Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
The development of regular army officers an essay
By Michael H. Clemmesen, Brigadier General, MA (history)
One must understand the mechanism and the power of the individual soldier,,, model is expensive in manpower cost (in then that of a company, a battalion, a brigade and so on, before one can ven- a Western industrialised state), relative ture to group divisions and move an army. I believe I owe most of my success to cheap in training cost due to the long the attention I always paid to the inferior part of tactics as a regimental officer... service contracts, and relatively cheap in There are few men in the Army who knew these details better than I did; it is equipment as a result of the limited size. the foundation of all military knowledge. The Duke of Wellington. The training-mobilisation army is relevant The standing force army is likely to be in continental states faced with a poten- Two army models attractive to states without any massive, tial (rather than an immediate) massive direct, overland threat to their territory. scale overland treat that makes it neces- It will often help and clarify an analy- In the pure version of that army, the sol- sary to have a large section of the state sis to establish the theoretical, pure mod- diers will have long service contracts. Be- population available for direct defence. els that can be used as references. In this cause of its potential high readiness, in- The potentially large trained manpower essay I shall use the two basic types of cluding mature unit cohesion, this army pool makes it possible to mobilise an army armies that influence the land forces of model is useful for external intervention that can defend the borders and territory the real world: the standing force army operations and in support of the police in depth. On the other hand the charac- and the training-mobilisation army. for internal security operations. The ter of the force makes it unsuited for other
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than the direct defence mission. It is po- the conscripts in internal security opera- chose an up-or-out (to a second career) litically risky to use it for internal secu- tions). The large and dense populations path or employ a large number of the rity operations or for external interven- and low salaries of India and Pakistan have older officers as specialists or administra- tions. made it possible for the two countries to tors outside units. Real standing armies Few armies mirror the logic of these maintain very large standing armies of long are using a combination of the two paths. pure models. The example closest to the contract soldiers. In the training-mobilisation army this age- first is the present British Army. Two good rank composition problem is less urgent. examples fairly close to the pure training- Officer recruiting, education, The wartime responsibilities of many of- mobilisation army are the Cold War pe- and use ficers are different from their peacetime riod Finnish and Swedish armies. jobs. The expansion of the army on mo- Real states are faced with a unique com- Both types of armies need an officer bilisation makes it necessary to use offic- bination of threats, requirements, and corps in the peacetime units numerically ers at least one command level higher than possibilities. They may need forces for dominated by lieutenants and captains in their peacetime posts, making the age di- international security operations and for their twenties and early thirties, with a lemma less urgent. The mobilisation of countering a limited force strategic coup much smaller group of majors and lieu- field formation and territorial defence attack with relatively high readiness and tenant colonels in their late thirties or headquarters adds to the requirement for immediate unit cohesion even if there is forties, and with a very small number of experienced regular officers. The reserve also a risk of a massive overland invasion. senior officers. cadre in a training-mobilisation army will France has normally needed a combina- However, the two pure types of armies man many of the posts that must be filled tion of a standing force (for external and can or must use very different officer re- by the regular cadre in a standing army internal operations) and a mobilisation cruiting, screening, formal education, and with its immediate readiness requirement. force to counter its continental enemies. career systems. Where it is necessary in a standing army Israel has been exposed to an immediate In the standing force army where the of- to base regular officer recruiting on the threat that made it necessary to maintain ficers peacetime and wartime function is premise that a high percent of those re- a standing force based on long conscrip- the same, there are only two ways of keep- cruited will have a second career after their tion service soldiers (the unit cohesion ing an acceptable age-rank composition service in the army; the training-mobili- thus created has made it possible to use in the officer corps. Either the army must sation army can in principle offer a one
8 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 career life. This difference can influence demic education. Without such an offer scripts. If there are no exemptions for the how the regular officers are recruited and it may be difficult to recruit the right privileged, e.g. university students, all the educated. people in the right quantity. The educa- male talent of the nation of proper physical The standing force army cannot count tion can be given during the basic of- and mental condition will have contact on finding a substantial number of of- ficer training or linked to it. In both cases with the defence forces. If the training is ficer- candidates in the ranks of the long the result will be that officers recruited focused and meaningful and the officers service contract soldiers and NCOs. It is without a university background will have in the training units offer good role simply not possible to attract much lead- a relatively long basic education period. models, a significant number of qualified ership potential for service in the ranks. Another option, however, is to have an young men (and women, if they serve) Thus the army has to find its officer can- employment contract with a later study will show interest in a career as an officer. didates outside the army, in direct com- leave with full pay (to be used studying A significant number of those with obvi- petition with other careers. If army of- in a civilian university) as an integrated ous leadership potential and an appro- ficer service is well regarded in society, it element. priate school background (college/gym- is possible to recruit people with college/ The officers of the standing army nor- nasium) will be selected for junior NCO university backgrounds. That will save the mally arrive in their units with very little or reserve officer training. During the army money and help ensure that the can- practical experience of soldiering or lead- post course period as junior leaders they didates have prepared their second career ership. This problem is best handled by will demonstrate their qualities, before before entering. Then the army (like the linking the young officer to a mature they can apply and may be selected for British Army) can concentrate on giving NCO, who will tutor the young basically regular officer education. Even if the ca- a short, focused military education. The drilled academic in his profession. As the dets have full military and basic leader- U.S. Army can get a large part of its offic- up-or-out dilemma continues, the ad- ship training before entering training, ers from the very effective officer train- vanced education of officers is often education in the officer training academy ing programmes in the universities. If, linked to options for continued academic is likely to be relatively long (2½-4 years). however, the army cannot get sufficient education. There are two reasons for that. Firstly the high quality officer candidates with a back- The situation in the training-mobilisation cadets are not only to be prepared for ground that prepares them for a second army is different. The main source of of- their first, peacetime position of platoon career, it has to offer that civilian aca- ficer recruiting is the annual class of con- leader or company Second in Command,
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but must also be prepared for their next systems. There can be many reasons for of army. They may therefore accept with- command and junior staff officer levels. this. Firstly it can be a result of the fact out argument education and career mod- Secondly, they receive a comprehensive that the armies do not mirror the pure els that conflict with the real requirements general education in languages, manage- models. Many Cold War NATO mainly or they may seek civilian academic feath- ment, political science, history, etc. to conscript armies (e.g. the Danish) were ers that might enhance the self respect of prepare them well for their role as mili- dominated by the standing, combat ready an officer corps unsure of its own value tary leaders of the citizens of their state. element, giving some justification for fo- and profession. The difference between the academic train- cusing the basic officer education on the ing here and that given to cadets for a immediate platoon leader requirements. The army officer profession standing army is that here it is normally Secondly a training-mobilisation army the creation of the basis for a lifetime may also experience difficulties with re- A significant obstacle to the develop- career, not for a second career. Thus it cruiting a sufficient number of high qual- ment of a proper army officer education may be focused on what is necessary in ity candidates for officer training, lead- is the rather widespread lack of under- and for the army rather than what is ing to the bypassing of the system for standing or acceptance that we are talking needed to get academic credits. Therefore selecting from the conscript pool and to about the preparation for a profession. the academic subjects are much easier to offering elements of a civilian academic There can be many reasons, some of, integrate with the military subjects. This education. One reason could be the rela- which are widespread, others specific to does not necessarily detract from the aca- tively low prestige of the officer career. the Baltic States. demic standard of the teaching as this al- Another could be that only a small pro- A fair part of any democratic states ways depends more on the quality and portion of the annual conscript class is general public, press, and politicians lack ambition of the teachers and cadets than actually drafted, limiting the contact be- understanding of the professional require- on the type of resulting diplomas. tween potential candidates and the army. ments of a regular army officer. The ef- As with real world armies that hardly Thirdly the senior officers that develop fects of this natural condition will be re- ever look completely like the two basic the recruiting and education system may inforced if the army officers themselves, models, so it is with the military educa- have lost understanding of the character living in a basically civilian society, choose tion systems: they rarely match the two and requirements of their military pro- to seek academic degrees that may impress resulting logical recruiting and training fession and the requirements of their type their families and civilian neighbours
10 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 rather than spend their time in profes- civilian elements are linked to gaining a stand the pressure of war. In all armies sional improvement. combination of personal communication this is as much a development of charac- People in the three Baltic countries are skills (including languages), leadership and ter, teambuilding, and ethos as it is pure not likely to have been very impressed management skills rather surpassing that education. with the professionalism demonstrated of the conductor or orchestra leader. Due If those that create and carry out the by the majority of Soviet army officers. to the army environment unsupported basic army officer education deeply un- Some may also mistake military profes- by infrastructure it is more like directing derstand this, they lay the foundation for sionalism with the militarist attitudes a movie on location. a proper and necessary professionalism. they met then and want to make sure At the same time as the officer cadet is If not, they waste taxpayers money in that the officers of their country are given this interactive mix of civilian and peace. In war they can only hope that the different. Many seem to conclude that professional skills and knowledge, he/she enemy is even less professional. the only thing required is a good gen- must be educated and influenced into Comparing the army officer to a less eral education and a very light expo- being a conscientious administrator of challenged profession, the medical, can sure to some rather technical teaching state resources in line with the relevant highlight other elements of the army of- in how to command and train an in- legislation and procedures. ficer profession. There are several com- fantry platoon. Because any young officer, especially mon elements. A proper basic officer education is an in a training-mobilisation army, is also On the path to his profession, the ca- interactive mix of purely military elements given the implicit task of educating a part reer hospital doctor must receive a for- and elements that are fairly similar to what of the population to be better citizens, mal education that is a combination of are given in general or specific civilian he must be given a general education (po- theory and practice. If the balance between education. The military part could be litical science, history, international law) the two is wrong, he becomes a danger to compared to that given to a conductor that supports that mission. Even if many his patients, either because too much and composer student in an Academy of of the skills are distinctly individual, the emphasis on theory leaves him without Music. He has to understand the charac- army officer education must develop his the ability to apply his profession thor- teristics of a lot of different instruments understanding and acceptance that the oughly, or because too little theory leaves (that develop continuously) well enough officer corps must have an internal soli- him without a understanding of the com- to adapt their use to any situation. Some darity and cohesion to be able to with- plexity of the case.
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The integration of theory and prac- Education of army officers should have a similarities for understanding the require- tice in university hospitals should be cop- very high academic quality level. It should, ments for army officer education and ied in basic army officer education, even however, be judged by its own premises development. The doctor gets constant if it is more difficult. We do not have the and standards rather than forced to copy practice and interaction with reality in opportunity to fight small safe wars on preparation for other professions. his work. The officer, on the other hand, the local training area. This, however, does The parallel may be developed further: is rarely or never to get the chance to not justify the overemphasis on theory In both professions, you can unintention- practice his profession: managing his com- seen in many military academies. Practis- ally endanger the lives of your fellow citi- plicated killing machine in coercion of ing the profession can take other forms zens if you do not endeavour or succeed an opponent. His situation has been com- than the absolute one of leadership in war. to improve by studying and seeking rel- pared to that of a swimmer who practices Few outsiders feel that it is proper or evant experience all through your serv- all his life out of water, hoping that he safe to interfere with the internal organi- ice. The doctor, as the officer, should study can swim if tested, but at the same time sation of the education or training of the latest professional findings and tech- hoping that this will never happen. The doctors. It is more relevant to ensure that nical possibilities to keep updated and realism of the simulation and decisions the actual training given is of the best effective. If the doctor, or officer, gets that prepare him, depend on the depth possible quality than to dictate how they more responsible positions, the require- of the studies and professional under- should get their academic credits. The ment grows for management skills and standing of his fellow officers. He must medical profession is normally the only understanding and knowledge of other be prepared to succeed in a multinational one that the doctor will have in his life. than his own speciality. As with a doc- environment, in a language other than Thus the academic credits he/she receives tor, it would be a clear mistake to build his own, adding to the friction and risks. in secondary subjects are considered a promotion to higher leadership positions As officers, leading doctors must un- minor issue for most. on academic, theoretical criteria only. derstand the political system of their coun- Accepting that the education and train- Proven professional skills and management try to be effective. The doctor, however, ing of army officers can benefit from the ability must be an important element in normally does not have to put his hospi- approach used in medical schools could selection. tal on wheels to serve his country, assimi- focus the minds of those guiding and However, the differences between the late and use a large number of amateur approving the military education systems. two professions are as important as the assistants, or go into the rough in an area
12 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 where an enemy is trying to destroy it. education establishments. These persons However, the initial formal education The army officer may have to. This adds must, to succeed, have a combination of is not what makes a professional senior quite a few elements to the requirement total professional insight, moral courage, army officer. As already mentioned in the of the army officer. management skills, common sense, and above comparison with the medical pro- The character of basic army officer ability to interface with political leaders fession, the military profession is learn- education makes it very important that both nationally and internationally. ing by doing. the key military instructors in the acad- One part is an effective and objective The young officer builds his later pro- emy can serve as role models for the ca- evaluation and selection system, but fessional development by getting personal dets so that the young men or women how is the pool of qualified candidates experience at platoon and company levels can learn and be inspired by observing. developed? in his unit. Initial service other than that The character of the military profession The development of a good senior in units is likely to derail his later profes- makes it important that these instructors army officer is very much like the art of sional development, because thereafter it are young. A cadet finds it hard to iden- making a classical Japanese high quality will be without any real foundation of tify with a middle aged major or lieuten- sword: layers of high quality are added in personal experience, making it superficial ant colonel, no matter how competent he/ a continuous hardening process. A good and theoretical only. The harder, more she may be. senior professional officer is a composite realistic, more intense, these early experi- product, and the character of his basic ences, the better his professional founda- The development of the senior officer education is important. The qual- tion, the quicker it will build. What might regular army officer ity depends on the broad professional be learned in a few months in war can be insight of those who created the pro- learned in a couple of years in units that There is a long way from the basic army gramme he went through (and the free- participate in hard, sometimes lengthy, officer education to the very high pro- dom from diluting interference from exercises during the early service period. fessional level required in the end prod- outside). It should include a thorough The quality of the professional experience ucts: the Chiefs of Defence, Chiefs of foreign language training as it is easier to depends on the realism of the training in Central Staff, operational commanders learn earlier than later, and he will have garrison and the exercises: that means on and their chiefs of staff, leaders of doc- much use for foreign languages in his later the professional level, insight, and free- trine development, and leaders of the key professional development. dom of action of the senior officers mak-
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ing the exercises. If the exercises lack real- Troops (TEWTs) or seminars. Unfortu- From now on the further professional ism (due to lack of resources, lack of a nately such interaction is being under- development of the officer depends on proper training area, or superficial pro- mined in many armies by lack of profes- whether he gets the chance to practice what fessionalism of the exercise designers or sional discussion in the officers mess or he has learned with a maximum of free- directors) the gained professional experi- by a mid-level functionarys attitude to dom of action. He should develop and ence will be narrower. Without proper working hours. participate in the actual execution of ex- exercise experience, the officers later pro- After the initial on-the-job creation of ercises and training, and be given possi- fessional development will be severely ham- the professional young officer, his fur- bilities to give input to the development pered. It will be like being responsible ther development should be accelerated of methods and procedures. He will only for the training of a football team with- by a relatively short professional course learn effectively by personal responsibil- out the experience of matches. (6-11 months) where he builds on his ity, and from his mistakes. This second Experience from peace operations can personal experience and gains a broader service period after Junior Staff Course add significantly to the basic professional base of theoretical and doctrinal under- (Captain Course/Company Commander development of the officer. standing. It prepares him for leading com- Course/Brigade Course) should be the Service in the unit should include par- bined arms teams at sub-unit/unit levels main base for selection for further for- ticipating in short courses in specialist and for junior tactical (rather than policy) mal education and eventual senior field schools, not only or mainly to get the staff positions. The course should not be officer or higher rank. Those who do not specific knowledge or skills taught, but too long as it should be part of the young perform sufficiently well should be on to get the chance to interact with and learn officers continued experience building their path to more specialists or adminis- from fellow officers of the same age group. and professional development. Part of trative jobs or to their second career. The development of an officer also the course should be the encouragement In most small armies (with relatively depends on the existence of an open pro- of a career long informal study of mod- small, one-service garrisons) this service fessional debate between a sufficiently large ern military history. As they develop pro- period will involve the first rotation to group of young and more senior officers fessional and human insight through serv- another location. Some of the best offic- in the garrison. The unit commander can ice and ageing, they will understand what ers of this age and experience group give such a debate a formal form, e.g. by they read in increasing depth. This again should be used as instructors in the basic conducting Tactical Exercises without will enhance their professional work. officer education.
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The next step in the development of international operations; and in war. The service in various command, staff, and the senior army officer is his preparation military instructors should normally be possibly teaching positions, the officer for policy and other higher staff and com- general staff trained lieutenant colonels (or uses the insights and skills gained in all mand positions with a general staff of- majors) with good career prospects. The his previous service and courses or career ficer education. The ideal is probably a course should include a large element of long individual studies. The available time two-year course given to officers with civilian academic subjects, e.g. political will normally make it very difficult to do eight-to-ten years of officer experience. A science, management theory, economy, etc. more than just to update his knowledge one-year course like one run by many states The teaching must be at a very demand- in the general professional fields. followed several years later for some by ing level; even if it means that only a pro- His performance in the variety of jobs a one-year war college course is too short. portion of the students get full benefit that he is rotated to is likely to decide It will have to focus too much on a rather from the teaching. what career track he is going follow in superficial instruction instead of giving The students are mature, intelligent his remaining 15-25 years in the army. room for the development of the in-depth persons at a clear post-graduate level that understanding necessary for a staff officer pick-up very quickly, so these parts of the Final remarks in policy and joint positions or a com- course can be validated using academic mander at formation or higher level. quality criteria. However, including gen- Being an army officer is a young man/ The key mission of the general staff eral academic courses or formal exams is womans profession. In the eyes of the officer education is to offer a framework likely to undermine the course by detract- soldiers and young regular NCOs and for the personal professional development ing from the focus. The purpose is not officers that might have to fight, middle of the student. It should force him to use to create academics, but rather senior of- aged officers (above 40) in direct contact all his experience, but at the same time ficers with a broad insight in their own with them as trainers and potential lead- broaden the scope to include all aspects and supporting fields. ers lack credibility. This is a fact that has of joint services operations, military-ci- One very important part of the course to be taken into account when develop- vilian, total defence, and international is also to gain an impression of which ing the officer career and employment interaction in peacetime development of students who in their mid-thirties still system, even if the officers themselves or structure, doctrine, and plans; in crisis- possess a significant capacity for further the society around them think otherwise. management and during participation in personal development. During post course No army should live with a structural
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credibility gap between the leaders and officers, this is unfortunately not the case. the led. Full colonels and generals may be Wars are rare. somewhat older, as may be staff officers Weak military professionalism and unit of field rank in formation headquarters. quality will not be noticed by the Minis- There are limits, however. Even if ignored try of Finance quality control norms, in peacetime, the physical and mental pres- because they are as unsuitable to the evalu- sures of combat will punish such struc- ation of military effectiveness as those used tural weaknesses in war. The move to the in the Soviet Union. However, they cre- next higher level of command in a train- ate a framework for adjusting to civilian ing-mobilisation army makes the dilemma standards in working hours and other somewhat less direct here than in a stand- privileges that actually undermine any ing army (it may make a five year differ- chance to develop the well trained com- ence), but it does not remove it. bat ready army units led by deeply pro- There is a tendency in peacetime ar- fessional officers that the public money mies to ignore such facts, simply because used on the army could otherwise sup- it fits both the self-interests of the offic- port. Where the dangers of the sea and of ers as well as the limitations of Ministries flying set limits as to how far naval and of Finance to use civilian norms for guid- air force officer professionalism can rot, ing the development of the army. This army officers are more/less fortunate. does not only apply to the age distribu- And a final point: all professional de- tion and retirement ages. It also applies velopment happens in a continuous dia- to how one regard ones profession. No logue between study, experience through career lawyer, manager or other employee practice and experiment, and the matur- in a big civilian firm can safely ignore ing as a human being. This should be the that career depends on a 100% commit- general concept for army officer educa- ment to self-improvement. In some pub- tion and patterns of service. lic service careers, including that of army
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Formation of the NDA
By Ltcol. Almars Viksne, Commandant of the National Defence Academy of Latvia.
