MCNAUGHTON'S AIR FORCE: The Creation of the First Non-Permanent Active Air Force Squadrons, 1931-1933
LA FORCE AERIENNE DE MCNAUGHTON : la formation des premiers escadrons de l'Aviation active non permanente, 1931- 1933
A Thesis Submitted
To the Division of Graduate Studies of the Royal Military College of Canada
By
Mathias Joost, CD, BEd, BA Major
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in War Studies
September 2008
© This thesis may be used within the Department of National Defence but copyright for open publication remains the property of the author
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While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. Canada ABSTRACT
This thesis was submitted by JOOST, Mathias, in partial fulfillment of an M.A. at the Royal Military College of Canada, September 2008. The thesis is entitled "McNaughton's Air Force: The Creation of the First Non-Permanent Active Air Force Squadrons, 1931-1933," under the supervision of Dr. A. English.
Popular histories ascribe the formation of the first Non-Permanent Active Air Force squadrons, which were established in October 1932, either to public pressure or financial rationalization while more scholarly works have provided no explanation whatsoever. This thesis demonstrates that Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, the Chief of the General Staff, provided critical support for and the eventual authorization of these squadrons as part of his plan to modernize the Canadian Militia. The thesis examines various factors that could have generated the requirement for the squadrons and concludes that all but one can be eliminated on the basis of documentary evidence. Some factors, such as financial considerations, had no influence, while others, such as the Royal Air Force, may have provided a model for the RCAF to emulate but not the specific stimulus to create the units in question. The conclusion is that General McNaughton, in restructuring the Militia, required aerial support that could be called up should an expeditionary force be required. Accordingly, the squadrons were created on a part-time basis, similar to the Militia, to provide this support.
Keywords
McNaughton Royal Canadian Air Force Non-Permanent Active Air Force
iii RESUME
Ce memoire a ete soumis par JOOST, Mathias, dans le cadre de la realisation d'une M. A. au College militaire royal du Canada, en septembre 2008. Intitule La Force aerienne de McNaughton : la formation des premiers escadrons de l'Aviation active non permanente, 1931-1933, il a ete redige sous la supervision de A. English, Ph. D.
Les histoires populaires attribuent la formation, en octobre 1932, des premiers escadrons de l'Aviation active non permanente soit aux pressions exercees par le public, soit a une rationalisation financiere, tandis que les travaux d'erudits ne fournissent absolument aucune explication a cet egard. Ce memoire montre que le Major-general A.G.L. McNaughton, chef d'etat-major general, a fourni un soutien essentiel relativement a la formation de ces escadrons et, en fin de compte, a autorise celle-ci dans le cadre de son plan de modernisation de-la Milice du Canada. Le memoire examine divers facteurs qui pourraient avoir entraine la necessite de disposer de ces escadrons et conclut, en fonction des preuves documentaires, que tous sauf un peuvent etre elimines. Certains facteurs, tels que les considerations financieres, n'ont eu aucune influence, alors que d'autres, tels que la Royal Air Force, ont peut-etre fourni a l'Aviation royale du Canada (ARC) un modele a imiter, mais non l'impulsion necessaire pour effectivement creer les unites en question. En conclusion, l'auteur affirme que le General McNaughton, en reorganisant la Milice, avait besoin d'un appui aerien auquel on pourrait faire appel si un corps expeditionnaire etait requis. Par consequent, les escadrons ont ete crees comme unites a temps partiel, a l'instar de la Milice, pour fournir cet appui.
Mots-cles McNaughton Aviation royale du Canada Aviation active non permanente
iv TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract iii
Resume iv
List of Tables vi
Glossary vii
Introduction: From a paper organization to an operational establishment 1
Chapter 1: The Usual Suspects: Finance and Public Opinion 26 Financial Reductions and the Big Cut 28 Public Pressure 37
Chapter 2: "Fireproof House" Indeed: International Affairs as a Factor 50 External Affairs 52 A Foreign Threat: The United States and Japan 60
Chapter 3: "Mother Knows Best": The Influence of Great Britain 67 Imperial Defence 68 The Royal Air Force 77
Chapter 4: A Tool of Deception: The League of Nations Disarmament Conference, Geneva, 1932 87 Historical Review 89 Disarmament 98 The Sub-Committee 105 The Inter-Departmental Committee 108
Chapter 5: "I did it my way:" The Royal Canadian Air Force 115 Historical Review 116 Demands from within the RCAF 127 Howsam's article in Canadian Defence Quarterly 131 A Plan takes Form 133
Conclusion: McNaughton's Air Force 146
Bibliography 156
Curriculum Vitae 168
v LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Hours flown by type of operation 29 Table 2: Location and Roles of NPAAF Squadrons 40 GLOSSARY
AuxAF Auxiliary Air Force. The part-time component of the Royal Air Force. It was not granted the "Royal" prefix until after the Second World War.
CGAO Civil Government Air Operations. The acronym refers to both the Division within the Royal Canadian Air Force, and its activities related to civil-oriented air operations vice military air operations.
CGS Chief of the General Staff. The Commander of the Canadian Militia and also the Royal Canadian Air Force until November 1938.
FY Fiscal Year. The Federal Government operates on a financial year that runs 1 April to 31 March.
Militia The name used to describe the ground forces of Canada until the Second World War.
NPAAF Non-Permanent Active Air Force. The part-time component of the Royal Canadian Air Force.
PAAF Permanent Active Air Force. The full-time component of the Royal
Canadian Air Force.
RAF Royal Air Force.
RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force.
vii 1
Introduction From a paper organization to an operational establishment
Until the start of the Cold War and the rapid increase in the size of the Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) in 1950, the RCAF in peacetime was primarily a small organization with a miniscule professional component and reliant upon a larger part-time or citizen-based component. The question of balance between full- and part-time, and how best to use the part-time force, has been one that has plagued Air Force leaders since the very beginning of an independent Canadian air force.
During the First World War, Canada had three air services. The first was the
Canadian Aviation Corps, created on 16 September 1914 and dissolved on 7 May 1915 with its lone aircraft having disintegrated on Salisbury Plain in Britain. Next was the creation of two Canadian squadrons within the Royal Air Force (RAF) which the British government authorized on 5 August 1918. This organization dissolved on 5 February
1920 when the Canadian government decided it did not require a permanent peacetime air force, and refused to fund this two-squadron organization when British funds ran dry.
Even more short-lived was the Royal Canadian Naval Air Service, authorized on 5
September 1918, and officially demobilized on 5 December that same year.
After these abrupt starts, Canada's first permanent air force - the Canadian Air
Force (CAF) - was authorized on 23 April 1920, the foundation having been laid through
Order-in-Council P.C. 395 of 18 February 1920. The CAF relied heavily upon a small full-time cadre to train a larger part-time force. The CAF and the government soon realized that this arrangement was not adequate to provide a professional air force. The few permanent members were not sufficient to provide an immediate response in case of 2 emergency, but more significantly, proficiency as a pilot or in one of the ground-crew trades required constant practice, which a part-time force could not provide.
On 1 April 1924, the RCAF was established, initially with a greater emphasis on a small full-time air force. The Permanent Active Air Force (PAAF) would provide the immediate air defence requirements for Canada as well as the training for itself and for the Non-Permanent Active Air Force (NPAAF). The NPAAF consisted of part-time personnel, primarily pilots, who would receive their training to a basic military standard of proficiency and provide the resources for call-up in case of war or emergency. While the PAAF was formed into squadrons, units and detachments, the NPAAF personnel were simply put onto a holding list, to be called upon as required. Provision was made, however, for the NPAAF to consist of detachments, units, and formations as named by the Governor-in-Council.1
With the creation of a permanent Air Force, uses for the organization began to increase, especially after mid-1927 when the RCAF was re-organized into four new directorates, one of which was Civil Government Aviation Operations (CGAO). Among the CGAO activities was support to the provinces in combating forest fires and to the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police for anti-smuggling patrols, aerial surveying and photography. As other government departments and provincial governments saw the utility of aircraft, demand for air services rose, creating a requirement for additional personnel, both permanent and non-permanent.
Between the RCAF's formation in 1924 and 31 March 1932, the establishment of the PAAF increased from 66 officers and 307 airmen, to 204 officers and 732 airmen.
The strength of the PAAF increased and filled most of the establishment, mainly due to
1 King's Regulations and Orders for the Royal Canadian Air Force, 1924; paragraph 1 .a.(2). 3 the increased activities in CGAO. The NPAAF establishment remained at 67 officers and
130 airmen for the years 1924 to 1932.2 The NPAAF was initially used to accommodate personnel undergoing training, similar in manner to the current Canadian Forces Basic
Training List.3 Provisional Pilot Officers undergoing flying training, "boys" undergoing summer trades training and some civilian pilots undertaking training at Camp Borden were all placed on the establishment of the NPAAF.4 But a change in role for the RCAF meant an increase in strength for the NPAAF.
With the large-scale expansion of the RCAF from 1927 in support of CGAO5 the
NPAAF establishment was also used to accommodate NPAAF personnel who were temporarily employed on full-time service, both trained pilots and support officers, as well as the airmen necessary to keep the aircraft flying.6 Thereafter, the strength of the
"Establishment" is the maximum number of personnel that an organization may have. These figures are normally not attained as fiscal policies and other restraints impose limitations. The actual number of personnel is referred to as "strength". The PAAF strength from 1 April 1924 to 31 March 1932 increased from 68 officers and 307 airmen to 178 officers and 700 airmen. Directorate of History and Heritage (hereafter DHH) 76/31, Strength of the RCAF, Appendix "B " to 22-3-1 (AH) 21 Sep 50. The establishment figures for the PAAF and NPAAF are found in: F.H. Hitchins, Air Board, Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force, Mercury Series, Canadian War Museum Paper No. 2 (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1972), 125 and 263. There are various types of lists within the main Department of National Defence establishment. Active units are allotted a specified number of positions on the establishment, most of which are filled by trained personnel. Because the military is always training personnel, whether basic recruit training or advanced courses, special lists have been created to accommodate these individuals and allow them to be differentiated and counted separately from operational personnel. Personnel undergoing training are placed on a Basic Training List (BTL), while the Advanced Training List is for individuals who have been trained but are undergoing training for specialist skills or for trade advancement. The NPAAF served as the BTL for the RCAF during the interwar period. The term "boys" referred not only to the trainees' age, but also to their rank. Boys were enrolled as part of a technical training plan designed to provide the RCAF with qualified tradesmen. The plan was approved in 1925, but only commenced in 1927, terminating in 1931. Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1926 (Ottawa: F.C. Acland, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1926), 55; and F.H. Hitchins, Air Board, Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force; 1844. Interestingly, the civilian pilots were appointed Acting Sergeants while undergoing training. Hitchins, Air Board, Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force, 250 and 265, Note 8. NPAAF and PAAF personnel were employed in almost equal numbers on CGAO. Officers, upon receiving their wings, were either given a commission in the PAAF or the NPAAF. Normally, NPAAF service was part-time. Although both components provided full-time service, full- time service for NPAAF personnel was on an 'as required' basis. Once a NPAAF officer was no 4
NPAAF increased quickly, transforming the organization from a holding list for trainees to one that supported operations.7
The NPAAF not only experienced a major increase in personnel, but also its finances. In Fiscal Year (FY) 1924-25, the budget was $1,561,000, reaching $7,151,163 in FY 1930-31.8 This decreased to $5,442,000 the following year due to the effects of the
Depression on the government's coffers. On 15 February 1932, the government tabled the main estimates for the Federal budget for FY 1932-33 in the House of Commons. The
RCAF budget was slashed by two-thirds to $1,750,000. As a result of the "Big Cut," on
1 April 1932 all 78 NPAAF officers, plus 100 PAAF airmen and 110 civilians were released from the RCAF, although some were let go both before and days after 1 April.
These NPAAF officers had mainly been appointed during the previous three years when
CGAO was rapidly expanded.9 The NPAAF had disappeared as an organization. All was not lost, however, for the NPAAF. On 5 October 1932, the first NPAAF squadrons of the
RCAF were authorized. Effective 5 October 1932, four units were formed, as allowed by the original wording of the King's Regulations & Orders for the Royal Canadian Air
Force. These units consisted of three Army Co-operation squadrons and a Wing
Headquarters. At the same time, the NPAAF establishment increased to 128 officers and
longer required for full- or part-time service, he would revert to the Reserve of Officers. See King's Regulations and Orders, 1924, paras 21 ID, 211H, and 213 D, E, F, and G. 7 In FY 1927/28 the strength was only 27 officers and 1 airman. By January 1932, there were 78 officers on active duty on the NPAAF strength, plus 26 others on training or leave without pay. Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1928 (Ottawa: F.C. Acland, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1928), 41. Royal Canadian Air Force Officers List, "Gradation List, Non-Permanent, January 1932". The establishment, although set at 67, was temporarily overborne and thus had 78 officers. 8 These figures are based upon the Government's main estimates for these two fiscal years. See Hitchins, Air Board, Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force, 114 and 246. 9 Ibid, 263. See also the RCAF Officers List for the years 1929 to 1933. 5
624 airmen.10 In 1933, only a few officers were appointed to these three squadrons, as no funding was available; however, in 1934, recruiting of "other ranks" began in earnest, as did training. The NPAAF continued to expand so that by 10 September 1939,12 squadrons had been formed and were in varying states of readiness when Canada declared war upon Nazi Germany. Although some NPAAF squadrons were not fully operational, the NPAAF constituted 12 of the 20 operational squadrons of the RCAF, and over 40 percent of the RCAF's strength.
This redesign of the NPAAF from a holding list to an operational component of the RCAF represented a major paradigm shift. No reasons were given by the government or military for this change in policy, which is the central topic of this thesis.
Explanations for the creation of the squadrons have been largely unsatisfactory, as will be discussed later in this chapter. A shift in policy of this magnitude does not happen in isolation - factors originating from domestic and international policies, military versus political requirements, and interdepartmental rivalries all can play a part. Coincident with the creation of the first NPAAF squadrons were the Depression, the League of
Nations Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the increase in influence of Canada's
Department of External Affairs, and the re-organization of the Militia by General A.G.L.
McNaughton, Chief of the General Staff (CGS).11
In the many articles and books written about the RCAF, very little is mentioned about why the NPAAF flying squadrons were created, or what the influences were on the
10 These units were No. 1 (Army Co-operation) Wing, No. 10 Squadron in Toronto, No. 11 Squadron in Vancouver and No. 12 Squadron in Winnipeg. Hitchins, Air Board, Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force, 265. No. 1 Wing was never manned. When the announcement was made, only the location of No. 10 Squadron was given. The locations of Nos 11 and 12 Squadrons were not announced until January 1933. 11 Until November 1938, the RCAF reported to the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), the head of the Militia. Thus, any changes in the RCAF structure would have required CGS blessing. 6
RCAF during this period of fiscal and operational retrenchment. In fact, the majority of texts that mention a potential influence for the creation of the flying squadrons suggest one of two reasons: financial (the Big Cut), or public pressure. These simple explanations do not provide any consideration of other factors that could have been, and were, influential in the decision to create the NPAAF flying squadrons. Understanding the influence of these pressures provides a better picture of the problems the RCAF faced in this time of stress and provides a better understanding of the RCAF's perception of the
NPAAF's new role, which has not been explained in any published works.
Among the factors to be considered from within Canada are the Depression, and its forced cutback on the RCAF and other government departments, and public pressure and its possibility of causing the RCAF or government to consider forming NPAAF squadrons. Outside Canada, pressure from Great Britain on Imperial Defence and the example of the Royal Air Force (RAF), and the preparations for the League of Nations
Disarmament Conference were also considerations for the RCAF. Finally, the
Department of External Affairs and the Militia reforms instituted by General
McNaughton also put pressure on the RCAF. The relevance of these factors will be discussed below, and will be examined in later chapters.
This study argues that the creation of the NPAAF squadrons was the result of a desire on the part of General McNaughton and the RCAF to create a "flying militia" to support McNaughton's restructuring of the Militia for the role of providing personnel for a potential expeditionary force. In the event of Canada becoming involved in a major conflict, the Militia would mobilize and deploy overseas, and would receive aerial support from the NPAAF. 7
The usual explanations of fiscal and public pressure played only a minor role, while the RAF provided a model upon which the NP AAF squadrons were based.
External Affairs' support was desired in order for the RCAF to expand, as the agreement of another government department would have a greater effect than simply a desire from the Militia. The preparations for the League of Nations Disarmament Conference, during
1931, served as the means to gain this support. External threats to Canada were not a significant factor in the assessment of the requirement for NPAAF squadrons, while information gleaned from the Imperial Conferences provided useful background upon which to base the assessments required to gain External Affairs' confidence. In effect, all these factors were tools used by General McNaughton and the RCAF to create NPAAF squadrons in support of the Militia and its expeditionary force role.
The process from initiation to implementation of the NPAAF squadrons occurred over a very short time frame, 1931 to 1933. The Disarmament Conference appears to have provided the impetus for change, with a final framework for the restructuring of the
RCAF being completed by December 1931.The main details were completed by July
1932 and the structure filled-in over subsequent years. However, as the RCAF modeled itself upon the RAF and its Auxiliary Air Force, which was created in 1924, this study will need to examine events back to that period.
This study will employ the term Non-Permanent Active Air Force (NPAAF) to describe the part-time force of the RCAF. This was the correct terminology of the time and was used as the Canadian equivalent of the RAF's Auxiliary Air Force. It should be noted that the RCAF, prior to the creation of the NPAAF squadrons, used "Reserve" and 8
"Auxiliary" interchangeably with NPAAF. The former term was actually inappropriate as the RCAF had a non-active component named "RCAF Reserve" while "Auxiliary" was the RAF term.
This study also makes reference to the RCAF "desiring" specific results. In these instances, the reference is to the RCAF leadership generally, rather than a specific individual who in these cases has not been or could not be identified. Two problems encountered during the course of this study is that there are few documents that relate to any discussions regarding the factors noted above, while the leadership of the RCAF varied during this period due to changes in personnel and absences. In some cases senior officers were responsible for implementing decisions with no influence from the Director of the RCAF. Because of the inability to adequately attribute decisions to specific individuals, the generic use has to be made of the expression that the "RCAF" desired or achieved a goal.
The terminology on the creation of the squadrons should also be clarified. Before any squadron or unit first comes into existence, it must be "authorized." Thereafter, it will be "formed," staffed with personnel and provided with equipment. While units may be authorized, they are not always formed. An example is that of No. 1 Wing
Headquarters, which was authorized at the same time as the first three NPAAF squadrons, but was never formed - or manned with personnel. This differentiation will be applied in this thesis, with the terms "authorized" and "created" being used interchangeably.
12 For examples, see letters and memoranda in Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), RG 24, Series E-l-c, Volume 4951, File 895-9/110, Part 1. 9
The ranks given for each officer noted in this study will be the rank the officer held at the time of the citation. The exception will be the first part of Chapter 5, when the documentary evidence left by these officers will be reviewed.
It is also important to note that up to 19 November 1938, the RCAF was a subordinate arm of the Militia, under the command of the Chief of the General Staff. In practice RCAF squadrons reported to the local Militia District Commanders for operational purposes while RCAF Headquarters was primarily an administrative headquarters that also provided advice on air power to the Militia Headquarters. The influence of the Militia on the RCAF was pronounced as the RCAF was not independent and had to conform to Militia practices and doctrine. Thus, when the RCAF conducted any planning, it would have considered Militia intentions, especially those of the CGS, in determining a course of action.
This study will employ a systems analysis approach in examining the questions of how and why the NPAAF squadrons were created. This model, developed by David
Easton, lends itself to this study, as the decision to generate the NPAAF squadrons was unlikely to have been made by the RCAF in isolation.13 Easton's model uses demands and supports of internal and external factors in a feedback cycle to explain the decision making process. Demands are those stressors (factors or influences) that cause the system to produce a reaction, whether large or small. Support relates to the backing
13 See David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, 1979). Although this method of analysis is more than 40 years old, it is still considered "as one of a handful of primary approaches to the study of political science and public policy." Cited by Kent Rissmiller, Approaching a Model of Policy Change: A Challenge to Political Science; paper prepared for Eighteenth International Conference of the Systems Dynamics Society, 6-10 August 2000, Bergen, Norway; www.systemsdynamics.org/conferences/2000/PDFs/rissmill.pdf. accessed 13 November 2007, 1630 hours. Critiques of Easton's methodology include that it does not explain system breakdown, only stability; and that the system is modeled on the political system of the United States. The political situation in Canada in the 1930s was a stable democracy with many similarities to the United States. Therefore, the use of systems analysis as a means of analysis would be appropriate. 10 given by the public and members of the political system towards its activities. There is also the factor of the capabilities of the system to react to demands in a manner that prioritizes demands and responds in a manner that has support. These factors are very apropos in describing the Canadian military, as well as the government and government departments, at the time of the study.
Easton describes a political system as a means through which resources and energies of society are mobilized and oriented to the pursuit of goals. 4 His analysis is based on political systems as a whole, which includes government departments, and executive and legislative systems; however, he does make clear that the analysis can apply equally to the smaller parts of the system, such as individual government departments.
Demands may be either from inside or outside the system.15 For the military, this means that the public, other military organizations, the Federal cabinet, other government departments and even its own personnel could all make demands. The capability of the
RCAF to respond to these demands would determine whether the organization succeeded or failed.16 Using the "Big Cut" as an example, if the RCAF had not adapted to the pressure imposed by the lack of resources, the RCAF may well have had a solution imposed on it, or a more remote possibility, even have been disbanded.
14 Easton, A Systems Analysis, 153. 15 Ibid, 33-35. 16 For the purposes of this study, success for the RCAF in responding to the demands would mean that the RCAF response was able to satisfy the originator of the demand. Failure would be that the RCAF failed to provide a response that satisfied the originator of the demand, therefore leading to further pressure or possibly some form of sanction or censure of the RCAF or its senior leaders. Although the RCAF never appeared to be in danger of being eliminated as an organization, there was in 1932 the risk of the RCAF being reduced to such an extent that it would not be a credible air force. This was the same situation in which the Royal Canadian Navy found itself a few years later. 11
Support can also be internal or external. Externally, a system needs to marshal support if it is to gain approval from the government, the public and interest groups for the decisions it makes. An organization's responses to demands must also gain approval from within the system, requiring that there be unity among the system's members, in this case the senior personnel of the RCAF and the Militia Headquarters, and that there be rules and structure that allows decisions to be generated with a high potential for success.17 In a military system, the decisions are most often made based on hierarchy - an individual's rank. Even with rank as the basis for decisions, major decisions are not normally made in isolation; there is consultation between military decision-makers, in this case the senior RCAF staff officers, Militia headquarters, and government departments.
A further point of note is that support can also be for one part of the system to the exclusion of others.18 Thus, within the RCAF during the late 1920s and early 1930s, its personnel could have supported military operations and training to the exclusion of
CGAO, both of which roles the RCAF was performing at the time. This did not happen, which begs the question as to why it did not.
Easton's systems analysis normally uses a very wide focus when examining issues or events, covering government departments, lobby groups, private corporations and foreign influences. This study will use Easton's system but with a more narrow focus, as the number of factors that could have affected the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons is more limited. The main system under examination will be the RCAF, with
17 Eastern, A Systems Analysis, 157-8. Militia headquarters support was required as the RCAF was under the command of the CGS while each RCAF unit and squadron was under the command of the local militia district commander. 18 Ibid, 185-7. 12 other government departments considered outside the system and thus sources of external demands. Given that demands and support are the basis for the success of a system, this study must also examine how important personalities, such as the Prime Minister and the
CGS, as well as how external and internal systems, influenced the decision to create the
NPAAF flying squadrons. Events cannot be ignored either, as the Depression and the
Geneva Disarmament Conference were external factors that generated considerable pressure on both the government and the RCAF.
In terms of personalities several major people are of particular importance. The government of Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King was defeated in the election of
1930, leaving newly-elected Prime Minister R.B. Bennett to deal with the effects of the
Depression. Prime Minister Bennett was a micro-manager,19 in modern parlance, with the result that he could have played a major role in deciding the future direction of the
RCAF; however, this study found that for the most part he left running of the Militia and
Air Force to General McNaughton.
General McNaughton had considerable influence with the Prime Minister and in the shaping of the Militia and as has been noted in existing literature was also a very strong supporter of the RCAF. As has been noted by other authors, McNaughton used the preparations for the Disarmament Conference as the means by which he could reshape the Militia. This restructuring played a major role in the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons.
Further, various members of the government, most notably O.D. Skelton, Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1925-1941 held very strong views as to the
19 Ernest Watkins, R.B. Bennett (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1963). See for example the description of Bennettt and the 1932 Imperial Conference in Ottawa, pps. 158-61, or all of Chapter 12 pps. 167-80. 13 role of the military and its role in Canada's external relations. Skelton's position of creating a foreign policy for Canada independent of Great Britain was well known and
suggested a strong military, independent of outside influence and contacts. Skelton was also a member of the committee that would review Canada's position at the Disarmament
Conference. Although he did not play a role in the creation of the squadrons, the RCAF
and McNaughton used Skelton and his belief in an independent Canadian foreign policy as a means of gaining support for the restructuring.
Other individuals must also be examined. These include the influence of Wing
Commander L.S. Breadner, Director of the RCAF, in shifting to a military role for the
RCAF. Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Sutherland, the Minister of National Defence, and G.J.
Desbarats, the Deputy Minister could also have been major players, but appear to have been outside the loop in the decision to create the flying squadrons. The most serious restraint to evaluating their influence is that little documentation exists on these individuals.
Fiscal pressures were also an external factor. The Depression forced the Bennett government to dramatically reduce the funding for the RCAF. The RCAF apparently reacted to the shortfall by re-organizing itself and by attempting to orient itself towards military aviation. The pressure to do this came in part from General McNaughton and partly from within the RCAF. One important question needs to be answered in this regard. Was creation of the NPAAF squadrons a part of a Cabinet or McNaughton-led
effort to create an aerial militia further to the Militia reforms? For an answer to this question, we must examine whether there were demands or expectations of support that would have led to the creation of the NPAAF squadrons. 14
Another factor external to the RCAF was the Department of External Affairs, whose participation in the formulation of a Canadian position for the Disarmament
Conference and whose response to pressure from the United Kingdom for Imperial
Defence cannot be discounted. The Canadian position for the Disarmament Conference was developed in part by General McNaughton and by representatives from the army, navy and air force at a working group level with members from External Affairs. At the working group, the representatives of the three services formulated common policies and made interpretations on how to respond to the requirements of the Disarmament
Conference Preparatory Commission.They also provided the Interdepartmental
Committee, which included Skelton and General McNaughton, with input for their review prior to becoming the official Canadian response. McNaughton had used the
Disarmament Conference as a tool to reform the Militia; therefore, the interchange of
ideas and positions at the working level in the preparations for the Conference may hold
clues as to whether the Disarmament Conference was so used by or for the RCAF and if
so, in what manner. Conversely, External Affairs may also have had ideas as to what they as the department responsible for foreign policies expected from the military in the preparations for the Conference. What is in fact evident through this study is that the
RCAF not only used the Conference preparations for its own ends, but that the force misled officials at External Affairs about what its intentions were. By doing so, the
RCAF would gain the support of External Affairs for a stronger air force and still be able to achieve its goal of a stronger and larger military-oriented force.
A revamped air force would have been useful in the event of any future conflict,
one that many in the RCAF expected would involve Canadian support of Great Britain. 15
At the many previous Imperial Conferences, Great Britain had continually sought to have the members of the Commonwealth provide greater funding for their own national defence and to assist Great Britain in providing for Imperial Defence. This pressure had been resisted by previous Canadian governments and was definitely opposed by O.D.
Skelton. The development of a stronger, more capable RCAF would thus have been a position that Skelton could have supported as it could be used to allay British requests for more national military funding and at the same time reduce Canada's reliance upon Great
Britain for military support and with it the associated support by Canada of Imperial
Defence.
However, the linkages between the RAF and the RCAF, especially those suggested at the Imperial Conferences, were one external factor of which Skelton and
External Affairs would have been wary. Linkages could result in commitments, with the possibility of drawing Canada into a war for which Parliament had not approved
Canadian participation. As the RAF was the model air force for the RCAF, the organization of the RAF was one which RCAF leaders sought to emulate. Further, RCAF pilots trained and participated in exercises with members of the RAF, thereby furthering
RAF influence. The re-organization of the Militia was therefore the opportunity to
suggest re-organization of the RCAF to reflect the structure and roles of the RAF, and
also a means of furthering the linkages between the two air forces, possibly including mutual support and cooperation.
Similarly, the RAF model and its Auxiliary Air Force (AuxAF) provided some
impetus for the creation of an operational NPAAF. In the United Kingdom, the AuxAF
came into being on 9 October 1924. RCAF personnel attending courses in the United 16
Kingdom were certainly aware of the AuxAF, and wrote about the desirability of having
NPAAF flying squadrons based on the RAF model. The AuxAF therefore represented a model upon which McNaughton, and Breadner and his successors, could draw in developing a new model for the RCAF.
From another perspective, the RCAF would have seen the process of reform underway within the Army. This provided another impetus for similar changes in the
RCAF. The Militia was being re-organized to focus primarily on an expeditionary force with the result that when the air force was re-organized after 1932 it was in part to
support, through Army Co-operation squadrons, each of the new Army divisions.
Public influence could also have played a role in the form of support and possibly as a demand, but as will be noted in this study, did not. The 1920s and 1930s saw the evolution of air transport in Canada, including the formation of civil flying clubs, many of which were to play a significant role during the Second World War when they became part of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan and provided the training at 10 Air
Observer Schools and 36 Elementary Flying Training Schools. The public also had a love affair with aviation.21 Members of the public and local officials lobbied the government and RCAF that a NPAAF squadron be formed in their respective cities or towns; however, the squadrons were formed only in those locations that had already met the qualifications the RCAF sought.
20 Attempts by Adam Shortt to reform the Canadian Civil Service used the British civil service as a model. See J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), 25. Further, the Royal Air Force was the model for the RCAF upon the latter's creation in 1924. Wing Commander L.S. Breadner was Acting Director from February 1928 to April 1932, and was succeeded by Squadron Leader A.A.L. Cuffe, and Group Captain J.L. Gordon, who became the first Senior Air Officer, as the position of Director became known in 1932. 21 See for instance Frank Ellis, Canada's Flying Heritage (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954, 1981), who shows how aviation developed and how the public was fascinated by aviation. For a more detailed analysis of the Canadian love affair with aviation in the interwar period, and how this changed during the Second World War, see Jonathan Vance, High Flight (Toronto: Penguin Books, 2002). 17
Related to the factor of external fiscal pressure, the overhaul of the RCAF could
have been an internal response to the monetary squeeze. This reduction would seemingly have been a major influence in the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons, as part-time personnel would be less expensive and require fewer aircraft than full-time personnel.
