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Event Type: Struck by Lightning

Date: August 19, 2020

Location: Kidney Lake Fire, Montana

Lightning Strike Hits 10-20 Feet Away from Two Helitack Members

[Radio chatter quotations, dates, and times in this RLS are from the Dispatch Center’s incident card. Other quotes were obtained through After Action Review talks and notes.]

Overview On August 18 a smoke report is called on top of the ridge over Kidney Lake, Montana by a civilian at 0818. The had contacted the Duty Officer (DO) about this same smoke the night before, but could not see anything at this time in the morning.

At 0837 the Lookout does see the smoke and a flare-up and reports it in the same area. The DO sends Technician personnel toward a nearby trailhead and requests a Type 3 . The helicopter launches with the pilot, Helicopter Manager (HMGB), and two additional Helitack personnel inside. The two Helitack crewmembers—ICT5 and ICT5 Trainee—were put on the ground The helicopter flies over the fire and gives a size- at this helispot located west of their 0.1 acre Kidney Lake Fire. up at 0855. Due to the hike-in for ground personnel and a potential helispot to the west of the fire, the DO says if the helicopter can land to put the two Helitack personnel on the ground to access the fire. These two personnel are dropped off at 0904: one as the ICT5/EMT and the other as the ICT5 Trainee. These two hike to the fire, arriving at 1015. During this time, a Type 2 Helicopter is in support of the fire.

Fire Size-Up At 1020 the size-up is as follows [summarized]: “Fire name is Kidney Lake, South of Kidney Lakes, T5N R22W Sec 40 NE of SE, on U.S. Forest Service land. ***** Mountain [Lookout] is the reporting party with the cause lightning. ***** ICT - ***** IC. Fire behavior is smoldering creeping with no structures threatened. 0.1 acre, winds upslope 1-3 from the North. Fire is in timber, snags, and regen on a north aspect, upper 1/3 of the ridge. No additional resources needed with the best access being our helispot. There is a low risk summary rating and keeping the fire at Type 5.”

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Throughout the operational shift of August 18, the two Helitack members: Cut down snags that are holding heat, obtain the afternoon/evening weather from Dispatch, contain the fire at 1700, cold trail, and are off the fire heading to camp at 2027. They are aware of the possible thunderstorms predicted for the night and next day.

The next morning, the ICT5 Trainee radios to Dispatch at 0605 that: “They are up and will get on the [fire] line soon.” The Lookout can see thunderstorms approaching and makes positive contact with the IC regarding potential imminent weather. The fire is controlled at 0904.

Lightning Strike The Kidney Lake Fire was contained at 1700 the first day and controlled “Both firefighters got struck through the at 0904 the following day. ground. Both firefighters are OK. Moving downhill and taking cover.”

This communication (above) by the ICT5 Trainee is broadcast over the Forest repeater at 0943. At first, there is confusion over if this is a direct hit or a near miss. The DO asks for clarification from Dispatch. Dispatch radios the ICT5 Trainee for clarification and receives this reply at 0946:

“Both firefighters felt lightning in their feet and were knocked to the ground. Will get off the fire. Incident happened at HS [helispot]. Can walk down drainage to find a new HS.”

This was not a direct lightning strike to either personnel. The strike happened 10-20 feet away from them. One of the firefighters was standing/walking toward a natural crevice in which the other was already positioned (see photo on next page).

Further Dispatch transcripts indicate the ICT5 and ICT5 Trainee’s and others’ plan-to-action. At 0953:

“Have cell reception. Both of us were freaked out by what happened. Both are alright. We are going to be walking to ***** TH (trailhead). Do not want Heli to fly with gnarly weather. Can walk past the incident and call it out. We are going to call DO direct. 2-3 inches of rain.”

Talking with the DO by cell phone, both of these Helitack personnel were not injured. At this time, they are still receiving lightning and 20-30 mph wind, needed to grab their gear, and reassess their situation. The DO and aviation managers are trying to see if there is a window to get the Type 3 Helicopter back up to them.

Cellular and Radio Communication During this time, the DO “got a lot of good information” from the phone call. Radio communications are unable to foster an intimate conversation and pick up on everything, especially due to the amount of radio traffic from new fires and the difficulty to convey precisely what happened over the radio. It was therefore best to make a call directly.

The DO’s job is to get info rapidly and make decisions and to obtain critical information to make the best decision. With this information they will properly disseminate and relay up the -of-command as soon as possible. However, Dispatch and others do not hear all the conversations taking place—making it “difficult, a lot is happening in the background.”

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Helitack Crewmembers Felt Safer Walking Out—Than Waiting for Helicopter The two Helitack personnel left their up at the fire while they hid from the storm and are going back to retrieve it. At this time, the ICT5 Trainee positively contacts the Lookout to watch for any more storm cells moving their way. At 1022, it’s stated per the DO that the Helitack personnel will walk out. They will be calling the Kidney Lake Fire “out” on the way. At 1101, the ICT5 Trainee tells Dispatch: “Quick grid and with all the rain we got, calling the fire out; packing out.”