he National Defense Academy of NDA is under direct command of the • Practical research in the Military to T Latvia (NDA) is a military profes- commander of the NAF and it executes perfect the state defense and the opera- sional and academic higher educational the tasks of a separate military unit. In tion of the NDA and scientific establishment of the Repub- this case the NDA would act within the • To prepare and publish study mate- lic of Latvia. The NDA was founded on Latvian Brigade. rials, books and scientific projects neces- 13 February 1992 in accordance with the sary related to the state defense. resolution #54 Regarding the National Objectives of the National Defense Academy of the Council of Min- Defense Academy: General Principles of the isters. The NDA is the only government Officers Training military educational and scientific estab- • Considering the NATO states expe- lishment of the Republic of Latvia. rience, to train qualified platoon, com- Latvia considers their strategic objec- The academy is subject to the Ministry pany and battalion commanders for the tive in close cooperation with the North of Defense. In event of mobilization and National Armed Forces Atlantic Treaty Organization that would fighting trim it is subject to the com- • To organize constant short-term allow Latvia along with Estonia and mander of the National Armed Forces courses in required military occupations, Lithuania, become a full-fledged member (NAF) and it executes all the NAF tasks tactics and leadership on request of the of the alliance in the future. Nowadays according to the procedures and extent Ministry of Defense (MoD), and branches the National Armed Forces have to ad- established by the Minister of Defense. of the NAF here to the standards that Western coun- In exceptional case or in state of war the • Reserve officers training tries have set for their armies. Not solv-
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ing the problem of compatibility between staffs interchanges with the training Every level is followed by at least two- the NAF of Latvia and NATO it is hardly courses. Multilevel training policy con- year service in the National Armed Forces. possible to integrate the North Atlantic siders the pyramid of the military career. Level One deals with the training of security and defense structures. The sys- It increases the competition proceeding platoon commanders and specialists re- tem of individual and unit training ac- to every level of the military education. lated to the platoon commanders level. cording to the NATO standards will pro- This is to invest the monetary resources The training is organized at the National mote to meet the compatibility. Other- in the education of the most capable of- Defense Academy and corresponding level wise, without the appropriately trained ficers and separate the less prospective ones foreign military institutions. The pro- personnel there would be difficulty in the early stages. The succession sequence gram duration at the NDA is twenty-seven even in elementary military coopera- is in effect. That means an officer can run month plus a six-month practice in the tion. for the higher level courses only on con- units of the NAF. The average age of the The objective to train the individuals dition that he has an appropriate prelimi- graduates is 22 to 23 years; and they have and units to carry out certain tasks is to nary education and has served in the re- the right to occupy 2nd Lieutenants and train the individual and team professional quired positions. This education system 1st Lieutenants positions. However, due skills. The outcome is a well-trained, self- promotes the formation of a military to the small number of officer corps, lieu- confident and motivated soldier and a pyramid and increases the competition tenants often occupy higher positions. unit that is led skillfully and effectively. in taking a higher position as well as pro- Unfortunately we have to acknowledge that The training is an ongoing and advanc- ceeding to the next level of the military there is the drawback in acquiring the ing process. It is the main peacetime task education. military education. of the National Armed Forces. This proc- Level Two deals with the training of ess is organized and carried out by offic- The officers training is company commanders and specialists re- ers. Consequently, the fighting trim of organized in four levels: lated to the company commanders level. the National Armed Forces will depend The training is organized at the National on the quality of our officers. • Platoon Commanders Defense Academy and corresponding level Military education is an integral part • Company Commanders foreign military institutions. This is a one- of the officers career. During the entire • Battalion Commanders year program and the average age of military career, the service in units and • Higher Officers graduates is 27 years. Completing the
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Level Two education gives the right to ate military education for the National peacekeeping missions and joint exercises occupy Captains and Majors positions. Armed Forces. Five years have passed since with the partnership countries. Level Three deals with the training of the time the academy began to train of- The Platoon Commanders Program battalion commanders and specialists re- ficers in Malpils Agriculture Technical instructs the cadets to be able to perform lated to the battalion commanders level. School. Many things have changed dur- tasks as infantry officers in small units. The training is considered to be partly ing that period of time. The NDA, to- Cadets obtain the basic military knowl- carried out at the National Defense Acad- gether with the Police Academy, took edge, familiarize with the basic principles emy in the four-month course with the over former Russian military school of military administration and leadership follow-on training at the Baltic Defence premises. They repaired and equipped and acquire the foreign language. The pla- College or corresponding level foreign some buildings for living and study- toon commanders qualification require- military institutions. The study duration ing. The most important was that Latvia ments are set by the Order of the Minis- at the NDA is four months. The average at that time started continuous officers ter of Defense # 131 on 3 June 1998. age of graduates is 35 years and they training. The platoon commanders qualification should be posted to the positions of Lieu- The Latvian Military interoperability can be obtained by studying in the Full tenant Colonels. with NATO to the NDA means that the Time Program, Correspondence Course Level Four deals with the training of curriculum must be compiled so that and Postgraduate Course. It is also planned higher officers. Due to the restricted graduates could successfully operate in the to train the reserve platoon commanders number of the Level Four positions at NAF units considering the principles of at the academy. the National Armed Forces, the training total defense as well as participate in NATO To apply for the Platoon Command- is considered to be organized only at the led international peacekeeping missions ers Course it is necessary to have a sec- foreign military institutions according to without a long-lasting pre-training. As a tion commanders qualification. One can the mutual agreements of cooperation. result the priority in the curriculum is undergo the Section Commanders Course to the subjects necessary for acquiring either in the NAF training centers or at Officers Training at the NDA theoretical and practical experience in the NDA. In the Section Commanders managing units in the battle. That is based Course, there can be admitted citizens of The main objective of the NDA is to on principles of territorial defense, peace- the Republic of Latvia up to the age of train qualified officers with an appropri- time military service, participation in 25. They must have a secondary educa-
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tion. The admission tests are in Mathemat- cal Fitness and Foreign Language. Candi- tical exercises, seminars and self-study. The ics, Composition in Latvian, Physical Fit- dates who have accomplished the Section main emphasis is on the practical exer- ness and Foreign Language. The study Commanders Course at the NDA are not cises. Practical field exercises are carried duration is six months including a one- tested. out in the Adazi training area and they month practice. In admission tests the The main emphasis in the Platoon last for 10 to 12 hours. There are also applicants have to present the knowledge Commanders Program is on the Combat night field exercises. of the secondary education level. Physical Training Block. The block includes sub- To acquire the theoretical material the Fitness is tested according to the NAF jects that are critical to cadets training in instructor staff uses a group work and standards. practical skills at the battlefield and man- the interactive teaching methods that in- After a successful completion of the aging subordinate soldiers. Approxi- volve the trainee in discussions with the program, the cadets acquire the section mately, one third of the program is allo- instructor. Various audio-visual aids are commander qualification. That gives the cated to the foreign language training. It used in the teaching process. During the right to stand as a candidate for the Pla- is related to the necessity of knowing the self-study, the cadets are able to use the toon Commanders Course or to proceed language to participate in peacekeeping reading-room, library and a computer the service in the NAF units as section operations, joint exercises as well as the laboratory. commander. It is desirable that in the follow-on training in foreign military Classes are prepared, conducted and future the soldiers would acquire the Sec- educational establishments. controlled by the department instructors. tion Commanders Program only at the During the program, cadets master their NAF training centers. The Platoon Commanders commander, leader and instructor skills. Citizens of the Republic of Latvia up Course includes: Therefore, in the practical exercises cadets to the age of 25 can be admitted in the are appointed commanders of subunits. Platoon Commanders Course. They must • 14-month theoretical program (Part 1) After completion of the Part 1 Platoon have a secondary education and section • 6-month practice at the NAF Commanders Course the cadets earn Ser- commander qualification obtained at the • 13-month theoretical program (Part 2) geants ranks and they are posted to the NDA, the NAF training centers or To meet the objectives of the Platoon practice or specialized study programs at abroad. The admission tests are in Math- Commanders Course, various methods of the foreign military educational establish- ematics, Composition in Latvian, Physi- instruction are introduced: lectures, prac- ments. The practice takes place in the NAF
20 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 units in accordance with the Practice Regu- place during the first two years of regular knowledge. The knowledge is extended lations approved by the Commander of study. In the last two years on the bases during the course consequently enabling the NAF. During the practice cadets de- of the NDA there is a Reserve Platoon the graduates to proceed their studies at vise a Practice Project. The themes of the Commanders training. The instruction the foreign military educational establish- project they receive before leaving for the takes place once a week. After the comple- ments as well as to take part in partner- practice. The project supervisor from the tion of this course the candidates qualified ship countries joint exercises. At the end NDA instructors staff consults the cadet. to serve as Reserve Platoon Commanders of the course the students devise and The cadet personal abilities and traits are are enlisted in the reserve of the NAF. present the Course Project. reflected in the Practice Performance Re- The Reserve Officers who want to join The Battalion Commanders Course view. Practice is an integral part of the the full-time service will have to undergo deals with teaching Strategy, Tactics and Platoon Commanders Course to evaluate a 3-month service at the NAF followed Staff Work Organization. The specific on how cadets are able to put the theo- by the 4-month Platoon Commanders short-term course themes, contents and retical knowledge into practice. After a Refresher Course at the NDA. The cadets duration depend on a certain specializa- successful completion of the Part 2 Pla- will acquire the knowledge and receive a tion and it is coordinated with the MoD, toon Commanders Course the cadets earn Diploma of the Platoon Commanders NAF or the Staff of a Branch of Service. the rank of a 2nd Lieutenant. qualification and earn a rank of 2nd Lieu- The NDA provides knowledge in the The NDA is responsible of the Reserve tenant. The foreign language is not taught Infantry Officers Specialty. That does not Officers training from the students that in that program thus, one of the prereq- eliminate the possibility to train the Navy have successfully completed the Reserve uisites is to know the foreign language and the Air Force officers. The training Section Commanders Course at the Stu- according to the Platoon Commanders of those officers is conducted in the fol- dent Battalion. The study is on voluntary professional qualification. lowing way: bases. Six students of the higher educa- In the Company Commanders Pro- Representatives of the Navy and the tional establishments may participate in gram, besides acquiring the Battle Skills Air Force are invited to participate in the military training to become section an emphasis is also put on Younger Of- the admission board to select the best commanders. The program of the train- ficers Staff Work Methods and Adminis- possible candidates. ing is approved by the Order of the Com- tration Principles. The prerequisite of Civilian graduates training at the NDA mander of the NAF. The program takes entering the program is foreign language part 1 Platoon Commanders Course. Af-
21 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
ter completion of the training the gradu- military education standards. Candidates The process is rather complicated and ates are promoted 2nd Lieutenants. can be posted to the military training it requires abundant time and work re- Navy and Air Force specialist training abroad only on condition that they have sources. During the process the self-assess- abroad after completion the Part 1 Pla- successfully completed the Part 1 Platoon ment report is worked out as well as com- toon Commanders Course. Commanders Course at the NDA or they piled the required documents. First, the Up to the year of 2003, the students are NCOs with at least a year service ex- Accreditation Board approves the Assess- are admitted to the Part 1 Platoon Com- perience and their qualification is up to ment Board. Then, the experts of the As- manders Correspondence Course. Start- the required level of the training program sessment Board acquaint with the self-as- ing with the year of 2004, the course will in which they are going to participate. sessment report and attend the educational be available only in the full-time study After completion of the military educa- establishment. After the visit, it submits program. NCOs with secondary educa- tional establishment abroad and the edu- the Accreditation Board individual re- tion and at least 12-month service experi- ports of all experts as well as work out a cation equalization, the officer continues ence up to the age of 35 can be admitted common evaluation. Lastly, the Accredita- to serve at the NAF according to the at- in the Platoon Commanders Correspond- tion Board basing on the submitted mate- tained education. ence Course. rials from the educational establishment, An important task is to attain the NDA All the academy cadets and students are expert reports, Assessment Board evalua- primarily conscripts or full-time service- accreditation in Latvia. It takes place in tions and explanations from representatives men and they are subject to all restric- accordance with the Accreditation Regu- of the educational establishment, ballots and tions and duties according to the mili- lations approved by the Cabinet and is draws conclusion on the accreditation. tary regulations. organized by the Ministry of Education The work on the academy curriculum Due to the limited resources of the and Science. Curriculum is accredited at accreditation documents has already be- MoD, the small number of students in least once in six years. Accreditation is gun. The academy has already set the Self- specialist training is organized in various the educational establishment work organi- Assessment Board. Accordingly, the board foreign military courses and programs. zation and resource quality inspection. As has started to work on: After completion of that type of training a result, the institution either receives the • NDA Study Statutes it is required to organize the equalization state approved higher educational estab- • NDA Lecturer Load Statutes of the education attained to the Latvian lishment status or not. • Academic Council Statutes
22 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
• Curriculum according to the year 1999 estimate, will manders Program (Full-time Course, Cor- • NDA Internal Inspection Statutes cost Ls 789500 ($ 1315830). respondence Course and Postgraduate The NDA plans to acquire the curricu- Course) in the following four years must lum and academy accreditation in 2001. Framework of the NDA be 70 to 95 men. Since the foundation of It is impossible to implement the pro- the NDA in 1992, 780 cadets have gradu- gram without an appropriate funding. The NDA serves for two purposes si- ated the academy. The NDA is fully financed from the state multaneously. It is a military educational The Tactics Department is the biggest budget. We have to acknowledge that in institution in peacetime and a fighting and one of the most important depart- the recent two years the funding has re- unit within the Latvian Brigade in state ments of the NDA. The department train- markably enlarged. The NDA budget was of crisis. Therefore, the NDA staff also ing objective is to provide the cadets with gradually increased (33% growth in 1999 includes positions required only as for knowledge and practical skills in the train- in comparison with 1998) which enabled the military unit. The NDA is formed of ing subjects according to the curriculum us to carry out the curriculum changes departments, subunits, the Research as well as to train the cadets to be able to in accordance with the Western expert Center and other structures. The total serve at the NAF. The Tactics Department recommendations. NDA personnel are 176 people. It holds is responsible for the Combat Training The year 2000 budget to compare with both military and civilians including 58 Block. It also coordinates and manages the the year 1999 budget increased by Ls instructors. The number of cadets in Tactics Center, officers and senior cadets 445289 ($ 742150) or 29.88 %. The allo- March 2000, in the Platoon Command- Staff Work Methods Training and acad- cated resources provide the NDA study ers program was as big as 192, in the emy personnel Marksmanship Training. process. An extra funding is allocated to Company Commanders program it was After completion of the Combat Train- the NDA development considering the 7, in the Correspondence Course it was ing Block, the cadets must know: set priorities. Since two years ago, the 36, and there were 28 conscript soldiers. • The essence of the modern battle priority is in modernizing the study The number of trainees depends on • Forces organization, equipment, equipment and improving the cadets liv- the order of the NAF. According to the fighting capacity and tactics ing conditions. To fully complete the six- Order of the Commander of the NAF # • Platoon and company commanders story barrack reconstruction into separate 496 1 January 1998, it is stated that the work in organizing a battle, battle logis- rooms for two to three people, the project number of graduates in the Platoon Com- tics and administration
23 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
• Platoon and company commanders ics, Statistics and Computers according equipment application in catastrophe liq- duties in soldiers individual training and to the Baccalaureates Program. However, uidation. their consolidation in a unit the main task of the department is to in- In Signals, the cadets learn to use the • Company and battalion armament struct cadets in military-technical subjects field telephones and field communicators. • Individual and group training meth- such as Armament, NBC, Signals, Artil- They also acquire skills in using R-159, R- odology lery and Battle Engineering. 163 and Star LB C-130 radios. The com- • Signals, tactical legends and map The Battle Engineering deals with the pany commanders study the NATO sig- reading NDA and the NAF unit development and nal standards and signal procedures as well A great deal of the training is dedi- their logistics and certain types of equip- as to use the Kenwood TRC-80 radio. Last cated to the practical lessons at the NDA ment. year the academy purchased four mod- and the Adazi training area. Field exer- Within the Platoon Commanders Pro- ern ultra-short wave Kenwood TRC-80 cises are carried out regularly. An empha- gram cadets acquire the knowledge on how radios that guarantee good long-range sis is put on the practical training so that to use the infantry mobile support and communication. For the further develop- the future officers will be able: how to act against the enemy mobile sup- ment, the department needs modems to • Manage a platoon and company in port to increase the survivability. There various battle situations are the following topics in the program: instruct and organize computerized in- • Apply the platoon and company ar- Fortification, Explosives and Demolition, formation transmission. mament Mines and Mine Fields, Obstacles, Cam- In Artillery, the Platoon Commanders • Organize the cooperation with part- ouflage and Concealment, Engineer Intel- Program includes the history of artillery, ner forces, supporting units and logistics ligence, Battle Engineering etc. artillery weapon capabilities, artillery tac- • Present the battle situation on a map The same topics compile the Company tics, data preparation, and fire for adjust- or model Commanders Program. The topics in the ment and observation. The Company • Solve the tactical tasks on the map program are taught extendedly. The at- Commanders Program covers the mod- and in the field tention is focused to the organizational ern artillery weapons, their capabilities and The Technical Science Department deals activities, time and resource management tactical differences and cooperation be- with the Technical Science Block where and documentation. The cadets are intro- tween the infantry and support units. A cadets study Physics, Advanced Mathemat- duced to the engineering novelties and great emphasis is put on practice. The
24 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
NATO tactics are used in the fire sup- follow the latest developments and tech- and French. The Foreign Language De- port application. nologies. During the course, the cadets partment must: In Computers, the platoon command- learn to independently update their Provide foreign language training to ers acquire the basic computer skills as knowledge in the newest technical litera- all civilian and military personnel at the well as Windows 98, Word 97 and Excel ture, prepare visual aids and conduct les- Academy in order for them to comply 97. The company commanders acquire sons. with the language requirements of their Power Point 97 and get an insight to the NBC deals with the main mass destruc- positions. computer network and learn to use the tion weapons and the ways of NBC Develop the foreign language profi- Internet and e-mail. It is planned to fa- defense. The cadets learn the methods of ciency of the cadets enrolled in the dif- miliarize cadets with the database of ad- area inspection, ways of deactivation and ferent programs to meet the minimum ministration system Access 97. the general ideas of environmental prob- graduation requirements. In Armament, the cadets get acquainted lems. The majority of cadets study the Eng- with the NAF, NATO and neighboring The Administration and Political Sci- lish language. The English Section of the countries military equipment. In the Pla- ence Department concerns itself with the Foreign Language Department at Na- toon Commanders Program, the cadets Administration and Political Science Study tional Defense Academy uses primarily study the Army equipment such as Block. In the Platoon Commanders Pro- for its instruction the American Language armored personal carriers, armored recon- gram the cadets study the subjects such as Course materials that are developed by naissance vehicles, mechanized infantry Administration Theory, Administration curriculum personnel at the Defense Lan- combat vehicles, main battle tanks, self- Sociology, Micro and Macro Economy, guage Institute English Language Center propelled guns and howitzers, mortars, Administration Psychology, War Medi- in San Antonio, Texas. For students re- anti-tank weapons, multiple rocket launch- cine, NAF Regulations, Logistics etc. In quiring some knowledge of military Eng- ers and self-propelled anti-aircraft weap- the Company Commanders Program lish, materials like the Specialized English ons. They acquire the basics of aircraft those same subjects are trained extendedly. Training materials from DLIELC and the distinguishing whereas the Company After completing the program, the cadets book Command English published by Commanders Program cadets learn the must present a course project. Longman Group UK Limited are used as newest battle equipment models, combat The Foreign Language Department has supplemental materials. Before admission, helicopters, aviation armament as well as three-language sections- English, German all candidates will be administered an
25 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
American Language Course Placement Test tors have the cadets develop strength, speed • Practical research in domain of the (ALCPT) which will be used as one of the and agility through exercising in field and state security, defense policy and military factors in the decision as to whether the track, bodybuilding and weightlifting. education and science candidate should be admitted to one of Besides regular classes, the instructors con- • Research of the NATO alliance, the National Defense Academy Programs. duct sports sections in basketball, volley- Northern Europe and neutral countries This ALCPT test will be given several times ball, weightlifting and wrestling. The acad- experience in handling total defense, cri- during the course of the year and will be emy teams successfully participate in NAF sis management and military education part of the term and graduating grades. and even Latvian Championships. and training The entry and graduation language require- The Defense Research Center (DRC) • Promoting the information exchange ments vary according to the program that carries out practical research in the do- in security and defense matters among the the candidate is intending to enter. main of state security, defense policy and Ministries of Defense and Armed Forces The Sports Department main objec- military science in the interests of the NDA research centers of the Baltic and other tives: and NAF. It is an academy unit under partner countries • Improve and maintain cadets physi- the authority of the Ministry of Defense. • The NDA library has been operat- cal fitness It is subject to the Commandant of the ing since the spring 1993. The library stock • Teach cadets to conduct sports classes academy. primarily consists of donations from the • Teach cadets to organize and con- The DRC operates according to the Liesma Publishing House. It is also sup- duct competitions Statutes. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) plemented with new purchases as well as To achieve these goals the cadets ac- finances the DRC within the NDA budget institutions and private donations. The tively participate not only in regular classes whereas the Ministry of Education and library fond is unique. A special atten- but they also help in conducting sports Science finance government institutions tion in compiling the fond is paid to the sections and competitions. The depart- research projects. literature of military science, weapons, ment organizes classes in track and field, The chief task of the DRC is to organ- armament and equipment. The fond is wrestling, sports games and other disci- ize research in military education and sci- compiled regarding the suggestions from plines. A great attention is paid to the ence in order to strengthen the state the teaching departments and the DRC. hand-to-hand fight as well as Greek-Ro- defense system. The general outline of the There is a reading room, scientific and man and women wrestling. The instruc- DRC is: belles-lettres sections at the library. It pri-
26 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 marily serves for the academy cadets and ing. In 1997, the academy followed Dan- The academy officer and instructor staff the personnel as well as the MoD person- ish, British and the International Defense also undergoes different types of train- nel. Others may use the literature within Advisory Board for the Baltic States rec- ing abroad. Currently, one officer receives the library premises. On 1 January 2000, ommendations to modernize the study training at the Bundeswehr University in the library fond consisted of 27427 programs. Now there is a productive co- Germany and one in the Baltic Defense printed units. operation between the NDA and many College in Estonia. One English language Currently, the NDA library owns the foreign military educational establish- instructor undergoes training in the USA. widest stock of military periodical issues ments. A constant cooperation has been Continuously, academy instructors par- in Latvia. It is planned to expand it even carried out with 5 countries: ticipate in various short-term courses. more in the future. The library offers • The USA, English Language Training In cooperation with the USA there was copies of the most significant military lit- • Denmark, Leadership and Pedagogy installed an English language computer erature where originals were not available. • Sweden, Reserve Cadet Training in laboratory in 1999. Every year the acad- The current catalogue operates in the form certain military specialties emy hosts guest English language instruc- of cards. Since the year of 1999 the li- • Great Britain, Tactics tors from the Defense Language Institute, brary is connected to the integral biblio- • Germany, cadet training in military Texas. Supported by the Danish govern- graphic information system Alice. It is specialties required by the NAF ment, the academy installed the Army planned to computerize the library serv- Every year the academy plans coopera- Tactical Trainer. The Danish colleagues also ice and originate the possibility to use tion with the countries mentioned above. organized repeated academy instructors the CD-ROM database as well as access the In May 2000, there were 31 NDA students methodology training. 20 academy in- Internet. studying abroad in specialties like Engi- structors and officers participated in the neering, Communications, Artillery, Lo- course. This year, the academy will con- International Cooperation gistics and Navy Officer: sult the experts of the Danish Royal Mili- • Germany, 20 cadets tary Academy in teaching department International cooperation is one of the • Sweden, 7 cadets work optimization. NDA priorities in order to improve the • Denmark, 2 cadets There is an ongoing military coopera- program quality and take over the West- • The Czech Republic, 1 cadet tion with Great Britain. The main activi- ern countries experience in officers train- • The USA, 1 cadet ties were the Platoon Commanders Battle
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Course for the cadets in 1998 and the to the military education. An example ers training program must start in 2002. Platoon Commanders Methodology would be an approval of the Conception In cooperation with the NAF the NDA Course for the NDA instructors in 1999. of the NAF Officers Military Education has to clarify the necessity and effective- The further cooperation will be on the as well as the NDA curriculum accredita- ness of the short-term qualification NDA instructors work assessment in the tion in 2001. courses. The NDA must be ready to or- Platoon Commanders Course and instruc- We prefer to continue developing the ganize the Staff Officers, Communication, tors training in organizing the Company NDA material resources and infrastruc- Computers, Drivers, Field Medicine, Lo- and Battalion Commanders Course. ture. It is considered to: gistics and other courses for the NAF The experts from Great Britain, Den- • Allocate funding to improve the ca- personnel. mark and Sweden are invited to give an dets household by reconstructing the official NDA program evaluation for the NDA barracks till the year of 2003. Conclusion academy accreditation. • Repair building # 1 and gradually move the NDA departments and admin- While studying at the NDA, the fu- NDA Development Priorities istration to the repaired building. ture officers must be aware that in demo- • Equip the study rooms according to cratic countries soldiers are thought ci- The main priority still remains the the contemporary requirements vilians in uniforms. It means that the further curriculum improvement accord- • Organize the NDA Distance Learn- rights and freedom of each individual are ing to the NATO standards. That will be ing Center for the reserve officers and highly respected. There should not be an organized in close cooperation with part- specialized programs. abundance of restrictions. Restrictions are nership countries military educational • Organize the CD and video library to be as many as it concerns maintaining establishments as well as the Baltic Defense with an access to the Internet. the fighting trim. Those two processes College, whereas study program coordi- • Build a NATO standard obstacle ought to be mutually balanced. A soldier nation among the National Academies of course by the end of this year. is to be aware that he serves for his coun- the Baltic States and the Baltic Defense We also have to point out that the try to defend democracy. College is the other priority. academy has to compile the Reserve Of- The Officers Corps is the key factor in More attention will be paid to devis- ficers training program to begin the study maintaining the fighting trim as well as ing and approving documentation related in 2001, whereas the Battalion Command- good relations among the soldiers of all
28 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 ranks. Otherwise, without a well-trained Officers Corps there is no hope for ap- propriate Armed Forces. In a democratic society military leadership and training cardinally differs from the one experi- enced in the former USSR and current Russian army. Even if in some instances there are common tactical methods. The relevant differences are in the way: • A soldier feels in performing his du- ties • A person and his rights are respected • Of motivation in service for the country • A soldier acts under stress, threat or in warfare Latvian NAF takes over the NATO countries experience and principles. The standardization requirements are consid- ered in compiling the study programs. It is true that officers training require high expenditures but we are aware that good fighting trim and equalization with the NATO calls for well-trained and educated officers.