The reduction in funding could also have been a major excuse for the RCAF to shed its
civil roles and revert to a military force - an action that was in line with creating an
operational flying auxiliary. Such an influence was not, however, noted, although
funding was a major factor relating to why NPAAF squadrons were not formed in the years prior to 1932.
It is clear that there are several lines of questioning that need to be followed in
order to learn why the NPAAF flying squadrons were created. The published literature is not, however, very helpful in providing adequate information. The most useful source for
information on the RCAF is the official history. W. A.B. Douglas, in The Creation of a
National Air Force, The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume II
described the circumstances at the time of the decision to create the flying squadrons, noting the influence of the RAF, General McNaughton and the Geneva Disarmament
Conference; however, he never noted the actual reason(s) for the creation of these
squadrons.22 Similarly, Wing Commander F.H. Hitchins' Air Board, Canadian Air Force
and Royal Canadian Air Force also provided a great overview of the Air Force's
origins23 Using Hansard, the annual reports of the Department of National Defence, and
22 W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume II (Toronto, Ottawa: University of Toronto Press and Department of National Defence, 1986). 23 F.H. Hitchins, Air Board, Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force. Mercury Series Canadian War Museum Paper No. 2 (Ottawa: National Museum of Man, National Museums of Canada, August 1972). 18
Air Force Routine Orders, Hitchins provided a synopsis of events but no analysis of the reasons behind the events.
Many popular histories of the RCAF exist. These include Larry Milberry's Sixty
Years and Canada's Air Force, Leslie Robert's There Shall be Wings and Christopher
Shores's History of the Royal Canadian Air Forced However, these books lack academic rigour and primary sources, and have factual errors or omissions. In a similar vein, about half of the RCAF "400 series" squadrons have had histories written about them. Again, these books lack rigour and contain factual errors, such as indicating that the NPAAF squadrons "owed their formation largely to the pressure of prominent citizens in several major urban centres."25
A better overall history of the RCAF exists in Greenhous and Halliday's
Canada's Air Forces: 1914-1999.26 This book has greater accuracy but, given the immenseness of the topic, the reasons for the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons could not be adequately covered. William "Bill" McAndrew provided more detail on the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons in his brief outline of the inter-war period for the RCAF.27 Hitchins also presented a paper on the evolution of the RCAF at the
Larry Milberry, Sixty Years: the RCAF and CF Air Command, 1924-1984 (Toronto: CANAV Books, 1984) and Canada's Air Force at War and Peace, Volume 1 (Toronto: CANAV Books, 2000); Leslie Roberts, There Shall be Wings: A History of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co. Ltd., 1959) and Christopher Shores, History of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Toronto: Royce Publications, 1984). Terry Strocel, 440 Squadron History (Stittsville, ON: 1983 Canada's Wings, Inc, 1983), 5; Patrick McNorgan (ed), 402 "City of Winnipeg" Squadron History (Winnipeg: The 402 Squadron Association, 2007) has recently produced a history of one of the original three NPAAF squadrons. Another NPAAF squadron whose history has been written is No. 10/No. 110/No. 400. See Ron Wylie, On Watch to Strike: History of 400 (City of Toronto) Squadron (NP: NP, ND). Brereton Greenhous and Hugh Halliday, Canada's Air Forces, 1914-1999 (Montreal: Art Global, 1999). William J. McAndrew, "Canadian Defence Planning between the Wars: The Royal Canadian Air Force Comes of Age" in Aerospace Historian, June 1982, 81-89. 19
Canadian Historical Association's annual meeting in 1946. Though they provide relevant background information, neither provided reasons for the NPAAF creation. In a
similar vein Stephen Harris' Canadian Brass discussed the evolution of the Canadian
Army from 1860 to the start of the Second World War as well as McNaughton's efforts to reform the military in the early 1930s. This book provides highly important background information about the Militia side of the restructuring that was underway in the early 1930s.29
Other useful histories of the Canadian military exist that provide background information about the time of the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons but not the reasons for their creation. Among the most useful works are:
C.P. Stacey "The Military Problems of Canada, Canada and the Age of Conflict,"
"A History of Canadian External Policies: Volume 2: 1921-1948, The
Mackenzie King Era " and "Arms, Men and Government"
James Eayrs, "In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great
Depression,"
Desmond Morton, "A Military History of Canada" and
Roger Sarty, "The Maritime Defence of Canada. "
F.H. Hitchins, "Evolution of the Royal Canadian Air Force" in The Canadian Historical association: Report of the Annual Meeting Held at Toronto May 23-24, 1946 (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1946), 92-100. S.J. Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). C. P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada: A Survey of Defence Policies and Strategic Considerations Past and Present (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1940), Canada and the Age of Conflict, A History of Canadian External Policies: Volume 2: 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981) and Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer of Canada, 1970); James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964, 1967); Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990); and Roger Sarty, The Maritime Defence of Canada (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996). 20
Other works that provide useful background politically include Frederic Soward's
Canada in World Affairs: The Pre-War Years, Galen Perras' Franklin Roosevelt and the
Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance, 1933-1945: Necessary but Not
Necessary Enough, and Norman Hillmer's Doctoral Dissertation "Anglo-Canadian
Relations, 1927-1937: a Study of Canada's role in the shaping of commonwealth policies."31 These works help place the reorganization of the Militia and the RCAF into an international political context.
The relationship between Canada and the League of Nations has also received some treatment, but these texts only provide an overview. Books of value include
William Armstrong's Canada and the League of Nations: The Problem of Peace, which examined the Disarmament Conference but stops before the conference actually started.
Mark Eastman's Canada at Geneva gave a broad overview of all matters League of
Nations - economic, political, and social. Richard Veatch in Canada and the League of
Nations examined the domestic and international inputs into Canadian decisions regarding the League of Nations. Perhaps the most useful work for this study is an unpublished Doctoral Dissertation by Donald Clarke Story, "Canada's Covenant: The
Bennett Government, the League of Nations and Collective Security, 1930-1935."32
F.H. Soward, et al, Canada in World Affairs - The Pre-War Years (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1941); Galen Roger Perras, Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance, 1933-1945: Necessary but Not Necessary Enough (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publisher, 1998); and George Norman Hillmer, "Anglo-Canadian Relations, 1927-1937: a Study of Canada's role in the shaping of commonwealth policies" (Cambridge University: Unpublished PhD Thesis, September 1974) William Earl Armstrong, Canada and the League of Nations: The Problem of Peace (Geneva: Imprimerie Jent, S.A., 1930); Mack Eastman, Canada at Geneva: An historical survey and its lessons (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1946); Richard Veatch, Canada and the League of Nations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975); and Donald Clarke Story, "Canada's Covenant: The Bennett Government, the League of Nations and Collective Security, 1930-1935" (Toronto, University of Toronto: Unpublished PhD Thesis, 1976). 21
Biographies and autobiographies do not provide any significant information that reveals the reasoning behind the NPAAF squadron creation. For Prime Minister R.B.
Bennett, there are few biographical works and only a few books examining specifics of his career.33 Furthermore, the biographies do not shed much light on the subject of his relationship with the Canadian military. Ernest Watkins examined Bennett as an individual, more so than examining his political achievements or failures. Andrew
MacLean provided an apologist view of Bennett, while Lord Beaverbrook - Max Aitken - wrote mainly of personal encounters, and the parallelism between their careers at certain times.34
Several works discuss key personnel and provide useful starting points for understanding the major personalities of External Affairs of relevance to this study. J.L.
Granatstein's The Ottawa Men: Civil Service Mandarins: 1935-1957 covered some of the main individuals in the federal civil service and what their positions were with respect to key issues. Granatstein also produced in A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson, a biography of Norman Robertson, who joined External Affairs in 1929 in the position of
Third Secretary, and who participated in the formulation of a Canadian policy for the
Disarmament Conference. Jennifer Rossie, in an unpublished Master's Thesis, examined
Skelton's writings to place them within a philosophical context. Lester Pearson in his autobiography Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, provided
33 In the latter case, see for instance Larry A. Glassford, Reaction and Reform: The Politics of the Conservative Party under R.B. Bennett, 1927-1938 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) for a review of internal party politics; J.R.H. Wilbur, The Bennett new deal: fraud or portent? (Toronto: Copp Clark Pub, 1968) regarding Bennett's "New Deal"; or James Henry Gray, R.B. Bennett: the Calgary Years (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) for Bennett's period as a lawyer in Calgary. 34 Ernest Watkins, R.B. Bennett (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1963); Andrew D. MacLean, R.B. Bennett, Prime Minister of Canada 5th Ed. (Toronto: Excelsior Publishing Co. Ltd., 1935); and Lord Beaverbrook, Friends: Sixty Years of Intimate Personal Relations with Richard Bedford Bennett (Toronto: Heinemann, 1959). 22 little information about his role in the development of Canada's position for the
Disarmament Conference. John Swettenham's biography of McNaughton is also a handy reference for the overall outline of McNaughton's career and his interaction with significant politicians and government officials.
Unfortunately, several key personalities have not been the subject of biographies or detailed review of their military or governmental careers. Minister of National Defence
Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Sutherland and Deputy Minister of National Defence G.J.
Desbarats have not been the subject of any biographical work. The same situation applies for the early leaders of the RCAF, including Group Captain J.L. Gordon, Wing
Commander L.S. Breadner and Squadron Leader A.A.L. Cuffe.
Perhaps the most interesting article or book on the creation of the NPAAF squadrons is by a PAAF member, Flight Lieutenant G.R. Howsam. In the April 1931 issue of Canadian Defence Quarterly Howsam suggested that if the RCAF required expansion, NPAAF squadrons should be created.36 Howsam's proposal bears striking similarities to the actual development of the initial and subsequent NPAAF squadrons.
Overall, a review of the many military histories of the RCAF and the Army provides many apparent linkages between reform of the Army, reform of the RCAF and the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons. There is an apparent link between Flight
Lieutenant Howsam's article on creating an NPAAF and the paper prepared by Squadron
35 J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), and/I Man of Influence (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers & Co., 1981); Jennifer L. ^ Rossie, "The Historical Thought of O.D. Skelton: A Textual Examination of his Writings, 1907-1938" (Ottawa, Carleton University: Unpublished MA Thesis, 1989); Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 1, 1897-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 86-7; and J. Swettenham, McNaughton, Volume 1, 1887-1939 (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1968). 36 G.R. Howsam, "Canada's Problem of Air Defence" in Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No.3 (April 1931), 356-360. 23
Leader G.V. Walsh.37 McAndrew in his article and in the official history of the RCAF notes that it was the reform of the Army that generated the reform of the RCAF.
McAndrew also notes the role of the Depression. As McNaughton used the Geneva
Disarmament Conference as the impetus to reform the Army, there is an apparent linkage between the Conference and the reform of the RCAF. Unfortunately, none of the military works cited demonstrate the relationships between these factors, leaving this study to find such a linkage if it exists.
In the next five chapters, this study will examine factors external to the RCAF such as finances and public pressure, international affairs, the demands of Great Britain, the Disarmament Conference, and finally Chapter 5 examines the demands within the
RCAF itself. Each chapter will also review what has been written about the topic so that a baseline can be created and thereafter provide new information relevant to the potential influence of that factor in the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons.
Chapter 1 will examine finance and public pressure, the two reasons most often given for the creation of the NPAAF squadrons. This chapter demonstrates that finance was a minor influence, being only one of the fuses that set off the process that led to the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons. Public opinion, on the other hand, played a role in where the squadrons were located when the first three squadrons were authorized, but did not appear to have played a role in the actual decision to create NPAAF squadrons, as the RCAF had desired this type of squadrons since 1924.
Walsh was a member of Group Captain J.L. Gordon's staff, when Gordon was Director, Civil Government Air Operations. Gordon was relieved of these duties upon returning from the Imperial Defence College course and tasked to more fully develop the future structure of the RCAF. Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 124. 24
Chapter 2 is devoted to the influence of External Affairs and the international political situation. These two factors did not play a role in the authorization of the
NPAAF squadrons; however, they were factors that had to be considered in justifying the squadrons. Chapter 3 examines the influence of Great Britain and the RAF, as there was pressure from the former for military assistance, while the latter was the role model for the RCAF. Both played a minor role, in part used by the RCAF as internal justification for the authorization of the squadrons.
Chapter 4 examines the League of Nations Disarmament Conference. This
Conference served as the catalyst for the changes within the RCAF, as well as the Militia.
Through the preparations for the Conference, the RCAF was able to gain the support of
External Affairs for a revised structure and a larger establishment. Of note is the fact that the RCAF argued that should disarmament take place, the Air Force would first have to expand, so that it could be at the minimum strength required for national defence - a point that has not been noted in any published works on Canada at the League of Nations.
This explanation of why the RCAF had to expand was at the price of misleading External
Affairs, who did not wish to have the military make any foreign commitments. Of further import is that the preparations indicated that the PAAF would be the main force for CGAO in the future and that the NPAAF squadrons and personnel would simply be involved in training for their main role, a point that will be developed in Chapter 5.
Finally, Chapter 5 is devoted to the RCAF and the myriad internal pressures within the military. It is here that the main reasons for the creation of NPAAF squadrons can be found. This chapter shows how the factors examined in previous chapters were brought together to form the groundwork upon which the RCAF's desire for NPAAF 25 squadrons was expressed. One of the main points that will be demonstrated is that the squadrons were authorized as part of greater plan formulated by the CGS, General
McNaughton, to provide an expeditionary force capability for the Canadian Militia and
RCAF. 26
Chapter 1 The Usual Suspects: Finance and Public Opinion
The two most common reasons cited for the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons are financial and public opinion. The argument for financial reasons is that with reduced funding, the RCAF believed that part-time NPAAF personnel and squadrons were the least expensive option for maintaining a military capability. For public opinion, the reasoning is based on public pressure causing the RCAF to establish squadrons in specific locations. Before examining other factors that may have played a role in the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons, it is important to review these two factors as this produces two results. First, it examines these demands so that positive confirmation can be made as to whether or not they actually played a role. Secondly, it provides a background that allows a greater understanding of the factors that did influence the decision to create the squadrons. As it is, this chapter will demonstrate that these two demands did not play the role that has often been ascribed to them.
The first question that must be asked is whether finance and public opinion were possible demands, as recognized by Easton, on the RCAF. For these two suggested reasons to be plausible as demands, they must have been able to exert some influence upon the RCAF that would cause the RCAF to respond in a possible manner that would result in the creation of the NPAAF squadrons. In October 1932, when the flying squadrons were authorized, Canada was three years into the Depression. The Bennett government was increasingly having problems assisting Canadians as more of them were succumbing to the poverty of the Depression each year. The government had not originally recognized that there was a long-term problem with the Canadian economy and the welfare of Canadians, and had thus continued its normal spending habits. In Fiscal 27
Year (FY) 1931-32, The Bennett government made small cuts to the Federal budget, including to the RCAF's; however, the realization came in late 1931 that the Depression was not a short-term phenomenon and that larger cuts would have to follow.
Prime Minister Bennett was also his own Minister of Finance (as well as Minister of External Affairs). He had the capability to impose cuts on the RCAF and even force a restructuring had he so desired. Further, with greatly reduced funding, the RCAF would have been forced to review its operations and determine what it required to maintain a semblance of military capability. Part-time NPAAF personnel, organized into squadrons with specific roles, would be much less expensive than full-time PAAF squadrons.38 It is therefore highly plausible to see financial restrictions as a cause for the creation of the
NPAAF squadrons.
Public opinion has always played a part in modern Canadian politics. In
Bennett's first two years in power he received thousands of letters from ordinary
Canadians describing their poverty and hardships.39 As will be noted below, the RCAF and the Government received many requests related to the formation of NPAAF squadrons. The possibility of creating at a small price some employment and generating local pride in having a RCAF squadron could have been an incentive to Bennett to pressure the RCAF into locating a squadron in a particular location or in forming NPAAF squadrons. Public opinion, coupled with political desire, would thus have been a possible demand on the RCAF also.
38 The NPAAF squadrons would only be given four training aircraft, vice the 15 operational aircraft required for a PAAF squadron. As training aircraft were less expensive and the numbers were to be fewer in the NPAAF squadrons, there was a cost savings. Further, NPAAF personnel were only to be paid for 30 days service a year, vice the 365 (plus other benefits) for which PAAF personnel were paid. See DHH 73/664, "The Analysis of the Draft Convention," Annex 4, part III for info on PAAF and NPAAF squadrn comparison. 39 J.H. Thompson with A. Seager, Canada, 1922-1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1985), 212-3. 28
This chapter will examine finance and public pressure as demands on the RCAF, putting pressure on the RCAF directly or indirectly through agencies and persons outside the RCAF. Both factors will be shown to have had an effect upon the RCAF and the authorization of the NPAAF flying squadrons; however, both factors also will be shown to have had an effect insufficient to have been the sole cause of the creation of the flying squadrons.
Financial Reductions and the Big Cut
The "Big Cut" is given credit in some texts as the event that forced the military to change the role of the RCAF from "Bush Pilots in Uniform" to military pilots and create the NPAAF flying squadrons.40 The Big Cut describes the 1932 chopping of the RCAF budget from $5,442,000 in FY 1931-32 to $1,750,000 in FY 1932-33. The apparent reasoning for ascribing credit to the Big Cut as the origin of the NPAAF flying squadrons is that with funding significantly reduced, the RCAF of necessity began its transformation into a military service, with the implication that the operational NPAAF squadrons were created as part of this transformation, providing capability at an inexpensive price. None of the existing literature explicitly states this; however, as a general argument, it is the most likely reasoning for the Big Cut resulting in the formation of the NPAAF squadrons.
There are several salient facts that reduce the effectiveness of this argument.
After the Big Cut, the RCAF still continued to conduct more flying for other government departments than it did military flying, albeit both at greatly reduced rates. This
40 For example, see Greenhous and Halliday, Canada's Air Forces, 36, Roberts, There Shall be Wings, 107, or McNorgan, 402 "City of Winnipeg" Squadron History, 1 and 4-5. This book also cites public pressure as a reason for Winnipeg being chosen to receive one of the first three squadrons. 29 continued even after the RCAF began re-arming towards a military force in 1935, as noted in Table 1.41 Thus, the creation of the NPAAF squadrons did not change the operational orientation of the RCAF. Secondly, if the RCAF had been intent on creating inexpensive squadrons, then why did they not do so before the Big Cut, when the RCAF did have funding to spend on creating such units? As it was, the RCAF, as will be shown, did not have any expectation of funding any NPAAF squadrons when the creation of the first three was announced in October 1932. So why would the RCAF announce squadrons that would not start any training for several years?
Table 1: Hours flow by type of operation
Year Hours Flown - CGAO Hours Flown - Hours Flown - Operations Training FY 1932-33 2,672 hours, 05 min 1,982 hours, 05 min 4,921 hours,45 min
FY 1933-34 3,490 hours, 50 min 1,331 hours, 45 min 5,940 hours, 10 min
FY1934-35 3,745 hours, 55 min 1,389 hours, 45 min 7,331 hours, 30 min
FY 1935-36 4,049 hours, 25 min 1,288 hours, 40 min 5,113 hours, 25 min
FY 1936-37 4,686 hours, 25 min 1,269 hours, 05 min 6,148 hours, 35 min
Thus, the issue of funding and the creation of NPAAF flying squadrons appear to be closely linked. Historically, there is ample evidence to support this contention.
Provision for NPAAF flying squadrons had been included in the 1924 King's Regulations
See the Report of the Department of National Defence Canada for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1933 (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1934), 45; Report of the Department of National Defence Canada for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1934 (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1934), 78-79. Report of the Department of National Defence Canada for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1935 (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, I.S.O., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1935), 70-71 and 78; Report of the Department of National Defence Canada for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1936 (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, I.S.O., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1936), 61 and 63-64. Report of the Department of National Defence Canada for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1937 (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, I.S.O., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1937), 72 and 78. Ibid. and Orders for the Royal Canadian Air Force. The fact that none were created was in part ascribed by the RCAF to a lack of funding. The 1925 and 1926 Report of the
Department of National Defence stated: "No Non-Permanent Active Air Force units have as yet been formed, due to financial limitations."43 In subsequent years, the Reports only indicate the number of NPAAF personnel on the establishment and on strength, if and when they mention the status of the NPAAF. Financial limitations may also have been responsible for a policy noted in 1929, that the then current composition of the RCAF was to stay fixed;44 however, no reasons were stated for the continuation of the status quo. With the RCAF fully employed in CGAO, there may not have been any funding left over for the creation of NPAAF squadrons.
General McNaughton provided an alternate explanation as to why no NPAAF squadrons were formed. In 1930 he advised the Imperial Conference:
[t]o obtain adequate financial grants for our Fighting Services it was of importance that the Services should do some work which was of direct and immediate assistance to the State. We were employing aircraft for survey work, and unless this had been arranged extreme difficulty would have been found in procuring the funds necessary to maintain the 224 aircraft that they had now.45
Clearly the lack of funds was a problem that prevented NPAAF flying squadrons from being formed. It is also evident from McNaughton's statement where the
Report of the Department of National Defence Canada for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1926 (Ottawa: F.A. Acland, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1926) 47 and Report of the Department of National Defence Canada for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1927 (Ottawa: F.A. Acland, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1927), 39. DHH 74/282, Letter from E.G. Fullerton to RCAF Liaison Officer London, 1019-1-18, 29 July 1929. The letter indicated that there was no intention of creating an "Auxiliary Air Force" at that time and that the current policy was to "limit" the composition of the RCAF. DHH112.1 (D142); "Report of the Chief of the General Staff on the Imperial Conference, 1930", 2 December 1930,4. In 1931, Squadron Leader G.E. Wait expressed similar sentiments. See DHH 75/332; Squadron Leader G.E. Wait, "The Canadian Air Services", 1931, 2; DHH 75/338; Flight Lieutenant J.L.E.A. De Niverville, "R.A.F. Staff College 11th Course, The Royal Canadian Air Force" 12 December 1933, 2. 31 concentration of effort had to be placed, and the government's priority was CGAO in order for the RCAF to continue as a force. Forming NPAAF squadrons in the late 1920s could have created a problem for the RCAF. The government had to authorize these squadrons, at a time when its priorities lay with CGAO. As will be noted in the section on public pressure, the RCAF made several attempts to form their own Auxiliary Air
Force, all of which were fruitless. Thus, budget considerations had to be balanced against government priorities, namely CGAO.
To all appearances, senior RCAF personnel accepted the first reduction in the
RCAF budget, in FY 1931-32, without comment because of the Depression. In fact, for the RCAF, there were no real changes in operations as the number of hours flown for all causes increased.46 In the preparations for the 1932-33 main estimates that were to eventually result in the Big Cut, there were no indications of any plans for fiscal restraint.
The documents all showed that the various Military Districts produced estimates of the fiscal requirements of the RCAF stations within their area, estimates that were similar to those for the previous fiscal year.47 Of greater significance was the fact that no line items were observed indicating that funds were to be spent on creating NPAAF flying squadrons.
The figures for dollars and hours originate with the Report of the Department of National Defence Canada for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1931 (Ottawa: F.A. Acland, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1931), 44 and 78; and Report of the Department of National Defence Canada for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1932 (Ottawa: F.A. Acland, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1932), 45 and 80. It is unknown in what area(s) the reduction had effect, as hours flown and personnel trained showed no reduction. A comparison of the two Reports and the appropriate chapters in Hitchins, Air Board, did not provide any such detail. It is possible the reductions affected equipment purchases, such as aircraft, and administrative work. It should be noted that because the RCAF reported to the CGS, RCAF estimates were prepared by the stations and units and submitted through the Militia District in which they were situated. See the large volume of documents prior to February 1932 in LAC, RG24, Vol. 3548, File HQ 929-10-19, RCAF Estimates 1932-33. Although no overall total is given for the planned estimates, a comparison of selected unit budgets with their 1931-32 figures indicates that a similar budget was foreseen for 1932- 33. 32
However, while the RCAF planned according to what the organization believed would be a situation similar to the previous FY, at the Ministerial level there was an awareness of the looming problem. The documents relating to the RCAF's main estimates for 1931-32 indicate that towards the end of the fiscal year, the Deputy Minister
(DM) of National Defence, Mr. G J. Desbarats, made the decision that unspent funds were to be returned to the government. Such a return of unspent funds had not previously occurred. This suggests that at the DM level, there was an awareness as early as 1
February 1932 that a situation of tight fiscal expenditures existed and that efforts were underway to find ways of economizing.48
There were other such actions indicative of a high-level effort to economize and reduce spending . General McNaughton had departed for the Geneva Disarmament
Conference in late January. He left Colonel H.H. Matthews in charge in his absence.
Matthews, in a letter to McNaughton of 28 January, indicated that the Minister had stated that troops at Camp Borden could live in tents for the summer and that he would not authorize the expenditure of funds on barracks.49 The Prime Minister, in his role as
Minister of Finance, had also been involved in the workings of the Department of
National Defence asking for the names of all engineers in the department. Matthews saw nothing sinister in these events, believing the latter to be a case of consolidation of engineering services.50 McNaughton apparently did not foresee a problem either as he took no further action. In a similar vein, the Minister of National Defence advised the
48 On this date, the Deputy Minister, on instructions from the Minister, ordered that unused funds to the amount of $172,000 allocated to purchasing aircraft and engines for training was not to be spent. LAC, RG24, Vol. 3548, File HQ 929-10-16 RCAF Estimates 1931-32, Memorandum from Deputy Minister, HQ 929-10-16, 1st February 1932. 49 A fire in early January had destroyed the officers' barracks. 50 LAC, MG30 E-133 (McNaughton Fonds) Box 5, Folder: League of Nations Disarmament Conference, Geneva 1932. Letter from Matthews to McNaughton dated 28th January 1932. 33
Prime Minister that the department could save money on the salaries of civil engineers within the department, including the RCAF, without consulting anybody in the
Department of National Defence.51
The Prime Minister, as well as the Minister and Deputy Minister of National
Defence, all appear to have been aware of the fact that RCAF spending was going to be
reduced, and that efforts had to be made to find economies. McNaughton on the other
hand, despite his close relationship with Bennett, was not aware of the pending cuts. If
he had been, he would most likely have taken some action, which he did eventually when
he learned of the budget cuts. It would appear that the Prime Minister, the Minister of
National Defence and the Deputy Minister of National Defence were working behind
McNaughton's back, possibly to avoid a confrontation. A confrontation, however, would
most likely have been easier once the cutbacks were on paper, rather than only in the
planning stages.
Bennett's efforts to find ways of reducing spending appear to be the extent of his
activities with the RCAF's funding and structure. There are no letters or other documents
in his personal papers that suggest that he took an active interest in the Army or the
RCAF. Nor were there any such documents found in the files of the Library and
Archives Canada or DND's Directorate of History and Heritage. Even in McNaughton's
personal papers there is no mention of Bennett becoming involved in reorganizing the
RCAF or influencing any of McNaughton's decisions. Given that Bennett has been
51 Ibid, Letter from Matthews to McNaughton dated 2 February 1932. 52 Swettenham notes this close relationship in a number of instances, observing for instance that in April 1933 Bennett gave McNaughton a telephone call and then asked him to conduct an informal study on civil aviation. "Bennett used his Chief of the General Staff exactly as a senior commander would use a staff officer, ignoring the fact that as Prime Minister he had departmental channels through which to pursue his inquiries." Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol.1, 288-9. See also 314 for another example. Harris also makes the point that "Bennett preferred to deal with McNaughton on an informal, personal, non-institutional basis." Harris, Canadian Brass, 162. 34 characterized as a micro-manager, this suggests remarkable restraint, or considerable trust on the part of Bennett towards McNaughton. This trust did not, however, extend to advising the CGS of what was planned in financial matters towards his force.
On 15 February 1932 the axe fell on the RCAF when the main estimates were tabled in the House of Commons. The government's proposed budget had an overall reduction of $43 million in expenditures of which the RCAF's budget was reduced almost
$3.7 million, or 67 percent.53 There is no doubt that this event took all members of the military by surprise as the members of the Department only became aware of the budget cuts on this date, and then only through media and telephone calls and not through the
Minister of National Defence. At this time the Minister authorized the discharge of most of the NPAAF officers in the Department. As Matthews noted in a telegram to
McNaughton:
Departmental officials not consulted before these reductions submitted to House ... Appears all CGAO activities must cease. Discharge of all but 9 of total of the 78 non-permanent air officers authorized by Minister this morning Wednesday. Reduction in air sub staff may be necessary. Suggest you(r) [sic] recall to Minister but he is not inclined to be precipitate in this matter.54
As a result of this unanticipated reduction, McNaughton returned to Canada to argue the case for retaining a larger portion of the budget, especially the RCAF's. While he was enroute, planning was already underway as to how the RCAF could cope with the greatly reduced funding and manpower. The Acting Director of the RCAF, Wing
Commander L.S. Breadner, sent a letter to the militia indicating that the RCAF could not
53 See William Marchington, "Axe falls heavily upon every branch of Federal service" in Globe and Mail, 16 February 1932, 1. 54 LAC, MG30 E-133 (McNaughton Fonds) Box 5, Folder: League of Nations Disarmament Conference, Geneva 1932, Telegram to McNaughton in Geneva, 17 Feb 32. In fact, the remaining nine were also released. 35 pay for militia personnel who had been supporting the RCAF; these included engineering, medical and wireless services.55 While debates and accusations were traded in the House of Commons between the Government and the opposition as to what to do with the NPAAF officers and airmen who were released, the RCAF proposed putting these individuals on the Reserve of Officers as a means of retaining them in the RCAF.56
Group Captain J.L. Gordon, in explaining the need for $10,000 for the Reserve of
Officers, indicated that "[t]his reserve will allow appointments to NP Sqns as, and when they are formed," further indicating that unless the Reserve were formed, the money spent on training these individuals would be wasted.57 The funds were not provided despite the logic of the requirement, while the quote also shows that creation of NPAAF squadrons was being considered, but with no date.
