use force of immediate its the in threshold lowering of the the rise of Russia’sthe to and also ambitions power andglobal fishing), and port trans more intensive resources, maritime of energy transport and traction (due ex to the Arctic the up), and stepped Sea been having Barents the and resources of energy (due region Sea transport Baltic the to the to refers view Sweden’s – this view, changing been geopolitics of has the neighbourhood its In 2009. reviewedin partially were then force; plans those expeditionary an of model the adefensive from force Forces towards model 2004, in Armed of areorientation to the and capabilities, of military downsizing the and ing defence in spend cuts contributed the to attitude This region. the and state of the security military the to of athreat no sense had and challenges, global presence in the international arena, ar arena, international the presence in security policy since the end of the of end the the since policy security ------41 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 42 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 present in the Baltic Sea region. The political elite of Sweden is aware of this, of elite Sweden of The this, aware region. is Sea political Baltic the present in USA the with relations transatlantic and tensive bilateral It Sweden’s in is commitments. political and develop to interest morecial ex excessive finan would entail membership that and policy insurance best the is non-alignment hold conviction that the Swedes the still taboo; a political Sweden The of in NATO question accession allies. with NATO to ing remains co-operat in experience operational Forces Swedishfor gain to Armed the an opportunity offer will NATO that operations future in part take also will Sweden NATO’s with and region of structures. NATO the in command states forces armed the way). develop to been with co-operation has of these The aim Nor in 2011 CMX and states, Baltic the in 2012 2010, and 2011 BRTE Mariner Brilliant Sweden, in NRF 2009 Arrow Loyal (including region the in ercises Sweden’s and of solidarity” laration NATO and ex involvement active PfP in on NATO’scounting Swedish territory. “dec defending Hence in the support is Stockholm and security country’s the territorial safeguard independently not able be to will Swedish military the reform, completion current of the necessity. political and Moreover, the until at least amilitary be might tures Forces struc Swedish NATO to Armed the command even subordinating or actions NATO territory. co-ordinating Enabling operations, even land its Sweden’s using without states Baltic and the waters its support to airspace, NATO. not ablewith be NATO The that will Swedish government aware is point of for reference Sweden’s main the increasingly is region co-operation Sea position. The Baltic international its strengthen to and co-operation, and dialogue for aplatform political to gain Forces NATO to reform standards, adjust to Armed its operations, multinational in participation impedeits that obstacles technical the NATO alleviate to and with interoperability achieve NATO and Sweden’s operations. planning, crisis objective to is civilian ing, involved been also PARP, it in has train and this, exercises OCC, through for Peace and, 1994 since Partnership in NATO. participated has The country contributed Sweden to Cold up stepping with also co-operation War has NATO’s conflicts. in mediate to Peacevelopment Institute of creation aEuropean or policy the development the advocating of “soft de EU i.e. of instruments”, areform the to be seems CSDP. the country the reason, within For no been progress this has there that and not used being are EU the in available are which ments Germany. Presently,with however, instru the Sweden that disappointed is initiative &sharing pooling co-authored it the has Furthermore, products. for market arms EU of creation an the and co-operation; civil-military better involvement in crisis management operations after the end of the of end the the after involvement operations management crisis in and to keep the US the keep to and ------deploying the Armed Forces are to be considerably extended. Forces considerably be to extended. are Armed deploying the of The possibilities NATO one compliance standards. with in remaining the it as upgrades time equipment same at the military and to reduce armament its Sweden enable to is reform of the The purpose implementing NATO standards. NATO Forces forces with co-operate to Armed by of fully the ability the hance en to is objective reform of the important world. of the Another parts other in on missions and region the in not Sweden, elsewhere in only erations but also out op carry to have capabilities they Forces ensure to Swedish is Armed of the The priority term. short the in costs professional 2018), (by optimise to also and component Forces operational 2014),its fully (by Armed the make to ganise reor to reform implement to voluntary) and is alarge-scale service military of 1July as 2010 conscription (currently Sweden universal decided abolish to 2009 for In investments. budget of earmarked is this Aquarter US$ 6 billion. 1.3% around approximately to of GDPoscillated corresponding recent years, in has spending Military capabilities. and potentials high relatively es possess branch service the all and forces units, well-developed special with equipped, and volunteer trained well separate The Home very forces Guard. are mally Forces), Navy, Force(the Special the Army, as Air and well for the as the and state’s of the guarantor security agenuine to be considered are and ahighpotential possess wartime) in 41,000 Forces and (21,000 Armed peacetime during Swedish The troops 5.2. defence. of aNordic smart equivalent create to and tracting, or to developcapabilities con is new whenones defence at spending a time existing NORDEFCO maintain to is of within co-operation The aim troversial. con highly NATO,to domestically or up evenremain stepped co-operation, Norway) and accession while (Denmark NATO its more partners with broadly Co-operation Nordic The Defence region. the in services customs and guards border tween Sweden joined NATO’s has be co-operation closer system), as ASDE well as Norway, with agreement an signing (by surveillance air and programme) on (the is sea region.The SUCBAS priority the in security strengthening Sweden, to is,according region Sea conducive Baltic to the in Co-operation Iraq. in intervention US the even more pronounced became after that attitude an actions, global Cold USA’s the to War, the back dating anegative towards attitude, harbours publicly. this emphasise Swedish to public opinion still iteven reluctant if is Armed forces and the arms industry forces arms Armed the and offers the centre-right government an opportunity to co-operate to co-operate thean opportunity centre-right offers government . They include an operational component operational . They an include ------43 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 44 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 Baltic Sea. The well-developed and relatively well equipped Home Guard, on Home equipped The well Guard, relatively Sea. well-developed and Baltic Sweden’s the safeguard in and country’s interests defenddently the territory Forces indepen to The good arelatively Swedish possess Armed capability core. at their battalion operations have which aspecial 2011, in Forces formed Special the Forcesinclude The Swedish also Armed trained. ter bet be will equipment, and military and armament advanced technologically receivecomponent Forces. more Swedish The Armed of will Home the Guard Guard Home of the importance the increase to is rent reform objectives cur conditions. of One of the polar the for in suitable operations carriers personnel armoured of caterpillar number a high are there that table 2011). since (in service It system no is artillery 2010)since 155 Archer and mm (in service carriers personnel wheeled armoured AMV Patria as well as cles, vehi fighting CV90 infantry 2A5 tanks, Leopard include armaments Its basic uniform. relatively state-of-the-art and are of which majority great ment, the equip military and of armament heavy quantities large possesses The Army units. support service as needs) well on as the depending defence units or air engineering (artillery, group) combat units (the support and battle core of the battalion of: consist amanoeuvre will group ploy Abattle groups. seven battle able be de to will Army the reform, the After 2014. in new structure the in readiness operational achieve to It expected is of restructuring. phase initial Forces, the in Armed is the in year. Army, branch The largest this the start to of is new-generation construction submarines the and phase, testing the in are corvettes missile new Visby class –three upgraded steadily being is potential force force. minesweeping (6 The vessels) Navy’s apatrolling and asmaller as corvettes), well stealth as Visby class two including corvettes, 9 missile rines, subma (5 significant is capability strike amphibiousunits. combatIts and fleet standard (40-60) are to be acquired. acquired. to be are (40-60) standard the E/F in have now),aircraft some only new fighter aircraft which and elling, of refu mid-air capability the acquire will they of (as which aresult standard are to goingE/F be to upgraded aircraft 2015–2020,In 39 C/D fighter JAS the upgraded. Force consistently equipment Air are of the military and armament The aircraft. bases as fighter for used be may airfields 147 – most of its airfields support). network sea of extensive and support Swedenan land has squadrons: (C-130E/H) squadron (made up of two one battalion helicopter and transport aircraft), one 39C/D fighter 100 JAS with of (equipped four fightersquadrons consist core its –ultimately, will i.e. by 2014, restructured being currently is Nordic forces other combined). the of Force all The Air capability strike the exceeds Air wings Force’s capability fighter Swedish (the three strike core are level At of its highest combat readiness. the Force awhole Air The as maintains The Navy The consists of components: two consists the , i.e. the lighter lighter , i.e. the ------aircraft, it does have the capacity to upgrade and service them. service and upgrade to it capacity does have the aircraft, does not produce or helicopters transport industry Swedish arms the while vehicle). combat air Finally, unmanned European of the Neuron, prototype the for hull development the (Saabcreated the of new generations of armament engines), in Stirling co-operates composite and nologies armours, (STEALTH, new tech one in leaders is of the (NSC, Saab).aids industry The Swedish arms Flir), Saab), training (Ericsson, (Aimpoint, and simulators and optoelectronics radio-electronics and electronics Barracuda), Saab CSM Materialteknik, Bofors, Krutbruk, (Akers Bofors), systems (BAE protection missiles ballistic Sweden, guided and Norma) Nammo Hagglunds, BAE Krutbruk, (Akers nition Bofors), (Saab), BAE Hagglunds, (Kockums), ammu warships combat aircraft (BAE artillery and vehicles include: armoured industry Swedish arms of the products The newest mostimportant technologies. access the to has industry Swedish arms companies, the German and Norwegian some Finnish, with and market, arms players the in dominant i.e. the Britain, US and the producers in some arms Swedish have companies that with world. links the the to in Due advanced mosttechnologically and one strongest is of the industry arms ish The Swed areas. possible all Forces almost in Armed Swedish of the needs for provides largely which the industry a developed arms Sweden has branch. of service of kind any facilities) logistic with deploy to independentcontingent an ability (complete the including abroad, operations in part to take prepared well relatively Forces also are Armed ish enemy). by apotential The taken Swed areas in warfare guerrilla (including actions outirregular carry to possibilities extensive offers hand, other the - - - - 45 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 46 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 co-ordinate and agree on joint positions (usually concerning developments in on concerning joint agree and (usually positions co-ordinate to measures and consultations inter-ministerial and intergovernmental eral stepped-up multilat through created, being structures co-operation separate without MenReport”. Wise happening is “NB8 This so-called by the triggered aprocess in developing relations foreign policy closer have gradually been states education. Baltic Since and the 2010, Nordic and the culture protection, sector, energy, environmental states), Baltic of financial the the partners ing trad investors and mostimportant among the currently (the are Nordic states economy of the areas the in were co-operating partners the which under mat broader Nordic-Baltic of 8(NB8) the for co-operation margins place on the taking was co-operation military Nevertheless, Denmark). (mainly partners the units armedNordic of forces’ the to units military their or by affiliating NRF, and EUBG the within Afghanistan), Norway in with and Iraq, and kans Bal the in on Nordic NATO states Denmark (with the operations with erate co-op to started states Baltic individual addition, In Western Balkans. the and Ukraine in reforms sector security support to Nordic-Baltic initiatives launched question in countries the sectors, security Baltic the transforming and establishing from gained had they experience of use the order make to in Nevertheless, Estonia. and Latvia of Lithuania, security of the charge on in For NordicNATO then from states, changed. the was character its and declined joined NATO states the Baltic the 2004, in After region. Sea Baltic of the part south-eastern of the security the enhance NATO to states EU), accession (and doing Baltic the to so in the oftate and the facili to was Nordic ally. states the objective The European forbest prime all USA’s the as Unitedposition States itself and the with alliance the strengthen to effort of the part involvement its already and was region to Russia, the in exposed less was it geographically reunification, following German because, to NATO. docould so Estonia and Denmark Latvia accessionthe of Lithuania, supported and co-operation involved actively was this in particular in mark NATO. in membership states’ Den Baltic for the necessary infrastructure and development the forces, on, later in of and standards armed of their lishment estab the in them to assist advisors and instructors send partners, Baltic their equipment to military and armament used The would Nordic transfer states independence. gained Estonia and Latvia Lithuania, soon as as formats lateral bi various in co-operating started states Baltic the Nordic and the 1990s the In 1. II. NORDIC-BALTIC CO-OPERATION NORDIC-BALTIC THE BALTIC STATES

intensity of co-operation co-operation of intensity ------and this can be considered as a breakthrough of sorts. Since 2012, the chiefs of chiefs the Since 2012, of sorts. abreakthrough considered as be can this and projects, on specific states Baltic the defence with co-operation and curity se have Nordic states decided extend to the year last over the Nevertheless, 5. Article to refer directly NATO that in actions participation for Sweden consent in Finland and no There Policing is political mission. Air tic Bal to join the notpreparation as and region, the in NATO states with member forces air Finnish Swedish and of the interoperability the away ofas increasing states) seen be should Baltic over policing the air (aimedat improving exercise involvement (in 2012) NATO’s in of Sweden 2012) Finland and (inand 2011 BRTE the context, this In militarily. states Baltic the assisting to themselves mitting Sweden com and are Finland that and states, Baltic of the security fority the responsibil greater of NATO Nordic assuming members the are that meaning as efforts NATO these Russia. interpret could against alliances regional ditional ad at bycreating seen Moscow attempts be could as relations military Baltic Nordic- strengthen to is,however, efforts reason convictionThe that real their (Nordic) formatfirst. smaller the of in co-operation results seethe to want they Officially, Estonia. and Latvia Lithuania, with links developing military closer Policing. However, about Air Baltic have in Nordic wary states been the Finland of Sweden and participation Group potential for support tle its (NBG) the and Nordic Bat the in participate to ambition its in but NB8, also the within activity not Lithuania’s visible been in only has This Poland. fortute, with co-operation not if asubsti acounterpoise, defence as policy and vector of security its ern north the viewing recent years, in Nordic states the with co-operation closer Vilnius co-operation, for military partners ority one ofas Lithuania’s regarded recently pri Poland, until with relations bilateral foreign policy. in in tensions to roomfor manoeuvre Owing their expand and states Baltic for the guarantees security provide additional would indirectly NATO’s (though integration not undermining role) regional closer and states, Nordic the with links military of view, would co-operation strengthen such point their From organisation. this within broader co-operation in interest an established NORDEFCO was since years the In economies. and onsocieties cooperative security, healthy dialogue provides for aframework which and place years for in been several has which of State, US Department formatof e-PINE the the use to seeking been have also states Baltic Nordic and the USA, the with co-operation strengthen to further United order States. In the regards as and politics international in visibility region’s the boosts and states Baltic position Nordic and of the the strengthens Syria). in Suchco-operation war civil world, the of as the regions such distant particular in , the Baltic states have states shown Baltic , the has been seeking seeking been has ------47 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 48 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 obtain the contingency plans, a greater US and NATO military presence in the the presence in NATO US and military agreater contingency plans, the obtain upto stepped joint states efforts Baltic when 2008, the in war sian-Georgian Rus the more intensive levelafter only became political atCo-operation the time. place at in that were already that initiatives the continued through only lost some states and ofNATO, momentum its Baltic the between co-operation accession to After Estonia. Defence College Baltic (BALTDEFCOL)the Tartu, in of NATO’s part is which control system, and and NATINADS, surveillance air Group 1(SNMCMG1), NATO Countermeasures Mine Standing BALTNET the of the BALTRON, part today is which squadron countermeasures joint mine the includes initiatives of legacy earlier Thesive co-operation. lasting Baltic contributed more to inten war entity. More recently, Russian-Georgian the asingle of as becometo NATO, states members Baltic the NATO since regarded efforts countries’ of these part Later, became co-operation closer some areas. in co-operation for Baltic stimulus provided the region the in Nordic states involvement the early 1990s the In of the factors. by external stimulated was 1990 after Estonia and Latvia Lithuania, Defence between co-operation 2. opportunities. co-operation may offerNordic states additional the which in areas i.e. the exercises, and on co-operation training or trilateral lead some to more bilateral will Nordic partners, proposed by the states, Baltic the equipment with military and of joint armament acquisitions the sible that pos equipment. It therefore is military and supplies of armament on external forces fully depend armed their and industries, arms any havestates hardly defence budget unchanged The Baltic of the Estonia. and Latvia, and Lithuania by in defencespending increase likely the from benefit to expect Nordic states The economic considered in terms. also is formats, bilateral in especially nia, Esto and Latvia policy. Lithuania, with Co-operation security international in Nordic-Baltic ofalso region, the visibility the position and international their strengthen to seeking are Nordic states the states, Baltic the with co-operating Estonia’sthe NATO framework. By know-howwithin fields, developed those in of use Lithuania’s the and and issues security) energy (cyber and “soft security” developing in or countries, reforms sector security and building capacity to related activities and military) and civilian (both i.e.abroad region, operations outside joint to the states actions Baltic the with co-operation institutionalised limit preferto Nordic states the Still, organisation. the working within groups of some proceedings the may observe states Baltic the representatives from military and Committee Co-ordination NORDEFCO of Military the meetings selected in part have able been Estonia take to and Latvia defence of Lithuania, BALTIC CO-OPERATION BALTIC - - - - cellence in Estonia and Lithuania; to make regular joint contributions to NRF joint NRF to contributions regular make to Lithuania; and Estonia in cellence developmentfor the jointly to support of framework; Freedom of Ex Centres NATO Partnership the and or within by region themselves the in organised on exercises NATO; militarily and work to politically within together litically po continue to co-operating expected: be should states Baltic the future, In attacks. cyber 2007 of the aftermath the in for support Estonia political slow expressing in were rather Estonia and Lithuania and theEU-Russia to new negotiations block agreement; of efforts Lithuania’s back to have refused Estonia and Latvia territories, their in tivity ac competition in for are transit Estonia and Latvia level. Lithuania, political at the unity” no “Baltic often is there and vary priorities and interests tional However, defence issues. on policy many agree na and their links; atlantic trans maintaining have in acommon they interest neighbourhood; European about concerns: Russia’s its similar in policy Moreover, share states Baltic the forces.armed the development to their regard of with priorities different had states forces Baltic of the armed the addition, In co-operation. with frustrated partners the left and projects implementation the of trilateral hampered this and the domestic level at significant forces were also armed the managing in the states). Nordic UK, Problemsthe USA, (the partners different with eration forces co-op in armed respective developed their they 1990s the in back that fact consequences of the lingering are factors these joint seek to All savings. no basis and of equipment, have low types interoperability buyand disparate possess countries three the that fact by the hindered level, was co-operation economic military and At priorities. the or considerations political proximity Poland), with of because geographical Lithuania Finland, with (Estonia gration inte regional in than neighbours larger their developingin with co-operation have more been interested Estonia and Latvia level, Lithuania, political At the nature. domestic/structural and military have of states been apolitical, Baltic the between co-operation encounteredin obstacles the years, Over the equipment. military and (Kosovo) on foreign armament operations co-operating or jointly purchasing Estonia and Latvia of someLithuania, been cases have also there recent years jointIn their stepped Host and Nationup exercises. Support personnel) of staff number small a leaving only reasons, project for financial this from withdrew component land of 2010 of the in NRF-14 (Latvia part became which Battalion Baltic jointly formed the Estonia and Latvia level, Lithuania, military At the Policing mission. Air TO’s Baltic of the extension Concept, an new Strategic and exercises), (through region favourable on collectivedefenceNA provisions in ------49 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 50 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 strued as the CIS area) abroad and the Zapad the and abroad area) CIS the as strued of sphere influence and (con interests its citizens, of protection Russian the followed by Russia’s Georgia, in The war threat. on “Medvedev under doctrine” is economic and stability social political, their that states Baltic the in elites political and societies held by perception the the strengthened further has rhetoric Russia’s aggressiveanti-Baltic states. Baltic the in sustained services secret Russian or the forces, businesses of pro-Russian Russian-backed tivities ac to the were related that Latvia) in minority Russian-speaking of the tests pro and strikes and Soldier Bronze monument over Estonia, riots the in and cyber attacks the (including economic and affairs political numerous through have been Estonia and Latvia republics. Lithuania, former Baltic the ence in Moscow’s economic that believe and influ political its objective rebuild to is still states Baltic the Russia, with relations their normalised Despite having 3.1. 3. states. Baltic the credit dis could or region which the presence its in NATO in result decreasing could and NATOandEU the which imagein their the negatively affect that paigns cam information on co-operate internal could – preventing – and in interested also are states Baltic three in 2012). upon agreed rifle, All recoilless antitank Gustav Carl for the of ammunition joint possible purchase the (such as also equipment are military and of armament joint purchases Support. Limited to Host Nationrespect with finally,to co-operate and of training; cialisation and level spe of effectiveness the at increasing aimed possible new initiatives plans); to (every according four years jointly to BALTDEFCOL develop and the sible attempts at discrediting the state internationally – and Lithuania’s –and fears internationally state the sible at discrediting attempts identity. national It economic and concerned about and is life pos try’s social coun the system, political Lithuanian on the pressure possible fears Russian still leadership (which implies countries Russia). Theence on Lithuanian third economic and depend energy its lies security Lithuania’s understood broadly to threat mostserious However, the region. that the believes in muscles Vilnius its flexing country the and potential given Russia’s military future, growing the force in used be might military that but outpossibility it does not the rule Lithuania states. Baltic of the rity integ territorial about the fears to given rise have also involving(also Belarus) LITHUANIA, LATVIA AND ESTONIA