29 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
The Baltic Naval Squadron BALTRON By Juozas ALSAUSKAS, Commander Lithuanian Navy, Commander of BALTRON
he three Baltic States - Estonia, tablishment of the BALTRON. On 28 accordance with the United Nations Char- T Latvia, Lithuania began military co- August BALTRON was inaugurated. Bal- ter. operation in the defence area shortly af- tic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) is a per- It is noted as a precondition for plan- ter regaining independence. The defence- manently established tri-national standing ning and implementation of BALTRON related co-operation has resulted in four Naval Force with mine-countermeasures activities that BALTRON will train and military projects such as BALBAT, capabilities. The operational task of act in accordance with NATO/PfP naval BALTNET, BALTDEFCOL and BALTRON is to counter mine threats, to and staff procedures, both in the fleet and BALTRON. The idea to establish a joint reduce environmental damage in the ter- in the staff. The command and commu- naval unit was brought up in 1995. The ritorial waters and economic zones of the nication language is English, and same year started the first trilateral Baltic Baltic States and to enhance the security BALTRON activities apply relevant naval exercise AMBER SEA-95. In the end of peacetime seagoing. It is the priority NATO/PfP procedures and standards. of 1996 the practical preparations for the of the project to contribute to the devel- BALTRON project were launched, and opment of the national naval forces and Activities Germany undertook the role as the lead- to raise the self-defence capabilities of the ing nation in the international co-ordi- Baltic States and to develop interchange- BALTRON reached its first operational nation of the project. In April 16 1998 ability with NATO/PfP forces. milestone in September 1998 when the the Ministers of Defence of the Republic Another aspiration is to have a capa- squadron as a multinational naval unit of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed bility for participation in multinational participated in the international mine the formal agreement concerning the es- peace support operations conducted in countermeasures exercise OPEN SPIRIT-
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98. The main goals of exercise were to BALTRON staff was involved in tasking serves for six months at a time. Currently allow BALTRON forces to familiarise and monitoring the situation, command- squadron is composed of Staff and Sup- themselves wit NATO procedures and to ers briefings and message drafting, prepa- ply ship LNS Vetra (Lithuanian Navy bring BALTRON communications up to ration and conducting pre-sail and post- ship), minesweepers ENS Kalev (Estonian NATO levels. exercise briefings. The co-operation of Navy ship) and LVNS Imanta (Latvian During exercise U.S. BALTOPS-99 (an BALTRON and MCMFN was a very valu- Navy ship). At the same time BALTRON American invitational multinational mari- able experience both for the ships and ships also remain integral parts of national time exercise conducted in the Baltic re- for the staff as well. navies of the Baltic States. At the moment gion) BALTRON staff was working in 1999 was first full year of operations BALTRON units have been dismissed to multinational staff shoulder to shoulder for BALTRON. BALTRON conducted national bases for the crew change, ship with naval officers from Poland, Germany, activities aimed to prepare for stated aims. maintenance and crew rest. In accordance UK and Norway due to improve overall Beside preparations for main tasks, very with the Annual BALTRON activities plan co-ordination and understanding. So the important was the presence of the Naval for year 2000 the force will be collected issuing orders and reporting has followed forces of the Baltic States in the Baltic again in Liepaja on the 20 of March and NATO standards and procedures. Sea, promotion of the NATO integration will continue their duties. Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Exer- process and optimised use of resources. The BALTRON staff has started work cise PAS SEX- 99 between BALTRON and 1999 was difficult year but at the same October 1997 in Tallinn. The staff is fully Mine Countermeasures Force North-west- time it gave to all Baltic Navies first expe- operational since April 1998 and consists ern Europe (MCMFN) based on request rience in operating the combined squad- of the following positions: Chief of staff, from Baltic States to NATO was used to ron during around the year. Operations officer, Communications create the framework for tasking of ships Officer and Public Relation Officer. Com- in order to facilitate procedural and tac- Structure and Composition mander BALTRON and staff officers are tical training. Prior to sailing BALTRON appointed for a period of at least 12 staff was embarked on a NATO staff ship. BALTRON is comprised of a com- months. Currently the staff is organised Tasking authority for all participants were bined tri-national staff and national ships as an operational staff without the admin- Commander MCMFN and Commander from three Baltic Naves. Each nation pro- istrative capacity and it is designed to BALTRON. During actual exercise vides 1-2 vessels. Each ship in the force operate on board a Staff ship. During
34 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 the winter phase BALTRON staff organ- it can detect mine like objects. When it BARANOVA. On May 1999 she gradu- ised more extensive staff planning using find a mine, a remote controlled robot is ated from the United States Naval Acad- on-shore facility located at the Estonian submerged in the water and places an ex- emy in Annapolis with degree in Marine Naval base. Also staff can use on temporary plosive on the mine to detonate it. Engineering and the rank of Sublieuten- basis other naval facilities in the Baltic States Two minehunters are in service with ant. Since June 1999, she has been serving as agreed in the annual activity plan. the Baltic States (LVNS Namejs and LNS in BALTRON. In this period she took Suduvis). These vessels are equipped with part in exercises OPEN SPIRIT-99, AM- BALTRON Units a modem mine detection and classifica- BER SEA -99 and MCOPLAT-99. For this tion system. Their crews have been exten- last operation she worked as staff officer The force employs two basic types of sively trained in Germany prior to the on the Task Group staff. ships (donation of Germany) to clear ships arriving in Latvia and Lithuania. Elvira BARANOVA tells that there is a mines: minesweeper and mine hunter. The During exercise MCMOPLAT-99 LVNS big difference between the organisation minesweeper methodically travels back Namejs impressed every one by finding and function of the US Navy and the and forth across an area at the sea, drag- and disposing of the first mine in the Estonian Navy. The differences come from ging a buoy that cuts the cord from any entire operation. the size of the state, the economic and mines that are anchored on the sea floor. political situation, the geographical loca- The mine floats to the surface of the sea Personnel tion, and the historical background. How- where it can be seen and detonated. The ever, the basics are the same in virtually minesweeper also deals with influence Our Navies are very young, and are any modern military: the military disci- mines by simulating acoustic and mag- working hard to establish themselves in pline, the leadership principles, task per- netic fields of shipping with a towed so- the new environment. There are a lot of formance standards, etc. The training con- lenoid. The minesweepers operating with young officers coming back from differ- ducted during the four years in Annapolis BALTRON (FRAUENLOB and ent countries naval schools and academies, instilled a good sense of all that, plus it KONDOR class ships) are considered in- who are willing to use what they have was an outstanding stress management shore sweepers. learned to help the progress. One of such workshop. It also helped to attain a very The minehunter (LINDAU class) officers is the Executive Officer of the broad view of the worlds militaries. searches ahead with the sonar with which Estonian Navy ship OLEV Elvira Knowing the differences between various
35 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
navies and having the chance to see how • Training of the personnel, units and • Communications operators, techni- things are done and organised elsewhere squadron during deployment to cians and instructors training in Danish helps to get new ideas for own young navy. BALTRON. Signal School; Sublieutenant BARANOVA insists that Training provided by sending nations: • Specialized Damage Control train- being the only female in the squadron is Each sending nation is responsible for ing in German Navy damage Control tough at times, but at the same time it is a the preparation of its national units (per- school. This training involves firefighting, good opportunity for her colleagues to get sonnel and ships) assigned to BALTRON. shoring and rescue at sea. used to the thought that there will be more National units must be fully operational • Divers training in Norway. women actively involved in sailing and mine for the time of assignment. It is expected Training conducted during deploy- warfare. Having women as part of the ships that person joining BALTRON be trained ment to the squadron. company is a common thing in the US to perform assigned duties. For a ship, it During deployment to the squadron Navy now. For the Estonian Navy, how- is expected to be trained up to conduct training is executed mainly on squadron ever, it is a new experience, as in fact it is all assigned tasks on unit level and be ca- level in order to prepare the squadron to in Latvian Navy and Lithuanian Navy. pable to work together in the squadron. conduct MCM operations in the future. Communicators proved to be insuffi- In order to execute training on a squad- Training cient. All these had impact upon ron level BALTRON has conducted squad- The training system within the BALTRON performance during second ron exercises and participated in multi- BALTRON project is oriented in three part of the year and required to allocate national exercises. These have been mainly directions: time for basic exercises instead of scenario small to medium scale scenario based • Training of the staff personnel and based exercises. MCM exercises. Beside MCM, seamanship, units assigned to BALTRON before join- Training provided by supporting nations. communications and surface gunnery have ing BALTRON and provided by a send- Supporting nations have provided been trained during these exercises. ing nation. training support in following areas: • Training of the personnel assigned • Officers MCM staff training in Bel- International support to BALTRON before joining BALTRON gian-Netherlands Minewarfare school; and provided through BALTRON project • Communications officer training in From its beginning the BALTRON by supporting nations. United Kingdom; project has attracted wide international
36 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 support. The states supporting the estab- a threat to fishery and shipping. There- After an official request the Swedish lishment of BALTRON are Belgium, Den- fore, 1996 The Latvian Defence Minister Navy carried out Route Survey in the mark, Finland, France, Germany, Nether- Krastins wrote a letter to the German Baltic States beginning in 1994. Follow lands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, United Defence Minister Ruhe proposing a Ger- operations were called MCOPEST, Kingdom, and United States. The inter- man - Latvian exercise with the aim to MCOPLAT and MCOPLIT. During the national support to BALTRON is focused sweep the mines which were found in past five years the Swedish Navy has per- on providing equipment, training and former minefield. The result was that 16 formed seven mine and ammunition clear- expertise advice. Supporting nations have mines, 3 torpedoes and 1 bomb were ance operations in the Baltic. 97 mines, 57 organised and conducted: countermined. Germany and The Baltic units of unexploded ammunition have been • Full set of diving equipment for those States agreed upon an annual Exercise in destroyed in a 900 km2 area. divers (Norway); the Spirit of partnership for peace. Since Last operation MCOPLAT-99 (Mine • Setting up the communications training 1996 German Navy Minewarfare Flotilla Counter-measure Operation in Latvia, centre in Tallinn and installation of com- leads an annual Exercise conducted in 1999), organised by the Swedish Navys munication equipment by Danish Navy; waters of Baltic States. The exercise is called 21st MCM Flotilla from 18 October to 2 • Providing the language laboratory OPEN SPIRIT. It aims to effectively fos- November 1999, successfully located and by United States; ter the maritime co-operation in the Bal- destroyed 35 mines in waters of Riga Gulf. • Providing of degaussing (electromag- tic Sea area in the spirit of PfP, to coun- Overall, 19 ships and 530 men from 10 net and acoustic management) by Sweden; ter ordnances (mines, torpedoes, bombs, countries participated in operation. Con- • Sending staff officers to BALTRON shells, etc.) in the Baltic Sea, thereby con- tinuous support by the Supporting States staff in order to supervise and support tributing to the reduction of the envi- is important for the further development the staff personal. ronmental damage in the area and to pro- of the BALTRON project. Especially the During the First and Second World vide an opportunity for all participating support from states with experience in Wars parts of the Baltic Sea were mined. units to increase their individual knowl- NATO mine countermeasure operations Recent mine clearance operations in the edge and capability. is encouraged. Future development is coastal waters along Estonia, Latvia and The overall result of ordnance found concentrated on improvement of sweep- Lithuania have shown that remaining only in the Riga Gulf is as follows: 38 ing capabilities and expanding mines and ordnance in the area still pose mines, 8 bombs, and 12 torpedoes. minehunting capability.
37 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
BALTBAT - Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead
By Major T.D. Møller, Danish Army, Second in Command/Baltic Battalion Training Team 01. August 1999 - 31. January 2000.
able for United Nations Chapter VI op- The battalion as a whole was never de- Background erations. The battalion - in the peacekeep- ployed to a mission. The reason for that ing version - was organised with at multi- was the lack of finances in the Baltic States, The defence ministers from the Baltic national staff, a multinational headquar- States and several western countries initi- lack of logistic support and logistic con- ated the Baltic Battalion Project (Baltbat) ters & logistic company and three rifle cept and lack of sustainability after a pos- in the autumn 1994. The initial idea of companies, one from each of the three sible 6-month deployment. In order to the project was firstly to fulfil a wish from Baltic States. The equipment was basically compensate for the missing, but wanted the Baltic States to create a peacekeeping for peacekeeping operations and the weap- deployments, 1/3 of the battalion was unit and secondly to promote the co-op- ons for self-defence only. The training was from mid 1998 to the beginning of 2000 eration between the three Baltic States and carried out both in western countries and three times deployed to Bosnia as part of between the Baltic States and the western in respective Baltic States. the Danish Battalion. countries. The peacekeeping training period was finalised in the second half of 1997 dur- Phase 2 - the infantry Phase 1 - the peacekeeping phase ing several exercises in all three Baltic States. battalion phase The aim of the exercises was to report Baltbat was initially organised and Baltbat ready for deployments from 1998 A new dimension for Baltbat was dis- trained as a peacekeeping battalion suit- onwards. cussed and decided during 1997 and 1998.
38 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
The new challenge for the project was to in the training team. The different sup- reorganise and train the battalion as a light Baltic Battalion Training Team porting countries are manning the posts infantry battalion capable of executing in the training team in various ways. It Peace Support Operations. This second Right from the beginning of the has to be a must that the training team phase of the project is planned to be fi- project Baltic Battalion Training Team was officers are educated and trained in tac- nalised by the end of year 2000. established in order to support, train and tics and logistics related to brigade and supervise the battalion. Focus was initially infantry battalion tactics. The company Lessons learned on training the battalion and running the advisors must be experienced company battalion leaving only minor responsibil- commanders from units equal to Baltbat. The project has faced many problems ity by the organic commanders and lead- The age of the advisors must be equal to during the last 5 - 6 years. It is important ers. Later on the decision to leave more the commanders and leaders in the battal- to underline that the following lessons and more responsibility on the organic ion. If that is not the case problems in learned and observations are my personal commanders and leaders was taken. The building up confidence between the bat- opinion/observations, based on my 6- Baltic Battalion Training Team remained talion and the training team will occur. month service as 2IC/Baltic Battalion in place in an advisory role. Training Team in the period 1. August It is my experience that the decision Tactics and Doctrine 1999 - 31. January 2000. to let the Baltic Battalion Training Team advice instead of training the battalion Another problem was the decision to Project managing was a less sensible decision. It is obvious use British Tactics and Doctrine. The that the commanders and leaders still need choice of tactics and doctrine is closely A Steering Group at Ministry of De- to be trained and supported in a direct related to training and training standards fence level and a Military Working Group and close way. It was also obvious that and Table of Organisation and Equip- at Army Headquarters level manage the the Baltic Battalion Training Team did ment. Baltbat is organised as a motorised project. Both bodies include representa- not fully succeed due to the fact that the infantry battalion with a headquarters tives from the Baltic States, the western distance between the battalion and the company, a logistic company and three countries, Baltbat and Baltbat Training training team became larger. Another rifle companies. The organisation is in Team. problem was the quality of the personnel many ways comparable to a Nordic mo-
39 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
torised infantry battalion where the phi- with very short notice and without any ties given to the project from the three losophy is to use the vehicles as long as regards to the units/staff activities. An- Baltic States, insufficient logistic support possible. That is not the British philoso- other problem is the lack of time for hand- to the battalion in terms of ammunition phy. Adding to the problems of using over, which naturally leads to a drop in and personal equipment etc. It is clearly British Tactics and Doctrine is the fact the training performance for the unit/ stated that the Baltic States are responsi- that the majority of the training team staff. ble for providing ammunition and per- officers, dealing with the battalion staff The level of English language is in gen- sonal equipment for the soldiers in and the company commanders, are com- eral satisfactory but some officers are en- Baltbat. But the Baltic States have failed/ ing from the Nordic countries and not tering the battalion with little or no Eng- been unable to fulfil these demands lead- from the United Kingdom. lish language skills. ing to serious impact on the training. A possible way forward could be to Another major problem is the possibili- develop a common Baltic States doctrine Chain of command and ties of bringing foreign units to one of and tactics based on realistic personnel, command relations the other Baltic States. This is almost im- equipment and training standards. This possible due to lack of agreements, bu- is in my opinion a right and relevant task The project and consequently also the reaucracy and lack of will between the Baltic for the Baltic Defence College in close battalion commander have faced many States. These requirements have to be co-operation with the three Baltic States problems in connection with the chain solved by the Baltic States otherwise phase General Staffs. of command and command relations. In 2 of the project - ending up with the my perspective the battalion commander planned Field Training exercise in Octo- Personnel matters is unable of commanding his battalion ber 2000 - will not be a success. in terms of full command, operational Officers entering Baltbat for service command or operational control defini- Logistics have an uneven and often unsatisfactory tions. The three rifle companies are purely level of basic officers education. This a national responsibility and the com- In the early beginning of the project a means that its often necessary to train manding officer of Baltbat is only re- lot of equipment was donated to the basic skills before training function re- quested to set the training standards to project from the supporting countries. lated matters. Officers are often rotated be met. Consequences are unequal priori- Lessons learned are that the equipment
40 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 was donated without having a proper efited from the deployments both from a • Everybody (hopefully) has realised organisation and procedures ready in the military and from a politically point of that this is the last chance of finalising receiving countries. The equipment was view. The overall impression is that the the Baltbat project in its present configu- not in all cases properly handed over from three contingents did a very good job ration as a success. the donating countries and often with- together with the Danish battalion in Most of the involved personnel and out manuals and spare parts. In addition Bosnia. countries are working hard on achieving detailed tables of equipment and organi- The negative side of the deployments the aim. But there is still a long way to sation was missing. is that the training of the two specialist go. The problems were highlighted dur- companies were hampered and the possi- ing the process of transferring the battal- bilities of deploying the battalion head- The Way ahead ion from its peacekeeping organisation quarters in the field were impossible. the long perspective into the infantry organisation. Future donations are to be better co- Way ahead - near future A continued multinational (the Baltic ordinated between the donating and the States) way ahead is in my opinion only receiving countries. Donations of com- The aim of the near future is to final- realistic if some basic requirements are plete units or sub units including vehi- ise phase 2 of the project with a successful fulfilled. Firstly a common Baltic Doc- cles, weapons and spare parts etc. is rec- field training exercise in October 2000. trine and Tactics at brigade and battalion ommended instead of donating single The fundament for a success is established level has to be developed. This is in my spare parts or equipment. due to the fact that: perspective a natural and good task for • The deployments have ended, The Baltic Defence College supported by Deployments to Bosnia • The Baltic Battalion Training Team a few general staff trained officers from has strengthened the training of the bat- the supporting countries and some of the The deployment of 1/3 of the battal- talion and initiated a proper planning Baltic officers who joined the first course ion three times in the period mid 1998 - process for the exercise. at the college 1999 - 2000. To carry on early 2000 had an impact on the daily • The Military Working Group has put with British Doctrine and Tactics within training. But on the other hand the bat- pressure on both the Baltic States and the Baltbat and national doctrine and tactics talion and the Baltic Countries also ben- supporting countries. within the national forces will in my opin-
41 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
ion newer be beneficial for the Baltic to set common standards and States. interoperability demands. The common The next question is whether the Bal- standards and interoperability demands tic States wants to rely on common doc- have to be a part of the common doc- trine and tactics and close co-operation. I trine and tactics. To go totally bilateral think that the Baltbat project has shown without any co-operation between the that it is difficult to build up a multina- Baltic States is in my opinion unaccept- tional formation. It has been hard for the able and unrealistic if the Baltic States are national armed forces to understand and heading for a NATO membership. A ve- accept why Baltbat needs to be prioritised hicle for building a bridge between the when it comes to manning, finances, am- Baltic States and the supporting countries munition, etc. could be to establish a multinational staff One possibility is to carry on with either at battalion or brigade level. This Baltbat in its present configuration. I multinational staff should be test bed for think that the last five to six years clearly the common developed doctrine and tac- shows that this is not a realistic and rea- tics. The staff can also participate in exer- sonable way ahead. Both the Baltic States cises abroad and within the Baltic States. and also some of the supporting coun- Either in command post exercises (staff tries have clearly shown a lack of interest alone) or field training exercises by tak- and will to support the project. The other ing national companies or battalions un- extreme is to leave any kind a co-opera- der command. A few officers from the tion between the Baltic States and rely supporting countries should support the completely on bilateral support and co- staff. operation. I have seen a tendency to go more and more bilateral. This is from a military and economic perspective a bet- ter solution but dangerous if we forget
42 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
Baltic Security Co-operation: a Way Ahead
By Eitvydas Bajarûnas, Head of Foreign Policy Planning, MFA, Lithuania1
to appraise the main security challenges will benefit more if we are successful in Introduction of the Baltic Sea region, to examine cur- overcoming these old patterns and replace rent accomplishments of the three Baltic them with new habits of cooperation. Many outside observers recognize countries in their security cooperation That is a most elegant expression valid achievements of Estonia, Latvia and and, in that respect, to project major fu- even today. Lithuania - which celebrate 10 years of ture tasks. Indeed, viewed from the historical per- the restored independence - in implement- spective, the Baltic Sea region has experi- ing democracy, establishing functioning What is the Baltic enced a turbulent history where major free market economy, and engaging into security agenda? European powers - Russia (in the last cen- the wider world international co-opera- tury the Soviet Union), Germany and tion. Baltic foreign and security policies Assessing the security situation of the others - have regularly tried to exercise contributed to making them stand for Baltic countries U.S. Secretary of State M. strategic and ideological influence. stability, openness, dynamic development Albright in her speech in Vilnius in July Through out history fundamental rights and ability to cope with the many chal- 1997 presented it in such way: ... per- have been ignored. The smaller countries lenges of globalization. Commemoration haps no part of Europe has suffered more in the region have suffered dispropor- of a decade of a successful return to the from the old pattern of geopolitics than tionately through repeated occupation global community marks the right time the Baltic states ... and no part of Europe and oppression by their larger neighbors.
43 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
For centuries they have found themselves offers the world-market excellent trade approach to an undivided Europe. A sig- in a gray zone of uncertainty, governed opportunities, a good climate of foreign nificant factor here is the present day by power not by principles of law or investments, transit routes, and a steadily Russias involvement in partnership rela- moral. growing network of international, gov- tionship with the Western institutions. The peace treaties of 1920 between the ernmental and non-governmental arrange- The U.S. and the EU are key players in Baltic countries and Russia were the first ments. the Baltic Sea region. Other countries in signs of Russias acceptance of their sov- The region has enormous potential, the region - Nordic, Poland, and Germany ereignty, although it never reconciled it- given the 90 millions people who live - also have great interests in the stability self with the loss of the Baltic countries. there, with rich natural and human re- of the area. The Soviet Russia occupied the three sources and excellent transit opportuni- Indeed, the Baltic Sea region might be countries in 1939, after Hitler donated ties. It has an investment conducive envi- considered as one of the most expanding them to Stalin in the secret Molotov- ronment, a highly skilled labor force, and regions in Europe and after the Baltic and Ribbentrop pact. The Yalta meeting of is hi-tech oriented. Polish membership in EU, the region will 1945 became a funeral for Baltic independ- The fall of the Soviet Union and other be able to reveal its entire potential. Four ence. During the Cold War the dividing totalitarian regimes in the East, the unifi- EU members Denmark, Germany, Fin- line of Europe went across the Baltic Sea cation of Germany, restoration of inde- land and Sweden - border the Baltic Sea, region, which became a strategic backwa- pendence of the Baltic countries, Finish four others - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania ter that received little focus on interna- and Swedish membership in the EU and and Poland - are on the road to accede tional agendas. the Polish membership of NATO, fol- the Union and it is only a question of However, since the end of the Cold lowed by continuing European and Trans- time when it happens. Finally, Russia is War, the region has become an impor- atlantic integration processes all provide in a partnership and co-operation arrange- tant focal point where U.S., EUs and unique opportunities for creating stabil- ment with EU (although limited because Russias policies are intercrossed. There is ity and well-being around the Baltic Sea. of continued Chechen war) and declares a widespread understanding that the Bal- The Baltic region has become a labora- its intention to expand her relationship tic Sea region is one of the most dynami- tory example to other parts of Europe with the Union. For these reasons the cally developing, outward-looking and for promoting closer regional coopera- Baltic Sea has been called a future inner promising regions in Europe. The region tion, and as a test case for the Western EU lake.