The formation of NPAAF squadrons was but one consideration for the RCAF and
McNaughton as they prepared to minimize the effects of the funding reduction on personnel and operations. At this time there was nothing noted in the documentary record that suggested that the RCAF or McNaughton were thinking that the creation of
NPAAF flying squadrons would create a cost-effective solution to providing military capability. In fact, funding for these flying squadrons was available in neither FY 1932-
33 nor FY 1933-34. Although there was a request for some funding in order to begin
LAC, RG24, Vol. 3549, File: HQ 929-10-19 RCAF 1932-33 Estimates, Letter from Wing Commander L.S. Breadner, 929-10-19 FD 362 dated February 17, 1932. The greater portion of the debates in the House related to a group of NPAAF personnel who had offered their services to the Government of China. The debate questioned whether this was legal, and then focused on support of five airmen who became stranded in China after they had arrived there and then not found employment with the Chinese air force. Some debate questioned whether the Government could release the NPAAF personnel in the manner that it did. See for example Debates of the House of Commons, 18 February 1932 (307-8), 26 February (558-9, 597-8), 29 February (612). LAC, RG24 Vol. 3549, File: HQ 949-10-19 RCAF 1932-33 Estimates, Memorandum from Group Captain G.L. Gordon to General McNaughton, 929-10-19, April 18, 1932. 36
organizing the squadrons in FY 1933-34, there are no indications that the funds were
allocated.58
The RCAF's greatest effort appears to have been aimed at reprioritizing its tasks
so that what little money remained in the budget could be best used. This was achieved
after much review of operations with the result that the RCAF remained very much "bush pilots in uniform" as the vast majority of operations in the next three years were CGAO, but at a greatly reduced rate of flying. By the time the NP AAF flying squadrons were
approved by Order-in-Council PC 2198 on 5 October 1932, the immediate problems of
the funding shortfall had been managed.
Thus, while the Big Cut had a dramatic effect upon the RCAF, there is no proven
"cause and effect" relationship found between the budget reductions and the creation of
the squadrons. As McNaughton and the annual reports had noted, fiscal restrictions had
prevented the formation of the squadrons. The NPAAF flying squadrons do not appear in
any documents as a less expensive alternative, nor was there a linkage between the cuts
and immediate formation of the squadrons. Creation of the NPAAF squadrons was not
included in the planned expenditures for FY 1932-33. Further, the fact that there was no
funding provided to the squadrons for two years suggests that funding was not the real
issue behind the creation of the squadrons, as they were authorized and the first manning
started before funds were available.
DHH 75/454, Box 1928-1934; The main estimates for the RCAF state: "This Estimate does not provide:- Courses for Non-Permanent Air Force personnel," 2. A review of the individual line items in the main estimates does not show any funding for the NPAAF. In the supplementary estimates, line 7 provides $4,500 for "Expenses for Organization of Non-Permanent R.C.A.F." Further, DHH 181.009 (D1861), Memorandum Group Captain G.L. Gordon, Senior Air Officer to RCAF Liaison Officer, London, 1019-1-33, 8 February 1933 also indicates that the RCAF had planned for the fact that there would be no funding for NPAAF squadrons in FY 1933-34. It should be noted that the NPAAF squadrons were authorized and the first staffing initiated before funding was available. 37
As we shall see in later chapters, planning for NPAAF squadrons had been underway since 1924. Their formation had remained a matter of operational requirements overtaking military requirements/desires. With funding being dedicated to
CGAO, the RCAF could not commit to forming NPAAF flying squadrons.
Public Pressure
Carl Vincent, among others, has stated that the NPAAF "owed their formations largely to the pressure from prominent citizens in major urban localities who were interested in aviation and who felt that Canada in general and their cities in particular should have an Air Force equivalent to the Army and the Navy reserve units."59 This public pressure is sometimes given credit for the formation of the NPAAF squadrons in specific locations. In order for public pressure to have been the cause of the authorization of the first NPAAF squadrons, one of two conditions would have to have been satisfied.
There would have to be a history showing that the RCAF was not interested in forming such squadrons, or that any interest within the RCAF had completely waned, thus making it possible for public pressure to have been the prime factor in the formation of NPAAF squadrons.
As will be further explained in Chapter 3, the RCAF was interested in the RAF's
AuxAF even as the Order-in-Council for it was being created in 1924.60 In January 1927, in an evaluation of whether the RCAF should be conducting CGAO, the Director of the
RCAF, Group Captain J.S. Scott, indicated in a memo that the RCAF should be focused
59 Carl Vincent, "Vancouver's Weekend Warriors" in High Flight, Volume 1, No. 1, 25. This is a history of No. 11 (Army Co-operation) Squadron. 60 DHH 181.009 (D1518); See minutes between S.7. Reserve, RAF Headquarters and RCAF Liaison Officer, London, dated 13 June 1924 and 17 June 1924. 38 upon military activities and that "a large and efficient Air Force Reserve should be established."61 Further, the memo indicated that the RCAF should remove itself from
CGAO over time in a manner that would not create problems for the organizations then relying upon the RCAF. Clearly, the RCAF had the creation of NPAAF squadrons in mind, although not stating squadrons, the wording that "a large and efficient" force would need to be properly organized, suggests squadrons. Further, from the way that
"Reserve" is used, Scott was indicating the NPAAF, and not the non-active reserve component of the RCAF.
Later that year, in July, the RCAF indicated an interest in creating its own
Auxiliary, as the RCAF was "primarily a military force," and after having received RAF publications on the AuxAF was prepared to proceed with the formation of the "R.C.A.F.
Auxiliary Air Force."62 In 1928 and 1929 the RCAF further indicated a desire to create an Auxiliary Air Force, but did not. This was apparently the end of RCAF efforts to gather RAF assistance in creating NPAAF flying squadrons. However, events appear to have overtaken the intentions of the RCAF, as in July 1929, the RCAF Liaison Officer in
London was advised that the proposed organization of the Auxiliary Air Force was in abeyance for the time being. The reason stated was simply that the RCAF's current structure was being limited, without stating by whom.63 By "structure" it would appear that it was the contemporary operations and organization of the RCAF to which reference was being made. In this case, CGAO was dominating the RCAF and its operations and
DHH 74/272, Memorandum from Group Captain J.S. Scott, Director, RCAF, Major General J.H. MacBrien, to Chief of the General Staff, 18 January 1927, 3. DHH 74/282, Flying Officer H.W. Hewson to RCAF Liaison Officer London, 1044-3-20, 17 December 1927. Note how the name is identical to that of the RAF's component. Ibid. Flight Lieutenant E.G. Fullerton to RCAF Liaison Officer London, 1019-1-18, 29 July 1929. 39 structure with the result that the desire for an auxiliary air force along RAF lines had died.
The organization of NPAAF squadrons, modeled upon the RAF's AuxAF, was not, however, dead. On 1 November 1932, Militia General Order (G.O.) No. 147, which announced the Order-in-Council, indicated that three NPAAF squadrons were to be formed, plus one wing headquarters. In G.O. No. 147, only No. 10 (Army Co-operation)
Squadron was given a location, that of Toronto. On 1 January 1933, Militia General
Order No. 2 indicated that No. 11 (Army Co-operation) Squadron was to form in
Vancouver and No. 12 (Army Co-operation) in Winnipeg.64 This was almost in exact accordance with the RCAF plan for the establishment of the NPAAF squadrons, although the squadron in Vancouver was originally to have been a bomber squadron and Toronto's a fighter squadron (see Table 2).
Table 2 shows that the RCAF had a plan, signed off on 18 July 1932, for the location of the NPAAF squadrons and was able to follow the plan fairly closely. In the plan of July 1932, the criteria for the selection of locations for NPAAF squadrons were: strategic requirements, distribution by province and capability to provide technical personnel and facilities.65 This plan was later refined in 1933 so that when requests for
NPAAF squadrons were received by the Deputy Minister, the RCAF response was always that there were four requirements:
1) strategic requirements: that there was a need for a squadron in that location for defence reasons; 2) distribution by province according to their population;
DHH 76/46, "Peace Organization and Establishment of the R.C.A.F. considered necessary to meet minimum requirements for National Defence", July 18th, 1932, 3 40
3) the existence of local flying clubs from which pilots could be obtained; and 4) industrial centres from which mechanics could be obtained. 66 Table 2: Location and Roles of NPAAF Squadrons'6 7
Location and date Proposed role Role when formed authorized Victoria Fighter Not formed
Vancouver (1932) Bomber Army Cooperation
Edmonton Bomber Not formed
Calgary (1937) Army Cooperation Army Cooperation
Regina(1935) Fighter Bomber
Winnipeg (1932) Army Cooperation Army Cooperation
Toronto (1932) Fighter Army Cooperation
Hamilton (1935) Army Cooperation Bomber
Montreal (1934) Army Cooperation Fighter
Quebec City (1937) Bomber Bomber
St. John (1938) Bomber Fighter Coastal Artillery Halifax (1938) Fighter Cooperation London (1938) Not one of original 12 Bomber
Montreal (1934) Not one of original 12 Bomber
Additionally, Table 2 shows that the proposed Army Co-operation Squadrons were situated near major militia training bases. The RCAF plan of July 1932 indicated that
DHH 181.009 (D1861), various letters and memoranda provide the four points noted in the text. 67 The table is based on DHH 76/46, "Peace Organization and Establishment", Appendix B, and on information for individual squadrons found in S. Kostenuk and J. Griffin, RCAF Squadron Histories and Aircraft, 1924-1968 (Toronto and Sarasota: Samuel Stevens Hakkert and Company, 1977). 41 such locations were chosen to "permit them to co-operate in Militia training (in peace
After the order was made that NPAAF squadrons were to be formed, at least 36 cities and towns across Canada submitted requests for a NPAAF squadron to be formed in their location.69 The first request letter was from Vancouver; the next letter, dated 23
November 1932, was from Portage la Prairie, Manitoba. In all cases the reply was that the RCAF was forming only 12 NPAAF squadrons, based on distribution throughout the provinces, and on strategic requirementsAs a result Portage la Prairie, although apparently second to request a squadron, did not get one.70 The responses to the Deputy
Minister echo the plan and justification proposed by Squadron Leader Walsh as the future structure of the RCAF and specifically the NPAAF. What is not accounted for in any books or articles is why Toronto and Vancouver had their roles changed.
For the period prior to the announcement of the planned formation of the NPAAF squadrons, there is some evidence that there was lobbying for NPAAF units to be created.
Hitchins noted that in 1925 a resolution from the Air Force Club of British Columbia was read in Parliament. Major A.D. Bell-Irving, who was President of the Club, had asked that the Department of National Defence consider forming a "Reserve Air Arm, to be
DHH 76/46, "Peace Organization and Establishment", 2. See letters in DHH, 181.009 (D1861) and 181.009 (D2512). It should be noted that of the list of requests, there was one request dated 5 April 1932 from "Captain Seymour Biggs" of Victoria. Neither the letter nor the response was found on this or other files. Captain Biggs is believed to be Captain (Navy) Henry Seymour-Biggs (retired), formerly of the Royal Navy. He was a strong supporter of the military and is known to have recruited and sent young men to join the Royal Air Force starting as early as 1937. See Ken Stofer, The Biggs Boys (Victoria, BC: Kenlyn Publishing, 1995). One memorandum does exist making reference to a letter from Captain H. Seymour Biggs of early 1939 - DHH 181.009 (D1861), Memorandum to Deputy Minister from Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil, Chief of the Air Staff, 1019-1-32, F.D. 490, 7 February 1939. In fact, as will be shown below, Toronto was the first to request a NPAAF squadron, having put pressure on the Minister of National Defence in May 1931. The fact that there is no mention of this in the DHH, 181.009 (D1861) and 181.009 (D2512) files suggest that these files may be incomplete. 42 trained under R.C.A.F. supervision" to guard the British Columbia coast. With this, the matter appears to have been dropped, as no letter or other documentation between 1925 and 1931 was found indicating a desire on the part of any organization that NPAAF or
Reserve squadrons be formed; however, in 1931 lobbying resumed.
In November 1931 lobbying resumed when a group in Toronto wrote to the
Minister of National Defence desiring to form a "Reserve Squadron." which would eventually become No. 10 (Army Cooperation) Squadron. The group consisted of 16 individuals, including ten from the Toronto Flying Club. The reply from the Deputy
Minister was that the formation of the NPAAF had been under consideration for some time but that the subject was not sufficiently developed to permit actual organization.
Desbarats did indicate that a squadron would be localized in Toronto "if an[sic] when"
NPAAF squadrons were established.73 A petition signed by 26 individuals from the
Toronto area also arrived for the Minister, stating they wished to be considered for the
squadron.74 Further discussions took place at which time the groups in Toronto were
advised that the RCAF was not yet ready to organize the squadrons.75
Hitchins, Air Board, 141. It should be noted that while Hitchins refers to the organization as the Air Force Club of British Columbia the name was later changed to the Aero Club of British Columbia. LAC, RG 24, Series E-l-c, Volume 4951, File 895-9/110, Part 1; HQ 1019-10-1, Letter to D.M. Sutherland, Minister of National Defence, 24 November 1931. The group included Roy Maxwell, director of the Ontario Provincial Air Service, F.L. Trethewey, Director of de Havilland Canada and Phillip Garratt, who later became Director of de Havilland. LAC, RG 24, Series E-l-c, Volume 4951, File 895-9/110, Part 1; 1019-10-1 Deputy Minister G.J. Desbarats to A.J. Boddy, 28 January 1932. The Aero Club of British Columbia was the successor to the Air Force Club of British Columbia. "Localized" was the term used in Ministerial, Militia and RCAF documents to indicate that a location had been found. LAC, RG 24, Series E-l-c, Volume 4951, File 895-9/110, Part 1; Petition from Toronto group to Secretary, Department of National Defence, 30 May 1932. The names included W.A. Curtis, later post-war Chief of the Air Staff. LAC, RG 24, Series E-l-c, Volume 4951, File 895-9/110, Part 1; Tor: 5-41, D.G. Joy, District Inspector, Civil Aviation, Toronto to Controller Civil Aviation, 31 May 1932 and "memorandum of Meeting at City Hall - Toronto" by Group Captain Gordon, undated but shortly after 8 June 1932. 43
For No. 11 (Army Co-operation) Squadron in Vancouver, Group Captain
Gordon, recommended to the CGS on 5 December 1932 that Vancouver be approved as the site of one of the two NPAAF squadrons that had yet to be allocated to a city.
Gordon further indicated that an application had been made in Spring 1932, and that
Vancouver qualified as strategically important, had considerable interest already and had the facilities to accommodate a squadron.76 Who it was that wrote in Spring 1932 is not clear but records provided by Bell-Irving on the formation of No. 11 (AC) Squadron, he indicated that he first brought up the subject of an NPAAF squadron in Vancouver in
November 1932, after the formation of NPAAF squadrons had been announced in Militia
General Orders. Further, he stated that the Aero Club of British Columbia sent a letter on
77
30 December 1932. On 5 December, Gordon recommended that Vancouver be selected, with the CGS approving the choice and forwarding the recommendation to the Minister the next day. On 16 December, the Minister approved Vancouver as the site of one of the two remaining NPAAF squadrons.78
In Winnipeg, a "communication" from the Managing Secretary, Winnipeg Board of Trade, was successful in having No. 12 (Army Co-operation) Squadron formed there.
In this case, Group Captain Gordon noted that Winnipeg had a small aviation industry, an airport and qualified and experienced personnel available. Further, Winnipeg had the
LAC, RG 24, Series E-l-c, Volume 4951, File 895-9/111, Part 1; Memorandum, Group Captain Gordon to General McNaughton, 5 December 1932. DHH Operational Record No. Ill Squadron, Mfm reel no. 96; "Extracts from Manuscript Record Book of No. 111 (AC) Squadron, RCAF (NP) covering the period July 1932 - April 1940, loaned by Group Captain A.D. Bell-Irving. (July 1959)," 1. LAC, RG 24, Series E-l-c, Volume 4951, File 895-9/111, Part 1; Memorandum from Group Captain Gordon to General McNaughton, 5 December 1932; Memorandum from General McNaughton to MND, 6 December 1932, and HQ 1019-11-1, from Lieutenant Colonel C.R. Scott, Military Secretary to the MND to General McNaughton, 16 December 1932. LAC, RG 24, Series E-l-c, Volume 4951, File 895-9/112, Part 1; Memorandum, Group Captain Gordon to General McNaughton, 14 December 1932. 44
Militia Permanent Force troops to whom the NPAAF squadron could provide support if an Army Co-operation squadron were located there. Gordon recommended to the CGS that Winnipeg be approved, with Ministerial approval given on 16 December.
From the foregoing letters, it is evident that Toronto had a well-organized campaign to bring a NPAAF squadron to that city even before the announcement was made that NPAAF squadrons were to be formed. For Winnipeg, the letter appears to have arrived after the formation of NPAAF squadrons was announced, while for
Vancouver, there was a letter from an unknown source before the announcement of the
NPAAF squadrons, and two after. All three squadrons were formed as Army Co operation squadrons, yet according to the information related in Table 2Toronto and
Vancouver were not to have had those roles. With Vancouver, Gordon indicated it was a strategic location; however, this was most likely not for Army Cooperation, but for defence, a role that should have suggested a bomber squadron. This discrepancy cannot be sufficiently resolved simply on the basis of the lobbying that produced the squadron.
As noted above, the RCAF already had plans to "form" squadrons in specific locations.
This suggests that public pressure only changed the timing of squadron formations, but was not responsible for their actual creation, their location o or their roles. Further, other factors must have been at work in order for the role to have changed.
Further evidence suggests that the lobbying efforts of interested parties in
Toronto, Winnipeg and Vancouver were limited to the RCAF. It was only after the first
80 Ibid, and HQ 1019-12-1, from Lieutenant Colonel C.R. Scott, Military Secretary to the MND, to General McNaughton, 16 December 1932. 81 The exception to this may be the squadron in London and the extra squadron in Montreal, which may have been thus situated because of public pressure; however, the origin of these squadrons has not been examined as part of this study. What can be stated positively is that ten squadrons were formed exactly where the RCAF had intended, based on its plan of July 1932 and not where public pressure or prominent citizens had desired. 45 three squadrons had been announced that Canadian began writing to their local politicians; however, as previously noted, the RCAF had already chosen its 12 locations.82Prime Minister Bennett also received letters; however, the letters in his personal papers do not show any pressure or requests to form NPAAF squadrons but were generally appeals about enrolments or releases. On matters related to this study, only the issue of disarmament and the Disarmament Conference were the subject of letters to Bennett.
Air Vice Marshal A.A.L. Cuffe, in an interview of 6 March 1964, indicated that in
1930 there was no auxiliary air force as there were no funds available, but that in 1931 the press began to "agitate for a non-permanent force." 84 An examination of three major newspapers revealed no agitation for the years 1930 to 1933, especially none in the editorial sections of the Globe and Mail, Toronto Daily Star and Ottawa Evening
or
Journal. Even with the slashing of the RCAF budget in February 1932, there was no commentary related to the harm this reduction did to the Air Force or any suggestion for a non-permanent force. The RCAF, in fact, was hardly mentioned as an organization in these newspapers, although its personnel were occasionally mentioned if they had attended some event.
The one instance suggesting an auxiliary or reserve squadron be formed occurred in March 1931. The Toronto Daily Star and the Ottawa Evening Journal both reported that at the banquet for the McKee Trophy presentation, Colonel W. A. Bishop, VC,
82 See letters inDHH, 181.009 (D1861) and 181.009 (D2512). 83 For instance there was an appeal regarding the release of Flying Officer F.J. Russell who was released because he was found unsuitable, or a young man who wanted to join the RCAF. LAC, Bennett Fonds, Reel Ml 106, 288220 and 288307. 84 DHH, Camp Borden PRF File, Folder 3. 85 It should be noted that in Parliament there was also no pressure or comments made to the effect that NPAAF squadrons should be formed. 46
"believed that a strong R.C.A.F. reserve should be established."86 From the reporting of
Bishop's speech it is clear that Bishop was referring to the RCAF Reserve and not to the
NPAAF, as he suggested that the RCAF start recruiting civilians who could be called upon to serve in the event of hostilities.
The timing of Bishop's suggestion and the petition from the aviators in Toronto for a "reserve squadron" suggests that the letters may have been the result of Bishop's speech. That the reply from the Deputy Minister to the petitioners referred to an NPAAF squadron possibly indicates the confusion within the RCAF as to the usage of the terms
"reserve" and "NPAAF." It is also possible that the RCAF suggested to the Deputy
Minister that reference to the formation of an NPAAF squadron in Toronto would satisfy the petitioners, as the NPAAF would most likely be an acceptable substitute, or it could indicate that the RCAF was already considering forming an NPAAF squadron there.
The foregoing examination of the two usual reasons for the formation of the
NPAAF squadrons suggests that these two explanations do not completely explain their origin. Financially, the timing of the Big Cut followed by the formation of the NPAAF flying squadrons appears to be coincidental, or possibly the impetus for a program that was already planned in the 1920s. As will be noted later, planning for the squadrons was already underway when the reductions occurred on 15 February 1932. The formation of
NPAAF flying squadrons had been delayed in the mid- and late-1920s because of funding shortages, with the delay in formation possible for future years if funding were a problem. As it was, the RCAF recognized that funding would not be available for several
86 J.A. Wilson, Controller of Civil Aviation reiterated Bishop's comments. Ottawa Evening Journal, "Urge Rockcliffe 'Drome be Called 'Barker's Field'", 27 March 1931, 4 and Toronto Daily Star, "War Pilots Reunite at Toronto in 1933", 27 March 1931, 20. 47 years, but went ahead and formed the squadrons on paper despite the lack of funds.
There appears to have been no political pressure to form the squadrons based on the usual reason of financial reduction and the potential for the NPAAF squadrons to provide military capability at reduced cost.
In terms of public opinion, there was a demand placed upon the RCAF; however, it appears to have been coincidental to the RCAF's own plans. As noted in the Deputy
Minister's letter of January 1932, the RCAF was exploring the creation of the squadrons, but was not yet ready to authorize any. The few letters in Bennett's records that are related to the RCAF do not espouse the creation of new RCAF units. Public lobbying, therefore, primarily occurred after the authorization of the first three squadrons. Where public lobbying may have played a role was in advancing the timing of when two of the first three squadrons were formed - in Winnipeg and Vancouver. No evidence exists that the RCAF was prepared to form squadrons in these two cities until after the announcement on 5 October 1932 that three NPAAF squadrons were to be formed.
Further, only Winnipeg, Vancouver and Portage la Prairie indicated a desire to have
NPAAF squadrons prior to the end of 1932, and of these Portage la Prairie was not on the list of approved cities.
In Toronto's case, lobbying certainly brought the city to the attention of the
Minister and the RCAF. However, measuring the effect on the RCAF is unclear. As
Desbarats indicated, the RCAF was contemplating the formation of NPAAF squadrons, but was not yet ready to make an official commitment. The RCAF had also shown a desire throughout the period to 1929 that it wished to form NPAAF squadrons. Of note is the fact that the timing of the first letter from Toronto coincided with Colonel Bishop's 48 speech and the RCAF's planning for the Disarmament Conference, in which the RCAF had by November 1931 decided that NPAAF squadrons were desirable, as will be noted in Chapter 4. The timing of the letter from Toronto and the decision to create NPAAF squadrons is highly coincidental. As a minimum, the lobbying from Toronto brought that city to the attention of the RCAF as a suitable site.
What also needs to be explained is why two locations were chosen and the roles changed from the original intent in the plan of July 1932, to Army Co-operation. This has not been previously explained or noted in any text. Bomber squadrons were required for coastal defence, which was what the RCAF had planned for Vancouver, while Toronto was recommended as a site for a fighter squadron. Yet, between July 1932 and the decision to authorize the formation of squadrons in Toronto and Vancouver in October and December 1932 respectively, the roles of these squadrons changed to Army Co operation roles. If the logic of public opinion was applied, then the Vancouver squadron should have remained a bomber squadron, as had been requested by the Aero Club of
British Columbia. There would have been no reason to change the role as this was no part of the public pressure, nor should the role have changed as there was no strategic reason to do so. Explanations for this role change have not been found in the examination of finance and public opinion, suggesting that the answers lie elsewhere.
Of note is the fact that the Army Co-operation squadrons were to be formed near
Militia training areas, suggesting an obvious link between Militia training and the RCAF.
This should of course be expected. The fact that Cuffe indicates it was McNaughton who formed the squadrons requires further explanation, which will be provided in Chapter 5. In summation, the two normal explanations as to why the RCAF created the
NPAAF squadrons are not wholly satisfactory. The demands placed on the RCAF by these two factors played a minor role; however, the exact nature of their roles will not be determined until other factors are examined. These include demands generated by external Canadian politics, including Great Britain and the League of Nations
Disarmament Conference, as well as demands from within the RCAF. The next chapter will review the demands placed on the RCAF by changes in the international situation, perceived by External Affairs, the Militia headquarters and the RCAF itself. 50
Chapter 2 "Fireproof House" Indeed: International Affairs as a Factor
Two roles of any military force in western democracies are to defend the nation against any aggression and to participate in military actions as sanctioned by the government. In the First World War Canada came to the aid of Great Britain, providing men and materiel. In the post-war period, Canada was a member of the League of
Nations, in whose Charter Article X called for collective security. Despite the expressed desire on the part of nations and citizens to end warfare after the experiences of the First
World War, conflict was not something that had been eliminated. Treaties that attempted to eliminate war as a means of international diplomacy were created in the 1920s.
However, as the 1930s began, the international situation began to deteriorate suggesting that Raoul Dandurand's 1924 description to the League of Nations of Canada as "a fire proof house, far from inflammable materials" was starting to come apart.87
Alongside the international developments, in Canada the Department of External
Affairs began to assert its independence from Great Britain so it could create policies focussing on Canada as an independent nation, capable of making its own decisions.
Members of the Department were keen on ensuring that Canada would not automatically be drawn into any future conflict, either through Canada's links with Great Britain or through Article X of the League Charter. This desire within External Affairs was mirrored in the policies of Prime Ministers Bennett and King, both of whom also occupied the External Affairs portfolio.
87 Dandurand was the head of the Canadian delegation to the League of Nations Assembly when he made the statement, in relation to discussions on Article X of the League Charter, which described collective security measures. Canada had attempted through various means to have the Article eliminated, then modified and finally interpreted. See http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/hist/canada5-en.asp. accessed 17 November 2007. 51
Countering the move to greater freedom of action on the part of Canada were the activities of the Canadian armed services. The links between the Canadian Militia, Royal
Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force with their British counterparts suggested to External Affairs that the Canadian military was preparing to assist them and draw
Canada into a future conflict or threat. Thus, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, while
External Affairs sought greater independence for Canada, the military apparently worked for greater ties with Great Britain.
In this atmosphere planning began for the League of Nations Disarmament
Conference, scheduled to start in February 1932. While External Affairs could use the
Conference as a means of asserting greater Canadian independence from Great Britain for its own policy-making purposes, the military could also use the Conference as a means of asserting a requirement for greater strength. If External Affairs desired a strong Canada capable of defending itself or being an actor in the international arena, then a strong military, one not reliant upon British aid would be required. However, more capability would also make Canada more attractive to Great Britain to call upon for assistance.
RCAF planning in the early 1930s was thus influenced through demands from the
Department of External Affairs as well as from Great Britain, and the Royal Air Force.
The planning required for the Disarmament Conference also forced the RCAFto rationalize its role and suggest a force structure and strength based on demands from
External Affairs for a coherent and justifiable policy at the Conference. This chapter will examine the role played by External Affairs and the international situation on the RCAF and its decision to create the NPAAF flying squadrons. 52
External Affairs
In the 1920s, the young Department of External Affairs began to push Canada's assertions of sovereignty into the arena of international affairs. The Department opened up diplomatic offices in London, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C., in an effort to provide a Canadian voice in these locations and began to provide an independent
Canadian voice at the League of Nations, instead of blindly following the British lead.
Nonetheless, External Affairs continued to rely heavily upon the Mother Country for most diplomatic services and for intelligence about international affairs. This reliance upon Great Britain posed a serious concern for both Canadian political leaders and members of External Affairs that Canada might automatically be drawn into another international conflict, either through Imperial connections as a result of diplomatic or military ties, or through international crises and Article X of the League of Nations
Charter.89
In the case of the latter, there was some scope for optimism as the League of
Nations Disarmament Conference was to start in February 1932, and if successful, would potentially reduce the possibility for Article X interventions. Several international treaties had been signed in the previous six years including the Locarno Treaties (1925), the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), and the London Naval Treaty (1930 - successor to the
Up to 1927, Canada only had four foreign diplomatic missions: a High Commission in London, a Commissioner-General in Paris and Legations in Tokyo and Washington. See H. Gordon Skilling, "The Development of Canada's Permanent External Representation" in The Canadian Historical Association: Report of the Annual Meeting Held at Hamilton, May 24-5, 1943 (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1943), 82-93. See also http://www.mternational.gc.ca/hist/historv-4- en.asp. accessed 31 January 2008. Article X stated "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." Canada took this to mean that the League of Nations Council could compel member nations to assist in restoring the status quo ante. The entire Charter of the League of Nations can be found as part of the Avalon Project at Yale University, and is located online at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm. 53
1922 Washington Naval Treaty), all of which raised hopes for a peaceful future in international relations. Furthermore, Japan, although chastised for having invaded
Manchuria, was not yet publicly perceived as a threat to international security.
One problem that Prime Minister Bennett and Skelton faced was that Great
Britain was applying pressure on Canada and the other self-governing Dominions to align themselves more closely with British international, military and Imperial Defence policies. With pressure from Great Britain to assist in Imperial Defence, there was the possibility of Bennett, in either his role of Prime Minister or of Minister of External
Affairs, becoming involved in the restructuring of the RCAF and in the formation of the
NPAAF squadrons. Britain was concerned about the threat of war, with Japan being one nation of concern, thus raising the possibility that the NPAAF squadrons might be formed to appease or assuage British pressure by creating additional air force squadrons for use in time of war.
Despite the optimism of some Canadians about the prospects for peace, there was the question of possible conflict between other nations that could involve Canadian sovereignty, particularly a conflict between Japan and the United States. In case of war,
Canada would have to mobilize to defend its territory so that parties to a conflict could not use Canadian territorial waters or uninhabited regions as a base for attacks. An
Auxiliary Air Force could be quickly mobilized due to its small size and moved rapidly across the country due to the mobility of aircraft.90 With such a force, the RCAF would have a greater ability to move against any threat to Canada or to Canadian neutrality in
90 One of the advantages of an Air Force is that it can quickly move from one area to another, In the case of the NPAAF squadrons in the 1930s, the squadrons could have flown or been transported by train to potential areas of conflict. Further, it would be easier to mobilize the small number of people in a squadron in comparison to army units of a similar stature, such a battalion. 54 any conflict. Thus, the international situation and the intentions of External Affairs, through the activities of Bennett and Skelton, could have played a role in the formation of the squadrons. A strong RCAF would provide Canada with greater freedom of action and capability to assert its independence, while at the same time allowing the young nation to decide its own course in the event of international problems or conflict.
