Air Operations on the Fireline

Issue 21 • 2007 A Lessons Learned Newsletter Published Quarterly Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center Air Operations on the Fireline Lessons Learned Ten experienced interagency aviation personnel were recently interviewed regarding their most notable successes, difficult challenges, effective practices and pressing safety issues in wildland fire air operations. Special thanks are extended to these interagency community members for sharing their important lessons and practices with the wildland fire community. Notable Succ LCES from the Air Effective air tactical group supervisors (ATGS) employ the Lookouts/Communications/Escape Routes/Safety Zones (LCES) concept, in the same manner as ground firefighters; they just do so from an aerial platform. The ATGS can use LCES as a framework for communicating important safety information to ground per- In This Iue sonnel. Because the fire environment is constantly changing, an experienced Notable Successes ...........................1 ATGS will start out the operational period by contacting Division Supervisors, confirming their priorities, asking how they can help, and sharing feedback Difficult Challenges .......................... 3 regarding LCES and other pertinent tactical or logistical information. Aviation Effective Practices ............ 5 Building an Effective Air Operations Organization Pressing Safety Issues .................... 6 No one individual can claim a successful air operation, as it always takes a team of people who are dedicated to safety, communicate well, and help each How to Contact Us: other. In this environment, people need to work together to identify and quickly [email protected] resolve problems, proactively plan for emergencies and crisis response, and [email protected] help “fill the potholes of knowledge” by training and cross-training on various (520) 799-8760 or 8761 aircraft and procedures. One memorable incident involved arriving at a wildland fire as a Safety Officer fax(520)-799-8785 Continued on page 2 www.wildfirelessons.net and finding operations not as they should be. Starting at the creek bed. The East Verde represented the only good natu- helibase, the Safety Officer found three aircraft assigned with ral barrier protecting the communities of Pine and Strawberry, no identified Helibase Manager or helibase organization. The and it also served as a trigger point for the fire organization. Safety Officer identified other concerns, including a lack of During one operational period, a smoke column leaned over fire shelters in the aircraft for pilots, no shelter training for the in a strong south wind, and the fire was heading directly for pilots, and no helibase operating plan or consensus on what the East Verde River. With no time for a burnout by ground to do in an emergency. After discussing the situation, the fire personnel, the Operations Section Chief flew in a helicopter organization identified a qualified person at the helibase who using a Plastic Sphere Dispenser (PSD) to backfire toward began pulling an organization together. the main fire, from the edge of the creek bed. Once the helibase organization was functioning properly, the The SEATs supported the backfiring operation, laying down Safety Officer moved a mile down the road to the temporary a line of retardant, anchoring into the previous day’s black. As the SEATs finished a section of retardant line, Opera- dispatch center, where people needed some coaching to de- tions would come in and drop PSDs, extending the black velop a plan for an aircraft emergency, which they had not line. By the time the main fire started to get rolling, it met the discussed. The Safety officer printed out a blank template to back fire. The column stood straight up and when the smoke help the dispatch center think through the problem and get settled, fire behavior was minimal and helicopters held the organized. When the Safety Officer was leaving, the dispatch existing fire at the creek’s edge with buckets. staff was completing a telephone contact resource list. Because of the light fuels and low elevation, this operation Later that day as the Safety Officer was driving to the fire, worked without ground personnel to reinforce the retardant one of the incident helicopters lost an engine and crashed at drops. The risk assessment showed that it would have been the head of the fire where it had been dropping water. The more hazardous to fly firefighters into this remote location, helibase and dispatch office performed their jobs very well. where they would have been at the head of the fire with no Resources were moved quickly and the pilot was rescued. escape routes and safety zones. This operation involved no Later, at the hospital, the pilot said, “The engine quit and I ground personnel so the IMT put few firefighters in harm’s knew I was in trouble and going down, so I turned the aircraft way, and the operation greatly diminished the threat to near- to