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Today, only one decade after the end nority rights and settle their disputes challenges, ambiguity and certain insta- of the Cold War and the restored inde- peacefully. bility of a wider scope that still character- pendence of the Baltic countries, the is- The Baltic Sea region today appears to ize the region, to notice if distrust, which sues of the zones of influence, boundary be safe from destructive forces that could may come to us from the past, still domi- disputes, ethnic hatred and other past cause tension among its states and for the nates relationships, if asymmetrical balance problems have become irrelevant on the moment traditional military security is of capability still remain a source of ten- security agendas of the Baltic Region. In- less relevant in this region. Problems, sions - is it possible that a Cold war type deed, immediately after the collapse of the which dominated agendas in the first years of conflict again can become pertinent in Berlin Wall, there were many warnings that of independence the presence of Rus- the regional context? the end of the old socialist system might sian troops on the soil of the Baltic coun- These are more theoretical questions, revitalize old hatreds in Central and East- tries, a high degree of militarization in but there are many practical issues as the ern Europe. For 40 years communism had the Baltic neighborhood, tensions due to economic security, enlargement of both suppressed ethnic nationalism, frontier unsolved minority and human rights is- the EU and NATO, regional cooperation disputes and minority discontents. Today sues in Estonia and Latvia, unilateral de- and neighborhood issues, including Rus- we can see that none of these evils has pendency from the Eastern energy sup- sia and its Kaliningrad region, the U.S. come to pass - with the exception of Cau- ply etc. no longer dominate the secu- presence and the wider security context. casus, some parts in Central Asia and rity agendas. The type of tension most Finally, not all states in the region en- Western Balkans. Everywhere else minor- likely to occur in the Baltic is not a mili- joy an equal sense of security status. ity rights have been guaranteed and exist- tary threat, but rather the highly charged, Neighbors of the three Baltic countries - ing borders were either reaffirmed or tense political situation which could turn Nordic countries - are solidly integrated changed by consent. This extraordinary into violent actions, extremist group ac- both internally and with the rest of Eu- success is above all due to the enlargement tions, drug trafficking, smuggling, illegal rope. Presently many outsiders still regard processes of the EU and NATO to the migration etc. the case of the Baltic trio as somewhat East. It has promised prosperity and sta- But even these threats are regarded as different. Although a joined community bility to potential new members in re- manageable within the existing institu- of sovereign countries, institutionally and turn for their willingness to carry tions and cooperative structures. More mentally they are still apart. This pattern through market reforms, protect mi- important is to detect what elements of of ambiguity shows that further reflec-
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tion is needed on the place and functions kept under totalitarian regimes or dur- That is why it is of crucial importance of the Baltic security cooperation. ing the short prewar period of independ- for the EU to continue the enlargement ence fluctuating in between the East and process. EU, unfortunately, is badly con- Enlargement of West, the Baltic countries in case of EU flicted on the issue of expanding the the European Union membership would for the forthcoming Union-membership. Some countries, e.g. years be earmarked as a constituent part Germany, would like EU membership for One can say that what is happening in of the democratic West. some of its eastern neighbors, but is con- the enlargement process of the EU is that Indeed, the Baltics as well as other cerned about the free movement of east- Europe is returning to where it belongs, countries membership in the EU will have ern workers into Germany and illegal to its original sites, from which it had to a positive impact on the stability in the immigrants. EU politicians also shrink withdraw temporarily. Membership in the region and will be beneficial to its from farm-subsidy reforms regarded as EU is a precondition for modernization neighbors. Baltic Sea states regional co- necessary if the EU is to bear the cost of of the Baltic countries economies and operation, particularly among the states the entry of heavily agricultural states. societies as well as for fully-fledged par- of the Baltic Sea, Latvia and Estonia, as Be as it is the EU has already started its ticipation in the international commu- well as the strategic partnership with Po- journey towards the Baltics. Estonia in nity. Three small states will contribute to land, is of special importance to Lithua- 1997 became the first Baltic country to the economic, political and social progress nia. Together with the other Member start negotiations and by that making a in Europe, to the promotion of cultural States of the EU, Lithuania would con- breakthrough in Baltic geopolitics. On diversity and the development of com- tribute to strengthening the role of the December 1999 the Helsinki EU Council mon values. EU in Northern and Eastern Europe, par- approved the Commissions recommen- At the same time, the EUs enlargement ticularly in its relations with Russia, dation to open accession negotiations towards the Baltics is more than just an Ukraine and Belarus. At the same time, with Latvia and Lithuania. Progress in economic factor or recognition of their Eastwards enlargement of EU would in- negotiation go hand in hand with European cultural heritage. The Baltic crease political stability in the Baltic Sea progress in incorporating the EU acquis countries membership of the EU would region, guarantee the consolidation of into national legislation and implement- mean a dramatic shift in Baltic geopoli- democracy, rule of law, and the human ing it. The Union commits itself to be tics. For several centuries being forcefully and minority rights protection. ready to accept new members beginning
46 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 with the end of 2002. On its side, Lithua- tions between candidate countries and decision-making has already proved to nia stated its readiness to finalize nego- Russia is subjected to changes as well. The decrease the possibility of conflict among tiation during the year 2002 and as from candidate countries face dual EU enlarge- its members. The fact of co-ordination of the 2004 it should be ready to implement ment challenges on the one hand, they foreign policies among EU members also EUs requirements. Estonia and Latvia have to fulfill their membership require- decreases the possibility of external risks. have even more ambitious plans. ments and, on the other, they have to Although membership of the EU would Economic cohesion and level of inte- assist the neighboring regions of Russia be an important stability factor in the gration of the Baltic countries might even in making use of the possibilities offered Baltic Sea region only NATO can pro- suggest that three of them for practical by the EU enlargement process. vide formal security guarantees. purposes alone can be admitted to the The interdependence between Russia Of course, the strengthening of home EU during the same wave of enlargement. and the rest of Europe is emphasized in and justice affairs of the EU is on its way Such proposals have already been men- the Baltic Sea region. Today Russia is more and any future EU member will be capa- tioned from the Commission. That is not dependent than ever before on income ble to contest so called new threats, i.e., to say that the EU needs to have an ap- generated through exports to Europe. The smuggling, crime, etc. That, together with proach of geopolitical entity. It is a mere EU will remain Russias largest trading the increased role of EU in crisis manage- practical and pragmatic approach on how partner and the main export market for ment, would bring a stronger sense of sta- to avoid building temporary borders in its natural resources. Forty percent of bility and security to the region. between a single economic and social Russian foreign trade is with the Union. space. At the same time, case-by-case ap- The Unions enlargement to the Baltic ESDI/ESDP proach need to be preserved and better region raises a question of security and prepared Baltic candidates should not have many in Lithuania ask - does the EU pro- Indeed, strengthening of EUs crisis to wait for their neighbors, which are lag- vide the necessary security and stability management and military and civilian ging behind. to the region? The EU does not provide capabilities is a positive development by The EU enlargement has provided new any formal security guarantees but, of itself. Seen from a Baltic Sea perspective, dynamism to the Baltic Sea region. The course, membership in the Union will the development of the Common Euro- space of co-operation between Russia and definitely strengthen Baltic security. Regu- pean Security and Defense policy/Euro- the EU is expanding; the context of rela- lar exchange of information and common pean Security and Defense Identity, firstly,
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should benefit the European security en- partner with the WEU attentively follows hard security guarantees, although a sce- vironment and, at the same time, not the processes on the strengthening of nario where one EU member state is weaken but reinforce the transatlantic link European crisis management, i.e., ESDP/ threaten and the other members stay away lying at the heart of European security. ESDI. Lithuania together with other As- just because of the absent of formal defense Putting in practice the common Euro- sociated Partners with the WEU stresses guarantees is unimaginable. pean policy on security and defense con- the need for the adoption of the proper After 50 years NATO continues to cerns more than only the current EU decisions enabling Associated Partners; to guarantee and safeguard freedom and acts members, and is an issue for considera- take part in all ongoing consultations and as the prerequisite for economic and so- tion among all contributors to the secu- activities related to the European security cial prosperity. Lithuanias membership rity and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, and defence policy in relevant modalities, in NATO would make final recognition including EU and NATO candidate coun- to join future European-led exercises and and consolidation of the chosen path of tries. operations by committing forces, having reforms. The EU is not just a club of wealthy the same obligations and rights as other Integration into NATO is interpreted nations and well functioning economies, active participants, and to contribute to differently east from us, namely Russia, but also the Union of countries with the the efforts aimed at enhancing European although it is clearly not a threat to any- increased determination to coordinate operational capabilities. That would make one. All states have the right to freely efforts in response to external political EUs crisis management arrangements per- choose their security arrangements and and security challenges. The Kosovo cri- tinent to the Baltic Sea region as well. the path to well being. By admitting Es- sis once again has revealed the fact that tonia, Latvia and Lithuania into NATO the European countries have to have ef- NATOs openness the Alliance would consolidate the zone fective European crisis management capa- of stability and security in Europe. It bilities in order to cope with potential NATO membership of the Baltic coun- would also in a positive way affect the crises that might occur at the periphery tries is the biggest challenges ahead of us. traditional attitudes in the East, would of Europe in the future. Neither EU membership of the Baltic help to diminish the established stere- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as active countries, nor the increased defense role otypes and would open the way for fur- applicants for NATO membership, asso- of the EU can act as an alternative to ther and closer co-operation between ciated countries with EU, and associated NATO - EU is not designed to provide NATO and Russia.
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Lithuanias membership in NATO cure only after being integrated into The spread of weapons of mass destruc- would be an extension of the zone of se- NATO. Lithuanias membership in the tion and international terrorism, inter- curity and stability and a reinforcement Alliance will be a historic act of Euro- nal instabilities caused by a mixture of of confidence in Lithuanian-Russian rela- pean unification, making all chances of socio-economic and political imbalances tions. Indeed Baltic membership in NATO turning back the clock impossible. The and political fundamentalism could very should be viewed as a positive factor, con- NATO enlargement should continue to well lead to crisis requiring a reaction solidating bilateral relations and ensuring deny any attempts to draw new red lines from NATO. A wide range of common their further progress. Their accession into in Europe. The new Euro-Atlantic secu- risks and challenges can affect Alliance NATO would be demonstration and rity system can only be envisaged if old interests. This calls for a broad, compre- proof that relations between the Alliance dividing lines are removed and the crea- hensive and joint strategy of the Euro- and Russia are reaching an entirely new tion of new ones avoided. Atlantic institutions As a democratic or- level, thereby confirming that the Alliance Though, presently the Baltic countries ganization based upon the rule of law, and Russia may not only undertake joint do not face a direct military threat they NATO must continue to show its com- operations but also coexist in close prox- still border regions with a high degree of mitment to international peace and secu- imity. Our countries joining the Alliance uncertainty and unpredictability. rity, while defending the vital direct in- would be an additional psychological In an environment of multiple chal- terests of the Euro-Atlantic region. If the guarantee, affirming the Baltics as full- lenges and risks, the significance of the Alliance continues to adapt rapidly to the fledged partners in their relations with Alliance remains important for the coun- realities of the European security, it will Russia. The accession of new members tries of the region. New risks still exist retain its strength and vitality. strengthens the Alliance and increases con- and NATOs steady hand still saves lives One of the most important tasks of fidence and security of neighboring coun- and stops the spread of violence as it was the new NATO is to promote security tries. shown in Bosnia and Kosovo. Various integration in Europe across former di- There is no doubt that the security and local rivals and new challenges to the com- vides. There is no better way to safeguard stability of the Baltic Sea region cannot mon European security can be more ef- security and to strengthen stability in be considered separately from European fectively solved with deeper involvement Europe than by linking nations together security and stability. Just as the other and closer co-operation with partner coun- in close and binding co-operation. The Baltic States, Lithuania will be fully se- tries. Strategic Concept approved in Washing-
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ton by the NATO Heads of State and Gov- The Baltic countries are not asking for NATOs expanded security and stability ernment in April 1999 contained a new a free seat at the table when they apply but also to the destiny of the values and concept, which could have some relevance for membership in NATO. They have principles that communism denied and for the Baltic Region. It introduced a con- proven themselves as among those who in whose name communism was resisted cept of non-Article 5 crisis management. are able and willing to make tangible con- and ultimately brought down. NATO The document stated that an important aim tributions to secure peace and stability enlargement is a natural and continuing of NATO is to keep risks at a distance by on the European continent. The mere consequence of the emergence of an un- dealing with potential crisis outside cur- prospect of future NATO membership has divided and increasingly democratic Eu- rent Alliances territory at an early stage. encouraged states to make strenuous ef- rope. Integration to NATO, first of all, is forts towards democratization and reform At the 1997 Madrid Summit where based on the adherence to the common and to improve and strengthen relations three Baltic countries were indirectly values that have characterized the West- with one another. Lithuania is linked to mentioned in the open door part of ern part of the globe for many years and the West by the ties of culture, religion, communiqué, and two years later, at the that have united those countries to form beliefs and common values, and economy. Washington Summit, leaders of the Alli- common institutions to preserve stabil- These ties are well complimented by ac- ance made it clear that the Alliance is on ity and promote prosperity. The enlarge- tive co-operation in the fields of defense, an irreversible path of changes. The invi- ment should continue to provide a vis- foreign policy and infrastructure devel- tation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech ible and well articulated individual rec- opment. Republic to NATO was the best illustra- ognition of achievements of a country Lithuania is ready to assume the obli- tion of that. In Washington last year the that has built a viable democratic society gations and commitments under the Wash- Alliance leaders went even further in the with an expanding free market economy. ington Treaty, is fully prepared to share case of Baltic countries by naming them We do also believe that the limited capa- the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits explicitly and recognized progress made bilities of small countries, like Estonia, and burdens of common security and by them and other aspiring countries and Latvia and Lithuania, can be most affec- collective defence and to subscribe to the reiterated NATOs openness by setting a tive only when combined with the collec- Strategic Concept. target date - 2002 - for the next revision tive actions of other countries sharing the The admission of new members into of the enlargement process. They provided same values and interests. the Alliance is important not only to a solid mechanism - the Membership Ac-
50 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 tion Plan (MAP) - to assist the applicants and training system, including English ing interoperability by acquiring anti-tank in preparations for eventual accession. language training, logistics, quality of life and anti-air weapons. This will enable These facts are encouraging in a way to improvement, development of infrastruc- Lithuania to defend its sovereignty and double efforts to be qualified for mem- ture, armament and equipment procure- protect its democratic values, while simul- bership in the second round of enlarge- ment, and air defence. We are creating an taneously contributing to the effective- ment. armed forces based on Western models, ness of the Alliance, contribute militarily Lithuania expects the MAP together which can be integrated into NATO and to collective defence and to the Alliances with an enhanced PfP program to consti- also if need function independently of new missions. The development of self- tute a very practical and membership-tai- other armed forces. defence capabilities and the development lored element of NATOs open door The Programme places great emphasis of Armed Forces capabilities of operat- policy. However, even without the MAP on the need to prepare force structures, ing in conjunction with NATO or as a Action Plan Lithuania is well on the way to contribute militarily to collective de- part of the Alliance Forces are an enor- to prepare to assume membership obliga- fence and to the Alliances new missions. mous task requiring strong determination tions. We have worked hard to get ready Lithuania has adapted a firm commitment of our political and military leadership. for membership not for the sake of mem- to a progressive ten-year modernization The successful implementation of the bership in itself, but in the interest of and procurement programme to improve MAP mechanisms is essential for a cred- our country. its military capabilities. A ten-year armed ible and continuous enlargement process. Lithuania has prepared and submit- forces development plan foresees an ac- We note the Alliances readiness to pro- ted a NATO integration programme, tive military force of 25.000. We have al- vide advice, assistance and practical sup- which details the financial and military ready begun to reform our reserve force. port to the aspirant countries and in this commitments Lithuania is prepared to After completion of the reform we will context expect focused and candid feed- make to NATO. As part of these commit- have a complementary force of over one back on our preparations for NATO ments Lithuania is ready to spend 2 % of hundred thousand highly motivated re- membership. its Gross Domestic Product on defence servists who can be activated in case of a The enlargement should continue to by 2002. On the practical side we are con- crisis situation. demonstrate the credibility of the Alli- centrated on C3, the adoption of a new Lithuania is developing the overall ca- ances open door policy by launching force structure, systematized education pabilities of its armed forces and enhanc- individually tailored and membership
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oriented programmes of measures de- has turned out to be more problematic the new countries capable of contribut- signed to assist aspiring members in their and expensive than originally expected ing to NATO, are they important in re- practical preparation for accession. Lithua- a factor that has made many member states spect of NATOs new missions, are these nia has made significant and substantive reluctant to start new accession negotia- countries defendable etc.? progress in meeting the criteria for NATO tions. Third, the enlargement issue has moved membership, it is a fully functioning, sta- First, the second round of enlargement down on the NATO agendas. Operations ble democracy where human rights, free- definitely suffer from a lack of leadership in Bosnia and especially in Kosovo, the dom of expression, the rule of law and in the West. In the U.S. everything is over- ongoing debate on Defence Capability free and fair elections are respected. ruled by the presidential elections, which Initiative, ESDI (burden sharing), and The enlargement of NATO is a factor traditionally tend to be inward looking. relations with Russia are presently given for stability in Europe and the Alliance In Europe enthusiasm for enlargement is first priority. Indeed, ethnic tensions in should not close its door to well quali- decreasing drastically: Germany lost its Kosovo continue and there is little evi- fied candidates. We hope that this proc- rationale and political will (with the change dence that the World community will be ess and timely evaluation of the progress of political leadership) and even strategic able reach a political solution to the most made by individual aspirants will enable necessity (with Polish membership of difficult case in Balkan crisis any time the NATO Summit, which will be held NATO). France traditionally gives the EU soon. no later than 2002, to launch a subsequent first priority. Three Nordic Allies Den- Fourth, growing tensions between the round of enlargement by extending new mark, Iceland and Norway and three U.S. and Europe (and between the U.S. invitations to qualified candidates, includ- newcomers The Czech Republic, Hun- and Russia) on the National Missile De- ing Lithuania, to start accession negotia- gary and Poland are keeping the debate fence (NMD) issue also contributes little tions. on enlargement open, but they lack essen- to the enlargement process. Most likely Let us be frank - there is little evidence tial political influence at the negotiation the U.S. Administration will go along with at the moment that NATOs leaders are tables. the NMD and Europe will have to decide considering inviting new countries to Second, the whole argumentation for whether to join the project or not ob- start pre-accession talks already by 2002. the second round differs from that of the serving the risk of creating a double stand- The expansion to include Poland, Hun- first round. Value-driven motives are be- ard security one for the U.S. and one gary and the Czech Republic into NATO ing replaced by cool geopolitics: What are for the European Allies. If Europe decide
52 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 to join the NMD there will be little spare from nine aspiring NATO members came the Euro-Atlantic community and able to money left to be spend on the European together to remind NATO leaders of their bear its common responsibilities, has been defence ambitions. obligation to open the Alliance. The mes- fully integrated into these institutions. We Finally, the Russian factor still domi- sage of the meeting, which was called by call upon the member states of NATO to nates NATOs thoughts on openness. Lithuania and Slovenia was simple - only fulfill this promise of the Washington From one side, Russias leadership con- when all of Europe is gathered within the Summit to build a Europe whole and free. tinues a policy with strong rhetoric against borders of NATO can we say that the We call upon the members states at the any further NATO enlargement. From the wounds of the Cold War have been healed. next NATO summit in 2002 to invite our other, the pragmatic and realistic approach In other words, we are talking about a democracies to join NATO. with which Russias President Putin has vision for a stable, prosperous and uni- The declaration signifies that eastern renewed the relationship with the Alliance fied continent, allied with the United and central Europe has achieved an as- will most likely influence the enlargement States to further the common interests and tonishing solidarity. Here are nine na- process NATO will not be in a posi- values of both. The Vilnius meeting erases tions, that 10 years ago we feared would tion to brake of cooperation with Russia the red line the Russians have drawn. be confused by endless ethnic disputes, by any unfriendly move (and that is how Too often in the past, neighbors have and which even today we might cynically Russia continue to view the enlargement been jostling to position themselves for predict would promote their own indi- process). inclusion in the exclusive clubs of the vidual admissions into NATO at the ex- Such a new context of the NATO en- West, but the Vilnius meeting showed that pense of their neighbors cooperating to- largement forces the Baltic countries to aspirants (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bul- wards the same end goal. choose different strategies: Instead of forc- garia, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Alba- The three Baltic States, who enjoy ing NATO to consider their candidacies nia and Macedonia) are willing to coop- strong support from their Nordic or of demonstrating their individual erate in order to obtain the common goal neighbors, have claimed to possess the qualities, a strong front of all nine NATO of NATO membership negotiations by strongest democratic credentials and will aspirants named in Washington Summit the year 2002. The statement by the nine therefore be easier to digest than their is required. read in part: Our goal will not be reached southern rivals. Other NATO experts have Indeed, on 19 May 2000 in Vilnius, until each of us, as well as other Euro- argued that NATOs air war in Kosovo Lithuania, the ministers of foreign affairs pean democracies sharing the values of and its large peacekeeping force in the
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Balkans proved the Alliances primary was immediate positive response from the aircraft weapons. Second, to achieve threat is no longer potential aggression NATO Foreign Ministers. interoperability with NATO - through by Russia but instability in southeastern The action taken by the nine nations PfP, PARP mechanisms and using both Europe. In the wake of the Kosovo war, places a huge burden of responsibility on bilateral and multilateral military coop- Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Macedo- NATO to come up with its own strategy eration. nia won lavish praise from NATO com- on how to accommodate their ambitions Strengthening bilateral military co- manders for their crucial support role. while not paralyzing the institutions of a operation with other nations is an indis- The Vilnius meeting, however, is de- military alliance that operates on a basis pensable part of general efforts to pro- signed to stop such antagonism and make of consensus. mote partnership and to develop ability the case that NATO needs to make. The to work together. Trilateral Baltic coop- nine countries hope that by banding to- Baltic defence cooperation and eration contributes to that. gether they can repeat the success of the participation in the PfP Everyone, interested in Baltic security Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; and defence, know the trilateral projects, whose joint efforts at lobbying for mem- Currently a defence development plan which all starts with Blat-. All these bership succeeded last year. Now, thats a in Lithuania is on the way. It is envisaged projects are embraced by the Baltic Secu- challenge that can be heard and which will that the armed forces can function au- rity Assistance Group - BaltSea for short - demand a response in Washington and tonomously, are interoperable with and which for the purpose of improving co- the capitals of Europe. also can well be integrated into NATO ordination of bilateral assistance rendered The Vilnius Nine have achieved their structures. The development of Lithua- by the countries supporting Lithuania, end goal: Theyve set the terms of the de- nian defence structures envisages such pri- Latvia and Estonia in the field of security bate and formed a powerful lobby group orities and directions. First, to enhance and defense has been established in April to move a distracted Europe and the next self defence capabilities through the de- 1997 in Oslo. At the moment there is U.S. president (both U.S. presidential can- velopment of infrastructure, the establish- quite a number of supporting states didates - Texas Gov. George W. Bush and ment of a new military structure, and the which actively participate in the BaltSea Vice President Al Gore in their letters improvement of force readiness through framework: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, to the conference expressed commitment training, purchases of new communica- Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, the to an open-door NATO policy). There tions equipment, and anti-tank and anti- Netherlands Norway, Poland, Switzer-
54 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 land, United Kingdom and United Sta- military elite education. Finally, BaltPers, these countries undertake to train Lithua- tes. a Swedish sponsored project, involves the nian military personnel in operating the Life do not permit us to sleep on the creation of a modern military registra- transferred equipment. Lithuania expects laurels, thus the Blat projects are under- tion system in the form of a mobilisa- this developing trend to continue in the going rapid developments. The Baltic tion database. future. Peacekeeping battalion - BaltBat - is un- Indeed, the importance of the Baltic Lithuania is further preparing its dergoing reorganisation from a peacekeep- co-operation in the field of defence is not armed forces for participation in peace- ing to a full capacity infantry battalion decreasing. At the moment, a practical need keeping and other operations consistent enabling it to participate in all types of to organize joint procurement activities with international law. The primary em- peace operations. Most importantly the and possibilities of facilitating co-opera- phasis is placed on participation in unit needs to become part of the defence tion between national defence industries NATO-led PfP operations. Practical prepa- capabilities of the Baltic countries. The are underlined. ration is being conducted using PfP Baltic Air Surveillance Network BaltNet The equipment procurement policy is mechanisms, and Enhanced and More - after the completion of the equipment oriented toward NATO-compatible sys- Operational PfP (EMOP) gains special installation, personnel training and radar tems, which makes Lithuania turn to the importance. The tasks in the process of connection has already started its opera- Western market, as it becomes increasingly preparation vary from adequate training tions in the beginning of the year 2000. open to the Central European democra- and interoperability to enhancing mili- Lithuania hosts the regional air surveil- cies. Lithuania has already procured weap- tary representation in the military struc- lance center, capable of being integrated ons and other defence equipment such as ture of NATO and developing appropri- into the NATO network. Lithuanian con- tactical radios, transport vehicles, coastal ate national decision-making co-ordina- tribution to the Baltic Squadron - surveillance equipment, anti-tank weapons tion mechanisms. Therefore, the Politi- BaltRon - by the end of 1999 was aug- from a number of Western countries. cal-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP mented be a mine hunter procured from Governments of the Western countries are Operations (PMF), the Operational Ca- Germany. All three Baltic countries send authorising their defence ministries to sell pabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP their officers to the Baltic Defense Col- or donate excess equipment that is being Operations (OCC), Expanded and lege - BaltDefCol - which is rapidly be- decommissioned as they downsize their Adapted PARP, Defence-Related and Mili- coming the main venue for the Baltic armed forces. Also, as part of the package, tary Co-operation, PfP Training and Edu-
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cation Enhancement Programme play a NATO, role as stabilising powers in the Russian leadership in the 1990s has been major role in developing Lithuanias cri- region. On September 18 last year 30 the reunion of the areas of the former sis response and management capabilities. Lithuanian soldiers have been sent to Soviet Union into a more of less cohe- Lithuania intends to continue to fully NATOs peacekeeping mission in Kosovo sive unit. Russian military doctrine of that support and participate in the develop- (KFOR) where they joined a polish bat- period presented repression of Russian ment of various activities and initiatives talion which is compound unit in the speaking population in the near abroad in the framework of EAPC (such as con- USA brigade. as an acceptable reason for the use of mili- sultations on security issues, civil emer- tary force - and it was left to the Russians gency planning, humanitarian de-mining, Russia in the Baltic Sea region to decide when the minorities were be- small arms control etc.); the activities of ing repressed. In addition, Russians aban- PfP (exercises, implementation of train- In developing relations with Russia all doned their no-first-use doctrine con- ing and education programme, PfP deci- three Baltic countries seek to perform cerning nuclear arsenals. sion-making and planning etc.). Lithua- bilateral relations, which would ensure At the same time, Russia made a good nia was constantly using the EAPC to equal beneficial co-operation in spirit of name for itself in 1992-1994 by withdraw- promote practical regional security coop- good neighborhood, strengthening mu- ing its forces from the Baltic countries eration: at the end of 1998 the NATO/ tual understanding and confidence and (although, afterwards almost regretting this EAPC seminar Developments of the Bal- extend goodwill for our countries inte- move). Although trade between the Baltics tic defense structures, which took place gration into European and Transatlantic and Russia was not flourishing, Russia has in Vilnius. structures. On it side, it is in the interest shown an economic interest in elaborat- Especially close co-operation is in se- of Russia that neighboring countries are ing its relations with the Baltics not least curity field. The formation of common stable, democratic and integrated into the where the passage of goods is concerned. peace keeping battalion, known as a European institutions. In 1997 Russia shifted its Baltic policy LITPOLBAT, common military training After the collapse of the Soviet Union to a more positive stance by offering se- and participation in peace operations the Russian military doctrine and politi- curity guarantees and cooperative projects increase Lithuanias, which is aspiring for cal thought developed the concept of the to the Baltic countries. In 1997 Russian membership in Alliance and Polands, near abroad (which also covered three President Yeltsin made, in connection which this year became a member of Baltic countries). The political aim of with Lithuanian President Brazauskas visit
56 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 to Moscow, an offer of security guaran- thereby creating a valuable bridge on eco- nia. Lithuania granted the right to ob- tees to the Baltic countries. Later followed nomic and cultural levels between differ- tain Lithuanian citizenship for all the a complementary proposal to include ent peoples. Most importantly, Russians inhabitants that resided in Lithuania up cross-security guarantees of the U.S., Ger- still need to assume responsibility for past until the declaration of the independence. many and France by Russia. The three misdeeds - the annexation of the Baltic The Russian population represents ap- Baltic countries turned down the propos- countries, the deportations of thousands proximately 8 per cent of the population als. As a rule, guarantees are offered to inhabitants, and the destruction of their of Lithuania and they enjoy full social, states threatened by third countries, but property and cultural heritage. cultural and linguistic autonomy guaran- in this case Russia proposed guarantees The 1991 bilateral Treaty between Rus- teed by the Lithuanian laws and accord- aimed at deterring threats which the Bal- sia and Lithuania reaffirmed the right of ing to international standards. tic countries perceive to emanate from each country to freely choose different It is too early to speculate on how new Russia itself. security arrangements. Numerous inter- Russian Presidents foreign and security It seems that concern with Russias de- state treaties and inter-governmental agree- policy will be developed with regard to graded power status and wounded sense ments, including the Treaty on the Foun- the relationship vis-à-vis the Baltic States. of identity has fuelled preoccupations with dations of Inter-State Relations and a We simply hope that declared pragma- territorial integrity. Border agreements Border Treaty, have been signed between tism and realism will not develop in between Russia and Estonia and Latvia Lithuania and Russia. An Intergovernmen- to the policy of political and economic remained unsigned, although both agree- tal Commission was established in 1996. pressure that we are witnesses of in ments remain nearly ready for several years The Commission consists of eleven work- Latvia. and despite the fact that a border agree- ing groups addressing the issues of trade On our side, we support the develop- ment with Lithuania was reached. Issues and economy, energy, agriculture, trans- ment of democracy, market economy and related with Russian speaking minorities, port, archives, social affairs, science and civic society in Russia, believing that residing in Estonia and Latvia are still a culture, illegal migration, regional coop- Russia will finally go away from the ter- high priority on their bilateral agendas. eration, properties of diplomatic missions, ritorial mentality. Admission of Lithua- Russia needs to realize that the ethnic and financial claims. nia, Latvia and Estonia to NATO and the Russian minorities in the Baltic countries Rights of national minorities, includ- EU will facilitate the changes in Russias will soon become citizens of the EU, ing Russians, are fully respected in Lithua- position and will help Russia to perceive
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herself as a modern player in the Baltic if one accepts the Russian demand that sia has been one of NATOs most impor- Sea region. countries wishing to join NATO should tant goals since the end of the Cold War. Strong Russian resistance against the not join because of the Russian opposi- Lithuania has the same goal, and has actu- Baltic membership of NATO is a well- tion, it will actually mean accepting the ally been successful in maintaining friendly known fact. But whatever psychological Russian view that these countries are in and co-operative relations with Russia. All barriers there may exist among Russias the Russian sphere of influence. The best political, economic and security-related decision-makers, they will be reinforced way to disabuse Russians of the notion questions with Russia are being solved if NATO stops the enlargement process of sphere of influence would be to ac- through constructive and mutually ben- short of its stated goal of a reunited, knowledge the Baltic request for NATO eficial dialogues. democratic Europe. Redrawing red lines membership and to put it on the Alli- Lithuania recognizes the importance on the map of Europe evidences the rem- ances agenda. of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and nants of old thinking. The NATO com- In contrast to Moscows way of think- welcomes the Alliances commitment to mitment to cross over these imaginary ing, NATO expansion would bring its partnership with Russia under the barriers, is the greatest assistance the West greater stability along Russias western Founding Act. Lithuania welcomes the can offer Russia in helping it to find its frontiers. During the Cold war the bor- involvement of Russia in restoring peace rightful place in a democratic Trans-At- der between Russia and NATO was a com- in Kosovo and is encouraged by Russias lantic community. This is why the inclu- pletely closed and chilly border, but to- re-engagement with NATO. As NATOs sion of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and day it is a very relaxed border of coop- Secretary General said in Vilnius we need other well-qualified countries in the next eration between good neighbors. NATOs to get NATO-Russia relations back on round of the NATO enlargement could enlargement has so far stabilized Russias track a new European security architec- be one of NATOs most important tasks, frontiers rather than threatened them. If ture cannot be built without Russia. demonstrating unequivocally that NATOs Moscow opposes enlargement because it Russia has resumed cooperation with open door policy is credible and firm. wishes to dominate its former satellites, NATO after having frozen contacts for We often hear from Russias leaders that NATO should discourage such nearly a year in disagreement over the Russia is prepared to use only political revanchism. NATO bombing campaign in Yugosla- and diplomatic means in its effort to pre- Maintenance of an open and produc- via. That is a positive development in- vent the alliances eastward expansion. But tive dialogue and engagement with Rus- deed.