O.D. Skelton firmly believed that a "stronger department of external affairs, a professional foreign service and separate diplomatic representation for Canada were essential" for Canada to maintain its freedom of action.91 This view was reflected in his relationship with other government departments and foreign services. Unfortunately,
Skelton published little after 1925, instead devoting himself to his career. Jennifer
Rossie, in an unpublished master's thesis, examines Skelton's writings to place them within a philosophical context. Rossie highlighted a speech by Skelton given as the inaugural John Finley Green Lecture at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri in 1937, and published as "Our Generation, Its Gains and Losses." In the speech, Skelton stated that isolationism cannot be a universal or permanent policy as it does not divert international problems from a nation, nor mitigate nor eliminate them. Instead, Skelton saw international co-operation as the means to peace and prosperity. Further, Skelton characterized the League of Nations as split between those nations who advocated
"consultation, conference and conciliation" and those who advocated collective
See Hector Mackenzie, Skelton's Boys: Recruitment for the Foreign Service of Canada, 1925-1941; http://www.intemational.gc.ca/departnient/skelton/mackenzie-en.asp, accessed 8 November 2007 and Robert Bothwell and Norman Hillmer, "Introduction" in The In-Between Time: Canadian External Policy in the 1930s (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing, 1975), 12. Jennifer L. Rossie, "The Historical Thought of O.D. Skelton: A Textual Examination of his Writings, 1907-1938" (Ottawa, Carleton University: Unpublished MA Thesis, 1989). Ibid, 159. This is the same lecture series and location at which Winston Churchill gave his "Iron Curtain" speech in 1946. 55 sanctions.94 Unfortunately, Skelton does not appear to have stated how the League or its members were to counter belligerency if diplomacy did not work, or indicated the role of military forces in diverting or mitigating problems or their utility in the diplomatic process.
John Holmes also noted the fact that External Affairs and Skelton wished to avoid any commitments.95 The key point for Holmes was that the Department of External
Affairs wished to keep Canada from generating any foreign commitments, whether through Imperial ties or Article X of the League of Nations Charter. Bothwell,
Drummond and English also made the point of avoiding entanglements.96 They noted that Canadian diplomats "were seldom concerned with matters of high policy," which suggests that their possible diplomatic inexperience could result in Canada accepting a commitment not approved by Parliament.97 As an example they indicated that Skelton advised Vincent Massey, during his tenure as Canada's High Commissioner in London,
OR to listen but not speak. At the same time, they noted that Skelton was wary of Great
Britain, always being on the alert for a British effort to involve Canada in any foreign commitment.99 The Department of National Defence, with its ties to Great Britain, could pose such a threat to Canada's independence of action, in his view. However, Skelton also appears to have realized that Canada could not be isolated from world events, which suggests that Skelton supported a strong military capable of defending Canada. 94 Ibid, 160-1. 95 John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, Volume 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979). 96 Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, Canada: 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). 97 Alternately, it could suggest that Skelton wished to maintain control on all matters of policy or decision-making. The Riddell Incident of 1935 would be an example of a Canadian diplomat making a suggestion with a resultant potential commitment on the part of Canada. 98 Ibid, 301. 99 Ibid, 302. Further information on Skelton's stance, this time towards the military, can be found in Stephen Harris' Canadian Brass,100 which showed that key figures in External
Affairs harboured a distrust of the Department of National Defence in the inter-war period. Harris observed that Skelton and Loring Christie had a "deep and abiding distrust of men in uniform" based on the military's strong links with their British counterparts.101
These links included hypothetical numbers of troops, provided by the Canadian Militia to the Imperial Staff that Canada could provide to Great Britain in the event of a future war, to which Skelton wondered: "how many hypotheses make a commitment." For his part, Christie was upset in the 1930s when he discovered that the General Staff had been
1 0^ preparing plans for an expeditionary force.
That these two members of External Affairs had a reason for concern can be found in Squadron Leader G.E. Wait's paper of 1931, prepared for and presented to his
RAF Staff College course at Cranwell. Wait indicated that Canada's obligations to the
Empire were "to make fullest use of our man-power."104 Two interpretations can be made from Wait's statement: that Canada had an obligation to prepare a strong military, or that
Canada had an obligation to support the Empire. In the latter case, if Skelton or Christie had been aware of such statements, it would have supported their belief that the military was planning on providing support to Great Britain. In the former case, this would have indicated potential support within the RC AF for a stronger air force. This position of a Harris, Canadian Brass. This distrust is also noted in Perras, Franklin Roosevelt, 9, where he states Skelton was always suspicious "that General McNaughton was attempting to commit Canada piecemeal to Britain's side" in any future conflict. 101 Loring Christie joined External Affairs in 1913 as its first legal advisor. He left the Department in 1923 but rejoined it in 1935, becoming Canadian Minister to the United States in 1939. Christie was an isolationist who suggested that Canada should not become involved in the war in Europe in 1939. 102 Harris, Canadian Brass, 160. 103 Ibid, 161. Christie was a member of the Department of External Affairs from 1913-1923 and 1935- 1939. In 1939 he was appointed Canadian Minister to the United States. 104 DHH 75/332; Squadron Leader G.E. Wait, "The Canadian Air Services", 1931, 1. 57 stronger Air Force is supported by the joint External Affairs / National Defence Report on the analysis of the draft disarmament convention. Here, the accepted position was that
Canada had in the past relied too much upon Great Britain for defence, but that for the future, each Dominion would have to be prepared to defend itself. In the case of Canada and the RCAF, this meant that a stronger air force was required in order to properly defend Canada. The new RCAF would be based on the minimum strength requirements the RCAF provided for the Disarmament Conference.105
In this atmosphere of scrutiny by External Affairs, the RCAF would certainly have been under the microscope. There were strong links between the Canadian forces and their British counterparts, especially the RCAF with the RAF, which would have raised some concern on the part of Skelton that the RCAF was conducting joint planning with the RAF, especially in light of the requests made by Great Britain at the Imperial
Conferences, as will be detailed in the next chapter. Great Britain had been calling for greater participation in Imperial Defence from its Dominions even before the start of the
First World War with these calls only becoming greater afterwards. The RCAF thus found itself in a position where pressure from Great Britain for Imperial military cooperation was countered by the desires of External Affairs and of the government to avoid any activities that could be interpreted as making commitments. This dichotomy is illustrated in the discussion to follow.
Perhaps the most useful description of the dichotomy and the involvement of
Prime Minister Bennett of relevance to this study is that by Donald Story in his
DHH 73/664 Volume 1, "Geneva Disarmament Conference: The Analysis of the Draft Convention", 31. Story, "Canada's Covenant." 58 examination of the Bennett government's participation in the League of Nations.
Bennett, as characterized by Story, was firmly in control of foreign policy decisions.
Bennett's approach to foreign policy issues was to conduct his foreign policy with a view to respecting three primary principles: consulting with the Commonwealth, following the lead of the United Kingdom, and using the League of Nations as a means of ensuring security.108 Following the lead of the United Kingdom, however, did not mean blindly agreeing to the UK's decisions and requests. Rather, Canada would defer to the UK's knowledge and experience, and weigh British recommendations in light of Canadian interests.109 Thus, for Bennett, Britain provided guidance that Canada would follow if the guidance were appropriate to Canada. On the other hand, the RCAF could potential follow the RAF's lead without consideration of Canadian requirements.110
O.D. Skelton provided influence in matters of where Canada's interests lay, when
Bennett chose to consult him. While both agreed that the League served as a forum for discussion, negotiation and bringing world opinion to bear, Bennett saw the League as providing, in certain circumstances, security guarantees.111 These security guarantees had the potential to draw Canada into military or other commitments, usurping the prerogative of Parliament. Skelton steadfastly maintained the position that Canada should have freedom of action; Bennett, however, was not so emphatic.112 The differences between the two men were ones that could potentially be exploited, especially by someone with close ties to Bennett.
108 Ibid, 60. 109 Ibid, 45. 110 As will be noted later, the RCAF followed the RAF's lead in almost all matters of doctrine, equipment, organization, policies and regulations. 111 Ibid, 58. 112 Ibid, 61. 59
If there was one relationship that could have affected Skelton's ability to have
Bennett make the decisions he desired, it was the close relationship between Bennett and
McNaughton. This further exacerbated the existing antipathy between the CGS and
External Affairs, as Skelton could have perceived that McNaughton had an apparent inside track to Bennett that could allow McNaughton to undermine other organizations.113
Swettenham noted this relationship in a number of instances, observing for instance that in April 1933 Bennett phoned McNaughton to ask him to conduct an informal study on civil aviation. Swettenham writes "Bennett used his Chief of the General Staff exactly as a senior commander would use a staff officer, ignoring the fact that as Prime Minister he had departmental channels through which to pursue his inquiries."114 In the eyes of
Skelton, McNaughton, with his ideas on reforming the Army and RCAF and on planning for various contingencies, posed a threat to Skelton and his ideas of Canadian independence of action
The one problem that these relationships highlight is that of military planning.
Military forces prepare for various contingencies, including the possibility of sending forces to other parts of the world. These forces' support could have been of use to Great
Britain in the event of Imperial challenges, or in support of the League of Nations for
Article X sanctions. For External Affairs and possibly Prime Minister Bennett, these contingency plans could represent a potential commitment on the part of the Canadian military to Great Britain or the League of Nations.
The existing literature indicates that while Skelton wished to maintain Canadian freedom of action in the event of any international conflict, the nation's military services
Harris, Canadian Brass, 160-2. 114 Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol.1, 288-9. See also 314 for another example. were creating links that could be interpreted as forging commitments that compromised
Skelton's desires. The implication was that if Canada wished to maintain independence of action, a strong military was desirable. No documents were found indicating this position, but as will be noted in Chapter 4, the RCAF sought the support of External
Affairs for a strong military. Further, there were no documents found relating any indications of an External Affairs influence in the creation of the NPAAF squadrons.
A Foreign Threat: The United States and Japan
In the 1930s, the General Staff considered three different scenarios that would require a military response.The first was that which involved a direct attack on Canada.
The second was a threat posed by a conflict in which Canadian territory could be violated, requiring the Canadian military to use force to ensure Canadian neutrality.
Finally, there was the possibility of dispatching Canadian forces in support of a major or a minor conflict involving the British Empire. After the First World War, Canada structured its militia for employment in home defence - to confront a direct military attack against Canada. The re-organization of the RCAF and the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons could be explained in part as a response to the possibility of such an attack. This section will note the considerations regarding this potential and whether it was considered as a factor or demand upon the RCAF.
If there were two countries described in Militia headquarters documents as potential enemies of Canada in the late 1920s and early 1930s, these would be Japan and, perhaps surprisingly, the United States. In 1921, Colonel James Sutherland Brown,
Director Military Operations and Intelligence created Defence Scheme No. 1. In the 61 event of a potential war with the United States, Canadian forces would launch a rapid strike into specific northern locations of the United States and use these as the strategic depth until such time as British forces could reinforce Canada.
While the plan seemingly suggested that the United States was a potential enemy, this view may not necessarily have been the reasoning behind the creation of the plan. James Eayrs found neither evidence nor mention of a potential conflict or threat from the United States. With his review of Canadian military planning in the 1920s and into the Depression, one would have expected such a mention if there was serious consideration of an American threat.115 Stephen Harris observed that Brown's Defence
Scheme No. 1 was part of an overall plan to be prepared for anything and not have the military in disarray because there were no plans.116 Harris too made no mention of any perceived threat from the United States. Galen Perras's Franklin Roosevelt and the
Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance, 1933-1945: Necessary but Not
Necessary Enough also noted that while there were natural points of contention between the two nations, and much misunderstanding, there was no threat posed by the United
States to Canada.117
In another scenario, Colonel H.D.G. Crerar observed in 1935, in thoughts similar to those of McNaughton, that if Japan attacked the United States from Canadian waters or invaded British Columbia, the American public would demand American military occupation of the Canadian west coast. Crerar did not, however, see this as a reason for revamping the Canadian military.118 This point is of interest, as one of the tasks the
115 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: from the Great War to the Great Depression. 116 Harris, Canadian Brass, 176. 117 Perms, Franklin Roosevelt, 1-32. 118 Ibid,20. 62
RCAF claimed for itself, in July 1932, was defence of Canadian neutrality, such as in the event of war between the United States and Japan, a point that will be discussed in
Chapter 5. From the foregoing, it appears that there was no perceived threat posed by the United States. Further, there does not appear to be any documentary evidence suggesting that a potential war between the United States and Japan was considered in the planning for the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons.
However, Japan was seen as threat although this realization took some time to fully evolve. Eayrs noted that in November 1928, Senator Raoul Dandurand wrote to
Prime Minister King that Japan was no threat, and that there were still four years left on the naval treaty. Further, in 1930 during discussion in the House of Commons on naval spending, no mention was made of the Japanese as a threat. In fact, six destroyers for both coasts were considered sufficient to defend Canada's overseas trade.119
Harris observed that in 1931, the army began working on Defence Scheme No. 2, which was a plan to protect Canada's neutrality in the event of a war between the United
States and Japan. Defence staff had recognized that Japanese expansion could bring it into conflict with other nations. Initially this was assumed to be Great Britain; however, by 1932, the United States was seen to be the main potential combatant against Japan.120
What can be observed in Harris' analysis is that recognition of a potential threat did not necessarily translate into any appreciable action. Defence Scheme No. 2 was not developed until after Japan's invasion of Manchuria on 18 September 1931.
Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: from the Great War to the Great Depression, 272-3. Harris, Canadian Brass, 180. Defence Scheme No. 1 was a counter to a planned attack from the United States, while No. 3 was a plan to deploy an expeditionary force overseas. Drafts of Defence Scheme No.3 were ready in April 1931. Harris, Canadian Brass. 179. 63
By contrast, Roger Sarty provided quite different information about the time and nature of the potential Japanese threat to Canada or the United States. He notes that in
July 1926, Admiral Walter Hose indicated that the building of destroyers for the Royal
191
Canadian Navy was needed in case of war between the United States and Japan. The government acted on the recommendation, acquiring four destroyers, a number that was subsequently increased to six in 1930. More importantly, Sarty states that in January
1931 McNaughton saw the requirement for Canada to defend its neutrality in case of a 1 99
United States - Japan war.
Thus, by late 1930, both the Navy and the Militia foresaw the possibility of Japan as a problem for Canadian security. For the RCAF, this recognition was not put down on paper so readily, if it existed at all. In the memorandum describing the organization and establishment of the RCAF, which became the future template for RCAF expansion, no mention is made of any potential threat, although the possibility of the United States going to war with "some other Foreign Power" is noted in July 1932 as a reason for the
RCAF to enforce Canadian neutrality.'23 Japan is one of several possible candidates as a further memorandum indicated the United States was preparing for potential "air attack from Europe or Asia."124 Within several months, the list of suspects was narrowed.
In a series of draft documents culminating in a final version dated July 1933, the
RCAF provided details on the air defence of Canada. One of the problems posed related to the defence of Canadian neutrality in the event of war between two "trans-oceanic
Power or Powers." Further, the assessment of the RCAF and the Army was that the
121 Sarty, The Maritime Defence of Canada, 88-9. 122 Ibid,93. 123 DHH 76/46, "Peace Organization and Establishment", 18 My 1932, 1. 124 DHH 73/664; Memorandum dated 14 March 1933. 64
United States would likely be involved in such a conflict. While not directly named, the
1 9S most appropriate candidate fitting the criteria provided would be Japan. An undated appreciation of the role of the RCAF in maintaining Canadian neutrality in the event of a conflict between the United States and Japan provides the first direct mention of Japan as a potential threat in RCAF documents. Internal evidence suggests that the document dated from around 1936-37, which would be the first instance noted in RCAF documents of Japan being directly named as a threat.126
The RCAF's delayed mention of Japan as a threat requires explanation. Given that the RCAF was under command of the CGS, the most likely explanation is that the
RCAF simply did not mention the name of the potential threat, but produced documents and plans based on Militia direction. As the documents were for the consumption of the
General Staff, the RCAF may have taken the fact of a potential Japanese threat as understood by the Militia.
One key quote, however, provides greater clarity on the perceived threat to
Canada, whether in maintaining Canada's neutrality or in home defence. During interviews for the Official History of the RCAF, retired Lieutenant General Maurice Pope
stated: There was never a threat to Canadian shores. In the 1930's the military knew this, but used the defence of Canada as a cover so they could prepare for the most likely contingency: the sending of an expeditionary force. In the inter-war years Canada's defences and defence forces were barely ticking over. The government had no defence -or military- policy. These were dirty words in the 1930's.
DHH 96/24, Box 1, File 1, Folder 2; "Air Defence of Canada", 1. DHH 96/24, Box 4, File 1, Folder 1; "An Appreciation of the Role of the Royal Canadian Air Force with Respect to the Maintenance of Canadian Neutrality in the Event of a War between the United States and Japan". The evidence of date is based on the squadrons tasked and determining their dates of formation. DHH 89/97, Box 1, File 7, The Creation of a National Air Force fonds; "Notes of Interview with Lieutenant General Maurice Pope on 5, 27 July and 23 August 1977, by Norman Hillmer". 65
Pope confirms that the direct threat was non-existent, but makes no mention of defence of Canadian neutrality. The use of neutrality may have been a smoke-screen by the Militia, in an effort to prepare for an expeditionary force. Harris noted that Militia
Headquarters focused more on Defence Scheme No. 3, which involved the dispatch of an expeditionary force, than any of the other schemes.128 By focusing on a threat, it would divert attention away from the expeditionary force which also justified a larger RCAF.
More will be said on the expeditionary force in Chapter 5.
From the foregoing, it can be observed that in the late 1920s and early 1930s, military personnel considered that there was no direct military threat against Canada. The threat posed to Canada by Japan was one of violation of neutrality and appears to have been a political tool to provide support for equipment acquisitions and structural changes.
No documents have turned up that demonstrate a direct link between a potential Japanese threat of war with the United States and the creation of the flying squadrons; however, as planning was underway for the NPAAF squadrons and for Defence Schemes No. 2, 3 and
4, the possibility does exist that there was some cross-pollination. It would thus appear highly unlikely that international threats to Canada were a factor in the formation of the
NPAAF flying squadrons.
The question of an expeditionary force requires greater examination, which will be done in Chapter 5. It is this military contingency planning that worried External
Affairs that the military might be making commitments that could automatically draw
Canada into another conflict without Parliamentary consent. As much as Bennett and
External Affairs wished to maintain Canadian freedom of action, pressure from Great
128 Harris, Canadian Brass. 181. 66
Britain on the government for any manner of commitment existed. Pressure on the military was also there and will be examined in the next chapter as to how it may have affected the decision to create the NPAAF squadrons.
The League of Nations also created pressure on Canada, indirectly through Article
X and more directly through preparations for the Disarmament Conference. The
Conference's influence on the creation of the NPAAF squadrons will be discussed in
Chapter 4.
A final conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that military contingency planning may have had several different roles and interpretations.
To the Militia and RC AF, a contingency plan for an expeditionary force could be interpreted as simply good military planning. Whether the Schemes were based on credible circumstances or on false premises, such as Defence Scheme No. 1, they were the basis for future action in the case of emergency. More significantly, to External
Affairs, the contingency plans, and especially Defence Scheme No. 3, were potential signs of the military's commitment to assist Great Britain in a future conflict. Hiding the fact that Defence Scheme No. 3 existed would thus have been in the interests of the
Militia and the RCAF in their dealings with External Affairs. 67
Chapter 3 "Mother Knows Best": The Influence of Great Britain
Through the 1920s and into the 1930s Canada began to assume a greater role in international affairs; however, the link to Great Britain remained strong. The Canadian military modeled itself upon their British counterparts, while the Department of External
Affairs still relied heavily upon Great Britain to furnish support to Canadians worldwide.
But through the 1920s there was a developing split between the military and External
Affairs - the former drawing itself closer to Great Britain, the latter wanting to assert greater independence for Canada in developing and following its own foreign policy.
This dichotomy became apparent in the late 1920s and expressed itself in various events of the period.
The greatest demand made of the RCAF in this period originated with the call from Great Britain for greater participation of the Dominions in Imperial Defence. Any pressure was directed primarily at the Canadian Government with the main recipient of these British requests being the Department of External Affairs; however, the RCAF did feel an indirect pressure.
This chapter examines the nature of the linkages between Great Britain and the
RCAFto show how Imperial Defence exerted pressure that was most sharply felt by the government and by External Affairs. Nonetheless, such Imperial linkages also provided information on threats, planning and doctrine of use to the RCAF. Further, the linkages between the RAF and RCAF were extensive, with the RAF's Auxiliary Air Force serving as a model for the authorization of the RCAF's NPAAF squadrons. 68
Imperial Defence
After the First World War, Great Britain retained an Empire that spanned the globe. Despite the defeat of Germany and its allies, threats to the security of Britain and its colonies were still present. Faced with a massive debt for its wartime expenditures,
Great Britain put pressure on the Dominions of the Commonwealth for their greater participation in sharing the burden of defending the British Empire. The growing concern over Japan in the late 1920s was just one threat that might warrant a
Commonwealth response.
Norman Hillmer indicated that at Imperial Conferences, the Canadians, Irish and
South Africans regularly expressed concern about Britain's position "in a threatening world," but gave little in the way of material assistance or future commitments. Maurice
Hankey (Secretary to the Committee on Imperial Defence and Cabinet Secretary) noted in 1934 that in Canada French-Canadians were hostile to the idea or any suggestion of
Imperial Defence.129 Further, Bennett had no sympathy towards the Committee on
Imperial Defence and never allowed his High Commissioner in the United Kingdom to attend any of its meetings.130
Hillmer examined the basis for the Canadian position in a further paper. He observed that in Canada, Imperial Defence received mild support because Canada's geographic remoteness from Great Britain and proximity to the United States suggested that Canadian commitments should lie elsewhere, as the United States would likely not
129 George Norman Hillmer, "Anglo-Canadian Relations, 1927-1937: a Study of Canada's role in the shaping of commonwealth policies" (Cambridge University: Unpublished PhD Thesis, September 1974,270, 274. Representatives of the Irish Free State were invited to the Imperial Conferences and included in matters of Imperial Defence. See Dominion Office 114/1, 81 on "Channels of Communications Regarding Air Matters," held at DHH. 130 Ibid, 285. 131 DHH 77/480, Norman Hillmer, "The Anglo-Canadian Military 'Alliance' in the Nineteen Thirties", Paper presented at the Canadian Historical Association meeting, Fredericton, NB, 5 Jun 1977, 1. 69 allow any foreign power to attack or occupy Canada. For Great Britain, geographic
factors made Canada attractive as a source of men and munitions in time of war, as
Canada was unlikely to be directly affected and could thus assist Great Britain while not requiring much in the way of troops and equipment for its own defence. This was the case in the First World War when Canada provided four divisions and was a major source
of war materiel. Further, Canada's geographic location suggested that Canada could possibly shoulder the burden of providing an initial response to threats against British colonies in the western hemisphere, such as Bermuda.132 For Bennett and Skelton, these
British efforts at Imperial Defence were unwelcome as the efforts appeared to be attempts to entrap Canada in commitments, which neither individual desired.
Thus, while there were concerns about Imperial Defence, it would appear from
Hillmer's research that any reform to the RCAF would unlikely be linked to Imperial
Defence, both from the standpoint that no commitments would be forthcoming from
Canada and because of the attitude of Bennett. There certainly was pressure applied regarding Imperial Defence; however, information made available through discussions on
Imperial Defence could have provided a model or substantiation for the RCAF in reorganizing itself.
The primary venue for the discussion of Imperial Defence was at Imperial
Conferences. At all of the inter-war Imperial Conferences , the importance of air power
was recognized, but so too was the right of each Dominion to conduct its own defence policy. The 1923 Imperial Conference recognized that each Dominion had the right to
decide for itself the extent to which it would cooperate on Imperial Defence. The
132 See for example the minutes of the November 1930 Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence and Bennett's comments. DHH 2007/17, Box 124, File 10 [Formerly DHH 112.3M2.009 (D3)], 11. 70
Conference also recognized the importance of safeguarding air lines of communications.133 Although there was little here of use for the Canadian Air Force, the predecessor to the RCAF, the attendees recognized the importance of air routes, with the implications associated with the movements of air forces to areas of concern - mobility - which was and remains one of the advantages of air power.
At the 1926 Imperial Conference, further recognition was given to the fact that air power was growing and presented a threat to sea power in some areas, as well as to cities through aerial bombardment. The Conference concluded that, among other things, mobility (the capability of air forces to rapidly deploy from one area to another) was an important consideration and that the Dominions should create and maintain air bases and refueling stations. In addition, the Conference's conclusions called for greater coordination among the Dominions' air services including the exchange of officers and even air units, "so far as local requirements and resources permit."134 Of note is the fact that while closer cooperation was recommended, the language involved in the final report of the Conference made no commitment on the part of the Dominions. Canada did, however, provide support to efforts that aimed at opening air routes or were directed at long-range flights.
After both conferences, no further action was taken on the part of the Dominions to provide the support that was requested of them. We thus see that in a period when
Great Britain was concerned about the growing threat from Japan, and other nations, to
133 DHH 2007/17, Box 124, File 10; Committee of Imperial Defence, Minutes of the 251st Meeting, November 28, 1930 [Formerly DHH 112.3M2.009 (D3)], "Aide Memoire of a Statement on the Imperial Defence Policy made by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the 251st Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the 28th November, 1930," 2. 134 Cited in Dominion Office 117/88, held at DHH. Memorandum of the Overseas Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, "General Principles of Imperial Defence", March 12, 1928, 16. 71
Britain's colonies and dependencies, some Dominions were pulling away from the notion that they were suppliers of arms and men, and had to follow Great Britain's lead in matters of defence. Thus, the very nations that had the men and training to provide support for a thinly stretched British military were no longer reliably available. This was apparent to British military leaders and drew them to apply greater pressure on the
Dominions to provide support to Great Britain in times of threat, as threats to Great
Britain would also affect one or more Dominions in matters such as trade and possibly even security. In effect, Great Britain was calling for collective Imperial security and moving away from the "mother country" providing for all necessities.
In 1926, the RAF's Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir H.M. Trenchard, presented a memorandum on the aspects of air power that he wished to see developed over the next few years. While reviewing the mobility of air forces, he hoped the
Dominions would conduct long-range flights to Great Britain and to each other.
Trenchard also indicated that the organization of Empire air resources on the basis of mobility was essential for imperial defence.135 Without directly saying so, Trenchard was advocating that Dominions participate in the opening of air routes so that these could be used if reinforcements were needed in time of war. This participation included exchanges of aircraft and personnel with Great Britain, other Dominions and even Crown
Colonies, as well as the provision of airports and service facilities. The implication was that the Dominions would provide support to Great Britain in time of emergency, and that such support include the provision of aircraft and personnel, use of airports and servicing facilities, and/or providing protection of other Commonwealth nations and colonies to free RAF resources for deployment to areas under attack or great threat. Trenchard's
135 DHH 74/758, "Memorandum on Air Power and Imperial Defence," November 1926, 2-4 and 20. 72 paper largely resembled the British position on air power presented at the Imperial
Conference.
Air forces not only provide mobility, they can be used to protect commercial shipping, as well as defend ports and cities in times of crisis. All of these functions were detailed in the Memorandum of the Overseas Sub-Committee of the Committee of
Imperial Defence of 1928.136 In discussing the need for cooperation, the Sub-Committee indicated "the burden of providing and maintaining the 'mobile defence forces,' naval,
i -in land, and air, should be shared throughout the various parts of the Empire." The theme of sharing the burden, and potentially committing Canada to a conflict was inherent in the document. Of significance to the RCAF, the Memorandum described the roles of air power, and thus provided some guidance for the RCAF in preparing for the defence of
Canada.
While the previous three conferences "suggested" that the Dominions provide direct support to Great Britain in time of crisis, Field Marshal Sir George Milne, Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the 1930 Imperial Conference, was more direct, stating that the Dominions should make themselves responsible for the immediate reinforcement of particular territories at the outbreak of war. Canada's Prime Minister Bennett suggested that a role of protecting British colonies would be politically unpalatable for the people of most Dominions, especially of Canada when these same citizens were aware that the
Kellogg-Briand Pact and the League of Nations had ostensibly been created to prevent
Dominion Office 117/88, held at DHH. Memorandum of the Overseas Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, "General Principles of Imperial Defence", March 12, 1928. Ibid, 12-3. 73 war.138 Interestingly, because of the contradictions apparent to Canada represented in
Milne's statement, Bennett repeatedly suggested that greater spending should occur on
1 ^0 armaments, but that disarmament should also be a strong consideration.
These contradictions included the fact that while each Dominion was independent and free to conduct its own security policy, Milne expected that in the event of an emergency assistance from each Dominion "would be forthcoming as readily as it was sixteen years ago." Thus, the Dominions were not free to conduct their own security policies if they were obliged to come to Britain's aid. Further, Milne pointed out that
Imperial trade depended on the security of locations such as Bermuda and Hong Kong, locations which had only very limited trade implications for Canada, and at least for the former, Milne was suggesting that Canada should be obligated to protect. The result would be that Canada would be protecting British interests while Milne was suggesting this was everyone's interest.140
Milne's statement was made in light of what he referred to as "many new developments in the relations between the Dominions and the Mother Country ... particularly in the air methods and means of warfare."141 Significantly, Milne suggested that either the principle of Imperial Defence was possible, or that it was impossible - that collective security in response to aggression against the British Empire and
Commonwealth was either a reality or it was not.142 Canada was not only concerned
138 DHH 2007/17, Box 124, File 10; Committee of Imperial Defence, Minutes of the 251st Meeting, November 28, 1930 [Formerly DHH 112.3M2.009 (D3)]. 139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid, 3. Imperial defence as desired by Milne comprised a pre-determined course of action on the part of the Dominions that included either providing troops directly to Great Britain, or to take responsibility for protecting a colony, specific to each Dominion. By taking over the task of protecting a colony, a Dominion would free British forces to reinforce areas under threat or attack. Milne 74 about being drawn into remote conflicts, but also those relatively close to home, such as
Bermuda. Milne recognized that financial constraints limited what each Dominion could do, but suggested that this was further reason for embracing collective security, at least to the extent of exploring the possibility of specific Dominions taking responsibility for first response in the case of aggression or potential aggression against certain portions or members of the British Empire and Commonwealth, or what Milne referred to as an "area of responsibility" of specific Dominions.143
We therefore see that there was very strong lobbying on the part of the British
Foreign office and the military to implement collective security. It is also evident that the
Dominions resisted the call. While national independence was one reason for the hesitation, the potential for disarmament to provide increased security may have also been a factor. In fact, disarmament was a possibility as the preparations for the League of
Nations' disarmament efforts were on the agenda at the 1930 Imperial Conference and were given serious consideration.