Defence policies Defence believes that the likelihood of a direct military confrontation is low, is confrontation military of adirect likelihood the that believes and Ladoga and military exercises ------al military exercises conducted US (Sabre in by Strike), the exercises US participation military al internation the with recent years in increased slightly contrary,on has the but, diminishing doesbe not to region appear the US presence in For the them, United States. the with co-operate could topics they on which security global and “specialisations” for looking their also They are relations. military close develop to want up stepped and be to region the US for presence in the seeking therefore are states region. the Baltic The in Russia with crisis/conflict litical event of the in apo act to will political the and means the has US currently the of view, power. balance their only In regional for the important highly key and be to region United the presence of in States consider the the states The Baltic Soldier Bronze monument. over riots the by the hesion, demonstrated as country’s the co undermine may potentially society Estonian within divisions development ethnic and regional asymmetric politicians, to Estonian cording Ac destabilisation. atinternal or causing attempts attacks cyber instruments, of use economic the may combined be with means involving military Pressure counter Estonia’s to run interests. will or policy economic that decisions curity government and/or se foreign and Estonian it forcing the take to discrediting at aimed pressure it of may become external that believes atarget leadership policies. The Estonian assertive increasingly its and potential military rising into consideration Russia’s it longer outtaking does not the tonia rule in term, possibility. However, unlikely an being Es as regarded is future now the or in In (35%). states Baltic the among all minority Russian-speaking largest economic the crisis). has It also by the exacerbated been has lowest (a that the defence tendency spending and military smallest of the security.It has terms in “weakest link” the be to pears ap Latvia states, Baltic tension). three the Of ethnic and of social instigation warfare, psychological and informational attacks, cyber crime, organised ism, (terror actions non-standard and conventional means using or pressure tack an ina at combination of and may consist topredict maydifficult be threats leadership, future Latvian the to According politics. position international in its Moscow’s and potential strengthen to ambition Russia’sen military rising ly giv low. though, aconfrontation, of such possibility It out doesthe not rule relative is territory its in confrontation military of adirect likelihood the that Latvia attacks. of terror possibility out doesthe not rule Lithuania Finally, Poland. to but not may also refer recently Russia, to only respect this in Estonia, Estonia, officially applies a broad definition of threats to its security and believes and security its to threats applies of definition abroad officially a direct military challenge to the country’s territorial integrity integrity country’s the to territorial challenge military a direct ------51 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 52 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 rity-enhancing factor, since the NDN positions them as important partners for partners important as them positions NDN factor, the since rity-enhancing secu additional an as airports and ports sea territories, their –via allies other of movement that the of–and treat US cargo NDN, they the from economically benefit Network states (NDN). Baltic Distribution the While Northern the within states position Baltic of the the (6) Swedenstrengthening Finland; and and states Baltic the between relations development of view the in policy ships of military NATO the partner (5) strengthening Lithuania); in future, in and, (in Estonia organisations military of international status have the that of Excellence tres i.e. Cen NATO of infrastructures understood broadly activities presence and Hope); Amber Host, (Baltic HNS to (4) related the exercises states Baltic the in of (Host allies Nation participation Support/HNS), the assistance as well civil as and military States accept to allied Baltic of the ability the enhancing to a view with (development andports) of airfields infrastructures civil and military in forces; involving investments (3) allied exercises NATO PfP and through region the in considered asuccess; be NATO (2) can contributions visibility increasing financial their increase Estonia and Latvia Lithuania, conditiontion on that the opera the extend to Chicago decision NATO of the the summit regard, this in Policing mission; include: Air (1) Baltic continuation of the currently states Baltic The for open. priorities the remains implementation plans the of enable to those needed andexercises field staff Poland of (Eagle question but the Guardian), the for contingency plans to the 2010 by annex the 5have strengthened been Article under states collectivedefence Baltic of the to the security.Commitments their NATO in membership treat states The Baltic Vilnius. in established Centre Security Energy for the CoE status Tallinn). promotion (CoE) of and Cyber Defence of Excellence Centre the activities in the United States (through the with relations in asset NATO an and within ciality Estonia pledged Asia. for to work Central Strategy update EU more of on actively the the has and states; Asian Central the and Russia with of transport co-ordination get to involved the trying been in has Latvia area. this in active also are states Network (NDN). Distribution Baltic other It the Northern noted be should that of use the USA on the the with co-operates and country atransit as potential its United States. Latvia the moreoperate with closely co-could they which in domains “assets” and their to identify have trying been and Estonia Latvia Lithuania, assistance. financial and material as well as (e.g. forces JTAC) training US armed includes the and states Baltic the between co-operation for Military Peace frameworks. NATO Partnership and es within Hope) exercis and Amber Host, (Baltic states Baltic by the organised exercises has been emphasising its expertise in cyber security issues as its spe its as issues security cyber in expertise its emphasising been has Lithuania Lithuania has been making efforts to obtain NATO accreditation and NATO accreditation to obtain efforts making been has and Article 5 as the foundations of foundations the 5as Article and specialises in expanding expanding in specialises ------on the largest members of the EU. of the members largest on the dependent CSDP development of are the the prospects that believe countries However, three partners. the priority up with step to co-operation opportunity an as Estonia and Latvia Lithuania, in seen is Groups particular in Battle EU the in Participation cohesion states. member among the enhancing EU, as and the conducive capabilities) within as co-operation and integration to military EDA, under joint co-operation development operations, of research civil- tions, joint (EUBG, acquisi CSDP to perceive instruments the have started they years project for NATO, arival CSDP as the treated however, and policy rity recent in Wolf” infantry brigade at its core. It possesses a limited quantity of heavy brigade at quantity core. its It alimited possesses infantry Wolf” Forces Land are The foreign missions. multinational in part ania’s take to ability Lithu and patrolling) water coastal and surveillance (airspace capabilities defence designed to enhance upgrades to technological limited and scattered implemented have recent and years been in planned The changes standards. Forces at to NATOadaptation completed aimed Armed reforms the Lithuanian alevel of 2% of achieving to budget, GDP. aview with military 2010, In the the increasing gradually to itself committed Lithuania 2012 In activities. current budget on spent is military of 85% the 2011. of0.8% in GDP (US$ 350 million) of 1.2% GDP from to recent years, in 2007 in back falling systematically been has spending (even for accounting size), Military but well-trained. relatively Defence Volunteer (National home guard Forces). poorly are equipped Its units volunteer as well as branch) independentservice Forces, an as operate which Special Force, the Forces, Navy forces and Air the (the Land armed the regular the includes military The Lithuanian wartime. during mobilisation through for mostprobably expansion no plans are there 2008, in professionalisation of policy. state their Since instrument an as treated are and home guard) (8,500 15,700 Forces troops; small the Armed are including Lithuanian The 3.2. development about the EU of sceptical the were initially states The Baltic United States. the with good relations maintain NATO a way to and contribution to collective defence within their as states Baltic other. Involvement each competition the in in with seen is foreign operations in are Latvia, and Lithuania especially and states, Baltic where the area an also is NDN However,the in economicparticipation and reasons, for political Pakistan. route via transport closed the considering 2014), USA (atthe especially until least Armed forces and the arms industries forces arms Armed the and

the main service branch, with the well-developed “Iron the with branch, service main the secu - - - 53 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 54 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 They include the regular armed armed of policy. state regular They instrument the include an as treated are to 50,000 wartime), during to expand capacity the with peacetime in troops (5,000 potential Forces have Armed small avery Latvian The equipment. military and supplies of armament dependent on external Forces fully are Armed anian of equipment. The of overhauls Lithu some types small and sic inspections out ba forces carry to armed the enable resources technological and material The country’s civil Euroelektronika). (Elsis, military the to provide services that companies exceptfor electronics two industry no arms has Lithuania tries. of contingents coun of other part as Forces participate only can Armed anian The deployed be to Lithu limited. is abroad capability on missions military’s occupied enemy). by the areas in The Lithuanian warfare guerrilla cluding (in operations out non-regular carry to volunteer them enables formations forces the and However, regular of the respect. potential the this in support dependent on allied defence fully of country’s territory,remain and regular Forces engage independently to have Armed in no capability The Lithuanian Afghanistan). in (including deployed been presenceits onIt foreign operations. NATO has in operations of view Lithuania’s in mark to ambition mainly branch service aseparate as NATO. The within adaptto co-operate to expected is MCM squadron the future, In boat apatrol squadron. and squadron countermeasures amine At core its are capabilities. countermeasures mine and consideration).patrolling under limited are Navy station has The radar the to component upgrade support an of and new (e.g. helicopters purchase the combat on service the mainly focused are plans ForceThe Air modernisation it counter to low-flying allow targets. whose armaments defence battalion air Force The an Air includes or symbolic. at merely on is sea land targets against out combat operations or carry to of pilots combat aircraft train to capability its helicopters); and and aircraft Forces of (a Special transport the squadron and Forces Land of the operations for support the provide to logistic is task main Force’s Army. of Air the The Defence Volunteer part al integral Forces an are Nation the terms, operational In modernised. gradually equipmentits being is and foreign operations in part take to prepared being is brigade which Wolf” “Iron for the place mainly in are plans upgrade Technological mortars. mm 120 and howitzers 105 mm carriers, personnel of armoured olderinclude types of equipmentitems equipment. The significant only military and armament

Special Forces have established Special been and and ------technological resources enable the armed forces to carry out basic inspections out inspections basic forces carry to armed the enable resources technological Navy. for new boats patrol and the builds Shipyard The country’s material civil Riga –the sector shipbuilding the from apart industry no arms has Latvia contingents states). ofthe other do within only so (they abroad can operations in part take to ability a limited Forces receive have Armed they weapons supplies outside. from The Latvian occupied enemy), by the areas in provided warfare guerrilla (including tions opera out non-regular carry to volunteer them enables the formations and forces However, regular of the respect. potential the this in support on allied dependent defence fully of country’s territory,remain engage and regular in Forces have Armed independently to no capabilities The Latvian isation plans. modern No Force development military’s targets. envisaged the Air is of in the counter only low-flying can defence squadron The air combat tasks. forming capable or helicopters per of aircraft no fighter has ponent. Its squadron only vessels. warfare mine and service) putity. being intoequipment (new boats patrol includes are vessels Its main capabil countermeasure mine a limited and waters, coastal to patrol pability ca high arelatively weapons. Navy has The portable weaponslow-calibre and with equipped Forces mortars). primarily The mm ofited Land are 120 number alim and carriers personnel a dozen armoured equipment (barely military any) or to acquire (and no plans Forcesarmament heavy any Land have hardly 2017). in readiness operational The gain to forces (the expected al brigade is multination for deployment within brigade, earmarked tion of amechanised foundation forma for the the as serving is brigade which infantry core an is At its military. Latvian of the branch service largest Forces the Land are The area. mainly, however, system, protection developing maritime radar its the in is defence to country’s of related the territory, Latvia directly measures gards forces. re As of multinational part as operations international in participation for preparations and objective complete to is NATO to adaptations standards development 2020, to the Forces’ plan by 2020. Armed multiannual Under the a level of to reach 2% of GDP increased budget gradually be should military the aprovision May includes that 2012 in parliament Latvian adopted by the The Defence Concept new National activities. budget on spent is current tary 1.5% mili 80% of of GDP2011. 1.0% to the in of 2007 GDP in million) (US$ 290 from recent years in decreased has spending Military well-trained. relatively Forces 2007. in were It professionalised Armed poorly is but equipped Latvian Force). Land of the part is The terms operational in which Guard, (the National home Navy) Force guard Forces, voluntary forces the and Air and (the Land the The Air Force Air The does not have a combat com ------55 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 56 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 home guard), home or volunteer 150,000 troops, the including –30,000 regular ing wartime arelatively dur capacity highmobilisation with peacetime, during soldiers (5,000 potential Forces Armed have small a very Estonian The equipment. military and supplies of armament dependent on external Forces fully are Armed Latvian the of equipment. Otherwise of overhauls some types small and respect to air and maritime operations, they remain fully dependent on allied dependent on allied fully remain they operations, maritime and air to respect country’s defend the independently to territory. With capability have a limited Forces The forces Armed there. allied receiving potentially to aview with bases marine Paldiski and Tallinn the place. modernise to is in The priority are plans No Navy development capabilities. countermeasure mine limited possesses Navy The become to operational. are stations radar formed be to ron and is short-range squad missile first defenceair the facility.By 2014, major military only its is base air Amari the and defence measures, no air Forces. has Estonia Land of needs the the to catering unit solely atransport serves as squadron mixed only formation. Its not is asignificant formed and being currently is Force weapons. Air The of anti-tank new types and new tanks as well as ters, EC-135 light Eurocopter and launchers helicop missile anti-aircraft including of equipment, newer types with place units equip to in are Plans units. tillery ar and brigade equip a to sufficient nonetheless are which quantities limited Sweden) and in donated by Finland Forces towed and artillery Armed Finnish received the from carriers (Pasi/Sisu personnel XA-180/188mament armoured supposed deployed). be to four brigades are of ar heavy It older possesses types (during wartime, peacetime core its during brigade constituting infantry an with military, Estonian of the branch service largest Forces the Land are The defence. of combat air capabilities the increase –to upgrades nological forces (Host of Nation allied of operations tech Support),the area the –in and supporting for and receiving necessary infrastructures military developto the i.e. support, on on Estonia’s based allied and country’s territory potential own defend to capabilities enhance to equipment.is The and priority structure its ForcesThe development Armed provides for plan comprehensive in changes for investments. budget of earmarked 25% is this million. US$ to 390 amounted budget military of GDP the 1.8% 2011 recent in years; in around oscillated has spending Military systematically). train units Defence League forces the and Forces poorly (theThe regular but are Armed equipped well-trained relatively (the Defence volunteerLeague). Navy,Force the the home as and guard well as forces peacetime), Forces, in (cadre Air Land the i.e. the regular the include

and are treated as a guarantor of the state’s of the aguarantor as treated security. They are and ------dependent on external supplies of armament and military equipment. military and supplies of armament dependent on external Forces fully are Armed of equipment. The ofoverhauls Estonian some types small and out inspections basic forces carry to armed the enable resources cal technologi and industry. The country’s material no arms civil has Estonia contingents states). of the other do within only so (they can abroad operations in part to take Forces ability have Armed a limited tonian occupied enemy). by the areas in The Es warfare guerrilla (including erations op outirregular carry to relatively capabilities offer good formations Estonia However, volunteersupport. the and well-developed capacity mobilisation the - - - 57 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 58 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 decision had been influenced by the stance adopted by Russia, which refused refused adoptedwhich by Russia, stance the by influenced been decision had Its project. the from however, 2003, In RepublicPoland. withdrew Czech the in helicopters onearound theIt hundred of provided forupgrade nificance. of thought be to major was sig concluded upgrade, 2002, Mi-24 helicopters in to the overcome. provedagreement to on co-operate The difficult interests divergences of the area T-72 the equipment (such as this even tanks), in tary technology, of military domain possible the be might in co-operation at closer least that it appeared While V4vergences among the of resurfaced. interests members priority, the di was and Western allies the with Developing relations closer to NATO accession Thus, Slovakia’s of supporting a means accession. as intended been had the jointtheir formation of brigade, which of staff ed the disband Slovakia Republic and Czech Poland,the 2005 in and tion disappeared co-opera onedevelop to motivations joined of regional NATO the and 2004, in caught process of up NATO Slovakia the accession. co-ordinate After tion and informa exchange to primarily working groups, served six conducted within V4 of integration. terms in works, behind lagging was which Slovakia, support militarily and need politically to the from came impulse Another co-operation. table,impulse fortheresuming an it on provided jointion to NATO finally was invita When the structures. Euro-Atlantic the towards on path its aburden be V4 potentially could strengthened apolitically thought that Prague partners, other the development NATO than to the of prepared membership V4. Better towards ill-disposed generally government was Czech then the because largely 1990s mid the in stalled Co-operation Western allies. their with co-operation V4 of on the priority developing was the members Besides this, membership. development NATO the that view could ofby fears V4 full to alternative an as part motivated in defence about was closer co-operation scepticism The initial of elites V4 political Group the foreign policy. in considered the be to useful NATO.and EU the integration with members’ of the process the totive buttress was a way of objec developing good neighbourly butprimary relations, the Group Visegrad (V4) the within co-operation 1990s the as In seen was 1.1. 1. III. VISEGRAD CO-OPERATION VISEGRAD