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U.S. engagement in the region is char- the USs commitment to help Estonia, Transatlantic links and acterize by the North European Initia- Latvia and Lithuania to deepen their in- the Baltic Sea region tive, the Barrens cooperation and the U.S.- tegration and prepare for membership in Baltic Partnership. the European Union and NATO. The Further strengthening of relations with The Charter of Partnership between the Charter declares that the integration of all European partners and with the U.S. United States of America and the Repub- the Baltic States into European and Trans- and Canada, who support the Baltics lic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and Atlantic political, economic, security and European and transatlantic integration, is the Republic of Lithuania, signed in Wash- defence institutions is a common goal of key priority. The U.S. geopolitical posi- ington D.C. on January 16, 1998, estab- all signatories. tion, combined with its capabilities, make lishes the institutional framework that The Partnership charter provides the a counterbalancing effect in the Baltic Sea promotes the furtherance of bilateral and framework for concrete and issue-oriented region. It has been a backbone of politico- multilateral cooperation, reciprocal sup- discussions on how the Lithuanian de- military support for the Baltic countries port to the Euro-Atlantic integration and fence establishment with U.S. support ever since the Cold war (even during, as common efforts designed for the consoli- moves forward in building self-defence it was seen in the non-recognition of Bal- dation of security, prosperity, and stabil- capabilities while simultaneously prepar- tic incorporation policy), and contin- ity within the region and Euro-Atlantic ing for Lithuanias membership of NATO. ues to play this role. The U.S. commit- area as a whole. ment is a strong reminder that the re- The Charter underscored a common The Baltic security in a wider gion is an integral part of an Euro-At- goal of the partners to work together in European and global context lantic context. enhancing the security of all states through Some say that the Baltic Sea region is the integration of Baltic countries into The changes in the world and the ever- the one region in Europe where an U.S.- the European and transatlantic security, increasing globalization have made us all Russian confrontation is still conceivable. political, and economic institutions. The well aware not only of our own back Thus, the U.S. has a strong stake in defus- US-Baltic Partnership Charter states the yard but also of the wider regional and ing the potential for conflict in the re- United States real, profound and endur- global issues. Having suffered through gion and promoting its stable economic ing interest in the independence and se- occupations and destructive policy of vio- and political development. curity of the three countries and furthers lence, the Baltic countries seek to contrib-
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ute to the security and stability of the For several years the Baltic countries lately with KFOR in the Kosovo prov- international community and to fight have participated vigorously in all efforts ince. At the height of tensions in the Bal- against modern challenges. - of the UN, OSCE, NATO and WEU - to kans in the summer of 1999 a Lithuanian Lithuania reconfirms its commitment maintain security and stability in Europe. military medical team joined the Czech to the principles of settlement of interna- Baltics are regular participants in the in- Military hospital fielded in Albania dur- tional disputes by peaceful means and re- ternational missions they contribute civil ing the NATO Allied Harbour humani- frains from the use of threat or force in experts to OSCE missions and contrib- tarian operation. Lithuanian police offic- any manner inconsistent with the purposes ute civilian police to the UN, OSCE, and ers have significantly contributed to the of the United Nations. WEU mission. authority and expertise of the OSCE If the Baltic countries want their secu- Since 1994 Lithuania has been a con- monitoring group in Croatia and the rity to be respected, they simply can not stant and fully-fledged troop-contributing Kosovo Verification Mission. Seeking to stay away from the processes outside their country to complex UN peacekeeping upgrade Lithuanian peacekeeping capabili- region. The Baltic way of dealing with operations in Croatia (UNPROFOR), ties and readiness, two major projects have the challenges as well as opportunities of Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES and UN po- been launched. Two peacekeeping battal- the modern age is twofold - through the lice support group in the Danube region), ions LITPOLBAT and BALTBAT were active participation in the UN and OSCE, Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and established with our Polish, Latvian, and and taking part in peace implementation Kosovo (UNMIK). Since the deployment Estonian neighbours. Now both battal- efforts and co-operation. of the first Lithuanian platoon within the ions are fully operational and their fur- First, the UN. In UN framework, espe- Danish Peacekeeping Battalion to the ther development is under way. Lithua- cially, on security issues the Baltics are UNPROFOR mission in the former Yu- nia is also a member of the UN Special less dynamic as they concentrate primary goslavia, some 30 civilian policemen and Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. on European issues. Lithuania seeks for a as many as 100 troops have served in the In January 1998, Lithuania joined the non-permanent seat on the UN Security cause of peace within the UN missions. Standby Arrangements System for UN Council for a term of 2004-2005, which Moreover, Lithuanian military platoons, peacekeeping operations that was set up will allow using the experience of good which hitherto total 480 troops, have to accelerate the process of deployment neighborly relations in strengthening peace served with the NATO-led missions IFOR/ of peacekeepers. Lithuania was one of the and stability at a regional and global level. SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and first countries to sign with the Memo-
60 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 randum of Understanding with the UN, relations with Russia and the confidence new accessions. As it was stated by Presi- according to which 24 Lithuanian civil- and security building measures made dent Adamkus, at the OSCE Summit in ian police officers, military observers and proposals for a more effective use of the Istanbul, Lithuania considers the possi- staff officers were put on stand-by and instruments of the Vienna Document of bility of accession to the Treaty, provided could be made available for deployment 1999. Based on the Presidents Statement, the accession terms are in our national to a new mission within 30 days upon a Lithuania proposed to Russia in accord- interests. Accession terms should not im- request by the UN. ance with the provisions of the Vienna pede the development of legitimate de- There are two OSCE type issues, Document and on the basis of reciproc- fensive structures of new member-states, which are pertinent to the Baltic Sea re- ity to exchange a passive quota of one new CFE member-states should have a gion. One is Confidence Building Meas- additional evaluation visit beyond the right to full access to the general flexibil- ures and the second the CFE Treaty. quota established under the relevant para- ity mechanism that will be set forth in The OSCE-wide format is best guaran- graphs of the Vienna Document and to the adapted CFE Treaty, including the tee to keep Baltic security issues on a Eu- exchange information on military forces right for Exceptional Temporary Deploy- ropean scale and to avoid artificial no- located in the territories of Lithuania and ment and an accession of the new states- tion of regional security to constantly Kaliningrad region in accordance to the parties to the Treaty as groups of states reemerge. Security is indivisible and there formats of the CFE Treaty. or geopolitical units/regional settings is no doubt that the security and stabil- As part of our efforts to contribute to should be avoided and individual ap- ity of the Baltic Sea region cannot be disarmament and arms control process, proach should prevail. considered separately from European se- Lithuania already last year expressed its Since the adapted Treaty will no longer curity and stability. There is no regional interest in the membership in the adopted be based on the Group to Group struc- security. One can only speak about re- CFE Treaty, which Lithuania regards as a ture Lithuania considers that there are no gional security cooperation. cornerstone of European security. Also direct linkage between NATO member- At the same time, there is still room Estonia and Latvia are interested in the ship and participation in the CFE Treaty. for improvement of the atmosphere of CFE. Internal preparations have already begun, mutual confidence in the region. Already Lithuania looked positively to the fact such as the established interagency group, 1998 Lithuanian President Adamkus in that the adapted CFE Treaty, after a rati- the Arms control and verification group his Statement On the development of fication process is over, will be open to established in the framework of National
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Defense Staff, which will be a small, but increasingly on interdependence, coopera- competent force. tion, and the expansion of joint infra- structures and common values. Coopera- Conclusion tion in the Baltic Sea region can be a sig- nificant contribution to the enhancement Continuous attention from the West of European unity, of transatlantic rela- is essential in the development of the Bal- tions, and of East-West reconciliation on tic Sea region still undergoing a period a wider scale. of transformation. This may take the form of direct investment and trade from Eu- 1 The views expressed are those of the au- rope and North America and of enlarg- thor and do not necessarily reflect the opin- ing Transatlantic institutions, thereby ion of the MFA. Various publications made providing unique opportunities for sta- impact on authors way of presenting the topic: U.S. Policy toward Northeastern Eu- bility and well-being around the Baltic rope, Council on Foreign Relations, 1999; Sea, and thus contributing to an integrated Cooperative Security in the Baltic Sea region, Europe whole and free. On the other side, by O.F.Knudsen, Chaillot Paper 33, Paris, continuos Baltic effort to promote trilat- 1998; The Third Annual Stockholm Confer- eral cooperation is also evident. ence on Baltic Sea Security and Cooperation - The Western world needs to understand Building an Inclusive System of Security, eds. that the Baltic countries are tied to Eu- J.P.Kruzich, A.Fahraeus, by U.S. Embassy in rope historically and culturally. They share Stockholm, 1998; Baltic Sea Region. Brief. Western values and aspirations. Having Prepared by the U.S. Information Service, Stockholm, 1998. thrown off the shackles of communism and Soviet domination, the Baltics, like their counterparts in Central Europe, want to join Europe and the Euro-Atlan- tic institutions. The Baltic security rests
62 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
Russian Security Policy In Search of a Major Power Identity
By major General Karsten Møller of the Danish Army
cating, that Russias geographic position The dissolution of the Soviet Empire Introduction between Europe, Asia and the Moslem and breakdown of the Soviet Union once world has shaped its geopolitical evolu- again opened the debate in the Russian The paradox of Russian History lies tion and foreign policy and even its do- political elite on the Russian national iden- in the continuing ambivalence between mestic development. Russia has never re- tity, in search of a new political and eco- messianic drive and pervasive sense of ally been an integrated part of Europe, nomical system, geopolitical orientation insecurity. In its ultimate aberration, this neither politically nor economically. On political allies and economic partners ambivalence generated a fear that unless, the other hand Russia has never integrated abroad. the empire expanded, it would implode. politically or economically with Asia in The last decade has been turbulent for In this very eloquent way Henry Kissinger spite of the fact, that the Russian expan- Russia politically, economically and so- describes the main trend in Russian and sion took place mostly to the East, count- cially. Russian security policy has under- Soviet foreign policy of at least two cen- ing more than 80% of Russian territory. gone several changes, has obtained very turies. (Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, In reality Russia has always been looking few successes, but several setbacks. 1994, p.143). A Russian would most cer- to and has been culturally much more Especially the year 1999 was a true annus tainly answer by saying: Geography is integrated with the West than both Rus- horribilis for Russian foreign policy, the destiny of nations and thereby indi- sians and Westerners normally realise. where the Russian weaknesses were dis-
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tinctly exposed, culminating with the cate of a pro-western foreign policy and Kosovo-crisis and the Russian isolation The four schools of thought of made a considerable impact on the con- at the summit in Istanbul in November. Russian foreign policy duct of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The initial reaction was a strong and pro- This policy was seen as a logical conse- found anti-western sentiment of the Rus- In the last years of the bipolar world- quence of his policies on democratisation sian political and military elite, but not order Gorbachev and Shevardnadze for- and market economy. But even at that at least among the Russian population. mulated the concept of New Political point, the post-cold war euphoria, con- The Russian rhetoric resembled that of Thinking, a new philosophy of foreign sensus could not be obtained in the po- the long forgotten cold war. In the wake affairs, which recognised an interdepend- litical and military elites on the direction of the Duma and presidential elections ent and interconnected world where the of the foreign policy and at least four the political elite is rethinking Russian importance of national interests and mili- main foreign policy schools, two idealis- foreign and security policy. The sentiment tary threats was less dominating; instead tic and two pragmatic, could be identi- is still anti-western and especially anti- human values played a greater role. A cau- fied, according to one of the leading NATO, but the recognition of the Rus- tious rapprochement with the West re- Russian experts. (Aleksej Arbatov, Rus- sian interests and options seems to be far sulted in several weapons control-agree- sian Foreign Policy Alternatives, Inter- more realistic in the environment of the ments and in the end the acceptance of national Security, Fall 1993) new President than it used to be. The the German reunification and the inde- The first school is described as an ide- Russian policy-makers will undoubtedly pendence of Eastern Europe by the disso- alistic school of liberal democrats, repre- analyse the Russian experiences of the last lution of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet sented by Yegor Gaidar, Andrej Kosyrev, decade before they formulate a new for- policy contributed considerably to the end Anatolij Tjubais and partly Viktor eign policy concept. The purpose of this of the bipolar world even if it can be said Chernomyrdin. Their main concern was article is in principle the same, but in- that the Soviet leadership had to make a a rapid economically and politically inte- stead of formulating the new Russian virtue of necessity due to its lack of inter- gration of Russia into the West as a means policy, which would be a very interest- nal ability to maintain its position as su- of securing the implementation of mar- ing exercise, but beyond my possibili- perpower. ket economy and democracy. The Euro- ties, it will try to identify the different The first president of the Russian Fed- pean Union, IMF and the World Bank options. eration, Boris Yeltsin, was a strong advo- were the main partners in the field of
66 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 economy, while co-operation with United From an objective point of view, how- very idea of co-operation with the West States, e.g. the signing of Yeltsin in 1993 ever, this school could be and was criti- and resulted in a more self-assertive course of the START II Agreement, was seen as cised for their obvious lack of interest in of Russia. (Russian Foreign Policy After a means of establishing a new strategic developing pragmatic relations with the the Dissolution of the USSR.) partnership with the only remaining su- emerging CIS-countries, based on the new The second idealistic school was the perpower. In the period 1992-93, the so- political situation. The same can be said internationalists, as its supporters pre- called euphoria period, they were domi- of their policy towards the Eastern Euro- ferred to characterise themselves. They nating Russian foreign policy. pean countries, which had just left the were in favour if the of the restoration The leading members of this school Warsaw Pact. Both areas are of vital im- of the former Soviet empire and are of- eventually became rather unpopular in portance for Russias geopolitical situa- ten also called Derzhavniks after the old parts of the political and military elites tion and thereby for their relations to Russian word derzhava, which literally because of some serious consequences of the West as well. They did not recognise means state, but has a clear implication of their policy for what was and still is per- the potential of divergences of Russia and empire in contradiction to the modern ceived as basic Russian security interests. the West on important regional and glo- Russian word for state, gosudarstvo. The But first of all they became extremely bal issues, e.g. originating from diverg- leading members of this school were com- unpopular among a vast majority of the ing security interests due to Russias sta- munist like the chairman of KPR, Russian people because of their responsi- tus as a European as well as an Asiatic Gennadij Zyuganov, the chairman of the bility for the economic shock therapy, power. Their policy has been character- Duma, Genneadij Zeleshnov and neo-im- the privatisation (to the benefits of the ised by their failure to formulate the es- perialists like e.g. Aleksandr Lebed. They friends) and the social decline of the sential foreign policy objectives and secu- are people who cannot reconcile them- majority of the people. rity priorities of the Russian Federation. selves with the dissolution of the Soviet The impact of this unpopularity also In her merciless critique of this school Empire and they believe that the peoples affected their foreign policy, which in the Dr. Nadia Arbatova concludes: on most of the former empire genuinely want its eyes of many people was totally compro- issues Russia just followed Western lead reestablishment. It is only the political mised, as was the rest of their policy. This having produced a wide-spread impres- elites of these countries who have inter- might be unjustified, but was a fact that sion of a never ending sequence of uni- ests in their continuation as independent their political opponents have used skilfully. lateral concessions, which discredited the states. They do not, however, favour a
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reunification by military force but rec- eration are going to be solved. This school sible intentions by giving extended con- ommend instead the exertion of political comprised people like Grigorij Yavlinsky, cessions and exercising the outmost flex- and economical pressure on these coun- Aleksij Arbatov, Sergei Karaganov and ibility in their mutual relationship. An- tries. They have a clear understanding of Vladimir Lukin. They were pointing out other group wanted a much harder policy, the many serious weaknesses of Russia in the necessity of defining Russias security especially vis-à-vis Ukraine. It is impor- the international system. Nevertheless they and foreign policy priorities based on the tant to note that this problem is one of have been demanding that the West rec- realities of its geopolitical situation and the most controversial in Russian foreign ognised the special Russian rights and domestic political and economical prob- policy, involving a lot of emotions con- responsibilities in the so-called near lems. They were strongly in favour of close cerning the lost empire. abroad. co-operation with the West, but were The fourth school is often character- Concerning the far abroad they are stressing that Russian interests should be ised the reactionary-pragmatic, and con- very suspicious of the West and tend to pursued, not abandoned for the sake of sisted of radical nationalists like Vladimir be isolationists. They are advocating es- co-operation and economic aid. They were Zhirinovsky and General Colonel Albert tablishing a politically and economically sceptical about the reliance on Western Makashov. They want to restore Russia as co-operation with alternative partners, economic aid and in the words of Nadia a superpower and the Russian empire, if first of all China and India, but also Arbatova: considered a sound national necessary by force, and have been strongly Iran. They are in favour of the expan- security policy as a value of its own rights, in favour of economic blockade and mili- sion of Russian arms trade and even regardless the amount of foreign credits tary intervention on the side of the sepa- exports of nuclear technology and ma- this policy might earn. They were oper- ratists in the Baltic republics, Crimea, terial as a means to enhance the pros- ating on the principle that rejection of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, Their perity of Russia. utopian expectations and naïve illusions ideological point of departure is Great The third school of thought was char- would help to avoid disappointments and Russian nationalism, orthodox Christian- acterised the democratic-pragmatic or mutual recrimination later. ity and anti-Semitism; they are strongly the liberal, democratic gosudarstvenniki. This school had two different views on anti-Western and have been advocating They believe that a strong democratic state the Russian relations with the near abroad alliances with Iraq, Libya, North Korea is a necessity for Russia, if the severe eco- countries. One group wanted to over- and Cuba. They are in favour of the dis- nomic and political problems of the Fed- come these countries fear of Russias pos- solution of UN; instead they want the
68 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 world divided into spheres of influence Main Tenets of Foreign Policy of the tions should be developed on the basis of the great powers. Russian Federation, signed by President of mutual interests. In the Asian-Pacific This school as well as the first have been Yeltsin in April 1993. This document is ocean region a stable and balanced relation- marginalised since the middle of the nine- important, because for the first time in ship should be developed with all coun- ties, while the second and the third have centuries a Russian foreign policy with- tries, first of all China, India and Japan. merged in the process in the period 1994- out a special spiritual mission, e.g. Mos- The active Russian policy vis-à-vis CIS 96 in which a new broad foreign policy cow as the Third Rome or the extension raised doubts in the West of the Russian consensus was created. of the communist idea to the rest of the intentions, especially when foreign min- world, was formulated. ister Kozyrev defined the near abroad as The new pragmatism The document emphasises the relations a unique, sui generis geopolitical space, with the near abroad and the Russian to which nobody but Russia could bring The basis for this consensus was the interest in strengthening its ties with the peace(Nezavizimaya Gazeta, 22 Sept. recognition that the great expectations of former Soviet republics and protecting 1993). Russia worked hard for the recog- the first two years of the Russian Federa- the Russian minorities left in these coun- nition of CIS as an international regional tion had not been met. Russia had failed tries. The most important foreign and organisation with observer status at the to become an equal partner of the West security priorities of Russia were the UN General Assembly. CIS-peacekeeping And it was realised among the deci- strengthening of the integration in CIS in the states of the former Soviet Union sion-makers, that Russia had to take into on the political and economical level, but was a top priority for Russia but eventu- considerations its status as a nuclear power also on the political-military level. ally showed to be one of the most con- with extended regional responsibilities, Creating an efficient system of collec- troversial issues as well in relationship to what Leon Aron has called postimperial tive security was given top priority. the other CIS-countries as to the West. pragmatism. (Leon Aron, The Foreign The document also stressed the need Russia had legitimate security interest, e.g. Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist Rus- for resuming intensive co-operation with in Tadjikistan, and felt obliged to inter- sia and Its Domestic Context). the Eastern European countries and that vene, which was disapproved by the West, This new pragmatism was clearly ex- European integration without Russia which on the other hand did not have pressed in the paper made during 1992 would severely damage vital Russian na- any intentions of involving themselves in by the National Security Counsel: The tional interests. Russian-American rela- any of these troublespots.