The Imperial Conference included an "Arbitration and Disarmament Committee" to provide a coordinated Commonwealth approach to the issue of disarmament. General
McNaughton indicated that the Department of National Defence had grave concerns over the proposed limitations on air forces contained in the Draft Disarmament Convention.144
His first concern was that civil aviation was a primary means of transportation in Canada and one in which the RCAF was heavily involved through CGAO. The draft convention would have undertaken the elimination of this type of secondment to civilian roles.
suggested that either the Dominions would accept the premise that all Dominions would provide support in the case of attack against Great Britain, a Dominion or a colony. 143 Ibid, 4-6. 144 Dominions were allowed to have representative on the various sub-committees. These representatives kept national authorities aware of the direction of the draft convention. 75
Accordingly, Canada could not accept any restrictions in this realm and proposed that all military personnel seconded to civil duties be included in the quotas of all nations, although it was recognized that acceptance of this Canadian position would probably be difficult to secure at the Preparatory Commission.
Secondly, while the Department of National defence saw limitations on numbers of personnel and aircraft as practical, any restrictions based on horsepower or finance were seen as impractical. The position on horsepower position was in response to a
British request as the British government leaned towards accepting horsepower as a means of measuring limitations, but had later changed its mind. Having Canada raise the objection meant that Canada was preparing the way for Great Britain to ease itself out of an uncomfortable situation.145 Canada had previously taken a position that financial limitations were an impractical measurement for limiting air power. The main objection was that the RCAF, because of financial restrictions, was not fully developed and the force was ineffective for its main role of defending Canada. If budgets were considered as restrictions, use of the RCAF budget as a measure of limitation would be a hindrance for the further development of the RCAF.146
We therefore see that Canada had developed a position regarding the RCAF and disarmament by 1930. While serious thought was being given to disarmament, the circumstances of Canada and the RCAF played a significant role in the development of a
145 DHH 112.1 (D142) "Report of the Chief of the General Staff on the Imperial Conference, 1930", 2 December 1930, 13-14. W.A. Riddell, the Canadian representative at the League of Nations, brought forward this objection, as directed by External Affairs. The horsepower limitation would have involved limiting the number of aircraft in an air force based on the total horsepower of the engines, with each nation being allowed only a specified amount if horsepower. An explanation of the Canadian objections to horsepower can be found in DHH 73/664, Volume 1, Geneva Disarmament Conference, 116-8. In contrast to what Riddell stated in Geneva, the internal Canadian explanation included problems with the means of measuring horsepower and of formulating horsepower for the many types of engines that could be used in aircraft, including gasoline, diesel, turbine and two-stroke. 146 DHH 73/664, Volume 1, Geneva Disarmament Conference, 30-31. Canadian and Imperial position at the Imperial Conference. In the case of horsepower,
Canada was assisting Great Britain. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the
Imperial Conference played a role in the development of the RCAF's structure.
One point should, however, be made about a statement of the RCAF made at one of the
Conferences. Pursuant to a decision at the Imperial Conference of October 1930, a
Committee of Experts was created to examine military organization and cooperation among the Commonwealth nations. While the resultant report focused primarily upon the United Kingdom, the seven other nations on the committee presented reports on the status of their forces with respect to key points from the 1926 Imperial Conference and points related to Imperial Defence. Canada's response regarding its air force was that the
RCAF was being modeled upon the RAF, with the goal being that the two services should be interoperable.147
Imperial Defence Conferences were thus a forum at which British policies could be espoused and the Dominions gather information. It was not, however, a forum at which Canada agreed to any commitments. Canadian diplomats, government ministers and military officers learned much about British military policy and thinking.While
Canada could have some input into developing Commonwealth disarmament policy, there does not appear to be any direct link between Imperial Defence and the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons. The RCAF modeling itself after the RAF was one area, however, that showed the strong influence of Britain upon Canadian military structure.
DHH 78/500, Report of the "Committee of Experts of the Fighting Services, Imperial Conference 1930," 7. 77
The Royal Air Force
If the Imperial Conferences and Imperial Defence did not play a significant role in the development of a restructured RCAF and the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons, the RAF certainly did. C.P. Stacey observed that from the Imperial
Conferences the decision was made to equip, organize and train Canadian military forces along British lines, except for aircraft types.148 W.A.B. Douglas also indicated that the
RCAF was created using the RAF as a model.149
The RCAF had a close relationship with the RAF. The RAF had been exchanging information with the Dominions on intelligence, technical matters and other confidential subjects. These were passed directly to the Director of the RCAF, or through the RCAF
Liaison Officer in London, among others, on a regular basis.150 RCAF officers also attended RAF staff courses.151 In terms of aircraft, the RCAF continually conducted winter testing of British aircraft for the Air Ministry. In 1926 the RAF Air Council approved the exchange of two RCAF officers with two RAF officers. The exchange would be a continuing basis with each officer serving overseas for two years.152 These exchanges would provide a number of RCAF officers with a greater understanding of how the RAF operated and particularly how the Auxiliary Air Force operated and what role it had to play in British air defence.
C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 89. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 60-1. DHH, Dominion Office 114/1, Dominion Office document D8730, No. 133, "Air Ministry Memorandum" dated 27 July 1926. In 1928 these courses included RAF Staff College, Aeronautical Engineering, RAF School of Army Co-operation, RAF School of Armament and Gunnery, Central Flying School, RAF School of Air Pilotage and RAF School of Storekeeping and Accounting. See DHH 75/327; Squadron Leader G.O. Johnson, "R.A.F. Staff College 6th Course, Student Lecture: The Royal Canadian Air Force" 18 January 1928, 6. DHH D.O. 114/1, Dominion Office document D9215, No. 149. 78
Squadron Leader G.O. Johnson, while on course at the RAF Staff College in 1928 briefed his classmates that in order for the RCAF to be interchangeable with the RAF, the
RCAF was adopting RAF procedures and equipment wherever possible and that these included:
"The Air Force Act and Manual of Air Force Law. All training manuals. Dress and clothing regulations. Service aircraft and armament. Stores accounting procedure."153
Squadron Leader G.E. Wait echoed this in 1931 in a paper he prepared.154 The fact that RCAF officers saw the RAF as the example to follow suggests that the RCAF would also examine changes within the RAF as potential examples that the RCAF should also incorporate. Thus, the creation within the RCAF of an Auxiliary Air Force along
RAF lines would be entirely plausible if the RCAF were following the example of the
RAF in almost all other aspects of an air force's organization and operations.
On 9 October 1924, a British Parliamentary Order in Council established the
Auxiliary Air Force (AuxAF) and the Air Force Reserve, although actual squadrons were not to be formed until the following year.155 Sir Samuel Hoare, later Viscount
Templewood, had indicated that the Auxiliary had been envisaged by Air Marshal
Trenchard as a corps d'elite, of the kind of young men who had at one time been interested in horses. The Auxiliary squadrons were to be entities unto themselves, and not
DHH 75/327; Squadron Leader G.O. Johnson, "R.A.F. Staff College 6th Course, Student Lecture: The Royal Canadian Air Force," 18 January 1928, 3. It is not known for whom Wait prepared the paper or presented it. DHH 75/332; Squadron Leader G.E. Wait, "The Canadian Air Services", 1931. Although less direct, Squadron Leader CM. McEwen also notes the RAF-RCAF link for training, but also notes that in time of war, "R.A.F. Establishments come into effect." DHH 75/331; Squadron Leader CM. McEwen, "R.A.F. Staff College 8th Course, The Air Services in Canada," 18 January 1928, 3. The prefix "Royal" was not conferred on the AuxAF until 1947. 79
1 C/T to be used as a source of airmen for the regular units. The original intent was to form six Auxiliary and seven Special Reserve squadrons, with a view to eventually raising 20
Auxiliary squadrons. The Auxiliary squadrons were to be raised and maintained by local recruiting, with only a small cadre of regular force staff, and with a part-time commanding officer.157
Even before the Order in Council became effective, the RCAF expressed an 1 SR interest in the AuxAF, wishing to gather information on what the RAF had planned.
The RCAF had only recently been created and was in the process of re-organizing from being a part-time organization to a full-time military force. Further efforts were made to imitate the RAF and create an RCAF version of the AuxAF over the next several years.
In July 1927 Flying Officer Hewson, on behalf of the Director of the RCAF, directed the RCAF Liaison Officer in London to request information of the RAF regarding the organization and training of the Non-Permanent (Auxiliary) and Reserve forces of that organization. This request was made with the intent of considering such organizations for the RCAF, as noted in the opening paragraph of the letter: "It is now the intention, since the R.C.A.F. has become a purely military force, to organize the Non-
Permanent and Reserve Forces."159 The potential to create Non-Permanent and Reserve units had always been possible due to the provisions in the King's Regulations and
Orders. Of interest is the fact that the RCAF referred to itself as a military-oriented force
156 Cited in Leslie Hunt, Twenty-One Squadrons: The History of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force: 1925- 1957 (London: Gamstone Press, 1972), 9. 157 Ibid, 11. The Special Reserve squadrons were composed of half regular force and half reserve personnel. 158 DHH 181.009 (D1518); See minutes between S.7. Reserve, RAF Headquarters and RCAF Liaison Officer, London, dated 13 June 1924 and 17 June 1924. 159 DHH 74/282; "Organization of R.C.A.F. Non-Permanent and Reserve Forces", 15 July 1927. 80 at that time, despite the fact that scholars later referred to it as "bush pilots in uniform."160
Within a matter of months of Hewson's letter, the RCAF became oriented towards civilian operations, in CGAO, and became unable to create squadrons due to fiscal considerations.
In response to the request, the RAF provided three publications and six pamphlets, including Air Publication AP 968 on the Auxiliary Air Force.161 Serious consideration of the creation of NPAAF squadrons was apparent as Flying Officer
Hewson sent a further letter in December 1927 to the RCAF Liaison Officer in London asking that if any amendments to AP 968 were made or contemplated, that these be communicated to the RCAF, "before proceeding with the formation of the R.C.A.F.
Auxiliary Air Force."162 This latter statement suggests that efforts were about to be initiated to authorize NPAAF squadrons.
Further interest was shown in 1928 when Squadron Leader A.A.L. Cuffe asked the RAF whether it would be possible to obtain the services of an RAF officer experienced in the organization and operation of the Auxiliary Air Force. The creation of such an organization in Canada was still contemplated in 1928 as noted by the fact that
Squadron Leader G.O. Johnson advised his RAF Staff College course in January 1928:
"The proposed ultimate organization of the Non-Permanent Force is similar to the
Auxiliary Air Force."163 By July 1929 no response had been received from the RAF for such an officer; however, the RCAF had decided not to organize an Auxiliary stating as a
160 The description appears to have originated with Air Vice Marshal T.A. Lawrence. DHH 77/39, Interview by Brereton Greenhous with Air Marshal C.R. Slemon, 29 September 1976, 7. 161 DHH 74/282; "Organization of R.C.A.F. Non-Permanent & Reserve Forces", 26th August 1927. 162 DHH 74/282; "Auxiliary Air Force", December 17th, 1927. 163 DHH 75/327; Squadron Leader G.O. Johnson, "R.A.F. Staff College 6th Course, Student Lecture: The Royal Canadian Air Force" 18 January 1928, 4. 81 reason that the organization of the RCAF was not going to be changed.164 No further correspondence exists on the files regarding RAF assistance in organizing an Auxiliary
Air Force.
It would therefore appear that the RCAF or some of its officers had been prepared to organize Auxiliary squadrons along the lines of the RAF in 1927 and 1928, and was considering the possibility as early as 1924. Events, namely the rapid expansion of the
NPAAF in the CGAO realm, appear to have overtaken intentions, thereby hindering or halting efforts to create an RCAF Auxiliary in the image of the RAF. As noted in
Chapter 1, General McNaughton indicated that the existence of the RCAF had hinged upon conducting CGAO and had the RCAF not conducted these operations, the ability of the air force to maintain its already aging fleet of aircraft would have been in doubt, as would the size of the organization.
Another item of note regarding the RAF influence was a small brochure the RAF presented on Air Power and Imperial Defence at the 1930 Imperial Conference. It
indicated the role of the RAF, how the RAF was organized and what threats were perceived.165 The significance of this document for this discussion is in how it was
mirrored by the RCAF. The RAF saw its roles as air defence, providing air forces for
overseas wars, providing a contingent to an Expeditionary Force, assisting in maintaining
the sea lines of communications and assisting in the development of Imperial air
routes.166 Its organization included 13 "Non-Regular" squadrons out of 52 assigned to
164 DHH 74/282; "Auxiliary Air Force - R.A.F. Staff Officer", 1 July 1929 and "Auxiliary Air Force", July 29th, 1929. Cuffe's letter was not found on the file but was referred to in the letter of 1 July. 165 LAC, R.B. Bennett Fonds, Microfilm Reel M997, "Imperial Conference, 1930. Air Power and Imperial Defence, Memorandum by Air Staff, documents 103887 to 103908. 166 Ibid, document 103890. The roles of the RCAF as stated by the Air Force in July 1932 were direct or home defence, maintenance of neutrality and an expeditionary force. See DHH 76/46, Peace 82 the defence of Great Britain. These home defence squadrons were divided into 35 bomber and 17 fighter squadrons. Of the 13 Non-Regular, eight were to be Auxiliary, an increase of one over previous plans, owing to the success of the Auxiliary.167 Of final relevance here is the fact that the brochure goes on to describe the air threats to Great
Britain. The air threat was of particular significance to Britain due to its proximity to potentially hostile nations. The most difficult expected problem was that of intercepting high performance day bombers; however, as technological advances were constantly increasing the threat posed by the bombers, defences such as communications and fighter aircraft also improved.168
As will be seen later, in its re-organization of 1932 the RCAF mirrored the RAF in terms of organization, and roles, including the formation of an RCAF version of the
AuxAF. Thus, the RCAF looked to the RAF as not only its parent, but also a model.169
For roles, the RCAF perceived home defence as including coastal and anti-submarine patrols, protection of ports and "localities," but more relevantly "protection of Empire Air
Routes and Convoys."170 Other roles that supported a requirement for a strong air force included countering violations of Canada's neutrality, and deployment of an expeditionary force. The roles described by the RAF in 1930 and the RCAF in 1932 are very similar and reflect the Canadian report at the Committee of Experts of the Fighting
Organization and Establishment. Further, the RCAF's Controller of Civil Aviation division was responsible for developing civil aviation in Canada. LAC, R.B. Bennett Fonds, Microfilm Reel M997, "Appendix I. The Air Defence of Great Britain", document 103898. See also DHH 78/500, the Report of the "Committee of Experts of the Fighting Services, Imperial Conference 1930," 5-6. The difference between the regular and non-regular force was that regular were full-time, equivalent to the PAAF of the RCAF. Within the non-regular, there was the Auxiliary Air Force and the Reserve. The Auxiliary was organized into active squadrons that conducted regular training. The Reserve conducted training when called upon. LAC, R.B. Bennett Fonds, Microfilm Reel M997, document 103899. See for example, the comments at DHH 78/500, Report of the "Committee of Experts of the Fighting Services, Imperial Conference 1930," 7. DHH 76/46, "Peace Organization and Establishment." 83
Services of the 1930 Imperial Conference, that the RCAF was being modeled along RAF lines.
The model aspect of the RAF-RCAF relationship is further reflected in several documents. The parallelism between the RAF and RCAF was not one simply of administration on the part of the RCAF, but also a desire on the part of the RAF that the
RCAF be interoperable with it. Reviewing the Canadian submission to the British
Empire Air Services Diary for 1928, a compendium of items of military and civil aviation in the British Commonwealth, the RAF's Chief of the Air Staff wished to make an addition which was that in case of emergency there would be a close understanding and cooperation between the two services.171 This example, from the British perspective, demonstrates one instance of the RAF attempting to create stronger links with a
Dominion Air Force.
However, not all of the efforts to create links were initiated from Great Britain. In the many Canadian examples, the links were not only in terms of structure, but also uniforms and nomenclature throughout the 1930s. In early 1934, the Adjutant General of the Militia suggested to the RCAF that it create a medical service along the lines of the
RAF. The response, prepared by Squadron Leader Walsh, indicated that the RCAF followed RAF organization, but was not always capable of modeling itself in the same manner. In part, the reason was that the RCAF being a much smaller organization did not have the capability of supporting some occupations, such as medical officers, especially when the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps could provide the same service more
DHH 74/771; Letter to Group Captain J.S. Scott dated 24 June 1927. The requested addition was not included in the text on the RCAF when the Air Annual first appeared in 1929. See Squadron Leader C.G. Bunge (ed), The Air Annual of the British Empire (London: Gale & Polden, 1929), 90-92. 84 effectively and efficiently. What is demonstrated by Walsh's reply is that while the
RCAF followed the RAF example organizationally, the RCAF operated under different circumstances from the RAF and could not always emulate that service.
A more revealing effort at copying the RAF, and one that reflected the effort to create a RCAF version of the Auxiliary Air Force occurred in March 1938. The RAF had introduced a Civil Training Schools scheme, designed to train ab initio pilots beyond the numbers of which the RAF was capable. The schools would train the pilots who, upon graduation, would proceed to a RAF school for advanced flying training. The RCAF examined this possibility, but decided that because of the cost, the RCAF would continue to train all pilots unless the pilot intake requirement increased.173 The suggestions for this plan mirror the NPAAF squadron scheme in several ways, the most important of which was that the RCAF was using a RAF plan as the model upon which the RCAF would implement its own actions.
Other earlier, but smaller instances show that the RCAF was modeling itself upon the RAF in more than just large-scale efforts. In December 1932 Group Captain Gordon requested approval from the CGS that NPAAF officers and airmen be given distinguishing badges, for officers to be worn on their collar, for airmen on their sleeve,
"[fjollowing the practice of the R.A.F"; however, the badges were to be the squadron
DHH 181.009 (D1861), Squadron Leader G.V. Walsh for ASO to SAO, 1019-10-1, FD. 90, 28 February 1934. While it would appear counter-intuitive that the Attorney-General would be involved in the medical establishment, he in fact wielded a great deal of influence on the structure of the Militia, and thus also of the RCAF. This capability is noted in the memorandum. LAC, RG 24, Series E-l-c, Volume 3504, File 898-6-22. The cost of training comparison was $1,417.55 per student for the civil schools and $1,263.00 per student for RCAF training. See Memo Squadron Leader G.A. Mercer, DAPT, to Wing Commander N.R. Anderson, APSO, 898-6-22, 15 March 1938. The recommendation to consider a civil training scheme if RCAF pilot intake increased was found in a memo Wing Commander N.R. Anderson, APSO, to Group Captain L.S. Breadner, SAO, 898-6-22, 17 March 1938. It should be noted that the RCAF in June 1939 implemented a similar scheme when eight flying clubs, members of the Canadian Flying Clubs Association, received contracts to train a total of 75 RCAF ab initio pilots. 85 number of the individual's unit, instead of the letter "A" worn by the RAF Auxiliary.174
In fact, in a memorandum of a week earlier, Gordon had cited the RAF publication as the
reference manual to use.175 While there was a suggested difference between the RCAF
and the RAF, squadron numbers versus the letter "A," the point of using RAF
distinguishing marks is worthy of note as another example of the RCAF attempting to model itself after the RAF.
The effect of the RAF example continued well past the organization of the first
NPAAF squadrons. In 1938 when the RCAF was in the process of renaming the
NPAAF, the first choice was renaming the NPAAF the "Auxiliary Air Force," which
followed the RAF's own Auxiliary Air Force. It was only when the Judge Advocate
General objected to the name, that the word "Active" was included in the revised title of
the NPAAF. In fact, Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil, Senior Air Officer indicated to the
Deputy Minister that the NPAAF/AAAF was directly comparable to the RAF's AuxAF,
again demonstrating the strong linkage and the modelling.
The influence of Great Britain clearly had a role in the development of the
NPAAF flying squadrons. While the British politicians were not able to gain any
174 DHH 181.009 (D1861), Memorandum from Group Captain J.L. Gordon to CGS, 1011-2-1, 13 December 1932. 175 Ibid, Memorandum from Group Captain J.L. Gordon to CAE, 1002-1-5, 6 December 1932. 176 DHH 181.009 (D2512), Memorandum from Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil to L.R. Lafleche, Deputy Minister, 1019-1-32, Vol. 2, 30 November 1938; Draft Air Force General Order; and Memorandum from Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil to L.R. Lafleche, Deputy Minister, 1019-1-32, 30 December 1938. 181 Harris, Canadian Brass, 178-9. McNaughton wished to reduce the size of the Militia from 15 to seven divisions. 86 leverage in Canada, the RAF certainly did have a fair degree of influence on the RCAF.
That force provided the role model for an RCAF version of an auxiliary air force. Clearly the RCAF was interested in creating an Auxiliary along the lines of the RAF's AuxAF as early as 1924, with definitive steps being taken in 1927 and 1928. It would appear that the only reason that the squadrons were not created was due to the expansion and necessity of the CGAO role from 1927 onwards, as McNaughton had made clear.
It can also be seen that the RAF served as a model for the RCAF. While closer links were espoused between the organizations in the event of emergency, the routine aspects of organization, dress and administration were copied very closely. The fact that
RCAF officers took advanced courses and participated in exchanges with the RAF appears to have played a role. The fact that the copying of the RAF as a model continued after the formation of the first NPAAF squadrons suggests that the RCAF continued with the tradition of following the RAF lead, albeit with modifications to suit the Canadian situation.
The Imperial Conferences played only a peripheral role in the development of the flying squadrons and the restructuring of the RCAF. External Affairs, as noted in existing literature, wished to maintain Canada's freedom of action and not be tied to any
League of Nations articles or Imperial commitments. The RCAF would therefore be a military-oriented organization, along the lines of the RAF, but without any commitments to the latter if External Affairs could exercise any influence. This emphasis on a military- oriented force will be covered in greater detail in the next chapter - on the influence of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference. 87
Chapter 4 A Tool of Deception: The League of Nations Disarmament Conference, Geneva, 1932
If one were to choose one major event that shaped the Canadian military in the
1930s, the League of Nations Disarmament Conference would be worthy of consideration. It would seem a strange coupling - disarmament leading to the militarization of the RCAF, and the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons - but the relationship exists. This ironic situation has gone unobserved, as Canada's actions and role at the League of Nations has not been given a thorough academic review.In terms of demands, the Government of Canada and the Department of External Affairs required the
RCAF, and the other military services, to provide input into determining Canada's position on disarmament. Despite the fact the Conferencesoon bogged down into disputes about how to measure forces and what should be permitted as military strength, it did allow two major Canadian figures and the RCAF to attempt to put their stamp on issues that were dear to them.
The Canadian preparations for the Conference provided O.D. Skelton and the
Department of External Affairs the potential to influence the structure and role of
Canada's three military services, including the RCAF, and indirectly upon the creation of the NPAAF squadrons. As noted previously, External Affairs was concerned that the military might make commitments to Great Britain that could draw Canada into a future conflict without Parliament having made the decision to go to war. Since External
Affairs chaired the Canadian preparatory discussions, it could try to control the
Department of National Defence to minimize any foreign linkages that could draw
Canada into a conflict. In doing so, External Affairs could potentially affect the size and 88 structure of the nation's military services. As a result, External Affairs could be supportive of a larger RCAF, as it would then possibly have a decreased reliance upon
Great Britain, while at the same time ensuring that the Air Force, as well as the two other services, conducted their relations with other forces in a manner approved by External
Affairs.
For General McNaughton, the Conference provided him an opportunity to reshape the Militia and the RCAF, providing a model of a future Canadian force as the basis for the Canadian submission, rather than submitting the contemporary size and structure.
McNaughton was concerned about the effectiveness of the Militia and wished to slim it down and reorganize it. He therefore used the Canadian preparations for the Conference
1 Q 1 as the justification for his planned restructuring.
While the RCAF's preparations for the Conference were subordinate to those of
Militia Headquarters, the Air Force did have the opportunity to advance its interests on two fronts. First there was the potential to gain a more substantial footing for RCAF participation in the defence of Canada and thereby garner support for a larger RCAF.
Second, the preparations for the Conference would allow the RCAF to propose that the force withdraw itself from civil aviation and concentrate solely on military training. This had been an ideal that the RCAF had explored as early as 1927 when the Director of the
RCAF, Group Captain J.S. Scott proposed to the CGS, Major General J.H MacBrien, that the RCAF slowly remove itself from CGAO and concentrate on military training.182 This proposal was overtaken by events, namely the requirement to conduct CGAO.
DHH 74/272, Memorandum from Group Captain J.S. Scott to Major General J.H. MacBrien, Chief of the General Staff, 18 January 1927, 3. As the RCAF reported to McNaughton, the CGS could have played a role in either pushing the RCAF to propose a restructuring, or in ordering the restructuring and the proposed size of the RCAF. The measure of McNaughton's influence will be in the next chapter. It should be noted, however, that the RCAF's efforts regarding the
Disarmament Conference ran counter to the RAF experience, as the RAF seriously considered limitations as means for the RAF to achieve parity with its European
1 QT neighbours, specifically France.
This chapter examines the demands placed upon the RCAF by the preparations for the Disarmament Conference and how the RCAF responded. An examination of the existing literature is in order as it provides useful background to the subsequent discussion of what the RCAF attempted to achieve. It also places into context the efforts by McNaughton and Skelton to achieve their own desired results.
Historiographical Review
There are very few published works on Canada at the League of Nations, the
Disarmament Conference and the Canadian civil servants who were responsible for developing Canada's foreign policies. On the whole, there is little information to be gained from these accounts, as most were produced after the Second World War, when the League was seen as a complete failure or a slow-moving behemoth at best. There are, however, a few very useful articles, books and theses.
Norman Hillmer, in his doctoral dissertation on Anglo-Canadian relations between 1927 and 1937, devoted one chapter to the League of Nations - "Canada, The
183 For an overview of the effect the Disarmament Conference had on the Royal Air Force, see Philip S. Meilinger, "Clipping the Bomber's Wings: The Geneva Disarmament Conference and the Royal Air Force, 1932-1934" in War in History Volume 6, No. 4 (July 1999), 306-330. 90
Empire and the League of Nations."184 The potential for Canada's League policies to affect domestic policy, such as military policies, existed as Hillmer noted that Bennett's
"essential external policy.. .was to fulfill Canada's external commitments, first to the
British Empire and then, if absolutely necessary, in other directions."185 Thus, British hopes that international cooperation could be achieved through disarmament would have been an ideal to which Bennett could agree.
Of equal significance to the possibility that the Disarmament Conference affected the RCAF was the fact that, according to Hillmer, both of Canada's major political parties saw the League as less important than the British Commonwealth, but still a useful forum for Anglo-Canadian consultation away from the "restraints of a cautious and
1 8fi uninformed government in Ottawa." Much as General McNaughton used the League's upcoming disarmament conference as a reason for modernizing the structure of the army, the potential was there for the British desire for disarmament and the League's
Disarmament Conference to have been used as a reason to overhaul the RCAF and create the NPAAF flying squadrons. Such a link is not, however, noted by Hillmer.
Richard Veatch examined the domestic and international inputs into Canadian decisions regarding the League of Nations.187 He noted Canada's inexperience at formulating international policies and that Canada's representatives to the League of
Nations delegations were chosen more for public relations purposes, to generate goodwill towards the government, than for serious representation. On significant issues Veatch
184 Hillmer, Anglo-Canadian Relations, 1927-1937. 185 Ibid; 221. The citation is from R.K. Finlayson, Life with R.B.: That Man Bennett, edited by J.R.H. Wilbur, 1966, 299-300, located in the Finlayson Papers at the LAC. Finlayson was Bennett's private secretary. 186 Ibid, 207-8, 210. 187 Veatch, Canada and the League of Nations. 91 noted that Canada followed Great Britain's lead, such as opposing conscription, since
1 SO both nations saw large land armies as the major threat to international peace. Large land armies were the result of conscription, against which, according to Veatch, Bennett gave a speech in the House of Commons indicating that it should be abolished. While Canada did not have conscription, many of the larger nations in the world did.
Veatch also noted Skelton as favouring a policy of "inactivity and silence" during the first half of the 1930s, which also included the Manchurian Crisis. The Canadian delegates to the Disarmament Conference were advised as part of the External Affairs briefs that "[t]he Dominion may, with propriety, keep in the background in Conference discussions on most subjects."190 No reasons are given for this statement; however, a possible explanation for Canadian delegates to remain inconspicuous could have been the fact that Canada had few military resources to reduce, making any Canadian statements on disarmament appear ironic. It may also be that Canada let Great Britain take the lead, which was a part of Bennett's foreign policy.
In combination with the autobiographies and biographies of members of External
Affairs, Veatch provided useful background information as to the Canadian decisions made for the Disarmament Conference. Unfortunately, as with the previously noted works, there is no documentation as to how the decisions were reached - what were the inputs that resulted in the decisions?
The only comprehensive work on Canada's position at the League of Nations during the period of this thesis is an unpublished doctoral dissertation by Donald Clarke
Story. In "Canada's Covenant: The Bennett Government, the League of Nations and
Ibid, 61-2. #>W,62andll7. Collective Security, 1930-1935," Story examined Canada's policy positions and the processes through which these positions were determined, using the Disarmament
Conference, the Manchurian Crisis and the Ethiopian Crisis as the points around which to highlight the policies.191 Story devoted considerable attention to the role played by
Bennett, but also briefly discussed O.D. Skelton, General McNaughton, W.D. Herridge and G.H. Ferguson, the latter two being the Canadian representatives in Washington,
D.C. and London respectively. Bennett, as characterized by Story, was firmly in control of foreign policy decisions; however, Story went further than other scholars in examining
Bennett's attitudes.
O.D. Skelton provided an influence in these matters, when Bennett chose to consult him. While both agreed that the League served as a forum for discussion, negotiation and bringing to bear world opinion, Bennett saw the League as providing, in certain circumstances, security guarantees through Article X of the League Charter which called for potential collective security actions.194 This had the potential to draw Canada into military or other commitments, usurping the prerogative of Parliament. Whether
Bennett's position on international security had an influence in the reformation of the
Militia and the RCAF, Story did not detail.
Story also noted the development of Canada's policy at the Disarmament
Conference. He indicated that there were two committees formed to develop Canada's position: an Interdepartmental Committee, and a working Sub-Committee. The former had as members General McNaughton, Commodore Walter Hose (Chief of the Naval
Story, "Canada's Covenant." Ibid, 58. 93
Staff) and O.D. Skelton while the latter consisted of both military representatives W.H.