History and the current status of co-operation status current the and History THE VISEGRAD GROUP VISEGRAD THE The shape and intensity of co-operation was determined by how determined of was co-operation intensity The and shape i.e. that V4i.e. that Soviet-made work could on upgrading together mili initially caused activity within V4 within activity to subside. caused initially ------“21 Republic); Czech by (co-ordinated the the destruction weapons of mass against protection on group the the by members: its four working co-ordinated groups V4 when possible the 2009 equipment in only became established military and armament to regard with Russia). co-operation in with Anewtlement opening of debt its set part as received new MiG-29A/UB and 12 aircraft kept MiG its Slovakia while 39 Gripen, JAS Republic the leased Czech F-16, the and Hungary the purchased example (Poland eventually the prime being aircraft fighter of acquisition new of on co-operation the failure the practice, in prevailed states individual of interests The particular transfers. andtechnology offsets provide also could US which companies and of Western products European the domesticproduction and on their V4the mainly have focused been countries concerned, equipment are military and of new armament acquisitions as far As V4individual members. the with talks favoured licencesbilateral and necessary Poland the grant to political sovereignty and security of its member states (Article 4), and argued 4), argued and (Article states of member its security and sovereignty political integrity, territorial on the for forum consultations transatlantic important an of NATO’s significance Thestates. V4 the sought role highlight to as also states new member old the and the between evenly distributed be should institutions of seats NATO principle promote to that and updates the of contingency plans for call to also and NATO acollectivedefence emphasises alliance, as document the that V4 the sure adopted 2010, worked in was make all to members together works on NATO’s During May 2012. Chicago in in mit concept that new strategic for NATO”, a strong “Responsibility declaration NATO of adopted the ahead sum by their demonstrated as co-operation, transatlantic in and defence capabilities NATO’s strengthening in interested particularly V4 – the all smoothly are states developing been has NATO, in co-operation Political hand, other on the industry. avoid to wanted arms the layoffsin partners the reasons: political and were decisive, social but that considerations rather However, abroad. production capacity defence and not it much so strategic was to locate afraid and were another in confidenceone limited had partners the because partly lacking, was will The political declarations. and consultations to limited The centres. output working was groups of the training jointlyto use or out acquisitions joint and upgrades to carry projects, plement joint research im to of However,failed creation concept the documents. and parties rules the of national aharmonisation exchange, information consultations, to include by (co-ordinated Hungary). intended to was Co-operation transport strategic on group the by (co-ordinated Slovakia); and defence modernisation missile st Century Soldier” project (co-ordinated by Poland); the group on air and by project (co-ordinated Soldier” and Poland); on group air the Century - - - 59 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 60 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 tions in Central Europe. V4 officers make up a substantial proportion of staff of proportion V4 Europe. makesubstantial Central upa in officers tions NATO’s within forcesThe of co-operating institu V4 armed also are states Republic. Czech by the co-ordinated is and way, Albania, and UK the involves which ForceHelicopter Task launched, Nor V4 was Spain, as well as HIP the 2009, In helicopters. Mi the possess that states amongoperation the co- operational and broader training trigger did mission Afghanistan of the However, capacities. complementary had they requirements that the fact the despite V4 and the tween direction contingents, despite that in some attempts be Afghanistan in Italy. established with co-operation closer any Nor was co-operated NATO’s Hungarians the within division while corps, British ARRC 1st deployed the brigade was a Czech with and Iraq, Kosovo then and Bosnia, in sectors “old” of NATO. the British members the with in operated The Czechs V4 on Individual wereIraq). more developing focused members co-operation Polishin sector the in Hungarians and presence of Slovaks the and erations, OEF op and KFOR the in Czech-Slovak battalions the than other collaboration V4among the on NATO’s have (there no foreign significant operations been Military co-operation Military Republic took Czech tougher stances). the (Poland and aftermath its in NATO Russia that adopt should policy towards the to respect with pecially es of it perceptions varied, their 2008, in war Russian-Georgian the ner during man a similar (Hungary) actively. in V4 acted the Although all had governments Republic) Czech Georgia’s more or the (Poland less ambitions and membership and supported Ukraine’s haveall they have different; Russia been have towards V4 more co-operate closely. to the attitudes The countries respective willingness of their despite declarations actions, their not did co-ordinate negotiations, they ongoing about the informed other kept each states two Republicthe and Czech the Poland and between more intensive in relations result project did on this United States the with for talks Russia’s the While derstanding reservations. un expressed Hungary and governments, Slovakia Under project. leftist to this objections to abate their failed it also plans, those back to V4 other the partners persuade to Republic. Poland not Czech failed only the Poland and in shield sile EU. For US mis of V4 example, elements the project build to split on been the has beyond of framework NATO the extend or the that initiatives military and litical po enough in achieve for large to cohesion nevertheless, They are, difficult be to states). Baltic the NATO with (usually within group aregional as together act to enough members for V4 the small within are threats of immediate perceptions the in The differences defence V4 policies of aligned. the the were fully countries “open the door however,that continue. should policy” does not This mean, that has

seldom taken the form of co-operation closer the seldom taken ------command of the 3 of the command the appliesthesame to and isCzech, of staff chief the and a Slovak, is mander Bydgoszcz, in com Poland,where the (JFTC) Centre Jointat the Force Training The capabilities pledgedThe were probably capabilities Czechs decisive the overcoming in by the initiatives. other in used be also could facilities whose logistic structure manent V4 it the contribution from become could cant suggested aper that and states, a signifi level of with ambition EU’sof the a V4BG would maximum match that development Groups), CSDP the to aview (with ofthe Battle creation the backed (2011/2012). for V4 closer aproposal put The forward under Czechs co-operation V4 the in presidency Czech the during made was progress work Further state. role frame of the the Poland take to expected they said partners the occasion same the of half 2016. On first the in duty first its tion of aV4BG begin could that crea the to commitment their restated Slovakia, Levoča, in of defence ministers meeting when May 2011 the in Groups.only momentum TheBattle project gained on adopt rules a lower EU envisaged the level in of V4BG for ambition the than to Group’s inclined Battle for was the Hungary addition, In crucial functioning. study, V4 the feasibility and were notthe able countries pledge to capacities the on slow very progress making was part Hungarian the 2011, and 2007 between NATO However, Forcethe actions. Response EU and concept works on dragged into account between complementariness need take to pointed the to partners Group involving (also concept Battle Ukraine). the of The aVisegrad discussed in Slovakia, Sliač, meeting of staff forces chiefs 2007, armed the January In not apositive was experience. this commitments, on delivery side’s inadequate Slovak its 2009) and but the to owing tardiness of (on second created half the duty in Group also was A Czech-Slovak Battle Slovenia. and Italy of with 2012), aBG created second half the Hungary in while –on duty Macedonia joined (later by Croatia, Austria and Germany with a BG Republic Group, created Czech the Battle and -German-Lithuanian-Latvian Polish- Group. joined decidedajoint not the build to Battle Slovakia initially EU. the within Co-operation Hungary. in abase from aircraft transport operates that SAC consortium the in participate to V4 only However, the are partners Hungary Poland and for centre pilots. helicopter training involvedbe MATC of creation the the in to partners regional their want The specialises). Czechs also Romania which in Bydgoszcz area in an is established (even being this though currently cellence, Police of Ex Centre involved heavily be Military also the in certainly will ners 2012). in (MNMPBAT,accredited part be to Police Regional expected Battalion Military Multinational of the part Bydgoszcz. platoons Slovak are and Czech rd NATO Signal Battalion (3NSB) currently being created in in created being currently (3NSB) Battalion NATO Signal As new EU Member States, the V4 States, the Member new EU As countries ------61 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 62 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 ate savings. While the country regards the V4 as the primary regional format regional V4 the primary the as regards country the ate While savings. gener could lead could and joint to which acquisitions joint defence planning, developing including in co-operation, deeper Republic interested is Czech The Republic). Czech for the important (especially progress technological and defence EU market of the liberalisation of view the in companies arms tic domes strengthen to Hungary); finally, opportunities and and public, Slovakia Re (noted Czech relations by the improve and region bilateral consolidate the to opportunities in particular); forcuts more(in Slovakia justification political auseful as or co-operation even closer Ministry), Finance Czech the and gary Hun budget for Slovakia, (important cuts Slovaks); of necessity the further the and Czechs by the raised (sporadically Russia with rapprochement its and policy of Germany’s direction about the Hungary); Republic and Czech uncertainty the in (mainly experiences by historical exacerbated of threat, sense growing the of perceived Russia’s and rise the Georgia) in war power (demonstrated by the Hungarians); the and Czechs for the (important zone crisis euro of view the in EU the concerned about);in confidence are eroding Hungary and Slovakia lic, Repub Czech (which the Libya in NATO’sintervention by the highlighted crisis Republic); Czech for the important (particularly Europe in interest waning United theStates’view in of umbrella the of security NATO efficacy about the to: refer concern raised are that The arguments laid. bution is of where stress distri the and arguments role of the different in variations are there same, the principle in is question in states the in circles or military ministerial political, by the raised of reasons catalogue the While V4shared. the fully are within tions CSDP. NATO the and however, does not This mean, motiva strengthening that context of the in co-operation regional about closer thinking start to V4 partners prompted defence concepts the has smart and &sharing pooling ofThe the rise 1.2. vehicles. armoured deploy Pandur in acombat unit to readiness its expressed also aMovement side Theand has Czech Control team. platoon complete Cargo aMedium facilities with logistic and unit a helicopter unit, company, clearance disposal ed), explosive amine an as ordnance well as wound the transport to used be or STRATEVAC 319 can (where Airbus craft an component provide to MEDEVAC amedical and manage air and aCASA using have The pledged Czechs –350 troops. Hungary contribute to and troops – 400 Slovakia Republic troops, –800 Czech the state, framework the as troops 1,200 Poland would deploy decided that it Ultimately was capabilities. adequate tribute not did con part on their Hungary and Slovakia that fact by the created impasse Attitudes towards co-operation ------emphasised that an attack on any of its allies would be a challenge to its own own its to would achallenge be on of any allies its attack an that emphasised low, be to on territory its but it attack has of amilitary likelihood siders the con Austria, neutral the and NATO Republic,The allies neighbouring Czech 2.1. 2. probably group’s the be V4BG will created be to link. weakest Hungary’s and contribution the to limited, rather is develop co-operation such Poland, however, country’s to economic its the considering capacity situation, with co-operation to openness its declared explicitly has and initiatives pects Under Victor Orbán’s ex potentials. Hungary limited states’ rule, two of the because anything if initiatives, regional more any ambitious forceing behind ly relations), for (despite driv years bilateral the butbe in tensions it cannot Hungary and Slovakia between co-operation Military raised. been has Slovakia to policing air allied ideaample, extend to the Republic. For Czech the ex Poland and from proposals on co-operation concrete is probably defence. Bratislava counting financing to regard with determination lack elite The political Slovak given area. the in over responsibility take ally an letting and costs cut to capabilities defence) involveair up that certain giving concepts acquisitions, co-operation (joint more large-scale to relatively open is Slovakia initiatives. more ambitious towards attitudes respective their in metry asym However,great is a maintenance. there range or firing training military logistics, and on transport for co-operation, instance closer pursue will they that announced states have confidence. two The adverselymutual tive and affect not construc are far so co-operation military from siderably experiences while forces con now differ armed their countries, two of the separation following the Slovakia (V4+B3). co-operation eral involved be to states Baltic multilat in the wants also Prague 2011. in Sharing) Round Table Capabilities on (Regional Directors Ministry of Foreign Affairs meetings the initiated Czechs the formatthat European broader Central this in It for was Prague. important Slovenia also is and Croatia Austria, tion with join could (themotor Polish-Czech of Hungary V4), and Slovakia but co-opera about which with developingPoland, co-operation expectations significant Republic The has Czech interested. are they may join if countries other which projects it develop to prefers practice bilateral in co-operation, for multilateral THE CZECH REPUBLIC CZECH THE