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The above mentioned consensus which the interpretation of the article of difficult to absorb for the military sys- developed in the period 1994-96, took its Zbigniev Brzezinsky in Foreign Affairs tem, a system, which only reluctantly con- point of departure in an emerging recog- Sept/Oct 1997:A geo-strategy for Eura- sidered the structural changes, which were nition that the strategic situation was sia. the logical consistency of these agreements. changing to the disadvantage of Russia The assessment was that all important The dissolution of the Soviet Empire re- The West was planning the extension political and economical and strategic fac- sulted in considerable changes and cuts, of NATO with at least three former mem- tors were developing in a direction that as did the withdrawal of forces from East- bers of the Warsaw Pact and was obvi- was highly unfavourable for Russia. The ern Europe, especially from the German ously not inclined to take into considera- strategic thinking of Russian political and Democratic Republic. The officer corps tion the Russian objections. The West had military elites tend to be dominated by of the armed forces used to be a privi- apparently lost its interest in Russia dis- geopolitics and geo-strategy even in the leged elite, but now it experienced a so- appointed as it was with the domestic post-cold war period. It is difficult to ac- cial disaster, by the way like most of the development. The development of CIS cept the concept of co-operative security civil society. Lack of reform and profound appeared to be a failure with sharply con- if you tend to consider international structural changes increased the problems, flicting interests between Russia and a politics as a zero sum game. especially the apparent lack of morale in number of the other CIS-countries. Only The arguments of the more traditional the armed forces, which was proved dur- Belarus and Armenia could be regarded political and military strategist got re- ing the first war in Chechnya. as loyal Russian allies; and both of them newed impact. They pointed out the ob- The political-military situation had were weak and poor. vious military weakness of the Russian profoundly changed. First of all the mili- In addition, the first Chechnian war Federation. The armed forces had been tary balance had changed dramatically to 1994-96 demonstrated the weakness of hid by a series of disasters leading to the disadvantage of Russia. Until the end Moscow in maintaining the cohesion of the biggest of them all, the war in of the eighties the Soviet superiority had the Federation, which added to the per- Chechnya by the end of 1994. The many been 3:1 of the five main weapons system ception of a Russia in a highly vulnerable cuts in the armed forces, resulting from categories of the CFE-treaty. The immi- position. In the political elite the suspi- the different weapons control agreements nent expansion of NATO would increase cion was raised if the West preferred a which were concluded during the period this ratio to 4:1. From a geo-strategic point Russian disintegration. At least this was of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, were of view Russia had withdrawn about 1500
70 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 km from Schwerin, Magdeburg and Prag necessary aggression with conventional from which Russia obviously would be to Kursk and Smolensk as it is pointed weapons, if such an aggression cannot be excluded. It contributed to the outspo- out by the Russians. For more than 300 stopped by other means. Unfortunately ken bitterness of the Russian political elite years Moscow Military District had been the development of the Russian nuclear and nourished the growing anti-Western rear area, now it had suddenly become a deterrent was not promising, to put it sentiment. It was never understood why frontline district. The operational depth mildly. Technical obsolescence and lack Germany was treated so generously after of NATO has been enlarged with almost of funding will force the Strategic the Second World War, while Russia after 20%. Rocket Forces to cut the number of the end of the Cold War was deliberately The argument of NATO, that the Alli- strategic warheads to 1000 by the end excluded from the only decisive security ance does not constitute a threat to Rus- of year 2001. organisation in this humiliating way. sia, has not been accepted by most of the The Russian perception of the inter- elite. The Russian counter-argument is national situation in traditional geopo- The Primakov legacy exactly the same as the Western during litical and geo-strategic terms contrasted the cold war when discussing the over- to the Western priorities of arms control, The reassessment of Russian foreign whelming military might of the peace-lov- non-proliferation of weapons of mass policy was distinctly expressed in what has ing Soviet Union: It is not only a ques- destruction and the much broadened se- been called the Primakov-doctrine, named tion of declared intentions, but also of curity concept of co-operative security. after the in 1996 appointed foreign min- capability, which is a rather important This new concept was in many ways re- ister Jevgenij Primakov. It can be de- factor in assessing the intentions. flected in the work of the many different scribed as generally anti-Western and prag- All these military-strategic deliberations institutions in Europe dealing with secu- matic, but with some elements of anti- led to the conclusion that Russia in this rity issues, e.g. OSCE, NATO, EU and Western idealism and was included in new situation had become far more de- WEU. Russia realised that the Western President Yeltsin´s Message to the Russian pendent of nuclear weapons. It became countries would never allow a new secu- Parliament in 1997. The essence of the apparent in the National Security Con- rity system in Europe to be based on doctrine can be expressed in four points: cept of 1997. The purpose of the Russian OSCE, which was the Russian preference. (1) Russia will carefully develop a long- nuclear weapons was not only the deter- Instead an emerging NATO-centred secu- term foreign and security policy, based rence of nuclear aggression but also if rity system could be observed, a system on political consensus.
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(2) Russia will actively defend her in- Primakov was striving for establishing Russia realised that she could do noth- terests, but should avoid direct confron- partnership and strategic alliances with ing to prevent the expansion, but she also tation in her course of action. China and India, but only with limited noted that legitimate and essential Rus- (3) Russia will strive for an interna- success. Especially China is reluctant to sian interests were not taken in consid- tional system based on the principles of become a close ally with a weak Russia. eration in the end. multipolarity and will oppose all tenden- The efforts to enhance the integration Russia chose to consider the NATO cies towards unipolarity. in CIS were revived, but apart from Russia Founding Act, signed at a NATO (4) Russia will develop relations to the Belarus and to a certain extent Kazakhstan Russia summit in Paris in May 1997, as a most important states in the world in ac- and Kyrgizstan, the efforts must be char- kind of compensation for the NATO-ex- cordance with the potential of Russia and acterised as a failure. pansion. Russia had become a strategic her status as a nuclear power relations, The decisive relationship, however, was partner of the Alliance and its was the which are to be built on the principles of Russia and the West or more specifically Russian perception, that the work in the equality. Russia - NATO. Permanent Joint Counsel, PJC, was in- Quietly a shift of paradigm had taken NATO´s decision at the Madrid-sum- tended to give Russia at least an indirect place in Russian foreign policy, a fact that mit in September 1997 to expand the Al- access to participate and influence the would become very clear during liance with Poland, The Czech Republic decision-making process in the Alliance Primakov´s period as minister of foreign and Hungary influenced the political and in all essential decisions concerning in- affairs and since September 1998 as Prime military elites negatively and permanently. ternational security and off course in Minister. In a foreseeable future this pri- The motivation of the Alliances decision questions where vital Russian interests were marily pragmatic, but basically anti-West- was simply not understood or as the mili- influenced. The final goal would evidently ern policy will be dominating Russian tary elite would say: It was all too clearly be joint decision-making. foreign policy thinking, while the understood. If Russia did not constitute a But the desire for and early expecta- Primakov perception of a Russia who is threat to the new members, why then did tions of a privileged strategic Partnership still maintaining status as great power and they need this membership? And if it was have been profoundly disappointed. Facts therefore has global interests and obliga- the intention to create a new and more have shown that this was never the inten- tions the idealistic part of his foreign political security organisation as it was tion of the alliance, Russia could not ac- policy concept - might be fading. stated, why then should Russia be kept out? cept participation in PfP, EAPC, IFOR/
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SFOR and PJC as the proof of the good firmed when in December 1997 United might be very pragmatic, but he will be will of NATO. States and United Kingdom launched limited in his freedom of action vis-à-vis In these organisations Russia would be airstrikes against Iraq without consulting NATO due to the public opinion, which reduced to one (big) country among oth- Russia at all. This event sent shock waves is distinctly reflected in the Duma. ers. Russia wanted at least a relationship through the political elite. The weakness Shortly afterwards the worst of the between one big alliance and one big of Russia had been exposed and the coun- Russian expectations were fulfilled when country, a privileged partnership. try had been humiliated. NATO at its summit in Washington in And if PfP and EAPC are not enough But was this event a shock, the next to April 1999 adopted the new Strategic for the Poles, the Czechs and the Hun- come, the launching of NATO air cam- Concept, in which NATO, according to garians why then should it be enough for paign against Serbia on March 24th 1999, the Russian interpretation, stated its in- Russia? has to be compared to an earthquake. In tentions to initiate military operations of The military elite claimed that the Alli- this case what was perceived vital Russian different kind outside the area of the ances assurances that NATO´s nuclear interests were totally neglected and the NATO Treaty and if necessary do it with- weapons and conventional forces would Russian position as great power had been out the consent of the UN Security Coun- not be stationed in the three new mem- undermined by the fact that the decisions sel. ber-countries were to put it mildly had been taken in the NATO-council and In the prevailing Russian perception vague. The establishment of the Headquar- not in United Nations Security Council, the air campaign against Serbia had abso- ters of the Danish-German-Polish Corps where Russia would have been able to lutely nothing to do with humanitarian in Szczeczin in Poland justified in their exercise its veto-right. Once again the intervention. It was a demonstrative ac- eyes the Russian suspicions. From the very Russian weakness had been mercilessly tion intended to give the Alliance a new beginning the military establishment se- exposed and the feeling of deep humilia- and badly needed raison dêtre at the eve riously doubted that NATO was chang- tion, shame and anger was broadly shared, of the organisations fifty years anniver- ing from a primarily military organisa- not only in the political and military elites sary. tion to a merely political one. It also sus- but also not least among common peo- The Russians are claiming that they pected that the concept of strategic part- ple. This experience will undoubtedly have have learned an extremely important les- nership between the Alliance and Russia a long lasting impact on the Russian per- son: Nobody will take Russian interests was hollow and its suspicions were con- ception of the West. The new president into account, unless the country possesses
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considerable military strength. And if you ing in the settlement of the crisis. At that sion over the countries of their former possess this strength you will be able to stage former Prime Minister Viktor allies and it was therefore impossible to neglect international law. Chernomyrdin was launched as mediator. sustain the battalion at Pristina airport. The Russian reaction to the air cam- His role in the negotiations is difficult In the end it had to be supported by paign demonstrated the weakness of the to assess, but most importantly his ap- NATO. former superpower. The rhetoric was pointment sent an important signal to strong and called upon the memories of Milosevic and to NATO. Russia wanted a The impact of the Kosovo crisis the worst days of the cold war. But there solution with or without the acceptance was very little to support the words. Rela- of Serbia and Russia wanted to be part of The Kosovo-crisis caused deep concern tions to NATO were suspended, except that solution. in the Russian political and military elites. from the co-operation in SFOR in Bosnia- The Russian intervention was actually The National Security Counsel met on Herzegovina, as well as bilateral military very helpful for NATO, which had seri- the 29th of April. The meeting was pre- co-operation between Russia and the ous internal problems with the mainte- sided by president Yeltsin and the conse- NATO-countries, and two middle-level nance of the political unity of the Alli- quences of the crisis for Russian security NATO-officials in Moscow were expelled. ance. Apparently she did not get much and defence policy was discussed. One of Active and substantial support for Serbia credit for her efforts. During the nego- the conclusions was that the nuclear forces was limited. Eventually Russia realised that tiations Russian interest were more or less should be given priority and that the she had been isolated, except from China neglected, which became obvious in the programmes for nuclear research and de- and India. The bluff had been called; in final stage dealing with the military ar- velopment should be enhanced and the the long run you cannot play the role as rangement, when the Russian frustration ministry of finance was told to provide a great power with an economy of a seize led to the famous march to Pristina on the necessary funding. Immediately after of the Netherlands and a (official) defence- July 12th 1999, an event which contrib- the meeting defence minister, Marshall budget almost three times that of Den- uted to the restoration of the Russian self- Sergyev, announced that Russia was go- mark. But it can be a very troublesome confidence, but was without any military ing to change her military doctrine. and painful process to realise this fact. significance. On the contrary the events In June the armed forces demonstrated After a while Russia assessed that she had demonstrated the Russian isolation. The during exercise Zapad 99 the new Rus- to maintain her influence by participat- Russian airforce was denied flight permis- sian threat perception. The scenario was a
74 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 local conflict like the one in the Balkans, countries) should be taken into consid- Russia is an important regional power which is developing into a major regional eration. If an aggression could not be with an enormous potential if it is used conflict, where Russia is attacked from the stopped by other means Russia would properly. Russia is still a nuclear power, West. A build up of hostile forces is tak- resort to the use of nuclear weapons. The which gives her a special status in the in- ing place in the Baltic Republics and in the same basic principles were observed in the ternational system. It is obvious that the end Russia is compelled to stop the aggres- new draft of the National Security Con- West is not recognised as a strategic part- sion by using tactical nuclear weapons. cept, which was published shortly after- ner. It might be a useful partner from The exercise was analysed in a meeting wards. Minor differences between the two time to time but conflicts of interests will 2nd of July in which President Yeltsin, all documents could be noted; the National continue. the ministers from the power ministries Security Concept emphasised the Russian and the ministers responsible for finance internal problems, which are seen as the The impact of the crisis in and economy participated. At the end of major threat to Russian security. In com- Northern Caucasus the meeting Yeltsin promised additional parison with the national security con- funding for the defence and the minister cept of 1997 the external threats are ac- The crisis in Northern Caucasus and of finance was ordered to provide the centuated without being dramatised and the outbreak of the second Chechnian war necessary means, which must be charac- the nuclear policy is identical with that in the autumn of 1999 have no doubt terised as a mission impossible. of the military doctrine. It is important contributed to this more realistic appre- In the beginning of October a draft to note that the two documents are rep- ciation of the Russian position. The main of the new military doctrine was pub- resenting the Russian view of the world security problems of Russia are the cohe- lished. It confirmed the changes in Rus- and her place in the international system. sion of the federation and the internal sian perception of the international situ- In the National Security Concept the il- weaknesses of the political and economi- ation. The threats against Russia would lusion of Russia as a great power with cal systems, the social and moral crisis and possibly derive from local conflicts devel- global interests and obligations seems to demographic development. It should be oping into major regional conflicts. The be abandoned. The weaknesses of Russia evident from the events in Northern Cau- main threat was once again identified as are clearly analysed and recognised and it casus in the autumn and winter that the the Western strategic direction even if the seems as if the logical conclusions for Southern strategic direction is the main Southern direction (from the Muslim Russian security policy have been drawn. external threat to the country. The mili-
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tary means necessary for this type of local forced tendencies of self-isolation and ited economic upturn is based upon the and even regional conflicts are not nu- what Sergei Karaganov has called a con- devaluation in the wake of the crisis in clear weapons but a wide range of con- trolled level of tension with the outside August 1998 and the rising oil-prices on ventional weapons systems, including pre- world, could be observed. (Moscow News the world-market. But this can turn out cision guided munitions. In comparison no. 9 March 8-14. 2000). But by the end be to be of limited duration. The Rus- with the conclusions of the meeting in of the year the prime minister and from sian share in the world economy is shrink- the National Security Counsel late April the same day the acting president, Vladimir ing and Russia is almost left out of the last year the new situation requires new Putin, wrote a long article in Rossijskaya information technology revolution if not priorities for the defence and the mili- Gazeta where Russia´s situation was ana- to speak of the post-industrial develop- tary-industrial complex. lysed in depth. As also stated in the Na- ment as such. tional Security Concept, which the act- For the next 15 to 20 years to come Putins vision ing president adopted in the beginning Russia will continue to lag behind the lead- of the New Year the main threats to Rus- ing group of industrial countries even if The election of Vladimir Putin as new sian security are internal and not exter- she succeeds in implementing a successful president seems to conclude the process nal. First of all he wants to strengthen economic policy. of analysing Russia´s role and possibili- patriotism, restore the central power of This situation leaves the president with ties in the international system. It is not the state (gosudarstvo) which is the pre- limited options regarding foreign and yet clear what will be the final result of requisite for modernising the country by security policy. the process, but there can be identified establishing economic growth and social The different schools described earlier different options and certain indications justice. It is also the prerequisite for the each have their solution. of which policy the new president will restoration of Russia´s position in the The first school, the liberal democrats pursue. international system (derzhava). What or the Westernizers, is almost non-exist- As mentioned in the beginning of this kind of role Russia is going to play is not ing but would suggest that Russia adapt article 1999 exposed the weaknesses of the defined in any detail. The president is well its foreign policy to the Western world Russian foreign and security policy. The aware of the Russian economic weakness. and take up a position as a junior part- strong anti-Western rhetoric was clearly The country is dependent of export of ner and this option is totally unrealistic leading to a growing isolation and rein- raw materials and crude oil. Russia´s lim- for domestic political reasons.
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The fourth school, the reactionary-prag- tended political, economical and politi- no need to legitimise this fact even con- matic or the ultra-nationalist, is still and cal co-operation with the CIS-countries ceptually. The fifth argument concerns the - after the NATO enlargement and the and the establishment of an alliance with relationship with China. A Russian-Chi- bombing of Yugoslavia even more in China are important pillars in this policy. nese alliance and mutual understanding favour of a comprehensive military build- The purpose is to regain superpower sta- of a multipolar world is anti-Western and up, mobilisation economy, self-sufficiency tus for Russia. pro-Chinese. It is not Russian interest to and extended co-operation with anti-West- be involved in a worsening American- ern states, e.g. Iran Iraq, Libya and North A new Russian foreign policy? Chinese relationship. Korea, and an alliance with China. It fa- As a new alternative he proposes a con- vours strong pressure on the CIS-coun- Sergej Karaganov has in the article, cept of selective engagement or a concept tries in order to force them into a closer which was referred to earlier, argued con- of concentration. co-operation with Russia and eventually vincingly against this concept. First of all It will require a substantial revision of reunification. This option is just as unre- it reflects a geo-strategic thinking of the the countrys strategic priorities. First alistic as was the first mentioned, but pri- 19th-20th centuries and even though the priority should be given to the achieve- marily for economic reasons. Ten years geo-strategic dimension has not completely ment of economic growth and the pre- after the breakdown of the Soviet Union disappeared, the globalisation of the world requisite for this will be integration into there are no way of return to a milita- and the geo-economy of the 21st century the world economy. A reliable protection rised economical and political system. are not properly taken into consideration. of Russian vital interests is needed. Mr, The third school is the merged schools Secondly, it requires Russia to pursue a Karaganov claims that the list should be of internationalists and democratic prag- global power policy, which is beyond the very short and he mentions one: The matists. They have been supporting the countrys economic resources. Thirdly, maintenance of an effective nuclear ca- basic concept of Jevgenij Primakov, the eventually it might in all probability lead pability as the most cost-effective instru- concept of a multipolar world, which re- to a confrontation with the United States ment of ensuring security and a wide quires a very pro-active foreign policy in and the West, which would be totally coun- range of other interests. Russia should all spheres in order to counter the ten- ter-productive. The fourth argument of abandon its aspirations of being a great dencies to a uni-polar world and to re- Mr. Karaganov points to the fact that power. It is pure illusion as the countrys establish the geo-strategic balance. Ex- Russia is a weakening pole and there is positions in all important fields are de-
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clining. The foreign policy should avoid president has only limited freedom of equal partner Russia will have the possi- confrontations, especially with the coun- action. The ministry of foreign affairs, bility to exert a maximum of influence tries, which are important for Russia´s the ministry of defence and the general on of the decision of these organisation, economic development. One of the main staff, members of the DUMA and Federa- and problems concerning foreign trade objects of the new foreign policy will be tion Council have still an important say will have priority. For that reason Rus- to attract foreign investments to Russia, in this process and the Primakov-doctrine sia will probably try to intensify the which in addition will require compre- was broadly accepted. It will therefore re- political and economical co-operation hensive internal reforms. At last he sug- quire great efforts to convince them of with Europe, especially the European gests that Russia drops its tough rhetoric the necessity of a radical change. No doubt, Union. Our threats are no longer feared, but president Putin is a very pragmatic per- The president has re-opened the co- they irk and discourage those who would son and it seems as if he is preparing a operation with NATO. It might develop like to promote partnership relations major conceptual change step by step. slowly step by step, but this is probably with Russia. The proposals put forward By stressing the internal problems as one of the areas where the new president of Mr. Karaganov are interesting because the origins of the Russian weakness and has the relatively little freedom of action. they are reflecting a new and much more not putting the blame on the West but The sentiments against NATO are still very realistic view on Russia´s place and possi- on Russia herself he has contributed to a strong, both in the political and military bilities in the international system, a view better understanding of Russia as a major elites, but not the least in the population. which is likely to be very close to the ideas regional power, but has abandoned the The 24th of March 1999 has not been for- of the new president and might be the concept of Russia as a great power pursu- gotten and will probably be remembered basic element in the new foreign policy ing global interests. He has realised that for years to come. Concerning the spe- concept of Russia. This concept is expected it will take decades to modernise Russia cial relationship between Russia and the to be adopted by the National Security and that it cannot be done without co- United States in the field of nuclear weap- Council in the near future and then operation with the West. Russia will pur- ons and arms control there are still many signed by the president. sue her own national interests by co-op- dangerous potential conflicts over the It must, however, be stressed that there eration in and with major international horizon: START II, START III; the ABM- are many participants in the decision- organisations, e.g. OSCE, EU and the treaty and not at least NMD, which might making process and it is likely that the Council of Europe and NATO. As an have serious consequences for the future
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Russian co-operation with United States solved, which can be very difficult because The predictability of Russia might be and NATO. of the strong nationalistic feelings it will enhanced, although this would be a new As mentioned earlier one of the most raise in Russia, if concessions are made to and an untypical trend for Russia. You controversial questions in Russian poli- Japan. always have to bear in mind the words of tics is the Russian relation to the CIS- The relationship with China is friendly Grigorij Yavlinsky: In Russia everything countries. Having recognised its position if not cordial, but apparently on a much can happen, as a major regional power the relation- more realistic level than in the times of ship with these countries will be of grow- Yeltsin and Primakov. The talk about a ing importance. The relationship to strategic alliance between the two coun- Ukraine has been improved recently but tries has silenced for the time being. is still very complicated. The union with A picture is emerging of a much more Belarus cannot conceal that there are ma- realistic and pragmatic Russian foreign jor divergences of interests between the policy even if the basic anti-Western ten- two countries, which are setting narrow dency will still remain. In recognising the limits for further integration. The rela- weaknesses of the Russian Federation, it tions to the Transcaucasian countries are seems to have been accepted that for years very active but also extremely complicated. to come Russia can only play a role as a The threat from fundamentalist Muslims major regional power. The world will from have contributed to the intensification time to time be reminded of Russia spe- of the relations to the Centralasian coun- cial status as a nuclear power. Russia will tries and Russia is enhancing its role as probably not be an easy player in the in- the bulwark against this threat. ternational system. She will pursue her In the Far East Russia is working to strategic priorities with all means and the improve the economical co-operation co-operation might be difficult. The Rus- with Japan. The relationship with Japan sian strategy might be the same, but the can, however, only be improved if the tactics have evidently been changed by the conflict over the Kurile Islands can be new president.