Hynes (Director of Naval Intelligence), A.L. Cuffe (Deputy Director RCAF), H.D.G.
Crerar (Army Staff Officer) and External Affairs representatives Norman Robertson,
Lester Pearson and Alfred Rive.195
The Sub-Committee followed a position on disarmament that echoed the External
Affairs position on Canada and the League's Charter - that Canada did not support collective security. The Sub-Committee believed the French government position on disarmament was impractical, as France called upon the League to provide collective security against an aggressor. There was no mention, however, of the word
"disarmament" in the French plan.196 Story devotes over four pages to the views held by different members of the Sub-Committee, which was able to produce a report despite their differences. Bennett perused this final report, which had been approved by the
Interdepartmental Committee, and was not particularly impressed by it.
Regarding air forces, Story notes that Canada's position included opposing two points of the draft convention. The first was the seconding of military personnel to support civil aviation. The draft convention eliminated this secondment, a policy that the
Canadian position paper indicated would severely affect the RCAF, as the greater part of the organization's activities involved civil aviation. The second point involved the use of horsepower as the factor limiting the size of air forces - the number of aircraft in each air force would be limited by the total horsepower allowed for each nation. This point
195 Ibid, 96. 196 See Meilinger, "Clipping the Bomber's Wings," 311-2. Story provides further details in that the French position included limiting or eliminating trained reserves, which was a feature of the German military. The French supported their position of having the largest standing Army in Europe. Story, "Canada's Covenant," 104-107. 198 Harris, Canadian Brass, 178. 94 particularly pertained to Great Britain, as that nation had initially approved of horsepower
as a limiter. Then, after changing its position on the issue, the British requested Canada raise the objection at the Disarmament Conference. McNaughton gave an evasive answer
as to whether Canada would comply with the British request; however, Bennett provided
a positive one.
Story offered the most detailed account of the interactions in the development of
Canada's position for the Disarmament Conference. The thesis examined the processes behind the policy formulation and not the military factors involved, however. Bennett
appears to have had little influence on the development of the Canadian position as he
apparently let the two committees function without interference. Unfortunately, Story
does not indicate how Skelton or McNaughton may have influenced their respective members of the two committees.
Story also does not provide the details of Canada's submission to the Conference,
or what the domestic and political influences were on the submission. It is apparent that
Canada's opposition to the secondment issue was based on events before the severity of
the Depression was realized. The position was decided without reference to the potential
for large-scale reductions in the RCAF, suggesting that there was no knowledge on the part of the RCAF or External Affairs committee members that a major cutback was
looming. Whether and how the Disarmament Conference, Bennett and External Affairs
affected the reformation of the RCAF was not indicated in Story's work. Story also did
not indicate how the members of the two organizations interacted. That each would have
differing goals and perspectives was to be expected, but what this actually meant in 95 practice was worth examining for its implications in the development of the RCAF and the NPAAF squadrons.
The most notable details that emerge from the literature on the League of Nations is that External Affairs and the Department of National Defence worked together to create a common Canadian position for the Conference, and that the position developed generally reflected that of Great Britain. It should also be noted that the External Affairs representatives saw merit in the arguments put forward by the RCAF in terms of critiquing the draft convention, suggesting that there was cooperation between the RCAF and External Affairs.
As the Canadian position for the Conference was being developed in consideration of Great Britain's, the possibility existed for the Canadian forces to create linkages with their British counterparts. Interestingly because of the stated implications,
Harris noted that when McNaughton addressed the Interdepartmental Committee, he spoke of the potential for any agreement arising from the Conference to actually allow some nations to have better equipped and larger forces than they currently had. With a well-equipped seven division army, Canada would then be well placed to provide an expeditionary force "in support of... the British Empire, or possibly to implement a decision of the Council of the League." McNaughton implicitly stated Canada could assist Great Britain, with the implication of further ties and commitments outside the control of External Affairs. The Committee raised no objection to this implied commitment to Great Britain or the League of Nations.198
This latter point is of interest given Skelton's feelings about external commitments. No explanation has been found for Skelton's lack of action but a number 96 of possible explanations are possible. It is possible that Skelton decided to let the point pass, thereby not alerting McNaughton to a possible area in which External Affairs would closely watch military proposals. Skelton may also have decided that the expeditionary force would have been sent only after a Parliamentary decision but that by creating plans for one Great Britain might be assuaged in its call for Imperial Defence. Alternately, he may have decided that he or the three other members from External Affairs could manage the Militia and the RCAF.
Along with Skelton, Norman Robertson, Lester Pearson and Andre Rive all had the potential to exert some influence on the direction of the RCAF structure especially as the latter three were involved in the working committee. However, none of their biographies and memoirs mention of any details on the disarmament conference or the drafting of Canada's position. As previously noted, O.D. Skelton left very little in the way of memoirs, as his personal papers were destroyed in a fire. Further, the information that does exist on Skelton does not provide any details on the Disarmament
Conference.199 For Andre Rive no biography or personal papers were found.
The first few chapters of Jack Granatstein's biography on Skelton's successor as
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson,200 focuses on the
Skelton era. Granatstein noted that Robertson was involved in the preparations for the
Disarmament Conference, indicating that he and Pearson prepared the Canadian response to the League's "Draft General Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War," and made a general comment that Robertson continued work on the disarmament
199 A biography of Skelton by Norman Hillmer is expected in 2008. 200 Granatstein, A Man of Influence. 97 conference in 1932.201 Robertson may well have played a role in the reform of Canada's military, as he was a supporter of the League of Nations who believed in collective security and desired the League to play a more active role in countering aggressor states.202 This position would have been diametrically opposed to that of his supervisor,
Skelton, and could have meant that Robertson had some sympathies for the military and its ties with Great Britain, although this was not found in any documents or published literature.
Lester Pearson also had a part to play in the development of Canada's position for the Geneva Disarmament Conference. In his autobiography, he noted that one of his early assignments was to assist the Deputy Minister in formulating the recommendations to the government for the Disarmament Conference, being employed with Robertson and
Lieutenant-Colonel Crerar on a working sub-committee for the conference.204 Further,
Pearson acted as secretary to the 1932 Canadian delegation to the Disarmament
Conference, led by Sir George Perley, Minister without Portfolio.
In his memoirs, Pearson only indicated that he participated in the Conference by providing a short history of the conference itself. As for Canada's participation, he stated that the "great crisis" occurred when a member of the naval sub-committee proposed a 50 percent reduction of the warships of all nations, which posed a problem for Canada as she had only three. "Fortunately, at least for us, the proposal was not taken seriously."205
This statement was in error as Canada actually had four destroyers.
201 Ibid, 36 and 43. 202 Ibid, 44. 204 Lester B. Pearson, Mike, 86-7. See page 94 above for the complete list of participants. 205 Ibid, 91. Pearson was mistaken; at the time Canada had four warships, the destroyers HMC Ships Champlain and Vancouver, which arrived in 1928, and HMC Ships Saguenay and Skeena, which joined the small fleet in 1931. 98
This error may be considered indicative of how little the members of the
Department of External Affairs knew of the military's strength and what the three services wished to accomplish. However, considering that the emphasis from Skelton was one of avoiding foreign commitments, the need to know strengths was less important than understanding what the military's policies and plans were, Pearson's biography therefore does not provide any information useful to this thesis, other than suggesting by inference that it was the military's policies and plans that were important, and not the numbers.
The published works on and by the key players for External Affairs do not shed much light on the creation of the NPAAF squadrons. They do show that Skelton espoused a policy of Canadian independence of action and avoiding foreign commitments and entanglements. Fortunately, the government documents on the processes leading to a Canadian position for the Disarmament Conference provide greater detail on the relationship between External Affairs and National Defence.
Disarmament
If there was an impression that the harsh provisions in the Versailles Treaty were designed to unilaterally disarm Austria-Hungary, Germany and their wartime allies, this impression would not be borne out by the Commonwealth and Canadian discussions related to the Disarmament Conference. The report of the Inter-Departmental Committee prepared for Prime Minister Bennett made it amply clear that the thoughts of the Canadian External Affairs and National Defence members was that German disarmament was but the first step in a general limitation of armaments for all nations.
Lieutenant-Colonel H.D.G. Crerar also expressed this view in a talk that he gave to the Canadian Military Institute in Toronto in February 1933.207 When McNaughton was forced to return to Canada because of the suddenly disclosed budget cuts to his beloved RCAF, Crerar became the military expert on the Canadian delegation to the
Conference. Crerar's indicates in his presentation that German disarmament was the first step in general world-wide disarmament, which was also the position of the Inter-
Departmental Committee. This raises the possibility that disarmament was supported by members of the Department of External Affairs, as well as the military.
Further reflecting the opinion of Canadian military members in the inter-war period was the Canadian Defence Quarterly. The editorial introducing the October 1930 issue provides an interesting glimpse into the thinking within some military circles, with relevance to air forces.208 The unnamed author suggests that disarmament was in part driven by the desire to seek economies in peacetime, thus the results in naval arms reduction. The editorial goes on to note that if altruism were the basis for disarmament, then air forces would have been reduced as they do not always have "the power to discriminate in the selection of their targets." The author did believe that air forces and armies would be reduced through reorganization.209
206 DHH 181.009 (D3842) "League of Nations - Canada and the Disarmament Conference with Addenda", 10-19. 207 DHH 958C.009 (D229) "Disarmament: Address to the Canadian Military Institutes at Toronto, Feb., 1933: and Quebec, P.Q., Oct., 1933." Crerar's speech is an excellent summation of the problems encountered organizing the Disarmament convention and in applying it. 208 "Editorial" in Canadian Defence Quarterly, Volume VIII, No. 1 (October 1930) 1-13. 209 Ibid, 10-11. It should be remembered that this was written before the dramatic reductions in the RCAF's budget! 100
The editorial also provides some interesting points on the viability of the
Disarmament Conference, almost presaging actual events. One significant point was that disarmament would not develop until the public and politicians realized that its purpose was not to end war, but to reduce the cost of defensive armament during peacetime.
Secondly, the author indicated that disarmament could never be effective until common units of measurement were effective, such as whether manpower or machinery should be the basis of disarmament.210
On the eve of the Disarmament Conference, Canadian Defence Quarterly also published two very insightful articles, one examining the political aspects of the
911 conference, the other the military aspects. "Scrutator" noted that great progress was unlikely to be made at the Conference due to differences in the philosophy of security among France, Great Britain and the United States. Further, "Scrutator" observed that agreements had little meaning as moral persuasion was less likely to be used than military power to reverse an act of aggression.212 His conclusion was that disarmament was unlikely to happen quickly, and that perhaps the best step would be to create a permanent Oil organization that could help nations take steps towards that goal. "Scrutator" presented a unique political perspective that was not found in any other text for that period dealing with military affairs or disarmament.
"Scrutator'"s perception of what was possible is more realistic than that presented in the Canadian position noted in other texts. The most likely explanation for this is that
210 Ibid, 10-12. 211 "Scrutator", "The Political Aspects of the Disarmament Conference" and "Miles", "Military Aspects of the Draft Disarmament Conference" in Canadian Defence Quarterly, Volume IX, No. 2 (January 1932), 168-84 and 185-94. 212 "Scrutator", "The Political Aspects," 180-2. 213 Ibid, 183-4. "Scrutator" was Lester Pearson as indicated in the finding aid for the John Munro Fonds at the University of British Columbia.214 Providing some support to this is the fact that a diplomat would provide a unique perspective on security that a military officer might not, with the arguments made by "Scrutator" leaning towards a more diplomatic solution than military. One potential conclusion to be drawn from "Scrutator's" article is that Pearson saw military forces as a requirement for the immediate future, as disarmament was not yet possible, and force would still be necessary to provide a measure of security. As such, a strengthened Militia and RC AF would provide a measure of security and influence for Canada and its potential commitments to the Commonwealth through imperial defence and the League of Nations through collective security.
"Miles" presented an equally insightful paper. As with "Scrutator," "Miles" believed that the conference should be aimed at arms reduction, making the distinction between disarmament as the elimination of all weapons, and a reduction that does not affect a nation's right to self-defence. "Miles" also indicated that until there was a satisfactory means of settling international disputes, armaments would be required.
Perhaps the greatest strength of this article was its review of the draft convention and its basis on facts, comparing the armed forces of France and Great Britain, with the proposals of the draft convention.216 The overall point made by "Miles" was that the disarmament conference used military numbers and formulas to resolve a political problem. He therefore held out little hope of disarmament.
214 University of British Columbia, Special Collections, John Munro Fonds Finding Aid: http://www.library.ubc.ca/spcoll/AZ/PDF/M/muni'o_john.pdf. 21; accessed 10 January 2008. Munro was well placed to know as he collaborated with Pearson on Pearson's memoirs. 215 "Miles", "Military Aspects of the Draft Disarmament Conference," 185-7. 216 Ibid, 191-2. The identity or professions of "Miles" and "Scrutator" are not indicated in the journal; however, from the logic of their arguments, they appear to be either military personnel or very familiar with concepts of national sovereignty, which would be in line with the John Munro finding aid identifying "Scrutator" as Pearson. The viewpoints of military personnel on the subject of disarmament and re-organization are highly relevant to the unfolding of events; however, a dearth of material exists on the key military personnel involved in the preparations for the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the reshaping of the RCAF.
Military officers probably realized that disarmament was a very difficult concept to implement, one that would possibly not result in any tangible results in the international realm. The documentary evidence does provide any insight into whether members of the military and of External Affairs shared this realization when they were working together to produce a Canadian position for the Disarmament Conference. The question thus remains unanswered as to whether the two groups believed that disarmament was possible, or if they believed that they were undertaking an exercise that was unrealistic but that they were required to undertake as a result of Canada's membership in the League of Nations. Further, it cannot be stated whether the members of External Affairs accepted that an increase in size of the RCAF was required, including the formation of the NPAAF squadrons, before any disarmament, and whether the potential lack of progress on disarmament would negate this increase in the strength of the RCAF. The Canadian deliberations
The preparations for the Disarmament Conference have thus far not been well documented. These are important, however, as they reveal the evolution of Canada's position, and thus of the RCAF's role and structure as well.
While discussion of the evolution of the Disarmament Conference is unnecessary here, it should be noted that from 1920 to December 1930, there were many false starts and missteps. Each League member was allowed to have representatives on the various committees and sub-committees that prepared the draft convention. The positions developed in these committees were then confirmed with national authorities. Canada was therefore aware of the direction that the draft convention was taking, and was able to prepare a position that remained fairly consistent throughout the preparatory period.
By December 1930, the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament
Conference had prepared a draft convention, and the League of Nations Council set 2
February 1932 as the start date for the Conference. After the announcement that the
Disarmament Conference would take place in February 1932, the Deputy Minister for the
Department of National Defence, G.J. Desbarats, wrote to Skelton that Canada should work closely with the other self-governing nations of the British Empire to create a common formula for answering the questions and filling in the tables required for the
Conference. The League's Preparatory Committee for the Disarmament Conference had spent considerable time preparing a list of questions and tables for nations to complete. Desbarats suggested that the Commonwealth could provide consistent
218 LAC, RG25, Vol. 1567, File 1930-377-C Part 1, Letter Desbarats to Skelton February 18*, 1931 and 11th March 1931. answers, through mutual discussions, for the forms to be completed for and submitted to the Conference.
In subsequent months, letters went out from External Affairs to Australia, New
Zealand and other Commonwealth nations asking how they were preparing their submissions and to learn what they were submitting as their answers. The coordination was deemed necessary in part because of the decision made at the Imperial Conference to provide separate submissions for each Dominion, and because of exchanges and courses.
One particular area of concern for several Commonwealth nations, including Canada, was with Royal Navy officers on exchange in all Commonwealth navies (although nothing was noted for officers of the British Army or Royal Air Force serving on exchange), and with officers from the Commonwealth attending courses in the United
Kingdom, the accounting of these individuals was required. The question was whether these officers were to be counted on Canadian strength or on Great Britain's. This process of mutual consultation supported the notional independence of each of the
Commonwealth nations. Desbarats further agreed on 21 April 1931 to a suggestion from
Skelton to have an inter-departmental committee review the draft convention.220 This committee was to take on important proportions for the military, as it would allow
McNaughton to put forward his ideas about what the strength of the Army and RCAF should be, preparing the way for reforms of both organizations.
The accounting of personnel went into such small minutae. See various documents in LAC, RG25, Vol 1567, File 1930-377-C, Parts 2 and 3. LAC, RG25, Vol. 1567, File 1930-377-C, Part 1, Letter Desbarats to Skelton April 21st, 1931. 105
The Sub-Committee
The Sub-Committee, in effect the working group, began its meetings on 22 June.
The military members began the task of providing data for tables and questions that would be used as a submission to the League of Nations describing the state of the
Canadian military. More importantly, Crerar issued a memorandum to all members of the
Sub-Committee on 22 June that indicated that in preparing the submissions, members should assume that all nations had the right to be allowed a minimum military force to react to aggression.222 Thus while the returns to the Disarmament Conference would provide the actual number of personnel and equipment, nations could submit a minimum that they required. The importance of this nuance was that it allowed Canada to indicate that its military was under-strength, thereby allowing General McNaughton to reform the
Army and the RCAF to increase the number of personnel it required.
While the period of the Sub-Committee's activities from June to September were spent gathering data and filling out the tables, Walsh was also preparing a report on the minimum requirements for the air defence of Canada. Walsh presented his initial report to Pearson on 10 November 1931. Starting with the premise that there were three roles for the RCAF - co-operation with the Army, co-operation with the Navy, and home and coastal defence - Walsh indicated that the Air Force would have to have a large component that was instantly ready for defence. The reason for this was that air attack could be kept secret until the last moment, with the threat against North America emerging through the continually increasing range of bomber aircraft. As an example of
222 LAC, RG25, Vol. 1567, File 1930-377-C, Part 2, "Memorandum on Draft Disarmament Convention", 22 June 1931. 106 the high state of readiness and the large numbers required, he cited the air defences around London, England.223
Additionally, Walsh noted that because of the current state of the RCAF, the
RCAF was "entirely inadequate to perform even one of these duties," as the organization was not military, but civilian-oriented in its operations. Furthermore, budgetary restrictions were "retarding" the RCAF's development. The current establishment, if used for the Disarmament Conference, would in Walsh's estimation, leave Canada
"defenceless" from air attack. As a result, Walsh proposed a Permanent Force (PAAF) establishment of 426 officers and 3,762 airmen and a Non-Permanent Force (NPAAF) of
574 officers and 6,238 airmen as a minimum requirement. The strength of the RCAF on
31 March 1931 was only 177 officers and 729 airmen, both PAAF and NPAAF. The high number of PAAF would provide the personnel required in case of a sudden attack and allow squadrons to be situated in areas where technicians could not be found for
NPAAF squadrons. Each NPAAF squadron was to have 18 PAAF airmen, most of whom would be technicians to keep the airplanes flying.224
By 31 December 1931, these figures were to change, but the plan for a military
RCAF had further developed. Walsh indicated to Pearson that the figures of 2329 all ranks were to be used for the PAAF and 2108 for the NPAAF. This represented a drop of
LAC, RG25, Vol. 1567, File 1930-377-C, Part 4, Letter Walsh to Pearson November 10th 1931, Attachment "Observations by Air Service Member on Articles on Draft Disarmament Convention". London's air defence would consist of six squadrons of eighteen aircraft required to defend Britain in a plan prepared by Air Commodore Higgins in 1921. This would have been the effective plan to which Walsh referred. By 1932, this plan had changed so that the number of aircraft defending London doubled. See John Ferris, "Fighter Defence Before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain, 1917-1934" in The Journal of Military History Volume 63 (October 1999), 857-8. DHH 76/46, "Peace Organization and Establishment", Appendix A. 107
45 percent for the PAAF and 70 percent for the NPAAF. It is not known on whose direction the reduction in personnel was made.
More importantly, the structure of the RCAF was to be:
Permanent Force
1 Torpedo Bombing Squadron 15 aircraft 1 Fighter Squadron 15 aircraft 1 Army Co-operation Squadron 15 aircraft 1 Flying Training School 40 advanced + 48 ab initio aircraft 1 Army Co-operation School 8 aircraft 1 Wireless School 5 aircraft 1 Armament School 16 aircraft 1 Photographic School 3 aircraft
Non-Permanent Force
6 Army Co-operation Squadrons 30 aircraft, 90 at full strength225 3 Torpedo Bomber Squadrons 15 aircraft, 45 at full strength 1 Fighter Squadron 5 aircraft, 15 at full strength 1 Flying Training School 40 aircraft
Clearly, the possibility of creating NPAAF squadrons hinged upon the acceptance of the reasons, roles and figures Walsh provided to Pearson. If External Affairs had balked at these figures, it would have been more difficult to have them accepted by the
Government; however, there were no documents found that indicated any hesitation on the part of External Affairs to accept this plan for the RCAF and the use of these figures.
Canada, therefore, proposed an Air Force of 2,329 Permanent and 2,108 Non-
Permanent members to the Conference.226 These figures were recognized as being higher than the then current strength of the Air Force, but were explained by stating that some
225 The NPAAF squadrons were to receive only enough aircraft for training purposes. It would only be at the time of mobilization that they would receive their full complement of aircraft. 226 DHH 73/664, "The Analysis of the Draft Convention," 31 and Annex 4, part III. 108 nations were lightly armed and could be entitled to an increase in strength.227 The figures were based on internal and external requirements, as well as being considered relative and not absolute. They were relative in that if other nations disarmed sufficiently, Canada could find itself in a position where its own forces would require reduction.
It should also be noted that the NPAAF would form the bulk of the Army Co operation support, with six of the seven squadrons coming from that component. The figure of seven corresponded with the number of Militia divisions in McNaughton's reforms, suggesting what would seem intuitive - that the RCAF and the Militia were co operating in the formulation of not only the RCAF's roles, but also its strength.
This proposal on the strength of the RCAF provides some valuable insight into the thinking behind the creation of the NPAAF squadrons as well as the thoughts behind the Canadian position. First, the RCAF was being given roles that were military, with no indication of a civil role for the force. Secondly, its strength was calculated first and then
a structure formed around the number of personnel. In forming a military organization,
one would expect that first the requirements of the Air Force would be defined, after which the required structure would be created and finally the number of personnel required would be calculated. The RCAF, however, did this in reverse - calculating numbers and then the structure. Without the basis for the initial planning figures, the
reason for this reversal in process must remain unexplained.
Inter-Departmental Committee
While the Working Group was amassing its figures and tables, the more strategic
work was left to the Inter-Departmental Committee. It was here that the concerns of
227 DHH 181.009 (D3842) "League of Nations - Canada and the Disarmament Conference with Addenda," 2. External Affairs and National Defence would be turned into direction for the Working
Group. The Inter-Departmental Committee began meeting in June 1931. Its main objectives in the first meetings were to determine how to complete the tables that were to be submitted to the Disarmament Conference, and what information should be included.228
A key concern for the Inter-Departmental Committee was ensuring that three basic points were addressed. First, the Air Force was essential to both defence and to civil development. Second, the suggested method of limitation on numbers of aircraft based on horsepower was impractical. Finally, Canada opposed Article 28 of the preparatory documentation, which stated that secondment of Air Force officers to civil duties should be only temporary and provisional. Opposition to this Article was based on the fact that Canada depended heavily upon the Air Force to perform civil functions.
As had been discussed at the Imperial Conference of 1930, Canada sought to gain acceptance of its position on this latter point. When it failed to do so, Canada sought a special exemption for its own situation, rather than an elimination of the article which it believed would be more difficult to secure.
The secondment of RCAF officers to civil duties is also significant in assessing the development of the NPAAF squadrons. As noted in the previous chapter that the
RCAF was interested in a military model based on the RAF's Auxiliary Air Force, and that, as noted above, provision was made in Canada's Disarmament submission for 2108
Non-Permanent personnel. As CGAO operations had not yet ceased and the "Big Cut" had not yet taken place, the template set forward for the Disarmament Conference
See the minutes of the meetings of 2 and 17 July. LAC, RG25, Vol. 1567, File 1930-377-C,, Part 2 110 indicated what the intentions were for the RCAF. The result was that the NPAAF would most likely be removed from civil operations, becoming a wholly military force comparable to the AuxAF.
The Inter-Departmental Committee indicated, however, that the Permanent Active
Air Force would remain involved in civil duties. The Convention analysis indicated that 100 PAAF aircraft were to be allocated to CGAO, while NPAAF personnel would train only 30 days a year. The conclusion to be drawn from these figures would appear to be that the Permanent Force would take on the role of CGAO as there would not be enough flying time allotted for NPAAF personnel to fly operationally, especially with the
PAAF expanding and flying hours fixed in the annual RCAF budget. The objection to making secondment a temporary situation was a threat to the continued operations of the
Permanent Force. Prohibiting civil operations to the military would mean that the RCAF had lost a major reason, in the eyes of the government, for its existence. Further, the civil role was one that the RCAF could not shed despite previous efforts to do so.
The report of the Inter-Departmental Committee and the analysis of the convention both highlight the fact that Canada was following an Imperial line, but only in as much as Canada expected that the United Kingdom would solicit Canada's support in reaching a single Commonwealth policy on "all the important questions." Further,
Canada desired that each Dominion be allocated separate figures for land and air forces, a position that was accepted in Geneva and in London. No such separation was desired for
230 Both the structure and the budgetary figures for the proposed structure of the RCAF after disarmament has taken place include estimates for CGAO operations. DHH 73/664, "The Analysis of the Draft Convention", Annex 2, Form "A" (Memorandum on Air Limitation, Figures to be submitted under the Tables Annexed to Chapter C, Part II) and Annex 4, part III (Memorandum on Budgetary Figures for Proposed Canadian Land, Navy and Air Programmes). 231 DHH 73/664, "The Analysis of the Draft Convention," Annex 2, Form "A". Ill naval forces as Commonwealth naval forces were considered as one entity in the London
Naval Conference of 1930.232 As a result, the Canadian position, one that
Commonwealth members also accepted, was that the duration of any convention resulting from the Disarmament Conference should coincide with the duration of the London
Naval Conference.
The text of the Inter-Departmental Committee report is notable in that it indicates that Canada considered itself an independent nation capable of making its own commitments and decisions. There was no mention of blindly following the British lead, although clearly Canada would be willing to assist the United Kingdom in maintaining a unified Commonwealth position as long as it did not compromise any Canadian positions.
Nowhere is this Canadian independence asserted more than in the section on
Canada and Article X of the League of Nations Charter. The article reads;
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In the case of any such aggression or in case of any danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.
From the start Canada opposed this Article. Canada's attitude was that the League was a consultative and co-operative body, and that consultation and co-operation constituted the real meaning of security.233 Similar discussion and concern was expressed for Article
DHH 181.009 (D3842) "League of Nations - Canada and the Disarmament Conference with Addenda," 7-8. Ibid, 57-8. The discussion on Canada's participation in amending the original wording of the Article continues to page 60. Canada also hoped that the International Court of Justice would be another means of settling disputes. See 71. 112
XVI, which indicated that members were to provide the necessary military forces to protect the covenants of the League.234
As a result, for the Disarmament Conference, as well as at any Imperial discussions, Canada would not be ensnared by any commitments to automatically wage war. Led by the Department of External Affairs, Canada's position at the Disarmament
Conference was therefore one of seeking to find ways to arrange a meaningful and equitable disarmament such that international security could be achieved. It was through this form of security that Canada hoped to avoid any entanglements in Imperial- or
League-initiated conflicts. But, a corollary to this position was that to ensure its own security, Canada would require a strong military, and therefore proposed a stronger
RCAF than what existed at the time. The Disarmament Conference actually provided
Canada the opportunity to rearm.
We can therefore see that international influences played a role in the creation of the NPAAF squadrons. Whether at Imperial conferences or at the preparatory work for the Disarmament Conference, the Canadian position was one that protected the unique situation of the RCAF in its civil role, although this appears to have been more an incidental result of a desire to maintain an independent foreign policy and not a case of wishing to protect the RCAF. Certainly the Inter-Departmental Committee had a desire to ensure that Canada had the right to have forces necessary for self-defence, which could mean expanding the RCAF.
Canada's position also included retaining independence in the use of its military forces - Canada would not commit to the use of force whether in support of League of
234 Ibid, 61. The discussion on this Article continues to page 66. 113
Nations covenants or Imperial loyalties unless Parliament had made the decision to use force. This position was clearly made at the 1930 Imperial Conference and for the
Disarmament Conference. The RCAF would therefore be a nationally-oriented organization, first and foremost protecting Canadian interests and not committed to any external nation or organization.
The Disarmament Conference also provided the excuse for the creation of a larger
RCAF. With an establishment of over 4,400 personnel and a more military structure, the
RCAF would be considerably larger if the structure proposed for the Disarmament
Conference was implemented. As will be noted in the next chapter, this establishment was required for reasons that would have created serious problems with External Affairs.
The new structure and roles did not mean that the RCAF would get out of its
"Bread and Butter" role of CGAO immediately. Instead, it would appear that military personnel would continue to be involved with CGAO until civil airlines and operators were able to take over. These PAAF personnel could then revert to newly-formed military-oriented squadrons. The discussion about "secondment" further suggested that the RCAF expected to be involved in civil duties. The opposition to the elimination of secondment suggests that the RCAF knew it would continue with civil flying for a while.
It also indicates the RCAF did not expect to be removed from this role.
With an enlarged PAAF proposed, the need for NPAAF to conduct CGAO would apparently be reduced. The NPAAF would appear to have been proposed as a strictly military force because the position papers for the League of Nations do not provide enough training days or permanency of NPAAF pilots to be involved with civil duties.
Thus, even before the Big Cut, the RCAF was proposing an evolution of the NPAAF, 114 including making NPAAF personnel completely temporary, working only 30 days a year, instead of full-time service as had been the case when these personnel were employed on
CGAO.
It is apparent that the RCAF leadership used the Disarmament Conference to further its own ends for both the PAAF and the NPAAF as military forces. The change in roles, the increase in strength and a revamped structure all suggest that the RCAF was willing to use the preparations for the Disarmament Conference to create a larger and restructured air force following in the footsteps of the Militia. As noted by Harris, the
Militia was planning a revised structure in early 1931 with McNaughton using the
Conference as the means to justify and initiate the changes. Further, it would have been the Militia determining how many Army Co-operation squadrons were needed, not the reverse.
For General McNaughton and the RCAF, they were able to achieve one of their goals in that External Affairs supported the plans for restructuring the Militia and the Air
Force, while Bennett approved them. The RCAF was not, however, able to escape from the role of CGAO, although this would have fallen to the PAAF and not the NPAAF.