Defence policy is a natural regional partner for the Czech Republic, but Czech for decades two the partner regional anatural is has developed smooth has ------63 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 64 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 defence budget, which are not backed by any specific defence concept. Experts defence concept.Experts defence by specific not budget, any backed are which the in led to deep cuts has however, reasoning experts, this to Czech According operation. allied the supporting with primarily tasked military Czech the with respect, forces this in allied count on and the threat, external an against try forces coun able defend be to the independently to armed own their expect do not The Czechs allies. its from receive assistance Republic will Czech the NATO in membership Republic that Czech the held conviction in astrongly There is purpose). of(the creation V4BG this serve could capabilities Europe’s expeditionary its Central including defence capabilities, would strengthen which and relations of transatlantic investment in akind as serve could that projects comeconcrete should Europe up with Central experts, Czech to security.According its diminishing itafactor views as and priorities US defence of strategy the change RepublicThe concerned about is Czech the area. this a success in was US defence access market the to direct companies Czech granting agreement of an signature USA – the the with co-operation ogy US point of view. puts a lot development on of Prague the emphasis of technol accept the no longer but projects, it uncritically will security USpate global in partici readily Republic The will Czech Washington. with relations its review to prompted Prague defence this project, missile on the Czechs the ation with presence on co-oper territory. its from However, US withdrew the military as aUS obtain to for years many striven it has security; European and of Czech United Republic States The the views Czech president Czech Václav defended Russia’s the and Klaus blame, position. to partly also was Tbilisi government in the that opposition argued leftist the side, while Georgian Topolánekthe centre-right backed government of Mirek scene. The political Czech the polarised war security. The Russian-Georgian territorial its to tory. threat However, adirect as does not Russia view Prague on terri its services secret Russian of the activity high sustained about the concerned economic Republic The also actors. is Czech by risky frastructures in critical manage that companies in of stakes acquisitions and key resources supplies of of the motivated disruptions politically of problems both include sources Potential of allies. its security the and security own its to athreat as services, secret Russian of the activity the and pressure, military nomic and eco a combination using political, of of asphere influence build to ambition Russia’s regards supplies. Republic The also Czech energy and resources gic strate in or interruptions infrastructure, critical to treats attacks, cyber as such threats of asymmetric risk pointed growing out the also security. It has and Article 5 safeguard the country’s security and that, if under threat, threat, under if that, and country’s the security 5safeguard Article and as its key partner and a guarantor aguarantor and keypartner its as ------ue, although according to the Czech Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministries, Ministries, Foreign Defence and Affairs Czech the to according ue, although added val generate should and co-operation savings may join. Regional tries coun other the which developmentfore projects the advocating of bilateral there is of Prague on major anumber obstacles. stumble could projects such V4, entire involving since projects the large have in consist to not necessarily However, format. does multilateral co-operation V4 the primary gard the as regional co-operation developing in regional interested keenly are The Czechs MATC. the to NATO.tion to V4BG likewise the to and refers This acontribu constitute time same at the can that actions ever, those to limited is CSDP. the under projects backs Its involvement, Republic formally Czech how NATO. The on within co-operation focused are Czechs the security, therefore region’s of the a guarantor stability, as but not its primarily The regarded is EU The Mi-17.the on pilots how operate to Afghan train will where they Afghanistan in mission the them for to prepare pilots andCzech forcourse Croatian training first the launched Czechs the 2012, In army, activities. among other Afghan the from pilots trains currently which centre Pardubice training the in based project is The helicopters. Mi the possess that among countries co-operation erational op and training in consists and Norway, Albania and Spain, as UK well the Force Helicopter involves Task which the Initiative, V4 then the and as states NATO’s have co-ordinating been they Force Helicopter Task 2009 HIP (HHTF) since years: for several training helicopter in have specialising been Czechs The Slovakia. to extended be to is invitation Hungary, an and with underway are talks project, on this apartner is Croatia instructors. and personnel ground of pilots, helicopter training for NATO countries the EU by the used and be to (MATC) Centre Aviation Training Multinational of creation the the concerns project important Another Afghanistan. in operation on now the focused are Czechs the defence in spending, recent deep cuts the and capabilities military limited their to Due USA. the with relations away strengthen to it also be to NATO in seriously, operations participation own considering their take Czechs complementary. the and reason, For important this equally are abroad tions view, Czech the involvement collective In defence and opera threat. in under come country the should assistance, of allied guarantees the of strengthening involvement ameans their as foreign operations treat in The Czechs allies. their on with depend co-operation will forces countries of those armed the aspects Consequently, some in specialise. to be Republic will Czech of size the the tries forces of option only coun armed for longer the the the in term, that predict CSDP CSDP does not feature prominently in debates on security and defence. and debates in on prominently security does not feature and re and ------65 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 66 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 one of the instruments of policy state one instruments of the as treated are and potential asmall possess 25–30,000 wartime) during Republic (21,700 and Forces Czech peacetime of Armed in the The troops 2.2. 2018. around aircraft Czech-made L-159A the ALCA chasing pur (in 2009) in interest expressed has Lithuania Policing, and Air Baltic in V4+B3 the in including have 39 jet JAS fighters The format. Czech participated states, Baltic the developing in with co-operation interested also is ernment gov The Czech Ireland. and Macedonia Croatia, Germany, Austria, public, also Re of Czech 2012), the (on from second half the includes, duty apart in which Groupthe composition Battle EU thein of reflected ber. also is approach This anewer to NATO experience its mem transferring partner amature scene as international the in Republic present to Czech itself the enables Croatia with Co-operation partners. regional their as particular, in Croatia including states, Balkan the and Germany, Austria regard also V4, Czechs the from the Apart missions. foreign for dures proce lengthy launch to having without state of another territory forces the in defencefor of the one’s one’s or state, use to another to armed country own some responsibility ordertransfer to laws in amend to possibility the cluding in allies, their regarding scope of on commitments the agree should closely co-operate to choosing countries the in parties parliamentary all that essary Republic, it Czech nec reasons). of is policy view the the In or due internal to of government following achange deliver to on commitments possible refusal ally’s the (such as ally on adecisionrely give to an in up and some capabilities problems involved political of the aware They co-operation. are closer of such consequences and feasibility about the questions raising been have also Czechs concluded Zbrojovka 2011). Poland’s Česká in ment and between Bumar The (e.g. sectors agree co-operation or arms jointthe discarded); be of the projects could units less effective ofthe (as which a result facilities training and ranges joint of use the firing institutions, among educational co-operation concern that mention projects usually Czechs the co-operation, to regional reference In longer it the in term).increase and evento defencespending maintain to efforts their in class political Czech NATO, of help the asection within may also commitments serving from apart on). Therefore, co-operation, insisting is developing regional Minister Finance the in defencespending (which for cuts more justification it as not should serve

Armed forces and the arms industry forces arms Armed the and . Since 2004, it has been aprofessional been it has . Since 2004, ------cision on the future of the JAS 39 fighters, on lease till 2015. A decision to extend extend 2015. A decisionto till 39 fighters, JAS on oflease the future cision on the de final the not yet has taken leadership The 1980s. Czech 1970s and the in made Czech-made Force machines and Soviet Air are of the aircraft remaining the component C-295) defence. ground (four However, of the CASA air and aircraft 39, L-159); hold applies equipmentforce (JAS same modern transport to units the air brigade. The tactical surveillance control and acommand, brigade and sile defence mis air brigades –an two as well as aircraft), Albatros L-39ZA training of of combat(a Mi-24/Mi-35 and asquadron combat squadron and helicopters Forces Land for support the and aircraft), L-159 ALCA training combatof and the andsquadron a aircraft defence fighter of multirole 39 (a Gripen JAS squadron of air charge in four squadrons component. a support are and At core its there Force The Air artillery). vehicles, fighting (infantry 1980s mid the to back date units Forces’ Land held by the DANA Most armament self-propelledthe howitzers. and vehicles fighting BMP-2 Republic, the Czech infantry the in upgraded tanks T-72M4CZ the to a lesser extent, and now put being into service; carriers, nel person wheeled II armoured Pandur equipment the includes modern relatively Forces’ Land levels equipment of vary. the The only NRF).The technological the NATO contribution its Republic’s to in Czech (and also the is speciality battalion protection WMD Liberec-based the that noting brigade. Itid worth response is arap nominally is level and of ahigh combat readiness it maintains battalion, airborne brigades, one an includes of which mechanised two core are At their The carriers). wheeled personnel and aircraft of new transport (the purchase operations multinational in part take to capability the expanding technically to limited and out have recent scattered years in been The carried upgrades aprofessional military. creating and capabilities developing expeditionary NATO to at adapting standards, aimed and year plemented of end this by the im be to Forces was which haveArmed completed largely reorganisation, its possible. The therefore Czech are spending military in cuts Further nance. government consolidate to public is fi current for The priority the activities. US$ 2.5 budget 80% of billion). the on spent is current lessto More than than 1.6% from of GDP again 1.1% to decreased ofit GDP (corresponding has 2011 in but late 2000s, 2009 since the in slightly increased spending Military size. its due to mainly capabilities, and potential alimited but with facilities logistic strong with equipped, and trained Forces well relatively are Armed The Czech sense. administrative and technical the in mainly branch aseparate is which component Force, (Support logistics the Forces), Air Forces and the Land and force. combat of component It the Forces), consists (Joint the includes which are the largest service branch of the Czech Armed Forces. Armed Czech of the branch service largest Forces the Land are includes a relatively well-developed a relatively includes (and versatile) combat component, ------67 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 68 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 they are not considered to be a prominent subject. Slovakia applies abroad Slovakia not subject. a prominent considered be to are they integrity, country’s the to territorial into account threats do take documents not is Defence policy amajor topicstrategic While of public debate Slovakia. in 3.1. 3. of production its abroad). (Česká 90–95% sales Zbrojovka sells Forces domesticproducts), with Armed it because dependent is on and export supply to their do try Czechs no major (althoughplacing recently the orders been has military the because difficult is capacity this However, maintaining Armed Forces. the needs of current the the pointfrom view of of sufficient are (VOP-25 of VOP-26)upgrades tanks and (LOM helicopters which Praha), and of and overhauls area the in (Era). capacity preserved have The also Czechs systems communication and (Ramet) (Retia), defencefor systems radars air electronics radio and launchers) multiple and missile for mortars also (Tatra, ammunition), wheeled chassis Europe), tank in ons (including ammunition of weap kind of this (Českáons Zbrojovka, manufacturers one largest of the light weap and arms of small Vodochody),– Aero manufacturers the are as of light combat aircraft conditions (e.g. market free in manufacturer well the doing quite are companies aerospace Theduction some Czech in segments. world-classpro to maintain potential the has industry arms Czech The equipment). military and armament heavy to transport no(as means it has theatre operation the to move to ability on site, limited but facilities with logistic own its tingent with deploy to independentcon arelatively ability even includes the This abroad. operations in participate to capability high arelatively Republic has Czech the military, Czech of the only. combined intopotential accountextent the Taking alimited to Forces wartime in Armed Czech of the potential the expand can abolished was conscription universal after created system The reserve limited. is operation land and acombined air defence of through country’s territory Forces engage to Armed short-term, Czech in of independent the The ability Forces. Armed Czech ofbeyond needs the the developing to aview upgrades) capabilities with servicing, (training, helicopters transport in still further give to up specialise to combat its and plans helicopters also Prague Defence Ministry. Czech by the agreed been have already extension conditions of the and The terms 2012. in already probably taken be will lease the SLOVAKIA

Defence policy - - - - erto enhanced its capacity to modernise the armed forces, will decline. Joint decline. forces, will armed the modernise to capacity its enhanced erto hith has which Europe, support) for Central financial (including US support budget that mean US military the in cuts policy. experts, Slovak to According defence and security to Union’s respect European of the aware with limitations are and Europe in of stability guarantor United States the be to consider the they as Europe, US presence in eroding concerned about the are experts vak Bay detainees). Slo Nevertheless, former Guantanamo receive to agreed three Obama’s Barack (for presidency on later during 2010 in example, Slovakia improved relations US-Slovak defenceSlovakia. in US missile ofelements the deployment head of the government, he of would the not allow he remained as asthat Fico (who long office in announced today) back is Minister Prime 2009, In links. transatlantic need preserve to broader context of the the USA in the NATO, with relations presents collectivedefence within and emphasises party, Smer-SD, of members. its Slovakia’s security the ruling NATO guarantees that it is that United for States stress to Europe’s more is willing security, and keyrole of the the emphasise to reluctant is leadership Slovak The current Russia. criticised strongly of Foreign Affairs Ministry Slovak the while ceasefire, sidered Russia’s for immediate an excessive be to called and reaction contime butthesame for provokedat conflict, having Georgia Ficothe blamed Robert minister prime Slovak the war Russian-Georgian the railway). During develop should economictries (e.g. broad co-operation gauge the by extending coun two the that argue left-wing party ruling the to links with it, experts cautious about quite right-wing are While co-operation. scope of circles such level, but ongoing debates bilateral are at the Russia about the with co-operate should they that believe also The NATO Slovaks Russia. between lations and re of partner chances foster to the it and with dialogue maintain to essary it nonetheless nec is country; predictable not is afully Russia experts, Slovak crisis). many gas to According the 2009 by affected heavily was (Slovakia rity supplies aproblem resource is secu country’s for ofsource energy the energy of territory. its However, Slovakia’s that dependence it on asingle recognises security the to NATO. in athreat as doesmitments not Russia view Bratislava of security.The Slovakia’sown priority deliver to on defence is com its policy for its significant as of NATO its partners security the it regards that clared de of collectivedefence, has and importance the emphasises Slovakia reason, NATO. For within this assured be only can security that and citizens, its and state of the objective of prime defenceliver policy, security the the i.e. ensure de independently to forces insufficient is of armed its potential the that aware is The country works, of proliferation destruction. weapons or the of mass cyber net and energy to threats includes This threats. security of definition ------69 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 70 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 considerably hamper joint projects. They believe that the modernisation and and modernisation the joint Theyconsiderably that projects. believe hamper V4 individual will equipment by possessed the members military ment and of arma disparity the that aware government. However, are experts Slovak centre-right previous the under games coalition the during defence spending in cuts further facilitate that of example measures an as even served tion has state’s the co-opera security.Regional enhancing presented as being rently cur are V4, the hitherto whose achievements veloping within co-operation de in interested also is defence. Slovakia and of security areas not the in only co-operation for regional partner RepublicThe Slovakia’s is Czech natural NATO projects. with complementary be will activities the getto which to involved extent CSDP the to only the in able be will Slovakia defence in spending, but, deep cuts due the to politically CSDP the decide back to government will Forces. current It the possible is that CSDP the towards attitude areserved demonstrated has Slovakia recent years In have becometions recently speciality. aSlovak of opera types two The latter or units. sapper protection, chemical gineering, deployment development on or the of the combat for offocus, units en instance, and one in domain, concrete should specialise country the that believe experts Slovak missions. expeditionary oriented towards are which investments those out only for carrying criticised been also It mission. has the from return they hoc formed deploys ad units country the a rule, As Forces foreign operations. in Armed of the participation of management its the at Groups. home for However, Battle criticised been the has and Slovakia NRF the Slovakia’s to refers Forces also contribution This to NATO operations. in EU and for involvement the Armed Slovak of crucial the are that projects modernisation placed on these also been has priority its addition, In Afghanistan. in especially recent years, presencein abroad up stepped military its has Slovakia spending, military in cuts Despite the reliability. its boosting position and international its policy, country’s element of strengthening the security foreign and important an ally, as an treated but as it deliveralso to on is commitments its for Slovakia a way is abroad operations in Participation collective its defence commitments. of to a devaluation leading tasks, its all not able be NATOfulfil to that will risk the create could this because 5 notshould extended be of Article interpretation works on the NATO’s During peripheries on in own. its its sible conflicts have pos manage to will EU the and at be risk, may also projects transatlantic , based on the assumption that it has no added value for the Slovak Armed Armed Slovak for no added value it the has that assumption on the , based new strategic concept, Slovakia argued that the the that argued concept, Slovakia new strategic , which are then dissolved once then are , which ------, NATINADS, should be seen as a project which has increasingly slim chances of chances slim increasingly has aproject which as seen be should NATINADS, The priority, second NATO’s in highest i.e. participation defence system air units). of other expense the at mainly happening is this situation financial ing forces (in adeteriorat multinational within serve to units prepare designed to (the primarily 2015 Model are programme). The changes NATO standards with compliance full at achieving aimed measures Forces continuing are Armed vak The Slo budget activities. on spent is current military of 85% the More than unchanged. or remain years, coming the probably in continue decrease to will (toyears 1.1% of overGDP (corresponding to slightly and US$ 2011 1 billion) in recent in decreasing been 1.5%has of2009, GDP around centred until was which spending, Western Military partners). their of joint with projects part as more or less regularly, mainly train readiness constant maintain that units (only systematically Forces train to Armed the do not and allow re-arming ing have hinder been constraints Financial potential. and capabilities limited with Forces). Training Forces’and The older of Armed equipment types, mostly the is Force), Air Forcesnent the component (the support Land and the (Support and compo operational of aprofessional It force been the It 2006. consists since has pointthe state’stheviewfrom of of significance of little are policy. and have potential limited wartime) during mobilisation through to expand ability limited Forces peace,with during troops (14,000 Armed Slovak The 3.2. co-operation. regional for partner unreliable arather be to country it considersthe Partnership, Eastern Kyiv’s in ambitions the Euro-Atlantic the backs and policy supports Bratislava while Ukraine, regards As co-operation. for security partners – as perience ex transformation its it transferring which to is Croatia Montenegro and also Serbia –but particular in including states, Western Balkan considersthe also Bratislava (UNFICYP). Cyprus in mission UN ofa joint the contingent part as it which maintains Hungary, with more with closely co-operated has Slovakia a less is probable (thoughscenario).defence capabilities this recent years, In giving someup of its domains, specific in specialise it will Lešť). Alternatively in range forces training special its use to convince to allies its trying been has –Slovakia (e.g. major investments do not training require and joint exercises which generate and savings that on projects focus to likely therefore is Slovakia at present. unrealistic is of this one beyondterm government, and the tending ex repayment periods with from loans would have financed acquisitions be to forces. New armed allied the for with co-operation opportunities improve the order to in equipment necessary is radar and aircraft replacement of land, Armed forces and the arms industry forces arms Armed the and ------71 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 72 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 systems, albeit on a smaller scale (Konstrukta, Metrodat). Metapol Group is (Konstrukta, scale on asmaller albeit systems, communication and equipment, optoelectronics radio-electronic manufacture also companies Slovak (ZVS, Konstrukta). missiles including of ammunition, (Technopol), of missiles providers as well a potentate), as manufacturers and is (ZTS corporation artillery and armour equipment, including military and of armament heavy manufacturers players The are 1980s. mid dominant the of standards technological representthe not Most of state-of-the-art. them but are munitions, weapons to products its and respect with Forces (mainly Land of needs the the to caters extent alarge to industry arms Slovak The contingent. multinational a or contingent country’s another in participation than other operations in part take to no ambitions has Forces However, abroad. Armed the use to military Slovak the capability the defence country’s develop to of continuing the is territory.wards The country or exclusively to oriented primarily nor it did capability develop other any wartime, during of troops number the increase to system not any did create Slovakia conscription, abolition of Following universal the symbolic. merely is operations Force’sout tactical short Air the as carry to support, ability allied dependent on fully are they operations, air country’s regards territory. As land defend the Forcesindependently to capabilities The have Armed Slovak limited country’s space. the air shields fully of long-range abattery (including which missiles) S-300 capability tively large component arela Thecombat defence ground though. helicopters, has of air Force The forces Air does not have regiment. any special the with operations in joint fleetMi-17 – used, of instance, is formentioning it is worth helicopters Thein operations. used are but them only four of aircraft, fighter MiG-29 ern mod relatively the are obsolete.units largely combat core ofand air At the the Force Air limited ofis the out. The potential carried being rent are overhauls cur and considerable, is upgrade to maintenance only potential the though mid-1980s. of the Even standards Soviet-made technological representthe and or Slovak either levels; are mostitems technological equipment at is various Land Forces’The Staff. General the to directly Forces subordinated is Land and the from separated operationally been has forces regiment special the that mentioning brigades. It worth is of well-developed two mechanised consists The Afghanistan. in equipment contingent of the to the serving limited are of situation Slovakia’s and force. ofnot equipment systematic Upgrades air are andtechnological financial deteriorating implemented, the being considering Land Forces Land are the main service branch of the Slovak military. Its core military. Slovak of the branch service main the are - - - - (KFOR, EUFOR ALTHEA), and is also involved in the mission in Afghanistan. involved Afghanistan. in mission also is the ALTHEA), and in EUFOR (KFOR, region the presence in military extensive arelatively has Hungary structures. into Euro-Atlantic integration their and Western ofBalkans the stabilisation on is the Its priority civil. and military both NATO missions, in EU and part takes NATO-EU Hungary fostering co-operation. and of security area the in integration of 2011) concerned deeper half (first Council EU the in Presidency Hungarian of defence. priorities the of One and the of security areas the in activity EU greater backs Budapest 4. Article under of consultations sibilities pos the of question expanding the raising been also has integrity. The country territorial of and independence, its sovereignty safeguards the being 5as cle vehicles and has offered 32 used helicopters. Hungary views NATO used helicopters. offered32 Hungary has and vehicles Humvee 14 with contingent Afghanistan in Hungarian the equipped has and donations, financial with Forces including recent years, in Armed Hungarian the supported The USA has partnership. strategic transatlantic acontinuing in and Europe US presence in a sustained in defence. interested is Budapest and United States considersthe Hungary states. European of Central interests into account the take should co-operation such that insists but NATO also Russia, between co-operation and advocates Budapest deeper them. possible as with relations close as maintain or to organisations two of the members become to full them neighbour which countries of the aspiration involvementthe is as up region, step to their the in NATO for security. It and Hungary’s for EU own its in is the important interests particularly be to neighbourhood of Western its Balkan stability the regards it. Budapest of danger disregarding low, be to of the itterritory warns although its against attack of aconventional armed likelihood the believes rity. Hungary secu cyber and energy country’s to the financial, threats to but points it also groups, radical actions of undemocratic the and migrations trafficking, drugs crime, organised disasters, industrial and natural terrorism, destruction, the proliferation of mass weapons of conflicts, regional as such threats global of It context. aware is security awider in threats considersmilitary Hungary 4.1. 4. importers. potential or Forces Armed the absence the from major of Slovak to due orders difficult is potential industry’s arms the Maintaining vehicles. fighting for packages infantry grade provides up that consortium aSlovak-Belarusian-Russian is this noteworthy; HUNGARY HUNGARY

