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The Latvian MAP by His Excellency the Minister of Defence of Latvia, Mr

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Baltic Defence Review 2/1999 The Latvian MAP By His Excellency the Minister of Defence of Latvia, Mr. Girts Valdis Kristovskis. ation of their abilities to function within didate countries that broadly outlined The basic principle underlying the structure of the North Atlantic Alli- NATO requirements to be accomplished Latvias development of its NATO ance. We welcome the challenge! in order to qualify for consideration as a Membership Action Plan Latvia presented its Membership Ac- member nation. As a candidate country, tion Plan (MAP) to the NATO Assistant Latvia had a chance to instil its individual During the April 99 Washington General Secretary P.K. Kleibern in Sep- national character in developing a realis- NATO Summit, Latvia was named as one tember 1999. We are confident that the tic MAP and spelling out the specific re- of the NATO candidate nations. As a re- plan is thorough, realistic, achievable, and quirements that will clearly and confi- sult of this Summit, each candidate coun- consequently, could serve as a basis in dently guide it toward membership in try received a unique opportunity-develop NATOs political decision making to in- NATO. a Membership Action Plan for joining vite Latvia to join the Alliance. Thus, the The basic groundwork had already NATO. This plan requires a clear national MAP focuses Latvias short term and long been done the previous year with Latvias security strategy, as realistic control mecha- term defence development objectives to- development of a NATO Integration Plan. nism, as well as a political will for its im- ward interoperability with NATO. The MAP is merely a continuation of that plementation. This is a national plan and planning process that targets the solidifi- it reflects the nations strengths and its Latvias Approach towards cation of actions and focuses on the plans realities. The mere planning and execution Developing the MAP execution. The MAP has been presented of this plan is a major event that provides to and approved by the Cabinet, and the a new stimulus and a clear goal to every The Alliance during its Washington Latvian Parliament, thus ensuring its high- candidate nation as well as an effective evalu- Summit, presented documents to the can- est government support. 7 Baltic Defence Review 2/1999 Latvias MAP takes into account NATO Latvias MAP consists of two basic parts. Latvias MAP characterises its demo- requirements as well as the US. 1998 De- The basic plan reflects Latvias political, eco- cratic principles, the rule of law and hu- partment of Defence prepared Latvian nomic and military goals and priorities. man rights, a market economy with a pro- Defence Assessment report. The plan is The second part consists of Annexes that grammed, long term economic growth, focused, and it is achievable! It is also reflect the activities to be performed, re- an even regional distribution of re- tightly controlled and closely tied to the sources, target dates and responsible depart- sources, and a democratic control of its year 2000 budget and to the 4-year plan. ments. The Plan is administered and con- Armed Forces. The plan further reflects The Plan also reflects the governments trolled through an established computer Latvias co-operation with countries in the declaration, that it plans to systematically software program. In its makeup, the plan Baltic region and stresses its desire for raise Latvias Defence Budget to 2% of was designed to be simplistic and informa- peaceful co-existence with its neighbours. the Gross National Product (GNP) by the tive. From the public point of view, it The successful implementation of the year 2003. The Latvian Parliament is sched- emphasises and assures easy understanding Plan depends on a sound public relations uled to vote on this proposal in January of the plans requirements and describes the program, both at home and abroad. In 2000. The table below reflects the budget necessary actions to complete the plan. order to gain the necessary support for projection through the year 2004. NATO membership and to raise the pub- Political and Economic Issues lic image of the Armed Forces, the plan Defence budget Year % from GDP contains an information strategy for edu- Ls (M) Since its regained freedom in 1991, cating and informing the entire popula- 17998 06.6 24.7 Latvias main national security and for- tion, but concentrating on the younger 15999 00.8 33.2 eign policy goal has been to be part of generations. Recent public opinion polls NATO and the European Community. indicate a positive change in the support 26000 10.0 44.0 This goal was re-emphasised by the Parlia- of the Armed Forces, as shown in the 20001 18.5 66.5 ment in 1995 and was made a part of chart below: 25002 13.7 84.3 Latvias National Security concept in 1997. 