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Zaleski, K., Sliwa, Z., & Veebel, V. (2020). Baltic visions and dilemmas of Journal territorial defence after 16 years in NATO. Journal of International Studies, 13(4), of International 184-196. doi:10.14254/2071-8330.2020/13-4/13 Studies © Foundation Baltic visions and dilemmas of territorial of International Studies, 2020 defence after 16 years in NATO © CSR, 2020 Papers Scientific Krzystof Zaleski WSB University, Dabrowa Gornica, Poland [email protected] Zdzislaw Śliwa Baltic Defence College, Tartu, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia [email protected] Viljar Veebel Baltic Defence College, Tartu, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia [email protected] ORCID 0000-0002-9122-0134 Abstract. The concepts of development of territorial defence forces and capabilities Received: are different within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and are June, 2020 1st Revision: closely linked with specific characteristics of respective nations. Moreover, it is October, 2020 linked with historic circumstances, culture, composition of society and other Accepted: specific domains. Changes in the internal and international security environment December, 2020 are further affecting decisions about selecting specific defence and deterrence models. The security on the Eastern Flank of the NATO has progressed visibly DOI: after 2014 events in Ukraine, causing investments into Estonian, Latvian and 10.14254/2071- Lithuanian territorial defence as a recognition of their value to support their 8330.2020/13-4/13 armed forces. The aim of the current research is to analyse the ongoing evolution of territorial defence forces of three Baltic countries in broader regional perspective in light of changed threat perception and risk assessments. Keywords: Baltic States, deterrence, territorial defence, North Atlantic Treaty Organization. JEL Classification: F1, F5, P4 184 Krzystof Zaleski, Zdzislaw Śliwa, Baltic visions and dilemmas of territorial defence Viljar Veebel after 16 years in NATO 1. INTRODUCTION In recent decades, military reforms and development in the Baltic States have followed the NATO preferences and assessment system, drawing on the official strategic-level documents of NATO (Veebel and Ploom, 2019). This has been the way to determine what is effective and what contributes best to progress and outcome in terms of sufficient defence and credible deterrence. In practical terms, reforms in the Baltic militaries have mostly been focused on the ability to fit into the solidarity-based deterrence model, to have niche capabilities, to be able to receive allied forces and to assure the local population that the best choices have been made (Veebel, 2018). While the existing conventional reserves of the NATO member states are sizeable, safe and quick deployment is a critical variable in the event of a conflict scenario in the Baltic States. This might be problematic considering the very limited safe transportation options available in the region. The Baltic States, neighbouring the North-West military district of Russia, are one of the few areas where, compared to NATO’s similar needs and options, Russian options in resupplying, logistical support and regrouping of military forces are very promising, especially concerning safety and alternative logistical options. The Russian advantage could actually be even growing, should Russia believe that there exists a winning regional strategy for a conflict with NATO, and focuses on rapid improvement of its anti-access/area denial capabilities near the Baltic borders (Veebel 2019; Mykhailyshyn, 2017). The aim of the current study is to present the evolution of three Baltic countries’ territorial defence forces as the nations on the Eastern Flank of NATO, in the context of regional cooperation and evolving security environment. The central focus of the research is to recognize which are the different solutions and how they support the concepts of national defence of the respective nations. The starting assessment is that such concepts are differing among the nations in NATO, but tasks are overlapping in many fields; what is visibly different regarding subordination and size. In general, territorial units are an important factor to support and complement regular armed forces in specific areas. They create close links with the society by involving various groups of the society, thus providing a source or reserve manpower with at least basic military training. The following study is composed of three major parts. The first part of the current article focuses on theoretical options and dilemmas for Baltic States in terms of territorial defence and deterrence. In the second part of the study the authors provide an overview of territorial defence forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the context of their background, organization and specific characteristics, including their tasks ranging from peace, crisis to wartime. This is leading to the analytical part of the study which is presenting findings and conclusions and allowing drawing deductions in general terms related to the presented concepts of territorial defence. 2. THEORETICAL OPTIONS FOR BALTIC STATES WHEN CHOOSING TERRITORIAL DEFENCE MODEL The concepts of creating territorial defence type forces (TDF) are neither new nor exclusively linked with the current century, as throughout history they have had very important role in defence of territory of many nations involving the broad range of societal groups. They were closely linked with overall concepts of national defence or just ad-hoc voluntary groups related to resilience and resistance against aggression and later on to fight occupation forces. Such the units, formal or informal in nature, were operating often in a region from which their members were coming from; therefore they were fighting for local societies, own households and families. It was supporting motivation and dedication to act decisively. Such examples, when population was actively involved in guerrilla warfare were presented in history e.g. by resistance of Spanish and Russian people against Napoleon troops invasion or later Russian resistance against fascists 185 Journal of International Studies Vol.13, No.4, 2020 (German) occupation. In China and Vietnam the forces founded based on population decisively supported the victory against conventional, better-trained, and equipped operational units from Japan and U.S. respectively. In Poland, the German occupation was faced by continuous resistance thorough all the war period and it was continued against communists’ government as of lack of acceptance for new ideology and subordination to Soviet Russia. However, the territorial defence forces are not only prepared for guerrilla warfare, as those training is closely linked with preparing them to support operation of regular armed forces as light type units. Conceptually, the term ‘territorial defence’ in every nation means something different and it “evokes different memories and it has multifaceted political, organizational and strategic connotations” (Roberts, 1976, 34). Finland has extensive experiences in this aspect as the national defence planning that initially the enemy will face the resistance of local force to hinder attack by attacking flanks and lines of communication (Tillotson, 1993, 276). Such the partisans’ tactics could be effectively utilized when terrain and local conditions will support it. The delay operations and wearing down enemy troops is allowing denying seizing key terrain and infrastructure and in the long-term, it is creating supportive conditions for counterattack by friendly armed forces. In Ukraine, so-called volunteer battalions provided initial response to counter separatist units, at the same time they exposed the weakness of armed forces being not ready to deliver required united reaction to the aggression. They played significant role during the first phase of the war in 2014 and later they were transferred into national territory defence battalions or paramilitary organizations, and many were included into land forces. Theoretically, TDF could be divided into three categories (Makar and Novoskoltseva, 2016; Rieker 2002, 21-38) The first one is based on armed forces model ready to execute combat missions with them or to be send abroad (U.S., Germany, and United Kingdom). The second group is presented by small nations with the main task to protect and defend critical objects facilitating mobilization of regular armed forces, their operational deployment and manoeuvre (Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium). Finally, the third category belongs to neutral nations with the broad range of tasks, including guerrilla warfare in the case of occupation (Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland).The tasks and organization of units within the categories mentioned above are differing during peace, crisis and war and quite often, those are overlapping. The point is that there are many tasks related to support for local communities e.g. as of facing consequences of natural disasters. Such the need caused allocation of proper resources, which were not adequate to requirements in the past and not properly allocated as of lack of clear priorities. It was recognition of the need to involve population much stronger into defence matters and lack of personal reserves as of cancelling conscription. In the context of role of TDF in response to non-military or ‘hybrid’ threats, the topic is very often mentioned after 2014. According to Ryszard Jakubczak it is
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