Defence policy to be its key ally in the area of security of security area the in keyally its be to and Arti and - - - - 73 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 74 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 more or less regularly, mainly as part of joint exercises with their Western their with of joint exercises part as more or less regularly, mainly train readiness constant maintain that (only units the systematically train to has been not able and in re-arming, difficulties facing been it has constraints, financial Dueto capabilities. and potential limited offer equipment, which tary mili and of armament older types with equipped mainly is military garian Forces. deployed be The Armed Hun the may also support to Administration Public of and Justice (10,000 Ministry Guard troops) of Border the the tions, condi late 2006). in wartime In were dismantled branches service individual of Joint commands (the the to Forces separate Command directly subordinated combat units support and support Force, as well Air Forces as the Land and the policy. state’s pointthe theviewfrom of of significance of little are and potential, ed war), during mobilisation through have to alimit expand ited ability (19,000 lim peacetime, in Forces troops small Armed are Hungarian The 4.2. (e.g. AHungarian personnel pilot training). of military it conducts joint training Slovakia, With agreements. offramework EU, NATO bilateral or the under and co-operation regional pursues Budapest the project than the other V4 other the members). project than the V4BG less involved is of actively creation the (Hungary the to approach tious in ambi an adopting country’s from prevents economic Hungary which situation impededby seriously the sors. been However, for has co-operation potential the left-wing its V4, predeces the than within especially co-operation, on regional emphasis put greater has The government Orbán of Viktor Western Balkans. NATO that “open keep its should doorplace policy” in for arguing the been has V4 the in It also forum. states, of Western Balkan aspirations Euro-Atlantic the need support to the emphasised has Budapest Serbia. and Croatia with eration developing is defence close countries). co-op also Hungary three by the created Slovenia (the and Group Italy Group asuccessor is of with aformer joint brigade Battle EU Italian-led an in participating been Sincehas 2007,a mission. Hungary ever, never deployed engaged itbeen been joint has it in while has exercises, on How 2000. in operational became agreement a1998 under created battalion ing peacekeep ARomanian-Hungarian lacking. are regulations legal relevant the because situation deployed acrisis in practically be could unit the if it unclear is riverfor region Tisa adecade, but the in disaster event of the in anatural sponse for have working on joint been methods re Those commands countries’ 2002. in battalion engineering Tisa the jointly created Ukraine and Slovakia mania, Hungary, 2001. since Ro Cyprus in mission UN on the served has -Slovak unit Armed forces and the arms industry forces arms Armed the and They They of have consist a professional been force 2004. since with all of its neighbours within the the within of neighbours its all with - - - - - ------

to significantly expand the number of troops in wartime, nor has has it developednor wartime, in troops theof number expand significantly to system but alternative not any conscription, it created has universal abolished has Hungary operation. regular ashort through country’sfend the territory de Forces independently to capabilities have Armed limited The Hungarian facilities. training using mainly exercise pilots copter pilots, Hungarian heli transport 39 and JAS –exceptfor noteworthy is the programme training pilot development constrained concept of Hungary’sForce. Air The drastically entire up the successors make of their acquisitions 17 or helicopters potential worn-out of upgrades the Mi-8/Mi- and lease Gripen JAS of the extension an fighters put MiG-29 were out modern relatively At present service. of the costs, of 1970s-1980s. need cut to the to Due standards technological the represents 2012) equipment in 2026 to mostof the extended was agreement (theden lease from Sweleased aircraft ment. 39 Except forfighterstate-of-the-art JAS the control regi support and command and asignal and regiment defence missile air helicopters), Mi-8/Mi-17 an include the and helicopters also and transport Mi-24 the base combat helicopter (the and aircraft) fighter multirole Gripen 39 (JAS base aircraft fighter the bases: two in organised are defence troops air crisis). Air and ForceThe financial by the mid-2000s, interrupted butthe was in launched was carriers personnel BTR-80 armoured of upgrade the (a limited needs current to out response in carried are Upgrades unclear. are ernisation now obsolete The the for priorities and D-20 gun-howitzers. mod carriers personnel service), in BTR-80A armoured the (only remain 14 T-72M tanks equipment quantity. the Basic includes in decreasing are they 1980s; and mid- of the standards technological the represent and made, and -designed Soviet- all equipment are military and armament brigades. heavy Their try The core of the ground component Forces The ground Joint core of of the the moment. at the unclear are take Forcesdevelopment will Armed of the future the directions The aircraft). 39 fighter JAS for the missiles guided the work and station on radar NATINADS third of the construction the armament, of new acquisitions suspended has (Hungary contingent Afghanistan in garian Hun of needs the meet to the what to necessary is have limited upgrades been constraints, However, NATO to re-arm. and financial of because within the interoperability its Forces 2016 to increase to plan is reform Armed tive of the 2016, from 1.39% to objec of GDP it, starting The by principal 2022. increasing level 2013–2015 in to current at and the spending keeping to military itself ted commit has Hungary budget activities. on spent is current military of85% the 1.0% to billion). of2007 GDP nearly to (corresponding More US$ 2011 1.4 than in 1.3% from recent years in of decreased GDP has in spending Military partners). consists of infan two consists ------75 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 76 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 a declaration of intent, and not a basis of real change in the arms sector. arms the in change of not ofreal abasis and intent, a declaration as mainly treated be should the plan situation, financial try. Given current the indus state’s the arms Forces role expand to the in and Armed of needs the the to cater to of domesticmanufacturers ability the enhance tive to is of which objec the Plan, Modernisation Industry Arms its released Defence Ministry the Forces 2012, equipment. In on would imported Armed have entirely rely to of the modernisation Apotential 39. JAS for the of armaments types basic the i.e. AGM-65 for one centre of missiles, the Maverick maintenance and a service opened (Csepel, Raba). Raytheon 2008 units In protection WMD and troops ing equipment for and vehicle engineer Videoton) as well as Radiant, (ArmKom, mid-1980s radio-electronics of include, primarily, the and standards nological tech Forces. representthe Its Armed products of the needs tocatering the not is capable and of potential asmall has industry arms Hungarian The countries. of or other those tingents con multinational in participation to foreign to deployment limited is regard Forcesploy However, on Armed its foreign missions. level of the with ambition country’s working territory. to develop to de It capabilities its continually is defence of orthe exclusively towards oriented primarily capability other any ------ing that otherwise Ukraine will find itself in the Russian sphere influence. of the Russian in find itself will Ukraine otherwise that ing EU, NATO fear joining the and of Ukraine prospect the backed consistently has – Romania minorities of national rights the for over example respecting – countries two the between exist Even tensions though Ukraine. with tions Romania’s rela determines context also The Russian Transnistria. separatist in troops presence of Russian to the have objecting and been integrity ritorial principle of byMoldova’s the stand The Romanians ter Russia. and Romania between of rivalry area Union Soviet aspecial 1940, is in the to lost by Romania of Moldova, NATO’s defence system. criticism tinued amissile build to plans con its Forces and on Europe Conventional in Armed Treaty the from drawal because of also Russia’sand with theCaucasus, and Transnistria in conflicts” “frozen of involvementbecause Moscow’s so-called or indirect the in direct region Sea Black of asource problems the as in Russia views also Romania crime. organised and development programmes, the of missile destruction, of proliferation weapons the of mass terrorism, international counts Romania gion). However, among which level generates of high arelatively itthreat, also re Caspian the from transit velopment resources of goods and (the prospects economic achieve to USA) de and the with co-operation through (including position the country’s international to build offers opportunities East Middle the and region Sea Black the Romania’s Western Balkans, the location between lobbiedhas for Moldova’s Turkey’s and EU. the in membership advocate of Ukraine’s Georgia’s adetermined been and accession NATO, to and has Romania reason, For region. this entire of the security the enhance to and influence own its expand to opportunity an as this viewing area, that ence in pres i.e. up EU region, Sea astepped US and Black of the “internationalisation” for an calling been It region. Sea has Black of asource problems the as in – and rivalry this the object of Moldovabeing neighbouring of affiliation geopolitical the –with arival as Russia views traditionally United States. Romania the with partnership strategic the deepen to –and security mania’s understood broadly of Ro pillars –the EU NATO country’s in the consolidate the and membership objective The of priority Romania’s East. Middle to defence is policy the in more and, recently, also Western Balkans the region and Sea Black the in of context Romania’schallenges strategic theThe by defined is policy 1.1. 1. IV. ROMANIA

Defence policy ROMANIA AND BULGARIA ------77 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 78 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 take new threats into account, including the challenges related to the security security the to related challenges the into account, including new threats take NATO however, security.It its has, that should erably enhance stressing been consid to on defence territory its system) (the missile of NATO infrastructure organisation’s the 5as cle foundation.deployment It considersthe of elements NATO’s advocates maintaining Romania of pro-US Romania’s line the weaken foreign policy. would thus and area, foreign policy into the expanding disputes internal the president in may result centre-right the government centre-left and place mid-2012 the since between in been has that war political of the States. However, dynamics and scale the United the with relations close need preserve to about the a broad consensus maintained has elite political Romanian decades, the two ForEurope. last the involvement US in diminishing Western the from benefiting is country the since a threat, than rather opportunity an as Romania in seen is strategy curity US se of The the ongoing East. Middle transformation potentially, the in and, region Sea Black the Afghanistan, in operations for support the logistic and transit providing Europe, South-Eastern in partner mostimportant single the is For region. US, Romania positionthe its the in strengthening afactor be to United States the with co-operation considers its gence Romania co-operation. of Romania’s Forces, modernisation intelli close the Armed and in assistance US financial exercises, joint includes military USA also the with Co-operation Deveselu.in airfield at the defence system, US missile of the part forms which deployment launcher, on concluded agreement SM-3 the of an an missile tries coun two the 2011 in previously, and, and, Iraq) in deployed Afghanistan in for bases US troops logistics and transit as serve port sea Constanța the and airfield (the Kogălniceanu Force Task initiative of the East part as bases tary US forces it access mili its to which granted under agreement an signed nia Roma 2006 In relations. military close maintain countries two ner, the and defence part and UnitedThe Romania’s security States is mostimportant resources).pian Romania’s EU’s become to with the (in connection aspiration gateway for Cas security energy and economic problems by caused the crisis, corruption, tions, institu mania’sstate ineffective to security.These related include: issues concept of understood broadly come Ro into the also factors internal Finally, high. is region the in offence destabilisation policy, risk the which to according of assumptions Romania’s de original the –it reaffirmed only tion of threats percep the Romanian didaffect not conflict tory. The Russian-Georgian 2008 of terri its security the to threat adirect poses Russia it does not that believe region, problems the generating in be to considersRussia Romania While military character and regards Arti regards and character military ------- - - -

licing with Bulgaria (September 2012). It also seeks to continue and to extend 2012). (September extend to continue to and seeks Bulgaria It also with licing po on agreement air an signed also it has Croatia; and Bulgaria with aircraft fighter jointly to purchase willingness its signalled has equipment –Romania military and of armament joint ofin is purchases co-operation area ferred longest EU. and one deepest Its of the pre recessions in the triggered has nia Roma in which economic due crisis, the to at region mainly present, the in co-operation military and need for political the closer recognises Romania Slovakia. and gary Hun Ukraine, with battalion engineering “Tisa” Hungary, the and with talion joint bat peacekeeping the in by participating neighbours its with co-operates also Romania countries. Sea Black the of navies of all the exercise an SEAFOR, BLACK in part it ayear takes twice by Turkey Furthermore, initiated 2004. in Harmony, Sea operation Black anti-terror in an part taking been it2009 has e.g.region, Sea the since Black in co-operation regional to significance political Group Italian-Romanian-Turkish (2010). the Battle great and attaches Romania 2007) Cyprus, and (withGreece, BG Bulgaria Groups: Balkan Battle the two in participates and initiative EUBG the It backs Portugal. and Spain Netherlands, Force Italy, (EGF) by France, co-created Gendarmerie the European ofber the amem been it 2009 has since context; European the in police, including tary the developmentmili to the of significance great sovo). attaches also Romania Ko from withdrawal considerably the and (due defence in spending cuts to Kosovo), in mission subsided involvement its has but missions EU currently in deployedsonnel (due EULEX on missions EU contribution the to large to its of per number largest third the had foundation of 2010 security.In Romania the be should relations transatlantic NATO strong astrong and that phasises it em EU, time but the same at the consolidate position its it within which can CSDP contribution its the to treats Romania neighbourhood. its in stability and curity of se area an away build to are of NATO’s for which Bucharest partnerships, the the developmentto and door“open policy” significance great attaches also Romania NATO to Forces, them standards. adapting Armed and the training and modernising in helpful It USA. also is the with alliance element of the an as –and of Romania NATO’s cohesion security and hence the –and reliability contribution enhancing to important TO’s an as regarded is foreign operations NA in participation it. The country’s with petition sustained considerable and defence, collective to not com complementary in and as foreign operations in NATO’s views Bucharest though. 5, involvement covered by Article also be to for them not called has Romania threats. supplies cyber resource and of energy as an important instrument with with instrument important an as ------79 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 80 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 representing the technological standards of the mid-1980s. The Piranha III III mid-1980s. of the The Piranha standards technological the representing Forces’ items Land most of levels equipment of the vary, the with technological The branches. service other the from comprise units Forces also Special that core of the the as it since mentioning serves worth also is forces regiment The special recruited. are Afghanistan combat in in operations part taking alia role inter as, brigades play aspecial brigades). infantry The mountain infantry mountain two brigades, including general of into brigades (a nine total structured divisions three At core its are military. Romanian of the branch service largest Forces the Land are The limited. be mostlikely scope will their and planned than later attained be objectives will the therefore, plans; those the implementationhindered of has funding level. Insufficient technological equal an achieve to and become independentof relatively and allies, its bilities capa expeditionary its increase to capabilities develop to logistic expected is equipment –by 2015. it By 2025, military and armament to regard with – also NATO standards with compatibility Forces. full achieve set to TheyArmed are of the modernisation implementing athree-step currently is Romania tivities. GDP, ac budget on spent is current 2011). billion military i.e. 90% of US$ the 2.4 (from 1.5% recent years in of GDP 1.3% to 2007 decreased in has of spending tary Romania’s with joint Western in allies). exercises Mili usually basis, a regular on train forces units well-developed relatively special the and readiness stant con maintain that (only units the training prevented have systematic and also re-arming, their have hindered constraints Financial ofmostly older types. equipment, but military and of Forces armament have quantities Armed large The Romanian branches. service different among the distributed operationally nevertheless are which Command, Joint the Logistic under structures support Navy) Force component Forces, the and Air and operational (the Land the an of policy state instrument an as treated are and have potential alarge wartime) during 153,000 peacetime, during Forces troops (73,000 Armed Romanian The 1.2. co-operation. for military partner est” Romania’s Poland Finally, is exercises. “young relatively onoperation military develop to intends co- Bucharest which with partner main the Serbia is kans, Western Bal the In migration. illegal and terrorism combating defence and of missile domains the in especially important is co-operation This region. Sea Black the in Turkey with co-operation keypartner its it which as sees military Armed forces and the arms industry forces arms Armed the and . They were professionalised in 2007. Forces. They in were professionalised The include Armed , the units from which the battalions battalions the which from units , the ------the capacity to manufacture and upgrade aircraft, including combat aircraft, combat aircraft, including aircraft, upgrade and manufacture to capacity the has also industry arms Autonoma, MFAgie Roman, SA Mizil). The Romanian Re Ratmil company (Mecanika, RomArm state-controlled of the umbrella the under operate all ammunition and arms small artillery, of tanks, facturers of acquisition Western manu licences. by The the achieved been largest ing despite some improvements hav technologically it lags behind that is though, disadvantage, industry. Its main awell-developed arms has Romania support).independent contingent logistic own its (with Forces deploy to develop should Armed an acapability Romanian the future, good. relatively In also is abroad operations in part take to capabilitiy Their operations. engage to well-prepared irregular in Forces also are Armed nian Roma the warfare, mountain as such some In respects, allies. its from port dependent on sup Romania making limited, highly is dependent operations Force’s The Air Sea. Black engage to Romania’s the in in in ability interests secure to and defence country’s of the territory regular ensure dependently in to well-prepared relatively Navy are Forces the Land and The Romanian theDanube. on flotilla fleet, butriver have mid-1980s).it does strong the a no submarine has Romania of standards conditions (even Sea technological Black the it though represents for modern relatively is 7corvettes) which and frigates (3 capability strike not high yet arelatively defenceponent resolved. has been of Navy has The air new com F-16s. 24 and ground used of the 24 The ofa total question upgrading to buy plans has improves, situation Romania financial Forces the (provided buy to Force aplan 15 F-16Armed used Air disclosed Dutch the from jet fighters NATOwith joint Force’s forces) Junethe Air 2012 In the is challenge. greatest have (which not been approved aircraft for fighter operations Lancer MiG-21 successors obsolete for the the Choosing contingentfor Afghanistan). the in support of ensuring purposes for the (mainly apriority as upgraded being are the helicopter fleet and units airlift the constraints: financial despiteyears the recent in Force obsolete. largely Air is were Some undertaken by the upgrades brigade. The equipment held missiles air to asurface and combat squadrons Force five Air are core of At the the units. combat support component also and Force Air industry. acomprehensively The includes developed domestic arms of the products on the reliant Forces’ are plans Land upgrade the ghanistan), Af in mission of the purposes for the mentioneders above mainly (which are carri personnel armoured of Exceptacquisition for the upgraded. the being currently or are upgraded, been have items Forces. only partly Land Other held state-of-the-art only by items the the are carriers personnel armoured ------81 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 82 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 example, Bulgaria has firmly backed Georgia’s territorial integrity and has has and integrity Georgia’s backed territorial firmly has Bulgaria example, Sofia’sdo that not mean thesame. Forand Moscow’s are positions security on Russia war). with good relations However,sian-Georgian traditionally the Rus 2008 forthe negotiations peace during ground aneutral as serve could West deteriorate (e.g. Russia the and between territory its it suggested that relations amediator should Turkey, itas act could with that declared has and co-operation of military wary is context –Bulgaria strategic ception of the the 19 the “Turkish yoke” of the itself in freed and independence gained country the whose under patronage Russia, with good had relations historically has ia Bulgar were made. cuts deepest the defence that sector the in it was set in, crisis –when the importance of being secondary as treated are issues policy security. Defence energy enhanced and corruption, and crime bat organised ways effective to com as such concerns security include: internal Bulgaria for of issues importance Other regions. Sea Black the and Western Balkans into the organisations of these enlargement the EU, support to and the and of Bulgaria’s NATOority country’s in consolidate to the is policy membership The pri East. Middle the from Bulgaria’s attack in apossible is view missile threat military Thesignificant only threats. military to significance greater no attaches security, and understood broadly to its threats main the – to be pressure or migration asudden smuggling crime, of organised rise the ing – includ regions of those a to possible related destabilisation risks military non- considers Bulgaria East. Middle the and Sea Black the Balkans, ern West the “unstable” regions: neighbourhood oflocation three the in of context Bulgaria’s strategic thecountry’sThe by defined is policy 2.1. 2. level. technological adequate an attain shipyard), Romania’s in but not able it been service Navyto has (the Mangalia in currently vessel types the all building in experience has industry building Optica). (Pro The ship optoelectronics and Martin) Lockheed with operation co- in Systems licence),(Elprof, (UTI aBritish working under stations radar licence), aGerman systems working communication under ktromagnetica, (Ele systems and communication forcommand vehicles, fighting electronics aRolls-Royce working under licence), (Aerofina),canica, radio missiles guided (Turbome Forces, engines Land for Romaero), the (IAR), helicopters aircraft produces components armament (Avioane, also which Aerostar, aircraft and BULGARIA