External Affairs was not so successful in its efforts, as the RCAF and the Militia were planning for foreign commitments, which will be demonstrated in the next chapter. 115
Chapter 5 "I did it my way:" The Royal Canadian Air Force
Previous chapters have shown that finance, public pressure, and the RAF model had minimal influence on the RCAF's decision to form the NPAAF flying squadrons.
The previous chapter demonstrated that the RCAF used the opportunity provided by the
Disarmament Conference to gain the support of External Affairs, and justify a more military-oriented RCAF, one that would most likely ride on the coattails of the Militia.
The RCAF provided External Affairs with one justification for the NPAAF squadrons, and, as will be noted below, used another within the RCAF. This chapter examines internal pressures within the RCAF as well as pressures from within the military structure to re-orient its role. Characterized as "bush pilots in uniform," because of the level of
CGAO flying, the potential of internal demands to create a military-oriented air force could have existed. Further, the RCAF would most likely have been subject to pressure from the CGS, who desired the restructuring of the Militia, including preparations for an expeditionary force, a concept loaded with connotations of foreign commitments, which
Skelton and Bennett would not have approved.
This chapter will first examine what information is available on key RCAF officers of the period, as they would have been able to make the most direct statement on the demands placed on the RCAF to create NPAAF squadrons. Next, the existing literature will be reviewed to determine what has been stated about the actual procedure through which the NPAAF squadrons came into existence. The literature on
McNaughton and his desire for an expeditionary force will also be reviewed. 116
Finally, the chain of events and potential influences that led to the creation of the squadrons will be discussed. This discussion will note that there was in fact little pressure to change the operational orientation of the RCAF, although this had been desired, and that the changes to the RCAF, including the creation of the NPAAF squadrons, were the result of the Militia restructuring instituted by General McNaughton.
Historiographical Review
Existing literature does not provide any indications of when the RCAF first began to plan for NPAAF squadrons, nor are there indications of who initiated the process.
Unfortunately, there is very little information available that directly answers these questions. The two biggest problems are that very little has been written about any of the key figures in the RCAF at that time, and that the major figures of the RCAF in the 1930s left very little in the way of personal documents to assist historians .
For example the papers of Air Marshal Lloyd S. Breadner,235 who was the Acting
Director of the RCAF from February 1928 to April 1932, contain only documents from the period 1915 to 1916.236 The problem for Air Marshal G.M. Croil, who was
Commanding Officer of Camp Borden from December 1927 to December 1932 and was in a position of influence also has left documents, is the opposite. The only documents in his fonds date from late 1937 onwards, with only two newspaper clippings from the period prior to this.237 Similarly, the Air Vice Marshal Frank S. McGill fonds holds mostly documents that relate to a period after the formation of the NPAAF flying
235 This section will use the highest rank attained by these officers. All other ranks used will be that at the time of the citation. 236 DHH 74/707, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner Papers. 237 DHH 78/104, Air Marshal G.M. Croil Papers. These clippings bear not relationship to the NPAAF squadrons. 117 squadrons. One letter from March 1935 is of interest to Auxiliary history, as it is a letter from Air Marshal Robert Leckie to McGill describing how the RAF supported its AuxAF and how often the members of the AuxAF paraded. The LAC also has a McGill fonds; however, it does not have any information of value to this study, consisting mainly of papers related to McGill's First World War experience and general papers from after the
Second World War. Other potentially important officers left no records at all. Air
Vice Marshal J.L. Gordon, who was the RCAF representative at the 1930 Imperial
Conference, and Air Vice Marshal A.A.L. Cuffe, who was a member of the working group for the Disarmament Conference position paper, left no personal papers that would assist this study. Finally, while Air Vice Marshal G. V. Walsh produced the paper outlining the RCAF requirements for an effective Air Force, his papers contain mainly personal letters and memorabilia.240
Another Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal W.A. Curtis, provided his personal papers to the Library and Archives of Canada. The Curtis fonds contains documents related to personnel of interest to Curtis, such as personnel who undertook training with the Royal Flying Corps in Canada, as well as personal correspondence and documents from after his retirement. As one of the founders of No. 10 Squadron in
Toronto, it is unfortunate that there is no document related to that period.241 It should be noted, however, that the LAC has received further documents from the Curtis family, but these are not yet available to the public.
DHH 74/628, McGill Papers, Folder M, File 2. LAC, R2544-0-8-E, Frank S. McGill Fonds. LAC, R2647-0-9-E, George Victor Walsh Fonds. LAC, R4052-0-6-E, Wilfred Austin Curtis Fonds. 118
Air Vice Marshal George Howsara, who wrote an interesting article in Canadian
Defence Quarterly, which will be examined below, suggesting the need for an auxiliary air force for Canada, was the Director, Civil Government Air Operations (CGAO) from
February 1931 to February 1933. As such he would have had the potential to state whether or not the RCAF should continue with the CGAO role. Howsam was interviewed as part of the process of preparing the Official History of the RCAF. He indicated that he was involved in the planning and organization of No. 10 Squadron
(Toronto), but not the details of how he was involved or what the strategic setting was.
Howsam also indicated that the RAF Staff College course at Andover taught the importance of a strong civil base, a criterion involved in the selection of NPAAF squadron locations.243 While the Howsam interview provided some interesting bits of information, it does not specifically relate why the NPAAF flying squadrons were created or what influenced their creation.
Key individuals for the RCAF during the 1931-32 period have therefore little to offer in understanding why the NPAAF squadrons were created. As a group they could have exerted some influence, by acting in unison or through consensus, with senior
RCAF personnel consulting each other and other officers before making a decision.
While there is no direct evidence of cooperative or consensus on the creation of the
NPAAF squadrons John Ferris indicated that through the 1920s, questions of doctrine in
242 DHH G.R. Howsam Biographical file, Interview with Air Vice Marshal G.R. Howsam, 1 and 7. 243 Ibid, 3. 119 the Royal Air Force were settled by consensus.244 With the RCAF being heavily oriented towards the RAF model, consultation on the NPAAF could have been possible.
As will be shown below, some RCAF officers had a different opinion of what the primary role of the RCAF was - suggesting that it was supporting the RAF in time of war. It cannot be concluded from this limited evidence whether the RCAF actively promoted this opinion, or whether this was a private opinion of these officers. That these officers would state a wartime role of supporting the RAF as the first priority, a role that was not articulated on paper, suggests that consensus did not exist within the RCAF.
If the RCAF were not consultative, this would suggest that an individual or a few individuals had a significant role to play. William McAndrew observed that the RCAF's senior officer, a Group Captain, was only a minor player in militia headquarters and
"whose military advice was confined to technical matters and then only on rare occasions on which it was asked."245 The fact that the head of the RCAF may have been a minor player within the Militia raises the possibility that the CGS, to whom he reported, may have been more influential in the affairs of the RCAF and in the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons.
Roger Sarty provided an interesting perspective on the reorganization of the military during this period and the role played by McNaughton.246 Starting from
McNaughton's desire to reorganize the Militia, Sarty noted that McNaughton was also concerned about the potential for various conflicts, especially one between Japan and the
244 John Ferris, "British Strategic Air Defence, 1915-40", in Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo, Sebastien Cox and Peter Gray (eds) (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 26- 28. 245 McAndrew, "Canadian Defence Planning," 81. 246 Roger Sarty, " 'Entirely in the hands of the friendly neighbour'; The Canadian Armed Forces and the Defence of the Pacific Coast, 1919-1939", in The Maritime Defence of Canada, 79-109. United States, a conflict that could take place off Canada's Pacific Coast. Further, Sarty observed that while McNaughton supported the navy's program to acquire destroyers and develop west coast defences, he perceived the air force to be of particular importance in enforcing Canada's neutrality.247
Sarty indicated that one PAAF and three NPAAF maritime reconnaissance squadrons were to be created and located on the West Coast, because air force squadrons could be moved quickly from one location to another and because the Royal Navy was expected to protect the East Coast. Sarty characterized this plan as optimistic due to budgetary restraints. He also indicated that McNaughton went on to suggest to the government an increase in the number of squadrons on the West Coast - six maritime bomber squadrons, all PAAF - thereby increasing the number of PAAF squadrons and reducing the NPAAF ones.248 This suggestion was prompted by tensions between the
United States and Japan arising from the latter's withdrawal from the League of Nations.
Further budget cutbacks, however, meant this latter suggestion was shelved.
Sarty was able to shed more light on the importance of the NPAAF in the overall scheme of the RCAF. He observed that McNaughton was willing to trade three NPAAF squadrons for five more expensive PAAF squadrons, which is not noted in any of the other works.249 It also suggests that the NPAAF was a potential source of personnel for less immediate problems, and that budgetary restraint was potentially a secondary consideration. Sarty is not clear whether this proposal originated with McNaughton, nor is he on the issue of whether it was staffed through the RCAF or External Affairs.
Ibid, Sarty discusses the events of 1932-33 on 93-4. Ibid. Sarty, "Entirely in the hands of the friendly neighbour," 94. James Eayrs has stated that in February 1933, McNaughton made the creation of
NPAAF squadrons a priority of the RCAF and that funds had been set aside specifically
for this purpose.250 Although Eayrs mentions this expenditure as part of an overall list of priorities and points of discussion, he is the only source that refers to the NPAAF
squadrons as a CGS priority. Eayrs' source for this ranking is not, however, indicated.
One final point in support of McNaughton being the architect of the NPAAF
squadrons was an interview of Air Vice Marshal A.A.L. Cuffe, conducted on 6 March
1964. In it, Cuffe states that it was General McNaughton who decided to form the Army
Co-operation Squadrons, although he does not give any specific reasons as to why.251
Thus, existing literature demonstrates that McNaughton had a desire for a strong
RCAF, believing that it should be the front line of defence for Canada. With such a
desire, it is entirely plausible that McNaughton's influence extended towards the creation
of the NPAAF squadrons. This, however, is not explicit in any existing literature. If the
CGS did exert pressure, one would expect that there would be some strategic imperative
that would have influenced him. Such an imperative has not been noted in the existing
literature. The only definite imperative was the apparent need to increase the number of
PAAF squadrons at the expense of the NPAAF in 1933, but then only because of rising tensions between the United States and Japan.
As with the paucity of information about RCAF officers, there is a similar dearth
on the strategic imperatives the RCAF faced. Most works by noted military historians provide only minimal mention of the creation of the NPAAF squadrons. When the
Eayrs, From the Great War to the Great Depression, 294-5 and 297 1 DHH, Camp Borden PRF File, Folder 3. formation of the units is mentioned, the strategic imperatives behind this action are not noted. There are, however, useful points in some of the texts noted below.
Wing Commander F.H. Hitchins' text on the air forces from 1920-1939 provided the details and effects of "The Big Cut" on the RCAF and the discussions in Parliament, but his work made no mention of any influence of the Geneva Disarmament Conference or of the formation of the NPAAF squadrons in the Parliamentary debates.254 Hitchins did note that tentative regulations for the NPAAF were created, an establishment determined and four new units authorized in 1932. In 1946 Hitchins also presented a paper on the evolution of the RCAF in which he noted the recovery of the RCAF after the cuts of 1932 was aided by the creation of the "Auxiliary Active Air Force squadrons".256
He provided no further explanation other than the suggestion that this was part of the change in orientation from a civil to a military air force.257 Again, there is a possible linkage between the budgetary cutbacks of February 1932 and the creation of the squadrons, although this linkage is indirect and not conclusively stated.
The official history of the RCAF provided greater detail on the background behind the decision to create the NPAAF flying squadrons.258 W.A.B. Douglas related that the Geneva Disarmament Conference provided McNaughton with the opportunity he needed to bring about a fundamental change in the army's establishment, but at the same
For example, see Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada and Arms, Men and Governments and Morton, A Military History of Canada. Hitchins, Air Board, 259-262. Hitchins, "Evolution of the Royal Canadian Air Force," 92-100. Ibid, 99. The name of the NPAAF changed to "Auxiliary Active Air Force" in 1938. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force. time presented dangers for the RCAF, which McNaughton strongly supported.
Douglas' history provided the basic background to the RCAF re-organization that resulted in the formation of the NPAAF squadrons. The official history noted that that there was an initial plan (submitted in December 1931), identified who wrote it (Walsh) and related when it was finalized (early 1932). The role of, size of and reason for the
Permanent Active Air Force is described; however, the history noted only that the dispatch of an expeditionary force was a secondary consideration, one that could be met by the NPAAF.260 The official history did not indicate that the planning for the future structure of the RCAF, including the formation of NPAAF squadrons, was underway in
November 1931 as part of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Nor did the official history note that the proposed strength, role and organization of the RCAF had been provided to the joint External Affairs - National Defence Working Committee. Instead, the interpretation in the history of the planning was that the RCAF was "concerned with preventing unreasonable limitations to its growth."261
The official RCAF history is the most significant source in describing the relationship of the Geneva Disarmament Conference to the development of the NPAAF squadrons. It provides information on the restructuring process within the Army and the
RCAF, and some of the rationale behind the creation of the squadrons. The significance of the Depression, inter-departmental rivalries, and political will are not, however, noted as possible factors in the creation of the NPAAF squadrons.
Ibid, 123-4. The change in McNaughton's attitude, from perceiving the RCAF as an adjunct of the militia to the major force in home defence, is noted at 125. Ibid, 124. Ibid, 124. 124
McAndrew provided more detail in his brief outline of the inter-war period for the
RCAF.262 He noted that two events pushed the RCAF out of its civilian role and back into the military: "the Great Depression" and military planning for the Geneva Disarmament
Conference. McAndrew highlighted a chain of events that started with McNaughton using the Disarmament Conference to reform the army, in the process of which the
RCAF also reviewed its role.263 A preliminary review of the future requirements of the
RCAF, McAndrew noted, was completed by the end of December 1931. This review identified the units required to meet the RCAF's new responsibilities in home defence, a role that McAndrew identified as having been given to the RCAF because McNaughton concluded that the RCAF could conduct the first line of home defence less expensively than the Royal Canadian Navy. This review of December 1931 was the same one that
Walsh presented to Pearson, and that formed the basis of the RCAF proposal for the
Disarmament Conference.
Of greater significance is the observation made by McAndrew, citing Eayrs, that a
small expenditure of funds could be quickly translated into a military capability with its roots in civilian aviation.264 This basis in civil aviation certainly suggests the NPAAF, as the NPAAF was to draw its personnel from civilian pilots and mechanics in the areas where the squadrons were to be located. McAndrew in this article thus provided more detail on the period of the formation of the NPAAF squadrons than was possible in the official history. However, McAndrew did not provide any background or information
262 It should be noted that McAndrew prepared the chapter in the official history on the interwar period. McAndrew, "Canadian Defence Planning between the Wars," 81-89. 263 Ibid, 85. 264 Ibid. The source for this contention (footnote 26) is James Eayrs, From the Great War to the Great Depression, 275. It should be noted that although the basis of the NPAAF rested in civil aviation, there was no documentary evidence found that indicated any influence of or consultation with J.A. Wilson, the Controller of Civil Aviation from 1922 to 1941. 125 about the efforts to circumvent the concerns of the Department of External Affairs, or how the RCAF had been attempting to emulate the RAF, as noted in Chapter 3, both of which are important points in considering the NPAAF squadrons.
What we therefore see in the published literature is that there are useful points that provide some insight into the process behind the creation of the NPAAF squadrons. The individual apparently responsible for initiating the action in 1931 had been possibly identified. There is a consensus that McNaughton used the Geneva Disarmament
Conference as the means to overhaul the Army. McNaughton was aware of the fiscal tightness of the period and sought to effect savings by making the RCAF the first line of defence for Canada. Further, McNaughton apparently saw the NPAAF as a means to acquire enhanced military capabilities - air force squadrons - at lower costs. In the event of war, the NPAAF would be mobilized and provided with further training to ensure the
NPAAF aircrew were up to military flying standards. This capability could be achieved at a cost far lower than having an equal number of PAAF squadrons permanently ready.
From this first observation a second is derived - that the NPAAF flying squadrons were created because of the need for airmen upon mobilization. By drawing upon existing civilian skills and possibly the rapid growth of civil aviation, these squadrons could be built up rapidly. Aircraft could also be obtained fairly quickly through Canadian and possibly American or British companies, as construction times were considerably shorter in the 1930s. However, if McNaughton's intention was to rapidly create a capability, the Big Cut derailed it temporarily. He envisioned his proposal before the drastic cutback, after which funding would not be available to even start training of the
NPAAF squadrons for another two fiscal years. 126
There are two points that are not considered in the foregoing works. The role of the RCAF was stated as the defence of Canada in the documents provided for the preparations for the Disarmament Conference. The NPAAF was not mentioned as having any special role, so it may be assumed that the defence of Canada was also the role of the NPAAF squadrons; however, as will be noted below, this was not the case.
Secondly, none of the authors note that an expeditionary role for the NPAAF squadrons was only provided later and was not one of the reasons stated to parties outside Militia
Headquarters and the RCAF. The reason for the creation of the NPAAF squadrons is thus still open - was it for the defence of Canada, as provided to External Affairs, or was it for an expeditionary force as was stated in RCAF documents?
Further, the foregoing works do not settle the issue of the influence of budgetary restraint. As noted in Chapter 1, the budget was most likely not the reason for the creation of the NPAAF squadrons, as the RCAF recognized that funding for the NPAAF would not be available for several years, nor had the RCAF planned for the squadrons in the estimates prepared for FY 1932-33 before the Big Cut. Nonetheless, the squadrons were created.
Finally, some of the literature suggests that the Disarmament Conference was the means by which the RCAF would move from a civil orientation to a military one. This ignores the documentation noted in the previous chapter that shows that even with the
Conference proposals the RCAF realized that it would still have a civil role.
What is missing from the histories of the RCAF is an overview of the evolution of the NPAAF squadrons. Planning for these squadrons would have evolved over a period of time and would have involved RCAF officers as well as possibly the RAF, as the 127
RCAF had requested RAF assistance in forming the squadrons, as noted in Chapter 3.
Further, there were differences between the NPAAF as presented to the Inter-
Departmental Committee on Disarmament in December 1931, and what was provided for
RCAF planning purposes in July 1932. The differences will explain the questions noted in the paragraphs above.
Demands from within the RCAF
One very important aspect of the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons would be the demand placed on the RCAF from within by its own personnel. With RCAF officers having strong links with the RAF, there could have been internal pressure to create a military air force that resembled the RAF, while at the same time there could have been pressure to re-orient the RCAF into a military force. There was no such apparent push from within the RCAF. However, a distinction exists between the two types of pressures - creating a force resembling the RAF would have meant authorizing
NPAAF squadrons, while creating a military-oriented air force did not necessarily mean creating NPAAF squadrons. Whether a shift to an Air Force conducting military operations included a non-permanent force or not, there is little evidence to support either supposition as a cause for the creation of the squadrons.
There is little evidence of what members of the RCAF thought about the contemporary operations of the RCAF or its structure. What does exist is from five decades later when the Official History was being prepared. Compared to the Unification process of 1968, there appears to have been a consensus within the RCAF as to what needed to be done in restructuring the RCAF, as there were no resignations of key 128 people, nor were there any dissenting commentaries written in the Canadian Defence
Quarterly. The only article suggesting that NPAAF squadrons be formed was Howsam's article, which supported forming NPAAF squadrons but it was written before they were created. Howsam's article advocated copying the RAF model by creating non-permanent squadrons, a desire that had died out in 1929, as was noted in Chapter 3 and as will be discussed below.
Efforts at re-orienting the role of the RCAF were occurring in the late 1920s at the same time as the RCAF attempting to form NPAAF squadrons with RAF assistance. In
January 1927, in response to a memorandum from the Militia Chief of Staff, Major
General MacBrien, several senior RCAF officers commented upon a reply prepared by
Group Captain Scott. Scott recommended that the RCAF slowly withdraw from CGAO.
His reasons included the fact that commercial organizations should be encouraged to take on these activities, but more importantly, that CGAO made it impossible for the RCAF to maintain a high standard of training required for military operations. Further, Scott stated that the Department of National Defence had been created for military purposes and that
RCAF participation in CGAO was retarding the development of other government departments with an interest in or requirement for aviation support.265
In response to Scott's recommendation, Wing Commander Gordon indicated that the government should encourage civil aviation and remove restrictions. One such restriction on civil aviation was the RCAF's participation in CGAO. Gordon reasoned that the stronger civil aviation was in Canada, the stronger the RCAF would be.266 Wing
265 DHH 74/272, Memorandum from Group Captain J.S. Scott to Major General J.H. MacBrien, Chief of the General Staff, 18 January 1927, 1-2. 266 DHH 74/272, Minute 2 of Memorandum from Group Captain J.S. Scott to Wing Commander J.L. Gordon, Assistant Director of Air Staff and Personnel. Commander Stedman, for his part, supported the memorandum and suggested that the
RCAF was "not equipped or manned, for its real functions in case of national emergency.
It is merely a training organization for the civil operations, whereas actually the civil operations should be a training organization for the Air Force."267
Three senior RCAF officers in 1927 wanted the RCAF to move out of CGAO and revert to military operations and training. Scott's memorandum, as noted in Chapter 1, recommended that NPAAF squadrons be organized. That neither Gordon nor Stedman objected to the NPAAF recommendation suggests that this recommendation had their support, as they had been given the freedom to provide remarks on the entire memorandum. A similar desire was expressed in one of the fortnightly newsletters sent to the RCAF Liaison Officer in London, written shortly after the Big Cut. The author of the news letter noted: "Most of us are hoping that we will be moving towards a training scheme of definite military training, army co-op., naval co-op., bombing,
fighting, etc;..."269
Unfortunately, no further accounts or statements have been found indicating a desire on the part of RCAF personnel to move out of CGAO activities. Those commentaries that do exist originate from periods much later and are supportive of the
CGAO efforts. Air Marshal C.R. Slemon recalled in 1976 that pilots flying in the late
1920s and early 1930s saw the CGAO as productive - helping open up the north and
contributing both to the development of the military and of Canada. Further, Slemon
267 DHH 74/272, Minute 2 of Memorandum from Group Captain J.S. Scott to Wing Commander E.W. Stedman. Stedman was Assistant Director Supply and Research at this time. 268 DHH 74/272, Memorandum from Group Captain J.S. Scott to Wing Commander J.L. Gordon, and Memorandum from Group Captain J.S. Scott to Wing Commander E.W. Stedman, both 18 January 1927. 269 DHH 181.003 (D232), "Fortnightly News Letter", 31 March 1932. 130 stated that the only means to get funding for the Air Force was by conducting "productive flying," by which he meant CGAO.270 In a similar fashion, Air Vice Marshal F.V.
Heakes agreed that the CGAO aided in the development of Canada and that the pilots were proud to be doing this. Heakes also noted that the RCAF were happy to be paying their way, and in the process gained a "rich and attractive experience." More importantly, Heakes observed that the CGAO was regarded as secondary to military operations and training.271 For his part, Air Marshal C.R. Dunlap also indicated that his peers were strongly in favour of CGAO, although, he notes, most of peers were involved in CGAO. His opinion was that up to about 1936, RCAF officers saw CGAO as primary, but after that date the pendulum swung to the primacy of military operations. This comment has support from the statistics on RCAF flying hours, which as noted in
Chapter 1, were heavily CGAO until 1936.
The most detailed remarks are from Air Vice Marshal G.R. Howsam, in response to the same questionnaire. He indicated that there was some dissatisfaction with the
CGAO role, but that this was "[fjor the most part the same old desk-bound low skilled pilots." The arguments made by these "desk-bound officers," Howsam suggested, were that the civil role caused the RCAF to "sing for your supper" and was "not proper work for an officer and a gentleman." Those in CGAO, he indicated, replied that it was better to sing for your supper than to have no supper at all, and that this created strong civil
270 DHH 77/39, Interview by Brereton Greenhous with Air Marshal C.R. Slemon, 29 September 1976, 7. 271 DHH 77/51; Questionnaire completed by Air Vice Marshal F.V. Heakes for Capt W.A.B. Douglas, 22 April 1978, 6 and 8. The two relevant questions are: 1. "Among your Service peers in the 1920's, was there dissatisfaction with the RCAF's primary civil role? Can you give specific examples of those who opposed the civil role and those who supported it? What were the arguments used?" and 2. "Between 1932 and 1936, what did the majority of your Service peers consider to be the primary role of the RCAF? Did this viewpoint change in the period from 1936 to August 1939? If so, how?" 272 DHH 2004/26, Questionnaire completed by Air Marshal C.R. Dunlap, undated (but after March 1978), 6 and 8. 131 support that was required for a "sound national base for our Air Force." In terms of the primacy of military operations, Howsam noted that this type of flying was "excellent in every way."273
From the foregoing, it would thus appear that between 1927 and 1932 there was a change within the RCAF as to the perception of CGAO. In 1927 senior RCAF personnel wished to move out of the role and into a military orientation; however, by 1932 this position appears to have reversed itself as the value of CGAO was recognized. The possibility is thus slim that the NPAAF squadrons were created because the RCAF desired a chance to move out of the CGAO realm. Pilots involved in CGAO appeared to have recognized its training value and its significance to Canada and Canadian aviation.
Whether this realization of the value of CGAO translated into support for the NPAAF squadrons is very difficult to measure based on the few sources and the death of the key individuals involved.
Howsam's article in Canadian Defence Quarterly
Only one article was found in the period prior to October 1932 in which a serving
RCAF officer advocated the formation of NPAAF squadrons emulating the RAF. In the
April 1931 issue of Canadian Defence Quarterly Flight Lieutenant G.R. Howsam suggested that if the RCAF required expansion, NPAAF squadrons should be formed.274
Howsam also went on to describe the Auxiliary Squadrons in Great Britain, suggesting they provided a useful template. The British Non-Permanent organization consisted of the following:
2 DHH G.R. Howsam Biography file, Questionnaire completed by Air Vice Marshal G.R. Howsam, August 1978, 6. 274 Howsam, "Canada's Problem of Air Defence," 356-360. 132
(a) A Cadre Squadron shall have a nucleus of permanent pilots and mechanics - approximately one-third, which enables it to be mobilized on a war footing more quickly than an Auxiliary Squadron. (b) An Auxiliary (Non-Permanent) Squadron shall have only a small Permanent Force staff, usually a permanent adjutant and stores officer, together with a limited number of permanent mechanics. The remainder of the personnel, both pilots and mechanics, are Non-Permanent.
The British squadrons had proven themselves effective, being fully manned and operationally ready in a short period of time, while participating in national-level exercises. Thus, Howsam suggested that Canada use them as a model and create two
NPAAF squadrons in 1931, followed by two in 1932 and two more in 1933. He suggested the squadrons be created in Victoria, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal and Halifax. These locations were suggested not only because of the defence requirements of Canada, but also because large cities could provide pilots and mechanics.276 At the same time, funding efficiencies could be achieved as there would be fewer wages to pay for the increase in personnel, compared to a similar increase in numbers for the Permanent Force.
Howsam's proposal bears striking similarities to the actual development of the initial and subsequent NPAAF squadrons. The link between Howsam's article and actual events should be considered as strong. Douglas noted in the Official History that it was only in December 1931 that Air Force Headquarters had completed a preliminary review of its requirements for the air defence of Canada, required for the Geneva Disarmament
Conference position paper.277 Furthermore, McAndrew observed that the General Staff was involved in re-organizing the Militia in January 1931. This would signify that
Ibid, 359. Ibid. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 124. 133
Howsam's suggestion would have been coincident with ongoing army planning and
could have been used as a template for the RCAF's eventual plans.
There is evidence that the Canadian Defence Quarterly was a means of providing
alternate viewpoints from within the Army. Harris noted that the Canadian Defence
Quarterly reflected the silent views of the Army of the day as it was technically
independent of the Department of National Defence and provided a means by which
officers could espouse views other than those that were accepted by the Department.
The appearance of Howsam's article could thus have been a means to alert Army to a potential capability that would benefit the Army's restructuring and the RCAF at a time when the concept of NPAAF squadrons had been quiet for several years
The possibility that Howsam's article was used to re-invigorate the idea for the
creation of NPAAF flying squadrons, along RAF lines, should be considered as highly plausible. As a minimum, it was coincidental to the actual planning. However,
Howsam's proposal would not have been the only factor in the RCAF's planning through
1931.
A Plan takes Form
As noted in Chapter 4, in November 1931 Walsh presented Pearson with a plan
for the RCAF's future requirements in terms of strength and later in December for
structure. Planning for such proposals must have been underway for a period of time. It
278 Harris, Canadian Brass, 151. Harris noted that while the CDQ was technically outside the Department it was edited by Colonel H.H. Matthews and Major Ken Stuart, both of whom were to have distinguished careers. Contributors included Commodore Walter Hose, Major General A.G.L. McNaughton, Wing Commander J.L. Gordon, Lieutenant Colonel H.D.G. Crerar, Lieutenant Colonel G.R. Pearkes and Major E.L.M. Burns. This short list is indicative of the quality of the personnel contributing to the journal; however, its influence was probably minimal as Harris also noted that the journal was either preaching to the converted or confirming pre-existing prejudices against the militia. 134 took Walsh six months to prepare the establishment proposal presented in July 1932, so it could be inferred it took him as long to prepare the initial requirements.
Walsh's proposal to Pearson was not, however, the only proposal on the table. Of interest is the fact that in December 1931, McNaughton advised the Minister that seven army co-operation squadrons were required, one for each army division. In fact,
McNaughton had suggested four bomber, four fighter, and four torpedo or reconnaissance squadrons as necessary beyond the seven army co-operation, for a total of
19 PAAF and NPAAF squadrons.279 What McNaughton finally accepted, and what was identical to Walsh's submission in December, was that there should be 13 squadrons: 3
PAAF squadrons - one army co-operation, one fighter and one bomber or reconnaissance
- and 10 NPAAF squadrons of six army co-operation, three torpedo bomber or reconnaissance, and one fighter.280 McNaughton thus had to settle for a one-third reduction of what he apparently originally desired; however, the reason for the different proposals remains unknown.
