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The Development of Regular Army Officers – an Essay Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 The development of regular army officers an essay By Michael H. Clemmesen, Brigadier General, MA (history) One must understand the mechanism and the power of the individual soldier,,, model is expensive in manpower cost (in then that of a company, a battalion, a brigade and so on, before one can ven- a Western industrialised state), relative ture to group divisions and move an army. I believe I owe most of my success to cheap in training cost due to the long the attention I always paid to the inferior part of tactics as a regimental officer... service contracts, and relatively cheap in There are few men in the Army who knew these details better than I did; it is equipment as a result of the limited size. the foundation of all military knowledge. The Duke of Wellington. The training-mobilisation army is relevant The standing force army is likely to be in continental states faced with a poten- Two army models attractive to states without any massive, tial (rather than an immediate) massive direct, overland threat to their territory. scale overland treat that makes it neces- It will often help and clarify an analy- In the pure version of that army, the sol- sary to have a large section of the state sis to establish the theoretical, pure mod- diers will have long service contracts. Be- population available for direct defence. els that can be used as references. In this cause of its potential high readiness, in- The potentially large trained manpower essay I shall use the two basic types of cluding mature unit cohesion, this army pool makes it possible to mobilise an army armies that influence the land forces of model is useful for external intervention that can defend the borders and territory the real world: the standing force army operations and in support of the police in depth. On the other hand the charac- and the training-mobilisation army. for internal security operations. The ter of the force makes it unsuited for other 7 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 than the direct defence mission. It is po- the conscripts in internal security opera- chose an up-or-out (to a second career) litically risky to use it for internal secu- tions). The large and dense populations path or employ a large number of the rity operations or for external interven- and low salaries of India and Pakistan have older officers as specialists or administra- tions. made it possible for the two countries to tors outside units. Real standing armies Few armies mirror the logic of these maintain very large standing armies of long are using a combination of the two paths. pure models. The example closest to the contract soldiers. In the training-mobilisation army this age- first is the present British Army. Two good rank composition problem is less urgent. examples fairly close to the pure training- Officer recruiting, education, The wartime responsibilities of many of- mobilisation army are the Cold War pe- and use ficers are different from their peacetime riod Finnish and Swedish armies. jobs. The expansion of the army on mo- Real states are faced with a unique com- Both types of armies need an officer bilisation makes it necessary to use offic- bination of threats, requirements, and corps in the peacetime units numerically ers at least one command level higher than possibilities. They may need forces for dominated by lieutenants and captains in their peacetime posts, making the age di- international security operations and for their twenties and early thirties, with a lemma less urgent. The mobilisation of countering a limited force strategic coup much smaller group of majors and lieu- field formation and territorial defence attack with relatively high readiness and tenant colonels in their late thirties or headquarters adds to the requirement for immediate unit cohesion even if there is forties, and with a very small number of experienced regular officers. The reserve also a risk of a massive overland invasion. senior officers. cadre in a training-mobilisation army will France has normally needed a combina- However, the two pure types of armies man many of the posts that must be filled tion of a standing force (for external and can or must use very different officer re- by the regular cadre in a standing army internal operations) and a mobilisation cruiting, screening, formal education, and with its immediate readiness requirement. force to counter its continental enemies. career systems. Where it is necessary in a standing army Israel has been exposed to an immediate In the standing force army where the of- to base regular officer recruiting on the threat that made it necessary to maintain ficers peacetime and wartime function is premise that a high percent of those re- a standing force based on long conscrip- the same, there are only two ways of keep- cruited will have a second career after their tion service soldiers (the unit cohesion ing an acceptable age-rank composition service in the army; the training-mobili- thus created has made it possible to use in the officer corps. Either the army must sation army can in principle offer a one 8 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 career life. This difference can influence demic education. Without such an offer scripts. If there are no exemptions for the how the regular officers are recruited and it may be difficult to recruit the right privileged, e.g. university students, all the educated. people in the right quantity. The educa- male talent of the nation of proper physical The standing force army cannot count tion can be given during the basic of- and mental condition will have contact on finding a substantial number of of- ficer training or linked to it. In both cases with the defence forces. If the training is ficer- candidates in the ranks of the long the result will be that officers recruited focused and meaningful and the officers service contract soldiers and NCOs. It is without a university background will have in the training units offer good role simply not possible to attract much lead- a relatively long basic education period. models, a significant number of qualified ership potential for service in the ranks. Another option, however, is to have an young men (and women, if they serve) Thus the army has to find its officer can- employment contract with a later study will show interest in a career as an officer. didates outside the army, in direct com- leave with full pay (to be used studying A significant number of those with obvi- petition with other careers. If army of- in a civilian university) as an integrated ous leadership potential and an appro- ficer service is well regarded in society, it element. priate school background (college/gym- is possible to recruit people with college/ The officers of the standing army nor- nasium) will be selected for junior NCO university backgrounds. That will save the mally arrive in their units with very little or reserve officer training. During the army money and help ensure that the can- practical experience of soldiering or lead- post course period as junior leaders they didates have prepared their second career ership. This problem is best handled by will demonstrate their qualities, before before entering. Then the army (like the linking the young officer to a mature they can apply and may be selected for British Army) can concentrate on giving NCO, who will tutor the young basically regular officer education. Even if the ca- a short, focused military education. The drilled academic in his profession. As the dets have full military and basic leader- U.S. Army can get a large part of its offic- up-or-out dilemma continues, the ad- ship training before entering training, ers from the very effective officer train- vanced education of officers is often education in the officer training academy ing programmes in the universities. If, linked to options for continued academic is likely to be relatively long (2½-4 years). however, the army cannot get sufficient education. There are two reasons for that. Firstly the high quality officer candidates with a back- The situation in the training-mobilisation cadets are not only to be prepared for ground that prepares them for a second army is different. The main source of of- their first, peacetime position of platoon career, it has to offer that civilian aca- ficer recruiting is the annual class of con- leader or company Second in Command, 9 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 but must also be prepared for their next systems. There can be many reasons for of army. They may therefore accept with- command and junior staff officer levels. this. Firstly it can be a result of the fact out argument education and career mod- Secondly, they receive a comprehensive that the armies do not mirror the pure els that conflict with the real requirements general education in languages, manage- models. Many Cold War NATO mainly or they may seek civilian academic feath- ment, political science, history, etc. to conscript armies (e.g. the Danish) were ers that might enhance the self respect of prepare them well for their role as mili- dominated by the standing, combat ready an officer corps unsure of its own value tary leaders of the citizens of their state. element, giving some justification for fo- and profession. The difference between the academic train- cusing the basic officer education on the ing here and that given to cadets for a immediate platoon leader requirements. The army officer profession standing army is that here it is normally Secondly a training-mobilisation army the creation of the basis for a lifetime may also experience difficulties with re- A significant obstacle to the develop- career, not for a second career.
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