hit outside of the flames. I was already thinking about that by communities. fire shelter before I was on the ground. Man, was I glad to A Communications Plan is Key have it when I climbed out of the aircraft and took off.” An Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) recalls a recent 150 acre wildfire in a very steep canyon with at least 90% slopes in tall mixed conifer. Numerous aircraft were working this incident including three heavy airtankers, a lead plane, two light helicopters, a heavy helicopter, and one medium helicopter. The airspace over the fire was seriously con- gested. ATGS and the pilots communicated well with each other; every pilot knew what the other pilot was doing and aviation personnel took their time. ATGS set up a hold point for the helicopters to use while the airtankers were in the Fire Traffic Area (FTA). Air Attack also set-up and enforced an entry and exit pattern. In these situations, communication proves to be the key to success. If you have a good plan and it is well known, people know what to expect and do. There are no surprises and operations go much more smoothly. Using a PSD Courtesy of USFS SE Region Aviation Personnel Evaluating Risk and Decision Making On one fire, the Incident Commander (IC) asked an Avia- The Right Operation in the Right Fuels tion Safety and Technical Assistance Team (ASTAT) to take a In 2004 during the Willow Fire near Payson, Arizona, no large look at their air operations because they had a concern that airtankers were available to perform retardant drops. In- they felt the IMT needed assistance in mitigating. The ASTAT stead, the Incident Management Team (IMT) used five Single arrived at the incident, finding that the wildfire was located Engine Air Tankers (SEAT). The small airtankers performed high in the “goat rocks” at the base and on the side of a butte. well, benefiting from relatively short turn-around times. The The local unit wanted the fire controlled before it reached the SEATs also proved effective because the wildfire was in light top of the butte to protect several four-wheel drive accessible fuels at a low elevation. cabins located on the plateau a few miles from the fire. The The fire would make a run towards the East Verde River each rocky terrain prevented firefighters from safely constructing evening threatening to jump the river, which is actually a dry fireline, and prevented anyone from staying near the fire to 2 monitor three helicopters working the fire. The fire was at LCES Beyond Wildland Fire an elevation of 8,500 feet, the weather was sunny and the One of the biggest successes noted in one unit’s air op- temperature very hot. erations was realizing that ground safety concepts, includ- One of the ASTAT members requested a flight in the aircraft being used as an air attack platform to observe the air opera- ing LCES, apply not only to wildland fire operations on the tions, and found the helicopters dropping water on the creep- ground, but also serve as a useful tool to establish and main- ing, spotty fire without much direction or success, and that tain a safe work environment during aviation operations. For the pilots were placing themselves in definite risk. Because example, the person marshalling on the helibase watches of the fire’s location and terrain, if something happened to over the big picture serving as a lookout to identify where the one of the helicopters, rescue operations would have proven helicopter will go if there is a loss of power and where the very difficult and protracted. Shortly after the observation ground personnel we will go to avoid the helicopter. They are flight, the ASTAT brought the overhead personnel together identifying the escape routes and establishing an appropri- to discuss safety and tactical options, resulting in immediate ate safety zone around the helicopter. To cover the commu- cessation of the air show in the rocks. nications portion of LCES, it is necessary to identify a communications plan with the aircraft, ground personnel, other aircraft, flight following, etc. Difficult Challeng Practicing for Emergencies Working with aircraft in an interagency environment and out of improvised airfields always presents a challenge. Manag- ing an aviation emergency in this environment presents the most difficult challenge an aviation person can face. Only by having everyone well briefed and practiced on how to imple- ment emergency procedures can a rapid and professional response occur during emergency situations that nearly always develop rapidly. Since each day typically brings new people into and takes people out of the organization, emergency procedures must be a daily topic at briefings if everyone is to know their role and serve it well. During periods of slow aircraft operations, when smoke pro- hibits flying or when personnel are waiting for a mission as- signment, the organization can, and should, train and practice, practice, practice.

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