It would appear that McNaughton had greater plans for the RCAF, especially with respect to the Army Co-operation squadrons. No explanation was found as to why
McNaughton accepted the lower figures presented by Walsh or why McNaughton presented larger figures to the Minister after Walsh had presented his proposal to
Pearson. It is entirely possible that the suggested structure McNaughton presented to the
279 LAC, RG24, Series C-l, Reel T-1769, File 309, documents 000049-59; memorandum from General McNaughton to Minister, "Conference for the Limitation of Armaments Limitation of Personnel of the Air Forces"; 22 December 1931, 1-2. See also DHH 73/664, "The Analysis of the Draft Convention", Annex 2, Form "A" for the final submission for the Disarmament Conference. Squadron Leader G.E. Tait, in a presentation prepared in 1931, mentions that in time of war, the RCAF would provide one Army Co-operation squadron to each of the four Canadian divisions to be sent overseas, one Army Co operation squadron to the Corps, two bomber squadrons and four fighter squadrons. DHH 75/332; Squadron Leader G.E. Wait, "The Canadian Air Services," 1931. 280 LAC, RG24, Series C-l, Reel T-1769, File 309, document 000054. Minister was designed to show that the RCAF was seriously under-strength, and that even Walsh's proposed larger structure was below what was desirable. With only a slight increase required in the PAAF strength, Walsh's "compromise" structure would hopefully make the larger size of the RCAF more politically palatable. It may also have been that McNaughton had separately proposed or even created Walsh's figures. As has been noted, McNaughton had a particular interest in the RCAF and keeping it strong - having a hand in the figures would be representative of this interest.
As it was, the figures presented in McNaughton's and Walsh's proposals in
December 1931 were to change by the time the first proposed structure was defined. On
18 July 1932 Wing Commander J.L. Gordon, Assistant Director of Air Staff and
Personnel, signed the memo outlining the initial structure for the RCAF, a document that was intended for RCAF use. In it Walsh, who had prepared it for Gordon, outlined the roles of the RCAF and the establishment required to meet these roles.281 Three distinct roles were seen for the RCAF: direct or home defence, maintenance of neutrality and participation in an expeditionary force, with the NPAAF flying squadrons involved in all three.
Twelve NPAAF squadrons were envisioned - four fighter, four bomber and four army cooperation. Of these, two-thirds of the force - two fighter, two bomber and four army cooperation - were to be available for the expeditionary force. This left two
NPAAF fighter and two NPAAF bomber squadrons for home defence and maintenance of neutrality as noted in the memo's section on "Home Defence."282 In the articles and books noted above, there are no indications of the NPAAF having multiple roles, as
1 DHH 76/46, "Peace Organization and Establishment." 136 noted in Walsh's plan. In fact, the NPAAF was assuming some of the roles McNaughton had proposed to the Minister for the ideal RCAF structure, suggesting that McNaughton either had some influence in Walsh's plan, or was aware of its contents.
A memorandum of 14 March 1933 prepared for the Minister indicated that because of changes in the international situation, the structure of the RCAF required amendment. The number of Permanent squadrons was increased by two for a total of nine while the number of Non-Permanent was reduced by one to 11, although the figure "11" was reduced to nine in a hand-written edit. It is not known if this edit was added before or after the memo was sent to the Minister, but this number of nine appears to have become the new strength for the NPAAF.
In a memorandum for the CGS describing the RCAF requirements for the "Air
Defence of Canada," the RCAF recommended nine NPAAF squadrons. Notes for this draft suggest that the CGS wanted the three forfeited NPAAF squadrons reinstated. In fact, Group Captain Gordon stated in a note to file that the memorandum on the Air
Defence of Canada was rewritten after discussion with the CGS. Shortly thereafter, in a memorandum of 26 July 1933, Wing Commander Johnson, the (Acting) Senior Air
Officer (as the Director of the RCAF was now named) indicated that the NPAAF would be reorganized to conform to the new plan with the NPAAF consisting of two fighter,
DHH 73/664, Memorandum to the Minister of National Defence, 14 March 1933, 5. The author or signatory of the memorandum is not specified on the document; however, given the language and the editing in the document it appears likely that the memorandum was prepared by Wing Commander Scott to be forwarded to the Minister by General McNaughton. Given the document in footnote 46, it appears likely that this memorandum was never forwarded to the Minister. Supporting this possibility is the fact that page 4, which was to contain information on "aid of the civil power" has only the title on the page, but no text. The nature of the "changes in the international situation" was not specified in the memorandum. 137 three bomber and four army co-operation squadrons, with three squadrons unassigned.
Interestingly, in the text describing the roles of the RCAF, no mention was made of the roles of the NPAAF squadrons.
Two points emerge from this set of documents: that the CGS desired of 12
NPAAF squadrons, but that the RCAF was willing to forego some NPAAF squadrons based on changing circumstances. McNaughton's interest in maintaining 12 squadrons is consistent with the findings of published literature.
The changes in the strength of the NPAAF squadrons, as noted between 1931 and
1933, suggest that the RCAF may not have been as interested in forming the NPAAP
squadrons as previously suggested.285 Changes were made as a result of the re-appraisal of the international situation, resulting in the re-evaluation of the RCAF's proposed
structure. The RCAF may have been leaning towards squadrons to meet a potential threat that would require an immediate response, which implied more Permanent Force
squadrons. Given that there was no direct threat to Canada in this period, and that the
Militia leaders knew this, it is most likely that the possibility of conflict between the
United States and Japan would be the assumption for a potential "immediate requirement" as no other area of actual or potential international situation was noted in
the documentary evidence of the period.
The easy elimination of three NPAAF squadrons in the first draft RCAF plan of
the air defence of Canada cannot be readily explained unless one considers that there may
284 DHH 96/24, Box 1, File 1, Folder 2, "Air Defence of Canada", 4; "Air Defence of Canada", draft dated 3/4/33, 3; notes to "Air Defence of Canada" dated 19 May 1933, note dated 20 May 1933 signed by Group Captain Gordon and "Air Defence of Canada" dated 26 July 1933 signed by Wing Commander Johnson. 285 The proposal to Pearson was for 3 Permanent to 10 Non-Permanent squadrons, for July 1932 it was 7 to 12 and in the draft of 3 April 1933 it was 11 to 9. 138 have been other pressures on the RCAF. These other "demands" on the RCAF would not have been fiscal. If the RCAF were concerned about fiscal restrictions, the NPAAF
squadrons would have been the most cost-effective force and would have remained at the
same number or possibly higher. The elimination of the three squadrons may have been the result of changes in the threat scenario; however, in the face of a lack of
documentation, any suggestions along these lines would be merely speculative.
As it was, the final ratio, which remained in place until the start of the Second
World War, was 11 PAAF to 12 NPAAF squadrons, although three of the Permanent
squadrons had not been formed by the start of the conflict. The change between draft and
final report appears to be the result of McNaughton's intervention, in an effort to ensure a
greater NPAAF representation in the RCAF. The notes attached to the file indicate that
the RCAF was responding to McNaughton's desire to retain 12 NPAAF squadrons.
Further, as noted in published literature, McNaughton had an interest in the NPAAF; the reversion to 12 NPAAF squadrons would thus appear to be a demand the CGS placed on
the RCAF.
A possible reason for McNaughton's interest in the NPAAF is that it provided the backbone of the RCAF's contribution to an expeditionary force, which McNaughton had
been planning since early 1931. hi a letter to District Officers Commanding in July 1935,
Colonel H.D.G. Crerar, Militia Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, made it
clear that the previous structure of the militia was based on home defence. However, in
light of the situation in the late 1920s and early 1930s, home defence was no longer a
problem as there was no threat from the United States. The greatest military challenge 139 was now one of participating "in a major war in support of other members of the British
Empire or, possibly, to implement a decision of the Council of the League of Nations."
To prepare for this possibility, the Militia was planning in 1931 for various contingencies. Defence Plan No. 3, issued 15 April 1931, envisioned Canada sending an expeditionary force in support of a major war involving the British Empire. Defence Plan
No. 4, the first draft of which was presented on 1 March 1932, envisioned Canada sending an expeditionary force for a minor conflict involving the British Empire. This planning was underway at the same time that the RCAF was preparing its estimates of what establishment and squadrons would be required for a peace establishment and for provision to External Affairs for the Disarmament Conference. As the RCAF plans stated clearly that role number 3 was an expeditionary force, coordination between the
RCAF and the Militia was almost a certainty. The four types of roles for the military as stated in the "Air Defence of Canada" plan,288 which was an RCAF document, correspond directly with the four Defence Schemes, and with the exception of Defence
Scheme No. 4 (a minor Empire crisis) are the exact roles that Walsh used in the RCAF plan of July 1932.
Several points emerge from these documents. First, there is no linkage between a threat and the NPAAF, but there is between the scenarios, specifically the expeditionary force of Defence Scheme No. 3, and the requirement for NPAAF squadrons. Secondly, the Defence Schemes do not appear to have been relayed to External Affairs as that
Department would surely have raised an objection that would be found in the
286 DHH 2002/17, Box 125, File 36; "Scheme for the Reorganization of the Canadian Militia," 15 July 1935, 1-2. [Formerly DHH 112.3M2.009 (D46)]. 287 DHH 2002/17, Box 126, File 15; "Defence Scheme No. 4. Organization, Mobilization and Despatch of a Contingent," 1. [Formerly DHH 112.3M2.009 (D64)]. 288 DHH 96/24, Box 1, File 1, Folder 2, "Air Defence of Canada", 4. 140 documentary evidence. As already noted, Defence Schemes 2, 3 and 4 were either prepared or being readied at the same time as the preparations were being made for the
Canadian contribution to the Disarmament Conference.
The overall appearance is that while the RCAF was providing one structure to
External Affairs, they were in reality preparing a second one that reflected their actual requirements and intentions, as well as that of the Militia. In 1935, General McNaughton prepared a review of the defence situation for the Government of Canada in which he highlighted the requirements for Canadian defence.289 McNaughton provided a background to the current state of the Canadian forces, the crossroads for which he indicated had been reached in January 1931, when the League of Nations announced that its long-delayed Disarmament Conference would meet in February 1932. He noted that in Canada, an Inter-Departmental Committee had been created on the instructions of the
Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs and that the Committee prepared and presented a report to the Prime Minister in January 1932. The report was accepted by Bennett and used as the guideline for the Canadian delegation to the conference.290 Obviously, McNaughton saw the preparations for the Disarmament
Conference as a turning point for the Militia and the RCAF.
McNaughton noted that before the Disarmament Conference began, each of the representatives to the conference received a background report that presented the rationale on each of the three services. Of interest is the background McNaughton provided for the submission on the RCAF. Besides indicating that the contemporary state of the Air Force was inadequate, the rationale behind an expanded RCAF was explained
DHH 112.3M2007 (D71), "The Defence of Canada," revised to 28 May 1935. in terms of three roles: 1) co-operation with the army 2) co-operation with the navy, and
3) to defend Canada, for which the Air Force was required to counter threats posed by aircraft carriers and long range bombers. Because of the possibility of a surprise attack, sufficient forces had to be maintained at a high state of readiness. From this assessment, draft figures were derived, which were subsequently presented to the Disarmament
Conference and included 208 officers and 1900 other ranks for the NPAAF.
McNaughton's 1935 statement represented a shift in the rationale for the RCAF, as it referred to the roles provided to External Affairs but it did not accord with the rationale found in RCAF documents of 1932 and 1933, especially that the roles of the
RCAF included an expeditionary force. One possible explanation was that McNaughton knew that the report could make its way to External Affairs, as the document has typed on the front page "Prepared for the information of the Government of Canada, only."
McNaughton apparently knew that the roles provided for the Interdepartmental
Committee and the Prime Minister were deliberately misleading, as he was aware of the various roles noted in documents the RCAF prepared and which he used before the
Minister in December 1931.
The foregoing suggests that what McNaughton was attempting to achieve was an aerial militia. The NPAAF would provide the bulk of the RCAF's contribution to the expeditionary force, much as the Non-Permanent Active Militia would provide the same for the army. The role of the NPAAF was thus primarily support of an expeditionary force in time of war. This was not, however, a point of view that all RCAF officers appeared to share or of which they may have been aware.
291 Ibid, 5-6. It should be noted that Conference representative were advised there was a possibility of a surprise attack, although in reality there was no apparent threat. 142
It is interesting to note that in an interview in 1964, Air Vice Marshal A.A.L.
Cuffe stated that the RCAF had wanted to have the four army co-operation squadrons formed as fighter squadrons. Cuffe states that they were formed as army co-operation because General McNaughton had them formed as such.292 Cuffe's statement appears to contradict the documentary evidence as the RCAF's plan of April 1933 showed that the proposed RCAF structure of nine squadrons included only two fighter squadrons, with all four army co-operation left intact.293 Had the senior RCAF officers desired fighter squadrons at this time, the expectation would be that the number of fighter squadrons would have been left intact. As it was, Walsh's initial structure of four squadrons for each role was retained, while the role of the NPAAF remained primarily to provide personnel for an expeditionary force role.
The future role(s) and structure of the RCAF were not so clear in the minds of some RCAF officers. While McNaughton wanted the RCAF to support an expeditionary force for any overseas adventure, RCAF officers saw things differently.Flight Lieutenant
J.L.E.A. De Niverville, who attended the RAF Staff College in December 1933, provided a view on the role of the RCAF in wartime that suggested a different role. In a presentation at the College, he indicated that in the event of a major war involving the
Dominions, the assumed role of the RCAF would be:
"(i). Provision of reinforcement for the R.A.F. (ii). Coast defence. (iii). Provision of squadrons for a Canadian Expeditionary Force."294
DHH Camp Borden Research File, Folder 3. "Interview of A/V/M/ A.A.L. Cuffe, 6 March 1964," 3. DHH 96/24, Box 1, File 1, Folder 2, "Air Defence of Canada", draft dated 3/4/33, 3. DHH 75/338; Flight Lieutenant J.L.E.A. De Niverville, "R.A.F. Staff College 11th Course, The Royal Canadian Air Force," 12 December 1933, 7. 143
In this case, the RCAF was to provide personnel to the RAF even before it provided squadrons to an expeditionary force, which was not an undertaking mentioned in any of the documents and did not accord with the documentary statements.
Support of the RAF was not a new role, while an earlier statement of the RCAF's role in wartime provided even fewer options. While attending the RAF Staff College at
Andover in January 1928, Squadron Leader G.O. Gordon prepared a precis of the RCAF in which he stated "It is assumed that the role of the R.C.A.F. in war will be to assist the
R.A.F. by providing squadrons or personnel."295 Here there is only one role.
These two statements suggest that within the RCAF there were diverging explanations of the RCAF's primary role. This is further supported by the fact that these were officers who were considered highly capable, as they had been sent to the RAF Staff
College. Even with the roles developed in July 1932, and McNaughton's desired RCAF role of providing an expeditionary force, some members of the RCAF may still have considered support to the RAF as more important than support to an expeditionary force.
From the foregoing, there did not appear to be any internal pressure for the RCAF to create the NPAAF squadrons in 1932. Senior RCAF officers had desired such a plan in 1927, but the intervening five years appeared to have ended that desire. Howsam's article suggests that there was recognition of the RAF model as one for the RCAF to follow if the organization was to expand; however, the statements by RCAF personnel in the 1970s suggest that RCAF personnel were cognizant of the need for civil-oriented
DHH 75/327; Squadron Leader G.O. Johnson, "R.A.F. Staff College 6th Course, Student Lecture: The Royal Canadian Air Force," 18 January 1928, 3. 144 operations as a means of maintaining an Air Force and were not pushing for a change in roles or in creating NPAAF squadrons.
The RAF model was clearly seen as one that the RCAF should follow in creating the NPAAF. However, this model was modified to meet RCAF circumstances. While site selection and formation of the squadrons were similar, the types of aircraft, training and roles were different. These differences were primarily forced upon the RCAF due to fiscal restraints.
Perhaps the greatest influence on the formation of the NPAAF squadrons was
General McNaughton. The foregoing shows that he had an influence on the RCAF's plans. When the NPAAF squadrons were to be reduced, he brought the number back to their original state. Further, the NPAAF had a role similar to that of the NPAM - a formed and trained body to support an expeditionary force. If McAndrew's statement is correct that the Director of the RCAF had minimal influence, the planning for the force had to have higher support, which most likely would have come from McNaughton.
The documentary evidence also shows that there was a dichotomy between what had been described to External Affairs and the Government as the reason for the NPAAF, and the RCAF, and what was used for RCAF planning purposes. Here again
McNaughton would most likely have provided direction when the RCAF misled External
Affairs as to the RCAF's roles. It is unlikely that the RCAF would have been prepared to provide misinformation to another government department unless this had been coordinated with higher levels of command. For McNaughton, he would not have
approved of the RCAF indicating its true roles to External Affairs, as this would have 145 jeopardized his plans for the restructuring of the Militia that included the expeditionary force to which External Affairs would have objected. 146
Conclusion McNaughton's Air Force
The RCAF's Non-Permanent Active Air Force and its successors have played a major role in the success of the RCAF. Yet, despite the importance of the organization, there has been no clear-cut answer as to why the first NPAAF flying squadrons were formed in October 1932. Some texts state that it was for financial reasons, to allow the
RCAF to have a military capability at minimal cost, while others state that it was the result of public lobbying, to generate a local RCAF presence. There is, as we have seen, limited validity to either argument, as these were not the primary factors and were coincidental to the formation of the squadrons. If anything, there were a series of demands placed on the RCAF, some of which played a role. There is, however, only one factor that can demonstrably be shown to have played a major role.
Before looking at each of the demands and the influence they had, it would be worthwhile to review the chain of events. These facts provide a framework around which the various "demands" can be assessed. In 1924, the creation of the AuxAF in the United
Kingdom generated an interest in the RCAF for a similar component. Initially, restrictions on funding prevented such an organization from being created, after which the requirement to fund CGAO created a further barrier. Efforts to create NPAAF squadrons ceased in 1929.
The preparations for the Geneva Disarmament Conference provided a means by which the RCAF could put forward a plan for an expanded air force, including an
Auxiliary. The proposals put forward by the RCAF had the support of Bennett and
External Affairs. Plans for personnel strengths were generated by November 1931 and a draft structure by December. The roles for the RCAF, and justification for the strength and structure as provided to the government, were to be cooperation and training with the other two services and defence of Canada's neutrality and security.
The future plan for the RCAF, prepared by Squadron Leader Walsh and signed in
July 1932, was to have a structure one of whose aims was to provide support to a Militia expeditionary force. Nine of the 12 NPAAF squadrons would be committed to the expeditionary force; however, not all of these nine were army co-operation, as NPAAF fighter and bomber squadrons were also envisioned to support an expeditionary force.
The importance of this expeditionary role cannot be understated as two of the first three squadrons had their planned roles changed to that of army co-operation in opposition to the RCAF plan for the squadrons in Toronto and Vancouver, which called for these two squadrons to be a fighter and a bomber squadron respectively.
Despite the plan to create NPAAF squadrons as detailed in the RCAF submission to External Affairs, there were no actual plans to form NPAAF squadrons in the next
Fiscal Year, 1932-33. The Big Cut of February 1932 was a complete surprise to the
RCAF, although the Prime Minister (in his role as Finance Minister) and the Deputy
Minister of National Defence were aware of the looming slashes. However, the Big Cut did not result in any new demands within or from outside the RCAF to form NPAAF squadrons.
The evidence strongly suggests that it was General McNaughton who applied pressure on the RCAF to form NPAAF squadrons to support his restructuring of the
Militia, as these squadrons would provide the bulk of the air support for his planned expeditionary force. Published works on the military of that time indicate that 148
McNaughton was a strong supporter of the RCAF, while evidence presented in this thesis indicates that he also strongly supported the NPAAF.
It is in this framework that the various demands placed upon the RCAF must be
seen. Each of the potential influences can therefore be evaluated and their actual role
defined. Further, it allows us to eliminate several potential demands as factors in the
creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons.
Public pressure was a possible source of a demand on the RCAF; however, it did not play a role in the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons. The evidence indicates
that while there were minor demands dating back to at least 1925 for the RCAF to create
squadrons in certain locales, these requests had no effect and were not actioned. By July
1932 the RCAF had decided where to situate the squadrons and had solid reasons, based
on the RAF experience, for choosing these locales. The three cities in which the first
NPAAF squadrons were formed, Toronto, Vancouver and Winnipeg, had already been
selected as three potential locations for the 12 NPAAF squadron locations. That this
occurred before public requests were made suggests that public pressure did not cause
any particular location to be selected as the site of an NPAAF flying squadron, but rather
only the order in which they were formed.
There is no support for the contention that a lack of funding was the cause of the
NPAAF squadron's formation. It is important to note that there had been no advance
warning to the RCAF that there would be reductions for FY 1932-33, which would have
allowed the RCAF to plan for this eventuality. Thus, the fact that there was no provision
for the formation of the NPAAF squadrons in the draft estimates for FY 1932-33 strongly
suggests that no NPAAF squadrons were being considered at that time. What can be said about the fiscal restriction demand is that, when combined with the evidence of previous
RCAF planning for the NPAAF squadrons, fiscal restraint played no role in the desire or effort to create the squadrons in 1932.
An alternate explanation is that because of the lack of funding after the Big Cut, the RCAF decided to create inexpensive squadrons to provide military capability, rather than more expensive PAAF squadrons, hence the NPAAF. However, this explanation is not very strong. Budgetary restraint had hindered the creation of NPAAF flying squadrons prior to 1932. If the RCAF commanders were not willing to create and man
NPAAF squadrons before 1932, why would they have been willing to create them in the new era of restraint? If the squadrons had been created to generate a military force at limited cost, then waiting until 1934 to authorize the first squadrons would have been a valid option, instead of forming them on paper in 1932.
The preparations for the Disarmament Conference were not a source of any demands, to use Easton's terminology, upon the RCAF in a manner that would have influenced the creation of the NPAAF flying squadrons. There was planning to prepare a RCAF position for the Conference; however, this would have been required whether or not there was an intention to form the squadrons. What is evident is that the preparations for the Conference provided both the RCAF and External Affairs with a tool to further their own positions. In the case of External Affairs, this was an opportunity to formulate a uniquely Canadian position on an international issue, and hopefully control the perceived military tendency to form associations and quasi-commitments with their
British counterparts. For the RCAF, the Conference preparations were a tool to put forward a proposal for a stronger RCAF. The Bennett government and External Affairs 150 accepted this proposal and with it the reasoning that a stronger air force was required for national security and protection of Canada's neutrality. Thus, two major governmental organizations saw and used the preparations for the Conference for their own purposes; however, the Conference did not present any challenges to the RCAF that would have forced the creation of the NPAAF squadrons.
The Department of External Affairs did not play a role in the creation of the
NPAAF flying squadrons as it did not place any demands upon the RCAF that would have led to structural changes. There is no evidence that Skelton or External Affairs provided direction for a stronger, military-oriented RCAF, although they may have supported the concept, accepting the proposed structure of the RCAF, which included
NPAAF squadrons. The plans drawn up for the Conference would be expected by
External Affairs to be the plans to which the RCAF would adhere in the future and, as such, External Affairs would have perceived a strong RCAF as a requirement for national defence, as exemplified in the roles the RCAF stated to External Affairs - defence of
Canada. External Affairs therefore had no influence in the creation of the squadrons, but did play a role in how the RCAF put forward its plans, which included providing External
Affairs and the government with false statements about the true reasons why the NPAAF squadrons were being created and why the RCAF was being restructured.
The roles that the RCAF described in its own documentation included support for an expeditionary force, to which External Affairs would have raised objections. The three roles that the RCAF used for its own purposes mirror the first three Defence
Schemes, of which Nos. 2 and 3 were completed or in planning when the RCAF was preparing its plans. (The military requirements for Defence Scheme No. 4 - a "minor 151 conflict" - were considered as being integral to the forces required for the other schemes.). These RCAF roles do not, however, reflect what was provided to External
Affairs. With the RCAF coming under Militia command, and the Militia planning its
Defence Schemes, the RCAF would naturally have to follow suit, but also not advise
External Affairs of the plans. This forced the RCAF to mislead that department. This deception was not, however, a factor in the creation of the first NPAAF squadrons, nor was the international situation.
One of the key statements is that of Lieutenant General Maurice Pope, that there never was a threat to Canada. With few neighbours and being far from international problem areas, Canada in the 1930s was unlikely to be threatened by any conflict with the exception of threats to Canadian neutrality. The Militia Defence Schemes could be seen as simply good military planning, and while the first two Defence Schemes appear to have elicited very little in the way of actual preparation, as none was apparently required,
Defence Scheme 3, involving an expeditionary force did receive considerable attention, namely being the basis upon which General McNaughton restructured the Militia. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that international threats were responsible for the creation of the NPAAF squadrons, although conflicts to which Canada might send an expeditionary force were influential.
The requests from Great Britain for support in Imperial Defence played a peripheral role. There was some pressure placed on all the Dominions either to provide funds or commit to providing troops to support any Imperial problems. The Government of Canada resisted such pressures, making no commitments. However, the RCAF and the Militia made plans for an expeditionary force in support of such a potential Imperial 152 request and backed up the plans with restructuring. How much of this was based on respecting British requests and how much on normal contingency planning is difficult to measure. No documentary evidence was found to permit such a measurement; however, the linkages between the Dominion and the Imperial motherland suggest that there was certainly strong support for such contingency planning, especially in the eyes of some
RCAF officers who saw the RCAF's primary role as being to support the RAF.
Imperial linkages had another role to play. Although not so much as a demand from the United Kingdom as an internal demand on the part of the RCAF, there was the model of the Royal Air Force. It is clear that the RCAF modeled itself after the parent force. This was apparent in the nature of the RCAF's training, equipment, and structure, although with Canadian limitations based on the smaller size of the RCAF and the more limited funding that the RCAF had received through the 1920s and into the early 1930s.
The fact that the RCAF was modeling itself upon the RAF, plus the RCAF's interest in the AuxAF provides strong support for the "role model" potential. The desire on the part of the RCAF to create a Canadian version of the AuxAF was powerful and certainly played a role bringing the development of the NPAAF flying squadrons to the attention of the RCAF leadership. However, by 1929, these efforts had waned in the RCAF as the focus shifted to CGAO. Thus, the model was there, some of the desire appears to have remained in 1932, but the financial situation would not allow a duplication of the RAF's
AuxAF, suggesting that the RAF model was simply a model and not the reason for the creation of the squadrons in 1932.
Similarly there may have been a demand within the RCAF for the creation of the
NPAAF flying squadrons. The evidence is inconclusive as the statements indicating 153 there was no demand for the squadrons are from a period over 40 years after the fact, by officers who may not necessarily have been prepared to relate a bad image of the RCAF of the time. What can be confirmed is that up to 1929 some RCAF officers were aware of and wished to duplicate the AuxAF, while one member (Howsam) had proposed this force as a model for potential RCAF expansion shortly before the squadrons were actually formed. Further, reminiscences from senior retired RCAF personnel suggests that they were happy to be flying, even if only CGAO. Thus, if there was a demand in
1931 or 1932 from within the RCAF for the creation of a flying auxiliary, it was not very strong.
If there was one overriding demand placed on the RCAF, it was that of creating the squadrons to support a planned expeditionary force as the main effort of the NPAAF.
General McNaughton apparently was the driving force behind this effort. McNaughton had a demonstrated interest in the RCAF and has been shown to have made decisions about the number of NPAAF squadrons when the structure of the RCAF was being finalized in late 1932 and early 1933. Further, air support of McNaughton's planned revised army divisions would have provided a modern and more effective military force.
Also supporting this conclusion is the fact that the first three NPAAF squadrons were formed as army cooperation squadrons, even though the RCAF plan had called for two of the NPAAF locations not to have a squadron with this role, due to strategic considerations. For the Toronto and Vancouver squadrons to be formed in this role, when they were supposed to be fighter and bomber respectively, suggests that pressure was being applied to have army cooperation given primacy. Coupled with the noted desire of General McNaughton to have NPAAF squadrons and to create an expeditionary 154 force, it is highly plausible to believe that he was also responsible for having the Toronto and Vancouver squadrons change role.
Further, given that the roles of the RCAF included defence of Canadian sovereignty, which was the primary reason given to External Affairs for the existence of the RCAF, one would have expected bomber reconnaissance to have been the first type of squadron created. Any potential threat or problem affecting Canada directly would have to first approach by sea, either crossing the oceans or on aircraft carrier, to which the bomber reconnaissance squadrons would have been the most effective response, either spotting the advancing aircraft or by spotting and attacking the ships. Thus, as the
Army went ahead and planned for an expeditionary force, the RCAF apparently had to support this effort, being a subordinate headquarters, as air support for the expeditionary force was part of McNaughton's plan. While it is possible that the RCAF was only
"playing the game" until funds were available for PAAF squadrons, the RCAF did not use the opportunity to eliminate the NPAAF squadrons when funds did become available.
The over-riding factor in the creation of the NPAAF squadrons, therefore, was the desire on the part of General McNaughton to create an aerial component for his planned expeditionary force. To achieve this end, McNaughton had to hide his true goals from
External Affairs and the government and have the RCAF change its plans for the roles of the first NPAAF squadrons. The preparations for the Geneva Disarmament Conference were the means that allowed McNaughton and the RCAF to put forward a revised structure and increased force size for the future RCAF and at the same time gain the support of another government department for this increase. 155
Despite the lack of funding, the RCAF created the squadrons as an apparent means of committing to the army cooperation role. If the goal had been to have an immediate military capability, the initial squadrons would have been manned from the time of their authorization instead of waiting until 1934 for the manning of the squadrons to begin in earnest. Further, public pressure only determined which cities received
NPAAF squadrons before others on the RCAF list of approved locales.
The initial NPAAF flying squadrons were therefore created as a means of providing support to the planned army expeditionary force. General McNaughton, in his efforts to restructure the Militia, required NPAAF squadrons to provide the air component of the expeditionary force. Just as the Non-Permanent Active Militia would form the bulk of the expeditionary force, the NPAAF squadrons would form the largest part of the air contribution.
McNaughton also made sure that the NPAAF would meet the requirements he had set out for the expeditionary force. When the RCAF had reduced the number of NPAAF squadrons in draft documents of early 1933, it was McNaughton who reinstated the original number of a dozen. The NPAAF squadrons were very much McNaughton's air force. 156
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Curriculum Vitae
Major Mathias Joost was in the Regular Force from 1985 to 1995, first as a naval officer, then as a military police officer. After accepting the Force Reduction Plan, he spent two years teaching English in South Korea, joining the Air Reserve in 1998 upon his return to Canada. In May 2003 he joined the Directorate of History and Heritage where he is in charge of the War (Operations) Diaries program.
Major Joost has been researching and preparing an international operations database for DHH, which will be online soon and will provide information on the more than 400 international deployments and missions in which the Canadian forces have deployed since the end of the Second World War. He has presented papers at major conferences including the annual Society of Military History and has published papers on various topics, including "Western Air Command and the Japanese Balloon Campaign" in the Canadian Military Journal. Major Joost has a B.A. (Honours - History & Political Science) from Mount Allison University (1982), and a B.Ed. (Honours- History & Geography) from the University of Manitoba (2000).