Countering Russia and Chinese Cyber-Aggression
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Countering Russia and Chinese Cyber-Aggression Prospects for Transatlantic cooperation Franklin Holcomb Countering Russia and Chinese Cyber-Aggression CONTENTS ABOUT THE AUTHORS Executive Summary ......................................... 1 Franklin Holcomb is a Title VIII Fellow in the Introduction ....................................................... 1 Transatlantic Leadership program at CEPA with a Background ......................................................... 2 focus on Russian and Eastern European security Section 1: The Cyber Bear and Dragon ....... 3 and political analysis. Section 2: European Innovation and Before joining CEPA, Franklin worked as an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War Strengths in Cyber Defense ........................... 5 where he published multiple reports on Eastern Section 3: The United States and Europe ... 9 European security, particularly focused on the Endnotes .............................................................. 11 Russian invasion of Ukraine. He also worked as an academic assistant at the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia as part of his master’s degree studies. ABOUT CEPA Franklin graduated from Texas A&M University with a double major in Russian Language and The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) International Studies: Politics and Diplomacy. He works to reinvent Atlanticism for a more secure is finishing his master’s degree in Democracy future. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., and and Governance at the University of Tartu where led by seasoned transatlanticists and emerging he studied governance policy, including Estonia’s leaders from both sides of the Atlantic, CEPA e-Governance systems. His dissertation is brings an innovative approach to the foreign focused on the analysis of the militias of Estonia, policy arena. Our cutting-edge analysis and Latvia, and Lithuania. He has a deep interest in timely debates galvanize communities of cybersecurity, particularly as it relates to political influence while investing in the next generation and military activity in Europe. Franklin has of leaders to understand and address present studied and lived in Russia and speaks advanced and future challenges to transatlantic values and Russian as well as some Ukrainian. principles. CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. Cover: Chinese and Russian national flags flutter on a lamppost on the Tian’anmen Square in Beijing, China, 24 June 2016. China is working for the establishment of an investment fund worth 100 billion yuan (15.3 billion U.S. dollars) to finance regional cooperation projects between China and Russia, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang said on Thursday (7 September 2017). China is ready to increase the scale of the investment fund and suggest the Silk Road Fund finance China-Russia joint programs, Wang said in a speech at a commercial conversation on the sidelines of the Third Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, a major Pacific port city in Russia. He said the Chinese government encourages enterprises to invest in Russia’s Far East and expand cooperation in manufacturing, resources exploitation, infrastructure, agriculture and tourism. Credit: REUTERS . ii Countering Russia and Chinese Cyber-Aggression societies are becoming ever more politically Executive Summary and economically interconnected through The United States and its European digitalization. The internet of things (IoT) is partners face serious and determined cyber dramatically increasing the connectivity of opponents and must expand cyber defense the average citizen, with the number of IoT cooperation with an emphasis on learning devices worldwide expected to hit 50 bn by from each other’s strengths. 2022.1 States too are becoming increasingly digitalized as they increasingly rely on • Russia has shown itself to be a e-services and data storage. As more people reckless cyber actor, with its NotPetya and services go online, hostile actors have cyberattacks against Ukraine in 2017 that exponentially more entry points for attacks, devastated private and public systems information to steal or distort, and systems worldwide. to breach and paralyze. • Cyber vulnerabilities to European Cyber threats to society cannot be contained countries are also vulnerabilities to the to ensure they do not threaten the United States. government, nor can a state isolate itself • Hostile cyber actors such as Russia from threats to its allies and partners. A and China have not been deterred by hostile breach of a café outside a parliament Western policy responses and the West in Europe that exploits a vulnerability must focus on becoming more resilient in an IoT device that the cashier did not to cyberattacks. update could be used in seconds to infect key systems, steal vital data from the target • State-sponsored cyber operations, country and enable more dangerous attacks both hacking and disinformation, are on American targets. Meanwhile, an attack increasingly mutually reinforcing. on a café on Capitol Hill aimed at gaining access to a congressional staffer’s phone • Eastern European states have taken poses the same risks to European states. As innovative policy steps to harden their the internet erodes geographic restrictions defenses against constant Russian cyber on communication and trade and helps bring aggression. the Euro-Atlantic community closer together • The U.S. government and U.S. civil it also increases American and European society should expand their outreach vulnerabilities to interlinked cyberattacks, to eastern European governments and particularly coordinated operations from societies to help support and learn from hostile governments. Because we are only our partners and thereby improve our as strong as our weakest link, as the maxim cyber defenses. goes, cybersecurity cannot be thought of in purely national terms. If a disinformation campaign succeeds in undermining political Introduction stability in Europe, it is only a matter of time until a similar one is loosed on the The United States and its allies face United States. Increasing active cooperation increasingly capable and aggressive cyber between America and European countries, opponents and must work together and particularly in joint research, cyber- learn from one another to counter them. exercises and training, as well as efforts to Hostile countries regularly mount major develop common understanding of hostile cyber operations against American and cyber actors’ intentions, are already crucial European states aiming to disrupt their to securing our shared political, economic economies, conduct espionage, undermine and military interests from hostile cyber military readiness and manipulate activity and will only become more so in public opinion through the spread of coming years. disinformation. At the same time, Western 1 Countering Russia and Chinese Cyber-Aggression A poster showing six wanted Russian military intelligence officers is displayed as U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania Scott Brady, accompanied by Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division John Demers, speaks at a news conference at the Department of Justice, in Washington, U.S., October 19, 2020. Credit: Andrew Harnik/Pool via REUTERS. or to extract useful intelligence, but Background they can just as easily be used to extract Governments have used cyber tools to many information and release it as part of a wider ends, including conducting information disinformation operation targeting the U.S. operations to influence elections or political and/or European publics. Russian cyber decisions, snooping to extract information, actors have conducted cyber “information disrupting economies and supporting operations commensurate with broader ongoing combat operations. The lines strategic military doctrine” by breaching a notionally dividing these operations were target organization and stealing “internet always weak and have eroded to the point data that is then leaked to further political that they are often differences without narratives aligned with Russian interests,” distinction. the cybersecurity firm FireEye concluded in 2017.2 Hostile actors now conduct multifaceted operations that do not fit easily within Cyber and information operations existing models of thinking about security. are increasingly linked and mutually These attacks’ long-term objectives, such reinforcing, complicating effective and as undermining American influence or coordinated response by traditional European unity, often overlap and reinforce government agencies. “Cybersecurity isn’t one another. Cyber operations targeting purely IT. Active operations are targeting politicians in the United States can be used people’s minds in cyberspace,”3 Joanna to gain access to governmental systems Świątkowska, the former program director 2 Countering Russia and Chinese Cyber-Aggression of the European Cybersecurity Forum, Rolands Heniņš, Latvia’s defense counselor observed. When considering how to help in Washington.8 Europe and America share their countries withstand cyberattacks, cyber adversaries, prominently including policymakers should realize that cyber Russia and China, who aim to exploit threats are a wide range of potential threats technical weaknesses and social strife. and operations against an entire society, with distinct yet often overlapping objectives.