1997 1998 1999 Without being a part of the Euroatlantic 20003 26.0 104.7 security umbrella, Latvia cannot assure long- N1BS -62 +31 +2 20004 23.0 114.0 term stability and security for its people. Z3/S +52. +72 +3 8 Baltic Defence Review 2/1999 implementation, is a considerable invest- plans, but differ in the sense that they are Military Issues ment for Latvia to gain NATO member- more specific, are resource based, and deal ship. The preliminary planning phase at with specific issues in areas such as: arma- From Latvias military point of view, the Ministry of Defence was completed ment, supply, mobilisation resources, com- there are two basic principles that it must in March 99, and the plans were updated munications, transportation, etc. To gain achieve in order to be eligible for NATO in the fall of 99. Subsequent MOD plan- a better understanding of the planning membership. First - enhance the military ning will be accomplished in the follow- requirements, it is worth while to exam- ability to protect the nations sovereignty, ing sequence: ine the following Latvian National Armed and second - be able to fully integrate its • Phase I Complete long term (12 Forces (LNAF) four-year plan defence military operations with NATO. These two yr.) planning process by the end of 1999. concepts/requirements: principles are closely related and they pro- • Phase II Complete long term budg- • Develop a Total Defence Force con- vide the necessary impetus for Latvia to eting cycle by the end of 2000. cept develop its Armed Forces according to • Phase III- Complete and implement • Conform to NATO command, con- NATO standards. defence plan control system trol and communications (C3) require- The MAP also outlines the mission of Latvias defence planning system is ments Latvias Armed Forces: based on a long-term (12 yr.) plan, a mid- • Form and equip three Mobile Re- 1. Protect the nations sovereignty range (4yr.) plan, and the short term plan serve battalions 2. Be able to function within the (1yr). The long-term plans are general in • Develop a NATO compatible logis- NATO structure nature and set out long term military goals, tics system 3. Be able to contribute to the secu- capabilities and requirements that are • Develop a quick-reaction force by rity system of the Alliance at the time of based on the Total National Defence con- year 2003 acceptance. cept. One such long-term goal is to be • Develop two training centres and Of particular importance is a respon- able to mobilise 50,000 men for the raise the professional level of its soldiers. sive planning and administrative control Armed Forces of which 90% are land • The short-term plans are driven by mechanism. The effort of planning and forces. the annual budget, are very specific, pre- programming a budget, and monitoring The Mid-term plans are based on the cise, deal with programs to be completed and controlling the progress of the plans broad guidelines found in the long term in that year, and are closely controlled. 9 Baltic Defence Review 2/1999 dier. It was also able to repair a number on the efficient usage of allocated re- Resources of existing facilities, and begin develop- sources. As a result, the main emphases is ment of armament and individual soldier being placed on achieving the maximum As mentioned before, the NATO Mem- equipment acquisition programs. In com- results based on currently existing plans. bership Action Plan has to be realistic and parison to the 1999 budget, the planned Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence is within our capabilities. Consequently, the year 2000 budget foresees a 32.53% in- seriously working on improving its au- resources assigned to NATO integration crease. dit capabilities, financial control struc- have been divided into the following cat- Parallel to the personnel expenses, Ls tures, as well as increasing the required egories (investments, logistics and facili- 9.7M in 2000 investments form that part staffing in these critical areas. Latvia is ties development) and also cover finan- of the defence budget that ensures future also closely co-operating with experts from cial controls and multilateral relations. development of the defence system. The the United States, Great Britain and Den- It should be noted that in 1999 Latvia year 2000 investments budget will be spent mark to establish a Planning, Program- was able to raise its Defence Budget suffi- in the following areas (chart below). ming and Budgeting System that would ciently enough to be able to increase the Along with the task of ensuring that permit it to establish the required mecha- salaries of the Armed Forces and improve the Defence Budget will continue to grow, nisms, directives and train the personnel their quality of life for the average sol- a great deal of attention is also focused necessary to reach established goals.
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