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Territorial Defence in Baltic Defence College
By Michael H. Clemmesen, Brigadier General
1. Start defensive operations with the territorial forces at the place of attack option being to stop it before it reaches and continue resistance against the enemy across the length and breath of the the state territory and causes death and territory causing delay and attrition. destruction. 2. Conduct the main defence with manoeuvre forces, closely integrated with and However, for the relatively weak and supported by territorial forces. poor state, the best is rarely an option. 3. Conduct the deep battle with forces left behind enemy lines with forces infil- Use of the depth of the territory and the trated for the purpose and any available long-range artillery unit, priority against potential power of resistance of the na- enemy command capability and logistic assets. tion to deter and if necessary counter 4. Protect friendly command elements and logistic assets with territorial forces attack and invasion becomes the only in rear areas. (From Chapter 1: The Foundation for Operations. option. The more significant the relative The Baltic Defence College Operations Manual. Revised Edition May 2000) weakness, the more the defence will de- pend on full use of the territory and well- When the basis for the creation of the different in many details, they could be prepared mobilisation of the national Baltic Defence College was worked out in grouped together under that heading. resources. the summer of 1997, it was agreed that Territorial defence is never the pre- It was also agreed in 1997-98 that the the teaching should reflect the territorial ferred option. All nations want to meet, teaching should be inspired by the Total defence idea. Even if the developing op- contain, and defeat any attack or inva- Defence models for the mobilisation of erational concepts of the three states were sion as far forward as possible, the best national resources developed by the Nor-
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dic States: a balancing of defence needs coastal defence) in a geographical with the protection and support of the area. Any responsibility for con- civilian population. trol of/co-ordination with naval or During the last 1½ years of prepara- air force units will be decided by tion and teaching of the first Senior Staff the mission and task organisation Course, the international staff of the Bal- given by higher authorities. tic Defence College has developed a com- The Military Region Areas of Re- mon understanding of how this must be sponsibility (AOR) have boundaries done. We had to develop one model. following the civilian subdivision of It was not possible within the the national territory. They also mir- available course time to work ror one clearly defined operational level with several, radically different problem or task (e.g. one major likely ones. The revised edition of route of invasion or possible enemy ob- the College Operations jective: e.g. the state capital). The region: Manual and the tactical exer- • Give orders to any assigned manoeu- cises are the results of that vre forces and any coastal defence forces common brainstorming and and subordinated air defence units in the represents the de facto line region, according to directives from su- of discussion and teaching perior headquarters. of mobilisation and Total • Give orders to Military Districts not Defence issues at the Bal- subordinated to the manoeuvre forces. tic Defence College. • Provides Combat Service Support The teaching in the Baltic Defence ent units). The teaching strongly under- to both manoeuvre forces and Military College operates with Military Regions lines the principle that there must always Districts, as well as host nation support (sub-divided into Military Districts for be a clear responsibility, unity of command, to any international reinforcements. local defence and total defence) and ma- for all armed forces (no matter if volun- • Co-ordinates land, naval, and air op- noeuvre forces (brigades and independ- teer force, close air defence, border guard, erations in defence of the region.
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The Manoeuvre Forces: all armed forces, e.g. Border Guard ele- with elements subordinated to manoeu- • Conduct the main defensive opera- ments, under command) in a way that vre force sub-units. tions. creates the best possible conditions for • Prepare counter-mobility engineer • Are assigned missions and AOR (nor- the employment of the manoeuvre works to the rear of the manoeuvre force mally following Military District bounda- forces. formation. ries) in the main threat areas. • Guard key military objects (e.g. HQs, Forces of the Military Districts in the The Military District prepared obstacles). manoeuvre force AOR are under opera- Main Defence Mission tional command of the manoeuvre force The Military District commander. However, the manoeuvre When directly subordinated to the Total Defence Mission formation uses its own units against the Military Region, they likely (or actual) enemy main effort. The • Meet and defeat minor violations of Total Defence co-operation is active in Military District forces are used outside the state territory wherever they occur. peacetime, partly in that the Military Dis- the expected or actual enemy main effort • Meet, delay, and wear down major trict co-ordinates military assistance to and in the rear part of the manoeuvre invading forces and gather detailed intel- other state and local authorities in the force AOR. Enemy actions in these areas ligence concerning the enemy forces in district (in case of natural or other catas- are delayed and reduced in strength, the district, thereby creating the time and trophes, major crime, etc.), and partly in thereby giving the manoeuvre force time conditions necessary for the successful the planning and exercising of the war- to react/move its forces to counter the employment of manoeuvre force forma- time role. enemy. tions and units. From mobilisation onwards this mis- The Military Districts are created with • Continue the same mission with sion is continued regardless of the tacti- an area covering one or more civilian forces operating behind the forward ele- cal or command situation in the district. administrative units (counties). Thus they ments of the invading forces. However, the conditions are drastically cover the entire area of the state and they When subordinated to a manoeuvre different in the three different situations: ensure that any invasion of the land ter- force formation, they in our own rear area; when the district is ritory is met at the point of entry with • Conduct forward, flank, and rear a combat zone; and when behind the lines Economy of Force defence means (with security operation with district units or of the invading forces.
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In our own rear area during and after In the combat zone the district: it is only natural that the Baltic Defence the mobilisation the district: • Tries as much as possible to continue College is a focal point of developing such • Participates in and assists in the im- to support the population and the other doctrine. This development depends, how- plementation of the planned mobilisation total defence authorities. ever, on inputs and contributions from and distribution of the total defence struc- • Facilitates liaison between manoeu- all three Baltic states. In the following two tures and resources in the district (e.g. vre force units (or any international re- articles Major General Ants Laaneots pro- personnel, transport, medical supplies and inforcements) and the civilian authorities vides a valuable contribution and I wel- facilities, other supplies, other facilities) in the district in relation to evacuation, come further contributions. for police, civil defence/rescue service, local logistic support, etc. civilian emergency authorities, and other Behind the lines of the invader the district: • Helps to organise and lead resistance proper organisations. against the invader. • Protects the mobilisation, training, • Tries as much as possible to continue and deployment of the manoeuvre forces to support the population and screen it and other central defence force and civil from pressure. defence/rescue units. • Starts the planned guarding of ear- The Baltic Defence College marked key civilian and military objects and institutions. Thus the Baltic Defence College has • Prepares and guards demolitions and created a common understanding of the other obstacles. concept of territorial defence, which is • Counters in co-operation with actively being developed within the frame- other total defence authorities (civil de- work of teaching of the senior staff course fence, police) enemy operations in the at the college. As the development of this district (special operations units, and the concept is of crucial importance to devel- effect of air and other long-range weap- opment of the overall structure and con- ons). cept of the defence forces of all three states,
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The Defence Region and its tasks By Ants Laaneots, Major General of the Estonian Defence Forces
According to the Main directions of Estonian defence policy ratified by the ised command is lost or if the enemy Parliament on May 7, 1996, the defence conception of the country is based on the breaks through in the deep of the terri- principle of territorial defence. In Chapter III of that document the following is tory. stated: To organise national defence the territory of the country is divided into - division of wartime units into two defence regions. / / Every defence region is divided into defence districts (RT parts general-purpose forces and terri- torial (national defence) units. I 1996, 33, pg. 890). - wide use of dispersed combat tac- The purpose of Estonian territorial The distinctiveness of territorial de- tics and guerrilla activities. By establish- defence is to wear down the intruding fence is: ing locations for combat activities instead enemy in every way, to slow down enemy - decentralisation of the defence of fronts and by guerrilla activities in the advance by every kind of combat activ- forces by establishing districts. Form- rear area of the aggressor the latter is given ity, to fiercely protect strategically impor- ing and preparing wartime units, mobili- no opportunity to benefit from his ad- tant objects to keep them under own con- sation and implementing in wartime are vantage in firepower. The enemy is tied trol until other states in the international done in specific areas of responsibility. in constant combat that has no fixed front security system could react with political, Such military-territorial units are inde- line or rear. economical and military help. And after pendent in their preparation and conduct The territorial defence system consists that to free the territory of the country of combat activities. They are based on of defence regions, defence districts, navy- either independently or with the help of the availability of local reserves and sup- and air force units and units and estab- others. plies and can operate also when central- lishments under central command.
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In its order no 198-k Creating defence mand subordinate units and raise a de- them with preparation for and conduct regions and forming their staffs dated gree of combat readiness; of civil defence and rescue activities; March 13, 1998, the Government of the - to plan and prepare to raise combat In time of crisis: Republic of Estonia tasked the Defence readiness and carry out mobilisation; - planned and orderly to raise defence Forces to establish defence regions. The - to plan and prepare for defensive mili- readiness of the defence region and to Defence Minister attempted in his order tary activities through specific action plans form and prepare wartime units for de- from July 22, 1998 Forming the staffs of and through checking their feasibility by fence activities; defence regions to implement the order. conducting training and exercises; - in co-operation with border guards However, this implementation has been - to plan, prepare and constantly con- to counter border violations; delayed for several reasons. trol the availability in quantity and qual- - to wear down the invading enemy The defence region (DR) is a military- ity of the necessary reserves (reservists, and slow down the enemy advance start- territorial operative body of troops ca- vehicles) and supplies for carrying out ing from the borders of own area of re- pable of independent operations. It con- defence tasks; sponsibility with combat activities of sists of different defence districts (DD) - to organise peacetime training and border guards and general-purpose as well and units from different arms. activities of general-purpose forces units as territorial defence units that can be as well as territorial defence units and to formed immediately; to block enemy as- Tasks of a defence region provide regular supplies according to the saults and tie him up in combat opera- orders of the Chief of Defence; tions thus creating the conditions for The tasks, structure and composition - to organise the guarding and protection forming main defence forces and for us- of a defence region are usually determined of objects at the defence forces disposal; ing them in an organised way; in accordance with the operative tasks - to ensure that border guards units - to hold strategically important areas given to it and with its location. In its and rescue board units in the area of re- objects; area of responsibility a DR may have the sponsibility of the defence region are pre- - to tie enemy forces with active de- following tasks: pared and ready; fence, gaining time and creating condi- In peacetime: - to prepare the area of responsibility tions for outside forces to arrive and take - to observe the situation on land, sea for defence activities; the initiative; and in air space; - to establish the necessary co-opera- - to destroy the enemy by constant at- - to maintain constant readiness to com- tion with civilian authorities, helping tacks with own forces and together with
88 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 helping forces eventually to free all Esto- received complete military training and To guarantee effectiveness the DD nian territory; who will have the best weapons, equip- headquarters must be formed already in - to organise guerrilla war and counter ment and vehicles of the defence forces. peacetime integrated with the headquar- activities in the areas conquered by the The battalion or a unit equal to it (artil- ters of Defence League units. enemy; lery battalion, air defence division etc.) is It is recommendable to form rescue - to assist civilian authorities in their the base unit for the general-purpose units as specialised units within the defence conduct of rescue and civil defence ac- forces. In wartime it is practical to form regions based on rescue board peacetime tivities. brigades that operate according to the companies. Being in the special purpose A wartime defence region consists of: principles of Task Forces, i.e. brigades with- reserve of the commander of the defence a) units of general-purpose forces; out a permanent structure. Their composi- region these units carry out the most im- b) territorial units, incl. defence districts, tion is determined by the commander of a portant tasks of rescue and civil defence, and rescue units and border guard districts. DR according to the tasks given to them. if needed also engineer tasks in wartime. The units with the best weapons and Defence districts (DD) are formed In wartime border guard districts con- the best training status are designated to on the basis of units from the Estonian tinue observation, guarding and protect- the general-purpose forces. These include Defence League as tactical units de- ing the border in their area of responsi- mechanised, infantry, coastguard, artillery, signed to complete territorial defence bility operating under the command of air defence and engineer units. General- tasks within a certain area of responsi- the commander of the defence region. In purpose forces are formed on the basis bility. In order to form defence districts sectors attacked by the enemy they organ- of defence forces peacetime units or by it is practical to use reservists between the ise fierce resistance on the border with defence districts. They are not associated age of 20-55 who have completed conscript the purpose of gaining time necessary for with any specific area of responsibility service or have received the necessary the mobilising the defence region. When and they are used, under command of military training in some other way. They the aggressors forces break through the the Chief (supreme Commander) of De- will be given weapons, equipment and sub-units of the border guard district fence, to complete the most important vehicles of the Defence Forces and the remain in the enemy rear and begin guer- combat tasks in any area of the country. Defence League not designated for De- rilla activities in designated areas. When In order to form general-purpose forces, fence Force wartime units. Also older fe- the territory of the country is freed they those reservists are used, who are between male and male volunteers may be included assume the border guarding duties with- the age of 19-35, who are healthy and have in the DD to carry out lighter duties. out waiting for special orders.
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To guarantee the success of the com- bat activities the Chief (Supreme Com- mander) of the Defence Forces may rein- force a defence region with additional land-, air- and/or navy units.
Principles of territorial defence activities
Taking into account that combat will often take place against an enemy supe- rior in size and firepower as well as mo- bile and fire power, the following recom- mendations may be given for conduct- ing combat activities: - since we are not able to considerably improve our firepower, we must prevent the enemy from using his fire in a con- centrated way. Defensive battles must be conducted not in the pre-planned defence sectors or positions but in deep areas, - mines and other obstacles must be persed manner and thus avoiding his us- creating combat sectors and using so called widely used. Since we are not able to re- ing his forces in a concentrated way; dispersed combat tactics; markably improve our units mobility - it is important to protect large in- - the technical weakness of own weap- in the near future, we must try to slow habited locations because combat in built- onry and inferior mobility must be com- the enemy mobility down to our level; up areas allows tying and defeating nu- pensated by a multitude of forces and prac- - to gain local superiority the enemy merous enemy forces with small forces (as tical arrangement of territorial defence; forces must be tied in combat in a dis- the Chechnya war example proves);
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- in the areas conquered by the enemy Supplementing the units of a defence mobilisation in a secret manner, regulated guerrilla war must begin immediately. region with materials necessary for every- with orders, thus guaranteeing a flexible day and combat activities takes place on increase of forces corresponding to the Logistic service of a defence region the account of both the resources of the greatness of the danger. defence forces and local resources follow- The speed of conducting it is vitally The rear of the defence forces operates ing the principle of from up downwards important for the national defence. on three levels. First, the rear of the Gen- as follows. The defence region provides To conduct mobilisation formation eral Staff of the Defence Forces; second, supplies for all its units, in wartime also centres are established in the garrisons the rear of a defence region and third, the border guard and rescue board units, and the defence districts, one for each rear of a battalion or a unit that is its equal. guaranteeing material transportation to battalion or a unit equal to its size. For- In a small and relatively poor country units based on the units commanders mation centres form sub-units in the for- it is impossible to gather and keep all requests either with rear area vehicles or mation points that are established, one materials necessary to wage war in the with vehicles of the designated defence for each company or a unit equal to it. defence forces. That is why the supplies districts. If the transportation means are The personnel of formation points and for the units in wartime come from two inadequate and if the situation demands centres are designated from the Defence sources. Military materials that cannot be it, also the units vehicles are used to trans- League and from the personnel of the obtained from civilian society (weapons, port materials. defence forces not used in wartime forces ammunition, mines, explosives, helmets, and from conscripts. It is practical to have combat order) are obtained and distrib- Principles of mobilisation a defence region 2IC to run mobilisation uted to the units by the logistical system in the defence region, his work organ be- of the defence forces. All the materials Mobilisation of a defence region is ing a regional national defence department. necessary for military activities that are its organised and planned transition available in civilian society (food, fuel, from peacetime staff into wartime staff Commanding a defence region vehicles, spare parts, certain clothing items within the set timeframe. etc.) are purchased or obtained by imple- DR mobilisation may be total or par- The commander of a defence region is menting the obligatory duty law of the tial. It is prepared as territorial and dis- under the direct command of the Chief national defence. persed. It must be possible to conduct (Supreme Commander) of Defence and
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is fully responsible for completing the preparing the area of responsibility for bat activities the ACP may be used when peacetime and wartime tasks given to his combat activities, are the region com- necessary to command the tactical group defence region as well as for co-operation manders direct responsibility. In addi- operating in the main direction of the with the representatives of different serv- tion Defence League, border guard and activities. Depending on the operational ices and civilian authorities. rescue board armed units and national situation the command posts change their The commander of a defence region defence departments are directly subor- locations on the average 1-3 times in 24 leads subordinated units, organisations dinated to the regional commander in case hours. It will be disallowed to relocate the and establishments either directly or a crisis endangering the national safety of main command post and alternative com- through his headquarters of the defence the country breaks out. mand post at the same time. region. The headquarters of the defence To command the defence region in During the time prior to combat ac- region is commanded by the chief of staff, wartime at least three command posts are tivities and also in a war situation where who carries out his duties being the act- established: main command post (MCP), there is no direct danger, the peacetime DR ing 2IC of the commander of the defence alternative command post (ACP) and headquarter building and its communica- region. It is practical to appoint another rear command post (RCP). Command- tion systems may be used as a permanent 2IC of the commander of the defence re- ing of all activities of the defence region command post of the defence region. gion in addition to the chief of staff. takes place from the main command post A general conscription duty, a dis- All the defence forces land-, navy- and where the commander and main person- persed command system that is always air force units are placed under the com- nel of the headquarters of the defence re- ready to operate, a territorial system of mand of the defence region commander gion are situated. The alternative com- mobilisation and peoples great desire to by the Chief (Supreme Commander) of mand post with the necessary operational defend the country are the preconditions Defence. Establishments and organisations personnel, commanded by the 2IC of the for the success of the territorial system of that are situated within the area of re- commander of DR, is situated in a hid- national defence. (Lieutenant General Ermei sponsibility of the defence region are to- den and protected terrain. It monitors Kanninen About our system of territorial de- tally subordinate to the commander of combat activities and the orders of the fence, report in the Finnish Military Science the defence regions. In peacetime opera- commander of DR, being ready to take Society, March 1, 1971). tional issues, i.e. combat readiness, rais- over commanding the forces of the de- ing defence readiness and mobilisation, fence region. During the course of com-
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The Defence League and Defence Districts
By Ants Laaneots, Major General of the Estonian Defence Forces
The experience of the defense wars in the last century has shown that the stable force in every place of the country success of military activities does not depend only on the fighting ability and securing the rear area. It is important to bravery of the units waging war on the front but more and more on what is done know that organized resistance will be put to ward off the enemy on the whole territory of the country. Next to the units up everywhere the enemy has appeared with the main intensity of the regular combat activities, the numerous complex including the territory seized by the en- of military units and establishments carry out all kinds of tasks in forming war emy. The system of territorial defense is time units, providing all the necessary supplies for the fighting units, securing the instrument used to solve these prob- and supporting the fighting units and protecting citizens from the dangers and lems. hardships of war all over the country. In a majority of the European coun- tries, particularly in those that do not Nowadays an aggressor will use numer- is very difficult to predict in which part belong to any military alliances, the armed ous special forces in an attack: land- and of the country the enemy may suddenly forces are divided into; general-purpose marine assault, air- and rocket impacts in appear therefore the means and readiness forces and territorial units. Such classifi- order to neutralize power- and command to face him must be evenly distributed all cation is used in the armies in Finland, structures, destroy or seize important over the country. To preserve the defen- Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, objects and economy, and to quickly sup- sive will of the fighting units and of the Poland, Latvia, Lithuania etc. press resistance and the defense ability of whole population warding off the aggres- As a rule, general-purpose forces com- the population of the victim country. It sion it is particularly important to have a pose a more battle efficient and mobile
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part of the armed forces. They are desig- territorialism. Total defense embraces the In one or the other way we have both nated to solve the major combat tasks of idea that military defense of a small coun- of the mentioned components. the national defense in the core of aggres- try is able to achieve its goals only when Peacetime units of the armed forces sion in any part of the country. They are the entire population participates in it prepare and form general-purpose forces not permanently assigned to any area of with all available means. The territorial necessary for the wartime. responsibility. structure serves this purpose and allows Territorial units are located all over the achieving it. Territorial defense is based on the country and they have certain areas of Today Estonia has achieved the cor- Defense League responsibility. In a way they form a na- rect solution of the national defense that tionwide security cover and fill various needs only further detailing and consist- Also we do not have to start creating tasks both in own rear and in the terri- ent implementing. Both the Scandinavian territorial units from the scrap. When our tory occupied by the enemy. experts and the experts from NATO have neighbors in Finland form their territo- declared our general defense conception rial units only while declaring mobiliza- Territorial defense in Estonia fitted for the purpose. It provides decen- tion, we have already in peacetime a na- The conception of Estonian national tralizing the national defense in time of tionwide territorial defense structure in defense has gone through a development war and creating regional military-terri- the form of the units of the Defense League of eight years. The purpose was to estab- torial body of troops defense regions that are well suited for the establishment lish a system of defense forces that is as with vast authority and responsibility. The of wartime territorial defense. Addition- easy, practical and effective as possible, defense region consists of general-purpose ally the areas of responsibility of the that would guarantee completing the military- and territorial defense units. It Defense League units coincide with the mobilization task and resistance in every has a fixed area of responsibility where it countrys administrative divisional units case no matter what the situation. The is fully responsible for preparing and suc- counties, which makes it considerably national defense models of the Nordic cessfully conducting defensive activities easier to connect the military side of the countries served as a good example. also in the situation where the central national defense with civilian society and The basic principles of our national command of the national defense in no to establish and implement the total defense are of a total nature and based on longer operational. defense system as a whole.
