Upper Canada Preserved: the Long Shadow of the Militia Myth of 1812 NATHAN EWEN

60 Upper Canada Preserved: The Long Shadow of the Militia Myth of 1812 NATHAN EWEN The War of 1812 is little more than a footnote in military history for most people around the world, if they are aware of it at all. By the time peace was concluded with the Treaty of Ghent on Christmas Eve in 1814, both the British and Americans were happy to put the ugly affair behind them and largely forget it had even happened. For the British, consumed by the massive challenge posed by Napoleon, there was little to celebrate or remember from the backwater battles in North America. The Americans on the other hand would find a few heroes that would help craft their military identity in the decades to come. Winfield Scott, Oliver Perry, and Andrew Jackson would make names for them, and assign at least a little bit of glory to American arms in a war largely marked by incompetence and failure. The crushing victory at New Orleans and the words of poet Francis Scott Key would be among the few events that Americans would recall from the conflict, generating new myths in the young republic. But for two other peoples, the War of 1812 was a seminal event, forever defining what was to come after. For the First Nation peoples of eastern North America, the War of 1812 was a catastrophe that largely destroyed any hope for peace and self-determination they once had. Largely siding with their British allies, their interests were quickly cast aside during peace negotiations by an Empire that was desperate to be done with the war. Abandoned, First Nations peoples across the continent would be faced with generations of attacks, land seizures, abuse, neglect and marginalization. Many have debated who exactly “won” the War of 1812, but there is little debate that it was the people of the First Nations that lost. Possessing the strongest claim to victory in the War, the people of Canada would come out of the conflict with a very different understanding of its significance. More specifically for residents of Upper Canada, it was a formative event that would ensure the territory was to remain that most quintessentially Canadian of things; not American. While Canadians today are less clear on the wars relevance1, in the decades after 1814, there was far less doubt. Having withstood a number of invasions and attempted conquests, Upper Canada could lay claim to victory after the war, which it would do with enthusiasm. Upper Canada would engage in a process of myth making that would help define the province as a uniquely British, and yet Canadian territory. Central to this story was the promotion of the idea that it was the people of the colony itself that repelled the invaders and thus secured its freedom. This so called militia myth, the idea that it was the citizen soldiers of Upper Canada that 1 Gloria Galloway, “War of 1812 extravaganza failed to excite Canadians, poll shows”. The Globe and Mail. Feb 21, 2013. 61 were the true victors of the war, would become incredibly popular in Canada. By relegating the contributions of British regulars and their First Nations allies to supporting roles, the advocates of this historical revisionism elevated a particular class of British-Canadian colonials (in particular those of Loyalist stock) to an exalted position of prestige. However, it is called a myth for a reason, and the reality of the conflict from 1812-1814 was such that at best one could say the militia played a supporting role, and at worst was a drain on the provinces meager resources. What this paper will seek to show is that prominent Upper Canadian men, often connected to the militia, claimed that it was the citizen soldiers who fought and defended the colony, and in doing so worked to entrench their own positions of power and privilege. Furthermore, by spreading this myth through various mediums such as popular art forms and childhood education, they helped create a new sense of identity for the province that would foster a burgeoning Canadian nationalism. To do this, we shall first assess the militia’s role in the War of 1812, then examine how the myth was created and promoted, and finally seek to place that myth within the context of the new identity in Upper Canada and British North America. As the clouds of war gathered in Upper Canada, the British officer in charge, Isaac Brock, had good reason to be concerned. To defend the whole of the province, he had less than 500 regulars, and the accepted wisdom was that it would be impossible to defend from any serious invasion. Having stationed most of the regular forces in Quebec, instead the British commanders would have to lean on the militia to augment their army in the field. However, the effectiveness of these units as a fighting force was highly doubtful, as they were ill prepared, with inferior training and leadership.2 Even more concerning for Brock, the citizens of Upper Canada was, in his estimation, not people who could be relied on. Initially settled by United Empire Loyalists whose politics were more reliable, Upper Canada had more recently welcomed so called late Loyalists whose fervor and patriotism for the Empire was far more suspect. Assessing the populations enthusiasm for the upcoming war Brock said they were “either indifferent to what is passing, or so completely American as to rejoice in the prospects of a change of Governments”3. Even amongst civilian leadership, Brock was frustrated by a lack of willingness to support the war effort, at least to the extent that he deemed necessary, by the Assembly in the capital at York. Rebuffing his request to suspense habeas corpus, as well as his demand that militia members deny any allegiance to a foreign power and swear an oath of loyalty to the King, the Assembly left Brock to remake the militia as best he could. One of Brock's first initiatives was to reform the militia to make it into what he hoped would be an effective force, by establishing “flank companies”.4 These small “elite” units, drawn from the militia battalions, would be incorporated into the line beside British regulars. By placing them under the command of prominent, and presumably loyal men, and mixing them amongst veteran troops, it was hoped that the militia could better assist in the defense. Calling for volunteers for these flank companies, there was an initial wave of enthusiasm and nearly 2000 men answered the 2 Alan Taylor. The Civil War of 1812. (Vintage Books, New York, 2011) 3 Donald R. Hickey. The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. (University of Illinois Press, 2012) 4 Alan Taylor. The Civil War of 1812, 150 62 call.5 However the question of how would these men fights, if they would fight at all, was yet to be answered. The answer would be found in the earliest stages of the war, when Brock faced off against the American army under General Hull at Detroit in the summer of 1812. Brock found that so many militiamen demanded to go home that he was compelled to allow a significant amount of them to return, and even those he refused would still leave under penalty of a fine.6 The citizen soldiers would however make a good account of themselves in the critical battle of Queenston Heights later that year in the Niagara region. The 1st York Militia would be made famous at this battle, as various final words are attributed to Brock imploring them on. A well know painting of Brock's final moments, “The Death of Sir Isaac Brock” by John David Kelly, features the stirring words “Push on York Volunteers!”.7 While Brock's last words are unknown, if he had any at all, it is true that the 1st York was in the centre of battle and fought well. The militia, when required to, could indeed fight and often well. However, the militia was never available in sufficient numbers, speaking to the lack of enthusiasm on the public’s part for the war. When one considers that this was a war of defense, fighting to repel invasion, Brock's concerns over the loyalty and reliability of the populace seems warranted. Desertion was a consistent concern, and in the months following Queenston absences reached critical levels causing some units to functionally disappear when ordered to parade.8 Just as critical was the issue of obtaining paroles. A common practice amongst armies in the gunpowder age, a parole would be granted to a captured soldier, releasing them on the promise that they would not take up arms again. Amongst the militia of Upper Canada, those actively seeking paroles became a chronic occurrence. After the American capture of York in 1813 for example, paroles were obtained by approximately 1700 militiamen, despite only 300 being present in town during the battle.9 The implication then must be that individuals traveled into York from the surrounding areas, seeking a legal release from active duty. Thus even the civilians who actually enrolled could not be relied upon to fulfill their duties to the Crown. Despite there being thousands of military age men in the province, the British could never muster more than a few hundred in any given district. By the end of 1812, the optimism that followed the initial rush of volunteers had dissolved, and the prospects for meaningful militia support in 1813 were viewed skeptically. Abandoning the flank company system in 1813, the new commander Gordon Drummond reorganized the militia into what was called the Incorporated Militia, offering more incentives for civilians to join.

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