Defence policy th century. Those experiences continue to influence the Bulgarian per the Bulgarian continue century.influence to Those experiences ------in Afghanistan). However, major political parties in Bulgaria (the centre-right Bulgaria However, in parties major Afghanistan). in political up stepped involvement its has (e.g. foreign missions in garia contingent the Bul defence in spending, deep cuts very the and economicDespite crisis the prestige. Forces, international away of build to Armed its professionalism and the enhance to instrument an NATO, as also within and on commitments its a way to deliver as operations international in participation its treats Bulgaria NATO application not should veto to right plans. have the member of the those asingle principle that the championed has and states, member for all plans creation the ofcalled contingency for has precise. It not sufficiently sions are provi its out pointing that been it for has security.Nevertheless, its damental” In In region. the in defence system US missile ofelements the deployment the of US involvement through greater Europe in South-Eastern in resulting actually of is Western US presencewhich Europe, in transformations the in phase natural as Bulgaria in seen is policy US security of the direction new the and balanced, been has US defence doctrine the in change the to action Bulgaria’s USA. the re of with working together tradition short relatively has country the that fact the and probably is potential Bulgaria’sfor this smaller reason of the Part butregion, however, prefers, Romania. with co-operation the in partner important an Forces. as TheArmed United Bulgaria States views Bulgarian of the modernisation the in US assistance and cludes joint exercises in also Co-operation Iraq). to also ly, years, previous (and in East Middle the to potential and, moved for being Afghanistan to centres US troops training and logistics as serve currently facilities the and Force Task the East, concerning agreement a2006 USA under the to available infrastructures military its made The for Macedonia. support its may withdraw Bulgaria that There have signals been relations. of their asource tensionin also language) are aseparate as of Macedonian status the into question called having (Bulgaria language and history shared cate of Macedonia’s EU, countries’ NATO two in the but and the membership advo an been also has to security. Bulgaria respect with closely operating have co- states been two leader, the but currently of Balkan status for the Serbia competed with historically has Bulgaria structures. Euro-Atlantic the now in is embedded Bulgaria that fact the into question does notwhich call to position, butway Sofia does in a it international its strengthen to for Bulgaria Moscow away is deployed with good territory. its relations Emphasising in defence system missile of possible elements the consent having to expressed NATO, is Bulgaria’s most important security partner. Bulgaria Bulgaria partner. United security Bulgaria’s is States mostimportant Bulgaria has been emphasising the importance of Article 5 as “fun 5as of Article importance the emphasising been has Bulgaria ------83 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 84 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 weapons sectors). weapons light and electronics (the optical, industry for arms its opment opportunity defence at adevel one as of Bulgaria’s and smart established) be universities for centre aspecial position (it proposed that has international its tive boost to defence initia smart the use to trying also been has Bulgaria respect. this in Serbia with co-operation military developingbeen close has and ranges firing its “internationalise” to seeks also Bulgaria multi-rolecluding aircraft. fighter equipment, in military and of armament on co-operate joint purchases also might have they pointed they out and that consultations, intergovernmental for annual a mechanism established NATO. states ner in two the late 2011, In Sofia’s as part regarded being main increasingly is Bucharest Romania. with 2012, in Greece and, with policing on agreement air an signed 2010,In Bulgaria region. the in co-operation for military closer impulse provided an has crisis Turkey. with co-operation The military economic in more interested becoming is Bulgaria that mean by could Turkey initiated operation –this terror 2004 in anti- Harmony Sea the Black in part taking in interest an expressed Sofia that 2011 in only it was state). Sea hand, Black other each the vessel from On navy involving operations one humanitarian and of rescue exercise es (a biannual exercis BLACKSEAFOR the in part takes country the region, Sea Black the In (SEECP). smuggling and terrorism crime, organised and cross-border bating com security, including of internal involved area the also in co-operation in is Bulgaria Western Balkans, on territory. the its In established be to quarters lobbied has head brigade forand SEEBRIG for the the command a permanent creation the of advocating been has Bulgaria initiative. flagship the is Italy and Turkey Romania, Greece, Macedonia, Albania, with co-created Bulgaria which Brigade(SEEBRIG), Europe The South-Eastern partners. Western Balkan co-operation develop to regional closer seeking is Bulgaria NATO’s structures. command of it duplicate could that functions the arguing headquarters, operational EU of creation a permanent opposed the NATO. has Bulgaria within capabilities development the to threat tions), apotential seesCSDP as time but same at the involvement high (hence relatively its EU opera the EU in in membership its CSDP the in participation views Bulgaria involvement. Forces foreign military and Armed of the model expeditionary about an less opposition is enthusiastic which leftist the by criticised been has This capabilities of Bulgaria’sexpansion expeditionary an advocating actively been has power 2009, in since GERB, abroad. operations in country’s on the BSP) post-communist participation disagree the and GERB mainly as a means of consolidating of consolidating ameans as mainly mainly with its its with mainly ------an air defence missile brigade and a radio-technical regiment), however it aradio-technical is brigade and defence missile air an squadron, mixed and one fightersquadrons Force (three Air large relatively is The modernisation. and Forces’ Land for maintenance available the funding most of the consume brigade, will entire of an engagesity, potential the will by neces which, kind of of this aunit maintenance The and months. creation six every rotate to possibility the with level unit, tactical of amultinational NATO acomponent in as operations part soldiers)take could that one thousand (of group battle approximately battalion core) expeditionary the an as serving brigades Forces one (with mechanised equip of form to and the Land is the only. of extent overhauled alimited to and modernisation for The priority the 1970s-1980s the to back dating by Soviets, built of designed and items primarily brigade) operations whose equipment consists aspecial brigadeand infantry brigades, alight four well-developed core brigades (two are mechanised their At military. Bulgarian the in branch biggest Forces the service Land are The out. carried be forces will multinational within co-operate to units selected at preparing aimed projects most important the only straints, con However, more plemented,variants. modest in financial due albeit to the im be to are programme 2004 provided for the projects mostof in the which 2011–2020, years for under plan the investments adopted anew military garia Bul 2011 reduced. In being reforms of the scale the in havetions resulted only condi Forces financial deteriorating to 2015 Armed adopted; the was Bulgarian the of the modernisation for programme first when the 2004 since unchanged have remained have taken Forces’ Armed transformations the that directions forces. multi-national The within operate to units selected prepare to marily couple implementedThe last changes over have of the intended pri years been NATO. with interoperability levels and of compatibility expected the attain not able Forces been to have Armed still The Bulgarian activities. on current budget spent is military 90% of the GDP, More than 2011. in i.e. million, US$ 760 of of GDP 1.4% to 2007 2.4% from in recent years in decreased has spending tary Bulgaria’s with Western Mili jointpartners). exercises during mostly much, Forces (the do Armed not train level adverseonof the impact training an had have and re-arming problems have hindered Financial olderment types. are equip military and Navy. ForceForces, the Air and armament the Most of the Land Theyof the consist wartime. during reserves place mobilise to in no plans has of it policy. state 2008 mostlikely in professionalisation Following their instrument an as treated are they the and small, is potential their time; Forces- of peace during have Armed 26,100 troops atotal Bulgarian The 2.2.

Armed forces and the arms industry forces arms Armed the and ------85 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 86 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 tions equipment (Samel-90PLC), all relatively low-tech. The Bulgarian arms equipment arms tions (Samel-90PLC), low-tech. relatively The all Bulgarian communica Group, and (Opticoelectron Optix) instruments optical as well as (Vazovski Zavod), missiles unguided and (Dunarit) bombs tion (Arcus), aircraft plant), light weaponsexplosives (the and Arsenal (Videx JSC),arms ammuni 1970s-1980s. of small the include Its products standards technological the ing on equipment older, based represent designs Soviet military and arms lighter produces which industry developed arms arelatively well has Bulgaria contingent. tional state’s of another multina part as only missions such in ablebe participate to Forces Ultimately, abroad. operations will Armed in the part take to bilities process of developing the Forces in capa are Armed territory. The Bulgarian defence or of exclusively the to country’s primarily related capabilities other nor it is developing any Forces wartime, of size during Armed its the expand to not asystem did create Bulgaria conscription universal only. abolishing After level tactical the concerns and residual out is independentoperations carry Force to Air independent defence of of the country’s ability territory,the and engage to Forces short-term, in ability have Armed alimited The Bulgarian forces. multinational within to operate ability its intendedenhance to are fleet of the radio-navigation equipment the upgrade to Navy. undertaken The measures of its forces part as decided not submarine any keep to has Bulgaria 6 months. for one available NATO for ordermake to operations in 3to frigates the to bility NATO’s capa operational forces. Bulgaria’s naval full now restore to is priority with interoperability relative Navy achieve to the enabled newest, they not the frigates). missile were vessels Even the though three (including items tured some Western-designed manufac and acquired recently it as has branches, service other the equipment to than respect with situation better aslightly in Navy is role the Bulgaria’s in Despite asecondary playing defence doctrine, Typhoon or F-16) decade. of the second half the eight in by 2015 another and (most probably used Eurofighter aircraft eight fighter multirole purchase to is priority The helicopters. current and aircraft new include transport tions possible. extent Recent acquisi greatest the to Force modernised being Air is components The long-range Russian-made – due to the systems. missile S-300 remaining the –when with compared capabilities high arelatively defence has componentground The air readiness. of operational fighters)MiG-29 maintain VolokhovS-75 five (including missiles). types Twelve of all combat aircraft Soviet-made mostly is fighters, Forces, designed(MiG-21bis and armament its Land ofnot the amajor case force the capable in of As independentoperation. ------equipment (Terem EAD). force navy and air and tanks as equipment such military and armament heavy maintain overhaul to and capacity a limited Forces.country’s has It Armed also of needs able its is meet to the industry arms Bulgarian the segment, market to less-developedthat In for countries. export destined are Most products (STANAG). meet NATO standards Bulgaria in manufactured arms of the part (Terem). a licence MT-LB forSoviet under vehicles the carrier Only personnel fighting produce to light capacity tracked technological the has also industry Text completed early September 2012 Text early completed September 87 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 88 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 CIS C forces allied the and states forces Baltic of the armed the tween be interoperability at enhancing aimed and states Baltic the in organised ing BRTE ayear twice at least exercises countermeasure mine and conducts joint humanitarian which rescue, sea nia) Turkey, Russia, Roma (Ukraine, states Sea Bulgaria, Black the Georgia, of all – BLACKSEAFOR of SNMCMG1 it states; part forms Baltic of the vessels warfare mine of the asquadron BALTRON Squadron, Naval –Baltic of NATINADS it states; part forms Baltic the ering BALTNET States Policing Air Baltic Estonia Tartu, located states; in partner and Latvia Lithuania, Estonia, BALTDEFCOL B of NATO states airspace member the in situation onmation the ASDE Joint Forces Europe Allied in oneof eight Corps, Rapid offormations NATO’s Reaction the –Allied ARRC ABC A ABBREVIATIONS AND OFGLOSSARY NAMES APPENDICES – Commonwealth of Independent States of Independent Commonwealth – – atomic, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction destruction weapons of mass chemical –atomic, biological and – Baltic Region Training Event, a series of NATO exercises and train Event, of and NATO aseries exercises Region Training –Baltic – Air Situation Data Exchange, a programme for the exchange of infor exchange for the aprogramme Exchange, Situation Data –Air – Baltic Air Surveillance Network, an airspace control system cov control system airspace Network, an Surveillance Air –Baltic – Baltic Defence College, a military academy forfrom officers Defence College, – Baltic a military formation of the naval forces naval Force, formation of Naval Sea hoc the ad Black an – NATO Air Defence Quick Reaction Alert in the Baltic Baltic the in Alert Reaction Defence –NATO Quick Air - - - - -