The Helitack personnel felt safer walking out rather than waiting for a helicopter as it seemed a better option with less risk. The weather was their main concern. 1104 communication: “We’ll be following the spine ridge to the *****trailhead. Will contact DO or BRC (Bitterroot Dispatch Center) when getting close.”

During this time, the Forest Safety Officer has been informed of the situation and is en route to the trailhead. He walks up the trail a ways and makes contact with the Helitack personnel. Once they return to the trailhead, he drives the personnel to the hospital to be examined.

Position of Helitack Personnel and Their Story of What Happened

What is learned about this lightning incident once the two Helitack members come off the fire

Both Helitack members were close to the helispot when the lightning strike occurred. The area was fairly rocky and had some cliff rock bands. They had found a bigger rock with a crevice for positioning their bodies inside it. One Helitack member was bracing against rocks while sitting in this crevice, as the other was walking into the crevice.

When the strike occurred, both Photo shows the Helitack crewmembers’ locations when the lightning strike hit. personnel state that it happened on the same rock approximately 10 to 20 feet away from them.

The individual who was walking could feel it through their boots and legs while the one in the crevice felt it through their entire body. The member walking was knocked to the ground while the other was briefly dazed, then both retreated farther down the rock scree drainage. Radios were taken while retreating. However, one was malfunctioning after the strike.

Helitack Medical Evaluation Both Helitack personnel were examined at the local hospital in the Bitterroot Valley. The Forest Safety Officer was present in an acting role as their Hospital Liaison. Both personnel were deemed healthy, but their creatine phosphokinase (CPK) levels were higher than normal.

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One of the doctors informed that CPK levels are normally elevated after electrical currents/shock to the body occurs. These levels also are elevated in Rhabdomyolysis.

Therefore, the Helitack personnel were monitored until those CPK levels decreased. They were then released and asked to come back for a follow-up if they do not feel fine in a few days.

Additional Links to CPK

• https://emedicine.medscape.com/article/770642-workup

• https://www.mountsinai.org/health-library/tests/creatine-phosphokinase-test

Related Topics to Explore

 If all personnel are involved, is there a time for someone not there to take command and make decisions? How ill/hurt do the personnel need to be to take command away?

 Communication:

. At the beginning, was this a direct hit, near miss, or something else?

. Is this urgent or an emergency? What is the difference?

. Should you prepare an 8-line for yourself and partner if you are both injured?

. Can you give an honest diagnosis?

. Cell phone calls vs radio traffic with Dispatch.

. How quickly is all information being shared?

 What are lightning protocols? Have they been discussed in medical scenarios, 6 Minutes for Safety, or shared conversations? (Hint: Check out page 21 of your 2018 IRPG.)

 Maintaining communication with personnel as they hike out to make sure everything is still fine.

 Medical Response:

. Should the Type 3 Helicopter tried to come back? What if the storm made it more unsafe?

. Should there have been calls to a short-haul helicopter or private medical rescue helicopter on availability? Possibly start the spin-up process for them?

. Should other Forest personnel start to head toward the Helitack personnel? Especially ones medically trained. What if one went down (carrying them out)? Think of the possibility of more personnel on hill with storms cells.

. What are additional harms of hiking out (nearly two miles)? What are additional harms of staying on the hill waiting for a helicopter?

. Should an ambulance have been waiting at the trailhead as the Helitack members and Forest Safety Officer came out? Could an ambulance have made it up to the trailhead? Positives about initial checks by medical professionals and possibly ride to hospital under supervision.

 In the future, when looking at storm cells and fires, when would we pull people off the mountain? Is there a way to avoid this situation while fighting fire aggressively having provided for safety first?

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 Thoughts on staffing fires with 3+ people?

. Positives with 3+ people: More “horsepower” on the fire = quicker containment timeframes, more personnel available for medical response. (For an actual example of this, see Saddleback Fatality Fire bullet below.)

. Negatives: More personnel exposed to the hazards (snags, flights, lightning, etc.); more logistical requirements: flights, sling loads, etc. With more folks per fire, fewer fires may be staffed, etc.

. With regard to medical emergencies in particular, if one person goes down in a 2-person module with a medical, the following responsibilities all fall onto a single individual: the radio traffic, cell phone calls, IC of medical incident, IC of fire, writing down patient info, and performing emergency First-Aid/CPR.

 For one example where 3 folks on a fire was a critical factor, review the Saddleback Fatality Fire: https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/saddleback-fire-fatality-2013.

Additional Links to Other Lightning Incidents:

Ozena Lightning Strike (2011, ) https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/ozena-lightning-stri

Lightning Strike Impacts Firefighters (2017, Montana) https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/lightning-strike-impacts-firefighte

This RLS was submitted by:

Brian Gorwitz, Assistant Operator Darby/Sula Ranger District Bitterroot National Forest

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