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However the Defense League law does principle of its members being volunteers • Preparing the defense districts area not determine wartime tasks for the or- and it becomes a specific part of the of responsibility for defense activities; ganization, but regulates the activities of defense forces territorial force, it units • Securing and reinforcing the bor- the Defense League. These are established become defense districts. der guards (in frontier defense districts); in the mobilization plan, in the overall • Helping local municipal govern- plan of national defense and in other le- Tasks of the defense districts ments, government establishments and the gal documents concerning national defense police in guaranteeing the public order that are ratified by the Commander of The tasks, structure and order of for- according to legislation; the Defense Forces (in wartime supreme mation are determined by the order of • Organizing guarding and protection commander). However, in peacetime the the Commander of Defense Forces from of important national and military ob- Defense League is not capable of carrying December 1998. jects, material supplies; out all tasks of wartime territorial defense. Being three to four times larger than • Manning observation posts and com- The calculations show that the minimum the peacetime unit the defense district mand points that belong to the close-air staff necessary to carry out the tasks of (DD) is a tactical unit of territorial defense surveillance system (CASS) of air defense territorial defense is 30 000 people. The with a structure and set area of responsi- and making sure the observation tasks are voluntary national defense organization bility adjusted for it. completed constantly; Defense League incorporates a relatively The tasks that a defense district must • Organizing the take-over of military small amount (8 200 people) of members complete in their area of responsibility quarters and other objects on the depar- of different background and age which is are wide and various. More important of ture of the units and their purposeful use simply not enough. Defense League units these tasks are: and care; must become the framework that is go- • Carrying out tasks of raising the • Combat with the enemy reconnais- ing to be the basis of forming wartime defense readiness and in case of mobiliza- sance-diversion groups and the air- and territorial units defense districts. The tion forming the units that are both per- marine assaults; missing personnel will be formed out of manent staff and the units appointed for • Protecting the area of responsibility the reserves by mobilization. Thus the the task; either independently or together with Defense League changes its nature in war- • Helping the National Defense Depart- other military units in case the enemy time, as it cannot be based only on the ments and units conduct mobilization; attempt to conquer it;
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• Calculating and preparing military veillance system (CASS) of air defense, to need to complete tasks characteristic to reserves according to the tasks set by the complete tasks of internal security and these arms; commander of the defense district; guerilla activities in own area of respon- • Engineer sub-units to obstruct the • Providing supplies to the military, sibility; enemy movement, to destroy objects and evacuation of the injured and the sick from • Combat sub-units to complete un- demination, to do ground work, to re- the battle area and securing the rear ac- expected general military, guerilla and pair bridges and roads, to guarantee cross- cording to the tasks set by the commander other combat tasks in own DD and in ing over bodies of water. It is practical to of the defense district; areas of responsibility of other defense make use of peacetime road- and bridge • Organizing and commanding guerilla districts within the defense region; construction organizations in forming activities resistance movement in case the • Anti-tank, air defense and artillery engineer sub-units; enemy has seized the area of responsibility sub-units are formed according to the • Training sub-units to form new units • Helping the local authorities imple- ment civil defense. The structure and composition of every DEFENCE DISTRICT COMBAT FORMATION defense department depends on its location Borderline of a Guard and wartime tasks. For example, one of the Company area of tasks of a DD that is situated on the coast responsibility Borderline of a Guard or on islands may be protecting the coast. Platoon area of It means that coastal defense units must be responsibility a part of that DD. A DD with an open Air Observation Post area that has a danger of enemy attacks by Enemy tanks may need anti-tank sub-units etc. The typical structure of a defense dis- trict has: • Internal defense sub-units to Main HQ - Main Command Post Rear HQ - Rear Command Post guard and protect important objects and Rifle Coy - Rifle Company material supplies, to man the close-air sur- DD - Defence District
96 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 and to quickly prepare necessary reserves first be limited to one in each company. League, will be mobilized other military to supplement the combating units; Various tasks of a defense district also al- units. Therefore the commanders of units • Logistics sub-units determined by lows maximum use of female volunteers and defense districts should, already in own defense district sub-units and the and the members of the Women Home peacetime take into account this fact. Sepa- headquarters of the defense region to pro- Guard who are sure to manage with some rate sub-units should be formed for the vide supplies and services for the mili- tasks better than men, at the same time al- activities of the Defense League that are tary units. lowing to use the latter in combat units. not going to be included in the DD and In course of military activities also the does not influence its readiness and com- Defense districts are established border guard sub-units are given under bat ability. In case a crisis breaks out, step by step the command of the commander of the forming and implementing the defense defense district in case the former have districts is conducted according to the At the beginning of establishing and withdrawn from the border sectors un- corresponding orders of the general staff developing the defense districts it is prac- der attack into the defense district. of the defense forces that are passed on to tical at first to form one battle company In planning mobilization of defense the units and establishments via opera- in every defense district (Tallinn Special forces practical distribution and designa- tional communication network of the Defense District organization will need tion of reserves between general-purpose defense forces. In case of a direct assault special consideration) and the amount of units and the defense district is impor- on a defense region or a defense district, internal defense companies that corre- tant. Of course the units of general-pur- also in case the centralized command is sponds to the amount of tasks given to pose forces are a priority here. Reservists lost, defense districts are formed independ- them (in Tallinn the internal defense com- of age 20 to 45 who have completed tech- ently according to the orders of the com- panies may be joined into internal defense nical or military service or received cor- manders of defense regions or defense battalions if necessary), also one engineer responding military training, and are not districts corresponding to the regula- company, logistics company, heavy arms figured into defense forces wartime gen- tions of the commander of defense sub-units according to the weapons at use eral-purpose units, are appointed to form forces that has been established already and tactical need. In order to gain experi- defense districts. in peacetime. ence also the number of battle platoons in In peacetime some of the people who A commander of a defense district is the internal defense companies should at participate in the activities of the Defense fully subordinate to a commander of his
97 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
defense region. Depending on the com- several of the present chiefs of units have The rear command point that is com- bat situation and needs, the commander paid little attention to personal profes- manded by the Chief of Logistics of DD of a defense region may make a defense sional development and for a long time has two important tasks: logistical servic- district temporarily subordinate to a com- have been distant from any kind of learn- ing of own units and providing neces- mander of a general force brigade or tac- ing processes. Todays units and wartime sary material supplies that are available in tical group fighting in the area or vice defense district need energetic, experi- civilian society for the fighting general- versa in the best interest of successfully enced leaders. It is the task of the General purpose units according to the orders of solving a task some general force unit may Staff of the Defense Forces to conduct the defense region headquarters. be made subordinate to the commander the necessary rotation of officers in the At the beginning of military activities of the defense district. Defense League and appointing such peo- the command points of the defense dis- ple who manage their tasks well. tricts are situated in hidden and if possi- Responsibilities of the It is easier and more practical to form ble - protected locations. Locations are Defense League increase the headquarters of defense districts based changed according to need. Prior to com- on the unit headquarters including addi- bat activities and sometimes also in war In our present situation where quali- tional reserve officers chosen and appointed situations if there is no direct danger, the fied officers are in permanent need it is for it. Local bureaus of regional national peacetime headquarters building and com- most practical to appoint the chiefs of defense departments may be included in munication systems of the Defense League the Defense league units to be the com- the headquarters of DDs as a part of the may be used as a stationary command manders of the corresponding defense headquarters personnel department. point (SCP). districts. Receiving two tasks of very big In order to command the defense dis- responsibility and work- load the com- trict in wartime a DD main command To protect ones own shed manders must be highly professional. point and rear command point are estab- They must possess the qualities of a good lished on its basis. The Main command A somewhat funny problem has ap- leader and the ability to carry out ones point should be where the commander peared in the exercises of the first defense peacetime tasks as a chief of the unit, and of the defense district and headquarters districts. Some headquarters have included at the same time prepare wartime activi- main operation personnel are situated and all objects in their area of responsibility ties of the defense district. Unfortunately lead the whole activity of the DD. in the lists of objects that need guarding
98 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 and protection, oftentimes including small • Hospitals for the personnel of the fact that we have almost all the necessary shops, storehouses and other minor ob- defense forces; weapons and partially also the equipment, jects that belong to the planners them- • Road junctions, railway stations. create real preconditions to the situation, selves or to their relatives. Here a prag- This list is by far complete. where a large and important part of the matic approach is needed, important ob- To make establishing procedures faster national defense the system of territo- jects and places of storing supplies are and easier, the commanders of the Defense rial defense may get on its feet fairly placed under guard and protection, and League should, based on the initial infor- soon. Also our present governments firm there are simply not enough soldiers to mation, already in the first half of 1999- budget policy that is directed towards guard everything. The following should 2000 conduct necessary organizational developing national defense and under- be under the protection of internal and territorial changes to join units peace- standing of the extraordinary importance defense companies of defense districts: time and defense districts wartime inter- of fast completion of mobilization infra- • State, county and commune (munici- nal defense structures, divide defense dis- structure gives reason for optimism. pal) government establishments; tricts areas of responsibility into areas of • Radio, television, communication responsibility of internal defense compa- and information communication centers; nies and those again into areas of respon- • Water supply systems; sibility of internal defense platoons. It will • Airports and marine ports; be the concern of the units headquarters • More important bridges, embank- to determine wartime structure of defense ments and hydro-technical establishments; districts as exactly and practically as pos- • Storehouses and terminals of food, sible and in cooperation with the general fuel and other materials important in staff of the defense forces to compose and completing national defense tasks; ratify initial personnel tables, and that • Power stations and other important could be the beginning of real coopera- objects of power system; tion in mobilization with national defense • Industrial establishments important departments. from the point of view of the state and Good work of the General Staff and national defense; the units of the Defense League, and the
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Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
Lithuanias Struggle against Soviet Occupation 1944-1953
By Major Arûnas Staaitis, Lithuanian Army
I still believe that the struggle I led for nine years would bring its results ion and Germany the Soviet Union oc- cupied Lithuania on 15 June 1940 and Final words by Lithuanian General Jonas Þemaitis in the KGB Court, Moscow 1954. formally annexed it on the 3 August 1940. The Lithuanian nation never agreed to T he repression of the population in directed against the so-called enemies of occupation or subjugation. The people Lithuania started on the first day the people of which a majority had never of Lithuania resisted in all possible ways, th 1 of the Soviet occupation on 15 June 1940 been partisans . The Soviets deported and struggled to win back their freedom st o and continued until the 31 f August 1993 whole families; infants, children, women and independence. Despite the repression, when the Soviet-Russian Army finally re- and elderly to Siberia. Altogether the So- underground resistance organizations turned home. The Soviet authorities car- viets deported 12 percent of the popula- formed, and a mass revolt took place on 2 ried out deportations, mass killings, im- tion . A rough estimate is that during 23-27 June 1941 following the German prisonment, and sovietification of the the period 1940-1990 Lithuania lost one attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June Lithuanian people and Soviet colonists third of its population due to war, de- 1941. The revolt briefly liberated the larg- were settled in Lithuania. struction and repression, as well as to est part of the territory of Lithuania that Soviet-oriented historians have tried emigration and deportations a total was occupied by the Soviets, and re-estab- to justify the mass deportations by re- equal to about one million citizens. lished the independent Republic of Lithua- ferring to Lithuanian partisan activity, Following the secret 1939 Molotov- nia that formed a Provisional Government. but in fact the deportations were largely Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Un- Molotov, then Soviet Minister of Foreign
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Affairs, condemned Lithuania and Lithua- army at the Lithuanian border, and few in German camps and prisons, and many nians in Radio Moscow for the revolt. realized that incorporation of the Baltic higher rank officers and patriotic offic- German occupation of Lithuania fol- States into the Soviet Union was to come. ers had been sent to Siberia or were ex- lowed from 1941 to 1944. The occupa- Hopes for renewed freedom were raised ecuted during the first Soviet occupation. tional regime of Germany was also based by the Atlantic Charter, which was pro- Other officers, fearful of the Red terror, on extreme violence and repression, and claimed on 8 August 1941 by Churchill had escaped to the West. The Lithuanian mass exterminations of the population and Roosevelt. This agreement laid out anti-Soviet partisan movement began in were carried out. The new occupation of the general principles for the basis of peace earnest the summer of 1944 and reached the Lithuania as well as repression and after Germanys defeat. It underlined the its peak in the spring of 1945, but at the terror stimulated a natural necessity to right of every nation to restore independ- same time Soviet repression grew stronger. resist the occupant and violator. The ence, which had been taken away by ag- Lithuanians were terrorized, raped, shot, defense was primarily aimed at the re-es- gressors during the war. Thus Lithuanians imprisoned and deported to Siberia. Al- tablishment of the independent Lithua- fought against the Germans and then the most all of the Lithuanian armys high- nian State. The Lithuanian Freedom Army Soviets, and waited for a war between the ranking officers, who might have been (LFA) was founded in December 1941, West and the Soviet Union. At the end of expected to organize resistance, had fled and its first headquarters were established World War II in the West, Lithuania was into exile. Besides, before the Second in Vilnius on the initiative of Lieutenant the first Baltic State to start fighting trying World War there was no teaching of non- Kazys Veverskis. It must be pointed out to defend the free world from communism. conventional war fighting in the Lithua- that LFA was first of all a military organi- Lithuania met the second Soviet occu- nian Army Military Academy and NCO zation that preferred to restore Lithua- pation unprepared and disorganized. school, and especially the older officers, nian independence by the use of armed Because of the experience from the first trained in conventional warfare, found it force against the Germans, and it was not Soviet occupation, there was much deter- difficult to adapt. The Lithuanian writer a political organisation. mination to fight, but there were no bat- Algirdas Julius Greimas gave a sarcastic As the war progressed the German re- tle plans or outlines and, most impor- but accurate description of the psycho- treat began. When the front was still tantly, there was no political or military logical drama, which he himself experi- rather far away, Lithuanians hoped that leadership3 . Some leaders of the anti-So- enced I saw that those officers of ours who Western countries would stop the Soviet viet and anti-Nazi resistance had been put pretended to be members of the resistance were
116 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 shit. Its possible to trust lieutenants and cap- total number of losses of Lithuanians sion was transferred to Lithuania after tains, but not colonels 4 . partisans could be about than 30 thousand. fighting in the Northern Caucasus and The entire resistance struggle can be As the partisans could chose time and place Crimea, and was especially cruel. It eradi- conditionally divided into three periods: for the engagements the Soviet side suffered cated some villages and their inhabitants perhaps more than 80 thousand casualties5 . in the Dzukija region of Lithuania dur- First period: The Soviet government brought two ing Christmas of 1944. The NKVD sol- Summer 1944 to spring 1946 NKVD (later MGB and KGB) divisions, diers lived almost as prisoners, and were four Border regiments, and recruited often short of food and clothes. Fre- During this time, the resistance groups about seven thousand local army helpers, quently, they fought without officers, but were established spontaneously. Officers so-called stribai, for use against the par- even together with officers the NKVD and NCOs of the former Lithuanian army tisans. When needed other regular army soldiers were allowed to rape, rob and kill mostly led these groups, but only few of- units including air force and artillery were non-combatant Lithuanians. During the ficers and NCOs had survived two occu- brought in to Lithuania. M.A. Suslov, the whole resistance period NKVD workers pations. The resistance fighters acted in main ideologist of communism at this handled captured resistance fighters and battalion or company level units, mostly time and a member of the Soviet Polit- civilian people in a very brutal way. Try- during daytime, and used regular Army buro, came to Lithuania assigned with the ing to intimidate others, the fighters and tactics. More than half of the estimated special task of putting down the Lithua- often also innocent civilian people were 30 thousand partisans who fell in battle, nian resistance-movement. It is an indica- brutally tortured. Killed Lithuanians were died during the first fighting period. The tion of the seriousness of the problem he disgraced, clothes were removed from struggle in this period was very bloody. faced, that he said There will be a Lithua- corpses, ears and noses were cut, and five- Partisans had units from battalion to com- nia, but without Lithuanians 6 . cornered stars were carved on their breasts. pany size, but they did not have higher- The Soviets employed up to about ranking officers to co-ordinate the effort, 100.000 soldiers against the Lithuanian Second period: and many had little experience in war- partisans. Spring 1946 to the end of 1949 fare. There is no statistic of casualties on The frontline units used against the either side and they will probably never partisans were the 2nd and 4th NKVD As the Soviets expanded their control, be known, but an informed guess on the divisions. The 4th General Vetrov divi- the partisans split into much smaller
117 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
groups of approximately from 5 to 15 boycott mobilization to the occupational of freedom, will not let bolshevism the shame partisans, and fundamentally changed their army, fought collaborators, impeded the of civilization spread out and dominate the tactics. They spent the daylight hours in collectivization, and resisted the coloni- Baltic States and even Eastern Europe We well-camouflaged bunkers and mostly car- zation of the country and the nationali- believed in promises, but we were deceived We ried out combat operations at night, fight- zation of private property, and thus de- believed that by fighting we would be able to ing in often very well planned ambushes. ferred the general demoralization of the exist for a few years with our armed forces and The independent groups were gradually population. The partisans published more the iron will of the Lithuanian nation But it subordinated to a district, and began to than 70 periodicals and non-periodical went the other way. Nations who fought for concern themselves with the eventual con- newspapers. Many of the published pam- their freedom were left hopelessly alone Thanks solidation of all partisan forces and sup- phlets tried to inform the population of gentlemen! Through your indecision and delay port the creation of a united leadership. the international situation and to main- bolshevism has made terrible wounds to the But only in February 1949 was this proc- tain the national Lithuanian identity. Lithuanian nation. Communism destroyed part ess completed. The widespread armed re- During this period partisans many times of the nation by deportations to Siberia and sistance partially became an organized succeeded in breaking the Soviet Iron another part was put into jails for a slow death. military structure. Most partisan units Curtain and send representatives to the Against the partisans the Soviet NKVD used based their activity on military regula- West to ask for help against the Soviet means of torture never before known in the world: tions, statutes, drafted by themselves, occupation. One example of a Partisans the soles of feet were burnt, the flesh underneath wore military uniforms or at least distinc- plea to supporters in the free world, which the fingernails was pricked, fingernails were pulled tive signs, carried arms in public, and is- clearly illustrates the despair and hope- off, arms and legs were broken, sex organs were sued decrees for the fighters as well as for lessness of the situation, read: damaged, the skin peeled off the body the civilian population. The partisans Lithuanian partisans have understood very Partisans message to Western politicians7. military action and propaganda hindered well that alone they could not resist bolshevism. A consolidation of all partisan forces the establishment of administrative insti- But not all of us agreed that we could go like was achieved only in February 1949 when tutions of occupation authorities in ru- animals to the slaughterhouse. We believed with- all the leaders of Freedom Fighters ral districts, and disturbed the organiza- out a doubt in the victory of truth and in the throughout Lithuania had a secret meet- tion of the formal Soviet elections to the conscience of the Western world. Courageously ing. The Freedom Fighters created a uni- bodies of the occupational authorities. The we stood in an uneven fight, having no doubt fied council by uniting into the LLKS partisans also assisted in the efforts to that the Free World, which shows off its ideals (Lithuanian Freedom Fighting Move-
118 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 ment), which would coordinate the po- killed peace-loving citizens. Soviet propa- stantly, prohibited literature was dissemi- litical and military activities of the un- ganda varied this concept of banditry, nated, cultural resistance took place, and derground movement. The leaders of the capitalists, landowners and high-ranking dissident movement for human and civil Freedom Fighters formulated and ap- officials of the Smetona (last Lithuanian rights grew until the Lithuanian people fi- proved the rules and regulations, some President) regime9 . However, such asser- nally succeeded in regaining their independ- partisan field manuals, and a criminal code tions were refuted simply by the fact that ence as a free democratic nation in 1991. to the fighters and populations. They ac- hardly a tenth of the freedom fighters cepted an advanced doctrine for tactics could be called representatives of the ex- 1 J.P. Kedys, 1994. Terorizuojama ir of resistance and worked to improve ties ploiting classes. The partisan movement naikinama Lietuva 1938-1991. [Lithuania un- with supporters in the West. The Free- was most widespread in Dzukija, one of der destruction and terrorisation 1938-1991]. dom Fighters meeting approved a Supreme the poorest regions of Lithuania 10 . Ryto spaustuvë, Klaipëda. p. 409. 2 See annex A and B. Arvydas Anuauskas, Council, and selected General Jonas Þemaitis Individual partisan groups and sole 1996. Lietuviø tautos sovietinis naikinimas as chairman. All members of this Council partisans continued the struggle for a few 1940-1958 metais. [Soviets destruction of the died in battle or were shot in jails. more years. The last active partisan Antanas Lithuanian Nation 1940-1958]. Mintis. Kraujelis perished in the struggle on 17 Vilnius. pp.446-447. (Original in Russian). 3 Third period: 1950 to 1953 March 1965. The partisan struggle went Editor Saulius Þukas, 1999. Lithuania. on record in Lithuanian history as a war Past, Culture, Present. Baltos Lankos, Lithua- nia. p.202. The resistance movement gradually for the right of national independence. 4 declined during this period. The activity It is uncertain whether this struggle was ibid. 5 J.P. Kedys, 1994. p. 408. of the KGB agents and KGB shock groups responsible for the fact that fewer Soviet 6 Arvydas Anuauskas, 1996. p. 408. was increasing, and the incidents of trea- citizens came to settle down in Lithuania 7 J.P. Kedys, 1994. p. 202. son were growing in number8 . KGB shock than in Latvia and Estonia, where the 8 See annex B. MVD works results from troops disguised as partisans killed many partisan movement was much weaker 11 . 15 July 1944 to 25 October 1953 and Parti- civilian people in an attempt to discredit Although the armed struggle was sup- san war in the Lithuania in Numbers July 1944- the Freedom Fighters. The Soviet authori- pressed, the resistance of the Lithuanian October 1953. Quoted from Arvydas ties refused to recognize the partisans as population against the occupants contin- Anuauskas, 1996. pp.446-447. 9 Ibid, p.203. freedom fighters and declared that they ued. It simply took other forms: under- 10 J.P.Kedys, 1994. p.408. were simply bandits who robbed and ground organizations were founded con- 11 J.P.Kedys, 1994. p. 203.
119 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000
Annex A THE LITHUANIAN NATION IN 19401941 AND 19441953 MGB (KGB) STATISTICAL INFORMATION
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Annex B PARTISAN WAR IN LITHUANIA IN FIGURES JULY 19441953 MGB (KGB) STATISTICAL INFORMATION
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Annex C MVD (NKGB) work results from 15 July 1944 to 25 October 1953 (Translated from Russian)
Eliminated 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 Total Underground Command Centers --- 7212211-17- - 1 Regional and District Staffs 51351516 21 8335310 Total number of Armed Nationalists (Guerilla) 44515 19752 5119 3304 2647 2418 1804 1213 643 365 3810 From this: Killed 27436 9377 2014 1554 1213 1519 603 579 485 138 2009 A9rrested 2707 7674 3105 1850 1433 999 480 554 167 131 1796 Legalized Armed Nationalists 2285 35627 1805 760 117 581716163860 4 Nationalist Organizations and Groups 1966 801 530 396 303 424 246 292 8355325 Total number of arrested 43162 10997 16076 6141 4948 4769 3640 3139 1113 965 5937 From this: Members of Nationalist Organizations and underground signalers 3216 4638 3067 1661 1808 1721 1307 974 353 200 1485 Armed Nationalist supporters 3329 3608 1598 2214 1411 1127 812 749 345 396 1225 Total number of Deported : People -9-- 4247 2808 3293 35948 31273 776 23035 2-20 -7- 10603 ffffddddddddd Families -4-- 1120 520 1302 13123 9963 168 5213 3-1 -0- 2923 From this: Kulak Families -7-- 4-3 -2- 680 8622 7388 187 4718 2-1 -1- 2173 Nationalist Families (answer from terror acts) -7-- 716 500 452 3700 1674 18954 9--9- 749 Number of Armed Nationalists terror acts 8454 3432 2235 1357 802 556 278 138 93651011 Killed in these acts 5982 3141 2673 2362 1867 1401 429 227 94121292 From this: Soviet Collaborates 2753 434 499 269 225 132 82571--2- 202 Fallen MVD soldiers 953 732 257 185 181 90544535159 6 Confiscated: Cannons 44 1------9- Anti-tank Guns 100 19--1------1- 3 1 Mortars -5-- 151------1------1- 3 2 Grenade launchers (Panzerfaust) -44------1------1- 1 0 Machine guns 3595 1122 520 381 260 117 66784214301 Automatic rifles 6506 2624 1416 739 522 512 239 207 179 7*6687 Rifles 46884 9959 3595 1069 1409 988 479 468 381 1*0 23617 Pistols 5216 1883 1567 1127 1900 1006 478 578 403 1*7 9045 Mines 4359 1240 1659 68622 3 14133622 * Hand grenades 35196 5384 2974 1250 866 741 371 220 179 4*15631 Various ammunitions 6520618 1042756 761618 460539 158616 291354 157316 171802 48936 13311 394306 Explosives (kg) -3-- 5504, 3437, 745, 721-47, --- -4- 83, 1149, 8 Typewriters and copymachines 22183 729457973720481757
Head of the Lithuanian SSR MVD 4-th Department Maj. P. Raslan, 25 October 1953. *Arithmetical mistake in the original.
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Editors notes
n the Second issue of Baltic Defence Review 1999 I published the article UPRISING OF DECEMBER 1, 1924 by Dr. Hannes Walter. Unfortunately a translation error occurred on page 131. The text published reads: The share of Estonians in the grouping of the Red Army by the end of the War of Independence had grown to 160.000 men in the Estonian front line. The correct text should have read: The grouping of the Red Army had grown in number to 160.000 and the share of Estonians was only marginal. With this correction I hope that both the author and the readers will accept my sincerest apologies for the misleading mistake.
Ole Kværnø, Editor
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Section VI Graduation of the first staff course at the Baltic Defence College 22 June 2000
Mr. Juri Luik, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Estonia gradu- ates Captain Meelis Kiili of the Estonian Army
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The graduating Estonian students.
H.E. Lennart Meri, President of the Republic of Estonia and Brigadier General Michael H. Clemmesen, Commandant of the Baltic Defence College.
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The graduating Latvian students
The graduating Lithuanian officers
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Students of the first staff course together with national representatives
127