JFTC J territory its forces across or NATO moving deployed the to allied territory its in HNS H Kosovo in mission ing EUBG CSDP of is Lisbon Treaty ESDP states Baltic Nordic and the to addressed programme e-PINE defence projectedNATO system into the missile incorporated be to system EPAA gendarmerie military of the capabilities the at enhancing EGF EDA E CSDP CFSP CoE agement EULEX Kosovo EULEX Althea EUFOR CMX of Excellence –NATO of Excellence Centre – European Gendarmerie Force, an initiative of EU Member States aimed States aimed ofForce, Member EU initiative an Gendarmerie – European – European Defence Agency –European – Host Nation Support, civil and military assistance provided by the host nation host nation provided by the assistance military and –Host Nation Support, civil – Joint Force Training Centre, NATO training centre in Bydgoszcz, in centre Poland NATO Centre, –Joint training Force Training – Crisis Management Exercise, an annual NATO exercise in crisis man crisis in NATO exercise annual an Exercise, Management –Crisis – Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union Policy European of the –Common Foreign Security and – European Security and Defence Policy, and by the introduced new name Security the –European – Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union Defence Policy European and of the –Common Security – European Phased Adaptive Approach, part of the US missile defence US missile of the Adaptive part Approach, Phased – European – European Union Battle Group Union Battle –European – Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe, a US Department of State aUS Europe, Department Northern in Partnership –Enhanced – European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina Union and Force –European Bosnia in – European Union Kosovo, of Rule in polic LawMission EU –European the - - 89 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 90 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 serving the purposes of the OEF and ISAF missions in Afghanistan; it connects it connects Afghanistan; in missions ISAF OEF and of the purposes the serving NDN Norway (framework Sweden) and nation: Estonia Finland, NBG of parliaments members as well as ministries the from directors political states, of secretaries levels of of at heads government, ministers, the meetings regular with Estonia) Latvia, (Lithuania, states Norway, Baltic the and Iceland) Finland, NB8 Organization Treaty Atlantic North – NATO Defence System –NATO Air Integrated NATINADS N Croatia and Republic, Slovakia Czech of Poland, the initiative ated at the MNMPBAT disaster byfected anatural af area an or abattlefield from injured of the facilities medical to portation MEDEVAC gian territory equipment Norwe in military and armament Corps’ storage US Marine of the MCPPN Republic Czech the in established being currently personnel, ground for and pilots helicopter MATC M Kosovo in operation –KosovoKFOR Force, military aNATO-led international K ground JTAC – a format of regional co-operation between the Nordic states (Sweden, Nordic states the between co-operation – aformatof regional – Nordic Battlegroup, a European Union Battle Group Union formed by Battle Sweden, aEuropean – Nordic Battlegroup, – Joint Terminal Attack Controller, a soldier guiding air strikes from the the from strikes air Controller, asoldier guiding Attack – Joint Terminal – Northern Distribution Network, supply a network of Distribution ground routes – Northern – Multinational Aviation Training Centre, a NATO training institution institution aNATO Centre, training Aviation Training –Multinational – Marine Corps Prepositioning Program Norway, for the Program aprogramme Prepositioning Corps –Marine – Medical Evacuation, rescue operations consisting in the trans the in consisting operations rescue Evacuation, –Medical – Multinational Military Police Battalion, aNATO Police formationcre Battalion, Military –Multinational - - - - members not NATO are that former Yugoslavia, partners Western European but also the and CIS of the countries mainly currently area, Euro-Atlantic the in states PfP fornership Peace programme PARP P (OEF-A) on “war terror”, Afghanistan of framework in the the including OEF fornership Peace programme of framework NATO’s the Concept Capabilities within Part –Operational OCC O –NATO Force, Response NRF NATO’s rapid force readiness on response high 2009 into NORDEFCOcorporated in in capabilities, development and of military maintenance onco-operation the NORDSUP Iceland nominally, and, formed byco-operation, Sweden, Denmark Norway, Finland, NORDEFCO 2009 into NORDEFCO in incorporated keeping missions, Nordic on co-operation peace of co-ordinating charge in a Nordic organisation NORDCAPS 2009 into NORDEFCO joint in incorporated and acquisitions, equipment military and development and ation onof joint armament research NORDAC Asia of Central countries the and Caucasus the Russia, in connections rail and roads via Afghanistan with ports Sea Black and Baltic the – Partnership for Peace, a programme for co-operation between NATO for for between co-operation and Peace, aprogramme –Partnership – Operation Enduring Freedom, a series of US military operations within within operations of US aseries military Freedom, Enduring –Operation – Planning and Review Process within the framework of framework NATO’s the within Process Review Part and –Planning – Nordic Armaments Cooperation, a Nordic organisation for co-oper aNordic Cooperation, organisation –Nordic Armaments – Nordic Supportive Defence Structures, a Nordic organisation for aNordic organisation – Nordic Supportive Defence Structures, – Nordic Defence Cooperation, a Nordic organisation for military for military –Nordic aNordic Defence Cooperation, organisation – Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support, for Military Arrangement –Nordic Coordinated - - - - - 91 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 92 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 Baltic Sea basin (all exceptRussia) (all basin Sea Baltic of the countries at among the situation sea on the of information exchange the SUCBAS NATO Force United ofStates Air within the domain level, the STRATEVAC methods observation known Stealth equipment of and dures NATO states member proce or technical conditions for and common military procedures, terms STANAG Union European NATO the and within integration as well as good neighbourly and relations, security,ing stability for whoseEurope, South-East in objectives co-operation strengthen include SEECP crime cross-border combating in at co-operation close aimed and OSCE Hungary), by the key and initiated Slovenia, Serbia, Tur Greece, Montenegro, Moldova, Macedonia, tia, Romania, Croa Bulgaria, Herzegovina, and Bosnia (Albania, Europe South-East in states SECI SNMCMG1 TurkeyRomania, Italy and Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria, by Albania, created operations, pation peace in Peace Force (MPFSEE), Europe national of South-Eastern intended for partici SEEBRIG Hungary in abase from aircraft C-17 Boeing operating transport jointly and of purchasing purpose for created the Sweden Finland, as and well SAC S – Strategic Airlift Capability, a consortium of ten NATO member states as of Capability,as NATO ten states member aconsortium Airlift –Strategic – Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, an organisation of thirteen of thirteen organisation an Cooperative Initiative, European –Southeast – South-East European Cooperation Process, the most important forum forum most important the Process, Cooperation European – South-East – technologies aimed at decreasing the detectability of objects with of with objects detectability the at decreasing aimed –technologies – Sea Surveillance Co-operation Baltic Sea, a co-operation system for system aco-operation Sea, Baltic Co-operation Surveillance – Sea – Standardization Agreement, an agreement laying down processes, down laying agreement an Agreement, –Standardization – South-Eastern Europe Brigade, a military formation of the Multi formationof the Brigade, amilitary Europe –South-Eastern Mine Countermeasures Group 1 NATO Countermeasures Mine –Standing – Strategic Medical Evacuation, air evacuation at the strategic strategic at the evacuation air Evacuation, Medical – Strategic ------states V4BG Group Four, Visegrád of –Visegrád the states member V4 V Council –United NationsUNSC Security –United Nations Peacekeeping Force Cyprus in UNFICYP U – V4 Group Group Group, formed bymember Battle Visegrád Battle the 93 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 94 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 No SIPRI calculations are available for 2011. for available are calculations SIPRI No documents. budget official on based calculations from different where * Only 2007–2011 (US$ in million) spending Table Military 1. (according to SIPRI) to (according %of GDP as SIPRI to according official 2007 SIPRI) to (according %of GDP as SIPRI to according official 2008 SIPRI) to (according %of GDP as SIPRI to according official 2009 SIPRI)* to (according %of GDP as SIPRI to according official 2010 %of GDP as SIPRI to according official 2011 Denmark 4499 4230 4788 4504 4504 4332 4337 4518 4175 4515 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 Finland 3400 2848 3309 3074 3656 3652 3474 3461 3556 3105 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.3 Norway 1.6 (1.5) 6499 6390 7083 6596 6196 7232 5875 6371 6215 6181 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.5 Sweden 1.3 (1.2) 5960 6264 5886 5672 5438 6103 5793 6235 5545 6157 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 Estonia 1.8 (2.3) 1.8 1.8 (2.1) 1.8 1.8 (1.7) 1.7 (2.1) 1.7 488 429 430 389 330 336 332 353 471 371 1.7 0.9 (1.1) 0.9 1.2 (1.4) 1.1 (1.4) 1.1 (1.4) Lithu ania 402 405 487 638 326 410 453 0.8 531 611 351 - 1.2 (1.4) 1.0 (1.1) 1.6 (1.7) 1.5 (1.7) Latvia 260 444 289 540 267 539 343 552 316 251 1.0 Bulgaria 2.2 (2.0) 2.2 1.9 (2.0) 1.9 2.4 (2.5) 1.7 (1.9) 1162 990 1181 940 989 894 905 832 722 758 1.4 Romania 3000 2608 2086 2086 2664 2380 2265 2225 2417 1945 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.3 Republic 1.6 (1.4) 1.4 (1.6) Czech Czech 3090 2660 2448 2498 2673 2254 2752 2527 3129 3136 1.4 1.3 1.1 Slovakia 1065 1320 1293 1350 1130 1138 1139 1411 968 1351 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.1 Hungary 1.1 (1.0) 1.2 (1.1) 1690 1899 1506 1476 1287 1776 1378 1819 1351 1351 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.8 (2.0) 1.8 1.8 (1.9) Poland 1.7 (1.8) 1.5 (1.7) 8908 7848 8502 8414 8774 9149 7833 8781 8165 7475 1.7 Table 1. Military spending in 2007–2011 (US$ million)

Lithu- Czech Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia Latvia Bulgaria Romania Slovakia Hungary Poland ania Republic

2011 official 4518 3652 7232 6103 389 351 289 758 2380 2448 1065 1378 8908 according to SIPRI 4515 3656 7083 5960 336 405 267 722 1945 2254 968 1287 9149 as % of GDP 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.7 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.7

2010 official 4504 3461 6499 6157 332 326 251 832 2086 2660 1138 1351 8502 according to SIPRI 4504 3400 6390 5886 330 410 260 894 2086 2498 1130 1351 8781 as % of GDP 1.5 1.4 1.6 (1.5) 1.3 1.8 (1.7) 0.9 (1.1) 1.0 (1.1) 1.7 (1.9) 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 (1.0) 1.8 (1.9) (according to SIPRI)*

2009 official 4337 3556 6196 5672 353 402 316 905 2225 3129 1350 1476 7475 according to SIPRI 4230 3474 6596 5438 429 487 343 940 2265 2752 1293 1506 8414 as % of GDP 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.8 (2.3) 1.1 (1.4) 1.2 (1.4) 1.9 (2.0) 1.4 1.6 (1.4) 1.5 1.2 (1.1) 1.7 (1.8) (according to SIPRI)

2008 official 4788 3105 6371 5793 430 531 539 1162 3000 3090 1411 1899 8165 according to SIPRI 4499 3309 6215 5545 471 638 540 989 2664 2673 1351 1690 7848 as % of GDP 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 (1.2) 1.8 (2.1) 1.1 (1.4) 1.6 (1.7) 2.2 (2.0) 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.5 (1.7) (according to SIPRI)

2007 official 4175 2848 5875 6264 371 453 444 990 2608 2527 1139 1776 7833 according to SIPRI 4332 3074 6181 6235 488 611 552 1181 2417 3136 1320 1819 8774 as % of GDP 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.7 (2.1) 1.2 (1.4) 1.5 (1.7) 2.4 (2.5) 1.5 1.4 (1.6) 1.5 1.3 1.8 (2.0) (according to SIPRI)

* Only where different from calculations based on official budget documents. No SIPRI calculations are available for 2011. 96 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 organisationally separate, the numbers are indicative. are numbers the separate, organisationally not are branches service the where of Hungary, case the In included. not were peacetime during *** ** posts. of number the from different significantly * Where (thousands) of 2012 at endof 2011 personnel /beginning of service Numbers Table 2. Finland has the capacity to more than double the number rapidly during peacetime. during rapidly number the double than more to capacity the has Finland numbers* – actual – posts total: thousands) (US$ person service 1active per spending military tion % of popula Navy – Force – Air Army – in this***: Formations outside the three service branches and home guard maintained by the armed forces forces armed the by maintained guard home and branches service three the outside Formations - Denmark 0.32 251 3.4 9.1 3.5 18 0.28 (0.64**) 0.28 8.7 (27.3**) 8.7 15 (34.7**) 3.1 (4.4**) Finland 2.3 (3**) 243.7 15 Norway 344.4 0.46 3.7 2.1 7.5 23 21 Sweden 290.1 0.22 3.4 3.6 7.3 21 Estonia 0.42 0.25 4.95 70.7 0.3 5.5 Lithu ania 0.27 41.3 0.5 8.5 6.5 1 - Latvia 0.22 0.25 57.8 0.5 4 5 Bulgaria 0.39 26.1 3.4 6.5 29 29 15 Romania 45.8 0.33 36.1 9.7 66 7.1 73 Republic Czech Czech 112.8 0.21 21.7 4.6 6.2 23 – Slovakia 0.26 76.1 14 16 4 – 7 Hungary 0.19 72.5 19 11 – 5 Poland 0.26 89.2 25.4 10.1 100 60 (thousands) of 2012 at endof 2011 personnel /beginning of service Numbers Table 2. organisationally separate, the numbers are indicative. are numbers the separate, organisationally not are branches service the where of Hungary, case the In included. not were peacetime during *** ** posts. of number the from different significantly * Where Finland has the capacity to more than double the number rapidly during peacetime. during rapidly number the double than more to capacity the has Finland thousands) (US$ person service 1active per spending military tion % of popula Navy – Force – Air Army – in this***: numbers* – actual – posts total: Formations outside the three service branches and home guard maintained by the armed forces forces armed the by maintained guard home and branches service three the outside Formations - Denmark 0.32 251 3.4 9.1 3.5 18 0.28 (0.64**) 0.28 8.7 (27.3**) 8.7 15 (34.7**) 3.1 (4.4**) Finland 2.3 (3**) 243.7 15 Norway 344.4 0.46 3.7 2.1 7.5 23 21 Sweden 290.1 0.22 3.4 3.6 7.3 21 Estonia 0.42 0.25 4.95 70.7 0.3 5.5 Lithu ania 0.27 41.3 0.5 8.5 6.5 1 - Latvia 0.22 0.25 57.8 0.5 4 5 Bulgaria 0.39 26.1 3.4 6.5 29 29 15 Romania 45.8 0.33 36.1 9.7 66 7.1 73 Republic Czech Czech 112.8 0.21 21.7 4.6 6.2 23 – Slovakia 0.26 76.1 14 16 4 – 7 Hungary 0.19 72.5 19 11 – 5 Poland 0.26 89.2 25.4 10.1 100 60 97 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 98 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 according to CFE according of categories basic –numbers Army ofTable offensive 3. weapons 1 tanks 2 2 3 3 3 1 vehicles fighting infantry 1 2 – of this in service in – of this total – of this in service in – of this total (1980s) (1990s) (21 (1980s) (1970s) (1980s) (1980s) (1990s) (21 st st st rd rd rd nd nd nd generation generation generation generation generation generation generation generation generation st st century) century)

Denmark 20+[37] 20 45 45 45 57 Finland [70] 102 212 212 110 161 91 91 Norway 103+(43) 103+(43) 103 52 52 52 Sweden [160] 280 120 120 385 385 385 Estonia Lithu ania - Latvia Bulgaria 80+[270] 20+[80] 350 214 134 114 80 Romania 249 345 197 345 197 174 42 54 23 Republic Czech Czech [134] 207 250 457 457 164 30 30 Slovakia 143+[236] 30+[39] 470 234 69 30 91 Hungary* 15+[146] [502] [502] 161 15 – 341+[243] Poland 1377 1377 1377 699 942 232 126 Table 3. Army – numbers of basic categories of offensive weapons according to CFE

Lithu- Czech Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia Latvia Bulgaria Romania Slovakia Hungary* Poland ania Republic tanks

1st generation [70] 42 (1980s)

2nd generation 80+[270] 249 [134] 30+[39] 15+[146] 341+[243] (1980s)

2nd generation 54 (1990s)

3rd generation 91 52 [160] 126 (1980s)

3rd generation 30 232 (1990s)

3rd generation 20+[37] 120 (21st century) total 57 161 52 280 350 345 164 69 161 942 – of this in service 20 91 52 120 80 345 30 30 15 699 infantry fighting vehicles

1st generation 20+[80] 23 250 143+[236] [502] 1377 (1970s)

1st generation 110 114 174 207 91 (1980s)

2nd generation 45 102 103+(43) 385 (21st century) total 45 212 103+(43) 385 214 197 457 470 [502] 1377 – of this in service 45 212 103 385 134 197 457 234 – 1377 100 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 {in working order/in operational use} [withdrawn/in reserve] (ordered) reserve] [withdrawn/in use} operational order/in working {in *** 48). (Poland howitzers gun and 60) Romania ** of arms. list the from deleted been have store in items remaining the store, in howitzers gun of the 287 and store in tanks 146 of 43 the lists Army Hungarian * The With an option to purchase more arms of this type: armoured personnel carriers (Sweden 113, 113, (Sweden carriers personnel armoured type: of this arms more purchase to option an With (after 1990) (after types new 1990) (before types older armoured personnel carriers – older types – older howitzers gun self–propelled launchers) missile multiple mortars, similar, and (guns/howitzers or higher mm 100 cal. artillery, service in – of this total – new types – new – older types – older howitzers gun towed – older types – older mortars types – new – older types – older launchers missile multiple types – new – new types – new – of this in service in – of this total Deliveries started in 2011. 2011. in started Deliveries Denmark 506 506 416 90 20 32 32 12 Finland 1771+(18) 24+(18) 1002 1002 1681 [90] 940 927 618 62 58 54 Norway 26+(24) (24)*** 288 288 288 26 14 12 270+(24) Sweden (24)*** 113** 220 270 538 425 538 50 Estonia 245 245 139 179 139 139 66 Lithu ania 109 210 210 210 163 163 54 - several several Latvia 300+[890] Bulgaria 92+[200] 1004 1190 804 300 206 356 150 Romania [46] 31** 930 939 985 961 434 961 134 317 54 Republic 48+[116] 40+(67) 97+(67) Czech Czech [60] 141 317 97 93 57 Slovakia 56+[149] [74] 205 153 79 26 56 37 16 Hungary* 12 [287] 12 [153] [62] 591 514 591 591 12 487+(408) 487+(408) 1120+(41) 4+(20)** Poland 54+(21) 1120 487 249 643 170 Lithu- Czech Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia Latvia Bulgaria Romania Slovakia Hungary* Poland ania Republic armoured personnel carriers older types 416 940 288 425 139 210 300+[890] 930 57 56+[149] 591 (before 1990) new types 90 62 113** 31** 40+(67) 487+(408) (after 1990) total 506 1002 288 538 139 210 1190 961 97+(67) 205 591 487+(408) – of this in service 506 1002 288 538 139 210 300 961 97 56 591 487 artillery, cal. 100 mm or higher (guns/howitzers and similar, mortars, multiple missile launchers) self–propelled gun howitzers

– older types 12 [90] 14 206 [46] 48+[116] [153] 643

– new types (24)*** (24)*** 16 4+(20)** towed gun howitzers

– older types 618 220 66 54 150 434 [74] 12 [287]

– new types 54 mortars

– older types 20 927 50 179 109 several 356 317 93 37 170

– new types 24+(18) multiple missile launchers

– older types 58 12 92+[200] 134 [60] 26 [62] 249

– new types 54 54+(21) total 32 1771+(18) 26+(24) 270+(24) 245 163 several 1004 985 317 153 514 1120+(41)

– of this in service 32 1681 26 270 245 163 804 939 141 79 12 1120

* The Hungarian Army lists 43 of the 146 tanks in store and 287 of the gun howitzers in store, the remaining items in store have been deleted from the list of arms. ** With an option to purchase more arms of this type: armoured personnel carriers (Sweden 113, Romania 60) and gun howitzers (Poland 48). *** Deliveries started in 2011. {in working order/in operational use} [withdrawn/in reserve] (ordered) 102 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 {in working order/in operational use} [withdrawn/in reserve] (ordered) reserve] [withdrawn/in use} operational order/in working {in plans. chase upgrade/pur or of machines number the on information disclosed publicly no or yet as decision * No to CFE according combat and helicopters force of combat –numbers Air aircraft Table 4. 21 1990s 1980s helicopters support combat total 1990s 1980s combat helicopters – 4 purchase plans: upgrade plans total 4 4 3 combat aircraft – 5 (1990s –21 (1990s (1980s) (1980s) total rd th th st generation generation generation th th century generation generation st century)

Denmark 30+[32] 30 62 14 14 * Finland 12+(8) 12+(8) 62 62 62 Norway 18 52 57 57 18 134 {120} 134 Sweden 60–80 18+(7) 8+(7) 100 134 10 10 - Estonia Lithu ania - Latvia Bulgaria 43 {7} 43 18 {4} 18 15 {5} 15 6 {3} 6 29 58 16 11 6 * Romania [12] 60 48 24 24 58 23 35 Republic Czech Czech 28 24 14 10 14 14 16 12 Slovakia 21 {4} 21 10 10 21 Hungary [12] 26 12 14 12 15 15 Poland 127 48 48 29 29 32 32 16 31 Table 4. Air force – numbers of combat aircraft and combat helicopters according to CFE

Lithu- Czech Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia Latvia Bulgaria Romania Slovakia Hungary Poland ania Republic combat aircraft

3rd generation 43 {7} 48 48 (1980s)

4th generation 30+[32] 57 15 {5} [12] 21 {4} [12] 31 (1980s)

4th generation 62 134 {120} 14 14 48 (1990s – 21st century) total 62 62 57 134 58 60 14 21 26 127 upgrade plans 30 62 100 * 16 purchase plans: – 4th generation 10 16 24 th – 5 generation * 52 60–80 24 combat helicopters

1980s 6 {3} 14 12 29

1990s 10 total 6 24 12 29 combat support helicopters

1980s 18 10 18 {4} 35 12 10 15 32

1990s 11 23 16

21st century 14 12+(8) 8+(7) total 14 12+(8) 18 18+(7) 29 58 28 10 15 32

* No decision as yet or no publicly disclosed information on the number of machines or upgrade/purchase plans. {in working order/in operational use} [withdrawn/in reserve] (ordered) 104 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 construction) under of vessels (number vessels. and support command as classified are characteristics frigate missile with vessels multirole * Two Absalon–class to the Vienna Document Document Vienna to the according of warships Navy basic Table –numbers 5. 1970s boats missile total 1990s 1980s 21 1990s 1980s 21 1990s 21 1980s 1970s frigates missile 1960s submarines 1980s corvettes st st st century century century Denmark 7+(1) 2+(1) 3+2* [number of vessels in reserve] in of vessels [number Finland 8 4 4 Norway 15+(2) 4 +(2) 4 6 5 Sweden 14 4 2 3 5 Estonia Lithu ania - Latvia Bulgaria 10 4 3 3 Romania [1] 14 2 3 3 5 Republic Czech Czech Slovakia Hungary Poland 13 4 2 3 3 1 Table 5. Navy – numbers of basic warships according to the Vienna Document

Lithu- Czech Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia Latvia Bulgaria Romania Slovakia Hungary Poland ania Republic missile frigates

1970s 4 2

1980s 3

21st century 3+2* 5 corvettes

1980s 4 3 5 3

1990s 2

21st century 5 missile boats

1970s 3

1980s 3

1990s 4 3

21st century 2+(1) 4 4 +(2) submarines

1960s 4

1980s 2 [1] 1

1990s 6 3 total

7+(1) 8 15+(2) 14 10 14 13

* Two Absalon–class multirole vessels with missile frigate characteristics are classified as command and support vessels. (number of vessels under construction) [number of vessels in reserve] 106 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 for military–technological co–operation* military–technological for may used be that of armament types prospective Table and 6. Basic Dana/Zuzana**** MiG–29 A/B – version C/D – version F–16 Gripen 39 JAS combat aircraft 2 NASAMS Kub 2K12 9K33 Osa launchers missile surface–to–air Archer or higher mm 100 cal. artillery, Piranha III AMV/Rosomak armoured personnel carriers BMP–1 BMP–2 CV90 vehicles fighting infantry T–72M 2A5/2A6** Leopard tanks Leopard 2A4 Leopard Denmark 90 62 45 57 Finland (24) 102 110 62 91 Norway 103+(43) 24 24 52 57 Sweden [160] 113** 120 385 134 24 Estonia Lithu ania - Latvia Bulgaria 80+[270] 23+[80] 20 24 15 Romania 31*** [12] 122 40 16 Republic 48+[116] Czech Czech [134] 207 250 14 4 Slovakia 143+[236] 30+[39] 16 91 21 4 Hungary 12+[32] 15+[43] [502] [12] 14 487+(408) 341+[243] Poland 1377 126 111 60 48 30 31 Table 6. Basic and prospective types of armament that may be used for military–technological co–operation*

Lithu- Czech Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia Latvia Bulgaria Romania Slovakia Hungary Poland ania Republic tanks

Leopard 2A5/2A6** 57 120

Leopard 2A4 91 52 [160] 126

T–72M 80+[270] [134] 30+[39] 15+[43] 341+[243] infantry fighting vehicles

CV90 45 102 103+(43) 385

BMP–2 110 207 91

BMP–1 23+[80] 122 250 143+[236] [502] 1377 armoured personnel carriers

AMV/Rosomak 62 113** 487+(408)

Piranha III 90 31*** artillery, cal. 100 mm or higher

Archer 24 24

Dana/Zuzana**** 48+[116] 16 111 surface–to–air missile launchers

9K33 Osa 24 16 60

2K12 Kub 20 40 4 4 12+[32] 30

NASAMS 2 (24) 24 combat aircraft

JAS 39 Gripen 134 14 14

F–16

– version C/D 48

– version A/B 62 57

MiG–29 15 [12] 21 [12] 31 108 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 [withdrawn / in reserve] (ordered) assets). other among howitzers, gun manufacturing plant the ted inheri Slovakia of Czechoslovakia, break–up the (after type former of the version upgraded an are which standard), (NATO howitzers gun mm 155 cal. Zuzana have Forces Armed Slovak the while standard), Pact **** *** gun). of the version previous the with 2A6 model ** Forces). Armed Romanian of the tanks TR–85 the or Forces Armed Danish of the helicopters AW101 the transport Forces, Armed Finnish of the F/A–18 aircraft the combat as Hornet (such of co–operation subjects become to unlikely therefore and report, this by covered states other by purchased be to unlikely are These states. of single forces armed the by held weapons and arms prospective and basic include not does table * The Danish and Swedish tanks represent a standard between 2A5 and 2A6 (the Danish tanks are in fact fact in are tanks Danish (the 2A6 and 2A5 between astandard represent tanks Swedish and Danish NSM RBS–15 missiles anti–ship NH90 Hawk Black UH–60 Mi–8/Mi–17 helicopters support combat and transport Mi–24/Mi–35 combat helicopters C–295 Spartan C–27J B – version E/H – version C–130 Hercules C–130J Super Hercules aircraft transport RQ–7 Shadow RQ–7 tactical unmanned aerial vehicles With an option to buy more carriers (Sweden 113, Romania 60). Romania 113, (Sweden carriers more buy to option an With The armed forces of the Czech Republic and Poland possess Dana cal. 152 mm gun howitzers (Warsaw (Warsaw howitzers gun mm 152 cal. Dana possess Poland and Republic Czech of the forces armed The Denmark 4 Finland 12+(8) 2+(1) yes Norway 3+(2) (14) yes Sweden 4+(14) 8+(7) yes 8 8 Estonia - Lithu ania 3 - Latvia Bulgaria 18 6 3 Romania 5+(2) 11 4 1 Republic Czech Czech 28 24 4 Slovakia 10 Hungary 12 15 Poland (yes) yes 29 32 11 5 [withdrawn / in reserve] (ordered) assets). other among howitzers, gun manufacturing plant the ted inheri Slovakia of Czechoslovakia, break–up the (after type former of the version upgraded an are which standard), (NATO howitzers gun mm 155 cal. Zuzana have Forces Armed Slovak the while standard), Pact **** *** gun). of the version previous the with 2A6 model ** Forces). Armed Romanian of the tanks TR–85 the or Forces Armed Danish of the helicopters AW101 the transport Forces, Armed Finnish of the F/A–18 aircraft the combat as Hornet (such of co–operation subjects become to unlikely therefore and report, this by covered states other by purchased be to unlikely are These states. of single forces armed the by held weapons and arms prospective and basic include not does table * The Danish and Swedish tanks represent a standard between 2A5 and 2A6 (the Danish tanks are in fact fact in are tanks Danish (the 2A6 and 2A5 between astandard represent tanks Swedish and Danish NSM RBS–15 missiles anti–ship NH90 Hawk Black UH–60 Mi–8/Mi–17 helicopters support combat and transport Mi–24/Mi–35 combat helicopters C–295 Spartan C–27J B – version E/H – version C–130 Hercules C–130J Super Hercules aircraft transport RQ–7 Shadow RQ–7 tactical unmanned aerial vehicles With an option to buy more carriers (Sweden 113, Romania 60). Romania 113, (Sweden carriers more buy to option an With The armed forces of the Czech Republic and Poland possess Dana cal. 152 mm gun howitzers (Warsaw (Warsaw howitzers gun mm 152 cal. Dana possess Poland and Republic Czech of the forces armed The Denmark 4 Finland 12+(8) 2+(1) yes Norway 3+(2) (14) yes Sweden 4+(14) 8+(7) yes 8 8 Estonia - Lithu ania 3 - Latvia Bulgaria 18 6 3 Romania 5+(2) 11 4 1 Republic Czech Czech 28 24 4 Slovakia 10 Hungary 12 15 Poland (yes) yes 29 32 11 5 109 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 110 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 * Before June 2011, eight Swedish combat aircraft were participating in the operation. the in participating were aircraft combat Swedish eight 2011, June * Before Table 7. Engagement NATO/EU/US in operations Protector) (Unified Libya Somalia (Atalanta) Somalia Freedom) (Enduring of Africa Horn engaged) of ships (number operations naval tector) Pro (Unified Libya Dawn) (OdysseyLibya Baltic Air Policing Air Baltic engaged) aircraft of combat (number operations air Herzegovina (Althea) Herzegovina and Bosnia (KFOR) Kosovo Afghanistan (ISAF) 2012) of half /first of 2011 at end as deployed of troops (number operations land - 3x4 (2004, (2004, 3x4 Denmark 6 (2011) 6 (2011) 6 (since (since 2008) 2009, 2009, 2011) 750 35 – 1 Finland 1 (2011) 1 156 20 4 2x4 (2005, (2005, 2x4 Norway 1 (2009) 6 (2011) 6 (2011) 6 2007) 406 – 3 4 (2009– Sweden 5* (2011) 5* 2010) 500 67 – Estonia 163 2 1 Lithu ania 237 – 1 - Latvia 139 – – Bulgaria 1 (2011) 1 602 119 10 Romania 4 (2007) 1 (2011) 1 1938 56 59 Republic 4 (2009) Czech Czech 519 – 7 Slovakia 308 32 – Hungary 160 383 261 Poland (2006, (2006, 2008, 2008, 2010, 2010, 2012) 2560 4x4 4x4 229 188 Table 7. Engagement NATO/EU/US in operations * Before June 2011, eight Swedish combat aircraft were participating in the operation. the in participating were aircraft combat Swedish eight 2011, June * Before Protector) (Unified Libya Somalia (Atalanta) Somalia Freedom) (Enduring of Africa Horn engaged) of ships (number operations naval tector) Pro (Unified Libya Dawn) (OdysseyLibya Policing Air Baltic engaged) aircraft of combat (number operations air (Althea) Herzegovina and Bosnia (KFOR) Kosovo Afghanistan (ISAF) 2012) of half /first of 2011 at end as deployed of troops (number operations land - 3x4 (2004, (2004, 3x4 Denmark 6 (2011) 6 (2011) 6 (since (since 2008) 2009, 2009, 2011) 750 35 – 1 Finland 1 (2011) 1 156 20 4 2x4 (2005, (2005, 2x4 Norway 1 (2009) 6 (2011) 6 (2011) 6 2007) 406 – 3 4 (2009– Sweden 5* (2011) 5* 2010) 500 67 – Estonia 163 2 1 Lithu ania 237 – 1 - Latvia 139 – – Bulgaria 1 (2011) 1 602 119 10 Romania 4 (2007) 1 (2011) 1 1938 56 59 Republic 4 (2009) Czech Czech 519 – 7 Slovakia 308 32 – Hungary 160 383 261 Poland (2006, (2006, 2008, 2008, 2010, 2010, 2012) 2560 4x4 4x4 229 188 111 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 112 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 *** ** I–2015 I–2011, * I–2008, Table 8. Involvement operations–partners formations and multinational in I–2011 Lithuania), and Austria (without I–2007 partners (KFOR) Kosovo in operation lead states partners (ISAF) Afghanistan in operation partners Groups Union Battle European lead states II–2007, II–2011 II–2007, Estonia UK France Estonia France Denmark Germany France Sweden Lithuania Austria lands Nether Germany “107”** Norway Ireland Estonia Sweden Nordic* Finland - Germany France Latvia Ireland Estonia Finland Sweden Nordic* Norway Germany France Finland UK II–2013 Norway Ireland Estonia Finland Nordic* Sweden Denmark UK France Denmark Norway Ireland Finland Sweden Nordic* France Estonia USA France Austria Finland lands Nether Germany „107”** Slovakia Latvia Germany Poland I–2010 Lithu ania - - Germany France Slovakia ania Lithu Germany Poland I–2010 Norway Latvia - Italy France Romania Cyprus Greece BROC*** HEL– Bulgaria USA France Turkey Italy II–2010 Bulgaria Cyprus Greece BROC*** HEL– Italy USA Romania France nia Macedo Croatia Austria Germany II–2012 Slovakia II–2009 Republic Czech Czech - Canada France Republic Czech II–2009 Latvia ania Lithu Germany Poland I–2010 Slovakia - France Slovenia Italy II–2012 Italy Hungary USA France Slovakia Latvia ania Lithu Germany I–2010 USA Poland - Table 8. Involvement operations–partners formations and multinational in *** ** I–2015 I–2011, * I–2008, I–2011 Lithuania), and Austria (without I–2007 partners (KFOR) Kosovo in operation lead states partners (ISAF) Afghanistan in operation partners Groups Union Battle European lead states II–2007, II–2011 II–2007, Estonia UK France Estonia France Denmark Germany France Sweden Lithuania Austria lands Nether Germany “107”** Norway Ireland Estonia Sweden Nordic* Finland - Germany France Latvia Ireland Estonia Finland Sweden Nordic* Norway Germany France Finland UK II–2013 Norway Ireland Estonia Finland Nordic* Sweden UK France Denmark Norway Ireland Finland Sweden Nordic* Denmark France Estonia USA France Austria Finland lands Nether Germany „107”** Slovakia Latvia Germany Poland I–2010 Lithu ania - - Slovakia ania Lithu Germany Poland I–2010 Germany France Norway Latvia - Romania Romania Cyprus Greece BROC*** HEL– Italy France Bulgaria Turkey Italy II–2010 Bulgaria Cyprus Greece BROC*** HEL– USA France Italy USA Romania nia Macedo Croatia Austria Germany II–2012 Slovakia II–2009 France Republic Czech Czech - Republic Czech II–2009 Latvia ania Lithu Germany Poland I–2010 Canada France Slovakia - Slovenia Italy II–2012 France Italy Hungary Slovakia Latvia ania Lithu Germany I–2010 USA France USA Poland - 113 PRACEOSW REPORT OSW 09/2012 12/2012 The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO’s transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe. It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation.

The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland’s partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland’s natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement the ‘Western’ direction of Poland’s security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.